Venezuela QPQ Negative — HSS 13
Please note: in order to facilitate good debates over this affirmative, you shouldn’t read the China SOI DA,
Diplomatic Engagement PIC, or Ambassador CP as a set of affirmative answers have not been released.
http://www.economonitor.com/blog/2013/07/venezuela-and-iran-the-end-of-the-affair/
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-fraying-iran-venezuela-alliance-6603
"iran" "venezuela" "state department"
The United States federal government should
pressure Venezuela to implement election reforms by publicly and privately stating that attempts to
suppress or intimidate the opposition violates the Venezuelan constitution and Inter-American Democratic
Charter
demand free, fair and verifiable Venezuelan elections
work with regional partners including—but not limited to—Brazil, Canada, Colombia and Mexico to
encourage Maduro’s government
The United States federal government should offer full diplomatic relations towards Venezuela if and only if
Venezuela ends ties to international terrorist groups and rogue regimes, ensures future elections are held as defined
by Venezuela’s constitution and the Inter-American Democratic Charter, and cooperates with the U.S. and regional
partners to combat illicit narcotics trafficking in the Western Hemisphere.
Off Case
Venezuelan Politics DA
1NC
Democratic Transition coming, but at crossroads. Any US involvement fails and empowers
anti-US forces.
Spetalnick ‘13
Matt Spetalnick – White House correspondent who has covered news on four continents for Reuters, from Latin American coups and drug wars –
Reuter’s – March 6th, 2013 – “Despite new hopes, U.S. treads cautiously after death of Venezuela's Chavez” –
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/03/06/uk-venezuela-chavez-usa-idUKBRE92504920130306
Washington's challenge will be to figure out how far to go in seizing the opening to engage with
Venezuelan leaders as well as its political opposition without giving the impression of U.S. meddling following the
socialist president's death after a two-year battle with cancer. "We're not interested in having a confrontational relationship with Venezuela," a
senior U.S. official told Reuters. "We're going to have to see how things evolve. It's a dynamic period." For Washington, a major test will be
whether Venezuela follows its own constitution - which has been widely interpreted to require a special election to pick Chavez's successor - and
if such a vote is conducted in a free and fair way in "accordance with hemispheric norms," the official said. Washington had accused Chavez and
his allies of electoral abuses, such as intimidating foes and misusing state media during his 14-year rule. Chavez had created headaches for
successive U.S. administrations with his strong anti-American rhetoric and his alliances with some of Washington's main foes, including Cuba
and Iran. The question now is whether his leftist "revolution" and incendiary foreign policy can live on without his dominant personality at the
helm. In a normally divided Washington, Chavez's death brought a rare moment of bipartisan agreement, with Republicans and Democrats alike
seeing it as a chance to turn a page after a long period of strained U.S.-Venezuelan ties. "Hugo Chavez was a destabilizing force in Latin
America, and an obstacle to progress in the region," said Mike Rogers, a Republican from Michigan and chairman of the U.S. House of
Representatives intelligence committee. "I hope his death provides an opportunity for a new chapter in U.S.-Venezuelan relations."
"Hopefully
there will be a peaceful transition of power in Venezuela with real, meaningful
democratic reforms," U.S. Senator Bill Nelson, a Democrat from Florida, said in a message on Twitter. OBAMA'S NOT-SOSUBTLE MESSAGE Obama called it a "challenging time" for Venezuela and - in a measured but not-so-subtle message to Vice President
Nicolas Maduro, Chavez's preferred successor - said the United States "remains committed to policies that promote democratic principles, the
rule of law and respect for human rights." Taking the chill off the relationship between Washington and Caracas will not be easy. Recent U.S.
efforts to improve long-dormant cooperation in areas like drug interdiction and regional security were favourably received at first in Caracas but
ultimately failed to yield any real progress, the senior administration official said. And Washington was quick to reject Maduro's accusations,
made just hours before his announcement of Chavez's death, that the United States had been engaged in a conspiracy against the president and
Venezuela. "Their statements and actions today call into question their interest in having a functional and productive relationship with the United
States," the official said. Chavez, who took on Cuban leader Fidel Castro's role as Latin America's most vocal critic of Washington, accused the
United States of pursuing imperialist policies in the region as he used Venezuela's oil wealth to bolster leftist allies. As for whether Washington
hoped to see Venezuela move away from its alliance with communist-ruled Cuba, the U.S. official said: "That's up to them to determine who their
partners are." But the official added that Washington has not hesitated to make known its displeasure when "there were relationships with actors
of concern." U.S. officials had contended that Chavez' rule eroded democratic freedoms in Venezuela and he went too far in concentrating power
in his own hands. But any
overt U.S. effort to intervene in Venezuela's politics now would almost
certainly backfire, and possibly harm the anti-Chavez opposition. "It is a delicate time. I think
the United States needs to be very patient and not become a factor internally in a way that ...
could become negative," said Arturo Valenzuela, the U.S. State Department's top official for the Western Hemisphere from 2009 to
2011.
Maduro stands on crossroads – his perceived political success is key to check narcogenerals. That causes internal meltdown.
Noriega ‘13
Roger F. Noriega was ambassador to the Organization of American States from 2001-2003 and assistant secretary of state from 2003-2005. He is
a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute – “Venezuela elections may stir things up” ” – InterAmerica Security Watch – April 13th,
2013 – http://interamericansecuritywatch.com/venezuela-elections-may-stir-things-up/
As I noted after Chávez’s death last month, Venezuela is a country on the verge of a socioeconomic
meltdown. Street crime, power outages, and shortages of food and consumer goods trouble the lives of millions of citizens. The government
is running a dangerous fiscal deficit; mismanaged social programs are unsustainable. State revenues are down dramatically because the state-run
oil company – packed with political cronies and plundered by Chávez to fund pet projects – is producing far less oil than it was 15 years ago. The
regime has forfeited its legitimacy as senior officials are complicit with drug trafficking and terrorism. And the shameless intervention of Havana
to manage the chavista succession has stirred anger among nationalists in Venezuela’s once-proud military. Confronting
these
challenges without Chávez at the top of the ticket, the regime has exploited every unfair advantage to
engineer a convincing victory. Although the chavista leadership has closed ranks around
Maduro, their confidence has to have been shaken by his buffoonish performance – claiming to chat with Chávez
through a little bird circling over his head, for instance, or clumsily mimicking the antics of his charismatic predecessor. Even if the
chavistas decide to steal an electoral victory for Maduro, after the election, the narcogenerals led
by National Assembly president and ruling party chief Diosdado Cabello
will second-guess Maduro as he tries to run the
country . Cabello considers himself a much more able administrator, and he has a bitter distrust of the Cubans who appear to be
micromanaging Maduro and his campaign.
If Venezuela slips into a narco-state, it turns each case advantage.
Noriega ‘12
Roger F. Noriega was ambassador to the Organization of American States from 2001-2003 and assistant secretary of state from 2003-2005. He is
a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute – TESTIMONY¶ OF¶ AMBASSADOR ROGER F. NORIEGA¶ BEFORE THE¶ UNITED
STATES¶ HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES¶ COMMITTEE ON¶ FOREIGN AFFAIRS¶ SUBCOMMITTEE ON¶ TERRORISM, NON¶ -¶
PROLIFERATION AND TRADE¶ “¶ Hezbollah’s Strategic Shift: A Global Terrorist Threat¶ ”¶ 1:30 PM, Wednesday,¶ March 20¶ , 2012 –
http://www.aei.org/files/2013/03/20/-hezbollahs-strategic-shift-a-global-terrorist-threat_134945797264.pdf
Some may assess this¶ cooperation between¶ “¶ narco¶ s” and¶ terrorist¶ s¶ as a marriage¶ of
convenience between different criminal elements or¶ just¶ another¶ modus operandi¶ of¶ powerful international drug
syndicates¶ that can be tackled by l¶ aw enforcement¶ . Instead,¶ this criminal activity is the product¶ of a¶ conscious
strategy of¶ rogue regimes in¶ Iran and¶ Venezuela to wage¶ asymmetrical warfare¶ against¶ U.S.
security, interests and allies¶ close¶ to the homeland¶ .¶ As such, it requires a much more robust
analysis and coordinated¶ response¶ –¶ from exposing terrorist g¶ roups working within Venezuela, identifying¶ narcoterrorist activities in
Central America,¶ imposing¶ sanctions against state¶ -¶ ru¶ n entities¶ being used to conceal criminal transactions,¶ to dismantl¶ ing transnational
money¶ laundering schemes.¶ Under bipartisan legislation passed by Congress in December, the Department of¶ State was given six months to
provide you with an analysis of and strategy for dealing¶ with Iran’s activities in the Americas. Until now, the State Department has earned a¶
repu¶ tation within the U.S. government of minimizing this¶ threat¶ . This Subcommittee will¶ have to press the Department to conduct a thorough
and rigorous review of the Iranian¶ and Hezbollah activities in our region and to expose the¶ extraordinary¶ role¶ that is¶ p¶ layed¶ by Venezue¶ la
in this regard. U.S. diplomats will then have to inform our neighbors about ¶ this problem and lay the groundwork for a coordinated strategy for
dealing with this¶ phenomenon in our Hemisphere.¶ Mr. Chairman,
I fear that these narco¶ terrorist activities will exact
an increasingly terrible price from our neighbors and our nation¶ until our national security
establishment recognizes the nature of the threat and fashions an effective response.
2NC Link Uniqueness
( ) Maduro narrowly holding-off internal military challenges now –fidelity to Chavez’s
anti-US cause will be key.
Metzker ‘13
(Internally quoting Michael Shifter, Adjunct Prof @ Gtown, member of the Council on Foreign Relations, and
president of the Inter-American Dialogue. Jared Metzker – IPS Reporter, Washington DC - Inter Press Service –
June 17, 2013 – lexis)
The new president's waffling may be a reflection of his tenuous grip on power. By many accounts, Maduro
lacks the political prowess and rabble-rousing charm of Chavez, who enjoyed military backing as well as fervent
support from the lower classes.¶ In addition to a strong anti-Chavista opposition that openly challenges the legitimacy of his narrowly won
election, Maduro
has had to deal with a split within Chavez's own former political base. ¶ Shifter
pointed out that among the military, which was once a source of significant strength for Chavez, more support is
given to Diosdado Cabello, currently head of Venezuela's parliament and whose supporters believe he was the rightful heir to the
presidency.¶ Maduro's legitimacy stems largely from his perceived ideological fidelity, the reason for
his selection by Chavez to lead in the first place. Shifter said this leads him to "emulate" his
predecessor and makes rapprochement with the United States less probable.
2NC AT: Kerry Meeting
( ) Kerry meeting doesn’t non-unique the disad – it was a incredibly preliminary step.
Metzker ‘13
(Internally quoting Michael Shifter, Adjunct Prof @ Gtown, member of the Council on Foreign Relations, and
president of the Inter-American Dialogue. Jared Metzker – IPS Reporter, Washington DC - Inter Press Service –
June 17, 2013 – lexis)
Nonetheless, major actions remain to be taken if normalisation is to even begin , such as the exchange of ambassadors
and official U.S. recognition of the Maduro government. Shifter (who
regards the Kerry-Jaua meeting as "a small step" )
was not optimistic that these larger requirements will be completed in the short term.¶ " I don't
think Washington is going to push hard to send an ambassador to Caracas ," he said. "It will probably take more time to
observe the new government and see where it is going."
2NC AT: U.S. Engaging Now
( ) US moving cautiously now
Spetalnick ‘13
Matt Spetalnick – White House correspondent who has covered news on four continents for Reuters, from Latin American coups and drug wars –
Reuter’s – March 6th, 2013 – “Despite new hopes, U.S. treads cautiously after death of Venezuela's Chavez” –
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/03/06/uk-venezuela-chavez-usa-idUKBRE92504920130306
While the death of Venezuela's stridently anti-American President Hugo Chavez on Tuesday raised hopes in Washington for
better U.S.-Venezuela relations, the Obama administration reacted cautiously as it weighed the
prospects for a diplomatic thaw. President Barack Obama quickly reached out to Venezuelans, expressing an interest in a
"constructive relationship" in the post-Chavez era. But analysts said it would be hard to make tangible progress when deep political uncertainty
risks destabilizing the South American oil-producing nation. Washington's challenge will be to figure out how far to go in seizing the opening to
engage with Venezuelan leaders as well as its political opposition without giving the impression of U.S. meddling following the socialist
president's death after a two-year battle with cancer. "We're not interested in having a confrontational relationship with Venezuela," a senior U.S.
official told Reuters. "We're
going to have to see how things evolve. It's a dynamic period."
China SOI DA
1NC
China is taking the lead in Venezuelan oil now – economically and politically
DT 4/29, “China in Venezuela: loans for oil”, 4/29/13, http://dragonstrail.wordpress.com/ Dragon’s Tail, blog
about Chinese international affairs, Mollie
Despite its frequent anti-american rhetoric (which should not stop with Maduro’s election), Venezuela remains
largely financially dependant of the US. It does not brag about this and has been seeking throughout
the Chavez years to escape the US sphere of influence. It is quite naturally that the socialist state,
since Chavez’s election in 1998, has been turning more and more towards China. Indeed, Chavez visited
China 6 times in his 14 year rule in attempts to integrate its alternative world system. The energy-hungry
dragon on the other hand has very clear objectives in Venezuela: securing through investment
and loans a fair share of the world’s largest recoverable oil reserves. In the past decade but especially
in the past 3 years, bilateral trade has soared more than exponentially from $500 million in 1999 to
$7,5 billion in 2009 and over $20 billion in 2012 (PDVSA). China is now Venezuela’s second
trading partner after the US (Venezuelan trade ministry). In 2012, 65% of oil exports went to Venezuela’s
traditional oil partner, the US, through its american subsidiary Citgo ; China was in second place with 20 %. These
numbers clearly show China’s new interest in the world’s 10th largest oil exporter (2012). More
importantly, according to the US Geological Survey and the OPEC, Venezuela holds the world’s largest oil
deposits in its Orinoco Oil Belt (although mostly heavy crude which needs important refining) and contracts
are up for grabs. The oil industry, which accounts for 95% of the country’s exports, is controlled by PDVSA
(Petroles de Venezuela), a state owned company created in 1976. The process of nationalisation of oil resources
continued in 2007, when Chavez nationalised the Orinoco Belt projects, giving the state a minimum 60% ownership
in all joint ventures. In these difficult conditions for foreign investors, China has two great
advantages compared to its Western counterparts which are independence from the US and
money.
The plan kills china’s peaceful rise
Hilton 2013, “China in Latin America: Hegemonic challenge?”, Expert Analysis by Isabel Hilton, February 2013,
Executive Summary,
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&ved=0CD8QFjAC&url=http%3
A%2F%2Fwww.peacebuilding.no%2Fvar%2Fezflow_site%2Fstorage%2Foriginal%2Fapplication%2F26ff1a0cc3c
0b6d5692c8afbc054aad9.pdf&ei=hdzWUca8JILk4AOij4CoDw&usg=AFQjCNGHKw3VP72fVH4crRtY3_Llwiu0g&sig2=ICkNV90oFC_0Mp3rvFM0Fg&bvm=bv.48705608,d.dmg Mollie
China has tried to foster good relations around the world to facilitate its smooth ascendancy to
great power status. In Latin America, this creates a delicate balance between national interests
and the desire to avoid prematurely antagonising the United States. China sees Asia as its own
sphere of influence, and the Obama administration’s “pivot” – a “rebalancing” of U.S. foreign policy
towards Asia – has raised hackles in Beijing. The PRC, until now, has been willing to tread
carefully in the U.S. backyard, promoting soft power but playing down specific political challenges
to the U.S., including from its Latin American partners.
Resource exports
Confrontation escalates to retaliatory war
Hilton 2013, “China in Latin America: Hegemonic challenge?”, Expert Analysis by Isabel Hilton, February 2013,
Executive Summary,
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&ved=0CD8QFjAC&url=http%3
A%2F%2Fwww.peacebuilding.no%2Fvar%2Fezflow_site%2Fstorage%2Foriginal%2Fapplication%2F26ff1a0cc3c
0b6d5692c8afbc054aad9.pdf&ei=hdzWUca8JILk4AOij4CoDw&usg=AFQjCNGHKw3VP72fVH4crRtY3_Llwiu0g&sig2=ICkNV90oFC_0Mp3rvFM0Fg&bvm=bv.48705608,d.dmg Mollie
There are warnings within the U.S. security community about the potential implications of
Chinese involvement in Latin America in the future, and concerns about China’s still modest military
sales to the region. Examples of these sales include Venezuela’s 2010 purchase of 18 K-8 fighters from
China. Despite the concerns of the State Department, however, there has been little response in senior policy circles
to the “China threat”. Regardless of whether there is any real “threat” to the U.S., key decision-makers have not
reacted. China’s presence in Latin America is unlikely to diminish and will continue to affect its
regional partners for the foreseeable future. Although this undoubtedly entails a loss of U.S.
influence in the region, both China and the U.S. have so far sought cooperation rather than
confrontation. In the context of the Obama administration’s “pivot” to Asia, however, and the latent, longterm strategic competition between China and the United States, there is potential for increasing
competition for influence in the future. An escalation of tensions between China and U.S. allies
in the South China or East China Sea could prompt China to raise retaliatory tensions in the U.S.
backyard. At that point, the traditional Latin American allies of the U.S. could face some uncomfortable choices.
Goes nuclear
Lowther ‘13
Note: when this card has a line that reads “it says”, it is referencing a 42-page report by the Washington DC-based
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Ask your lab leaders about the CSIS and the PONI (Project on
Nuclear Issues) – several of them have worked for that organization and will have unique insights. The study at hand
was prepared by the CSIS’ Project on Nuclear Issues. The Tapiei Time article was written by William Lowther, who
is the Washington DC staff writer for that organization and he is citing a report by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, 3-16-2013, “Taiwan could spark nuclear war: report,” Taipei Times,
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/03/16/2003557211
Although Beijing and Washington have agreed to a range of crisis management mechanisms, such as the
Military Maritime Consultative Agreement and the establishment of a direct hotline between the Pentagon and the Ministry of Defense, the bases for
miscommunication and misunderstanding remain and draw on deep historical reservoirs of
suspicion,” the report says. For example, it says, it is unclear whether either side understands what kinds of
actions would result in a military or even nuclear response by the other party. To make things worse, “neither
side seems to believe the other’s declared policies and intentions, suggesting that escalation
management, already a very uncertain endeavor, could be especially difficult in any conflict,” it says. Although conflict “mercifully”
“
seems unlikely at this point, the report concludes that “it cannot be ruled out and may become increasingly likely if we are unwise or unlucky.” The report says:
With both sides possessing and looking set to retain formidable nuclear weapons arsenals, such a conflict
would be tremendously dangerous and quite possibly devastating.”
“
2NC Impact
( ) A war with china is likely in the short term. Causes massive death tolls.
Goldstein ‘13
[Avery Goldstein is the David M. Knott Professor of Global Politics and International Relations, Director of the Center for the Study of
Contemporary China, and Associate Director of the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics at the University of Pennsylvania,
“First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-China Relations,” International Security, Vol. 37, no 4, Spring, 2013, pp 4989]
Sino-American crises that could erupt in the near future, while China remains¶ militarily
outclassed by the United States, present distinctive dangers. The preceding¶ analysis offers some reassurance that
the interaction of conventional¶ and nuclear capabilities would limit the degree of instability. Because it is so¶ difficult to fully eliminate the
adversary’s ability to use military force to generate¶ a shared risk of catastrophe, the incentives that can make striking first so¶ tempting in a
conventional world are diminished. But because
instability in a¶ nuclear world could result in disaster, even a
small chance that the parties¶ would initiate the use of force is troubling. During a crisis, the
desire to¶ achieve a favorable outcome will provide incentives to manipulate risk and¶ may
encourage the use of force if only to signal resolve as each side seeks the¶ upper hand. This suggests
that the most worrisome possibility is a crisis in¶ which the United States and China fail to grasp
each other’s view about the¶ importance of its interests at stake. If one side believes that its stronger interests¶
ensure that it will be more resolute, it could be tempted to signal resolve through the limited use of conventional force to manipulate risk. Because
the¶ risk being manipulated is ultimately the genuine risk of escalation to a nuclear¶ exchange, this should be sufªcient reason for scholars to
provide policymakers¶ with a better understanding of the current prospects for such dangerous instability¶ in U.S.-China crises.¶ Concerns raised
by the possibility that China could one day grow strong¶ enough to become a true peer competitor facing the United States have received¶ much
attention. Although clearly important, that is a discussion about ¶ the distant future. In the meantime, greater attention needs to be paid to the¶
immediate danger of instability in the kinds of crises that could ensnare¶ the United States and China while China is still relatively weak.
Ironically, perhaps,¶ whatever new security challenges a much stronger China could one day¶
pose, the end of China’s currently profound military weakness would at least¶ mitigate the key
near-term problem identified here—the potential for crisis instability¶ exacerbated by asymmetry
in Sino-American power. But before any¶ such major shift in power occurs, there is a real, if
limited, possibility that a¶ mismanaged Sino-American crisis will render all speculation about the
long¶ term tragically moot.
( ) US-China conflict escalates to Nuclear catastrophe
Goldstein ‘13
[Avery Goldstein is the David M. Knott Professor of Global Politics and International Relations, Director of the Center for the Study of
Contemporary China, and Associate Director of the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics at the University of Pennsylvania,
“First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-China Relations,” International Security, Vol. 37, no 4, Spring, 2013, pp 4989]
In a crisis, the U.S. and Chinese interests at stake will be high, and either¶ side could decide that
the risk of escalation introduced by conventional, space,¶ or cyberattacks was worth running . Even
though no stake in a crisis would be¶ high enough for either the United States or China to choose an unrestrained ¶ nuclear exchange, some
stakes might be high enough for either one to choose¶ to initiate military actions that elevate the
risk of escalation to such a disastrous¶ outcome.88 As discussed above, both China and the United States have¶ important interests
over which they could find themselves locked in a warthreatening¶ crisis in the Western Paciªc. The recent pattern of pointed Chinese¶ and U.S.
statements about the handling of persistent disputes in the South¶ China Sea, for example, suggests that both sides attach a high and perhaps
increasing¶ value to their stakes in this region. Whether that value is high enough ¶ to contribute to crisis instability is an empirical question that
cannot be answered¶ in advance. The
most worrisome source of instability, however, is¶ clear—the temptation to
use nonnuclear strikes as a way to gain bargaining¶ leverage, even if doing so generates an unknowable
risk of nuclear catastrophe¶ that both China and the United States will have incentives to
manipulate.
( ) Recent cyber attacks indicate possibility of war is high
Feldman ‘13
[Noah Feldman, constitutional and international law professor at Harvard University, “The Coming Cool War With China,” Bloomberg,
6/02/2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-02/the-coming-cool-war-with-china.html]
Someone steals your most sensitive secrets. Then, planning a face-to-face meeting, he says he wants to develop “a new type” of relationship with
you. At what point, exactly, would you start thinking he was planning to drink your milkshake? ¶ Ahead
of the first summit
meeting between U.S. President Barack Obama and President Xi Jinping of China on June 7, the
two nations are on the brink of geopolitical conflict. As its officials acknowledge, China is a classic rising
power, poised to challenge U.S. dominance. In historical terms, the sole global superpower never gives up without a fight.¶
“China’s peaceful rise” was a useful slogan, while it lasted, for China’s leaders. “America’s peaceful decline” will get no one elected, whether
Democrat or Republican. Geopolitics is almost always a zero-sum game. If China can copy or work around U.S. missile defenses, fighter jets and
drones, the U.S.’s global position will be eroded -- and the gains will go directly to China.¶ At the same time, trade between the two rivals
remains robust. Last week, Henan-based Shuanghui International Holdings Ltd. agreed to buy the U.S. pork-processing giant Smithfield Foods
Inc. (SFD) for $4.7 billion. This could be the single-largest Chinese acquisition of a U.S. company, and it is reason for enthusiasm. Mutual
ownership of significant corporate assets across borders doesn’t miraculously guarantee peace, nor can it make conflict disappear overnight. But
it gives both sides the incentive to manage geopolitical conflict, and not let it overtake the tremendous mutual benefits created by trade.¶
Entwined Economies¶ The
juxtaposition of rising tensions over cyber-attacks and the pork cooperation
perfectly captures the paradoxical state of Chinese-U.S. relations -- and explains why officials on
both sides are struggling to come up with a new conceptual framework to understand the change.
Never before has a rising power been so economically interdependent with the nation challenging it. The ties go beyond the U.S.’s 25 percent
market share for Chinese exports or China’s holdings of 8 percent of the outstanding U.S. national debt. They include about 200,000 Chinese
studying in the U.S. and perhaps 80,000 Americans living and working in China.¶ The
combination of geopolitical
competition and economic interdependence sets the terms for the struggle that won’t be a new
Cold War so much as a Cool War. If the Soviet Union and the U.S. avoided all-out conflict because of mutually assured nuclear
destruction, the relations between China and the U.S. today could be defined by the threat of mutually assured economic destruction. The
economic costs of violent conflict would be incalculably large. ¶ As a practical matter, however, we
mustn’t assume that
economic interdependence precludes the possibility of old-fashioned violence. On the positive side, China
is urging North Korea to re-engage with the six-party talks and denuclearize the Korean Peninsula -- a sign that the government in Beijing
realizes that its unruly ally could do significant damage to regional stability. On the negative side, North Korea seems perfectly content to ignore
its mentor’s directives. As we learned during the Cold War, proxies don’t always behave the way their would-be masters want them to. It is far
from clear that the Americans and the Soviets wanted their allies in the Middle East to go to war in 1967, 1973 or 1981.
2NC AT: Chavez Death
Maduro has furthered commitment to China
DT 4/29, “China in Venezuela: loans for oil”, 4/29/13, http://dragonstrail.wordpress.com/ Dragon’s Tail, blog
about Chinese international affairs, Mollie
Beyond these difficulties, prospects are good for China-Venezuela relations, even after Chavez’s
death. Since his election, Maduro has already promised that his first trip abroad would be to China.
He even said “the best tribute that we could give to our Comandante Chavez is to deepen our
strategic relationship with our beloved China”. China seems evermore poised to secure new deals in
Venezuela’s oil-economy and eventually buy stakes in debt-ridden PDVSA if it is denationalised. Talks have also
started in 2012 to establish a free trade agreement with Mercosur. The dragon’s strategy of tied loans and
loans-for-oil means it is at the same time securing resources and creating business through its
investment. Although not risk-free, it is clear that Venezuela will need Chinese funds in the future and
should respect the deals even in the case of a collpase of Maduro’s government. It is also
establishing itself as the second power in the Caribbean region and in Latin America. China will have to be
careful not to push the continent into a bipolar balance of power and not confront the US but
rather build partnerships with it, so as not to hinder its “peaceful rise” global strategy.
2NC Link Uniqueness
China has carefully avoided confrontation in Venzeula oil
DT 4/29, “China in Venezuela: loans for oil”, 4/29/13, http://dragonstrail.wordpress.com/ Dragon’s Tail, blog
about Chinese international affairs, Mollie
Indeed, China is investing in Venezuela for energy security but also for business and profit. Beyond
the numerous bilateral benefits, it has two main negative aspects on China and its international relations with the
US, but also on Venezuela and its economy. For example, due to the transport distance (it takes about 40 days to
ship oil to China) and refining problems, Chinese state-owned companies sell up to a third of
Venezuelan oil locally for profit (there is a noticeable gap in between PDVSA export and Chinese import
figures). China however wishes to conduct business in South America without raising tensions
with the US, either by enforcing Venezuela’s anti-american rhetoric or by challenging their
presence in their “back yard”. Thus, although mainly conducted by state-owned companies, China has to
put great effort into separating its business from its politics contrarily to Venezuela. As for
Caracas, one of the consequences of raised dependence on oil exports is the decrease of other
business due to the “Dutch Disease”. This effect takes place when important natural resources
export increase the value of a country’s currency, thus making other exports more expensive and
less competitive. A good example in Venezuela is in the textile industry, where it is becoming cheaper to import
Chinese textile than to produce it locally (which once again indirectly benefits China).
2NC Link
Now is the tipping point – peaceful rise is only possible if status quo investments are not
increased
DT 4/29, “China in Venezuela: loans for oil”, 4/29/13, http://dragonstrail.wordpress.com/ Dragon’s Tail, blog
about Chinese international affairs, Mollie
Beyond these difficulties, prospects are good for China-Venezuela relations, even after Chavez’s death. Since his
election, Maduro has already promised that his first trip abroad would be to China. He even said “the best tribute
that we could give to our Comandante Chavez is to deepen our strategic relationship with our beloved China”. China
seems evermore poised to secure new deals in Venezuela’s oil-economy and eventually buy stakes in debt-ridden
PDVSA if it is denationalised. Talks have also started in 2012 to establish a free trade agreement with Mercosur.
The dragon’s strategy of tied loans and loans-for-oil means it is at the same time securing
resources and creating business through its investment. Although not risk-free, it is clear that Venezuela
will need Chinese funds in the future and should respect the deals even in the case of a collpase
of Maduro’s government. It is also establishing itself as the second power in the Caribbean region and in Latin
America. China will have to be careful not to push the continent into a bipolar balance of power
and not confront the US but rather build partnerships with it, so as not to hinder its “peaceful
rise” global strategy.
2NC Heg Impact
Failure to challenge China kills dollar diplomacy and hegemony – infrastructure and oil
are key
Hilton 2013, “China in Latin America: Hegemonic challenge?”, Expert Analysis by Isabel Hilton, February 2013,
Executive Summary,
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&ved=0CD8QFjAC&url=http%3
A%2F%2Fwww.peacebuilding.no%2Fvar%2Fezflow_site%2Fstorage%2Foriginal%2Fapplication%2F26ff1a0cc3c
0b6d5692c8afbc054aad9.pdf&ei=hdzWUca8JILk4AOij4CoDw&usg=AFQjCNGHKw3VP72fVH4crRtY3_Llwiu0g&sig2=ICkNV90oFC_0Mp3rvFM0Fg&bvm=bv.48705608,d.dmg Mollie
The United States is Latin America’s traditional hegemonic power, but China’s influence in the
region is large and growing. How far does China’s presence in the U.S. backyard represent a hegemonic
challenge? China is important in the region as a buyer of Latin American resources, primarily from
four countries, an important investor and an exporter of manufactured goods. The impact of China’s activities varies
in degree from country to country. In several countries local manufacturing has suffered from cheaper Chinese
imports; several countries have ben- efited from Chinese demand for resources, others from large investments, and
China is having an important impact on the region’s infrastructure . The risks to the region include
resource curse, distorted development and environmental degradation due to a lowering of environmen- tal and
social standards. Despite its significant economic presence, China has been careful
to keep a low political and diplomatic profile to avoid antagonising the U.S. and to maintain a
benign environment for its economic activities. Chinese support, however, has been important for partners,
such as Cuba and Venezuela, that do not enjoy good relations with the U.S. So far the two powers have sought
cooperation rather than confrontation, but rising tensions with U.S. allies Japan and Vietnam
could have repercussions in Latin America if China feels the U.S. is becoming too assertive in its
own East Asian backyard.
I
ntroduction Ever since President James Monroe’s 1823 declaration that European powers must respect the
western hemisphere as the U.S. sphere of influence, the United States has been the dominant economic,
political and military power in Latin America. As such, it has faced a series of challengers, from Nazi
Germany to the Soviet Union and Japan. In the last two decades, the rise of the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) has been reshaping the politics and economics of the region. How far has the PRC
become the new hegemonic challenger? China has not sought a strategic confrontation with the United States in
Latin America, as the USSR did in the Cold War. However, against the background of U.S.–China rivalry
and potential confrontation over such issues as Taiwan, this could change in the future. In the
meantime, China’s economic weight offers its Latin American partners a new freedom to defy U.S.
interests, should they choose to. China plays three major roles in Latin America: as an insatiable
consumer of commodities; as an exporter of cheap manufactured goods; and as a lender and
investor. The region’s importance to a rising China is underpinned by its resources: Latin America has the
world’s largest reserves of silver, at 49% of the global total, copper, at 44%, and tin, at 33%. It also has at least 16%
of the global oil reserves and the largest quantity of arable land in the world. China plays a flexible hand in different
countries, within the framework of a regional strategy. Although China’s policy papers treat Latin
America as a region, this does not get in the way of China’s ability to work with local differences
in pursuit of its objectives: in Venezuela, for instance, China offers large loans in exchange for
oil, whereas in Peru it favours direct investment in the mining sector.
<<heg bad impacts>>
Saudi Oil DA
Saudi Oil DA Link---1NC
Aff eliminates dependence on Saudi Oil- infrastructure investment is key
Alvarez and Hanson 09 (Cesar Alvarez and Stephanie Hanson. 2/9/09. "Venezuela's Oil-Based Economy". Council
on Foreign Relations". www.cfr.org/world/venezuelas-oil-based-economy/p12089
Venezuela's proven oil reserves are among the top ten in the world. Oil generates about 80 percent of the
country’s total export revenue, contributes about half of the central government’s income, and is responsible for about one-third of the country’s
gross domestic product (GDP). Increases in world oil prices in recent years have allowed Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez to expand social
program spending, bolster commercial ties with other countries, and boost his own international profile. Though Chavez has threatened to stop
exporting Venezuelan oil and refined petroleum products to the United States, its biggest oil-trading partner, experts say a significant short-term
shift in oil relations between Venezuela and the United States is unlikely. The
medium-term outlook for state oil company
PDVSA is questionable, however, and analysts draw links between PDVSA's profitability and the political stability of the country.
Analysts say the recent global financial crisis and sudden drop in oil prices are adding to the oil company's financial turmoil. Share 1 0
Venezuela's Economy under Chavez Hugo Chavez took office in 1999. Since then, Venezuela’s economy has remained squarely centered on oil
production. In 2006, Chavez announced a nationalization of oil fields managed by foreign companies, which resulted in an increase of the
government’s shares in these projects from 40 percent to 60 percent. Government officials argue, however, that economic growth efforts are not
solely focused on oil. Venezuela’s ambassador to the United States, Bernardo Alvarez Herrera, wrote in a 2006 Foreign Affairs essay that the
non-oil sector, which includes mining, manufacturing, and agriculture, grew 10.6 percent in 2005, “indicating an important diversification of the
country's economy.” Yet even if the country is working to diversify,“oil still predominates,” says Miguel Tinker-Salas, a professor of Latin
American history at Pomona College. In 2002, the Venezuelan economy experienced a significant downturn following a failed military coup to
overthrow Chavez and a two-month strike by the state-run oil company PDVSA. The response to the strike—the dismissal of more than
seventeen thousand PDVSA employees—resulted in a rapid drop in GDP between 2002 and 2003. In subsequent years, rising international oil
prices helped the economy to recover. In 2007, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates, economic growth was 8.4 percent. Opinion is
divided over the effect of Chavez's policies on Venezuela's economy. Some economists say the tremendous rise in social spending under Chavez
has greatly reduced poverty and pushed unemployment below 10 percent, its lowest level in more than a decade. According to a February 2008
report from the Washington-based Center for Economic and Policy Research, not only has unemployment dropped, formal employment has
increased significantly (PDF) since Chavez took office. But other economists express concerns about the country's high inflation levels. The IMF
has forecast inflation of 25.7 percent in 2008 and 31.0 percent in 2009—among the highest rates for any country in the world—and according to
news reports, the country is already experiencing food shortages of goods such as sugar and milk. Francisco Rodriguez, former chief economist
of the Venezuelan National Assembly, writes in a 2008 Foreign Affairs article that income inequality has increased during Chavez's tenure, and
further, Chavez's social programs have not had a significant impact on infant mortality rate or literacy rates among Venezuelans. PDVSA PDVSA
(Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A.), Venezuela’s state-owned petroleum company, oversees the exploration, production, refinement, and export of oil
as well as the exploration and production of natural gas. It is the world's third-largest oil company, behind Saudi Aramco and ExxonMobil.
