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Political rationality:
Young Danish and Norwegian immigrant citizens and their
political reasoning
Keywords: political rationality, immigrants, political reasoning, young people, students.
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Abstract
This article aims to uncover the dynamics of political reasoning among young
immigrants. How do they people reason about the larger social and political world around
them and what rationalities are in play? A dynamic approach is used to analyze cognitive
functioning. A model of political reasoning combining identities, emotions, and information
is suggested and examined empirically. In a qualitative study the reflectivity of the students
and their willingness to act as rational and responsible citizens is evaluated. Based on a
selection of young Danish and Norwegian immigrant students, the dynamics between the
elements of the model are explored. In the analysis, some identities play a decisive role,
while emotions seem fairly often to be the trigger and the mechanism of political action.
Introduction
Democracy is founded on the idea of the right and the duty of individuals to engage
and participate in the public realm. John Stuart Mill, along with later participatory democrats
like Carole Pateman (1970), pointed out that the community gains, when citizens take an
active part. But also, that individuals grow and learn through their activity. Political
participation builds individual capacities in several ways: Those who take part learn about
their community and society, they develop civic skills that can be carried throughout their
lives, and they often come to have a greater appreciation of the needs and interests of
others and of society as a whole (Schlozman: 2002:437). A long tradition in the social studies,
like in the writings of John Dewey (1916/1966), heralds the philosophic assumption that
political knowledge and participatory skills needed by citizens in a democracy are learned
through practice in school and community. The very idea of a democracy includes public
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participation in elections, decision-making, and public engagement. Democratic participation
distributes power among ordinary people, serves to legitimize decisions in public affairs, and
is a vital characteristic of political culture. The term ‘political culture’ is often evoked in this
relation as it refers specifically to political orientations—“attitudes toward the political
system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system”
(Almond & Verba, 1963:12). Participation, as evidenced either by voter turnout or by other
forms of public involvement, is regarded as a barometer of the quality of democracy in a
country or serves to characterize the political culture in a democracy (Diamond & Morlino,
2005). The political culture of two particular countries, Norway and Denmark, is the context
of the present study, which aims to address how young people reason about their political
involvement. Scandinavian political cultures are characterized by high levels of trust and
participation (voter turnout) (Blais, 2008:623; Newton, 2008). Public debate is free, as are
other forms of organizational and individual participation. However, both countries have
over the last decades experienced immigration both from Western and particularly from
non-Western countries, and the process of integrating new citizens into the prevailing
political culture has to some extent been problematic. It turns out for instance that
immigrants participate less than the Norwegian and Danish majority populations, and for
some immigrant groups, it can be said that they occupy a new lower class (Bhatti & Hansen,
2010; Østerud, 2007). Research has pointed out a number of politically alienating
mechanisms among immigrant youth (Solhaug, 2012). Despite these alienating mechanisms
and the vulnerable situation of this group in a new country, immigrant youth consider
themselves capable of political participation and committed to it. A number of studies have
revealed important insights into how immigrant youth consider themselves politically
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passive overall but at the same time view themselves as politically active in certain contexts
(Kristensen & Solhaug, 2011).
Looking more closely at political participation, citizens need to decide about their
degree of political engagement on a number of topics (Dalton & Klingemann, 2008:9-10).
These topics could be almost anything, such as choosing candidates and parties in elections,
deciding on issues and the position to hold on each, and choosing the means of political
involvement. Citizens approach these decisions in very different ways. Some may pursue
their own personal strategic interests, while others actively use cues or values to make
choices about personal involvement. How citizens choose to participate may also vary
according to which decisions they have to make, the context of political involvement, or
even their own mood. Consequently, we believe that citizens reach decisions about political
involvement quite differently. This article proposes to focus on how immigrant youth decide
on political matters by focusing on their political rationality. The research question is
therefore:
What important dynamics can be traced in how young immigrant students in Norway
and Denmark reason about their political participation?
The response to this research question is an exploration of the dynamics of different
forms of political rationality among students. By clarifying these “dynamics,” predominant
forms of rationality can be identified and situated. Theoretically, students’ reasoning can be
viewed as a cognitive dynamic among their identities, their emotions, the information they
have, and their preferred way of pursuing political activity.
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A selection of 11 Norwegian and 12 Danish students in two secondary schools were
interviewed in late fall 2010. We believe that selecting students across different political
cultures makes it possible to explore a greater variety of students and makes the research
findings more valid. Furthermore, young students in secondary school are in the process of
becoming political because they acquire citizen’s rights to participation during their time in
school. The study of political rationality is highly relevant for the process of political
socialization in which the school plays a significant role. Political socialization may be
regarded as a process by which citizens become integrated into the existing political culture
on the one hand and prepare for openness and political change (being critical) of the culture
on the other (Sears, 1990:90).
