Presentation at the National Endowment for Democracy
May 24, 2007
By Chito Gascon
Executive Director – LIBERTAS
Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow

CONTEXT
Historical & strategic
Current conjuncture
Nature of Philippine elections
CONFIGURATION / CONDUCT
Balance of political forces
Issues raised
Outcomes, trends, and flashpoints
CHALLENGES / CONSIDERATIONS
General observations and conclusions
Scenarios and directions
Policy recommendations

January 2007
These coming elections in May 2007 are especially important. Many of our current political problems, which have hindered fuller economic development and social justice, especially for the poor, can be traced to unresolved questions
concerning the conduct of past elections. As a nation, we cannot afford yet another controversial exercise that further aggravates social distrust and hopelessness.”

85M people in 7K islands in South-east Asia (10 major languages)
350 years of Spanish rule
American rule during the 1 st Half of the 20 th century
Prior to & immediately after WW2 a r epublican system was put in place patterned after the USA
Widespread poverty, inequality, and injustice
Internal armed conflicts
Authoritarian rule (1972-1986)
1986: Transition to democracy
One of the few democracies in the region

1997: Asian Financial Crisis
First Major Push for Charter-Change (CHACHA)
Top-down
Perceived as an effort for perpetuation of power
1998 Presidential Elections
Rise of a populist candidate
Resurgence of Marcos-style politics and persons
Bad governance, scandals, corruption
2001: ’PEOPLEPOWER’ Revolt
(EDSA2)
Reform-oriented BUT elite-driven

EDSA2
Elite-driven, urban-based middle class support
Promise for reforms (rhetoric rather than reality)
The Rupture of the Constitution
Truncated impeachment process
Re-politicization of the security forces
The role of the judicial system
Deep Political Cleavages
Mass Riots – EDSA3
Oakwood Mutiny / EDSA 20 Mutiny
Resurgence of rebel activity

Notwithstanding the political divide, the 2004 national elections were seen as a
to ultimately resolving the impasse
The crisis of LEGITIMACY from 2001 was aggravated by revelations of widespread electoral fraud from the 2004 elections, which only
came to light in 2005, in the
wake of the Hello Garci Scandal

Chronic Political Crisis
Moves to remove Arroyo (legal & illegal)
Counter-moves to consolidate power
Transactional politics & patronage
CHACHA Redux
Attempt to cancel elections
Polarization
Intimidation of the media
Human rights violations
Crackdown on the opposition

Upper Chamber – The Senate
HALF of 24 members
Elected at a national level
Dominated by opposition parties with only 4 seats from the administration remaining in the Chamber
Lower Chamber – House of Representatives
ALL seats (MIXED SYSTEM: 80% SMD + 20%MPL)
13 th Congress – 236 / 14 th Congress – 265
Dominated by administration parties; only 32 seats currently held by opposition parties
ALL Local Government Positions

45 million voters
224,748 precincts (around 200 voters each)
Voter fills out a blank ballot with possibly up to 33 names to write manually
Counted manually at the precinct, recorded in an election return, tabulated at the municipality/city in a certificate of canvass, then
tabulated at the province, then
tabulation at the COMELEC

Number of Registered and Actual Voters (in millions), 1992- 2007
Election
Registered Voting Percent
May 2007/ projected
45.060
33.795
75.0
May 2004*
May 2001
43.536
36.148
35.414
27.574
81.4
76.3
May 1998*
May 1995
May 1992*
34.117
36.415
32.141
29.474
25.736
24.255
86.4
70.7
75.5
* Presidential, Congressional, AND Local Elections
Source: 2005 National Statistical Coordination Board Statistical Yearbook.

Distinct but interrelated markets:
• National market for senators
• Local markets for congressmen with national consequences
• Purely local markets for governor, mayor, and local council members

The Party Groups
ADMINISTRATION - TEAM Unity (5 Parties)
OPPOSITION – The GO (5 Parties)
INDEPENDENTS
• Re-electionists / Returnables / Stars
• AKP
• ‘KBL’
The Administrative Agencies
COMELEC
Deputized agencies
The Non-Partisan Citizens’ Monitoring Efforts
Churches
Schools & universities
Business & professionals
Civil society
Media

The Lingering Question of Legitimacy
Truth about 2004 results
CHACHA 3
The Economy
Moving on
Social payback
Social Issues
Poverty and hunger
Access to education, health & housing
Corruption / Public Accountability
Political Finance
Extra-Judicial Killings & Disappearances
The Politicization of Security Forces
The Party-list System
Political Dynasties
‘Moral Politics’

No substantial improvement in the administration of the election
Problems with voter’s lists (reports of padding / other irregularities)
Widespread Incidences of fraud (retail/wholesale)
Weakness in enforcing election laws (campaign finance/others)
Rejection of some political dynasties & consolidation of others
Election-related violence
Politicization of security forces
Proxy wars and iconic b attles
Emergence of a new generation of national leaders

(continued)
The senate vote as barometer of public sentiment
Exit polls & counts show unequivocal opposition victory
YET, results remain in doubt because of vote manipulation
[8-2]-2 /[ 8-1]-3 / [7-2]-3 / [7-1]-4 / [6-2]-4
UNLESS ‘Magic’ happens
Paradox: virtual hegemony of the ruling coalition at the local level YET the failure to deliver votes in the senate
80% win for the ruling parties in the House (at least 70 districts uncontested)
The so-called COMMAND vote (a myth except in the ARMM)
Some cracks in the façade of unity (LAKAS vs KAMPI)
Marginal gains for opposition forces in the House