According to Tinker-Salas, after the nationalization of Venezuala’s oil in 1976, PDVSA was very much like a “state within a state.” It “insulated
itself from the government” and functioned largely as its own entity with control of the nation’s wealth. In 1980, PDVSA acquired CITGO, a
U.S.-based refinery, and it is now one of the world's largest refiners. Under Chavez, however, the company's mandate has drastically expanded.
In 2002, Chavez redefined PDVSA’s role to include the government’s social priorities. PDVSA must now spend at least 10 percent of its annual
investment budget on social programs. This money is funneled through the National Development Fund, or Fonden, an investment fund set up in
2005 that is not included in the government's budget. Peter Hakim, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington-based center for
policy analysis, says that Chavez’s gradual takeover of PDVSA has given him an enormous bankroll to pursue his political and economic
ambitions. Yet Chavez has also moved to expand PDVSA’s role in Venezuela’s oil ventures. In the 1990s, Venezuela opened its oil industry to
limited private investment and allowed foreign companies to manage specific oil fields. Such “strategic associations” made up roughly 23 percent
of total oil production as of 2006. In April 2006, Chavez announced the government would take a majority stake in such projects, increasing its
share from 40 percent to 60 percent. Though this partial nationalization is expected to burden PDVSA with investment costs in the billions, in
2007 the president created seven new subsidiaries of PDVSA, including services, agriculture, shipbuilding, construction and industry. The head
of PDVSA, Rafael Ramirez, told the New Yorker in June 2008 that Chavez plans to use the oil company to transform Venezuela from an "oil
sultanate to a productive society within a socialist framework." The financial crisis and oil price drop has had some impact on the oil company. In
particular, PDVSA lost a $5 billion line of credit in October 2008. In early 2009, Chavez signaled the government would be open to more foreign
investment in its oil resources, but analysts say there is little trust (Bloomberg) contracts would be honored over the long term. "Chávez is
celebrating the demise of capitalism as this international crisis unfolds," Pedro Mario Burelli, a former board member of PDVSA, told the
International Herald Tribune. "But the irony is that capitalism actually fed his system in times of plenty." Spending the Oil Money It is difficult to
determine how Venezuela has been spending its oil windfall, given the lack of government transparency (the country ranks 162 out of 179
countries ranked on Transparency International's corruption index). However, from the few official figures the government has released and its
stated pledges of aid to foreign countries, it is possible to glean a picture of billions of dollars dispersed on activities not directly related to
PDVSA's core business. Analysts express frustration that these reports lack detail, and efforts by news organization to obtain further information
from government agencies have been rebuffed (NYT). PDVSA has transferred billions of dollars to Fonden, the off-budget investment fund many
experts say is financing Chavez's social projects. According to International Oil Daily, an energy trade publication, PDVSA spent $14.4 billion on
social programs in 2007 (as compared to $6.9 billion in 2005). These programs include projects such as medical clinics providing free health
care, discounted food and household goods centers in poor neighborhoods, indigenous land-titling, job creation programs outside of the oil
business, and university and education programs. Increased oil revenues have also given Chavez the ability to extend assistance programs outside
Venezuela’s borders. For example, he provides oil at a preferential price to many countries in the Caribbean through the Petrocaribe initiative. In
2009, a Venezuela-backed home heating program to low-income households in the United States was briefly halted, a sign that low oil prices may
be forcing Chavez to reconsider (TIME) some of his social programs. In August 2007, the Associated Press calculated that Chavez had promised
$8.8 billion in aid, financing, and energy funding to Latin America and the Caribbean between January and August 2007, a figure far higher than
the $1.6 billion of U.S. assistance for the entire year. Though it is impossible to determine how much of that funding was actually dispersed, the
difference in aid is striking. Chavez is also suspected of funneling money to the FARC, a Colombian guerrilla group, as well as providing funds
to Argentine President Cristina Kirchner’s election campaign in 2007—though he denies both charges. Military expenditures are also funded by
the government's flush coffers. Between 2004 and 2006, Venezuela spent roughly $4.3 billion on weapons, according to a January 2007 Defense
Intelligence Agency report. As part of deals signed with Russia in 2006, Venezuela purchased 100,000 Kalashnikov rifles, twenty-four Sukhoi-30
fighter planes, and fifty-three Russian helicopters. In March 2008, it hired Belarus to build an air defense system. Critics of Chavez think he
should be pouring money into infrastructure to ensure a sustainable oil industry rather than allocating so much for social and foreign policy
initiatives. According to the Wall Street Journal, PDVSA “spent just $60 million on exploration in 2004, compared with $174 million in 2001.”
But Vicente Frepes-Cibils, the lead economist for Venezuela at the World Bank, says “investment is increasing” and Venezuela has an
accumulation of reserves including outside funds ranging from $10 billion to $15 billion that it is planning to use for oil infrastructure. PDVSA's
Production Levels and Fiscal Health PDVSA has not filed financial statements with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission since 2004.
As a result, its production levels and overall fiscal health are subject to debate among economists and industry analysts. A report (PDF) by the
International Energy Agency examining Venezuela's extra-heavy crude oil production put PDVSA’s 2005 production rate at 3.2 million barrels
per day but showed a decreased rate of 2.55 million in September 2006. Currently, OPEC, the U.S. government, and the International Energy
Agency agree that Venezuelan oil production amounts to roughly 2.4 million barrels per day. The Venezuelan government, however, says
PDVSA's production is about 3.3 million barrels per day. Either way, there are new signs that all isn’t rosy at PDVSA. In 2008, Venezuela's
energy ministry released unaudited results documenting a 35 percent fall in profits by PDVSA the previous year. A few months later, audited
figures were released that indicated profits increased 15 percent in 2007. The International Energy Agency, however, shows a $7.9 billion loss in
2007. Oil prices, which were extraordinarily high through much of 2008, helped mask some of the company's financial woes. Since they began to
drop dramatically PDVSA has struggled to keep up with its financial obligations, especially once it lost a $5 billion line of credit (CNBC) with
the Royal Bank of Scotland in October 2008. The company had about $7.9 billion in unsettled accounts (Latin Business Chronicle) between
January and September 2008, up from $5.7 billion during all of 2007, but analysts say so far the company is unlikely to default on its creditors.
However, the company may need to make serious cutbacks or possibly even sell assets, analysts say. Venezuela
has an estimated 78
additional estimated 235 billion barrels of
unconventional extra-heavy crude oil in the Orinoco Belt region located southeast of Caracas. If development in the
region can turn this extra-heavy tar-like oil into a more marketable commodity, Venezuela’s total
reserves could rival those of Saudi Arabia , reports the New York Times. Oxford Analytica notes, however, that PDVSA
billion barrels of proven conventional crude oil reserves and an
will struggle to develop its heavy-oil reserves in a timely fashion given its lack of infrastructure investment
and the ongoing oil nationalizations. Oil industry experts suggest that PDVSA needs to invest at least $3 billion annually into its existing fields
just to maintain current production levels.
Diplomatic Engagement PIC
1NC
The United States federal government should extend an offer to the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela to establish full diplomatic relations if and only if the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela agrees to end ties to international terrorist groups and rogue regimes, ensure
future elections are held as defined by Venezuela’s constitution and the Inter-American
Democratic Charter, and cooperate with the U.S. and regional partners to combat illicit
narcotics trafficking in the Western Hemisphere.
The CP solves the case — offering diplomatic engagement successfully extracts Venezuelan
concessions
Christy 1AC Author 13 — served as Senior Policy Analyst for the Republican National Committee (RNC),
focusing on energy, foreign affairs, and national security issues. Prior to joining the RNC, Patrick worked at the
National Republican Congressional Committee as an Analyst and as Clerk for the International practice of Barbour
Griffith & Rogers, LLC. His writings on defense policy and foreign affairs have appeared in the The Commentator,
The Diplomat, National Review Online, The Weekly Standard, and U.S. News.com. Patrick was named a Manfred
Wörner fellow by the German Marshall Fund in 2011 and a Publius Fellow by the Claremont Institute in 2012.
Originally from San Diego, California, Patrick holds a BA from Vanderbilt University (Patrick Christy, Foreign
Policy Initiative, 04-19-13, “FPI Bulletin: Post-Chavez Venezuela’s Uncertain Future”,
http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/files/2013-04-19-Bulletin-Venezuelan%20Elections_1.pdf, Accessed 07-02-2013 |
AK)
For the United States, it should welcome that Capriles may be emerging as the voice of the Venezuelan people and his supporters have already organized mass protests against the election results.
The United States should stand with him and the growing Venezuelan opposition during these dangerous days. As
Senator Marco Rubio recently stated, “The Venezuelan people should know that the democracies of the Western
Hemisphere are watching the electoral review process closely and will seek to hold accountable
any individual determined to have disrupted the peaceful conduct of free and fair elections. What’s
more, Maduro’s dangerous behavior should be a wakeup call. For too long, Washington turned a
blind eye to Venezuela’s attack on democracy and dangerous behavior. White House Press Secretary Jay Carney was right
to call for a “100 percent audit of the [election] results.” Given the current distribution of power in Caracas (Chavez loyalists dominate the election commission and Supreme Court),
policymakers in Washington will need to determine a policy response that is both pragmatic and
in line with America’s moral interests. The White House should also work with key democratic
partners in the hemisphere to ensure Venezuela’s acting government refrain from using violence
against peaceful protestors. Moving forward, the Obama administration should make clear to whoever emerges in
Caracas that full diplomatic relations with the U nited S tates will be contingent upon Venezuela ending ties to
international terrorist groups and rogue regimes like Iran, taking meaningful steps to ensure future
elections are held as defined by Venezuela’s constitution and the Inter-American Democratic Charter, and
cooperating with the U nited S tates and regional partners to combat illicit narcotics trafficking in the Western
Hemisphere . If Nicolas Maduro does hold on to presidential power, he will
have a choice: he can replicate the dangerous—
and failed—policies of Hugo Chavez, or he can respect the will of the people. Sunday’s disputed election shows the Venezuelan people
support the latter.
The CP’s signal is key — it solves relations, terrorism, and soft power — the plan crushes
resolve and turns the case
Christy 1AC Author 13 — served as Senior Policy Analyst for the Republican National Committee (RNC),
focusing on energy, foreign affairs, and national security issues. Prior to joining the RNC, Patrick worked at the
National Republican Congressional Committee as an Analyst and as Clerk for the International practice of Barbour
Griffith & Rogers, LLC. His writings on defense policy and foreign affairs have appeared in the The Commentator,
The Diplomat, National Review Online, The Weekly Standard, and U.S. News.com. Patrick was named a Manfred
Wörner fellow by the German Marshall Fund in 2011 and a Publius Fellow by the Claremont Institute in 2012.
Originally from San Diego, California, Patrick holds a BA from Vanderbilt University (Patrick Christy, U.S. News
& World Report LP, 03-15-13, “Obama Must Stand Up for Democracy in Post-Chavez Venezuela”,
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/03/15/after-chavez-us-must-encourage-democraticvenezuela, Accessed 07-01-2013 | AK)
Washington must realize that a strategy of engagement alone will not ensure a renewed and improved
partnership with Caracas . Failure to realize this will not only undermine whatever influence America has in
the months ahead, but also send a troubling signal to Venezuela's increasingly united political opposition.
The Obama administration should instead pursue a more principled policy towards a postChavez Venezuela. In particular, it should: Pressure Caracas to implement key election reforms . Venezuela's
opposition faces formidable obstacles. Interim President Maduro will use the government's near-monopoly control of public
airwaves, its established networks of political patronage and last-minute public spending
programs to bolster his populist agenda. Washington should stress publicly and privately that any
attempts to suppress or intimidate the opposition runs contrary to Venezuela's constitution and
the principles defined in the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which was adopted by Venezuela in 2001. To this point, José
Cárdenas, a former USAID acting assistant administrator for Latin America, writes, The Venezuelan opposition continues to insist that the constitution (which is of Chavez's own writing) be
followed and have drawn up a list of simple electoral reforms that would level the playing field and better allow the Venezuelan people to chart their own future free of chavista and foreign
Venezuela announced that a special
election to replace Chavez will be held next month, it is important to remember that elections alone do not make a
democracy. Indeed, Chavez long embraced the rhetoric of democracy as he, in reality, consolidated executive power, undermined Venezuela's previously democratic political system
and altered the outcomes of election through corruption, fraud and intimidation. The Obama administration should make clear that free
and fair elections, properly monitored by respected international election observers, are essential
to Venezuela's future standing in the hemisphere and the world. Likewise, Secretary of State John Kerry should
work with regional partners—including (but not limited to) Brazil, Canada, Colombia and Mexico—to firmly
encourage Maduro's interim government. A unified regional voice would send a powerful signal to
Chavez's cronies in Caracas and longtime enablers in China, Iran and Russia.
interference.
Demand free, fair and verifiable elections . Although
Reinstate Ambassador/Recognize Maduro CP
1NC
Text: The United States federal government should reappoint a Venezuelan ambassador
and formally recognize Nicolas Maduro as the Venezuelan president.
Ambassador reinstatement is a prerequisite to normalized relations – only the counterplan
solves
Meacham, 13 -- director of the CSIS Americas Program. He joined CSIS from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC), where he served on the professional staff for Senator
Richard Lugar (R-IN) for over a decade. He served as the senior adviser for Latin America and the Caribbean on the committee, the most senior Republican Senate staff position for this region.
In that capacity, he travelled extensively to the region to work with foreign governments, private-sector organizations, and civil society groups. He was also responsible for managing the
committee’s relationship with the State Department regarding the Western Hemisphere and overseeing its $2 billion budget. (Carl, June 21st, “The Kerry-Jaua Meeting: Resetting U.S.-Venezuela
Relations?,” CSIS, http://csis.org/publication/kerry-jaua-meeting-resetting-us-venezuela-relations, amils)
If the United States continues on this road,
both countries will seek to appoint ambassadors as a step in normalizing
relations. Last week, the Washington Post published an editorial that suggested recent U.S. overtures to Venezuela are something of a lifeline, thrown while the Venezuelan government
is struggling to maintain its legitimacy and when its neighbors, although having recognized the Maduro government, have recognized the need for an impartial audit of the election results. Many
believe it more appropriate for the United States to prioritize delicate issues such as human rights violations and antidrug policies before being willing to consider reinstating ambassadors.
Appointing ambassadors would certainly signal a real intention from both countries to forge a
positive relationship. Having a U.S. ambassador in countries that have similar conditions to those
of Venezuela is not something to be opposed across the board. In many situations, having a U.S.
ambassador in a nondemocratic country serves as a symbol to advance our most cherished
beliefs. It also serves as proof of the U.S. government’s willingness to keep lines of communication
open. But the timing of this appointment would imply that the Unites States would deny the opposition’s claims of a fraudulent election, as well as the urgency of the audit of the election
results. This also comes at a time when Venezuela is more divided than ever, politically and economically. So rather than serve as an example of a pragmatic posture, this maneuver
would be viewed by a critical mass of a very motivated Venezuelan opposition as U.S.
government support for the Maduro In short, relations between the United States and Venezuela have a rocky track record that recent headlines cannot
obscure. And while there are undoubtedly members of the Venezuelan government who want to improve relations, it’s difficult to see their argument winning over the more hardline Chavistas in
the government, who would likely see any steps to building ties as betraying the cause. Venezuela has time and again proven to be unwilling to work with the United States, making it difficult for
In order to move ahead and legitimize this new relationship, the
United States must make a decision regarding Maduro’s legitimacy: does the United States
recognize Maduro’s election sans a proper audit?
the United States to gauge any real intentions of change.
US refusal to recognize Maduro is perceived by Venezuela as belligerent action – kills
relations
Baverstock, 13 (Alasdair, May 17
th
, “Venezuela's Maduro still waiting on Washington's recognition,” Christian Science Monitor,
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2013/0517/Venezuela-s-Maduro-still-waiting-on-Washington-s-recognition, amils)
, President Nicolás Maduro’s narrow victory has yet to be
recognized by the United States. Refusing to legitimize the new premier while a partial recount of the
vote is underway, the US position has led to further political tensions in a relationship
historically stressed under the leadership of former President Hugo Chávez. Venezuela's Maduro victory upheld in audit - but opposition says
fight not over A handful of countries, including Chile, Peru, and the US, have expressed concern over
the democratic standards of the election, which Maduro won by a little more than 1 percent of the vote. Venezuela’s opposition party is calling for the
More than a month after Venezuela’s contested presidential election
results to be annulled, citing over 3,000 instances of election fraud, ranging from alleged multiple-voting in chavista-strongholds to polling booth intimidation. “Obviously, if there are huge
irregularities we are going to have serious questions about the viability of that government,” said Secretary of State John Kerry during a hearing of the US Foreign Affairs Committee following
While the US has pledged not to interfere with Venezuelan politics,
the refusal to recognize Maduro's presidency has left many to question what message the US is
trying to send, and how – if at all – it will impact Venezuela post-Chávez. “[The US isn’t]
recognizing or failing to recognize,” says David Smilde, professor of sociology at the University of Georgia. “They’re just waiting.
But here in Venezuela that’s seen as an act of belligerence.”
the announcement of President Maduro’s victory in April.
2NC Solves Iran/Terror/Relations
Resotring ambassadors is a prerequisite to Venezuela compliance – your 1ac evidence.
Revise 13 (Nicolas Revise, staffwriter for Arab News. January 13 2013. "US Eyes Better Relations with Venezuela in Post-Chavez Area". Arab News. www.arabnews.com/us-eyes-betterrelations-venezuela-post-chavez-era)
the transition from Chavez to another leader opened up the possibility of resetting the
relationship and putting it not necessarily on a friendly course, but on a correct course,” expert Cynthia Arnson said. The first essential step would be to
reinstate their ambassadors , said Arnson, director of the Latin American program at the Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars. Caracas and Washington have been operating
embassies in each country without an ambassador since a diplomatic spat in 2010. Jacobson took the
opportunity to discuss issues of joint concern such as combating drug-trafficking, counter-terrorism and energy
cooperation. Venezuela is sitting on major oil reserves and accounts for some 10 percent of US oil imports. “We have for some time made clear that we were willing and open to
“The prospect of
trying to improve our ties with Venezuela,” State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland told reporters this week. Washington had already proposed some ideas on how to improve ties step-
If the Venezuelan people want to move forward with us, we think there
is a path that’s possible. It’s just going to take two to tango,” she said. But Chavez, who since
assuming power in 1999 has long worked to forge an anti-US alliance among leftist leaders in
Latin America, “was not really interested” in boosting ties, Arnson said.
by-step, she added, refusing to go into specifics. “
Restoring ambassadors is the first step toward congressional oversight of Venezuala-Iran
relations and counter-narcotics/terrorism.
Sullian, 13 Specialist in Latin American Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division of Homeland Security (Mark P. “Hugo Chávez’s Death: Implications for Venezuela and
U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research Service, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42989.pdf, amils)
In the aftermath of the presidential election, there could be an opportunity for U.S.-Venezuelan
relations to get back on track. An important aspect of this could be restoring ambassadors in order to
augment engagement on critical bilateral issues, not only on anti-drug, terrorism, and democracy
concerns, but on trade, investment issues , and other commercial matters. With Chávez’s death and an upcoming presidential
election, the 113th Congress is likely to maintain its strong oversight on the status of human rights
and democracy in Venezuela as well as drug trafficking and terrorism concerns, including the
extent of Venezuela’s relations with Iran.
Instability NB
Lack of Maduro’s recognition fosters regional violence and instability by legitimizing the
opposition.
Carlsen, 13 Foreign Policy In Focus columnist Laura Carlsen is director of the Americas Program for the Center for
International Policy in Mexico City. (Laura, May 2 , “U.S. Efforts to Block Democracy in Venezuela Harm Hemispheric Relations,” Foreign Policy in Focus,
nd
http://www.fpif.org/articles/us_efforts_to_block_democracy_in_venezuela_harm_relations_in_the_hemisphere, amils)
The U.S. government stands alone among major world governments in refusing to recognize the
results of the recent Venezuelan presidential election. The petulant position of the Obama
administration harms U.S. relations across the entire hemisphere and feeds a scenario of violence
in that Caribbean country. Nation after nation--including the last hold-out Spain and the Organization of American States—has recognized Nicolas Maduro, who took
office following his narrow win in the April 14 elections. The results ratified by the National Electoral Council show Maduro with 50.78 percent to 48.95 percent for defeated conservative
candidate Henrique Capriles—a difference of 1.8 percent, or some 260,000 votes. There were no major anomalies on Election Day, which by all reports went remarkably smoothly. Following the
elections, Capriles contested the results in fiery speeches and called on supporters to demonstrate, but curiously did not file a legal challenge. The Venezuelan electoral system is highly tamperproof, as recognized by monitoring organizations like the Carter Center, which before the vote assessed the system as “the best in the world.” Delegations from the Carter Center, the Union of
South American Countries, and other experts observed the elections and proclaimed them clean and fair. Venezuelans vote electronically, then print out and double-check a paper ballot before
depositing it as well. The Electoral Council carries out an audit at polls of 54.3 percent of the votes. These reviews are signed by members of the political parties, including Capriles’ Democratic
Unity Party. The Electoral Council has agreed to audit the remaining 46 percent of ballots, although the electronic vote is the legal vote and the process for reviewing the paper backup after the
on-site audit is unprecedented and logistically challenging, with almost no possibility of changing the result. Representatives of the conservative coalition announced instead that they plan to
gather alleged evidence of fraud to present to the Supreme Court. Capriles said from there he will attempt to take the case to international courts, promising a drawn-out process that will feed
Daniel Kovalik, a U.S. human rights
lawyer who was among 170 international election observers from around the world, reported in
the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, “What we found was a transparent, reliable, well-run and thoroughly
audited electoral system.” Voter turnout was reportedly 79 percent—a major achievement that would be the envy of more
mature democracies, including the United States. And still the U.S. State Department spokesperson Patrick Ventrell stated
on April 24, 10 days after the elections, “We do continue to believe that the ongoing CNE
recount and a thorough review of alleged voting irregularities will…ensure that the Venezuelan
people feel that their democratic aspirations are being met and that they have greater confidence
in the election outcome.” This, coming after recognizing in the same press conference that the
Maduro government was making overtures to repair relations with the United States through the
appointment of its new charge d’affaires, dashed hopes of more cordial relations between the two
trade partners. The frame of concern for “the Venezuelan people” rings hollow. In a democratic contest, especially in a society as polarized as Venezuela’s, the losing side never
feels like its “aspirations are being met” when they lose. And the insistence on a 100-percent recount after the ignominy of the
Bush-Gore election of 2000 and the immediate U.S. recognition of the conservative Mexican
president Felipe Calderon, despite evidence of voter fraud and a much narrower margin in 2006,
is hypocritical at best. At worst, it is an example of U.S. external pressure that encourages a
break with the rule of law and violates the principle of self-determination that President Barack
Obama claims to uphold. This is the first time the U.S. government has refused to recognize a
Venezuelan election result, as Mark Weisbrot of the Center for Economic and Political Research
points out. Weisbrot notes, “Washington's efforts to de-legitimise the election mark a significant
escalation of US efforts at regime change in Venezuela. Not since its involvement in the 2002 military coup has the US government done
sharp divisions with the country. The opposition still has not presented the suit or the proofs for judicial review.
this much to promote open conflict in Venezuela.” The Obama administration is bending over backwards to spur on an opposition movement that has no virtually legal leg to stand on in its desire
for new presidential elections. There are some indications that the strategy to refuse to accept defeat at the polls was considered even before the close vote. Although Capriles conceded rapidly
and gracefully to former President Hugo Chavez in the presidential elections last fall, it was a bad omen when he refused to sign a pre-electoral pact to respect the results prior to this election.
Now violent opposition protests in the streets have led to the deaths of nine people. Maduro has
attended the funerals of his supporters killed in the disturbances with vows to defend his victory
and prosecute those inciting and participating in violent acts. Health clinics established by
Chavez have been frequent targets. It is highly unlikely that Capriles would stake his future on rejecting legal electoral institutions if he did not have the
support of the U.S. government. It is even more unlikely that he could sustain a movement for non-recognition. Even many members of his own coalition will not go so far as to say they honestly
The other countries of the region recognized Maduro as the new president
within hours of the results. Not only did the left-leaning governments provide their diplomatic
welcome, but also Colombia, Mexico, and other nations closely allied with the United States.
believe he won the April 14th elections.
Capriles’ actions and de facto U.S. support for prolonging post-electoral unrest not only
endanger peace and stability in Venezuela, but also potentially the entire region. Venezuela is a
geopolitical hub—for its oil, for its role in building south-south integration projects like ALBA
and Unasur, for its solidarity trade pacts, and for its defiance of U.S. hegemony. To illegally disrupt the
constitutional order there will not be as easy as it was in Honduras, where even a broad opposition movement couldn’t restore the constitutionally elected president after a right-wing coup in
nations across the hemisphere and the world will react with anger if the Obama
administration decides to maintain this course, both in defense of their neighbor Venezuela and
also in what they see as a threat to their own sovereignty. Already former Brazilian president
Lula da Silva has warned that "Americans should take care of their own business a little and let
us decide our own destiny." The longer the United States remains globally isolated in its refusal
to accept Venezuela’s election results, the longer the instability, uncertainty, and violence will
continue. Extending the conflict could very well end up unnecessarily costing more lives. The
Obama administration should consider that its stubbornness about what it considers an adverse
election result in a foreign country is a direct cause of bloodshed. It harms relations with our hemispheric neighbors and partners
2009. Inevitably,
and sows the seeds of distrust and enmity in a region where we have a good chance at building cooperation on issues of vital importance to all of our countries. Venezuela’s elections must be
accepted at once to show that the United States will uphold democratic processes and the rule of law, even when its government is not particularly pleased with the results.
Opposition seeks support in Colombian – damages relations and increases regional
instability
Correro del Ornico, 13 (June 11th, “Venezuela “Destabilization Plan”: Colombian Government Meets Venezuelan
Opposition,” http://www.globalresearch.ca/venezuela-destabilization-plan-colombian-government-meetsvenezuelan-opposition/5338592, amils)
In what has become a new diplomatic crisis in the region, the
Maduro administration continued to criticize
Colombian officials this week for a meeting held between Venezuelan opposition leader
Henrique Capriles and President Juan Manuel Santos in Bogota on May 29th.
The encounter, which has threatened the strong ties that have characterized Colombian-Venezuelan relations since
2010, saw Santos receive Capriles, the right-wing governor of Miranda state and losing presidential candidate, for
private talks that the Maduro government has characterized as “lamentable”.
“I’m very sorry that Santos is giving credence to the people who refuse to recognize Venezuela’s legitimate
authority, and to the false idea that we can be overthrown, and the false ideas of the traitorous, fascist sectors of the
Venezuelan right wing”, the Venezuelan President said in response to the meeting.
Capriles, who was beaten by Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela’s Colombian government’s meeting with Venezuelan
opposition derails relations April 14th presidential elections, has failed to recognize his defeat, taking
instead the reins of an opposition movement that has attempted to challenge the legitimacy of
Maduro’s victory and the country’s electoral authorities. Capriles has said he is seeking
international support to delegitimize Maduro’s presidency.
Venezuelan Foreign Minister Elias Jaua called the reception of such a controversial figure by the Santos government
“a knife in the back”. “We have done everything we can to help find peace for the Colombian people. It’s not right
that in Colombia they are promoting and legitimizing someone who openly refuses to acknowledge the institutions
of the Venezuelan state”, Jaua said. The Venezuelan Minister referred to Capriles’ visit as part of a
destabilization plan that involves mobilizing right-wing sectors of Colombian society to sow
violence and chaos in the OPEC member state.
The same sentiment has been expressed by President Maduro, who has alleged that in Bogota “a situation of
complete conspiracy” exists.
“We are neutralizing the plots against our country. It is well known that the principal
conspiracies against our homeland have been hatched in Bogota. All of Venezuela knows this
and we’ve given proof of it”, Maduro said.
For its part, the Santos administration has called the row a “misunderstanding” and has refused to comment on the
meetings, calling for dialogue with the Venezuelan government instead of “microphone diplomacy”.
But as of earlier this week, efforts to mend the impasse had yet to be made by Colombia’s diplomatic corps.
“We haven’t had contact with [Foreign Minister Holguin] since Saturday. We are waiting for their communication
to express the ideas that President Nicolas Maduro has asked me to transmit to the Colombian government”, Jaua
said. According to Venezuela’s highest diplomat, these instructions include a complete revision of bilateral relations.
“Right now we are evaluating everything and all aspects of our relationship with Colombia until the Colombian
government clarifies the reach that those who fail to recognize the [Venezuelan state’s] institutions have [in their
country]”, Minister Jaua affirmed.
Last week’s row comes after years of diplomatic work had successfully rebuilt bilateral relations following the
tensions that marked the governments of former Colombian President Alvaro Uribe and the late Hugo Chavez of
Venezuela.
Santos’ replacement of Uribe as president in 2010 effectively began a new period in Venezuelan-Colombian
relations that witnessed a warming in diplomatic ties and the signing of new multi-faceted agreements between the
neighboring states.
The reception of Capriles by Santos, however, was a “breaking of the rules of the game”
established between the two governments three years ago, President Maduro said.
“The Colombians who live in Venezuela understand Chavez’s democratic revolution and
hopefully a way will be found so that truth and principles of respect can reconstruct the relations
between our two governments”, the Venezuelan President stated.
Peace Process At Risk
Part of the political fallout that has accompanied the diplomatic breech has been the possible
departure of Venezuela from the peace process underway in Cuba between Colombian
authorities and the country’s FARC rebels.
As part of the policies of former President Hugo Chavez, Venezuela has been a guiding force and active mediator in
the current talks taking place between the guerrillas and the government.
“Nobody can doubt the important role that the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela has played and is playing in the
search for peace in Colombia”, FARC leadership wrote in a blog on Saturday.
The statement additionally expressed the guerrilla group’s apprehension “over the acts which will without a doubt
affect the extraordinary atmosphere of peace that we have been able to build through dialogue in Havana”.
Representatives of the Colombian government have similarly articulated the importance of Venezuela to the
dialogue.
“The situation is very worrying… but I am hopeful that it will be overcome”, said Humberto de la Calle, the Santos
administration’s chief negotiator.
Just prior the diplomatic crisis, the talks had yielded their most significant breakthrough in the past 6 months by
outlining the basis for an agreement that would restructure land tenancy laws in the South American nation.
Meanwhile, the host nation of the peace process, Cuba, has expressed its complete support for the Maduro
administration’s stance towards its neighbor.
“Cuba has had an unchanging position of solidarity with Venezuela and the recognition of it’s legitimate
government headed by President Nicolas Maduro, whose decisive triumph on April 14th is an unquestionable
expression of the sovereign will of the Venezuelan people”, said Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez.
The Minister referred to the international campaign being carried out against Venezuelan
institutions “and any direct or indirect support for them” as “damaging to the unity of Latin
American and the Caribbean. They undermine independence and hurt the efforts that Venezuela
and other states have made for peace
Politics Links
1NC
Engagement opponents control the debate on venezuela
Harper, 10 (liz, Senior Editor @ US Institute for Peace, adjunct fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs,
americasquarterly.org contributing blogger based in Washington DC, 12/21, http://americasquarterly.org/node/2058)
It's not clear whether some
sought to use the QFR to strong arm the State Department to articulate or take tougher positions ,
and thereby bolster Palmer's confirmation prospects and support on the heels of his "weak" hearing
performance. Alternatively, perhaps the QFR was publicized to thwart his prospects entirely. Who knows; at this stage, it's irrelevant.
What's very relevant are the unfolding consequences of the QFR mishandling. First and foremost, Palmer got rolled. A dedicated Foreign Service
officer was not treated with due professionalism and respect. We will not know how great he would have been in Venezuela. Second, the State
Department on this matter appears naive, indecisive and disorganized. Third, critics
who never wanted ANY ambassador—
and certainly NOT Palmer—in Caracas, succeeded. As did Chávez, for the short term. To take up the second point, the State
Department appears to have different and confused messages on Venezuela. The ostensible example of this
is the two messages of Larry Palmer's Senate testimony versus his answers to the QFR. What can be said publicly and on the
record regarding Venezuela? Beyond talking with a low voice on the safest matters, it is not
clear. Is such timidity to Chávez' bluster necessary? The next step will be to see whether the State Department will go bold and call Venezuelan
Ambassador to the U.S. Bernardo Alvarez a persona non grata, or take a softer approach and cancel his visa. Alvarez had been back home, and
over the weekend, it was said he was not planning to return to Washington DC—already one move ahead of the anticipated reciprocation to
Palmer's rejection. It was in Chávez’s best interests to welcome Palmer, as he wanted to work with Venezuelans, and help ease the growing
tensions between the two countries. But now, the State Department will have to rethink this, and find another person...most likely with a stronger
track record on human rights and democracy. Perhaps we should accept that playing nice and fair with an irrational actor like Chávez is not likely
to yield positive results. At the end of the day, we've
been backed into a corner to put forward a tougher
ambassador, and not Palmer, who was our first pick. Does this mean likewise that our policy of engagement
must be altered? Are we acting in response to Venezuela's moves? In this context, Chávez, and some conservative
critics here, are setting the terms of U.S. policy. This debacle also illustrates the express need for the State Department to
complete its review of Venezuela policy and clarify its positions. The QFR mishandling is a symptom of the bigger
issue: uniting our various agencies to craft a coherent message and policy on Venezuela. What are the
"red lines" of what we'll tolerate from Venezuela? When one of our career diplomats goes on record saying that Venezuela's National Guard is
involved in narcotrafficking, provides safe haven to terrorists like the FARC, imprisons judges for ruling against Chávez, why is the State
Department not publicizing those concerns? Until now, the State Department had been keeping its profile too low for anyone's good. Ostensibly
that of Ambassador Palmer. At this point, why is it a mistake to outline on record ways in which the Venezuelan government is breaking very
basic standards of human rights and hemispheric security? Just some open and disquieting questions. At the least, the State Department needs to
figure out what its basic message is, and then put it out there with a unified voice, loud and clear. This could go far to improve its public outreach
and image. But while silence continues, it
seems that the Venezuelans have settled the U.S. debate: this kind
of "engagement" will not get us where we want to be. Chávez is antithetical to our democratic values and security
concerns. He is moving full steam down the field, while we sit on the sidelines. Time to play.