Situating the study: previous research
A “word in title” search of “political rationality” in the ISI web of knowledge social
science citation index yields 107 hits from 1970 to present. A large majority of these studies
focus on political rationality as an analytical tool either for explaining political behavior or for
studying rationality in a specific political context. Important early contributions to political
reasoning and development include (Adelson & O'Neal, 1966) and (Adelson, 1971). Studies
of political cognition, schemas, and development which are highly relevant for social studies
teaching include (Torney-Purta, 1989), (Torney-Purta, 1992), (Torney-Purta, 1994), and
(Byrnes & Torney-Purta, 1995).
Sullivan et al. emphasize that research in political psychology has shifted from a focus
on personality and politics to a focus on political attitudes and beliefs and then to political
cognition and information processing (Sullivan, Rahn, and Tudolph, 2002:27). Studies of
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political rationality have been prominent within the field, and rationality models have been
one of the key developments (Sullivan et al., 2002:27). Thus, studies of political cognition
and information processing are considered to be among the latest developments in political
psychology (Sullivan et al., 2002); see also (Taber, 2003). It is argued here that the study of
political rationalities will reveal how people use both an individual and a larger social
perspective when reflecting on their political involvement. Forms of rationality seem to be
dependent on context, which implies that different models may apply in different contexts
(Sullivan et al., 2002). We believe that rationality can be studied as a general phenomenon
among individuals and that identification of a predominant rationality is important and is
likely to occur on many occasions. An overview of rationality models of political decisionmaking is offered by Lau (Lau, 2003). Rational choice models as well as modes of imperfect
information are discussed. However, emotions in particular, or non-consequentialist or noncognitive rationalities more generally, which are analytical categories in the present study,
are not dealt with in the Lau study. A recent study of rationalities and participation has been
carried out by Børhaug (2010). He found that a majority of students find participation
meaningful to the extent that they as citizens are able to influence the outcome of politics
(Børhaug, 2010:132).
Theory – proposing a model of reasoning
Democracy rationalities
The first step in this research is to tie an analysis of political rationality to a
theoretical framework of citizenship. Despite the fact that political participation is axiomatic
to democracy, it is valued rather differently depending on the approach used in various
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models of democracy (Dagger, 2002; Delanty, 2002; Habermas, 1995; Schuck, 2002). In
Schumpeter’s liberal version of democratic participation in elections, competition over
power is most important. In this political context, individual interest and instrumental
rationality prevail. Pateman and other participatory theorists on the other hand argue that
active citizen involvement is a goal in itself, which serves to educate people’s awareness of a
larger collective (Pateman, 1970); see also (Mansbridge, 1999). Habermas, for his part,
emphasizes public deliberation (deliberative democracy) as a particularly important form of
participation to illuminate issues and to form opinions through public debate on issues
(Habermas, 1994; Habermas, 1984). The sociology of Giddens emphasizes that modernity is
characterized by information seeking and reflexivity (Giddens, 1997). In other words, the
way people reason about politics, pursue their interests, and reach decisions may be quite
different. Individuals’ information processing therefore reflects specific approaches to the
role of citizen and also specific perceptions of democracy. The study of political rationalities
may prove, in a larger perspective of citizenship roles, to be an important approach for the
study and may also reflect how people perceive their role in a democracy.
The qualities of individuals’ actions are not simple to determine. Individuals act in
response to the social expectations and demands placed on them as well as the cultural
messages to which they are exposed. Moreover, they reconstruct these in their own
subjectively structured terms (Rosenberg, 2002). Most thinking about social and political life
is structured around two basic perspectives. The liberal institutional perspective (dating back
to classical liberal thinkers such as Locke, Mill, and Bentham) is based on certain core
assumptions, including the following:
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Individuals perceive an essentially objective world around them.
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Individuals have the capacity to reason (they accumulate information and make
calculations and inferences on the basis of experience as part of an ongoing
reflexive and cognitive process).
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Individuals have preferences. Preferences are subjectively held, but objectively
defined. They guide individuals’ choices and motivate their behavior.
Central to this understanding is the ongoing interplay between individuals and
institutions (Rosenberg, 2002), and in a narrow sense, rationality can simply be seen as
intelligent pursuit of self-interest (Sen, 2002). The liberal institutional perspective has a
counterpart in a sociological alternative. In this view, people are not particularly rational in
the sense of being calculating or goal-oriented. To the extent that they reason or that their
actions are actually directed, the underlying comprehension is more likely based on values,
faith, or feelings. In this sense, the structuring force is based on collectivity, rather than on
individuality, which becomes the proper departure point of investigations into social and
political life. This distinction has both ontological and epistemological implications, and
further points about the epistemological implications of this observation will be made later.
This way of thinking is very much reflected in March & Olsen’s work on
political institutions and rationality. They distinguish between two different types of
rationalities for action: a “logic of consequentiality” (actors are motivated by the pursuit of
interests) and a “logic of appropriateness” (stressing the role of identity, moral
considerations, and “reasoned obligation”). This distinction can be regarded as a difference
between instrumental and identity-based or rule-based types of action in relation to political
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institutions (March & Olsen, 2000). The first perspective builds on images of a rational agent.