Unfolding Electoral Scenarios:
MASSIVE CHEATING
MODERATE CHEATING
TOLERABLE CHEATING
Post-Election Governance Scenarios
Legitimacy issue may linger BUT possible resolution would be through a utilitarian strategy (neither through democratic or revolutionary means)
Crossroads: 1) gridlock or 2) workable compromise on some issues
For things to move forward, the government must accept the results

Building Foundations for the Next Government
Critical to sustain economic growth and reduce public desperation
Initiate credible political, electoral, and administrative reforms to reduce imperfections in the political process and ensure credible elections in 2010 that help return stability
Alternative Attitudes to the Result:
Best outcome
• Administration focuses on reforms rather than survival
• Administration agrees to compromise for the common good
Worst outcome
• Administration views its partial win as endorsement of its policies
• The rebuke of administration intensifies the political hostilities

Complete full automation of elections ahead of 2010
Further reduce opportunities for human intervention / human error in the counting & tabulation process
Separate election adjudication & election disputes resolution from elections management functions
Improve the capacity of the COMELEC
Enforce election laws fully (particularly on campaign contribution & expenditure) coupled with a vigorous anticorruption effort
Support civic-ed /voters ed / citizen’s oversight
Initiate law reform legislation (party law / political finance)
Rationalize the mobilization of election officers to include citizen volunteers
Create civilian oversight & control over security forces

In order to renew civic engagement in defense of democracy:
 Some key principles to this political engagement
 Consider programs and activities at laying foundations for the restoration of a consensus for democracy through among others: in the run-up to the 2010 General Elections
 Restoring full credibility to the electoral process
 Cleaning-up the institutions and systems for election administration

Political party development, strengthening, and consolidation
 Alternative candidates emerge with distinct visions of governance
 Preventing a blow-out of the economic situation in the interim period
 Spreading the benefits of economic growth
 Pursuing reform agenda in social expenditure (education, infrastructure)
 Reducing drivers of political polarization such as violence and exclusion

Point estimates of senatorial preferences from exit poll, and projected actual votes and difference from threshold (in millions)
Projected Difference from
Candidate Coalition Percent votes threshold Minimum Maximum
Legarda
Escudero
Villar
Lacson
GO
GO
GO
GO
58.5
53.3
49.8
46.4
19.770
18.013
16.830
15.681
8.178
6.421
5.238
4.089
18.856
17.014
15.842
14.705
20.684
19.012
17.818
16.657
Pangilinan
Aquino
Angara
Arroyo
Trillanes
Zubiri
Honasan
Ind
GO
TU
TU
GO
TU
Ind
Recto
Cayetano
Pichay
Pimentel
TU
GO
TU
GO
Roco
Defensor
GO
TU
28.4
28.2
Sotto TU 26.2
Note: Sample population is 10,620 actual voters from 79 provinces.
Source of basic data: May 14 Pulse Asia exit polls, www.abs-cbnnews.com
34.3
31.0
30.4
28.5
44.6
42.6
41.1
36.8
35.4
34.9
34.6
11.592
10.476
10.274
9.632
9.598
9.530
8.854
15.073
14.397
13.890
12.437
11.963
11.794
11.693
0.000
-1.115
-1.318
-1.960
-2.839
-2.061
-2.737
3.481
2.805
2.298
0.845
0.372
0.203
0.101
10.660
9.559
9.359
8.725
8.691
8.625
7.958
14.103
13.434
12.932
11.495
11.028
10.861
10.761
12.523
11.394
11.189
10.538
10.504
10.436
9.751
16.042
15.359
14.847
13.378
12.899
12.728
12.626

Point estimates and projected votes (in millions) with adding preferences for ‘Cayetano’
Candidate Coalition Percent Projected votes Additional votes
Arroyo
Trillanes
Zubiri
Honasan
Recto
Pichay
Pimentel
Roco
Defensor
Sotto
Legarda
Escudero
Villar
Lacson
Pangilinan
Aquino
Angara
Cayetano
TU
TU
GO
GO
TU
GO
TU
Ind
TU
TU
Ind
GO
TU
GO
GO
GO
GO
GO
34.3
30.4
28.5
28.4
36.8
35.4
34.9
34.6
28.2
26.2
44.6
42.6
41.1
38.0
58.5
53.3
49.8
46.4
12.437
11.963
11.794
11.693
11.592
10.274
9.632
9.598
9.530
8.854
19.770
18.013
16.830
15.681
15.073
14.397
13.890
12.842
+ 2.366
Difference from threshold
8.077
6.320
5.137
3.988
3.380
2.704
2.197
1.149
0.743
0.270
0.101
0.000
-0.101
-1.419
-2.061
-2.095
-2.163
-2.839

A Need to Foster Trust in Democratic Process
Elections and election administration
Democratic institutions (parties and parliaments)
Democratic processes (oversight and rule of law)
A need to renew and reinvigorate civic engagement in politics (partisan and non-partisan)
Defend, deepen, and widen the political space for effective participation
Develop and support democratic leaders
Nurture and strengthen constituencies as well as energize communities for sustained advocacy of political and social reform

Develop parties based on principles, not persons
Legal framework that provides incentives and disincentives
Ensure transparency, accountability, and internal organizational democracy
These reforms will:
Attract sustained support from broad constituencies
Secure adequate funding
Develop capable mechanisms and machinery for public policy
Build a cadre of credible leaders, candidates, professionals, and networks