2NC Kerry Link
Cooperating with Venezuela is super unpopular—especially with Kerry
Black Star News 4/23 (http://www.blackstarnews.com/global-politics/south-america/john-kerry-spits-on-maduros-hand-hostility-promotes-venezuela#sthash.FJk0MYmg.dpuf ›
JOHN KERRY SPITS ON MADURO'S HAND: HOSTILITY PROMOTES VENEZUELA INSTABILITY BLACK STAR EDITORIALAPRIL 23,2013 , nkj
what's really behind the hostility towards Maduro's election?
Is this punitive U.S. policy to get back at Chavez who never minced words when it came to the chilly relations with
Washington? Is it opposition over the populist Chavez policies that empowered marginalized communities with
expansion of education and healthcare coverage and housing?
Is it resentment over the financial support and oil concessions that Venezeula extended to countries such as Cuba,
Nicaragua, Bolivia, Haiti and others? Under Chavez, Venezuela provided tens of millions of dollars of heating oil even to low-income Americans.
Is it opposition to the new form of regional-cooperation, among South American countries that Venezeula has been
promoting, that would in the long run reduce dependence on powers such as the United States?
So
Whatever the real reasons are, Secretary Kerry must weigh his pronouncement and assess the possible consequences carefully.
It's a testament to Chavez's legacy that the country remained stable even while he was suffering from terminal cancer. Chavez was such an out-sized presence and no contemporary Venezuelan
politician will come close to matching his charisma and charm. He beat Capriles handily by 10% points before his health rapidly declined. Maduro may not be president today had Chavez not
publicly endorsed him before his death. So in essence, Capriles lost a close vote to a man who had already departed this earth.
Venezuela needs peace, stability and reconciliation. The leadership sent signals of willingness to normalize relations with the U.S.
Rather than work with the newly-elected leadership, John Kerry decided to spit on Nicolas Maduro's extended hand .
Kerry hates the plan—doesn’t even recognize maduro
Politico 4/17 (http://www.politico.com/story/2013/04/nicolas-maduro-venezuela-john-kerry-90208.html#ixzz2YgF49046 John Kerry won't recognize Nicolas Maduro yet, urges recount
By ASSOCIATED PRESS | 4/17/13 Read more: http://www.politico.com/story/2013/04/nicolas-maduro-venezuela-john-kerry-90208.html#ixzz2YgFAriqs, nkj)
The Obama administration is refusing to recognize Venezuelan President-elect Nicolas Maduro and says a recount of this
should occur.
Testifying before Congress, Secretary of State John Kerry backed the call by opposition leader Henrique Capriles for the vote count of
Sunday's presidential election to be re-examined.
WASHINGTON —
week's election
Venezuela's National Electoral Council says Maduro won by 262,000 votes out of 14.9 million cast.
But asked directly at a House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing Tuesday if he recognized Maduro as the winner, Kerry wouldn't say yes or no.
2NC Ros-Lehtinen Link
( ) Our Ros-Lehtinen Link
First – she’s opposed to engaging Venezuela unless specific human rights conditions are
attached.
Congressional Documents and Publications ‘13
(June 4, 2013 – lexis)
U.S. Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), Chairman of the Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee, made
the following
statement after meeting with Venezuelan opposition leader Maria Corina Machado and writing a letter to Secretary of State John Kerry
asking for the immediate release of U.S. citizen Timothy Tracy, being held hostage in Venezuela.
Statement by Ros-Lehtinen:¶ "Today I had the honor of meeting with Venezuelan pro-democracy leader Maria Corina Machado, a stalwart
champion of democracy for Venezuela. I applaud her for her courage in continuing to boldly speak out against the Maduro regime, and join her in
urging the U.S. and responsible nations to be on the side of the people of Venezuela and support them in calling out the illegitimate elections and
robbing the Venezuelan people of true democracy.¶ "Under
the Maduro regime, democracy is made a pathetic joke
and Venezuelans continue to be deprived of their human rights. It is also appalling that this
regime has unjustly detained Tim Tracy, a U.S. citizen who was simply exercising his freedom of speech in making a
documentary, but now finds himself sharing a prison with some of the worst criminals of Venezuela. This situation is unacceptable
and I urge the State Department to do all it can to secure Tracy's release and safe return to the
United States unconditionally."
And – She hates Venezuela and brings in the Israel lobby
Madsen, 11
Wayne Madsen, Investigative journalist, author and syndicated columnist. Has some twenty years experience in security issues.
As a U.S. Naval Officer, he managed one of the first computer security programs for the U.S. Navy. He has been a frequent
political and national security commentator on ABC, NBC, CBS, PBS, CNN, BBC, Al Jazeera, and MS-NBC. He has been
invited to testify as a witness before the US House of Representatives, the UN Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and an terrorism
investigation panel of the French government. A member of the Society of Professional Journalists (SPJ) and the National Press
Club., 6/20/11, http://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2011/06/20/the-outsourcing-of-influence-peddling-to-the-israelilobby.html
The confluence of the Israel Lobby with pressure groups such as those that support the Saakashvili regime in Georgia
is not an isolated situation. Before the rise to power of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) of Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey, Israel could rely on the support of successive Turkish governments. Turkey, in turn, established its own Washingtonbased lobbying group, the American Turkish Council, which was modeled on the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). It was
recently learned from Turkish government officials in Washington that the secret network of Turkish military officers, politicians, intelligence
officers, professors, and journalists known as “Ergenekon,” which plotted a series of coups against independent-minded Turkish governments,
was a construct of the CIA and Mossad. An in-depth investigation of the Ergenekon network conducted by the Turkish intelligence service
discovered that many of the key players in Ergenekon were Dönme, the descendants of Turkish Jews who converted to Islam and, to varying
degrees, now practice a combination of Kabbalah Judaism and Islamic Sufism while remaining secular and Turkish nationalist in the mold of
Turkish state founder Kemal Ataturk. Similarly, the
Israel Lobby has made common cause
with the right-wing Cuban exile
community in Florida, which has become as influential in the politics of south Florida as the many Jews and Israelis who live
there. The convergence of interests of pro-Israelis and Cuban Gusano exiles can best be seen in the current chair of the House Foreign Relations
Committee,
Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, who represents a congressional district in south Florida. Ros-Lehtinen, who is of
Cuban Jewish descent, is one of AIPAC’s and the ADL’s best friends in Congress . She is also a vociferous
opponent of the governments of Venezuela and Nicaragua, both of which have severed diplomatic
relations with Israel and have recognized the independence of Abkhazia, to the dismay of Israel, AIPAC, and the ADL. While RosLehtinen rattles sabers against Venezuela, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay, and other Latin
American nations that have recognized Palestine within its 1967 borders, she supports continued U.S. military assistance to Colombia, Honduras,
Costa Rica, and Panama, Israel’s last four remaining allies in Latin America. Ros-Lehtinen, while decrying alleged human rights “abuses” in
Venezuela and Nicaragua, is silent on actual abuses in Colombia, where Israelis routinely supply weapons and advisers to the government in its
inhumane war with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), peasants, and labor unionists. The trial in New York of Russian air
cargo services owner Viktor Bout for allegedly trying to sell weapons to the FARC is one outcome of the
strategic alliance
between Israel, its U.S. Lobby, and the right-wing Latin American exiles and intelligence operatives who call
Miami their home. The conviction and imprisonment of former Yukos owner Mikhail Khodorkovsky, considered a major agent-of-influence
for Israel in Russia and a one-time potential President of Russia, has placed Russia in the same category as Venezuela, Nicaragua,
Abkhazia, Turkey, and other nations that have incurred the ire of the Israel Lobby either directly or via outsourcing deals made with
strategic allies such as the Georgians, Cuban exiles, or, now, in the case of Turkey, the Armenians. In the past, AIPAC always ensured that
“Armenian genocide” resolutions failed in the U.S. Congress, a payback for Turkey’s support for Israel. With Turkey adopting an independent
foreign policy, AIPAC and the ADL are now strategically allied with the Armenian lobby to push for Armenian genocide resolutions in
Washington and elsewhere.
Israel lobby key to agenda
Petras, 6
(James Petras is a Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University, 4/6, http://petras.lahaine.org/?p=7)
The problem of war and peace in the Middle East and the role of the Israel lobby is too serious to be marginalized as an after-thought. Even more
important the increasing censoring of free speech and erosion of our civil liberties, academic freedom by an aggressive lobby, with powerful
legislative and White House backers is a threat to our already limited democracy. It is incumbent therefore to examine the fourteen erroneous
theses of the highly respected Professor Chomsky in order to move ahead and confront the Lobby?s threats to peace abroad and civil liberties at
home. Fourteen Theses Chomsky claims that the Lobby is just another lobby in Washington. Yet he fails to observe that the lobby has
secured the biggest Congressional majorities in favor of allocating three times the annual foreign aid designated to all of Africa, Asia
and Latin America to Israel (over 100 billion dollars over the past 40 years). The Lobby has 150 full time functionaries working for
the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), accompanied by an army of lobbyists from all the major Jewish
organizations (Anti-Defamation League, B?nai Brith, American Jewish Committee, etc) and the nation-wide, regional and local
Jewish Federations which hew closely to the line of the ‘majors’ and are active in policy and local opinion on Israel
and promote and finance legislative candidates on the basis of their adherence to the Lobby’s party line. No other
lobby combines the wealth, grass roots networks, media access, legislative muscle and single-minded purpose of
the pro-Israel lobby. Chomsky fails to analyze the near unanimous congressional majorities which yearly support all the
pro-Israel military, economic, immigration privileges and aid promoted by the Lobby. He fails to examine the list of over 100
successful legislative initiatives publicized yearly by AIPAC even in years of budgetary crisis, disintegrating domestic health
services and war induced military losses.
It’s unique – she’s currently on-board for immigration reform.
LeoGrande, 12
William M. LeoGrande School of Public Affairs American University, Professor of Government and a specialist in
Latin American politics and U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America, Professor LeoGrande has been a frequent
adviser to government and private sector agencies, 12/18/12, http://www.american.edu/clals/upload/LeoGrandeFresh-Start.pdf
But was Obama's success a harbinger of structural realignment in the Cuban-American community or merely a conjunctural product of Romney's
flawed candidacy? The Republican ticket had its shortcomings. In 2007, candidate Romney famously ended a speech to stunned CubanAmericans with Fidel Castro's signature closing, "Patria o muerte! Venceremos!" (Homeland or death! We shall overcome!). Vice presidential
candidate Paul Ryan had a record 8 of repeatedly voting in the House of Representatives to end the embargo against Cuba (on the libertarian
grounds that the government should not impede free trade). "That did their ticket a lot of harm with Cubans, and allowed us to at least get a
hearing with them about many other economic issues," an Obama campaign official said.9 Moreover, the Republican Party's anti-immigrant
posture, which hurt it with Latino voters nationwide, hurt it with Cuban-American voters as well. The
state's most prominent
national Republican elected officials– Senator Marco Rubio, and Representatives Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Mario
Diaz-Balart, all distanced themselves from their Party's hardline on immigration reform. In 1996, when Bill
Clinton won 35% of the Cuban-American vote against Bob Dole, 10 the Republican Party was also hurt by its anti-immigration policy. That year,
the Republican Platform supported making English the official language, advocated cutting off welfare for noncitizens, and deny citizenship to
the U.S.-born children of illegal aliens. Yet despite these 11 problems, there was growing evidence that Obama's gains might represent more than
just Romney's weakness. Polling by Florida International University since 1991 has chronicled gradual changes in the Cuban-American
community in south Florida, both demographically and attitudinally– changes that, as they begin to manifest themselves in voting behavior, do
not bode well for the Republican Party. The Cuban-American Electorate When FIU began polling Cuban-Americans south Florida in 1991, 87%
favored continuation of the U.S. embargo. By 2011, support had fallen to 56%. In 1993, 75% of respondents opposed the sale of food to Cuba
and 50% opposed the sale of medicine. By 2011, solid majorities (65% and 75% respectively) supported both. In 1991, 55% opposed unrestricted
travel to Cuba, whereas in 2011, 57% supported unrestricted travel for all Americans and 66% supported unrestricted travel for Cuban-Americans
(Table 2). These changes in Cuban-American opinion were clearly linked to demographic changes in the community. Exiles who arrived in the
United States in the 1960s and 1970s came as political refugees, motivated principally by their opposition to the socialist course of the revolution.
Those who arrived in the Mariel exodus in 1980 and afterwards were more likely to have left for economic reasons. Recent arrivals, especially
those who arrived in the post-cold war era, were far more likely to have maintained ties with family on the island. A 2007 poll of CubanAmericans in south Florida found that 58.3% were sending remittances to Cuba, but fewer than half of those who arrived before 1985 were
sending money, whereas three quarters of more recent arrivals were. The differences in age and experience among different waves of 12 migrants
produced sharply different opinions about relations with the island, with more recent arrivals being far more likely to favor policies that reduce
bilateral tensions and barriers to family linkages, especially the ability to travel and send remittances (Table 3).
Appeasement Link
Perceived as weak appeasement – crushes Obama PC and means plan can never be a win
Mead, 10 (Walter Russell, Senior Fellow Council Foreign Relations, Prof Foreign affairs @ Bard, 3/31,
http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2010/03/31/kicked-by-the-great-white-north/
The policy of slapping friends seems not to be working very well; the policy of kissing up to the bad guys has been even less of a success. North
Venezuela and Iran have blown off the administration’s efforts to put bilateral
relationships on a friendlier basis. Not only is President Obama back to Bush’s old policy of trying to get the UN to adopt
Korea, Cuba,
tougher sanctions on Iran, he’s denouncing human rights crackdowns in Cuba. The biggest success to date, getting a new missile treaty with
Russia, is at lot less impressive than it looks. Russia needs to reduce the costs of its nuclear arsenal and wants the prestige that comes from arms
talks with the US just like the Soviet Union used to have. I support the treaty and hope it gets ratified, but on the whole it’s more a favor from us
to Russia than the other way round. In many cases, the administration has good reasons for specific choices that it makes. Russia, for example, is
never going to be our best friend, but there is no point in not trying to put relations on a more businesslike basis. Britain’s stand on the Falkland
Islands, that there is ‘nothing to negotiate’ where sovereignty is concerned, is a tricky one to support. It always looks bad to be against talks.
Given global skepticism about US intentions after the poorly handled war in Iraq, it made sense for the Obama administration to bend over
backwards to show it was willing to reach a new relationship with Iran. Pressing Karzai to clean up the abysmal corruption that wastes American
money and undermines the strength of his government is certainly the right thing to do. And by twice announcing controversial housing decisions
in Jerusalem during critical talks with the United States, the Israeli government was showing enough arrogance or incompetence that the White
House had to do something. But while many of steps the administration is taking make sense on their own terms, when you look at them all
together the picture isn’t pretty. Beating up on your friends and kissing up to your enemies looks terrible , especially when
neither your friends nor your enemies show any respect. Slamming Honduras and pampering Russia might have both been good decisions on
their own; but when you do them both you end up looking like a hypocrite who moralistically and didactically lectures the weak while fawning
on the strong. Nobody
respects that kind of behavior, and nobody admires people who practice it. It
— and the sharks out there are paying attention . The emerging perception
tastes weak, like blood in the water
of weakness is one reason the administration has had to fight Israel so hard over the Jerusalem issue. As Laura Rozen reports in a must read
article at Politico.com, administration sources say that the quarrel with Netanyahu is “bigger than Jerusalem” because “it’s
about the
credibility of the administration.” It’s precisely because so many people have kicked so much
sand in the administration’s face that it had to raise the stakes so high on this one. Forcing Netanyahu to
back down in Jerusalem may help the administration fight the perception of weakness abroad, but it is
unlikely to help President Obama much at home. And he may not get the win he seeks . Canada and Brazil have
blown the administration off with no ill effects, and even the preternaturally accommodating Japanese are still defying the administration over the
unpopular American military base on Okinawa. If Netanyahu sticks to his guns on an issue where he has strong domestic support, he might still
force Washington to compromise. Beating up on our few remaining friends isn’t going to fix things. What
the President really
needs is a victory over an adversary. He needs to get North Korea, Iran, Syria, Hamas, Venezuela or even
Cuba to take a step back — or he needs to charm one of them into behaving more nicely. Capturing bin Laden or otherwise achieving
something decisive in Afghanistan would also be a plus. Failing that, foreign policy will be a continuing weak spot
for the administration, and sooner or later that will mean trouble.
anything short of big stick on Venezuela triggers intense congressional opponents and high
media profile
Harper, 10 (liz, Senior Editor @ US Institute for Peace, adjunct fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs,
americasquarterly.org contributing blogger based in Washington DC, 12/21, http://americasquarterly.org/node/2058)
I'm told that some
sought to torpedo Palmer's nomination from the get-go, either preferring another candidate with
more credentials on human rights, or not wanting an ambassador in Venezuela at all. Critics doubted that
Palmer—despite his experience as President of the Inter-American Foundation and as the Chargé d’Affaires in Ecuador during a time of
major internal crises—had the steel to tangle with Venezuela's strongman. To many, his soft tone and
circumspect statements at his confirmation hearing reinforced this view. Because Palmer did not
come out swinging a big stick at his Senate confirmation hearing, Senator Richard Lugar sent the ambassador a set
of "questions for the record" (QFRs), in attempt to strengthen support for his nomination. Palmer sat down with folks at
the State Department and answered them, discussing the low morale in Venezuela's military, the ties between members of Venezuela's
government and Colombian guerrillas and allowing them refuge in Venezuelan territory, its role in narcotrafficking, Chávez' increasing control
over the judicial and legislative branches, steady erosion of checks and balances, and violations of human rights and freedom of the press.
Palmer's responses—which he thought would be closely held, according to several sources at the State Department, including the
ambassador-designate himself—were newsworthy, especially at a time of heightened tensions between Colombia and Venezuela. The
QFR ripped around town and the world, media reports picked up Palmer's statements, thereby setting
off the wildfire. So much for the State Department trying to keep a "low profile" on Venezuela and the sensitive
situation in the Andean region.
Spun as appeasement, soft on terrorism and national security
Kouri, 11
Jim Kouri, Law Enforcement Examiner
Jim Kouri, CPP, the fifth Vice President and Public Information Officer of the National Association of Chiefs of Police, has served on the
National Drug Task Force and trained police and security officers throughout the country, Examiner.com, 6/26/11,
http://www.examiner.com/article/obama-urged-to-place-venezuela-on-terrorist-sponsor-list
Obama urged to place Venezuela on "Terrorist Sponsor List" Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez, who is believed to be in
Cuba following emergency surgery, is in ''critical'' but stable condition, Miami's El Nuevo Herald has reported. The government has treated the President's departure
the
House Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, Chairman Connie Mack (R-14) again called on the Obama
Administration to cease their delaying of placing Venezuela on the "State Sponsor of Terrorism List." The
hearing, "Venezuela's Sanction able Activity," was held to provide oversight of sanctions
available for the State Department and Treasury Department to dissuade illicit activity in the Western Hemisphere. To date, the Obama
Administration has underutilized these tools allowing ruthless dictator Hugo Chavez to profit from the drug trade, sell fuel to the
Iranians, and transport terrorists around the world. Congressman Mack stated, "The State Department said they would name
Venezuela a state sponsor of terrorism as well as enforce consequential sanctions on their state run oil company if
they received proof that Venezuela is demonstrably sanctionable. That proof was again presented
to officials of the State and Treasury Departments and further delay by the Obama Administration is unacceptable
and will only continue to coddle Hugo Chavez." Chairman Mack reiterated Venezuela's repeated support for
acts of international terrorism; including the sale of refined fuel to Iran and the actions of Ghazi Nasr al Din, a
Venezuelan Diplomat, who was sanctioned by the Treasury Department for facilitating the transfer of funds to Hezbollah and escorted Hezbollah
officials to and from Venezuela. Iran, and its proxy group Hezbollah continue to expand their presence in Central and South
American taking advantage of their already close relationship with Venezuela's despot Presidente Hugo Chavez,
according to Air Force General Douglas Fraser, commanding officer of the U.S. Southern Command,
since June 10 as a state secret. Chavez's government so far has made no comment about Iran Hezbollah activities in their country. During Friday's hearing of
Additionally, Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) drew sanctions on several Venezuelan senior government officials, Hugo Carvajal Barrios, the
Director of Military Intelligence, and Henry de Jesus Rangel Silva, General-in-Chief of the Venezuelan Armed Services, for materially assisting and supporting drug
trafficking and terrorism activities by the revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Mack added: "If the Obama Administration continues to coddle Hugo
Chavez and the threat he poses to our security, freedom loving Americans will take matters into their hands by not purchasing oil and gas from PDVSA, the Chavez
In addition, last week Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), Chairman of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee, said that no U.S. funds should be provided to the newly-formed Hezbollah government in Lebanon, or to a
Palestinian Authority that includes Hamas. The congresswoman and other lawmakers are concerned that U.S. taxpayer
run oil company which operates as CITGO in the U.S."
money may end up in the hands of terrorist groups
claiming to be political organizations. “For years, members of Congress warned that it
It was clear that Hezbollah’s influence was growing, and that the
Executive Branch had no long-term strategy to deal with that reality, and no contingency plan to
stop U.S. aid from falling into the wrong hands ," she said.
was unwise to fund a Lebanese government in which Hezbollah participated.
Economic Engagement perceived by congressional critics as appeasement, soft on national
security, terrorism and iran
Goodenough, 12
Patrick Goodenough, Patrick covered government and politics in South Africa and the Middle East before joining CNSNews.com
in 1999. Since then he has launched foreign bureaus for CNSNews.com in Jerusalem, London and the Pacific Rim. From October
2006 to July 2007, Patrick served as Managing Editor at the organization's world headquarters in Alexandria, Va. Now back in
the Pacific Rim, as International Editor he reports on politics, international relations, security, terrorism, ethics and religion, and
oversees reporting by CNSNews.com's roster of international stringers, CNS News, 2/2/12, http://cnsnews.com/news/article/iranvenezuela-links-examined-amid-fresh-calls-terror-sponsor-designation
Iran-Venezuela Links Examined Amid Fresh Calls for Terror-Sponsor Designation U.S. lawmakers
will turn a spotlight Thursday on the deepening links between Iran and leftist regimes in Latin America, at a
meeting that will likely hear fresh calls for the administration to designate Venezuela as a state sponsor of terrorism. Three weeks after
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua and Ecuador, the U.S. House Foreign
Affairs Committee will hold a hearing entitled “Ahmadinejad’s Tour of Tyrants and Iran’s Agenda in
the Western Hemisphere.” “Iran has been actively working for years to expand its ties and influence in the Western Hemisphere, and it
has found willing partners in the region’s anti-American despots,” committee chairman Rep. Ileana
Ros-Lehtinen (R-Fla.) said in an earlier statement. The panel aims to review steps the U.S. should take to
advance American interests and counter Iran’s activities in the region. Among experts scheduled to testify is Institute for Global
Economic Growth president Norman Bailey, who formerly served on the National Security Council and in the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, where he was appointed in November 2006 as “mission manager” for Cuba and Venezuela. In a
the Hugo Chavez regime’s
“facilitation and encouragement of the penetration of the Western Hemisphere by the Islamic Republic of Iran.” “Since 2005, with
Venezuela’s assistance, Iran has created an extensive regional network of economic, diplomatic, industrial and
commercial activities, with significant effect,” he wrote, noting that Iran’s interests have extended to other Latin American countries,
especially the leftist-governed Ecuador, Bolivia and Nicaragua. Bailey noted that although the Iran-Venezuela partnership had
caught the attention of U.S. policymakers in recent years, “little by way of concrete responses has emerged to counter the
extensive web of illicit activity and strategic connections that Iran has made in Venezuela and throughout Latin America.” Among his
recommendations – designation of Venezuela as a state sponsor of terrorism, for its collusion
both with Iran and the Iranian-backed Lebanese terrorist group, Hezbollah. Bailey said designation would potentially result in a
briefing paper published by the American Foreign Policy Council on Wednesday, Bailey explored
boycott of Venezuelan oil to the U.S., but argued that the oil shipments “could easily be made up with equivalent amounts released from the U.S.
Strategic Petroleum Reserve.” “By contrast, such a move would have a much more pronounced impact on the Venezuelan economy.” Links to
foreign terrorist organizations The U.S. currently lists Cuba, Syria, Iran and Sudan as state sponsors of terrorism, a
designation that
carries sanctions including a ban on arms-related exports and sales, controls over exports of dual-use items, prohibitions on
economic assistance, and various financial restrictions. Designation requires a determination by the secretary of state that a
country’s government “has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism,” for example through support for and links to “foreign
terrorist organizations” (FTOs).
Congressional resolution passage proves congress perceives plan as appeasement – triggers
bipartisan opposition
Walser, 10
Ray Walser, Ph.D., is Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of
the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation, 1/20/10,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/01/state-sponsors-of-terrorism-time-to-add-venezuela-to-the-list
Since January 2009, the Obama Administration's attempts to improve relations with the stridently anti-America Chávez have yielded little more
than empty gestures. Although ambassadorial relations were restored in June 2009, Chávez has signaled renewed support for the narcoterrorism
of the FARC, begun threatening and punishing Colombia for its defense cooperation agreement with the U.S., helped destabilize Honduras by
backing former president Manuel Zelaya's illegal referendum, pushed ahead with major Russian arms acquisitions, and sealed ever closer ties,
including joint nuclear ventures, with Iran. Venezuela plays an increasingly prominent role as a primary transit country for cocaine flowing from
Colombia to the U.S., Europe, and West Africa. Nevertheless, the Obama Administration, according to the President's National Security
Council adviser on Latin America, Dan Restrepo, does
not consider Venezuela to be a challenge to U.S. national
security: President Obama "does not see Venezuela as a challenge to U.S. national security. There is no Cold War nor Hot War. Those things
belong to the past."[2] This view is not optimistic--it is dangerous. The Administration needs to, as a
recent bipartisan congressional resolution urges , adopt a genuinely tough-minded approach to dealing
with Chávez and Venezuela. The Administration needs to develop a public diplomacy strategy to counter Chavista disinformation and a
diplomatic strategy in the Americas that responds to growing threats of political destabilization. It also needs to recognize that under
Chávez, Venezuela has become terrorism's most prominent supporter in the Western Hemisphere.
The Obama Administration can begin to correct this policy of drift and inaction by placing Venezuela on the list of state
sponsors of terrorism along with Iran.[3]
Powerful congressional and committee backlash – spun as appeasement and soft on terror
O’Brien, ‘9 (Michael, The Hill, 10/28, http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/65219lawmakers-want-venezuela-named-a-state-sponsor-of-terrorism
Lawmakers want Venezuela named a state sponsor of terrorism A bipartisan pair of lawmakers
introduced a resolution on Wednesday to classify Venezuela as a state sponsor of terrorism. Rep. Ron
Klein (D-Fla.), a member of the Foreign Affairs committee, and Rep. Connie Mack (R-Fla.), the ranking
member of the Western Hemisphere subcommittee, joined together to float a bill calling on Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton to add Venezuela to the list of states which sponsor terrorism. The resolution,
H.Res.872, cites the Venezuelan government's ties to Iran, Hezbollah, and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Columbia (FARC) as examples of the South American nation's support for terrorism. "The evidence linking Venezuela’s Hugo
Chavez to the FARC and Hezbollah – two of the most dangerous terrorist organizations, responsible for many bombings,
kidnappings, killings and drug trafficking – is overwhelming, " Mack said in a statement announcing the resolution. "Naming
Venezuela a state sponsor of terrorism will strengthen the stability of the region," the Florida
Republican, who has long been a vocal critic of Chavez, added. "The Administration must not turn a
blind eye to Chavez’s dangerous aggression and must add Venezuela to the state sponsors of
terrorism list without delay.” "Venezuela’s assistance to the FARC in Colombia destabilizes the region and places the Chavez regime
squarely outside the international community," Klein said. "This legislation seeks to stop Venezuela’s facilitation of
terrorism now. The United States cannot and will not accept such actions taking place so close to home.”
Especially because well documented terror ties – drives opposition
Goodenough, 12
Patrick Goodenough, Patrick covered government and politics in South Africa and the Middle East before joining CNSNews.com
in 1999. Since then he has launched foreign bureaus for CNSNews.com in Jerusalem, London and the Pacific Rim. From October
2006 to July 2007, Patrick served as Managing Editor at the organization's world headquarters in Alexandria, Va. Now back in
the Pacific Rim, as International Editor he reports on politics, international relations, security, terrorism, ethics and religion, and
oversees reporting by CNSNews.com's roster of international stringers, CNS News, 2/2/12, http://cnsnews.com/news/article/iranvenezuela-links-examined-amid-fresh-calls-terror-sponsor-designation
In its most recent annual report on international terrorism, published last August, the State Department in its section on state sponsors cites
Cuba’s links with the Basque separatist group ETA and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) – both FTOs – as well as Iranian
and Syrian sponsorship of Hezbollah and Palestinian FTOs including Hamas. Yet Venezuela’s
links to Hezbollah are welldocumented (as early as June 2008, the U.S. Treasury Department charged that Chavez’ government was
“employing and providing safe harbor to Hezbollah facilitators and fundraisers”) and he has also been accused of
ties to FARC and to ETA. Caracas’ cozy relationship with state sponsors of terror Cuba and Iran –
including new concerns that Chavez could help Tehran to evade the latest Western sanctions against its banks and
oil exports – provide further reason, proponents say, for Venezuela itself to be designated. Rep. Connie
Mack (R-Fla.), chairman of the Foreign Affairs subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, has for several years
sponsored legislation urging action . The most recent bill, introduced in May 2011, calls for “Venezuela to be
designated a state sponsor of terrorism for its support of Iran, Hezbollah, and the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC).” Mack introduced similar bills in October 2009 and in March 2008.
2NC AT: Doesn’t Assume Maduro
Chavez’s successor only magnifies the controversy
Washington Post 13 (03/06, “A misguided U.S. strategy for Venezuela,”
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-03-06/opinions/37497866_1_nicolas-maduro-apartments-and-applianceshenrique-capriles)
ANTICIPATING THE death of Hugo Chavez, the Obama administration began reaching out
months ago to his designated successor, Nicolas Maduro, in the hope of bettering U.S.Venezuelan relations. On Tuesday, that strategy absorbed a body blow : Hours before revealing that
Mr. Chavez had died of cancer, Mr. Maduro tried to blame the United States for his illness, and
he expelled two U.S. military attaches on charges of “proposing destabilizing plans” to the armed
forces. So much for the “reset” with Caracas. The ludicrous and crude propaganda launched by
Mr. Maduro was a sign that Mr. Chavez’s successors will be more thuggish and less politically adept
than he was — and, if anything, more inclined to scapegoat the United States and Venezuela’s
democratic opposition for the horrendous problems the caudillo leaves behind.
Nothing Changed – Maduro pursuing “all out Chavismo”
Alic, 13
Jen Alic of Oilprice.com, 4/21/13, http://www.mining.com/web/foreign-oil-and-gas-companies-look-to-status-quoin-venezuela/
Now that Nicolas Maduro—the late Hugo Chavez’s choice for
successor—has narrowly won Sunday’s presidential elections in Venezuela, oil and gas investors can expect a
perpetuation of the status quo. In Sunday’s voVte, Maduro won with a very narrow 50.7% and a vow to continue
with Chavez’s “revolution, ” which has seen the oil industry nationalized and the state-run PDVSA oil company
funding social programs and voraciously courting China and Russia. The narrow vote will not be without its challenges.
Foreign oil and gas companies look to status quo in Venezuela
Opposition rival candidate Henrique Capriles has refused to recognize the results and is demanding a recount, though the electoral commission is
standing firm on Maduro’s victory. For foreign oil and gas companies,
we can expect more of the same . There are no
regulatory changes in the works, and an unattractive windfall tax system announced in January will likely be pushed forward
under Maduro. What Maduro is inheriting, though, is a nightmare situation that will see him stuck between using PDVSA to fund expensive
social programs that cost it $44 billion last year alone diverted from oil revenues, and cutting social spending or allowing a rise in the price of
fuel that could spark regime-threatening unrest. If Maduro feels compelled to reduce fuel subsidies, it could lead to riots as cheap fuel—which
cannot be sustained—is one of the most crucial social benefits for Venezuelans, who pay around 6 cents per gallon. Maduro has inherited a
“sinking ship” and
does not appear to have the political capital to make any short-term changes in Venezuela’s energy
policy, experts at Southern Pulse told Oilprice.com. “The main energy issue for Venezuela is that oil production is struggling, down from a
peak of about 3.2 million barrels per day in 1998 to less than 2.8 million bpd now. One would hope that fixing infrastructure, completing refinery
repairs and construction, and investing in exploration and new technology would be priorities but Maduro will not have funds to invest unless he
makes controversial cuts to social programs,” according to Southern Pulse, which does not believe that Maduro will attempt to cut fuel subsidies
any time soon. A top priority for Maduro will be boosting refining capacity, says Southern Pulse. Towards this end, Maduro may be willing to
negotiate if a partner steps forward to build a new refinery, which is a goal Chavez failed to realize. “If PDVSA fails to increase production,
PDVSA President Rafael Ramirez may be replaced this year. One way for Maduro to keep his presidency afloat is to bring new proven wells
online in the Orinoco Belt; but that will require major investment. PDVSA may need more than a minority-partner-with-a-service-contract at
those fields if they want to start pumping soon.” In the meantime, China’s foothold in Venezuela remains on solid ground. China is already privy
to 600,000 bpd from Venezuela in return for $42 billion in loans. Maduro is not likely to rock this boat with Beijing, and according to the terms
already in place, Venezuelan exports are set to increase to one million bpd by 2015, though most of the loan money has already been spent.
According to Southern Pulse, Maduro will likely seek new loans from China, but this will depend on the terms and stability in Venezuela. If this
doesn’t work, Maduro will have to look elsewhere—first to Russia and then perhaps to US Chevron or Spanish Repsol, the latter two having only
we should consider that Maduro will pursue all-out chavismo . “As
president, Maduro will govern as he thinks Chavez himself would have ruled . However, Maduro probably will not
limited operations in the country. Overall,
begin pandering to the most radical elements of his party, PSUV, because he has little to gain from that. Maduro is not blind to the myriad
problems facing the next president such as blackouts, food shortages and rampant criminal violence,” according to Southern Pulse. While it’s
status quo for now for the oil and gas industry, it’s clearly bad news for Maduro. “Despite Chavez’s immense popularity, his memory
will fade. And with time citizens who loved Chavez will blame Maduro for their struggles,” experts at Southern Pulse say. “If Maduro survives
that long, the next election in 2018 will involve a much deeper conversation about the direction of the country.” “In fact, some think that one
reason former military leader and current National Assembly Diosdado Cabello—a Chavez loyalist–did not dispute Maduro’s succession is
precisely because of the precarious financial and political situation he would have inherited.”