At the micro-level, it borrows basic understandings from economic theory (e.g., Downs,
1957; Schumpeter, 1946). Action, from this theoretical viewpoint, is instrumentalist and is
based on calculations of returns. In opposition to this approach, March & Olsen propose
what they call the “conventional” or “obligatory” mode of action (which refers to the “logic
of appropriateness”). Political action here aims to match identity to specific situations
(March & Olsen, 2000). In such an institutional perspective, which is also very indebted to
Mead (1934) and the symbolic interactionists, political action is primarily seen as driven by
socially constructed meanings, roles, and rules as reflected in identities and institutions.
Political identity
In identity theory, an identity is a set of meanings applied to the self in a specific
social role or situation. It defines what it means to be a particular person in that role or
situation (Burke & Tully, 1977; Stryker, 1980). Political identity can be seen as a subset of
social identity. The competing social identities offered by superordinate (e.g., one’s national
identity) and subgroup (e.g., ethnic, religious, gender) identities interact in a complex
manner to generate optimal distinctiveness (Brewer & Conover, 2009). In our study, political
identity is seen as how citizens understand and represent themselves in relation to the field
of politics. Still, political identity is a somewhat mixed and ambiguous concept because
political identity-formation processes are often double-faced. For instance, they often signify
an attempt to articulate membership or belonging, while at the same time involving a desire
to define boundaries or to express involvement as well as creating demarcations on certain
issues. Identity involves the process of defining us, typically in opposition to them, a group
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holding different interests and values. Without the adversarial component, Gamson (2009)
argues, the potential target of collective will most likely remain an abstraction, as in the
cases of hunger, disease, or pollution. Identity does not dictate rationalities, but surely adds
direction and depth to them. Consequently, identity gives reasoning a direction and has a
generative capability for political involvement. Much thinking in relation to identity theory
points back to structural symbolic interactionism (Stryker, 1980). Two features that are
particularly important in structural symbolic interaction are “society” and “self”. Society is
viewed as a stable and orderly structure, as reflected in the patterned behavior within and
between social actors. While actors are creating social structure, they are also receiving
feedback from the social structure that influences their behavior. In this way, actors are
always embedded in the very social structure that they are simultaneously creating (Stryker,
1980).
It is assumed here that immigrants and second-generation immigrants are often
caught between committing to values representing a traditional world and to norms of
democratic participation and citizenship. Studying these themes in the context of upper
secondary schools is important because schools can be viewed as a political arena which
stimulates political participation. It is also useful for analyzing the relation between public
affairs and individual interests, which is a point of focus in the theoretical tradition of
citizenship. Political participation research narrowly studies participation itself, whereas the
introduction of the notion of citizenship ideally leads to a wider concept of democracy by
defining citizenship as the sum of rights, duties, participation, and identity (Delanty, 2002).
Citizenship entails both a status side and a praxis side, or otherwise put, a focus on rights
(“objective empowerment”) and on identity (“subjective empowerment”). The identity
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dimension of citizenship makes it possible to focus on actual political participation as well as
a subjective understanding of the individual as a member of a political community and a
participant in democratic processes. Identity is the sum of our perceptions of self and others,
our interpretations, and our attempts to match these interpretations to our social and
political practices.
Emotions
In his analysis of human motivations Elster points to the 17th-century French
moralists who made a distinction among interest, reason, and passion. Interest is the pursuit
of personal advantage, be it money, fame, power, or salvation. Reason relates to the desire
to promote the public good rather than the private good. Passions include emotions and
other visceral cravings (Elster, 2007). Elster argues that emotions matter in their impact on
behavior, and consequently it is desirable to incorporate emotions (such as contempt,
indignation, liking, anger, pride, envy, or admiration) into an analysis of political rationality.
Models of political choice and decision making that earlier were almost exclusively cognitive
have over the past two decades been enriched by incorporating emotion (Mutz 2007).
Political actions presume identities to provide direction for actions, but emotions add
a dynamic element to a given identity. The qualitative dimension of commitment also
reveals the early recognition of emotion in identity theory (Stets, 2009). Stryker pointed out
the intensity of emotions, recalling that emotions are both a cause and a consequence of
commitments (Stryker, 1980).
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Information
People use many kinds of knowledge to form their political literacy, such as
knowledge of political processes and how democracy works; how to get involved in politics
and in organizations; how the media work; knowledge of their own role in society; and other
information. Johnson calls such skills “operative knowledge for civil action” (Johnson, 2009)
and considers them central to the capacity to participate in civic and political processes.
According to Giddens, information seeking and processing are vital parts of modern agency
and that mass media provide basic tools for participation in democratic public life. Modern
social life, though, assumes that new information is always reflected upon in a constant
surveillance of social practice (Giddens, 1990). Reflexivity as ongoing cognitive reflection on
information and as surveillance of present and future action is an integral part of political
participation.
Action
In the present theoretical framework, the notion of action (and inaction) is used
simply to refer to all kinds of political behavior caused by the desires and beliefs of an agent.