Chavez death changes nothing
Goodman, 13 (Josh, Bloomberg reporter responsible for economic and political coverage in
Latin America, 4/17,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-17/venezuelan-leader-s-taunts-won-t-provoke-u-s-diplomat-says-2-.html
The U.S. is unlikely to adopt a more confrontational stance toward Venezuela even as President- elect Nicolas Maduro
ratchets up his
rhetoric in the wake of his narrow victory, the State Department’s top official for Latin America said. Echoing charges frequently levied by
his political mentor, the late President Hugo Chavez, Maduro yesterday accused the U.S. of trying to oust him by supporting opposition calls for a
likened President Barack Obama’s policy
towards Venezuela to U.S. support for the overthrow of Chile’s Salvador Allende in 1973. Roberta Jacobson,
assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs, said such rhetoric has become more commonplace since
Maduro took control of Venezuela’s troubled economy following Chavez’s death from cancer last month. While that
makes it harder for relations to improve, the U.S. is unlikely to respond in kind, she said. “I don’t think there’s
going to be a marked difference in the way we respond to Maduro versus the way we responded to
Chavez,” Jacobson, a career diplomat, said in an interview from the State Department in Washington. “It still doesn’t make sense to
recount of ballots in the April 14 election he won by about 270,000 votes. Today, he
get in, you’ll excuse me, a pissing match with Nicolas Maduro any more than it did with Chavez.” While relations between the U.S. and
Venezuela have long been strained -- the two countries have gone without ambassadors since 2010 -- former president George W. Bush in his
second term adopted a more conciliatory tone toward Chavez, which Obama continued. Other Cheek At the heart of what Jacobson called a
“turning of the cheek” approach are strong commercial ties -- Venezuela was the U.S.’s fourth-biggest supplier of oil last year -- and a sense of
political realism. That means that while the U.S. won’t back away from expressing its disappointment with the fairness of the election and the
lack of a recount, that shouldn’t lead relations to deteriorate further, she said. While Russia, China and most of Latin America has congratulated
Maduro for his win, the U.S. and European Union have held back support while seeking a recount to address opposition claims of irregularities.
is sworn in as president, I don’t think that’s going to change very much from one day to
the next our positions,” said Jacobson, who has served as the U.S.’s top diplomat to Latin
America since 2011. ‘Rush to Judgment’ Jacobson said the U.S. will continue to believe that the way the election results were handled
represent a “rush to judgment” that won’t help Venezuela overcome deep political divisions. Still, Jacobson said she doesn’t harbor
much hope that relations will improve either, even after what she described as Maduro’s favorable
response to a U.S. outreach a few months ago. In November, Jacobson said she called then-Foreign Minister Maduro to discuss how
“If Friday Maduro
to get relations back on track in a likely post-Chavez government. High-level meetings between the two governments were also held, though they
lost momentum as Chavez’s worsening health came to dominate the nation’s affairs, she said. Then, in the hours before Chavez’s death,
Maduro suggested the U.S. may have poisoned the socialist leader. During the month-long campaign he
continued to ramp up “exponentially” his anti-American rhetoric, “making it much harder ” today to
find any common ground, Jacobson said. Long Harangue Jacobson’s first encounter with Maduro, at the April 2012
Summit of the Americas in Colombia, was also marked by confrontation. In a private negotiating session attended by foreign
ministers, she said she was subjected to a “long, long harangue” by Maduro, in which he accused the U.S. of imperialism and starving communist
Cuba with its half-century trade embargo. “There were many around that table who were acutely uncomfortable with him yelling -- and he was
yelling at this point -- at a woman across the table,” she said. “Closing the doors didn’t seem to make a difference.” Then, less than two months
later, at a meeting of the Organization of American States in Bolivia, the two traded pleasantries while posing side-by-side for a group photo.
Maduro said he held no grudges against her or the U.S., according to Jacobson. “It’s very hard to read these signals,” she said. “Every
time
we get to the point of actually working on substantive stuff, we end up taking steps backward
with accusations of everything from killing Chavez with cancer to coups.”
2NC AT: Business Not Regime
Plan can’t avoid accusations of supporting the regime – business and investment is coopted
Toro, 13
Fransisco Toro, Venezuelan journalist, political scientist, reported for the Washington Post, the New York Times and the Financial Times, and
was Editor of VenEconomy, Venezuela's leading bilingual business magazine. Since 2002, he has run Caracas Chronicles, the must-read Englishlanguage blog on all things Venezuelan He holds a BA from Reed College (1997), and MSc from the London School of Economics (1999) and is
currently a doctoral candidate in Political Science at the University of Maastricht, in The Netherlands. New Republic, 3/5/13,
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/112596/hugo-chavez-dead-cuba-defined-him-much-venezuela-did#
Chávez imported more than just personnel and advice; he imported the Cuban Revolution's eschatology virtually
whole. Fidel's vision of revolution as a kind of cosmic morality play pitting unalloyed socialist "good" in an unending death struggle against
the ravages of "evil" American imperialism became the guiding principle of Venezuela's revolution.
The use and abuse of anti-imperialist rhetoric as a mechanism for consolidating authoritarian control over society was the most valuable lesson
Chávez learned from Fidel. A superheated brand of unthinking anti-Americanism became the all-purpose excuse for any and every authoritarian
excess, stigmatizing any form of protests and casting a dark pall over any expression of discontent or dissent. The technique's infinite versatility
proved its central attraction: You could blame shadowy gringo infiltrator for neighborhood protests over chronic power shortages just as easily as
you could silence whistleblowers of government corruption by casting them as CIA fifth columns. In Cuba, considering the island's history as a
target for American imperialist meddling, anti-imperialism—however wantonly abused—rested on a bed of historic verisimilitude. But in
Venezuela, a country with no history of direct American imperial aggression, this borrowed bit of rhetorical posturing served only to underline
chavismo's derivative status, its ideology a kind of fidelista hand-me-down lacking even the self-awareness to realize it was decades out of date
by the time it was born. Where Chávez was able to transcend the Cuban model, it was largely due to the advantages of life at the receiving end of
an unprecedented petrodollar flood. By some estimates, Venezuela sold over $1 trillion worth of oil during his tenure, and so his was
government by hyperconsumption, not rationing. The petroboom allowed Chávez to
substitute the checkbook for the gulag ;
Rather than
declaring all out-war on business, he co-opted them. Rather than abolish civil society, he created a
parallel civil society, complete with pro-government unions, universities, radio stations and community councils. Such
enhancements were tried before by left-wing populists in Latin America, but always failed because they ran out of
money. Chávez avoided this pitfall thanks to the greatest of his innovations: He consciously
avoided a complete break with the U.S. that Castro provoked in 1960. Instead, he railed against gringo
imperialism all morning, then spent all afternoon selling those same gringos oil. The irony is that this, his
marginalizing his opponents via popular spending programs rather than rounding them up and throwing them in jail.
most important innovation, will be the one least memorialized by his admirers. It was a gloriously incoherent posture, but one that fit the square
peg of revolutionary zeal into the round hole of an import-led petropopulism. Ironically, though, in its dependence on oil rents, the Chávez model
quietly undermined its own claim to represent a new alternative to dreaded Washington-sponsored neoliberalism. After all, if Venezuela
could afford to botch the nationalization of its own steel industry, it was because there were always
petrodollars around to import the steel that local industry was no longer producing. And if nationalizations up and
down the agro-food chain resulted in food shortages, money could always be found to import the
balance. As the Venezuelan State-Owned Enterprise sector grew, it looked more and more like the
USSR's—with a single profit-generating industry cross-subsidizing a bewildering array of loss-making
concerns. Chavenomics, as a development model, boiled down to little beyond extracting oil, selling it at high prices, and using the
proceeds to paper over the rest of the system's cracks. How such a model is supposed to be relevant to countries that
don't happen to float on top of hundreds of billions of barrels in oil reserves is anybody's guess. Still and all, petropopulism's attractions were all
too clear for Chávez. Those deep, oil-lined
pockets allowed Chávez a luxury Fidel could only dream of: being
able to hold a long string of not-overtly-rigged elections without ever seriously endangering his
grip on power. It used to be that you could have either unchecked personal power or electoral legitimacy, but the petrodollar
flood allowed Chávez to have both. Elected autocracy may sound like an oxymoron, but this is exactly what the Venezuelan
synthesis of the Cuban experience yielded: a system that washed away the sins of its own aggressive contempt for dissidence and dissent through
continual recourse to the ballot box. What Hugo Chávez
built was, in other words, a flawless autocracy.
Even if its not targeted at government – congressional Critics perceive Economic
engagement and industry profits as appeasement that bolsters regime – not people
Goodenough, 12
Patrick Goodenough, Patrick covered government and politics in South Africa and the Middle East before joining CNSNews.com
in 1999. Since then he has launched foreign bureaus for CNSNews.com in Jerusalem, London and the Pacific Rim. From October
2006 to July 2007, Patrick served as Managing Editor at the organization's world headquarters in Alexandria, Va. Now back in
the Pacific Rim, as International Editor he reports on politics, international relations, security, terrorism, ethics and religion, and
oversees reporting by CNSNews.com's roster of international stringers, CNS News, 2/2/12, http://cnsnews.com/news/article/iranvenezuela-links-examined-amid-fresh-calls-terror-sponsor-designation
Links to foreign terrorist organizations The U.S. currently lists Cuba, Syria, Iran and Sudan as state sponsors
of terrorism, a
designation that carries sanctions including a ban on arms-related exports and sales, controls over exports of dual-use items,
prohibitions on economic assistance, and various financial restrictions. Designation requires a determination by the
secretary of state that a country’s government “has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism,” for example through support
for and links to “foreign terrorist organizations” (FTOs). In its most recent annual report on international terrorism, published last August, the
State Department in its section on state sponsors cites Cuba’s links with the Basque separatist group ETA and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC) – both FTOs – as well as Iranian and Syrian sponsorship of Hezbollah and Palestinian FTOs including Hamas. Yet
Venezuela’s links to Hezbollah are well-documented (as early as June 2008, the U.S. Treasury Department charged that Chavez’ government was
“employing and providing safe harbor to Hezbollah facilitators and fundraisers”) and he has also been accused of ties to FARC and to ETA.
Caracas’ cozy relationship with state sponsors of terror Cuba and Iran – including new concerns that Chavez could help Tehran to evade the latest
Western sanctions against its banks and oil exports – provide further reason, proponents say, for Venezuela itself to be designated. Rep. Connie
Mack (R-Fla.), chairman of the Foreign Affairs subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, has for several years sponsored legislation urging
most recent bill, introduced in May 2011, calls for “Venezuela to be designated a state sponsor
of terrorism for its support of Iran, Hezbollah, and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).” Mack introduced similar bills
in October 2009 and in March 2008. In a white paper on the subject last summer, Mack argued that terror-sponsor designation
was not aimed at harming Venezuela’s people but to pressure Chavez’ government to end support for terrorism.
“Each SST [state sponsor of terrorism] is treated with a unique set of sanctions, and the designation does not
action. The
prevent travel to and from Venezuela, stop legal remittances to Venezuelan families, or impact services at the US embassy.” Mack said
profits
have not benefited the Venezuelan people for years: crime is out of control, social infrastructure is destroyed, and health and
education are ruined,” the paper said. “Oil in Venezuela is used as a weapon against the people and against other,
friendly countries in the region.”
designation could target Venezuela’s oil exports, affecting more than 33 percent of the government’s revenues. “Venezuelan oil
2NC XT: Spillover
Venezuela Engagement policies spun as appeasement – triggers intense fight and derails
Obama domestic agenda priorities
Dueck, 11
Colin Dueck,professor at the Department of Public and International Affairs, George Mason University, October 1, 2011
policy review » no. 169, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/94006
Look at how Obama’s strategy of accommodation has played out in relation to four categories of foreign
governments: 1) those essentially hostile to the United States, 2) those who pursue a mixture of strategic rivalry and cooperation, 3) genuine
American allies, and 4) Arab governments of varying allegiance. The first category, of regimes basically hostile
to the United States,
includes the governments of Iran, North Korea, Cuba, and Venezuela, to name only four of the most notable. Each of
these governments has literally defined itself at a fundamental level by violent opposition to
America. To think that a conciliatory tone, a preliminary concession, or a well-intentioned desire for better relations on the part of a U.S.
president by itself will transform that hostility is simply naïve. In the case of Cuba, for example, the Obama administration began by lifting
certain economic sanctions, in the hope of seeing some reciprocal concessions from the Castro brothers: political liberalization, an easing of antiAmerican hostility, anything at all of significance. No such concessions have been made. The case of Iran has already been discussed — Obama
reached out to Tehran with great fanfare in 2009, and has received in effect a slap in the face. Both Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez and North Korea’s
Kim Jong Il are likewise just as hostile and provocative toward the United States today as they were when George W. Bush was America’s
president. This is because the fundamental barrier to friendly U.S. relations with those regimes was never George W. Bush. The fundamental
barrier to friendly relations with these regimes is the fact that they are bitterly hostile to the United States. The kinds of concessions that
Washington would have to offer to win their genuine accommodation
would be so sweeping, massive, and unacceptable,
from the point of view of any likely U.S. president that they will not be made — and certainly
not by Barack Obama. Any smaller concessions from Washington, therefore, are simply pocketed by a hostile regime, which continues
along in its basic antipathy toward the United States. So who is supposed to be the target audience here? The true audience and for that matter the
ultimate source of these various conciliatory policy initiatives is essentially a small, transnational, North Atlantic class of bien pensant opinion
who already share Obama’s core policy priorities in any case. They have rewarded him with their support, as well as with the Nobel Peace Prize.
Others internationally are less impressed. And in the meantime, we may have lost something, in terms of the ability to seriously prepare for
certain looming security challenges. A primary and continuing emphasis on diplomatic engagement after Iran has repeatedly rebuffed the United
States does not help us to prepare for the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran. A declared commitment to nuclear abolition does nothing to
convince other nuclear powers to abandon their own arsenals, and may even be counterproductive in the sense that it deludes important segments
of opinion into believing that such declarations actually help to keep the peace. Obama has said from the beginning that the purpose of his more
conciliatory foreign policy approach was to bolster American standing in the world, but the definition of international standing has actually been
highly self-referential in the direction of aforementioned transatlantic liberal opinion. In many cases overseas, from the perspective of other
governments, Obama’s well-intentioned conciliatory
gestures are read as a sign of weakness , and consequently undermine
rather than bolster American standing. In one way, however, Obama has already achieved much of what he desired with his strategy of
accommodation, and that is to re-orient American national resources and attention away from national security
concerns and toward the expansion of domestic progressive reforms. He appears to sincerely believe that these liberal
domestic initiatives in areas such as health care and finance will also bolster American economic power and competiveness. Actually they will do
no such thing, since heavy-handed and constantly changing federal regulations tend to undermine investor confidence as well as long-term U.S.
economic growth. But either way, Obama’s
vision of a more expansive government role in American society is well on
its way to being achieved, without from his point of view debilitating debates over major national security
concerns . In that sense, especially if he is reelected in 2012, several of his major strategic priorities will have
been accomplished. Any good strategy must incorporate the possibility of pushback or resistance
from unexpected quarters. As they say in the U.S. military, the enemy gets a vote. So, for that matter, do other countries, whether friendly or not.
When things do not go exactly according to plan, any decent strategy and any capable leader adapt. Indeed any decent foreign policy strategy
begins with the recognition for backup plans, since inevitably things will not go exactly according to plan. Other countries rarely respond to our
initial strategic moves in precisely the way we might wish. The question then becomes: What is plan B? Obama
is tactically very
flexible, but at the level of grand strategy he seems to have no backup plan. There is simply no recognition of the possibility that world
politics might not operate on the post-Vietnam liberal assumptions he has imbibed and represented over the years. Obama’s critics often describe
him as providing no strong foreign policy leadership. They underestimate him. Actually he has a very definite idea of where he wants to take the
United States. His guiding foreign policy idea is that of international accommodation, sparked by American
example. He pursues that overarching concept with great tactical pliability but without any sign of ideological or basic revision since coming into
office. Yet empirically, in one case after another, the strategy is not working. This is a kind of leadership, to be sure, but leadership in the wrong
direction. Obama
believes that liberal domestic initiatives will bolster American economic power
and competitiveness. How can the Obama administration adapt and adjust to the failures of its strategy of accommodation? It can
admit that the attempted diplomatic engagement of Iran has failed, and shift toward a strategy of comprehensive pressure against that regime. It
can make it abundantly clear to both the Taliban and al Qaeda that the United States will not walk away from Afghanistan, despite the beginning
drawdown. It can start treating Russia as a geopolitical rival, which it is, rather than simply as a diplomatic partner. It can strengthen U.S. missile
defenses as a form of insurance against nuclear proliferators. There is a long list of policy recommendations that can be made on specific regional
and functional matters, but the prior and most important point is the need for a change in mentality. President Obama needs to stop working on
the assumption that U.S. foreign policy concessions or gestures directed at the gallery of elite transatlantic opinion — whether on nuclear arms
control, counterterrorism, or climate change — will somehow be reciprocated by specific foreign governments in the absence of some very hard
bargaining. He needs to grasp that U.S. strategic disengagement from specific regional theaters, whether promised or underway, is taken as a sign
of weakness in those regions and not simply as a sign of benevolent restraint. He needs to recognize that America’s international reputation
consists not only of working toward his own definition of the moral high ground, but also very much of a reputation for strength, and specifically
of a reputation for the willingness to use force. He needs to stop operating on the premise that past American foreign policy decisions are the
ultimate source of much violent discord in the world today. He needs to be willing to divide the international system conceptually and
operationally into friends and enemies, as they actually exist, and to support America’s friends while pressuring and opposing its enemies
relentlessly. Finally, he needs to admit the limited effect of his own personal charisma on the foreign policies of other governments. The president
of the United States is not an international community organizer. If the conceptual framework that underpins Obama’s foreign policy strategy is
altered, then better policies will flow on a wide range of specific issues. Obama needs to be willing to support America’s friends while pressuring
and opposing its enemies relentlessly. Admittedly, there is little chance that Obama will concede any of this. One of the things we know from
historical example is that presidents tend to keep operating on their own inbuilt foreign policy assumptions, even as contrary evidence piles up. It
usually takes either a dramatic external shock, or a new administration altogether, to bring about a major revaluation of existing assumptions.
Curiously, this resistance to contrary evidence in foreign policy appears to be even truer of highly educated, self-confident, and intelligent people
with core ideological convictions — a description that certainly fits President Obama. Obama
is malleable on tactics, and he takes
great care to project an aura of sensible calm, but in truth he is a conviction president powered by certain core ideological beliefs and
vaulting policy ambitions. His characteristic response when these core beliefs and ambitions are truly tested by opponents or events
is not to bend, but to bristle. He is therefore particularly unlikely to admit or even perceive that a foreign policy strategy based upon faulty
assumptions of international accommodation is failing or has failed. Nor is it politically convenient for him to do so. More likely, he will continue
along his chosen path, offering nothing more than tactical adjustments, until some truly dramatic event occurs which brings his whole foreign
policy strategy into question — an Iranian nuclear test, for example.
2NC XT: Congress
sparks fierce congressional fight - extremists control Venezuela debate and anything short
of confrontation gets viewed as appeasement
Harper, 10 (liz, Senior Editor @ US Institute for Peace, adjunct fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs,
americasquarterly.org contributing blogger based in Washington DC, 12/21, http://americasquarterly.org/node/2058)
Venezuela’s Formal Rejection of Ambassador-Designate Larry Palmer The long-running
debate over how to deal with the
irrational and impulsive strongman, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, has reached feverish pitch this winter. The latest
casualty in this war of words has become U.S. Ambassador Larry Palmer, the Obama administration's nomination as ambassador to Venezuela.
Worse yet, Chávez ultimately got what he wanted out of this latest battle: his choice of who will not be our next Ambassador in Venezuela. On
Monday, Venezuela formally told the U.S. to not bother sending Larry Palmer as the next ambassador since he would be asked to return the
moment he landed in Caracas. How did this all go down? Like
Cuba, any U.S. move regarding Venezuela involves egos,
politics and fortunately, some policy. Naturally, when Palmer went before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee over the summer,
the career diplomat—characterized by some at the U.S. Department of State as "not a Washington man"—he already faced an uphill slog. Our
domestic debate over Venezuela generally falls into two camps: engagement and confrontation . There
are, of course, shades of gray and nuances between the two sides—though such voices are so often
overpowered by the more extreme views. On one side, you have those espousing "strategic
engagement," keeping in line with the Obama administration's stated foreign policy and national security objectives. In short
and broadly speaking, these proponents might argue, with an irrational state, you shouldn't turn your back. Look where that got us with North
Korea, Iran and Syria. Instead you want a seat at the table to start a dialogue based on mutual respect and to build on areas of mutual interest. You
raise concerns discretely and express disapproval quietly or through third parties. As one person said, engagement should be “subversive,"
because you
seek to assert positive influence by being present and through cooperation on areas such as business
development, financial opportunities, or culture and sports. Indeed, Palmer was the right guy to carry out this mission. But,
the engagement policy, as it is practiced with Venezuela, seems more like "appeasement ," say people
clamoring for a tougher approach. After all, for years now, we have witnessed a democracy's death
by a thousand cuts. This past week, Hugo Chávez got one of his Christmas wishes with the approval of new decree powers, thereby
further eroding the country's once well-established institutional checks and balances. Chávez threatens more than human rights and democratic
norms; the
U.S. has legitimate national security concerns, such as nuclear proliferation, terrorism and
narcotrafficking. Yet, as Chávez runs roughshod over international norms, is the U.S. working to halt the downward spiral? Those
are the broad brush strokes of the debate into which Palmer was tossed.
opposition to economic engagement in Venezuela is increasing – triggers fight in congress
and Israel lobby hates it
Farnsworth, 10
Eric, contributing blogger to americasquarterly.org. He is Vice President of the Council of the Americas in
Washington DC, 11/3/10, http://americasquarterly.org/node/1976
Now What? Elections and the Western Hemisphere Tuesday’s election results were not unexpected. The question now is what will they mean
for U.S. policy in the Western Hemisphere. The outlines are already clear: expect a sharper tone
across the board of Congressional oversight and initiative toward the Administration in trying to
impact policy. Here are a few predictions for regional policy based on the midterm election results. The new chair of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee will be Ileana Ros-Lehtinen; the chair of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee will be Connie Mack.
Together with newly-elected Senator Marco Rubio, this troika of Florida Republicans may well seek to
reverse the Obama Administration’s slow motion liberalization of Cuba policy. Expect also a harder line coming
from Congress toward Venezuela and the possible renewal of an effort to sanction Venezuela as a state
sponsor of terror. As well, Chairman-To-Be Ros-Lehtinen has earned strong pro-Israel credentials and is a
strong supporter of Iran sanctions; further moves of Brazil or Venezuela toward Tehran could well prove to be a
point of friction between the Administration and Congress if the Administration is perceived as
downplaying their significance.
spun as appeasement – triggers intense fight and derails Obama domestic agenda priorities
Dueck, 11
Colin Dueck,professor at the Department of Public and International Affairs, George Mason University, October 1, 2011
policy review » no. 169, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/94006
Look at how Obama’s strategy of accommodation has played out in relation to four categories of foreign
governments: 1) those essentially hostile to the United States, 2) those who pursue a mixture of strategic rivalry and cooperation, 3) genuine
American allies, and 4) Arab governments of varying allegiance. The first category, of regimes basically hostile
to the United States,
includes the governments of Iran, North Korea, Cuba, and Venezuela, to name only four of the most notable. Each of
these governments has literally defined itself at a fundamental level by violent opposition to
America. To think that a conciliatory tone, a preliminary concession, or a well-intentioned desire for better relations on the part of a U.S.
president by itself will transform that hostility is simply naïve. In the case of Cuba, for example, the Obama administration began by lifting
certain economic sanctions, in the hope of seeing some reciprocal concessions from the Castro brothers: political liberalization, an easing of antiAmerican hostility, anything at all of significance. No such concessions have been made. The case of Iran has already been discussed — Obama
reached out to Tehran with great fanfare in 2009, and has received in effect a slap in the face. Both Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez and North Korea’s
Kim Jong Il are likewise just as hostile and provocative toward the United States today as they were when George W. Bush was America’s
president. This is because the fundamental barrier to friendly U.S. relations with those regimes was never George W. Bush. The fundamental
barrier to friendly relations with these regimes is the fact that they are bitterly hostile to the United States. The kinds of concessions that
Washington would have to offer to win their genuine accommodation
would be so sweeping, massive, and unacceptable,
from the point of view of any likely U.S. president that they will not be made — and certainly
not by Barack Obama. Any smaller concessions from Washington, therefore, are simply pocketed by a hostile regime, which continues
along in its basic antipathy toward the United States. So who is supposed to be the target audience here? The true audience and for that matter the
ultimate source of these various conciliatory policy initiatives is essentially a small, transnational, North Atlantic class of bien pensant opinion
who already share Obama’s core policy priorities in any case. They have rewarded him with their support, as well as with the Nobel Peace Prize.
Others internationally are less impressed. And in the meantime, we may have lost something, in terms of the ability to seriously prepare for
certain looming security challenges. A primary and continuing emphasis on diplomatic engagement after Iran has repeatedly rebuffed the United
States does not help us to prepare for the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran. A declared commitment to nuclear abolition does nothing to
convince other nuclear powers to abandon their own arsenals, and may even be counterproductive in the sense that it deludes important segments
of opinion into believing that such declarations actually help to keep the peace. Obama has said from the beginning that the purpose of his more
conciliatory foreign policy approach was to bolster American standing in the world, but the definition of international standing has actually been
highly self-referential in the direction of aforementioned transatlantic liberal opinion. In many cases overseas, from the perspective of other
governments, Obama’s well-intentioned conciliatory
gestures are read as a sign of weakness , and consequently undermine
rather than bolster American standing. In one way, however, Obama has already achieved much of what he desired with his strategy of
accommodation, and that is
to re-orient American national resources and attention away from national security
concerns and toward the expansion of domestic progressive reforms. He appears to sincerely believe that these liberal
domestic initiatives in areas such as health care and finance will also bolster American economic power and competiveness. Actually they will do
no such thing, since heavy-handed and constantly changing federal regulations tend to undermine investor confidence as well as long-term U.S.
economic growth. But either way, Obama’s
vision of a more expansive government role in American society is well on
its way to being achieved, without from his point of view debilitating debates over major national security
concerns . In that sense, especially if he is reelected in 2012, several of his major strategic priorities will have
been accomplished. Any good strategy must incorporate the possibility of pushback or resistance
from unexpected quarters. As they say in the U.S. military, the enemy gets a vote. So, for that matter, do other countries, whether friendly or not.
When things do not go exactly according to plan, any decent strategy and any capable leader adapt. Indeed any decent foreign policy strategy
begins with the recognition for backup plans, since inevitably things will not go exactly according to plan. Other countries rarely respond to our
initial strategic moves in precisely the way we might wish. The question then becomes: What is plan B? Obama
is tactically very
flexible, but at the level of grand strategy he seems to have no backup plan. There is simply no recognition of the possibility that world
politics might not operate on the post-Vietnam liberal assumptions he has imbibed and represented over the years. Obama’s critics often describe
him as providing no strong foreign policy leadership. They underestimate him. Actually he has a very definite idea of where he wants to take the
United States. His
guiding foreign policy idea is that of international accommodation, sparked by American
example. He pursues that overarching concept with great tactical pliability but without any sign of ideological or basic revision since coming into
office. Yet empirically, in one case after another, the strategy is not working. This is a kind of leadership, to be sure, but leadership in the wrong
direction. Obama
believes that liberal domestic initiatives will bolster American economic power
and competitiveness. How can the Obama administration adapt and adjust to the failures of its strategy of accommodation? It can
admit that the attempted diplomatic engagement of Iran has failed, and shift toward a strategy of comprehensive pressure against that regime. It
can make it abundantly clear to both the Taliban and al Qaeda that the United States will not walk away from Afghanistan, despite the beginning
drawdown. It can start treating Russia as a geopolitical rival, which it is, rather than simply as a diplomatic partner. It can strengthen U.S. missile
defenses as a form of insurance against nuclear proliferators. There is a long list of policy recommendations that can be made on specific regional
and functional matters, but the prior and most important point is the need for a change in mentality. President Obama needs to stop working on
the assumption that U.S. foreign policy concessions or gestures directed at the gallery of elite transatlantic opinion — whether on nuclear arms
control, counterterrorism, or climate change — will somehow be reciprocated by specific foreign governments in the absence of some very hard
bargaining. He needs to grasp that U.S. strategic disengagement from specific regional theaters, whether promised or underway, is taken as a sign
of weakness in those regions and not simply as a sign of benevolent restraint. He needs to recognize that America’s international reputation
consists not only of working toward his own definition of the moral high ground, but also very much of a reputation for strength, and specifically
of a reputation for the willingness to use force. He needs to stop operating on the premise that past American foreign policy decisions are the
ultimate source of much violent discord in the world today. He needs to be willing to divide the international system conceptually and
operationally into friends and enemies, as they actually exist, and to support America’s friends while pressuring and opposing its enemies
relentlessly. Finally, he needs to admit the limited effect of his own personal charisma on the foreign policies of other governments. The president
of the United States is not an international community organizer. If the conceptual framework that underpins Obama’s foreign policy strategy is
altered, then better policies will flow on a wide range of specific issues. Obama needs to be willing to support America’s friends while pressuring
and opposing its enemies relentlessly. Admittedly, there is little chance that Obama will concede any of this. One of the things we know from
historical example is that presidents tend to keep operating on their own inbuilt foreign policy assumptions, even as contrary evidence piles up. It
usually takes either a dramatic external shock, or a new administration altogether, to bring about a major revaluation of existing assumptions.
Curiously, this resistance to contrary evidence in foreign policy appears to be even truer of highly educated, self-confident, and intelligent people
with core ideological convictions — a description that certainly fits President Obama. Obama
great care to project an aura of sensible calm, but in truth he
is malleable on tactics, and he takes
is a conviction president powered by certain core ideological beliefs and
vaulting policy ambitions. His characteristic response when these core beliefs and ambitions are truly tested by opponents or events
is not to bend, but to bristle. He is therefore particularly unlikely to admit or even perceive that a foreign policy strategy based upon faulty
assumptions of international accommodation is failing or has failed. Nor is it politically convenient for him to do so. More likely, he will continue
along his chosen path, offering nothing more than tactical adjustments, until some truly dramatic event occurs which brings his whole foreign
policy strategy into question — an Iranian nuclear test, for example.
2NC XT: Cuba Lobby
Venezuala and Cuba policies inherently tied – even after chavez
Toro, 13
Fransisco Toro, Venezuelan journalist, political scientist, reported for the Washington Post, the New York Times and the Financial Times, and
was Editor of VenEconomy, Venezuela's leading bilingual business magazine. Since 2002, he has run Caracas Chronicles, the must-read Englishlanguage blog on all things Venezuelan He holds a BA from Reed College (1997), and MSc from the London School of Economics (1999) and is
currently a doctoral candidate in Political Science at the University of Maastricht, in The Netherlands. New Republic, 3/5/13,
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/112596/hugo-chavez-dead-cuba-defined-him-much-venezuela-did#
What Fidel Taught Hugo Cuba defined Chávez's career as much as Venezuela did Hugo Chávez died today in Venezuela at the age of 58, but his
battle with a never-specified form of cancer was waged largely in a Cuban hospital—a telling detail, as Cuba loomed just as large in his political
imagination as his native country. It's a point that my gringo friends up north always struggle with. The Cuban Revolution's immense influence
on the region has been constantly underestimated and misunderstood from day one. It's only a slight exaggeration to suggest that everything of
note that's happened south of the Rio Grande since 1959 has been an attempt either to emulate, prevent, or transcend the Cuban experience.
Chávez will be remembered as the most successful of Fidel Castro's emulators, the man who breathed new life into the old revolutionary dream.
Starting in the 1960s, guerrilla movements throughout the hemisphere tried to replicate the Sierra Maestra rebels' road to power, to no avail. In
the '70s, Chile's Salvador Allende tried the electoral route, but he didn't have a clear majority. In the '80s, Nicaragua's Sandinistas had the
majority and rode it to power, but took over a state too bankrupt to implement the social reforms they'd always championed. Chávez had all
three—power, votes, and money—plus charisma to boot. His was the last, best shot at reinventing Caribbean Communism for the 21st century.
At the root of the extraordinarily close alliance Chávez built with Cuba was a deep, paternal bond between two
men. A fiercely independent figure, the messianic Chávez was never seen to kowtow to anyone. But there were special rules for Fidel. Chávez's
extraordinary devotion sprung from Castro's status as the mythical Hero-Founder of Latin America's post-war hard left. Chávez loved to brag of
his frequent, spur-of-the-moment trips to Havana to seek Castro counsel. When he was diagnosed with the cancer that ultimately killed him,
Chavez got invites from high-tech medical centers in Brazil and in Spain, but it was never in doubt where he would seek treatment. Chávez
trusted Fidel, literally, with his life. There's no comparable relationship between two leaders in contemporary world politics, and it had its
political consequences—especially for Chávez. In a Cold War throwback, his
government welcomed tens of thousands of
Cuban doctors, trainers, and "advisors"—including, por supuesto, an unknowable number of spies—to Venezuela. And tens of
billions of petrodollars flowed in the opposite direction, a resource stream that propped up the last
bastion of totalitarianism in the Western Hemisphere long past its sell-by date. For Fidel, who had had his eyes on
Venezuela's oil riches since the 1960s, Chávez's election was an unbelievable stroke of luck. Much has been written about the way Venezuela
stepped in to fill the fiscal and strategic void the collapse of the Soviet Union left in Cuba, but the reality is much stranger than that. As the
unquestionably senior member of their Cold War alliance, the Soviets treated Cuba as just another satellite state; Fidel's subjugation to a cold war
superpower was always something of an embarrassment to him. In
the Caracas-Havana axis, by contrast, the paymaster
doubled up as the vassal. Venezuela effectively wrote a fat petrocheck month after month for the
privilege of being tutelaged by a poorer, weaker foreign power. The extent of this reverse colonization was startling. Cuban
flags eventually came to flutter above Venezuelan military bases and Venezuelans witnessed the surreal spectacle of
a democratically elected president telling them that Venezuela and Cuba share "a single government "
and that Venezuela "has two presidents ." Cuban military advisors kept watch over Venezuela's
entire security apparatus, and had exclusive control over Chávez's personal security detail. Through most of his 20-month battle with
cancer, the Castros had better information about the president's condition than even his inner circle back home, and they maneuvered
successfully to ensure a pro-Havana diehard , Nicolás Maduro, won the tough battle for succession.
Economic support for venezuala is key factor in Cuba policy – Maduro changes nothing
Ponce, 13
Dr. Carlos Ponce, general coordinator of the Latin American and Caribbean Network for Democracy, co-editor of
the political magazine “Nueva Politica”, lecturer in several U.S. and Latin American Universities and member of the
Steering Committee of the World Movement for Democracy and the ISC of the Community of Democracies,
1/12/13, http://www.capitolhillcubans.com/2013/01/venezuelas-coup-made-in-cuba.html
Hugo Chávez was aware of the potential complications of this new surgery and he clearly
oath on January 10th, or in case of his death, his
said that in case he became unable to take
chosen one to run for president was Nicolás Maduro. And the Constitution in
Venezuela is clear: the mandate began on January 10th, 2007 and ends January 10th, 2013, and if the elected president can’t take the oath that day
the Assembly’s President assumes power temporarily and calls for new elections within a maximum of 30 days. But for Cuba, which
receives more than $10 billion a year plus other benefits from Venezuela, this is not acceptable. Fidel
and Raúl Castro have been close friends and supporters of Chávez's regime for economic
reasons. Thanks to Hugo Chávez and his fake revolution, the Cuban dictatorial regime has been able to
survive this past decade. For Castro’s regime, the future of Chávez will also mark Cuba’s future .
The Castro brothers have become the conciliators and advisors of the two most powerful acolytes
of Chávez as well as of some fractions from the military. Castro has been coordinating the meetings
among Diosdado Cabello, the president of Venezuelan National Assembly, Vice President Maduro, Chávez’s
family and some sectors of the military.
GOP and Cuba lobby HATE Venezuela and spin plan as appeasement
Boothroyd, 12
Rachel Boothroyd, journalist in Caracas, Venezuela. She contributes to Venezuelanalysis, Pulsamerica and Correo
del Orinoco International, and has had pieces published on other sites such as the Latin American Bureau, Green
Left Weekly, Znet and Global Research.9/25/12, http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/7283
Republicans Vow to Halt “Policy of Appeasement” in Venezuela Caracas, September 23 2012
(Venezuelanalysis.com) – Republican nominee for Vice-President of theU.S., Paul Ryan, has vowed that a Romney administration would get
“tough on Castro, tough on Chavez” and to end what he described as a “policy of appeasement” applied by the
Obama administration towards both Cuba and Venezuela. Ryan made the comments from the Versailles Restaurant in
Miami, Florida last Saturday, where he was accompanied by staunch members of the anti-Castro lobby , including
Republican Representative, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen. Ros-Lehtinen is a member of the Cuban-American Lobby and the
Congressional Cuban Democracy Caucus; organisations which claim to be aimed at speeding up Cuba’s “transition to democracy”. "In a Mitt
Romney administration, we will not keep practising
this policy of appeasement, we will be tough on this brutal dictator (Castro).
All it has done is reward more despotism ... We will help those pro-democracy groups. We will be tough on Castro,
tough on Chavez. And it's because we know that's the right policy for our country,” said Ryan. The nominee had
reportedly travelled to Florida in a bid to win over the majority Latino vote two months ahead of the US elections. Florida is currently thought to
be a “swing state” and could prove a determining vote for the overall election results. Results of a recent voter intention poll in the state carried
out by NBC news show that Obama currently has a 5% lead over Romney, with a voting intention of 49% to 44%. ‘I learned from these friends,
from Mario (Diaz-Balart), from Lincoln (Diaz-Balart), from Ileana (Ros-Lehtinen), just how brutal the Castro regime is, just how this president's
policy of appeasement is not working. They've given me a great education, lots of us in Congress, about how we need to clamp down on the
to Ros-Lehtinen, Ryan is now a “loyal friend” to those who
campaign on Cuba-related political issues. Ryan's statements have caused some Democrats to accuse him of hypocrisy after
Castro regime,” said Ryan. According
he appears to have dramatically changed his stance on Cuba-US relations. Prior to 2007, the Republican had called for “free trade” between all
nations, which included voting to lift the trade embargo on Cuba. "To paraphrase President Clinton, it takes real brass to vote three times against
economic sanctions on the Cuban regime and then come to Little Havana and ask Cuban-Americans for their vote," said Giancarlo Sopo, a
Cuban-American supporter who told the US' Sun Sentinel that he would vote for Obama. "It's one thing to have a genuine disagreement with
someone on a policy. It's something else to change your position from one day to the next just to pander in order to win votes,” added Sopo.
Recently leaked footage of a meeting between Romney and party donors also showed the presidential hopeful lambasting
Obama for
believing that “his magnetism and his charm, and his persuasiveness is so compelling that he can sit down with people like Putin and
Chávez and Ahmadinejad, and that they'll find that we're such wonderful people that they'll go on with us, and they'll stop doing bad
things”. The leaked recording also shows Romney referring to Iranian President Ahmadinejad as a “crazed fanatic” and Iranian mullahs as
“crazy people”. He also commented that, in his view, the Palestinian people have “no interest whatsoever in establishing peace”. With the
presidential elections now drawing near, the
Republican party is beginning to increasingly outline its prospective domestic and
foreign policy, which Romney has said would be principally based on an attempt to implement a neo-liberal “Reagan economic zone” in
Latin America and other regions, such as the Middle East. The Republican presidential candidate has been outspoken in his
criticism of the “anti-American” views purported by the governments of Venezuela, Cuba and Iran
and has described them as one of the biggest threats to the United States today. Earlier in July, Romney
branded the Venezuelan government as a “threat to national security” and accused the country's
president, Hugo Chavez, of “spreading dictatorships and tyranny throughout Latin America”. The Republican National
Committee also circulated a video of Obama shaking hands with Chavez at the OAS “Summit of the
Americas” in Trinidad and Tobago 2009 at the same time. Romney has often claimed that the leader of Venezuela's Bolivarian
revolution has links to “terrorist” organisations such as Hezbollah and has access to weapons that
could “harm the US”. He has never presented any evidence in support of these accusations.
Powerful cuba lobby hates Venezuela economic engagement – even under maduro
Kozloff, 13 (Nikolas, doctorate in Latin American history from Oxford University, author of
Hugo Chavez: Oil, Politics and the Challenge to the U.S. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007),
Revolution! South America and the Rise of the New Left (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), No Rain
in the Amazon: How South America's Climate Change Affects the Entire Planet (Palgrave
Macmilan, 2010), Huffington Post, 4/14, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nikolas-kozloff/maduro-electionsvenezuela_b_3078387.html)
Déjà Vu? Washington's
War on Cuba and Venezuela: From the Kissinger Files to 'Cable Gate' If the polls are to be believed,
successor Nicolás Maduro will probably defeat the political opposition in Sunday's presidential
election, thus securing and solidifying Cuban-Venezuelan ties yet further . Such an outcome will come as a
severe disappointment to Washington, which has spent the better part of 40 years trying to prevent
such a diplomatic alliance from developing in the first place. For evidence of U.S. paranoia over Cuba ,
one need only consult the so-called "Kissinger files," sensitive State Department cables recently made accessible by
whistle-blowing outfit WikiLeaks. The correspondence, which dates between 1973 and 1976, underscores Henry Kissinger's
single-minded obsession with quarantining Cuba lest Castro's influence be felt far afield. In late 1973,
U.S. diplomats expressed concern about Venezuelan moves to end Cuba's diplomatic isolation, and
Hugo Chávez's
were particularly worried that Caracas might "put together Organization of American States [OAS] majority in support resolution permitting
reestablishment relations with Cuba." Washington was also perturbed by reports that Venezuelan Navy vessels had departed for Cuba in order to
load up on large shipments of sugar, and diplomats contemplated
a possible cutoff of aid to Caracas in retaliation.
Not only had the State Department grown alarmed about such developments, but rightist anti-Castro
exiles were becoming restive as well. According to the U.S. Embassy in Caracas, the exiles were "appalled" at the
prospect that COPEI, the current party in power, might renew relations with Cuba. In an ominous move, the exiles planned to publish full page
newspaper ads against the COPEI administration. Hoping to punish COPEI at the polls, exiles threw their support to opposing party Acción
Democrática (or AD) in the 1973 presidential election. Ultimately, the Americans noted, such support proved critical and " highly
influential Cuban-Venezuelan entrepreneurs, backed by Cuban money from Miami" helped AD
candidate Carlos Andrés Pérez secure an electoral victory. The Rise of CAP If Kissinger or the Cuban exile community however
hoped that Pérez, sometimes known simply as "CAP," would prove amenable to their designs they would be sorely disappointed. History has not
been kind to CAP, largely due to the latter's second and disastrous presidency which lasted from 1989 to 1993, during which time the veteran
politician followed the diktats of the International Monetary Fund and nearly drove Venezuela to the point of social collapse. Nevertheless,
during his first incarnation in the 1970s CAP was regarded as a nationalist and something of a galvanizing figure on the Third World circuit.
From 1974 to 1979, during his first presidency, CAP nationalized U.S. oil companies and oversaw a program of massive social spending. Writing
to Kissinger in Washington, the
U.S. ambassador in Caracas fretted that Venezuela now had "the
economic strength and political leadership in president Pérez to make her will felt beyond her borders."
Indeed, the diplomat added, "the energy crisis and president Carlos Andrés Pérez's electoral victory in December 1973 coincided and together
have changed Venezuela's perception of herself and her world role." Just like Chávez some 20 years later, CAP was "rapidly emerging as a
hemisphere figure." Taking advantage of windfall oil prices, CAP had turned Venezuela into a large international donor of development
assistance. Personally, the ambassador feared that CAP had grown too large for his britches as the youthful firebrand politician was fast becoming
"a Latin American spokesman for the developing third world countries vis-a-vis the developed nations, especially the Unites States." Reading
through the Kissinger files, one
is possessed with an incredible sense of déjà vu. Combing through paranoid U.S.
anything
the correspondence underscores just how hostile Washington has been to any nationalist politician
emerging in Venezuela , particularly if such a figure threatened U.S. priorities in the Caribbean.
telegrams, it's easy to imagine that diplomats might have been referring not to CAP but to charismatic Hugo Chávez. Indeed, if
Specifically, U.S. diplomats and anti-Castro exiles worried that CAP might use his newfound
diplomatic clout to edge closer to Fidel.
Congress and GOP backlash and media spin ensure perceived as appeasement, weak on
security and soft on Castro– also a flip flop Robertson, 12
Ewan Robertson, 4/11/12, Latin America Bureau analyst @ Venezuala Analysis, http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/6916
As both countries head toward important presidential elections this year, the United States has been intensifying its interventionist policy
in Venezuela. However, US attempts to influence Venezuela’s domestic politics while casting it a “rogue state” on an
international level, is leaving the Obama administration increasingly out-of-sync with Latin America’s new political reality. US Intervention in Venezuela Since the
election of President Hugo Chávez in 1998, US policy has aimed at removing the Venezuelan president from power and ending the Bolivarian Revolution which he
leads. This policy has included support by the Bush presidency for the short-lived April 2002 coup in Venezuela, which failed after mass protests returned Chávez to
power. Since then the US has focused on nurturing Venezuela’s conservative opposition, channelling over US$100 million to groups opposed to Chávez since 2002.
Washington and US corporate mass media have attempted to de-legitimise his government
internationally in a propaganda campaign, portraying Venezuela as a threat to the US and its president as a “dangerous dictator” who
has trampled upon democracy and human rights. Any hopes that the Obama administration would usher a new era of respect for Venezuelan sovereignty have
Meanwhile
long been dashed, with intervention intensifying as Venezuela’s October 7th presidential election draws closer and Chavez seeks his third term in office. In the last
imposed sanctions on Venezuela’s state oil company PDVSA for trading with Iran,
expelled the Venezuelan consul in Miami based on a suspect documentary implicating the Venezuelan diplomat in
plotting a cyber-attack against the US, and publicly criticised the appointment of Venezuela’s
new Defence Minister Henry Rangel Silva. While direct US actions have maintained a constant rhythm of
pressure against Venezuela, Washington’s hopes of removing Chávez from power undoubtedly lie in the possibility of the conservative Democratic
twelve months the US government has
Unity Table (MUD) opposition coalition defeating Chávez in this year’s presidential election. According to investigative journalist Eva Golinger, the US is providing
the opposition in Venezuela with political advice and financial support to the tune of US$20 million $20 million this year. This funding for anti-Chávez groups comes
from the US national budget, State Department-linked agencies, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and USAID, along with the US Embassy in Caracas.
A curious detail suggests that the US Embassy has become a key conduit for the distribution of this money. While the Embassy currently only maintains a Charge
D’Affairs responsible for diplomatic operations, and overall staff levels remain unchanged, the Embassy budget jumped from almost $16 million in 2011 to over $24
million for 2012, an unexplained increase of over $8 million. Washington has long worked to see the development of a united Venezuelan opposition capable of
defeating Chávez. With the current MUD coalition displaying relative unity behind opposition presidential candidate Henrique Capriles Radonski, and the still popular
Chávez currently undergoing treatment for cancer, the US is likely hoping 2012 is the year to see an end to Chávez’s administration. Indeed, the make-up of
Venezuela’s opposition reads like a “who’s who” of figures who have received advice and financial support from US sources over the previous decade. Several of
those who ran in the opposition’s February primary elections to elect the MUD presidential candidate have ties with US financial aid, including the winner Radonski.
His political party Primero Justicia has been a key recipient of funding and political training since its founding in 1999, which has helped it to grow into a national
force. US funding has also followed fellow primaries candidate Leopoldo López throughout his political career, first in Primero Justicia, then in Un Nuevo Tiempo
from 2002, before receiving NED and USAID funding to support his own organisation Voluntad Popular. MUD National Assembly deputy and primaries candidate
Maria Machado Corina has also received heavy US financial support, as well as holding a private meeting with George W Bush in 2004. Machado has recently been
appointed as a coordinator for Radonski’s “Tricolour Command” presidential election campaign, while Leopoldo López is now a member of the Radonski campaign’s
select Political Strategic Command. The Political Strategic Command is headed by experienced opposition figure Professor Ramón Guillermo Aveledo, who with his
close political colleagues “assists US sponsors in pouring money into the MUD,” according to analyst Nil Nikandrov. The importance of US funding in helping to
shape the current Venezuelan opposition should not be underestimated. Indeed, according to US Embassy cables released by Wikileaks, in 2009 US Embassy chargé
d’affaires John Caulfield argued for increased US funding of opposition groups, as “without our continued assistance, it is possible that the organizations we helped
Washington’s approach
to Venezuela moving into 2012 has been the increase of aggressive rhetoric designed to de-legitimise the
government and open the possibility of more direct intervention. At a special Organisation of American States (OAS) session held in Washington in March,
Democrat Congressman Eliot Engel said Venezuelan democracy was being “trampled” by the Chávez
administration and advocated a “robust” OAS mission be sent to the country to monitor the October presidential elections. Not to be
outdone by their Democratic counterparts, Republicans have continued to wind up the rhetorical
dial on Venezuela . In a presidential nomination debate in Florida this January, Mitt Romney made a commitment to “punish
those who are following” Hugo Chávez and his ally Fidel Castro, ex-president of Cuba. He claims that Obama has
“failed to respond with resolve” to Chávez’s growing international influence, arguing in his October 2011 foreign policy white paper foreign
policy white paper that he would “chart a different course” in US policy toward Venezuela and other leftist
governments in Latin America. Of course, US foreign policy has nothing to do with concern for democracy nor fabrications that Venezuela is
create ... could be forced to close...Our funding will provide those organizations a much-needed lifeline”. Another aspect of
involved in plotting an attack against the US.
Nationalized industries and trade ties ensure economic engagement can’t avoid backlash as
soft on Venezuela regime, national security, Cuba and terrorism
Robertson, 12
Ewan Robertson, 4/11/12, Latin America Bureau analyst @ Venezuala Analysis, http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/6916
Venezuela is one of the region’s most vibrant democracies, witnessing a huge increase in political participation in the previous decade, both in internationally-
Figures in
Washington routinely ignore the facts and the evidence regarding Venezuela, for example never mentioning the Chileancertified free and fair elections and in new grassroots forms, such as the thousands of communal councils which have sprung up around the country.
based Latinobarometro regional poll in which Venezuelan citizens regularly demonstrate they have one of the highest levels of support for democracy, and satisfaction
with how their democracy works in practice, in Latin America. Rather,
Venezuela has refused to play its
the issue for policy makers in Washington is that since the arrival
role
of Chávez
designated
within US imperial strategy. That is, to offer a reliable supply of cheap oil
controlled by US companies, to act as a market for US-based private foreign investment, and to conduct itself as a submissive ally in US diplomacy. It is the Chávez
policies of national control over oil and using the resource to fund social programmes, nationalising
strategically important industries, and vocally opposing US foreign policy while pursuing regional integration on
principles contrary to “free trade” that have made Venezuela a “problem” for US foreign policy. The Regional Dynamic
One of the Chávez’s administration’s key regional integration initiatives is the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America
(ALBA), established by Cuba and Venezuela in 2004 as an alternative to US free trade agreements by
emphasising mutual solidarity and joint development between member states. The group now contains eight members in Latin
administration’s
America and the Caribbean. Venezuela has also reached out to the Caribbean with the Petrocaribe initiative, in which Venezuela sells oil at preferential rates to
The US has responded by trying to isolate
Venezuela and discredit the ALBA. Romney has described it as a “ virulently anti-American ‘Bolivarian’ movement
across Latin America that seeks to undermine institutions of democratic governance and economic opportunity”.
Meanwhile, Council of Foreign Relations analyst Joe Hirst rather fancifully tried to paint the organisation’s inclusion of
social movements as a mechanism for promoting international terrorism , using information from the long-discredited Farc laptops .
The US has also applied diplomatic pressure to discourage other states from strengthening ties with
Venezuela. These have included using intimidation and diplomatic manoeuvres to try to prevent an alliance between Nicaragua and Venezuela after the 2006
participating nations to support their development, with 18 Caribbean states now participating.
election of leftist Daniel Ortega to the Nicaraguan presidency, and using threats and pressure against Haiti in 2006-7 to scupper the Préval government’s plan to join
Petrocaribe. This strategy failed, with Nicaragua joining the ALBA at Ortega’s inauguration in early 2007 and the first Petrocaribe oil shipment reaching Haiti in
March 2008.
Cuba fears drive US politics on Venezuela policy and opposition to the plan
Kozloff, 13 (Nikolas, doctorate in Latin American history from Oxford University, author of Hugo Chavez: Oil,
Politics and the Challenge to the U.S. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), Revolution! South America and the Rise of the
New Left (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), No Rain in the Amazon: How South America's Climate Change Affects the
Entire Planet (Palgrave Macmilan, 2010), Huffington Post, 4/14, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nikolaskozloff/maduro-elections-venezuela_b_3078387.html)
Ratcheting up Pressure on Cuba In May, 1974 the U.S. ambassador in Caracas confronted the Venezuelan
Foreign Minister with reports claiming that Venezuela sought to import sugar from Cuba. The ambassador
explained that he would be "glad to explore ways and means of trying to find additional sugar for Venezuela from countries other than Cuba."
Defiantly, CAP shot back that "he intended to go ahead with trade exchanges, including the sale of Venezuelan rice for Cuban sugar." Sure
enough, in early 1975 the U.S. Embassy noted that a Cuban vessel had loaded up on Venezuelan rice at a local port. Even
more
seriously, the Americans fretted that CAP might be tempted to ship oil to Cuba in the event that OAS
sanctions were removed. Already, the Soviets were interested in decreasing Cuban dependence on oil transported from the USSR, and indeed
Pérez reportedly related in private that Moscow had "been pressing him" to ship oil to the Communist island nation. In late 1976, CAP followed
up by traveling to the U.S.S.R. where he inked a deal to export oil to Cuba. On the diplomatic front meanwhile, CAP angered the Americans by
resuming relations with Cuba. In Caracas, the Cubans opened a new embassy and staff reportedly included five known intelligence officers.
Cuban news agency Prensa Latina meanwhile expanded its activities greatly in Venezuela. In Washington, Kissinger grew
alarmed
that Venezuela and other sympathetic nations might move to end the sanctions regime on Cuba, and the Secretary
therefore instructed his staff to delay any such vote at the OAS. Hardly deterred, CAP went ahead and organized an OAS conference in Quito in
November, 1974. However, when CAP failed to obtain the necessary votes, the Venezuelan took out his frustrations on the Americans, remarking
indignantly that Washington had bullied certain nations from either abstaining or voting against the OAS initiative. CAP Reacts to Posada Attack
Naively perhaps, CAP told U.S. diplomats that he was interested in becoming a kind of "bridge" between Washington and unfriendly Latin
governments. Privately, American officials wrote that Venezuela, a major oil supplier to the U.S., was "far too important to allow us to drift into
an adversary relationship." "If we choose openly to combat greater Latin American unity," the U.S. ambassador wrote, "the U.S. risks harming its
highly important interests in Venezuela and exacerbating its relations with the hemisphere." Whatever the feelings over at the State Department,
however, the CIA might have had other ideas in mind. Still
smarting from CAP's betrayal, anti-Castro Cubans plotted
against the island nation. One such figure was Cuban-born Luis Posada Carriles, a longtime CIA asset. During the 1970s Posada
moved to Venezuela where he oversaw U.S. intelligence operations. He is thought to be responsible for the worst terrorist attack in the
hemisphere at the time, a hit on Cubana flight 455 which departed Caracas en route to Cuba in October, 1976. After a brief stopover in Barbados,
the plane exploded in midair, killing all 73 passengers aboard. Officially, Posada was no longer in the employ of the CIA at the time of the
bombing, having left the agency in July. There's no evidence that the CIA directly orchestrated the plot, though records show that Posada may
have notified the agency in advance that was a bomb was set to go off. In Caracas meanwhile, the government began to suspect that the U.S. was
engaged in foul play. Dismissing Cuban claims of U.S. destabilization as propaganda, American diplomats assured the Venezuelans, rather
unconvincingly, that there was "no conspiracy underway to destabilize anything." Ironic Coda Though his administration was dogged by
allegations of corruption, CAP still had enough credibility to run for a second term in office in 1988. Campaigning again with the AD on a
nationalist platform, CAP was elected to the presidency once more but promptly reversed course and adopted more pro-U.S. policies favorable to
the International Monetary Fund. In 1992, CAP faced down a military coup orchestrated by none other than Hugo Chávez and others. Though
Chávez was imprisoned, the paratrooper later ran successfully for president. In 1998, Chávez was democratically elected and split apart the
corrupt two party AD-COPEI system. Ironically, even though Chávez spent the better part of his career deploring CAP's excesses, the former
military officer carried out a very similar foreign policy predicated on opening up relations with Cuba and rhetorically challenging the U.S. If
anything, Washington made things worse at this point by seeking to unseat Chávez, and drove Venezuela to pursue even closer links with Cuba.
That, at least, is the impression one gets from reading yet another batch of sensitive U.S. correspondence released by WikiLeaks and known as
"Cable-Gate." From CAP to Chávez Carrying on from CAP's earlier opening in the 1970s, Chávez opened up regular commercial and military
flights between Cuba and Venezuela. In a further blow, Cuba extended its influence at Venezuelan ports. Perhaps even more seriously, Chávez
was apparently so taken with the Castro brothers that he consulted directly with Cuban intelligence officers without even bothering to vet the
reporting through his own intelligence services. Even as diplomatic relations improved with Cuba, daily dealings with the U.S. Embassy in
Caracas took a complete nosedive, as I explain in a recent al-Jazeera column. WikiLeaks cables also illuminate a scheme which led to the
exchange of discounted Venezuelan oil for Cuban assistance in the health sector. In an echo meanwhile of earlier press openings under CAP,
Venezuela and Cuba now provide joint support for a hemispheric-wide news channel, Telesur. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly in light of
Sunday's presidential election, the Americans suspected that Cuba provided key expertise to Chávez on how to expand Venezuela's national
electoral registry. It is a fitting irony that to this day, the Posada case continues to fester and, if anything, has only served to bring Cuba and
Venezuela closer together. Indeed, both countries have sought to extradite Posada, who currently resides openly in Miami. During the recent
presidential campaign, Chávez heir Maduro even claimed that Posada was linked to a group of mercenaries who are intent on assassinating him.
Assessing Kissinger Files and Cable-Gate Looking
back upon Washington's 40-year campaign to roll back an
incipient Cuban-Venezuelan alliance , one is struck by a sense of profound political and diplomatic waste,
not to mention the State Department's skewed moral compass. From the Kissinger files to Cable-Gate, America's counter-productive campaign
only served to inflame public opinion and, if anything, made Venezuela even more nationalistic by the time of Chávez's arrival on the scene in the
1990s. If Maduro wins on Sunday, as expected, Chávez's heir apparent will probably
demonstrating once again the complete and utter bankruptcy of U.S. foreign policy.
deepen Cuba ties even further, thus
2NC XT: Laundry List
Our GOP, Appeasement, Cuba Lobby, Committee and Rubio Links
Mazzei, 12
Patricia, and Erika Bolstad, Miami Herald, 7/11/12, http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/07/11/vfullstory/2891728/republicans-attack-obama-for-chavez.html
over President Barack Obama’s remark about Hugo Chávez Republicans criticize President
Obama for saying Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez has not threatened U.S. national security. The
region’s experts, however, side with Obama. Republicans, led by Mitt Romney and Florida Sen. Marco Rubio, pounced
on President Barack Obama on Wednesday after he told a Miami TV anchor that Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez
does not pose a “serious” national security threat to the United States. Republicans wasted no time in
firing up a key South Florida constituency coveted by both Romney and Obama: Cuban-American
voters who hate Chávez for his close ties to the Castro regime in Cuba. “President Obama hasn’t been
paying attention if he thinks that Hugo Chávez, with buddies like the regimes in Cuba, Iran, and
Syria, drug cartels, arms traffickers, and extremist groups, is not a threat to the United States,” said
Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen of Miami, chairwoman of the House Foreign Affairs committee and co-chair of Romney’s
National Hispanic Steering Committee. “I am deeply disappointed that this administration continues to bury its
head in the sand about threats to U.S. security, our interests, and our allies.” Rubio said Obama “has been
living under a rock ” when it comes to Chávez, and said the president “continues to display an alarmingly
naïve understanding of the challenges and opportunities we face in the western hemisphere.”
Other Cuban-American lawmakers issued statements in the same critical vein , and Senate candidate Connie Mack, a
Republican congressman from Fort Myers, tied his opponent Sen. Bill Nelson, D-Fla., to the president’s
remarks. Experts in the region, though, called Obama’s comments reasonable. Chávez is “certifiable,” with a tremendous ego fueled by the
Mitt Romney, GOP
howl
power that comes from sitting on vast oil reserves — but he’s not as dangerous as the leaders of other less friendly regimes, said Riordan Roett,
the director of Latin American Studies Program at the School of Advanced International Studies at The Johns Hopkins University. The
Republican criticism is “just pure electoral politics,” Roett said. “He poses no security threat to the United States or anyone
else,” Roett said. “Hugo Chávez is not going to attack us, he’s not going to occupy our embassy, he’s not going to bomb U.S. planes arriving in
Caracas at Maiquetía Airport. He is a loudmouth who enjoys listening to himself, and has built up on the basis of oil revenue, a very, very
populist, dependent regime that can’t deliver on basic services, on goods and commodities to his own people.” Here’s what Obama told Oscar
Haza, a Spanish-language broadcast journalist and anchor in an interview with Obama that aired Tuesday night on A Mano Limpia (which
roughly translates to “The Gloves Are Off”), Haza’s nightly show on WJAN-Channel 41: “We’re always concerned about Iran engaging in
destabilizing activity around the globe,” Obama said. “But overall my sense is that what Mr. Chávez has done over the last several years has not
had a serious national security impact on us. We have to be vigilant. My main concern when it comes to Venezuela is having the Venezuelan
Romney
called Obama’s comment “stunning and shocking” and said in statement it’s a sign of “a pattern of
weakness” in the president’s foreign policy. “It is disturbing to see him downplaying the threat
posed to U.S. interests by a regime that openly wishes us ill,” Romney said. “Hugo Chávez has provided
people have a voice in their affairs, and that you end up ultimately having fair and free elections, which we don’t always see.”
safe haven to drug kingpins, encouraged regional terrorist organizations that threaten our allies like Colombia, has strengthened military ties with
Iran and helped it evade sanctions, and has allowed a Hezbollah presence within his country’s borders.” White House press secretary Jay Carney
declined to answer questions about the president’s remarks. The president’s campaign spokesman, Ben LaBolt, said Romney is only “playing into
the hands of Chávez” and his “outdated rhetoric” by giving him any attention. “Because of President Obama’s leadership, our position in the
Americas is much stronger today than before he took office,” LaBolt said. “At the same time, Hugo Chávez has become increasingly
marginalized and his influence has waned. It’s baffling that Mitt Romney is so scared of a leader like Chávez whose power is fading, while
Romney continues to remain silent about how to confront al-Qaeda or how to bring our troops home from Afghanistan.” Michael Shifter,
president of the Washington D.C.-based think tank Inter-American Dialogue, cautioned that it’s up to the
president to judge in an election year whether it’s politically smart to talk about Chávez in a way that draws
such heated Republican response in South Florida — especially considering how valuable the swing state’s votes are to Obama’s
prospects.
2NC XT: Israel Lobby
Triggers intense opposition from both Israel and Cuba lobbies and their Congressional
allies
Madsen, 11
Wayne Madsen, Investigative journalist, author and syndicated columnist. Has some twenty years experience in security issues.
As a U.S. Naval Officer, he managed one of the first computer security programs for the U.S. Navy. He has been a frequent
political and national security commentator on ABC, NBC, CBS, PBS, CNN, BBC, Al Jazeera, and MS-NBC. He has been
invited to testify as a witness before the US House of Representatives, the UN Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and an terrorism
investigation panel of the French government. A member of the Society of Professional Journalists (SPJ) and the National Press
Club., 6/20/11, http://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2011/06/20/the-outsourcing-of-influence-peddling-to-the-israelilobby.html
he confluence of the Israel Lobby with pressure groups such as those that support the Saakashvili regime in Georgia is not
an isolated situation. Before the rise to power of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey,
T
Israel could rely on the support of successive Turkish governments. Turkey, in turn, established its own Washington-based lobbying group, the American Turkish
Council, which was modeled on the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). It was recently learned from Turkish government officials in Washington
that the secret network of Turkish military officers, politicians, intelligence officers, professors, and journalists known as “Ergenekon,” which plotted a series of coups
against independent-minded Turkish governments, was a construct of the CIA and Mossad. An in-depth investigation of the Ergenekon network conducted by the
Turkish intelligence service discovered that many of the key players in Ergenekon were Dönme, the descendants of Turkish Jews who converted to Islam and, to
varying degrees, now practice a combination of Kabbalah Judaism and Islamic Sufism while remaining secular and Turkish nationalist in the mold of Turkish state
the Israel Lobby has made common cause with the right-wing Cuban exile
community in Florida, which has become as influential in the politics of south Florida as the
many Jews and Israelis who live there. The convergence of interests of pro-Israelis and Cuban
Gusano exiles can best be seen in the current chair of the House Foreign Relations Committee,
Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, who represents a congressional district in south Florida. Ros-Lehtinen, who is of Cuban
Jewish descent, is one of AIPAC’s and the ADL’s best friends in Congress . She is also a vociferous
opponent of the governments of Venezuela and Nicaragua, both of which have severed diplomatic relations
with Israel and have recognized the independence of Abkhazia, to the dismay of Israel, AIPAC, and the ADL. While RosLehtinen rattles sabers against Venezuela, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay, and other Latin
American nations that have recognized Palestine within its 1967 borders, she supports continued U.S. military assistance to Colombia, Honduras, Costa
Rica, and Panama, Israel’s last four remaining allies in Latin America. Ros-Lehtinen, while decrying alleged human rights “abuses” in
Venezuela and Nicaragua, is silent on actual abuses in Colombia, where Israelis routinely supply weapons and advisers to the government in its inhumane war
founder Kemal Ataturk. Similarly,
with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), peasants, and labor unionists. The trial in New York of Russian air cargo services owner Viktor Bout for
allegedly trying to sell weapons to the FARC is one outcome of the strategic alliance between Israel, its U.S. Lobby, and the right-wing Latin American exiles and
intelligence operatives who call Miami their home. The conviction and imprisonment of former Yukos owner Mikhail Khodorkovsky, considered a major agent-of-
Venezuela, Nicaragua, Abkhazia, Turkey,
and other nations that have incurred the ire of the Israel Lobby either directly or via outsourcing deals made
influence for Israel in Russia and a one-time potential President of Russia, has placed Russia in the same category as
with strategic allies
such as the Georgians,
Cuban exiles , or, now, in the case of Turkey, the Armenians. In the past, AIPAC always ensured that
“Armenian genocide” resolutions failed in the U.S. Congress, a payback for Turkey’s support for Israel. With Turkey adopting an independent foreign policy, AIPAC
and the ADL are now strategically allied with the Armenian lobby to push for Armenian genocide resolutions in Washington and elsewhere.
Triggers Israel lobby and congressional backlash to economic involvement in venezuela
Cole, 12
Juan, Richard P. Mitchell Professor of History and the director of the Center for South Asian
Studies at the University of Michigan, 1/11,
http://www.guernicamag.com/daily/juan_cole_ahmadinejad_in_latin/
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has begun a four-nation tour in Latin America that will include Nicaragua,
Cuba, Venezuela and Ecuador. In part, the trip is for propaganda purposes. With the European Union joining in an Israeli-inspired U.S.
boycott of Iran’s Central Bank, which in essence translates into a boycott of buying Iranian petroleum, Tehran is desperate to underline that it still
has friends in the world. Most of these are in Asia, but Latin
America still does have regimes that will defy the U.S. attempt
to isolate Iran. In one sense, these are not important countries geopolitically or economically. But an embargo strategy of the sort
that the U.S. is pursuing depends heavily on there being no significant leaks. Venezuela has $4 billion
worth of joint projects with Iran. (This article stresses a military dimension, with Revolutionary guards posted to the Iranian embassy
in Caracas and a comparison to Soviet policies in Latin America, which led to the Cuban missile crisis. I see these Iranian moves more as an aid
to espionage than being military in character.) Venezuela
is also significant because in 2009 it established a joint
bank with Iran, which allows Iranian financial institutions to interface with other banks via Caracas.
Some in the Israel lobbies in the U.S. Congress have urged financial sanctions on Venezuela in order to close this
loophole. But that step would make it difficult for the U.S. to pay for Venezuelan petroleum, a significant source of America’s oil imports. As it
is, the U.S. Government won’t accept contracts from the Venezuela state petroleum company because the latter helps Iran with gasoline
production. I doubt the U.S. government itself did much business with the company so it sounds to me like another symbolic sanction. I doubt
Brasilia much likes the idea of a U.S.-Europe financial and energy boycott of a country of the global South. The
U.S. just expelled
the Venezuelan consul in Miami over a Univision investigative report alleging a Cuban-Venezuelan-Iranian plot
to hack U.S. nuclear facilities. (Note to the Cuba and Israel lobbies: This story is not very plausible and you wouldn’t want one of its members to
be in the U.S.—hackers can be anywhere and like anonymity.)