Political science is often criticized for viewing political action and participation as a narrowly
instrumental process. However, over the years, other motives for participation have been
suggested by various scholars. Some point to social norms (Coleman, 1990; Elster, 1993;
March & Olsen, 1995), stressing rules, obligations, and an internalized sense of duty to the
wider community. Furthermore, another set of selective incentives is related to “expressive
incentives” or “process incentives” which value participation in the process itself and to the
fact that people participate simply to express their support or to reaffirm their identity
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(Calvert, 2002; Teorell, 2006). Finally, the category of emotions is seen as a generic incentive
driving political action and participation. The conceptual and theoretical framework
proposed is illustrated in Figure 1, which outlines the basic elements: rationalities, identity,
emotions, information, and action. These elements and their mutual relationships constitute
the “dynamic” approach proposed here.
Fig. 1: Cognitive political reasoning.
Rationalities
Emotions
Identities
Information
Action
Finally, Elster’s concept of mechanisms is used in the present analysis to explain
individual reasoning and behavior. A mechanism falls somewhere between the two extreme
positions: the general law and a nomothetic approach on the one hand, and a narrative,
idiographic approach on the other. A mechanism is a specific causal pattern triggered under
generally unknown conditions or with indeterminate consequences (Elster, 2007:36). It can
be recognized, but not foreseen (Elster, 1993).
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Methodology
Twenty-three immigrant students were selected from 2 Norwegian schools and 1
Danish secondary school in middles sized towns in Norway and Denmark. We attempted a
matching sample of students along variables like gender, religion, classes, country of origin
between and participation in schools. However, a sufficiently matching sample between
schools and country in a comparative design and study could not be performed. We
therefore focused on the present research question where the present variety of students
from different cultures and countries is fortunate.
In the first stage of research procedure we discussed the selection of students with
teachers which had recommendations. We attempted to maximize a variety as explained
above. We particularly attempted to include students who were active and outspoken as
well as passive and silent in school. In the second stage of the selection we had to ask
students to volunteer for our study. In this process we ended up with a good variety on
variables like participation, gender, country of origin and classes, but a somewhat biased
sample on religion. However we believe that this (good) variety sample is adequate for a
research question which aims at finding similarities in political reasoning across cultural
variation. ( For selection see Table I.)
Table I. SAMPLE; Characteristics of the study participants.
Religion
T1
N1
Muslim
T2
N2
Muslim
T4 11
N4
Baha’i 11
20
Kosovo
T3 10
N3
Buddhist
10
18
Vietnam
Age
Country of
origin
Gender
18
Iraq/
Kurdistan
Boy
17
Iran
T5 12
N5
Buddhist
12
16
Vietnam
T6 13
N6
Buddhist
13
18
Vietnam
T7 14
N7
Muslim
14
16
Tunisia
Boy
Boy
Boy
Girl
Boy
Boy
15
Year of
Residence
Citizenship
Religion
Age
Country of
origin
Gender
Years of
residence
Citizenship
Religion
Age
Country of
origin
Gender
Years of
residence
Citizenship
Religion
Age
Country of
origin
Gender
Years of
residence
Citizenship
12
12
Norwegian
Born in
country
Norwegian
Born in
country
Norwegian
Norwegian
GS1 15
N8
Muslim
23
Iran
GS2 16
N9
Catholic
23
Tanzania
GS3 17
N10
Orthodox
20
Georgia
GS4 18
N11
Muslim
17
Afghanistan
Girl
Girl
Boy
boy
8
7
5
10
Norwegian
Dk1
Muslim
17
Somalia
Norwegian
Dk 2
Muslim
17
Turkey
Norwegian
Dk 3
Muslim
17
Kuwait
Norwegian
Dk4
Muslim
17
Somalia
Born in
country
Norwegian
Born in
country
Norwegian
Born in
country
Norwegian
Dk 5
Muslim
17
Iraq
Dk 6
Muslim
17
Iran
Dk 7
Muslim
16
Lebanon
Girl
Boy
Girl
Girl
Boy
Boy
Girl
8
9
12
15
8
7
4
Danish
Danish
Danish
Danish
Danish
Danish
Danish
NNK1
Dk 8
Muslim
18
Iran
Dkk 9
NNK2
Muslim
16
Lebanon
Dk 10
NNK3
Muslim
19
Iraq
Dk 11
NNK4
Muslim
17
Pakistan
Girl
Boy
Boy
Girl
Dk 12
NNK5
Muslim
18
Palestine/
Lebanon
Boy
18
16
19
15
18
Danish
Danish
Danish
Danish
Danish
Analytical procedure
The interviews were carried out with quite open ended questions according to the
interview guide in appendix. They were recorded and transcribed. The analytical procedure
started with reading all interviews and looking for varieties and differences in rationalities
and identities. Upon the first reading of the interviews, surprisingly little instrumental
reflection among the students was observed. On the whole, they were strikingly preoccupied
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with norms, values, and appropriate behavior. The students’ preoccupations with
appropriateness led to a focus on rationalities as a key feature of political decision-making.
A second face looked at varieties and differences in reasoning between gender,
religion and participation. However, no particular differences were found in terms of
reasoning elements. From a study of rationalities, we attempted to identify elements in
students’ political reasoning that appeared to be important and also theoretically
meaningful. The theoretical model proposed here (Fig 1) may be considered as a dialectical
interaction between reading the interviews, interpreting empirical elements and theoretical
considerations.
A third stage was to focus on these similarities in the students´ reasoning. These
similarities across such a cultural variety were the most striking finding in our analysis and
lead to our suggested theoretical model in Fig 1. We believe that our model has a basis in
empirical findings and theoretical considerations presented here. As such it is founded in
empirical findings below as well as theory. It may not be generalizable.
Empirical results
Identity
Empirically, identity is a multifaceted and complex topic in which a variety of
global/national, religious, and personal aspects come into play to form political identity.
Among the study participants, religion and belief systems as well as ethnic and national
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origin are important identities that become very relevant when these people reason about
political involvement.
For Muslims, Islam provides an important framework for reasoning about politics. As
one participant stated, “As a Muslim, I believe in paradise and hell. Therefore, my goal is to
come to paradise of course, and the best way to reach this goal is to act as the best possible
human being in this world” (Dk 2). The student went on to explain that the Koran is the
guide to life: “The best way to become the best possible person is to live according to the
book and the life of its founder Mohamed.” This particular student continued to elaborate
on democracy by saying: “As a Muslim, I am against systems of rules created by humans. I
prefer Sharia. A lot of people have misconceptions about Sharia ... but principally when
studying Sharia, you find justice in it.” By suggesting the implementation of Sharia, the
student emphasized that this religion-based belief system should create a new social order
through the laws of Sharia. This was the only student among the participants to claim a
belief in Sharia, but Islam was an important guideline to others, like one young student who
said: “ … I am a very religious Muslim and my religion is important to most of my active life.
If I need to get an answer to different issues in life, I turn to my religion”(DK 4). The student
continued to explain how religious beliefs are related to politics: “When it comes to politics,
things like democracy and how society is supposed to work ... I try to bring in religious
considerations, but religion is not always given the greatest emphasis in decisions.” Both
these students described how religious considerations were important to them and came
into dynamic interplay with other information and reflections. In one way, religious values
seemed to feed a logic of appropriateness. However, “reaching paradise,” as stated by one
of the students, also displayed a religion-based logic of consequentiality which might be an
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underlying drive and motive for political action. A mix of value and instrumental rationality
was also apparent in reasoning about taxes, as expressed by one participant: “I think of
something that can gain my interest like SU (student financial support). I do emphasize taxes
and economic issues that affect me.” The student went on to explain that religious values (a
value rationality) like paying taxes and doing good things to others seemed to be important,
but instrumental rationality was also prevalent in his considerations, particularly on
economic issues. An important point here is what may be termed the legality discourse. In
what way is it perceived to be legal for immigrants to participate in politics? One student (Dk
4) emphasized that when writing articles, one should be neutral to avoid personal problems.
Without bringing up Islam, toward which many Danes might be critical, it is difficult to
participate. Moreover, discussions of foreigners and support for poor countries are
controversial for a Danish audience (DK 4). This student was saying that his political
participation (and that of immigrants generally) needed to be considered particularly
carefully because of their vulnerable situation in Danish society. This was due partly to
language difficulties, but also to what viewpoints are considered legal to have for
immigrants. Consequently, their (students’) religious value rationality needs to be carefully
combined with instrumental (political contextual) considerations and their potentially
vulnerable situation.
A third Muslim student expressed similar views on religion and life: “Yes, I am a
practicing Muslim. Every day I think of being good to others and being a good Muslim” (DK5).
When asked whether Islam is important to her views on politics, she answers, “of course it
is.” She elaborated on this by talking about her choice of political party and how her religion
and her immigrant identity seemed to focus her political interest and participation.
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However, she also voiced her frustration over media stigmatization and focus on Muslims as
potential problems, observations which, as with the previous student, seemed to guide her
feelings about politics. Without a doubt, here the media managed to evoke feelings related
to values and identity. However, she also voiced positive experiences with public debates in
school where she felt respected despite her views. Religious values were apparent in her
expressions and guided her views and their rationality. An important point about the three
dedicated religious participants described above is that certain issues related to religion and
particularly to immigrant status touched on their particular feelings and interests. Although
Muslim and immigrant identities are relatively stable personal elements which guide
deliberation, feelings seem to be trigger points which lead to particular cognitive and other
practices. Religion seems to promote value rationality, but situational factors and personal
goals and motives may call for a logic of consequentiality. The students’ reasoning about self
and society was also a part of the story of their becoming political beings. In their judgments
of self as well as in the field of politics, normative systems played a decisive role in sorting
out various viewpoints.