Jew Hating is explicit Venezuela policy – sparks lobby demands for isolation
Samuels, 10
Shimon Samuels is Director for International Relations of the Simon Wiesenthal Centre, which holds consultative
status at the Organisation of American States and the Latin American Parliament, 3/25/10,
http://www.thejc.com/news/world-news/29926/analysis-in-venezuela-antisemitism-state-policy
A new report by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) has criticised the Venezuelan
government for encroaching on the civil and political rights of its people, and particularly those of its
Jewish community. The report expressed particular concern about the rising number of antisemitic incidents,
and noted that the government-controlled media "contributed to creating an atmosphere of intimidation
and violence against the Jewish community in Venezuela". This is cause for serious alarm. However,
it is hardly surprising. Since Hugo Chavez took power, antisemitic expression has grown exponentially: in
government media; in the dissemination of the Protocols of Zion; in the accusation that "Semitic banks" are sabotaging the economy; in
the fact that the Caracas Jewish school was raided twice by armed forces "searching for Mossad-supplied arms caches"; in the desecration of two
synagogues; and in the closing of the Israeli Embassy. The Venezuelan ambassador to Moscow even alleged that Jewish citizens implicated in a
2002 anti-Chavez coup were "Mossad agents". The origins of Mr Chavez's attitude can be traced to the influence wielded over him by his
Argentine, pro-Nazi, Holocaust-denying school companion, the late Norberto Ceresole, who - in his 1998 book on Mr Chavez's election victory warned of the Venezuelan "Jewish mafia". In a 2004 Christmas Eve message, Mr Chavez claimed that "the descendants of those who crucified
Christ, the descendants of those who expelled Bolivar and crucified him in their own way… took possession of the riches of the world. A
minority appropriated the world's gold, the silver, the minerals, the water, the good lands, the oil and has concentrated the riches in a few
hands…" Here he was mixing the motifs of the Jews as Christ-killers and of Marxism. The next year, Mr Chavez compared the Spanish conquest
of the Indians to the situation of the Palestinians and, a year after that, tolerated the appearance of "Hizbollah Venezuela", an indigenous Wayuu
Indian tribe that has embraced Shiah Islam and is essentially a jihadi transplant into the region. Much,
too, has been made of the
burgeoning Venezuela-Iran strategic alliance. This is primarily anti-American, but its
antisemitic/anti-Zionist quotient is an added binding factor. A weekly Caracas-Tehran flight was inaugurated in
November 2004 by Mr Chavez, who arrived in Iran at the very moment his Special Forces raided the Caracas Jewish School. Mr Chavez is
undoubtedly obsessed with a world Jewish conspiracy represented by the less than 12,000 Jews remaining in Venezuela. They are
becoming the scapegoat for his dysfunctional administration and the economic crisis that is engulfing a country blessed with oil,
coffee and sugar. One third of the Jewish community has fled, fearing Soviet-style state antisemitism. Indeed,
such a policy has all the appearances of having already begun. A pro-Chavez television show named Venezuelan
Jewish leaders as anti-Venezuelan conspirators, and called on other Jews "not involved in the conspiracy" to publicly denounce their
coreligionists. A Chavista newspaper editorial questioned whether "we will have to expel them from our country… as other nations have done."
The Wiesenthal Centre's 2009 appeal to the Organisation of American States to conduct an enquiry into Venezuelan government–inspired
antisemitism has resulted in its associated Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Report. Within
this catalogue of
Caracas's violations of fundamental rights, it unambiguously documents the government's
incitement to Jew-hatred as a policy of state . For as long as this autocratic regime strategically endangers
the Western hemisphere and targets the classic scapegoat, pro-democracy activists will surely
lobby for its isolation from the international community.
Case
Terror
1NC
Venezuela doesn’t sponsor dangerous Hezbollah activity – that’s a myth.
Tegel ‘13
Simeon Tegel is a British journalist based in Peru and is GlobalPost's senior correspondent for South America. He writes about a broad range of
themes across Latin America – “American conservatives warn of militant Islam's spread in Latin America. But their claims are hard to prove” –
Salon.com – Jan 8, 2013 – http://www.salon.com/2013/01/08/is_venezuela_harboring_hezbollah/
American conservatives warn of militant Islam's spread in Latin America. But their claims are
hard to prove Is Venezuela providing operational support to Islamic terrorists? That deadly serious
question is increasingly troubling foreign policy and security experts as the South American country and Iran — which funds Hezbollah — move
ever closer. Despite deep cultural differences, a shared antagonism toward the US has drawn Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and his Iranian
counterpart, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, into an unlikely political friendship in recent years. “Iran is an example of struggle, resistance, dignity,
revolution, strong faith,” Chavez said during one early visit to Tehran. “We are two powerful countries. Iran is a power and Venezuela is
becoming one. We want to create a bipolar world. We don’t want a single power [i.e., the US].” Beyond the rhetoric lies a strategic alliance that
has seen Caracas, along with Damascus and Havana, vote against United Nations sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program, and increasing
Iranian investment in the Venezuelan economy, now worth more than $5 billion. All of that is very public. But,
as veteran US Republican Latin Americanist Roger Noriega,
according to critics such
Venezuela is also providing operational support to
Hezbollah, the Lebanese-based organization classified as terrorist by the US, UK and other allies.
It even came up in November’s US
elections, with the Republicans claiming in their official online party platform: “Venezuela has become a narco-terrorist state, turning it into an
Iranian outpost in the Western hemisphere.” “The current regime issues Venezuelan passports or visas to thousands of Middle Eastern terrorists
The GOP did not respond to GlobalPost’s requests for
was questioned — and even ridiculed — by several security experts in Israel and
South America contacted by GlobalPost. “ That is exaggerated . Generally, this kind of activity [terrorism] is
conducted by small units. It is political rhetoric,” said Ely Karmon, one of Israel’s top independent counter-terrorism
experts. Nicholas Watson, a senior analyst at British firm Control Risks, who specializes in South America, agreed, describing it
as “unhelpful.” He added: “That kind of rhetoric, the blatant accusations, doesn’t help the US’ position in the
region. It actually plays into Chavez’s hands and strengthens him within Venezuela.” That Hezbollah has been active in Latin America is
offering safe haven to Hezbollah trainers, operatives, recruiters and fundraisers.”
comment. But its claim
hardly news. Argentine investigators have linked the group to two deadly bombings in Buenos Aires in the 1990s. Together, the attacks on the
Israeli Embassy and a Jewish cultural center killed 114 people. One of five Iranians wanted by Interpol over the second bombing, Ahmad Vahidi,
is now Iran’s defense minister. Last year, he had to make a rapid departure during a state visit to Bolivia when Argentine prosecutors requested
Bolivian police arrest him. Meanwhile, according to the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, a Washington, DC, nonprofit research group, there’s
growing evidence that Hezbollah is infiltrating other parts of Latin America, taking advantage of widespread corruption and drug trafficking to
raise funds for its activities in the Middle East. The Buenos Aires attacks took place years before Chavez, now cancer-stricken but recently reelected, came to power in Venezuela. He was even in jail, awaiting trial for his role in a failed coup, at the time of the first bombing, on the Israeli
embassy. Nevertheless, a jigsaw of data, put together by everyone from Karmon to Manhattan District Attorney Robert Morgenthau, paints a
disturbing picture of apparent bilateral cooperation in areas such as Iran’s outlawed nuclear ambitions and the Venezuelan military’s adoption of
Tehran’s defense doctrine of “asymmetrical” warfare; in other words, guerrilla resistance to a potential US invasion. Now canceled, there was
also a secretive weekly flight from Caracas to Tehran, with a stopover in Damascus, operated jointly by Iran Air and Conviasa, the state airlines
in Iran and Venezuela respectively. Karmon and others say the passengers did not pass through customs. Meanwhile, Venezuela’s Lebaneseborn Interior Minister Tareck El Aissami — who was previously in charge of the country’s passport office, fueling the Republican claim of
papers being given to Islamic terrorists — makes no secret of his sympathies. “I’m also the son of Arabs, I’m Palestinian, I’m Iraqi, and today
we are the resistance force,” he said at a 2009 event in support of Palestinians in Gaza. “There are Hezbollah supporters in the Venezuelan
government. They have been neither investigated nor fired. They have been kept in their jobs,” said Roman D. Ortiz, director of Bogota-based
security consultancy Decisive Point. But does that translate into the Chavez government arming or providing training facilities or other logistical
support to Hezbollah? “The
existence of a Lebanese community [in Venezuela] plus a left-wing populist
government plus the anti-American rhetoric does not equal terrorism,” says Control Risks’ Watson. “ That
is speculation .”
The status quo is no longer threatening — sponsoring terrorism was a Chávez-led doctrine
— that dies out with Maduro
Ghitis 13 — independent commentator on world affairs and a World Politics Review contributing editor (Frida
Ghitis, World Politics Review, 01-10-13, “World Citizen: Will Venezuela-Iran Links Survive Chávez?”,
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12615/world-citizen-will-venezuela-iran-links-survive-chavez,
Accessed 06-30-2013 | AK)
Chávez made anti-Americanism the cornerstone of his foreign policy, working at
every step to antagonize U.S. goals and undermine Washington’s influence. Perhaps the greatest irritant of
all was the close relationship he forged with Iran, a country the U.S. and its allies believe is trying to develop nuclear weapons and sponsoring
international terrorism. As the U.S. spearheaded efforts to pass United Nations sanctions to stop Iran’s nuclear enrichment, Chávez traveled to Tehran and, along
with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, provocatively announced the creation of what they called an “Axis of
Unity” against the U.S. The two countries work together in a number of areas. Of particular interest to the U.S. is Venezuela’s help to Iran in circumventing international
sanctions. The question for Washington now is how to maximize the chances that once Chávez leaves the scene, the
ties linking Caracas and Tehran, more than 7,000 miles away, will fade. Just before the end of the year, President Barack Obama signed
into law the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act, which instructs the State
Department to develop a strategy to “address Iran’s growing hostile presence and activity” in
Latin America, and directs the Department of Homeland Security to take measures to protect U.S. borders with Mexico and Canada to keep out “operatives from Iran . . . Hezbollah
or any other terrorist organizations.” For Iran and its Lebanese ally Hezbollah, Chávez’s worsening condition could not come at a worse
During almost 14 years in office,
time . Their closest and most crucial ally, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, is engulfed in a brutal civil war, likely to put an end to his regime and possibly destroy Syria’s ties with Iran and
Hezbollah. The headwinds they face in Latin America recently came up in a speech by none other than Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. Speaking a couple of days after the start of the year,
Nasrallah said 2013 would bring a “very dangerous phase” for his organization, citing efforts to add the group to the European Union’s terrorist list and to restrict its movements in Latin America
Chávez dramatically acknowledged he may not be able
to remain in power and anointed Vice President Nicolas Maduro as his chosen successor. Washington has already taken tentative
as specific challenges. Before traveling to Cuba for his most recent cancer surgery,
steps, seeking to reach out to Maduro -- as has Tehran. It is not exactly clear what the American strategy is, but there is no indication that the first moves were effective or well-received. The U.S.
said that a telephone conversation between Maduro and a top State Department official, Roberta Jacobson, was aimed at improving relations, and there have been reports of other bilateral
contacts. However, Maduro lashed out at reports that relations with Washington would improve after Chávez dies, calling it a distortion and manipulation by Washington. At about the same time,
Iranian media reported a telephone call between Maduro and Ahmadinejad. The two are already friends. Maduro has strong connections with Tehran, having met in person with top officials on
many occasions during visits to Iran and having served as their host when they traveled to Venezuela. Maduro is a favorite to succeed Chávez in both Tehran and Havana, not to mention Caracas.
The Venezuelan constitution says if the president dies or cannot take office, the head of the National Assembly would take power temporarily. That position is held by another Chávez loyalist,
Diosdado Cabello. After 30 days, a new election would take place. Cabello and Maduro are just two of several Chávez supporters who would vie for power in the factional power struggles to
succeed the iconic president. Chávez’s unqualified blessing means that for now Maduro is the country’s most powerful man. He would benefit from an initial surge of support. And there is no
question he and the Chavista forces have a firm grip on all the institutions of power. Chávez’s entrenched United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) will not crumble without its leader. And
there is no denying that Chavismo thrived because of Chávez . There is no guarantee it will survive
without him in the long term, especially in the face of daunting economic problems, beginning with a budget deficit that stands at an astonishing 20 percent of GDP.
yet,
For Washington, this means that forging ties with Maduro risks strengthening him against his rivals, helping him quash internal rivals and legitimize his rule at a time when it is unclear just how
closely he and other Chavistas plan to follow the constitution. Infighting within the ruling party’s ranks, and the lack of a candidate with strong personal appeal, could open the way for the
opposition. Opposition leader Henrique Capriles, who mounted a strong campaign against Chávez in last October’s presidential election, is on record saying he would bring a dramatic change in
foreign policy, ending arms purchases from Russia, pulling away from China, reviewing oil deals that strengthen other authoritarian regimes in Latin America -- and rethinking controversial links
with Iran. Washington would do well to keep conversations at the lowest possible volume, whether with the opposition or other would-be Chávez successors, while openly urging Venezuela to
abide by democratic norms. If, in the event Chávez is unable to serve his term for whatever reason, a fair contest is allowed and enough time passes to loosen the emotional power of grief, the
A close
relationship between Iran and Venezuela has always been a geographic and diplomatic oddity,
one made possible only because of Chávez’s own worldview. Chávez’s immediate successor will
seek to maintain it, but the intensity and impact will be difficult to preserve for long in a post-Chávez
Venezuelan people may wake up to the dismal state of their economy, and discover there are better ways to decrease poverty and build lasting prosperity than Chavismo.
Venezuela .
Hezbollah not a threat to the US and Noriega is wrong.
Willans ‘13
Pierce Willans is currently pursuing a degree in political science at Seton Hall University – “Venezuela News: Hezbollah is in Venezuela, But
There's No Threat to U.S. Security” – Policymic – March – http://www.policymic.com/articles/29303/venezuela-news-hezbollah-is-in-venezuelabut-there-s-no-threat-to-u-s-security
Is Hezbollah in Venezuela? Probably. A more interesting question is: Does it matter, and if so, how much? American
foreign policy hawks have been sounding the alarm on this for years, claiming Hezbollah’s
activities in South America, which they often refer to as "America’s backyard," are a threat to national security. The U.S. State
Department labels Hezbollah as a terrorist organization and Iranian proxy. The origins of Hezbollah are murky, but it first emerged as a force in
the early 1980s, in reaction to Israel’s occupation of Southern Lebanon. During this period, the group quickly gained infamy in the United States
when it blew up the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, killing over 200 Marines, only months after it had blown up the U.S. Embassy there. That
being said, attacks
on American targets have been the exception, rather than the rule. Throughout its history,
the majority of Hezbollah’s energies have been directed towards Israel. In the decades since its creation,
Hezbollah has evolved and expanded its activities, operating as a political party in Lebanon while simultaneously maintaining its separate
criminal and military activities. Sometime in the 1980s they are believed to have established a foothold in South America, probably to raise funds
from the large Lebanese community there. It has been established that the group is engaged in narcotrafficking and money laundering, no doubt
spurred in part by Iran’s declining support due to the crushing international sanctions against it. Though their activities in Latin America appear
to be primarily aimed at raising money, fears of Hezbollah’s capacity for violence in the region are not without basis; Hezbollah is widely blamed
for bombing the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires and then again that city’s Jewish Community Center in the early 90s, killing over 100 people.
The fears of a Venezuelan-Hezbollah axis seem to be spurred in large part by the highly visible personal friendship
between the late Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. This unlikely alliance between two men of
such different cultural backgrounds appears to be a product of their respective governments’ isolation and shared antagonism towards the United
States. In the UN, Venezuela has voted against international sanctions on Iran for its nuclear program. Iran has billions of dollars invested in
have been most
prominently voiced by Roger Noriega. Mr. Noriega is currently a visiting fellow at conservative
think tank the American Enterprise Institute. Mr. Noriega is no stranger to murky Iran-Latin
American intrigue; while at the U.S. Agency for International Development, he was implicated in the Iran-Contra Scandal during the
Venezuela. There is, however, nothing particularly treacherous about that. The claims of a more sinister relationship
Reagan administration. He subsequently served in high-level diplomatic posts under President George W. Bush, including as Ambassador to the
Organization of American States, where he supported the abortive coup against Hugo Chavez in 2002. More recently, he has publicly accused
Venezuela of having a secret nuclear program. In his July 2011 testimony before Congress, Mr. Noriega further stoked the fires by claiming that
Venezuela actually supports Hezbollah and allows it and drug cartel members to operate in its territory, though he offered no proof. He also
hinted darkly that the federal government knows more than it is willing to say publicly on the subject.
Noriega clearly knows how
to get attention in Washington, but that is not the same as offering well-informed advice . In this post-9/11 foreign
policy environment, his efforts seem to be aimed at reinforcing conservatives’ penchant for conflating a
group’s stated anti-American sentiments with an unstated intention to actually do us harm. In many
ways, Hezbollah’s activities in Latin America are similar to those of other drug cartels, which are rightly viewed as a problem. But their activies
are a law enforcement problem, and needs to be confronted without the hysteria that seems to accompany any statement containing "Hezbollah"
and "America’s backyard" in the same breath.
Iran prolif not inevitable – prefer expert reporters.
Hibbs ‘13
(Mark Hibbs is a former journalist who has been covering nuclear proliferation issues for more than 30 years. In 2006, The Atlantic's William
Langewiesche wrote that Hibbs "must rank as one of the greatest reporters at work in the world today." Hibbs is now a Bonn-based senior
associate with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace – This article is an interview of Hobbs by The Atlantic – “Is a Nuclear Iran
Inevitable ?” – The Atlantic – April 12th – http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/04/is-a-nuclear-iran-inevitable/274924/)
You mention that there are countries like Iran that don't necessarily pursue the path to the bomb in terms of months or years -- they pursue it in
terms of slow progress that reaches a kind of momentum where it's almost irreversible. Do
you think that we've reached the
point with Iran where they've slowly built their capability to the point that it's inevitable that they get the bomb,
unless there's something major like war, an attack or some sort of internal social breakdown that prevents them from getting there?¶ No, I
don't believe that. I think that most analysts would conclude that between the period of around the middle of the 1980s and today,
there have been forces in Iran that have led certain people in the decision-making structure to try to have a nuclear
weapons capability. There are probably others in the system who didn't want that. Iran is by no
means a monolithic country.¶ ...Iran right now has a decision to make. It has acquired considerable nuclear capability which have
brought them very far along down a path towards obtaining a nuclear weapons capability. There's no question about that in my mind. But right
now it's up to Iran to decide whether it's going to draw a red line there, or whether it's going to cross it. And I think there's
no consensus right now about which direction Iran's going to move in.
US won’t respond with nuclear lash-out.
Washington Post ‘7
(Thursday, August 2, 2007 – “Obama says no nuclear weapons to fight terror” – http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/08/02/AR2007080201375_pf.html)
Obama said Thursday he would not use nuclear weapons "in any circumstance" to
fight terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan, drawing criticism from Hillary Rodham Clinton and other Democratic rivals." I think it would be
a profound mistake for us to use nuclear weapons in any circumstance," Obama said, with a pause, "involving
civilians." Then he quickly added, "Let me scratch that. There's been no discussion of nuclear weapons. That's not on the
table."
Presidential hopeful Barack
No nuclear terrorism – tech barriers.
Chapman ‘12
(Stephen, editorial writer for Chicago Tribune, “CHAPMAN: Nuclear terrorism unlikely,” May 22, http://www.oaoa.com/articles/chapman87719-nuclear-terrorism.html)
A layperson may figure it’s only a matter of time before the unimaginable comes to pass. Harvard’s Graham Allison, in his book “Nuclear
Terrorism,” concludes, “On the current course, nuclear terrorism is inevitable.” But remember: After Sept. 11, 2001, we all thought
more attacks were a certainty. Yet al-Qaida and its ideological kin have proved unable to mount a second strike.
Given their inability to do something simple — say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck bomb — it’s
reasonable to ask whether they have a chance at something much more ambitious . Far from being plausible, argued
Ohio State University professor John Mueller in a presentation at the University of Chicago, “the likelihood that a terrorist group
will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small.” The events required to make that happen
comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb or fissile material, perhaps
from Russia’s inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would have already gone missing . Besides, those
devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not maintained quickly become what one expert calls “radioactive
scrap metal.” If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes
and other safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an
ally — for reasons even the Iranians can grasp. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals
inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. Then comes the task of building a bomb. It’s not
something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a
safe haven and advanced equipment — plus people with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die
for the cause. Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American
soil. Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time — but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or
extortion. This, like every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of people who know
what’s going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up. That has heartening implications. If
al-Qaida embarks on the project, it has only a minuscule chance of seeing it bear fruit. Given the formidable odds, it probably
won’t bother. None of this means we should stop trying to minimize the risk by securing nuclear stockpiles, monitoring terrorist
communications and improving port screening. But it offers good reason to think that in this war, it appears, the worst eventuality is one
that will never happen.
Terrorist will use Conventional Weapons instead.
Hashmi ‘12
(Muhammad, author of “Nuclear Terrorism in Pakistan: Myth of Reality,” and expert in defense and strategic studies, “Difficulties For Terrorists
To Fabricate Nuclear RDD/IND Weapons – Analysis,” Jan 30, http://www.eurasiareview.com/30012012-difficulties-for-terrorists-to-fabricatenuclear-rddind-weapons-analysis/)
Many believe that these threats of nuclear terrorism are inflated and have been overstated because technical
hurdles still prevent terrorists from acquiring or building a nuclear device. Brain McNair argues that the threats of
nuclear terrorism have been exaggerated by the world. As the matter stands today, the possibility of nuclear terrorism remains more a fantasy than
fact. Furthermore, Shireen Mazari argues that Nuclear weapons would not be a weapon of choice for terrorists. Instead, she
claims that “terrorists already have access to enough destructive capabilities with in conventional means, so their
need for nuclear weapons is simply not there.” Analysts have endorsed the assessment that the threat of
nuclear action by terrorists appears to be exaggerated. Similarly, religious cults and left-wing terrorists with their beliefs
of certain prohibitions against mass murder are less likely by many estimates to use WMDs in a terrorist
activity, even though there is not any guarantee that terrorists will use WMDs. It has also been witnessed that no terrorist group is known to
have developed or deployed a nuclear explosive device, and the severity of the threat of nuclear terrorism remains disputed amongst international
scholars. So it becomes too early to conclude that how grave the threats of nuclear terrorism are. James kitfield concludes in an interview from
security expert that: Seven years after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, experts and presidential candidates continue to put nuclear
terrorism atop their lists of the gravest threats to the United States. Yet Brian Michael Jenkins, a longtime terrorism expert with the Rand Corp.,
says that the threat lies more in the realms of Hollywood dramas and terrorist dreams than in reality. There has
never been an act of nuclear terrorism, he notes, yet the threat is so potentially catastrophic that it incites fear — and that fear fulfills
a terrorist’s primary goal. In nutshell, we can say that it takes much more than knowledge of the workings of nuclear
weapons and access to fissile material to successfully manufacture a usable weapon. Current safety and
security systems help ensure that the successful use of a stolen weapon would be very unlikely. Meaning, it
remains, thankfully, an incredibly challenging task for terrorists to practice their idea in a successful way to meet their objectives.
No impact to Iranian proliferation — their evidence reflects a fundamental
misunderstanding of IR
Waltz 12 — Senior Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies (Kenneth N. Waltz,
Council on Foreign Relations, July/August 2012, “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb”,
http://sistemas.mre.gov.br/kitweb/datafiles/IRBr/ptbr/file/CAD/LXII%20CAD/Pol%C3%ADtica/Why%20Iran%20Should%20Get%20the%20Bomb.pdf, Accessed 0704-2013 | AK)
The past several months have witnessed a heated debate over the best way for the United States and Israel to respond to Iran's nuclear activities. As the argument has raged, the United States has
tightened its already robust sanctions regime against the Islamic Republic, and the European Union announced in January that it will begin an embargo on Iranian oil on July 1. Although the
a palpable sense of crisis still looms. It should not. Most U.S.,
European, and Israeli commentators and policymakers warn that a nuclear-armed Iran would be the worst possible
outcome of the current standoff. In fact, it would probably be the best possible result: the one most likely to
restore stability to the Middle East. POWER BEGS TO BE BALANCED The crisis over Iran's nuclear program could end in three different ways. First,
United States, the EU, and Iran have recently returned to the negotiating table,
diplomacy coupled with serious sanctions could convince Iran to abandon its pursuit of a nuclear weapon. But this outcome is unlikely: the historical record indicates that a country bent on
acquiring nuclear weapons can rarely be dissuaded from doing so. Punishing a state through economic sanctions does not inexorably derail its nuclear program. Take North Korea, which
succeeded in building its weapons despite countless rounds of sanctions and UN Security Council resolutions. If Tehran determines that its security depends on possessing nuclear weapons,
sanctions are unlikely to change its mind. In fact, adding still more sanctions now could make Iran feel even more vulnerable, giving it still more reason to seek the protection of the ultimate
deterrent. The second possible outcome is that Iran stops short of testing a nuclear weapon but develops a breakout capability, the capacity to build and test one quite quickly. Iran would not be
the first country to acquire a sophisticated nuclear program without building an actual bomb. Japan, for instance, maintains a vast civilian nuclear infrastructure. Experts believe that it could
produce a nuclear weapon on short notice. Such a breakout capability might satisfy the domestic political needs of Iran's rulers by assuring hardliners that they can enjoy all the benefits of having
a bomb (such as greater security) without the downsides (such as international isolation and condemnation). The problem is that a breakout capability might not work as intended. The United
States and its European allies are primarily concerned with weaponization, so they might accept a scenario in which Iran stops short of a nuclear weapon. Israel, however, has made it clear that it
views a significant Iranian enrichment capacity alone as an unacceptable threat. It is possible, then, that a verifiable commitment from Iran to stop short of a weapon could appease major Western
powers but leave the Israelis unsatisfied. Israel would be less intimidated by a virtual nuclear weapon than it would be by an actual one and therefore would likely continue its risky efforts at
subverting Iran's nuclear program through sabotage and assassination -- which could lead Iran to conclude that a breakout capability is an insufficient deterrent, after all, and that only
The third possible outcome of the standoff is that Iran continues its
current course and publicly goes nuclear by testing a weapon. U.S. and Israeli officials have
declared that outcome unacceptable, arguing that a nuclear Iran is a uniquely terrifying prospect, even an existential
threat. Such language is typical of major powers, which have historically gotten riled up
whenever another country has begun to develop a nuclear weapon of its own. Yet so far, every time
another country has managed to shoulder its way into the nuclear club, the other members have
always changed tack and decided to live with it. In fact, by reducing imbalances in military power, new
nuclear states generally produce more regional and international stability, not less . Israel's regional nuclear monopoly,
weaponization can provide it with the security it seeks.
which has proved remarkably durable for the past four decades, has long fueled instability in the Middle East. In no other region of the world does a lone, unchecked nuclear state exist. It is
Power
begs to be balanced
Israel's nuclear arsenal, not Iran's desire for one, that has contributed most to the current crisis.
, after all,
. What is surprising about the Israeli
case is that it has taken so long for a potential balancer to emerge. Of course, it is easy to understand why Israel wants to remain the sole nuclear power in the region and why it is willing to use
force to secure that status. In 1981, Israel bombed Iraq to prevent a challenge to its nuclear monopoly. It did the same to Syria in 2007 and is now considering similar action against Iran. But the
very acts that have allowed Israel to maintain its nuclear edge in the short term have prolonged an imbalance that is unsustainable in the long term. Israel's proven ability to strike potential
current tensions are best
viewed not as the early stages of a relatively recent Iranian nuclear crisis but rather as the final stages of a decades-long Middle East
nuclear crisis that will end only when a balance of military power is restored. UNFOUNDED FEARS One reason the danger of a
nuclear Iran has been grossly exaggerated is that the debate surrounding it has been distorted by
misplaced worries and fundamental misunderstandings of how states generally behave in the international
system . The first prominent concern, which undergirds many others, is that the Iranian regime is innately
irrational. Despite a widespread belief to the contrary, Iranian policy is made not by "mad
mullahs" but by perfectly sane ayatollahs who want to survive just like any other leaders.
Although Iran's leaders indulge in inflammatory and hateful rhetoric, they show no propensity
for self-destruction. It would be a grave error for policymakers in the United States and Israel to assume
otherwise. Yet that is precisely what many U.S. and Israeli officials and analysts have done. Portraying Iran as irrational has allowed them
to argue that the logic of nuclear deterrence does not apply to the Islamic Republic. If Iran
acquired a nuclear weapon, they warn, it would not hesitate to use it in a first strike against
Israel, even though doing so would invite massive retaliation and risk destroying everything the
Iranian regime holds dear. Although it is impossible to be certain of Iranian intentions, it is far more likely that if Iran desires
nuclear weapons, it is for the purpose of providing for its own security, not to improve its offensive capabilities (or destroy
itself). Iran may be intransigent at the negotiating table and defiant in the face of sanctions, but it still acts to secure its
own preservation. Iran's leaders did not, for example, attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz despite issuing blustery warnings that they might do so after the EU announced its
nuclear rivals with impunity has inevitably made its enemies anxious to develop the means to prevent Israel from doing so again. In this way, the
planned oil embargo in January. The Iranian regime clearly concluded that it did not want to provoke what would surely have been a swift and devastating American response to such a move.
Nevertheless, even some observers and policymakers who accept that the Iranian regime is
rational still worry that a nuclear weapon would embolden it, providing Tehran with a shield that would allow it to act more
Some analysts even fear that Iran would directly provide terrorists with
nuclear arms. The problem with these concerns is that they contradict the record of every other
nuclear weapons state going back to 1945 . History shows that when countries acquire the bomb, they
feel increasingly vulnerable and become acutely aware that their nuclear weapons make them a
potential target in the eyes of major powers. This awareness discourages nuclear states from bold and
aggressive action. Maoist China, for example, became much less bellicose after acquiring nuclear weapons in 1964, and India and Pakistan have both become more cautious
since going nuclear. There is little reason to believe Iran would break this mold. As for the risk of a handoff to terrorists, no
country could transfer nuclear weapons without running a high risk of being found out. U.S.
surveillance capabilities would pose a serious obstacle, as would the United States' impressive and
growing ability to identify the source of fissile material. Moreover, countries can never entirely control
or even predict the behavior of the terrorist groups they sponsor. Once a country such as Iran acquires a nuclear capability, it
will have every reason to maintain full control over its arsenal. After all, building a bomb is costly and
dangerous. It would make little sense to transfer the product of that investment to parties that
cannot be trusted or managed. Another oft-touted worry is that if Iran obtains the bomb, other
states in the region will follow suit, leading to a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. But the
nuclear age is now almost 70 years old, and so far, fears of proliferation have proved to be
unfounded. Properly defined, the term "proliferation" means a rapid and uncontrolled spread. Nothing like that has occurred; in fact, since 1970, there has
been a marked slowdown in the emergence of nuclear states. There is no reason to expect that this
pattern will change now . Should Iran become the second Middle Eastern nuclear power since 1945, it
would hardly signal the start of a landslide. When Israel acquired the bomb in the 1960s, it was at war with many of its neighbors. Its nuclear arms were
a much bigger threat to the Arab world than Iran's program is today. If an atomic Israel did not trigger an arms race then, there is no
reason a nuclear Iran should now. REST ASSURED In 1991, the historical rivals India and Pakistan signed a treaty agreeing not to target each other's nuclear
aggressively and increase its support for terrorism.
facilities. They realized that far more worrisome than their adversary's nuclear deterrent was the instability produced by challenges to it. Since then, even in the face of high tensions and risky
If Iran goes nuclear, Israel and Iran will
deter each other, as nuclear powers always have. There has never been a full-scale war between
two nuclear-armed states. Once Iran crosses the nuclear threshold, deterrence will apply, even if the Iranian
arsenal is relatively small. No other country in the region will have an incentive to acquire its own nuclear
capability, and the current crisis will finally dissipate, leading to a Middle East that is more stable than it is today. For that reason, the United States and its allies need not take such
provocations, the two countries have kept the peace. Israel and Iran would do well to consider this precedent.
pains to prevent the Iranians from developing a nuclear weapon. Diplomacy between Iran and the major powers should continue, because open lines of communication will make the Western
countries feel better able to live with a nuclear Iran. But the current sanctions on Iran can be dropped: they primarily harm ordinary Iranians, with little purpose. Most important, policymakers
the United States should take comfort from the fact that history has
shown that where nuclear capabilities emerge, so, too, does stability. When it comes to nuclear weapons, now as ever, more
and citizens in the Arab world, Europe, Israel, and
may be better.
The plan won’t change Maduro’s tune — engagement entrenches the regime and stifles
democratic opposition
Christy 1AC Author 13 — served as Senior Policy Analyst for the Republican National Committee (RNC),
focusing on energy, foreign affairs, and national security issues. Prior to joining the RNC, Patrick worked at the
National Republican Congressional Committee as an Analyst and as Clerk for the International practice of Barbour
Griffith & Rogers, LLC. His writings on defense policy and foreign affairs have appeared in the The Commentator,
The Diplomat, National Review Online, The Weekly Standard, and U.S. News.com. Patrick was named a Manfred
Wörner fellow by the German Marshall Fund in 2011 and a Publius Fellow by the Claremont Institute in 2012.
Originally from San Diego, California, Patrick holds a BA from Vanderbilt University (Patrick Christy, U.S. News
& World Report, 06-13-13, “U.S. Overtures to Maduro Hurt Venezuela’s Democratic Opposition”,
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/06/13/us-overtures-to-chavez-successor-maduro-hurtvenezuelas-opposition, Accessed 07-04-2013 | AK)
the Obama
administration's latest attempt to reset relations with the South American nation. What's worrisome is that Secretary Kerry's enthusiasm to find, in his words, a
On the margins of a multilateral summit in Guatemala last week, Secretary of State John Kerry met with Venezuelan Foreign Minister Elias Jose Jaua, marking
"new way forward" with Venezuela could end up legitimizing Chavez-successor Nicolas Maduro's
quest for power and undermining the country's democratic opposition and state institutions . Since the death of
Maduro's actions have more resembled those of a Cuban strongman than
a democratically-elected official. Indeed, he has taken drastic moves to preserve his power and
discredit his critics in recent months. First, the Maduro regime is refusing to allow a full audit of the
fraudulent April 13th presidential elections, as opposition presidential candidate Henrique Capriles had requested. As the Associated Press notes a full
Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chavez in March,
audit "would have included not just comparing votes electronically registered by machines with the paper ballot receipts they emitted, but also comparing those with the poll station registries that
contain voter signatures and with digitally recorded fingerprints." However, because Chavez-era appointees loyal to the current government dominate Venezuela's National Election Council and
Second,
Maduro's government is taking steps to dominate radio and television coverage of the regime. Last
Supreme Court – the two government institutions able to challenge election results – it is unlikely either will accept the opposition's demands for a full election recount.
month, Globovision, one of Venezuela's last remaining independent news channels, was sold to a group of investors with close ties to Maduro. Under Chavez, the independent broadcasting
station faced years of pressure as government authorities frequently threatened to arrest the group's owners and journalists. To no one's surprise, the company's new ownership has banned live
Third, the regime and its
allies are using fear and intimidation to silence the opposition. On April 30th, pro-Maduro lawmakers physically attacked opposition
video coverage of opposition leader Henrique Capriles and many of the station's prominent journalists have been fired or have resigned.
legislators on the floor of Venezuela's National Assembly. Days prior, the regime arrested a former military general who was critical of Cuba's growing influence on Venezuela's armed forces.