Still another Muslim student (DK 6) claimed that he knew his religion, but was not
very religious. However, he claimed that the Koran considers work and prayer as almost
equally important to a Muslim. This statement fitted his current emphasis on becoming a
man through work. He also claimed a split and uncertain national identity. Despite weaker
ties to religious and national identity, he held strong normative views on the characteristics
of a good citizen, who according to him should be active. He strongly emphasized that right
now he was very determined to read (in school) and work and to become a man. There was
a strong normative logic of appropriateness in his statements, which may have been
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influenced by his religious and cultural background, but which were not deduced from the
Koran as with the other Muslims. The logic of appropriateness was present in a strongly
reflective attitude. Throughout the interview, he was very outgoing and reflective and
claimed that “I always participate in discussions. I do try to respect others’ political
viewpoints, and I also claim respect for mine.” I think it is important to hear others’
viewpoints because I don’t learn anything if I only stick to my own beliefs. Therefore it is
always good to have conversations and hear other views.” However, when asked about
increased taxes to support the poor, he argued in a fairly instrumental fashion for reduced
taxes. “There is a limit as to how much each person should give to support others... .” The
question of taxes obviously touched upon his explicit life project of becoming a man and
seemed to evoke his feelings (observational protocol). His reasoning instantly turned to a
logic of consequentiality and became instrumental. This Muslim was observed to be much
more open to the prevalent views in his social environment, which reduced his emphasis on
normative religious considerations. A value rationality was apparent, but his openmindedness and reflexivity was equally, if not more, prevalent. This can be seen as a case in
which important religious and national identities were claimed to be weaker, which may
have promoted more reflexivity and openness to society. Two other Muslim participants
who have in common a more secular approach to Islam will now be presented.
The first of these is an Iraqi boy who said, “My religion is important and there are
things that I don’t do like drinking and eating pork. On the other hand, I think Muslims
overreacted in the case of Mohamed cartoons. We could just have ignored them (the
cartoons)!” He continued by saying that he was not particularly interested in politics and
society, but he still had some clear views on social order: “It is important that society works
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properly and that justice prevail. Justice is very important to me!” When asked about
participation in demonstrations, he replied that “yes, I could in some cases participate if
there was something relevant and important, I could do this. Such cases could be justice,
repression of women, or the fight for something important.” Furthermore, the boy claimed
that he would not be persuaded to demonstrate solely because of being a friend to
someone. On the contrary, he would want to decide on participation on the basis of rational
considerations. Two points should be emphasized here. First, when the student talked about
“justice and issues of importance” to him, the interpretation is that such cases are not only
dealt with rationally, but also have the potential to evoke strong emotions. Second, the
student was observed to insist on arguing by means of logic of appropriateness. However,
more instrumental motives might accompany this value logic. We see these emotions
possibly as triggers or as setting the cognitive agenda for consideration and possible action.
A very interesting young Muslim woman was the sole participant with formal political
experience in Youth City Council. “I really liked to be a representative in the council because
we had some influence and we were able to make changes.” The student is a Muslim, but
not religious and does not pray regularly. Her Muslim identity was still important, however,
for more practical issues of life behavior and in her resentment of the Taliban associations
related to Afghan identity. She claimed, for instance, that “In Islam, it is important that you
don’t destroy things, and crime is forbidden, which I think is good.” She also had a positive
reaction to an increase in taxes to support the poor. Furthermore, she emphasized the social
and political responsibility to participate in political and social affairs. “One cannot just sit
there and do nothing while others decide for you!” Her feelings came to the surface when
speaking of issues of particular importance. Throughout the interview, her arguments
22
followed the logic of appropriateness. Although instrumentality was not obvious in her
statements, it might of course still have been there.
Muslims seem to hold a strong identity and also a belief system which may have
many implications for social life. However, other religions like the Baha’i faith also play an
important role, as one student explained (N 4): “In Baha’i it’s important to be a good model
for others, to follow the norms and rules.” “My religion serves as a guideline for practice. It is
a relatively young religion, and its main goal is to promote peace on earth.” The student then
elaborated on how Baha’i adherents meet, discuss, and practice according to their norms
and train for daily life. As for participation, he claimed that an issue would need to be
personally important for him to engage actively. Once again, it was clear that personal
affection is often a prerequisite for participation. The value logic of appropriateness is
prevalent, but personal importance may of course involve instrumental motives. Political
reflexivity was less outspoken than with other participants, but could be traced from his
reflections on daily practices.
One interesting example involved a young mother of a child from the Middle East,
originally a Muslim (N9). When asked about identity, she emphasized that this was her major
problem and that she didn’t know what to say. She explained that she was a Muslim, but not
a practicing one, and never went to a mosque. In terms of national origin, she came from the
Middle East, but is also Norwegian and tries to understand her new social environment. She
said that she likes many things in her Middle Eastern background, but also many aspects of
Norwegian society. She described walking into a church and finding “the atmosphere good
to be in.” Possibly she might try to experience Christianity. She continued: “I have a very
23
different background from here. It is very difficult to relate to all the things going on here.”