Maduro even called for the creation of "Bolivarian Militias of Workers" to "defend the
sovereignty of the homeland." In light of all this, it remains unclear why the Obama
administration seeks, in Secretary Kerry's words, "an ongoing, continuing dialogue at a high level between the State
More recently,
Department and the [Venezuelan] Foreign Ministry" –
let alone believe that such engagement will lead to any substantive change in
Maduro's behavior . To be sure, Caracas's recent release of jailed American filmmaker Timothy Tracy is welcome and long overdue. However, it is clear that the bogus charges
of espionage against Tracy were used as leverage in talks with the United States, a shameful move reminiscent of Fidel Castro's playbook. While Secretary Kerry said that his meeting with his
Venezuelan counterpart included discussion of human rights and democracy issues, the Obama administration's overall track record in the region gives reason for concern. President Obama failed
to mention Venezuela or Chavez's abuse of power during his weeklong trip to the region in 2011. And while Obama refused at first to acknowledge the April election results, the State
Department has since sent very different signals. Indeed, Secretary Kerry declined even to mention Venezuela directly during his near 30-minute address to the plenary session of the
For Venezuela's opposition, the Obama administration's eagerness
to revive relations with Maduro is a punch to the gut. Pro-Maduro legislators in the National Assembly have banned opposition lawmakers
Organization of American States in Guatemala last week.
from committee hearings and speaking on the assembly floor. Other outspoken critics of the regime face criminal charges, and government officials repeatedly vilify and slander Capriles. What's
if the United States grants or is perceived to grant legitimacy to the Maduro government, that could
give further cover to the regime as it systematically undermines Venezuela's remaining institutions.
worse,
The Obama administration's overtures to Maduro's government come as the region is increasingly skeptical of the Chavez successor's reign. Last month, Capriles met with Colombian President
Juan Manuel Santos in Bogota. Chile's Senate unanimously passed a resolution urging a total audit of all polling stations. And in recent weeks, opposition lawmakers led by María Corina
Machado, a representative from the National Assembly of Venezuela, have held meetings in capitals around the region to educate foreign leaders about Maduro's illegitimate hold on power.
Rather than accept Maduro's strongman tactics, the Obama administration should take a firm stand and make clear to Caracas that any steps to undermine the country's constitution or threaten the
opposition will be detrimental to bilateral ties with the United States. The fact is that Washington holds all the cards. Venezuela's economy is in a free-fall, Maduro's popularity is plummeting,
By resetting relations
with the Maduro government now, the United States risks legitimizing the Chavez protégé's illgotten hold on power and undercutting the Venezuelan democratic opposition efforts to sustain
and expand its popular support. It's time the Obama administration rethink this hasty reset with Maduro.
and various public scandals – especially those related to institutional corruption – could further erode public confidence in the current government.
No impact to Iran-Venezuela ties — international outreach and status quo sanctions have
halted regional influence
Goodman 6-26 — staff writer for the Bloomberg News (Joshua Goodman, Bloomberg News, 06-26-13, “Iran’s
Influence Waning in Latin America, State Department Says”, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-06-26/irans-influence-waning-in-latin-america-state-department-says, Accessed 07-05-2013 | AK)
Iran isn’t actively supporting terrorist cells in Latin America and its influence is waning in the
region after almost a decade of promises to increase investment, according to a State Department report. While Iran’s interest in Latin
America is a “concern,” sanctions have undermined efforts by the Islamic republic to expand its economic
and political toehold in the region, according to the unclassified summary of yesterday’s report. “As a result of diplomatic
outreach, strengthening of allies’ capacity, international nonproliferation efforts, a strong
sanctions policy, and Iran’s poor management of its foreign relations, Iranian influence in Latin
America and the Caribbean is waning,” according to the report. The findings disappointed some Republican lawmakers who say President Barack Obama’s
administration is underestimating the threat from Iran. The report comes as the U.S. takes a wait-and-see approach to President-elect Hassan Rohani, who has vowed to seek more dialog with the
U.S. “I believe the Administration has failed to consider the seriousness of Iran’s presence here at home,” said Congressman Jeff Duncan, a Republican from South Carolina who wrote the
The U.S. stepped up its
monitoring of Iran’s presence in Latin America in a bid to isolate the country over its nuclear
program and after President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad forged closer ties with anti-American allies of the late
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. While Iran’s outreach bears watching, claims about more sinister activities are
legislation requiring the State Department report. “I question the methodology that was used in developing this report.” Chavez Alliance
unproven , said Christopher Sabatini, senior policy director at the Council of the Americas.
Iran-Venezuela ties are no longer a threat — the relationship is dead
Lansberg-Rodriguez and Zonis 7-4 — fellow at The Comparative Constitutions Project and a columnist
for the Venezuelan newspaper El Universal AND *Professor Emeritus at Booth School of Business (Daniel
Lansberg-Rodriguez and Marvin Zonis, EconoMonitor, 07-04-13, “Venezuela and Iran: The End of The Affair?”,
http://www.economonitor.com/blog/2013/07/venezuela-and-iran-the-end-of-the-affair/, Accessed 07-06-2013 | AK)
does this alliance still have a future? The answer to this question will be of no small
The alliance between these two
countries has generated concerns beyond the rhetoric. They have provided financial benefits to poorer neighbors and generated security risks to a great
many others. Some commentators, more than a few of them Republican congressmen, have publically surmised that Iran might
have been using Caracas as a staging ground for terrorist plots throughout the Western
hemisphere, although a State Department report released last week would seem to belie that fact.
Others believe that Iran’s true interest’s lies in accessing Latin America’s largely undeveloped
uranium reserves, in hopes of advancing its ambitions towards the status of a nuclear power. What cannot be denied is that there are, at present, numerous Iranian agents active in
Yet now, given that they never did get around to ending the Empire,
consequence to the world as a whole. It will extend beyond their role as a self-proclaimed rhetorical international disestablishment: an Axis of Insults.
Latin America operating at various official levels. The Iranian security apparatus has been instrumental in teaching Chavista security forces to more efficiently repress dissent among their own
what happens next? Venezuela’s new president,
Nicolas Maduro, has announced that he will meet soon with Iran’s new president-elect, Hassan Rowhani. And while neither country has provided any details, if Rowhani is the
moderate he is touted to be, he may well seek better relations with Europe and the United States,
advanced economies capable of engaging with Iran on more than a rhetorical level. Meanwhile, barring some
people. (The Venezuelan Jewish community, once among the largest in Latin America, has been a particular target.) So
unforeseen crisis precipitating the collapse of regime in Caracas, the Venezuelan government seems unlikely to do likewise. Under fire from accusations of having stolen the recent election,
Maduro’s domestic legitimacy is predicated primarily on his having been fingered by Chávez
himself as successor, rather than on any personal charisma or qualifications. Under these circumstances,
seeking rapprochement with “The Empire,” so often vilified by his hallowed predecessor, would be a dangerous game. In
geopolitics, much as in interpersonal relationships, countries sometimes outgrow each other . For an Iran that might finally be
coming of age, maintaining close ties with declining, unpopular Venezuela, would be no great
benefit, and might hold back a more fruitful potential dalliance with the West.
2NC Iran Not Interested in LA
Irans influence in latin america is fading - new iranian leader isnt focused there
Goodman 6/26/13 - (Joshua, reporter for Bloomberg News in Rio de Janeiro, "Iran Influence in Latin America Waning, U.S. Report Says"
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-26/iran-influence-in-latin-america-waning-u-s-report-says.html) Iran isn’t actively supporting
terrorist cells in Latin America and its influence is waning in the region after almost a decade of promises to increase
investment, according to a State Department report. While Iran’s interest in Latin America is a “concern,” sanctions have undermined
efforts by the Islamic republic to expand its economic and political toehold in the region , according to the unclassified
summary of yesterday’s report. “As a result of diplomatic outreach, strengthening of allies’ capacity, international
nonproliferation efforts, a strong sanctions policy, and Iran’s poor management of its foreign relations, Iranian
influence in Latin America and the Caribbean is waning,” according to the report. The findings disappointed some Republican
lawmakers who say President Barack Obama’s administration is underestimating the threat from Iran. The report comes as the U.S. takes a waitand-see approach to President-elect Hassan Rohani, who has vowed to seek more dialog with the U.S. “I believe the Administration has failed to
consider the seriousness of Iran’s presence here at home,” said Congressman Jeff Duncan, a Republican from South Carolina who wrote the
legislation requiring the State Department report. “I question the methodology that was used in developing this report.” Chavez Alliance The
U.S. stepped up its monitoring of Iran’s presence in Latin America in a bid to isolate the country over its nuclear
program and after President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad forged closer ties with anti-American allies of the late Venezuelan President Hugo
Chavez. While Iran’s outreach bears watching, claims about more sinister activities are unproven, said Christopher Sabatini, senior policy
director at the Council of the Americas. “It’s a shame that in such a dynamic hemisphere in which we have so many diplomatic initiatives that for
some -- especially Congress -- attention to the region has boiled down to mostly spurious charges about Iranian infiltration,” Sabatini said via email. Ahmadinejad made repeated trips to Latin America after taking office in 2005, most recently to Caracas to attend Chavez’s funeral in
March and the inauguration of his successor, Nicolas Maduro, a month later. By contrast, Rohani has said little about the region since
his surprise victory earlier this month. Instead, he said one of his main foreign policy priorities will be seeking “constructive dialog”
with the U.S. and U.K., two nations with which the country has traditionally been at odds. ‘Good Relations’ “We’ll seek to have good
relations with all nations, including Latin American states,” Rohani said during his first post-election press conference June 17, in response
to a question about the attention he’ll devote to Latin America. Under Ahmadinejad’s watch, Iran added embassies in Latin America and more
than doubled trade with Brazil, the region’s biggest economy. With Chavez, Ahmadinejad signed more than 100 accords to support everything
from a campaign to build homes in Venezuela to a joint venture to manufacture bicycles, which Chavez jokingly referred to as “atomic” twowheelers. The two countries also established in Caracas the Banco Internacional de Desarrollo, which together with its main Iranian shareholder,
Bank Saderat, is accused by the U.S. of being a vehicle for the Ahmadinejad government’s funding of the Middle Eastern terrorist group
Hezbollah. Yet with Iran’s economy crippled by sanctions, many of the projects haven’t gotten off the ground . For
example, pledges from 2007 and 2008 to help build a $350 million deep-water port off Nicaragua’s Atlantic coast and an oil refinery in Ecuador
have yet to materialize. Nor has it built what former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warned would be a “huge” embassy in Managua. That
hasn’t prevented the Obama administration from trying to curb Iran’s influence. In 2011, it imposed sanctions on state-owned oil company
Petroleos de Venezuela SA for defying sanctions on Iran. It also implicated an Iranian man working out of Mexico in a plot to kill Saudi Arabia’s
ambassador to Washington.
Iran is on its way out—Venezuela is no longer its regional gateway
Berman ’13 “Ilan Berman Testimony: Iran’s Extending Influence in the Western Hemisphere.” June 10, 2013. InterAmerican Security Watch.
http://interamericansecuritywatch.com/ilan-berman-testimony-threat-to-the-homeland-irans-extending-influence-in-the-western-hemisphere/)
Maduro, Hugo Chavez’s hand-picked successor as president, is now presiding over an
all-out implosion of the national economy, complete with shortages of commodities such as toilet
paper, sugar and flour.[28] As a result, even though Maduro—who as foreign minister presided over his
government’s contacts with Iran—is likely to mimic Chavez’ sympathetic attitude toward the
Islamic Republic, it is far from clear that his regime will have either the political stability or
economic solvency to serve as Iran’s regional gateway in coming years. In Iran, too, there is a
significant degree of uncertainty relating to the region. It is unclear, at least at this stage, whether incoming Iranian president
In Venezuela, Nicolas
Hassan Rowhani—who handily won the Islamic Republic’s June 14th election—will enjoy similarly close bonds with the “Bolivarian” regimes of Latin America.
Khamenei, has not yet given a clear indication that the region
remains a key regime interest. This is salient given that Iran’s extensive involvement in the
Syrian civil war over the past two years has sapped the regime’s economic resources and
political capital, diminishing its activism beyond the Middle East in the process. (Iranian officials have taken
More significantly, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali
pains to reaffirm their government’s commitment to the region, however; in early July, Ahmadinejad met in Moscow with Bolivian president Evo Morales and assured
him that Iran’s outreach to Latin America is unwavering, and will be sustained by his successor.[29]) As a result,
it is possible to envision that
Iran’s footprint in the region could erode over time.
No Venezuelan-Iranian military alliance—Iran is more focused on the Middle East
Sullivan and Beittel ’13 (“Latin America: Terrorism Issues.” Mark P. Sullivan --Specialist in Latin American
Affairs & June S. Beittel --Analyst in Latin American Affairs. April 5, 2013. Congressional Research Service.
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2063&context=key_workplace)
No matter the scope of Iran’s involvement in Latin America, Iran’s key foreign policy focus remains
its immediate region. It is in the Middle East and South and Central Asia where Iran perceives
that threats to its survival may emanate, and in which Iran has, for ideological, religious, and
political motives, tried to alter political outcomes in its favor. Whatever efforts Iran is making to engage
like-minded leaders in Latin America, these efforts pale by comparison to its level of involvement in
countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, or Lebanon, in which Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps—Qods Force personnel are on the ground consistently, funneling arms and funds to
pro-Iranian movements and parties. Interactions with national leaders and faction leaders in Middle Eastern and South and
Central Asian countries such as these are frequent. 66 Concerns about Iran’s Military and Potential Terrorist Activities An April 2010
unclassified Department of Defense report to Congress on Iran’s military power (required by Section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for FY2010, P.L. 111-84) maintained that Iran’s Qods Force, which maintains operational capabilities around the world, had increased its
then commander of the U.S.
Southern Command, General Douglas Fraser, maintained that the focus of Iran in the region was
diplomatic and commercial, and that he had not seen an increase in Iran’s military presence in
the region.68 In July 2012, General Fraser maintained in a press interview that Iran’s relationship with
Venezuela was primarily diplomatic and economic and that Iran’s ties with Venezuela did not
amount to a military alliance.
presence in Latin America in recent years, particularly in Venezuela.67 At the same time, however,
2NC Iran Not Aggressive
Iran doesn’t have sinister activities in Venezuela
Goodman ‘13
Internally citing a report from the US State Department – Joshua Goodman is a Rio de Janeiro-based reporter covering Latin America for
Bloomberg News – “Iran’s Influence Waning in Latin America, State Department Says” – Bloomberg News – June 26th –
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-06-26/iran-s-influence-waning-in-latin-america-state-department-says
The U.S. stepped up its monitoring of Iran’s presence in Latin America in a bid to isolate the country over its
nuclear program and after President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad forged closer ties with anti-American allies of the late
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. While Iran’s outreach bears watching, claims about more sinister activities
are unproven, said Christopher Sabatini, senior policy director at the Council of the Americas.¶
“It’s a shame that in such a dynamic hemisphere in which we have so many diplomatic initiatives that for some -- especially Congress -attention to the region has boiled down to mostly spurious charges about Iranian infiltration,”
Sabatini said via e-mail.¶ Ahmadinejad made repeated trips to Latin America after taking office in 2005, most recently to Caracas to attend
Chavez’s funeral in March and the inauguration of his successor, Nicolas Maduro, a month later.
Iran’s activities in Venezuela aren’t profitable or dangerous.
Goodman ‘13
Internally citing a report from the US State Department – Joshua Goodman is a Rio de Janeiro-based reporter covering Latin America for
Bloomberg News – “Iran’s Influence Waning in Latin America, State Department Says” – Bloomberg News – June 26th –
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-06-26/iran-s-influence-waning-in-latin-america-state-department-says
Under Ahmadinejad’s watch, Iran added embassies in Latin America and more than doubled trade with Brazil,
the region’s biggest economy. With Chavez, Ahmadinejad signed more than 100 accords to support
everything from a campaign to build homes in Venezuela to a joint venture to manufacture bicycles, which Chavez jokingly referred to as
“atomic” two-wheelers.¶ The two countries also established in Caracas the Banco Internacional de
Desarrollo, which together with its main Iranian shareholder, Bank Saderat, is accused by the U.S. of being a vehicle
for the Ahmadinejad government’s funding of the Middle Eastern terrorist group Hezbollah.¶ Yet with Iran’s economy
crippled by sanctions, many of the projects haven’t gotten off the ground. For example, pledges from 2007
and 2008 to help build a $350 million deep-water port off Nicaragua’s Atlantic coast and an oil refinery in Ecuador have yet to materialize. Nor
has it built what former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warned would be a “huge” embassy in Managua. ¶ That hasn’t prevented the Obama
administration from trying to curb Iran’s influence. In 2011, it imposed sanctions on state-owned oil company Petroleos de Venezuela SA for
defying sanctions on Iran. It also implicated an Iranian man working out of Mexico in a plot to kill Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to Washington.
Iran’s influence in Latin America decreasing and not supporting terror.
Goodman ‘13
Internally citing a report from the US State Department – Joshua Goodman is a Rio de Janeiro-based reporter covering Latin America for
Bloomberg News – “Iran’s Influence Waning in Latin America, State Department Says” – Bloomberg News – June 26th –
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-06-26/iran-s-influence-waning-in-latin-america-state-department-says
Iran isn’t actively supporting terrorist cells in Latin America and its influence is waning in the region
after almost a decade of promises to increase investment, according to a State Department report. ¶ While Iran’s interest in Latin America is a
“concern,” sanctions
have undermined efforts by the Islamic republic to expand its economic and political
toehold in the region, according to the unclassified summary of yesterday’s report.¶ “As a result of diplomatic outreach,
strengthening of allies’ capacity, international nonproliferation efforts, a strong sanctions policy, and Iran’s
poor management of its foreign relations, Iranian influence in Latin America and the Caribbean is
waning,” according to the report.
2NC No Prolif
Iran Prolif not dangerous and wouldn’t cascade.
Hobbs& Moran ‘12
Dr Christopher Hobbs is a Leverhulme Research Fellow at the Centre for Science and Security Studies within the Department of War Studies at
King's College London. Matthew Moran is a Research Associate at the Centre for Science and Security Studies within the Department of War
Studies at King's College London. He is currently working on a MacArthur-funded postdoctoral project that explores the relationship between
nuclear, nationalism and identity and how these issues impact on policy-making. Guardian: Julian Borger’s Security Blog – 12-19-12 –
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/julian-borger-global-security-blog/2012/dec/19/iran-nuclear-middle-east-arms-race
Inevitably, Iran's nuclear defiance has provided ammunition for the war-mongerers advocating a pre-emptive attack on Iran. Prominent
commentators such as Matthew Kroenig, claim that, at the very least, a nuclear-armed Iran would prompt a
'proliferation cascade' in the Middle East. If Iran acquires nuclear weapons – whatever form that scenario may take - its
regional rivals will follow suit. The argument here is seductive; it is easier to assume the worst than to hope for the best. The problem is, we
find that the counter-argument is more compelling.¶ The idea that 'proliferation begets proliferation' is not new. Dire
forecasts on the seemingly inevitable increase in the number of nuclear weapon states have been made since the dawn of the nuclear age. In 1963,
for example, US President JF Kennedy predicted that there might be up to twenty-five nuclear weapons powers within the next decade. However,
proliferation has proven to be historically rare, with the number of nuclear weapons states expanding only slightly from five in 1964 to nine in
2006 following North Korea's nuclear test.¶ The
flawed logic of 'proliferation begets proliferation' is clearly
demonstrated in North East Asia where North Korea's nuclear weapons have not provoked Japan or
South Korea, countries with advanced civil nuclear programmes, to follow suit despite a long history of regional conflict and volatile
relations. In this case, strong security alliances with the United States incorporating extended nuclear deterrence have played an important role in
dissuading these countries from going nuclear.¶ Ironically, the
Middle East itself offers further evidence that nuclear
proliferation is not inevitable. Noted for its policy of nuclear opacity (neither confirming nor denying its nuclear arsenal), Israel
acquired nuclear weapons in the late 1960s and over four decades later still remains the only nuclear power in
the region.¶ Now the threat posed by Iran to its neighbours is arguably greater given Tehran's aggressive posturing and regional ambitions.
However our research finds that those states deemed most likely to go nuclear due to their proximity to Iran and their suspected past interest in
acquiring nuclear weapons (namely Turkey, Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia), would have little to gain and much to lose by embarking down such
And at first
sight, it seems likely that Saudi Arabia would follow Iran down the nuclear path. In February, Saudi
a route.¶ Take Saudi Arabia, for example. Iran has long been at political and ideological odds with the kingdom across the Gulf.
officials were reported as claiming that Riyadh would launch a "twin-track nuclear weapons programme" in the event of a successful Iranian
nuclear test. An article published in the London Times in February [£] described a scenario whereby Saudi Arabia would attempt to purchase
warheads from abroad while also adding a military dimension to its planned civil nuclear programme at home. ¶ Look
more closely,
however, and there is a much stronger case to be made against Saudi nuclearisation. Beyond the
Kingdom's primitive nuclear infrastructure – the country lacks sufficient experience and expertise in practically all areas of the
nuclear fuel cycle – Saudi Arabia's political and strategic context does not favour the acquisition of nuclear weapons.¶
From a security perspective, the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States has held firm since the 1940s, despite a number of
challenges – most notably the participation of a number of Saudi nationals in the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The relationship barters Saudi oil for US
conventional arms and an implicit commitment to Saudi's defence.¶ In recent years, the role of Washington as the silent guarantor of Riyadh's
security has grown apace with the structural changes in the Middle East. The fall of the pro-Saudi Mubarak regime in Egypt; protests and
instability in Bahrain and Yemen; the collapse of the pro-Saudi government in Lebanon; and civil war in Syria have upended the established
regional order and made Riyadh's position less secure.¶ In this context, and given the determination of the United States to prevent nuclear
proliferation in the region, a move by Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons holds few positives for Riyadh's security calculus.¶ From and
economic perspective, Saudi Arabia's policy outlook exemplifies Etel Solingen's seminal theory on the relationship between economic liberalism
and nuclear restraint. Solingen argues that political coalitions favouring the reduction of state control over markets and increased privatisation and
foreign investment – are less likely to adopt a nuclear posture that would endanger their economic interests. ¶ In this regard, Saudi Arabia's
emphasis on facilitating the growth of foreign investment is significant. Riyadh has cultivated extensive trade relations with most international
powers, keen to attract foreign investment as a means of reducing over-reliance on oil and gas, increasing employment opportunities for the local
population (population growth of almost two percent equates to a need for some 200,000 new jobs per year), and reinvigorating the Saudi private
sector.¶ The acquisition of nuclear weapons would have far-reaching consequences, stalling progress and bringing progressive economic
isolation, thus drastically changing the nature of the kingdom's international trade relations. Saudi's interests are best served by nuclear restraint.¶
In an article published in the latest issue of The International Spectator, we argue that there are strong arguments for nuclear restraint in the cases
of other regional players as well. From security guarantees and the provision of advanced conventional weapons - in December 2011, following
the United States agreed a $1.7 billion deal to upgrade Saudi Arabia's Patriot missile defence system, for example – to facilitating increased
integration into the international economy, there are a range of measures that can persuade a state to forgo nuclear weapons. ¶ Ultimately, many
see a domino-effect as the logical response to Iranian nuclearisation. But when the stakes are this high, it is
important to look at all sides of the debate. From another perspective, there
is substantial evidence to suggest that
regional proliferation is not a very likely outcome at all.
Iran Prolif not dangerous – wouldn’t cause instability or domino effect.
Keck ‘12
(Zachary Keck is deputy editor of e-International Relations and an editorial assistant at The Diplomat. His commentary has appeared at Foreign
Affairs, Foreign Policy, World Politics Review and Small Wars Journal – “False Prophets of Nuclear Proliferation” – National Interest – April 5th
–
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/false-prophets-nuclear-proliferation-6725)
Even as other issues surrounding Iran’s nuclear program are debated, there
is a wide-ranging consensus in the West that an
Iranian bomb would precipitate a regional nuclear-arms race, if not a global one. Senators Lindsay Graham (R-SC),
Robert Casey (D-PA) and Joseph Lieberman (I-CT) said as much in the pages of the Wall Street Journal in March. Similarly, British foreign
secretary William Hague worries that if Iran acquires a nuclear weapon, “the most serious round of nuclear proliferation” to date would
commence. And recently in the New York Times, Ari Shavit of Haaretz stated matter-of-factly that “an Iranian bomb will bring about universal
nuclear proliferation.”¶ Fortunately for mankind’s sake,
there is no evidence to support these apocalyptic prophecies .
Although some precautionary actions might be prudent, neither
history nor contemporary circumstances indicate
that an Iranian atomic weapon would be a nuclear catalyst.¶ Historical Precedents¶ To begin with, fears of an
impending nuclear tipping point have been a regular feature of the nuclear age. The CIA is a case in point. Whereas in 1957 the agency predicted
ten countries could go nuclear within a decade, by 1975 it concluded that “logically” nuclear proliferation would only subside when “all political
actors, state and non-state, are equipped with nuclear armaments.” A quarter century and one nuclear power later (both South Africa and Pakistan
acquired a nuclear-weapons capability during this time, but South Africa dismantled all its nuclear weapons by 1991), CIA director George Tenet
announced in 2003 that we had entered “a new world of proliferation” and warned “the ‘domino theory’ of the twenty-first century may well be
nuclear.”¶ The 1960s were equally remarkable. As a presidential candidate in 1960, for example, John F. Kennedy foresaw “ten, fifteen, or twenty
nations” acquiring a nuclear capability by the 1964 election. The following year, the Kennedy administration was so certain a Chinese nuclear
test would trigger a global wave of nuclear proliferation that it considered simply giving Beijing’s neighbors “defensive nuclear weapons.”
Although not a single additional nuclear power emerged by 1963, President Kennedy remained “haunted by the feeling” that there would be
fifteen or twenty of them by 1975 and possibly twenty-five by the end of that decade.¶ And yet nearly half a century after the Cuban missile crisis
there are only nine nuclear-weapon states, five more than when Kennedy was elected and two of which already had advanced nuclear weapon
programs during his presidency. During the same time interval, four states have voluntarily given up their nuclear arsenals and an estimated forty
nations have not built them despite possessing the technical capability to do so. ¶ Still, just because nuclear forbearance has been the norm thus far
doesn’t necessarily mean this will continue into the future. In fact, according to Shavit, an Iranian bomb would “force Saudi Arabia, Turkey and
Egypt to acquire their own.” Similarly, President Barack Obama is “almost certain” that if Iran gets nuclear weapons, its neighbors will be
“compelled” to do the same.¶ Once again, there’s not much evidence to support these assertions. Although
a few countries have
built nuclear weapons because a rival acquired them, these are the exceptions to the general rule.
Of the quantitative studies done on reactive proliferation, none have found a nuclear-armed rival
makes a state more likely to even initiate a nuclear-weapons program, much less succeed.
Furthermore, as the political scientist Jacques Hymans documents in a forthcoming book, despite the diffusion of technology, nuclear aspirants
have become increasingly inefficient and unsuccessful over time. ¶ It’s therefore not surprising that in-depth case studies of Turkey’s, Egypt’s and
Saudi Arabia's nuclear prospects have found no cause for concern. Turkey is the most capable of building nuclear weapons but already has a
nuclear deterrent in the form of an estimated ninety nuclear warheads hosted on its territory for the United States. This is far more than what it is
capable of producing indigenously. Additionally, it’s hard to square Turkey’s supposed nuclear ambitions with the recent removal of its entire
stockpile of highly enriched uranium.¶ Egypt is far less capable of building a bomb than Turkey. Indeed, it already had a dysfunctional nuclear
program during the 1960s that was abandoned despite Israel, its archenemy at the time, acquiring a nuclear capability. Even before the onset of
the Arab Spring, proliferation analyst Jim Walsh argued it was “not likely that Egypt will seek, let alone acquire, nuclear weapons.” In the
aftermath of Mubarak’s overthrow, any government in Cairo will be preoccupied with improving the lot of its people, lest it too wind up on trial.
Achieving economic growth will require sustained access to foreign capital, markets and financial assistance, none of which would be
forthcoming if Cairo initiated a nuclear-weapons program.¶ Given its long-standing rivalry with Tehran, Saudi Arabia is certainly the most
alarmed by the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran. Moreover, Saudi Prince Turki al-Faisal, former head of intelligence and ambassador to the
United States and the United Kingdom, has repeatedly warned that if Iran is allowed to get nuclear weapons, the kingdom may well do the same.
Of course, this might be what a nation would say if it wanted Washington to “cut off the head of the snake” in Tehran. ¶ In fact, as Nuclear Threat
Initiative concludes, “no convincing evidence exists . . . that Saudi Arabia is attempting to develop, or has the motivation to develop, a nuclear
weapons program.” Similarly, in his comprehensive study that included fieldwork inside the kingdom, Ibrahim Al-Marashi found “little evidence
. . . that Saudi Arabia would seek to engage directly in a regional nuclear arms race.Ӧ If Saudi Arabia did pursue nuclear weapons, however, it
would be almost certain to fail. Even those most concerned about a Saudi bomb don’t claim it can build one itself. Rather, they contend Riyadh
will buy a ready-made nuclear deterrent from Pakistan. Pakistan’s willingness to take this unprecedented action is based on pure speculation, past
Saudi aid to Pakistan and a host of unsubstantiated claims, most notably those made by Mohammed al-Khilewi, a Saudi diplomat at the UN who
defected in 1994. In seeking to gain asylum into the United States, al-Khilewi told U.S. authorities that in exchange for financial aid, Pakistan had
agreed to provide Riyadh with a nuclear deterrent should the need ever arise. ¶ Besides al-Khilewi’s obvious motives for fabricating this story, it’s
doubtful Islamabad would uphold its end of the alleged bargain. After all, in the wake of 9/11 Washington gave Islamabad $22 billion to fight
terrorism and later found Osama bin Laden living amongst Pakistan’s military cadets. Furthermore, Pakistani leaders are exceedingly paranoid
their nuclear arsenal would not withstand an Indian or U.S. first strike. It’s therefore difficult to imagine them willingly parting with any nuclear
warheads.¶ Even if Islamabad did have some to spare, Riyadh would be an unlikely recipient. Given the world’s dependence on Saudi crude,
Pakistan would be the target of exceptionally harsh and unrelenting international condemnation, including from its “all-weather friend” China,
which has recently been getting 20 percent of its oil supplies from Riyadh. Iran would also be outraged and almost certain to respond by aligning
itself squarely with India. Pakistani leaders have gone to great lengths to avoid this outcome, and they wouldn’t suddenly invite it just to keep a
promise their predecessors might have made.¶ If
Iran does acquire nuclear weapons, there’s no reason to think a
regional nuclear-arms race would follow. Washington and its allies have avoided this outcome in
the past, and nothing suggests this time would be different.
No impact to Iranian proliferation — multiple warrants — their evidence reflects a fundamental
misunderstanding of IR
Waltz 12 — Senior Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies (Kenneth N. Waltz,
Council on Foreign Relations, July/August 2012, “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb”,
http://sistemas.mre.gov.br/kitweb/datafiles/IRBr/ptbr/file/CAD/LXII%20CAD/Pol%C3%ADtica/Why%20Iran%20Should%20Get%20the%20Bomb.pdf, Accessed 0704-2013 | AK)
The past several months have witnessed a heated debate over the best way for the United States and Israel to respond to Iran's nuclear activities. As the argument has raged, the United States has
tightened its already robust sanctions regime against the Islamic Republic, and the European Union announced in January that it will begin an embargo on Iranian oil on July 1. Although the
a palpable sense of crisis still looms. It should not. Most U.S.,
policymakers warn that a nuclear-armed Iran would be the worst possible
outcome of the current standoff. In fact, it would probably be the best possible result: the one most likely to
restore stability to the Middle East. POWER BEGS TO BE BALANCED The crisis over Iran's nuclear program could end in three different ways. First,
United States, the EU, and Iran have recently returned to the negotiating table,
European, and Israeli commentators and
diplomacy coupled with serious sanctions could convince Iran to abandon its pursuit of a nuclear weapon. But this outcome is unlikely: the historical record indicates that a country bent on
acquiring nuclear weapons can rarely be dissuaded from doing so. Punishing a state through economic sanctions does not inexorably derail its nuclear program. Take North Korea, which
succeeded in building its weapons despite countless rounds of sanctions and UN Security Council resolutions. If Tehran determines that its security depends on possessing nuclear weapons,
sanctions are unlikely to change its mind. In fact, adding still more sanctions now could make Iran feel even more vulnerable, giving it still more reason to seek the protection of the ultimate
deterrent. The second possible outcome is that Iran stops short of testing a nuclear weapon but develops a breakout capability, the capacity to build and test one quite quickly. Iran would not be
the first country to acquire a sophisticated nuclear program without building an actual bomb. Japan, for instance, maintains a vast civilian nuclear infrastructure. Experts believe that it could
produce a nuclear weapon on short notice. Such a breakout capability might satisfy the domestic political needs of Iran's rulers by assuring hardliners that they can enjoy all the benefits of having
a bomb (such as greater security) without the downsides (such as international isolation and condemnation). The problem is that a breakout capability might not work as intended. The United
States and its European allies are primarily concerned with weaponization, so they might accept a scenario in which Iran stops short of a nuclear weapon. Israel, however, has made it clear that it
views a significant Iranian enrichment capacity alone as an unacceptable threat. It is possible, then, that a verifiable commitment from Iran to stop short of a weapon could appease major Western
powers but leave the Israelis unsatisfied. Israel would be less intimidated by a virtual nuclear weapon than it would be by an actual one and therefore would likely continue its risky efforts at
subverting Iran's nuclear program through sabotage and assassination -- which could lead Iran to conclude that a breakout capability is an insufficient deterrent, after all, and that only
The third possible outcome of the standoff is that Iran continues its
current course and publicly goes nuclear by testing a weapon. U.S. and Israeli officials have
declared that outcome unacceptable, arguing that a nuclear Iran is a uniquely terrifying prospect, even an existential
threat. Such language is typical of major powers, which have historically gotten riled up
whenever another country has begun to develop a nuclear weapon of its own. Yet so far, every time
another country has managed to shoulder its way into the nuclear club, the other members have
always changed tack and decided to live with it. In fact, by reducing imbalances in military power, new
nuclear states generally produce more regional and international stability, not less . Israel's regional nuclear monopoly,
weaponization can provide it with the security it seeks.
which has proved remarkably durable for the past four decades, has long fueled instability in the Middle East. In no other region of the world does a lone, unchecked nuclear state exist. It is
Power
begs to be balanced
Israel's nuclear arsenal, not Iran's desire for one, that has contributed most to the current crisis.
, after all,
. What is surprising about the Israeli
case is that it has taken so long for a potential balancer to emerge. Of course, it is easy to understand why Israel wants to remain the sole nuclear power in the region and why it is willing to use
force to secure that status. In 1981, Israel bombed Iraq to prevent a challenge to its nuclear monopoly. It did the same to Syria in 2007 and is now considering similar action against Iran. But the
very acts that have allowed Israel to maintain its nuclear edge in the short term have prolonged an imbalance that is unsustainable in the long term. Israel's proven ability to strike potential
current tensions are best
viewed not as the early stages of a relatively recent Iranian nuclear crisis but rather as the final stages of a decades-long Middle East
nuclear crisis that will end only when a balance of military power is restored. UNFOUNDED FEARS One reason the danger of a
nuclear Iran has been grossly exaggerated is that the debate surrounding it has been distorted by
misplaced worries and fundamental misunderstandings of how states generally behave in the international
system . The first prominent concern, which undergirds many others, is that the Iranian regime is innately
irrational. Despite a widespread belief to the contrary, Iranian policy is made not by "mad
mullahs" but by perfectly sane ayatollahs who want to survive just like any other leaders.