“Here it is very different from where I come from.” “It is always a problem for me how to
understand the rules here, what to say, and how to relate to the Norwegian social context.”
In contrast to the other Middle Eastern students, this student displayed a rather uncertain
identity and found herself trapped in the uncertainty between conflicting emotions and
views. “I have few personal interests in social affairs, but I like to watch news on
catastrophes and particularly to see how they manage.” When asked whether anything was
personally important to her, she responded, “yes, particularly on Islam and culture and
things like that, I like to hear others’ opinions.” She preferred to be reflective in a situation
where sorting out different views had become a major issue in her uncertain identity.
It should also be emphasized that all these students, in one way or another, rooted
their reasoning in strong normative considerations based on values and concepts of the
good life. A logic of appropriateness was strikingly outspoken, and a pure and focused
version of the logic of consequentiality was equally absent in these young people’s reasoning
about politics. Their answers and reflections displayed indirectly normative considerations
about what they thought of as a good citizen.
Emotions
This section will focus a little more specifically on the role of emotions in political
engagement. When questioned about what issues were of particular salience to her, one
student responded with crime and the conditions on farms for fur-bearing animals. (In
Norway, there has been strong criticism of living conditions for fur-bearing animals on
farms). Furthermore, she liked to support the protection of polar bears, work against drunk
24
driving, and perform charitable work. Emotions are hard to read, but are often easier to
experience when listening to an interview (N 5). Likes, dislikes, and indignations are triggers
which direct attention to issues.
It was previously pointed out that interest reflects the pursuit of personal advantage.
However, when people express political interest, they may also refer to their likes and to a
more personal involvement: their fascination with something. One of the students clearly
stated that “If issues interests me, I may participate; if not, I will not get involved” (N6). This
student elaborated on personal interests in a way that may involve interest as a pursuit of
advantage. However, we are inclined to think that “interest” also involves an emotional
component of liking and disliking as well as other emotional aspects. It should therefore
follow that when students voice their personal interests, they also display emotions about
their more general personal involvement. This is important because in the authors’ opinion,
these emotions guide students to further reading, participation of some kind, or personal
reflections. Emotions may therefore become mechanisms in political action. The role of
emotional involvement was particularly clear for one Norwegian female student, who said,
“If I am going to participate, I really have to ‘burn’ for it.” This student strongly emphasized
that her personal political involvement had to be rooted in something deeply felt.
The Israel/Palestine question, conflicts, injustices, and issues of subversion were
mentioned by many students as sources of emotions and political engagement. A
Vietnamese student explained, “I remember participating in a demonstration about Gaza.” “I
felt like supporting students from this origin.” This student claimed that he was not
particularly interested in Middle Eastern countries, but that Gaza was special to him because
25
it involved people that he knew. He then elaborated further: “I need to be personally
involved to get the extra kick for participation” (N 7). This student appeared to point (among
other things) to his emotional involvement as decisive for his political participation. Such an
emotional precondition was quite clear in the last example presented here. A student was
asked about the importance of personal involvement in her decision to participate. She
responded, “If I go to town and I find something annoying to me, or if I don’t like something,
I walk over and tell people that it is not right.” “So if things really matter to me I tend to take
action.” We believe that this statement displays the role of emotions in political action for
many. Some degree of emotional involvement tends to direct attention, to fuel interest, and
sometimes to be the trigger for political participation.
Information – reflexivity
The reflexivity of the students was apparent and has already been noted. The point
has also been made that religious secularism may accompany a more outspoken reflective
attitude. This section will elaborate a little more on reflectiveness. The participant under
consideration is a young student from the Middle East who does not yet have any party
preferences for voting. “I will have to study (the parties and options) carefully to make a
choice… I can’t just vote for something I don’t know anything about! I will sort out my
preferences by reading.” This reflexivity was quite apparent in the words of another
informant: “I do value discussions, and I considered joining a political party. However, I
haven’t studied them (political parties) all yet, but I think my preferences are somewhere in
the “Red Alliance” (cluster of four parties).” A third young Somali explained that his parents
vote for the Socialist party, but that he himself wanted to have his own opinion. “Therefore I
26
sit down to read, not the most extreme right-wing parties, but I do consider the leftists
(three/four parties).” He continued by explaining that it is important to be informed about
society and that this may also be important in life. More examples could be presented, but
suffice it here to say that the thorough reflective inclination by these and other immigrants
displayed a striving towards the identity of an informed and responsible citizen. All the
participants seemed to take responsibility for making inquiries and preparing themselves for
rational and informed choices. The forms of rationality may be based on values, identities, or
simply instrumental pursuits.
Discussion
This article has proposed a dynamic model of political reasoning in which individuals
combine identities, emotions, and information in different forms of rationalities. These
elements (identity, emotions, and information) all seem to play a role in the reasoning of the
informants, but in quite different ways. For some dedicated religious students, the norms of
religion seem to be the major starting point for their reasoning. For others, information,
emotions, or both are the triggers that move them forward. Situational factors may also
come into play and generate reasoning about political affairs. The dynamics of the proposed
model therefore involve interplay among the elements as well as the weights given to
normativity, emotions, and information by each particular individual. The forms of
rationalities are expressed in the students’ reasoning about politics and in their political
involvement.
Empirically, for most of the participants, the identities which they expressed in
politics played an important role in how they viewed and anticipate their political
27
involvement. In particular, Islam and the Baha’i faith lent a high degree of normativity to
students’ political reasoning. These identities often seemed to be a starting point for rational
reflections, or they might instantly come into play when triggered by particular issues and
emotions. The rationalities were often influenced by normativity and were value-based.
However, a religious (or other) logic of consequentiality might also have been present, but
without manifesting itself. However, less religious Muslims and others used concepts of
normativity to build an identity which might take the form of a civic and political identity. As
pointed out earlier, the students also displayed strong and weak identities which might have
very different consequences for their rationalities and how they perceived and related to
politics. Here, it should be emphasized that much of the students’ reasoning took the form
of a search for normativity in response to questions such as what would be the appropriate
thing to do in particular situations or how do I see myself as a citizen. Regardless of which
identity is active in a particular situation and the strength of each, strong support has been
found for the authors’ belief that how people see themselves with respect to their identities
nearly always matters in their political life. Although issues appear and disappear, identities
are somewhat stable and may provide a basis for political orientation, information-seeking,
and rationalities. It also seems that strong religious beliefs tend to promote a logic of
appropriateness and reduce the importance of a logic of consequentiality.
As shown in the empirical analysis presented here, the various forms of rationalities
are difficult to capture. In a logic of appropriateness, there might be instrumental motives
which are empirically hard to uncover. Despite this uncertainty, the informants in this study
were found to use the logic of appropriateness much more than instrumental rationality in
their explicit statements. Sometimes the logic of appropriateness is combined with
28
reflexivity. However, much civic normativity was found across very different identities. This
phenomenon can be interpreted as young people striving toward a social, civic, and political
identity.
Furthermore, some support has been found for including emotions as a vital part of a
model of political reasoning. In the interviews described here, young people expressed the
view that they might turn to political action because certain issues were salient and
meaningful to them. Sometimes they voiced their emotions directly and explained how they
are related to issues and information. It is apparent that issues of particular salience touch in
one way or another on their emotions. These emotions direct attention to information and
issues of particular salience to a person, as well as being triggered by these issues. Emotions
are triggers and can make people take action in their lives. They are closely related to
identities in a two-way relationship. It is argued here that emotions should be part of a
political decision-making model because they often play a decisive role in political reasoning.
However, some people are labeled as “emotional,” while others are labeled as cool or calm
(less emotional). Still, it is apparent that emotions play a role in political reasoning and
orientation for most people.
Many of the students interviewed voiced the opinion that they turn to informationseeking when they feel uncertain. They also value discussions and reflexivity, which for many
become an integral part of opinion formation and political involvement. It should be
particularly emphasized that many of these students seem to act very rationally in their
search for information to become “enlightened citizens.” This reflexivity and the information
29
they obtain then take part in a dynamic interplay with identities and emotions. Information
thus completes the proposed model of political reasoning.
Conclusions
The process of developing the model proposed here has been both theoretical and
empirical. In the interviews conducted in this study, strong support was found for the model
as a dynamic framework of reasoning. One conclusion from this discussion is therefore that
the model presented here is supported both theoretically and empirically. This is the major
response to the research question posed earlier.
However, in response to the dynamics of reasoning, two more specific conclusions
can be added. The first is that these young people display a high degree of normativity in
their search for appropriateness during their reflections on civic and political life. None of
the students emphasized a purely instrumental and overtly egotistical approach to political
involvement.
Second, many students explicitly voiced the need for information as a basis for their
decisions on civic involvement. In this, they were acting as rational, enlightened citizens. This
is an encouraging finding for democracy.
As pointed out in the methodological section more research is needed to confirm or
change this model, which may not be generalized. However, we believe that the model may
be fruitful as a basis for research and also a guide for teaching. As a final act we would like to
suggest some careful school implications.
30
First of all in student’s process of becoming political they need to wrestle with issues
of salience which may evoke emotions and engagement. Important issues are a prerequisite
for “self-experience” of emotions and basis for reflections and possible participation. Second
we want to emphasize a positive and open classroom climate for discussion. The social
exchange of viewpoints in a civilized manner is of greatest importance for the stimulation of
reflections of self and society.
Appendix - interview guide
Students were asked to elaborate on the following topics:

How they see themselves as citizens

Students participation, socially, politically

Participation in New-Media

Organizational membership

Political engagement

Political issues

Political identities – what’s important to students

Political skills

Political rights and responsibilities

Conceptions of democracy

Social trust

Schools role and importance in political education

Participation in school
31

Political trust and self confidence
32
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