Although Iran's leaders indulge in inflammatory and hateful rhetoric, they show no propensity
for self-destruction. It would be a grave error for policymakers in the United States and Israel to assume
nuclear rivals with impunity has inevitably made its enemies anxious to develop the means to prevent Israel from doing so again. In this way, the
otherwise. Yet that is precisely what many U.S. and Israeli officials and analysts have done. Portraying Iran as irrational has allowed them
to argue that the logic of nuclear deterrence does not apply to the Islamic Republic. If Iran
acquired a nuclear weapon, they warn, it would not hesitate to use it in a first strike against
Israel, even though doing so would invite massive retaliation and risk destroying everything the
Iranian regime holds dear. Although it is impossible to be certain of Iranian intentions, it is far more likely that if Iran desires
nuclear weapons, it is for the purpose of providing for its own security, not to improve its offensive capabilities (or destroy
itself). Iran may be intransigent at the negotiating table and defiant in the face of sanctions, but it still acts to secure its
own preservation. Iran's leaders did not, for example, attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz despite issuing blustery warnings that they might do so after the EU announced its
planned oil embargo in January. The Iranian regime clearly concluded that it did not want to provoke what would surely have been a swift and devastating American response to such a move.
Nevertheless, even some observers and policymakers who accept that the Iranian regime is
rational still worry that a nuclear weapon would embolden it, providing Tehran with a shield that would allow it to act more
aggressively and increase its support for terrorism. Some analysts even fear that Iran would directly provide terrorists with
nuclear arms. The problem with these concerns is that they contradict the record of every other
nuclear weapons state going back to 1945 . History shows that when countries acquire the bomb, they
feel increasingly vulnerable and become acutely aware that their nuclear weapons make them a
potential target in the eyes of major powers. This awareness discourages nuclear states from bold and
aggressive action. Maoist China, for example, became much less bellicose after acquiring nuclear weapons in 1964, and India and Pakistan have both become more cautious
since going nuclear. There is little reason to believe Iran would break this mold. As for the risk of a handoff to terrorists, no
country could transfer nuclear weapons without running a high risk of being found out. U.S.
surveillance capabilities would pose a serious obstacle, as would the United States' impressive and
growing ability to identify the source of fissile material. Moreover, countries can never entirely control
or even predict the behavior of the terrorist groups they sponsor. Once a country such as Iran acquires a nuclear capability, it
will have every reason to maintain full control over its arsenal. After all, building a bomb is costly and
dangerous. It would make little sense to transfer the product of that investment to parties that
cannot be trusted or managed. Another oft-touted worry is that if Iran obtains the bomb, other
states in the region will follow suit, leading to a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. But the
nuclear age is now almost 70 years old, and so far, fears of proliferation have proved to be
unfounded. Properly defined, the term "proliferation" means a rapid and uncontrolled spread. Nothing like that has occurred; in fact, since 1970, there has
been a marked slowdown in the emergence of nuclear states. There is no reason to expect that this
pattern will change now . Should Iran become the second Middle Eastern nuclear power since 1945, it
would hardly signal the start of a landslide. When Israel acquired the bomb in the 1960s, it was at war with many of its neighbors. Its nuclear arms were
a much bigger threat to the Arab world than Iran's program is today. If an atomic Israel did not trigger an arms race then, there is no
reason a nuclear Iran should now. REST ASSURED In 1991, the historical rivals India and Pakistan signed a treaty agreeing not to target each other's nuclear
facilities. They realized that far more worrisome than their adversary's nuclear deterrent was the instability produced by challenges to it. Since then, even in the face of high tensions and risky
If Iran goes nuclear, Israel and Iran will
deter each other, as nuclear powers always have. There has never been a full-scale war between
two nuclear-armed states. Once Iran crosses the nuclear threshold, deterrence will apply, even if the Iranian
arsenal is relatively small. No other country in the region will have an incentive to acquire its own nuclear
capability, and the current crisis will finally dissipate, leading to a Middle East that is more stable than it is today. For that reason, the United States and its allies need not take such
provocations, the two countries have kept the peace. Israel and Iran would do well to consider this precedent.
pains to prevent the Iranians from developing a nuclear weapon. Diplomacy between Iran and the major powers should continue, because open lines of communication will make the Western
countries feel better able to live with a nuclear Iran. But the current sanctions on Iran can be dropped: they primarily harm ordinary Iranians, with little purpose. Most important, policymakers
the United States should take comfort from the fact that history has
shown that where nuclear capabilities emerge, so, too, does stability. When it comes to nuclear weapons, now as ever, more
and citizens in the Arab world, Europe, Israel, and
may be better.
2NC Noriega Indict
Noriega wrong and alarmist
Sigger ‘10
Jason Sigger – Jason Sigger is a defense policy analyst and the proprietor of the blog Armchair Generalist – “Neocon Invents Venezuela Nuke
Threat” – Crooks and Liars – October 6, 2010 – http://crooksandliars.com/node/40459/print
On the one hand, it's
admirable that the Foreign Policy website offers views from both the right and the
left on controversial public policy issues. On the other hand, it would be nice if they added some kind of warning
label. I don't know, something like " actual reality may differ from author's perspective. " I have this in
mind as Roger Noriega (former Bush political appointee, current AEI fellow) warns us of Hugo Chavez's supposed plans
to develop nuclear weapons with Iran's help.¶ Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez admitted last week that his government is "carrying out the
first studies" of a nuclear program. He attempted to portray it as an innocuous program designed solely for peaceful purposes.¶ --------¶ Chávez's
suggestion that he is merely studying the idea of a nuclear energy program is misleading. In fact, in November 2008, Iranian and Venezuelan
officials signed a secret "science and technology" agreement formalizing cooperation "in the field of nuclear technology." (The text of the
agreement, available in Farsi and Spanish, is available here.) The week after the agreement was signed, Venezuela's Ministry of Energy and
Petroleum prepared a presentation for the International Atomic Energy Agency documenting the establishment of a "nuclear power programme"
in Venezuela. That presentation, obtained from sources within the Venezuelan government, reveals that an "Atomic Energy Committee" has been
managing the nuclear program since 2007.¶ All countries have the right to a peaceful nuclear energy program under the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty, of which Venezuela is a signatory. However, Chávez's decision to rely on one of the world's worst proliferators to help
develop his country's capabilities in this sensitive technology sets alarm bells ringing. And his recent public declarations understating the nature
of his nuclear program raise more questions than they answer.¶ Just for the sake of accuracy, I'd note that China, Pakistan, and North Korea are
far more busy in weapons proliferation than Iran, particularly with high-tech equipment and materials. But this
kind of language isn't
new for Noriega. He is a particular hard-liner against Cuba and Venezuela, with a long history of
alarmist speeches and attacks against those governments. So it's not surprising to see this language, and it's
easier to shoot holes into his argument.
2NC No Retaliation
Obama won’t retaliate with nuclear weapons
Crowley ‘10
(Michael Crowley, Senior Editor the New Republic, “Obama and Nuclear Deterrence”, Jan 10th – http://www.tnr.com/node/72263)
The Los Angeles Times ran an important story yesterday about the
Obama administration's Nuclear Posture Review,
which evaluates U.S. policy towards the use of nuclear weapons. Apparently there's a debate inside the
administration--one that is splitting the civilians from the generals--not just about the size of our nuclear stockpile but also how we conceive of
possible first-strike and retaliatory policies. A
core issue under debate, officials said, is whether the United States should
shed its long-standing ambiguity about whether it would use nuclear weapons in certain
circumstances, in hopes that greater specificity would give foreign governments more confidence to make their own decisions on nuclear
arms. Some in the U.S. argue that the administration should assure foreign governments that it won't use nuclear weapons in reaction to a
biological, chemical or conventional attack, but only in a nuclear exchange. Others argue that the United States should promise that it would
never use nuclear weapons first, but only in response to a nuclear attack. As the story notes, some experts don't place much weight on
how our publicly-stated doctrine emerges because they don't expect foreign nations to take it literally. And the reality
is that any decisions about using nukes will certainly be case-by-case. But I'd still like to see some wider discussion of the
underlying questions, which are among the most consequential that policymakers can consider. The
questions are particularly
vexing when it comes to terrorist groups and rogue states. Would we, for instance, actually nuke
Pyongyang if it sold a weapon to terrorists who used it in America? That implied threat seems to exist,
but I actually doubt that a President Obama--or any president, for that matter--would go through with it.
Nuclear retaliation won’t happen.
Bremmer ‘4
(Ian Bremmer is the president of Eurasia Group, the leading global political risk research and consulting firm. Bremmer has a PhD in political
science from Stanford University (1994), and was the youngest-ever national fellow at the Hoover Institution. He presently teaches at Columbia
University, and has held faculty positions at the EastWest Institute and the World Policy Institute, 9-13-2004, New Statesman, “Suppose a new
9/11 hit America”)
What would happen if there were a new terrorist attack inside the United States on 11 September 2004?
How would it affect the presidential election campaign? The conventional wisdom is that Americans - their patriotic defiance aroused - would
rally to President George W Bush and make him an all but certain winner in November. But consider the differences between the context of the
original 9/11 and that of any attack which might occur this autumn. In 2001, the public reaction was one of disbelief and incomprehension. Many
Americans realised for the first time that large-scale terrorist attacks on US soil were not only conceivable; they were, perhaps, inevitable. A
majority focused for the first time on the threat from al-Qaeda, on the Taliban and on the extent to which Saudis were involved in terrorism. This
time, the public response would move much more quickly from shock to anger; debate over how America should respond would begin
immediately. Yet it
is difficult to imagine how the Bush administration could focus its response on an
external enemy. Should the US send 50,000 troops to the Afghan-Pakistani border to intensify the hunt for Osama Bin Laden and 'step up'
efforts to attack the heart of al-Qaeda? Many would wonder if that wasn't what the administration pledged to do after the attacks three years ago.
The president would face intensified criticism from those who have argued all along that Iraq was a distraction from 'the real war on
And what if a significant number of the terrorists responsible for the pre-election attack were again Saudis? The Bush administration
at a time when crude-oil prices are already more than $45
a barrel and global supply is stretched to the limit. While the Saudi royal family might support a co-ordinated attack against
terror'.
could hardly take military action against the Saudi government
terrorist camps, real or imagined, near the Yemeni border - where recent searches for al-Qaeda have concentrated - that would seem like a trivial,
insufficient retaliation for an attack on the US mainland. Remember how the Republicans criticised Bill Clinton's administration for ineffectually
'bouncing the rubble' in Afghanistan after the al-Qaeda attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in the 1990s. So what kind of
response might be credible? Washington's concerns about Iran are rising. The 9/11 commission report noted evidence of co-operation between
Iran and al-Qaeda operatives, if not direct Iranian advance knowledge of the 9/11 hijacking plot. Over the past few weeks, US officials have been
more explicit, too, in declaring Iran's nuclear programme 'unacceptable'. However, in the absence of an official Iranian claim of responsibility for
this hypothetical terrorist attack, the domestic opposition to such a war and the international outcry it would provoke would
make quick action against Iran unthinkable. In short, a decisive response from Bush could not be external. It would
have to be domestic. Instead of Donald Rumsfeld, the defence secretary, leading a war effort abroad, Tom Ridge, the homeland security
secretary, and John Ashcroft, the attorney general, would pursue an anti-terror campaign at home. Forced to use legal tools more controversial
than those provided by the Patriot Act, Americans would experience stepped-up domestic surveillance and border controls, much tighter security
in public places and the detention of a large number of suspects. Many Americans would undoubtedly support such moves. But concern for civil
liberties and personal freedom would ensure that the government would have nowhere near the public support it enjoyed for the invasion of
Afghanistan.
The U.S. won’t retaliate with nuclear weapons—it makes no sense
Spring ‘1
(Baker, Research Fellow at Heritage Foundation, Heritage Backgrounder 1477, Sept 20,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/MissileDefense/BG1477.cfm)
Nuclear retaliation is not appropriate for every kind of attack against America. Some opponents of missile
defense believe that the United States has an effective nuclear deterrent that, if necessary, could be used to respond to attacks on the homeland.
But no
responsible U.S. official is suggesting that the United States consider the use of nuclear
weapons in response to the horrific September 11 attacks. In most cases of attack on the United States,
the nuclear option would not be appropriate, but a defense response will almost always be appropriate. The United States
needs to be able to resort to defensive options.
2NC No Nuke Terror
No nuclear terror – counter to the goals of terror groups.
Kapur ‘8
(S. Paul; Associate professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, The Long Shadow: Nuclear
Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia. pg. 32)
Before a terrorist group can attempt to use nuclear weapons, it must meet two basic requirements. First, the group must decide that it wishes to
engage in nuclear terrorism. Analysts and policy makers often assume that terrorist groups necessarily want to do so (Carter 2004; U.S.
Government 2002). However, it is not clear that terrorist organizations would necessarily covet nuclear devices.
Although analysts often characterize terrorism as an irrational activity (Laqeuer I999: 4-5), extensive empirical
evidence indicates that terrorist groups in fact behave rationally, adopting strategies designed to achieve particular ends
(Crenshaw I995: 4; Pape 2003: 344). Thus whether terrorists would use nuclear weapons is contingent on whether doing so is likely to further
their goals. Under what circumstances could nuclear weapons fail to promote terrorists' goals? For certain types of terrorist
objectives, nuclear weapons could be too destructive. Large-scale devastation could negatively influence
audiences important to the terrorist groups. Terrorists often rely on populations sympathetic to their cause
for political, financial, and military support. The horrific destruction of a nuclear explosion could alienate
segments of this audience. People who otherwise would sympathize with the terrorists may conclude that in
using a nuclear device terrorists had gone too far and were no longer deserving of support . The catastrophic effects
of nuclear weapons could also damage or destroy the very thing that the terrorist group most values. For example, if a terrorist organization were struggling with another group for control of their common homeland, the use of nuclear
weapons against the enemy group would devastate the terrorists' own home territory. Using nuclear weapons would
be extremely counterproductive for the terrorists in this scenario.
No miscalc impact – US-Russian safety systems check conflict.
Morrison ‘7
(James Morrison, formerly served as an assistant foreign editor for the Washington Times. Mr. Morrison returned to the Foreign Desk in 1993 to
launch the Embassy Row column, a diplomatic news column primarily focusing on foreign ambassadors in the United States and U.S.
ambassadors abroad. The column is the only one of its kind in U.S. journalism. The Washington Times, September 25, 2007, Sentinels on Guard,
lexis)
Despite growing foreign-policy disputes, Moscow and Washington have prevented an accidental
nuclear disaster with extensive communication links through Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers
(NRRCs), Russian Ambassador Yuri Ushakov said in a review of 20 years of the program established under President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.
NRRCs have proved their efficiency as an instrument of transparency and confidencebuilding," he said in a speech last week at the State Department. "Moreover, they have become a reliable mechanism designed to
diminish and eliminate the very potential threat of an accidental nuclear disaster."
"The
No nuclear terror – they’ll choose conventional weapons.
Mueller ‘8
John Mueller, political science professor at Ohio State University, “The Atomic Terrorist: Assessing the Likelihood” Jan. 1
http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF
Meanwhile, although there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all (thus far, at least) have
relied on conventional destructive methods--there hasn't even been the occasional gas bomb. In effect the terrorists seem to be
heeding the advice found in a memo on an al-Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: "Make use of that which is available...rather than waste
valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach" (Whitlock 2007). That is: Keep it simple, stupid. In fact, it seems
to be a general historical regularity that terrorists tend to prefer weapons that they know and understand,
not new, exotic ones (Rapoport 1999, 51; Gilmore 1999, 37; Schneier 2003, 236). Indeed, the truly notable innovation for
terrorists over the last few decades has not been in qualitative improvements in ordnance at all, but rather
in a more effective method for delivering it: the suicide bomber (Pape 2005, Bloom 2005).
No Nuclear terror – too many tech bariers
Schwartz & Falk ‘3
(Yaron Schwartz, US office director of the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, and Ophir Falk, Vice President of Advanced
Security Integration Ltd., 2003”Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Terrorism” 5-13-2003
http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=487)
For a terrorist group to obtain a nuclear weapon, two principal channels exist: build a device from scratch or somehow procure
or steal a ready-made one or its key components. Neither of these is likely. Of all the possibilities, constructing a bomb from scratch,
without state assistance, is the most unlikely. “So remote,” in the words of a senior nuclear scientist at the Los
Alamos National Laboratory, “ that it can be essentially ruled out.” The chief obstacle lies not only in producing the nuclear fuel—
either bomb-grade uranium or plutonium—but also the requirements for testing and securing safe havens for the terrorists.[16] Unlike uranium, a
much smaller quantity of plutonium is required to form a critical mass. Yet to make enough of it for a workable bomb, a reactor is needed. Could
terrorists buy one? Where would they build it? Could such a structure go undetected by satellites and other intelligence tools? That is all very
implausible indeed. If making nuclear-bomb fuel is out of the question, why not just steal it, or buy it on the black market? Consider plutonium:
if terrorists did manage to procure some weapon-grade plutonium, would their problems be over? Far from
it: plutonium works only in an “implosion”-type bomb, which is about ten times more difficult to build than
the more simple uranium bomb used at Hiroshima. Among a litany of specialized requirements is an experienced designer, a
number of other specialists and a testing program. Hence, the terrorist’s chances of getting an implosion bomb to work are very low. An
alternative to stealing plutonium is bomb-grade uranium. The problem with buying bomb-grade uranium is that one would
need a great deal of it—around 50kg for a gun-type bomb—and nothing near that amount has turned up in
the black market.[17] Even when considering a country like Pakistan, the only possibility for terrorists to lay
their hands on that country’s uranium would be if its government fell under the control of sympathizers.
Given that Pakistan’s army is by far the most effective and stable organization in the country, there is not
much chance of that happening. Russia, again, is the terrorists’ best bet and therefore a potential target. It has tons of bomb-grade
uranium left over from the cold war and, in addition to bombs, has used this material to fuel nuclear submarines and research reactors. With a
reported history of smuggling attempts, there are definite prospects in Russia. If terrorists could strike the
main deposit and get enough uranium for a bomb, they would be on their way. But it would still be a long
journey: designing and building the bomb is anything but a trivial undertaking, as is recruiting the suitably
skilled technician/s for the task. The main risk for terrorists is getting caught. Finding an isolated location for minimal
risk of detection also would not be easy. Stealing or buying a complete bomb would circumvent the
aforementioned obstacles. But this option presents other pitfalls which are even greater: all countries,
including Russia and Pakistan (with US assistance), make ever greater efforts to safeguard their warheads and
materials, and even rogue states—if they should get the bomb (as North Korea appears to staunchly pursue)—would be highly likely
to do the same. Countries employ security measures specifically designed to prevent theft. Warheads are
typically stored in highly restricted bunkers. Terrorists would have a very hard time trying to take over one
of these and even if successful, it would be much harder to leave with the contents in hand .[18]
Nuclear terror risk exaggerated – tech barriers block the process.
Mueller ‘10
John Mueller is Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University and the author of "The Remnants of War. Foreign Policy –
JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 – http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/04/think_again_nuclear_weapons?page=0,2
"Fabricating a Bomb Is 'Child's Play.'" Hardly. An editorialist in Nature, the esteemed scientific journal, did apply that
characterization to the manufacture of uranium bombs, as opposed to plutonium bombs, last January, but even that seems an absurd exaggeration.
Younger, the former Los Alamos research director, has expressed his amazement at how "self-declared
'nuclear weapons experts,' many of whom have never seen a real nuclear weapon," continue to "hold forth on
how easy it is to make a functioning nuclear explosive." Uranium is "exceptionally difficult to machine," he
points out, and "plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basic
properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed." Special technology is required, and even the simplest
weapons require precise tolerances. Information on the general idea for building a bomb is available online,
but none of it, Younger says, is detailed enough to "enable the confident assembly of a real nuclear
explosive." A failure to appreciate the costs and difficulties of a nuclear program has led to massive
overestimations of the ability to fabricate nuclear weapons. As the 2005 Silberman-Robb commission, set up to investigate
the intelligence failures that led to the Iraq war, pointed out, it is "a fundamental analytical error" to equate "procurement
activity with weapons system capability." That is, "simply because a state can buy the parts does not mean it
can put them together and make them work." For example, after three decades of labor and well over $100
million in expenditures, Libya was unable to make any progress whatsoever toward an atomic bomb. Indeed,
much of the country's nuclear material, surrendered after it abandoned its program, was still in the original
boxes.
non-State actors can’t pull it off.
Mueller ‘8
(John, political science professor at Ohio State University, “The Atomic Terrorist: Assessing the Likelihood” Jan. 1
http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF)
More than a decade ago Allison boldly insisted that it would be "easy" for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile
material (Allison et al. 1996, 12).13 Atomic scientists, perhaps laboring under the concern, in Langewiesche's words, that "a declaration of safety
can at any time be proved spectacularly wrong" (2007, 49), have been comparatively restrained in cataloguing the difficulties terrorists would
face in constructing a bomb. But physicists Wirz and Egger have published a paper that does so, and it concludes that the task "could
hardly be accomplished by a subnational group" (2005, 501). They point out that precise blueprints are required,
not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint they "would most certainly be forced
to redesign" (2005, 499-500). The process could take months or even a year or more (Pluta and Zimmerman 2006, 62), and in distinct
contrast with Allison, they stress that the work, far from being "easy," is difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting, and
that the technical requirements "in several fields verge on the unfeasible." They conclude that "it takes much
more than knowledge of the workings of nuclear weapons and access to fissile material to successfully
manufacture a usable weapon" (2005, 501-2).
FDI
1NC
Econ resilient
E.I.U. ‘11
(Economist Intelligence Unit – Global Forecasting Service, 11/16/’11
(http://gfs.eiu.com/Article.aspx?articleType=gef&articleId=668596451&secID=7)
The US economy, by any standard, remains weak, and consumer and business sentiment are close to 2009 lows. That said, the economy
has been surprisingly resilient in the face of so many shocks. US real GDP expanded by a relatively robust
2.5% in the third quarter of 2011, twice the rate of the previous quarter. Consumer spending rose by 2.4%, which is
impressive given that real incomes dropped during the quarter (the savings rate fell, which helps to explain the anomaly.)
Historically, US consumers have been willing to spend even in difficult times. Before the 2008-09 slump,
personal spending rose in every quarter between 1992 and 2007. That resilience is again in evidence: retail sales in September
were at a seven-month high, and sales at chain stores have been strong. Business investment has been even more
buoyant: it expanded in the third quarter by an impressive 16.3% at an annual rate, and spending by companies in September on
conventional capital goods (that is, excluding defence and aircraft) grew by the most since March. This has been
made possible, in part, by strong corporate profits. According to data compiled by Bloomberg, earnings for US companies in
the S&P 500 rose by 24% year on year in the third quarter. All of this has occurred despite a debilitating fiscal debate in
Washington, a sovereign debt downgrade by a major ratings agency and exceptional volatility in capital
markets. This reinforces our view that the US economy, although weak, is not in danger of falling into a
recession (absent a shock from the euro zone). US growth will, however, continue to be held back by a weak labour market—the
unemployment rate has been at or above 9% for 28 of the last 30 months—and by a moribund housing market.
No diversionary theory – it’ll be small scale if it happens
Harrison ‘11
(Mark, Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham, Hoover
Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University, “Capitalism at War” Oct 19
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/academic/harrison/papers/capitalism.pdf)
Diversionary wars In
the concept of diversionary wars, political leaders seek and exploit conflict with external
adversaries in order to rally domestic support. The idea is well established in the literature, perhaps because the theoretical case is quite
intuitive, and narrative support is not hard to find. In fact, it may be too easy; as Jack Levy (1989) pointed out, few wars have not been attributed to political leaders’
desire to improve domestic standing. The
idea of diversionary wars is directly relevant to a discussion of capitalism
only if it can be shown that capitalist polities are more likely to exploit foreign adventures. One reason might be
advanced from a Marxist perspective: perhaps capitalist societies, being class-divided, are more likely to give rise to wars
intended to divert the workers from the cause of socialism. A longstanding interpretation of the origins of World War I in domestic
German politics conveys exactly this message (Berghahn 1973). This view does not sit well with the equally traditional idea that
a class-divided society is less able to go to war. The official Soviet histories of World War II used to
claim that, under capitalism, divided class interests made the working people reluctant to fight for the nation.
Because of this, the workers could be motivated to take part only by “demagogy, deception, bribery, and
force” (Grechko et al., eds 1982, vol. 12, p. 38; Pospelov et al., eds 1965, vol. 6, pp. 80-82). Quantitative empirical work has lent little support to the idea (Levy
1989). Exceptions include studies of the use of force by U.S. and British postwar governments by Morgan and Bickers (1992) and Morgan and Anderson (1999). They
of force is more likely when government approval is high but the government’s supporting
coalition is suffering erosion. They also suggest that force is unlikely to be used at high intensities under such
circumstances (because likely costs are high, eroding political support) or when domestic conflict is high
(because conflict would then be polarizing rather than consolidate support). Another line of research suggests that new or
conclude that the use
incompletely established democracies are particularly vulnerable to risky adventures in nation-building (Mansfield and Snyder 2005). One inspiration for this view
was the record of the new democracies born out of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. More recently, Georgia seems to have provided out-of-sample
confirmation. Suppose
diversionary wars exist. Is capitalism somehow more internally conflicted than other societies,
and so disproportionately likely to externalize conflict? As a comparator, the case of fascism seems
straightforward. Fascism did not produce diversionary wars because, for fascists, war was not a diversion;
it was the Schwerpunkt. The more interesting case is that of communism. Communists do not seem to have
pursued diversionary wars. But the domestic legitimacy of Soviet rule visibly relied on the image of an
external enemy, and thrived on tension short of military conflict. Soviet leaders used external tension to
justify internal controls on movement, culture, and expression, and the associated apparatus of secrecy, censorship, and surveillance. When they
tolerated trends towards détente in the 1970s, they subverted their own controls. An East German Stasi officer told his
boss, repeating it later to Garton Ash (1997, p. 159): “How can you expect me to prevent [defections and revelations], when we’ve signed all these international
agreements for improved relations with the West, working conditions for journalists, freedom of movement, respect for human rights?” If Soviet foreign policy was
sometimes expansionist, it sought expansion only up to the point where the desired level of tension was assured. Bolsheviks of the 1917 generation knew well that too
much too much conflict abroad encouraged defeatist and counter-revolutionary sentiments at home. Oleg Khlevniuk (1995, p. 174) noted: “The complex relationship
between war and revolution, which had almost seen the tsarist regime toppled in 1905 and which finally brought its demise in 1917, was a relationship of which Stalin
was acutely aware. The lessons of history had to be learnt lest history repeat itself.” Stalin did all he could to avoid war with Germany in 1941 (Gorodetsky 1999).
Postwar Soviet leaders risked war by proxy, but avoided direct conflict with the “main adversary.” Faced with unfavourable odds, they tended to withdraw (from
Diversionary tension must
fall short of diversionary war. From this follows an acceptance that capitalism, because of its tendency to
give rise to democratic structures and political competition, has been more open to diversionary wars than
other systems. But the empirical research and analysis that underpin this conclusion also imply that such wars
would generally be small scale and short lived, and the circumstances that give rise to them would be
exceptional or transient. We should place this in the wider context of the “democratic peace.” As Levy (1988)
wrote: “Liberal or democratic states do not fight each other … This absence of war between democracies
comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations.” Since all liberal
democracies have also been capitalist on any definition, it is a finding of deep relevance.
Cuba) or do nothing (in Poland) or accepted them with great reluctance (in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan).
Decline doesn’t cause war
Barnett ‘ 9
(Thomas P.M Barnett, senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC, contributing editor/online columnist for Esquire, 8/25/’9 – “The New
Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis,” Aprodex, Asset Protection Index, http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--securityremains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx)
When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary
predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression
leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China
and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how
globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international
security landscape.¶ None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can
be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and
Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last
century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly,
the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was
specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening
ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign)
for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions.¶ Looking
over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies,
and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential
state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity - a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends.¶ And with the United States effectively tied down by its two
ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has
been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts
in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else
we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local
forces.
2NC Resilient
US econ resilient
Johnson ‘13
(Robert , CFA, director of economic analysis with Morningstar, Morningstar.com, “U.S. Economy Not So Fragile After All” – 1/19 –
http://news.morningstar.com/articlenet/article.aspx?id=581616)
No, the U.S. Economy Has Not Been Fragile After All¶ Although most economists got at least some things right
about the U.S. economy over the past two years, the one nearly universal error was the expectation that the economy
was fragile. The U.S. economy has proven to be anything but fragile.¶ I believe this to be the single biggest
error that economists have made over the last two years. During that time, the U.S. has survived the fallout from a major
debt crisis in Europe, a divisive election, temporarily going over the fiscal cliff, gasoline prices that
have been on a yo-yo, a tsunami in Japan, and Hurricane Sandy, which shut down New York and
even the stock exchanges for a couple of days. These are not signs of a fragile economy.
Econ resilient – fundamentals growing
Stewart ‘13
(Hale Stewart spent 5 years as a bond broker in the late 1990s before returning to law school in the early 2000s. He is currently a tax lawyer in
Houston, Texas. He has an LLM from the Thomas Jefferson School of Law in domestic and international taxation where he graduated Magna
Cum Laude, seeking alpha, “Is The U.S. Economy Moving Into A Higher Growth Phase? Part 1 - The Positive” – Feb 5th –
http://seekingalpha.com/article/1158011-is-the-u-s-economy-moving-into-a-higher-growth-phase-part-1-the-positive?source=google_news)
housing, autos and manufacturing -- are bedrock components of the economy. If
all three are doing fairly well, the worst that can happen is slow growth. There is simply too much of a
All three of the above sectors --
multiplier effect of the combined total for a recession to occur with the above three expanding.
However, this is
before we get to the latest and upcoming fiscal follies from the people in Washington. We'll touch on that in Part 2.
Recovery from 2008 proves economy resilient
Drezner ‘12
(Daniel, Professor International Politics Tufts University, October, “The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked” Council
on Foreign Relations International Institutions and Global Governance)
In looking at outcomes, the
obvious question is how well the global economy has recovered from the
2008 crisis. The current literature on economic downturns suggests two factors that impose significant barriers to a strong recovery from the
Great Recession: it was triggered by a financial crisis and it was global in scope. Whether measuring output, per
capita income, or employment, financial crashes trigger downturns that last longer and have far weaker recoveries than
standard business cycle downturns.10 Furthermore, the global nature of the crisis makes it extremely difficult for
countries to export their way out of the problem. Countries that have experienced severe banking crises since World War
II have usually done so when the global economy was largely unaffected. That was not the case for the Great Recession. The global
economy has rebounded much better than during the Great Depression. Economists Barry Eichengreen and
Kevin O’Rourke have compiled data to compare global economic performance from the start of the crises (see Figures 1 and 2).11 Two facts
stand out in their comparisons. First, the
percentage drop in global industrial output and world trade levels at
the start of the 2008 financial crisis was more precipitous than the falloffs following the October
1929 stock market crash. The drop in industrial output was greater in 2008 nine months into the crisis than it was eighty years earlier
after the same amount of time. The drop in trade flows was more than twice as large. Second, the post-2008 rebound has been far more robust.
Four years after the onset of the Great Recession, global
industrial output is 10 percent higher than when the
recession began. In contrast, four years after the 1929 stock market crash, industrial output was at
only two-thirds of precrisis levels. A similar story can be told with aggregate economic growth. According to World Bank
figures, global economic output rebounded in 2010 with 2.3 percent growth, followed up in 2011 with 4.2
percent growth. The global growth rate in 2011 was 44 percent higher than the average of the previous decade. Even more intriguing, the growth
continued to be poverty reducing.12 The World Bank’s latest figures suggest that despite the 2008 financial crisis, extreme poverty continued to
decline across all the major regions of the globe. And the developing world achieved its first Millennium Development Goal of halving the 1990
levels of extreme poverty.13 An important reason for the quick return to positive economic growth is that cross-border
flows did not
dry up after the 2008 crisis. Again, compared to the Great Depression, trade flows have rebounded extremely
well.14 Four years after the 1929 stock market crash, trade flows were off by 25 percent compared to precrisis levels. Current trade flows, in
contrast, are more than 5 percent higher than in 2008. Even compared to other postwar recessions, the current period has seen robust crossborder
exchange. Indeed, as a report from CFR’s Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies concluded in May 2012, “The
growth in
world trade since the start of the [current] recovery exceeds even the best of the prior postwar
experiences.”15 Other cross-border flows have also rebounded from 2008–2009 lows. Global foreign direct investment (FDI) has returned
to robust levels. FDI inflows rose by 17 percent in 2011 alone. This put annual FDI levels at $1.5 trillion, surpassing the three-year precrisis
average, though still approximately 25 percent below the 2007 peak. More generally, global foreign investment assets reached $96 trillion, a 5
percent increase from precrisis highs. Remittances from migrant workers have become an increasingly important revenue stream to the
developing world—and the 2008 financial crisis did not dampen that income stream. Cross-border remittances to developing countries quickly
rebounded to precrisis levels and then rose to an estimated all-time high of $372 billion in 2011, with growth rates in 2011 that exceeded those in
2010. Total cross-border remittances were more than $501 billion last year, and are estimated to reach $615 billion by 2014.16 Another salient
outcome is mass public attitudes about the global economy. A
general assumption in public opinion research is that during a
downturn, demand for greater economic closure should spike, as individuals scapegoat
foreigners for domestic woes. The global nature of the 2008 crisis, combined with anxiety about
the shifting distribution of power, should have triggered a fall in support for an open global
economy. Somewhat surprisingly, however, the reverse is true. Pew’s Global Attitudes Project has surveyed a wide spectrum
of countries since 2002, asking people about their opinions on both international trade and the free market more generally.17 The results
show resilient support for expanding trade and business ties with other countries. Twenty-four countries
were surveyed both in 2007 and at least one year after 2008, including a majority of the G20 economies. Overall, eighteen of those twenty-four
countries showed equal or greater support for trade in 2009 than two years earlier. By 2011, twenty of twenty-four countries showed greater or
equal support for trade compared to 2007. Indeed, between 2007 and 2012, the unweighted average support for more trade in these countries
increased from 78.5 percent to 83.6 percent. Contrary to expectation, there has been no mass public rejection of the open global economy. Indeed,
public support for the open trading system has strengthened, despite softening public support for free-market economics more generally.18 The
final outcome addresses a dog that hasn’t barked: the effect of the Great Recession on crossborder
conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis
would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.19 Whether through
greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power
conflict, there were genuine concerns that the global economic downturn would lead to an
increase in conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy
movement fuel impressions of surge in global public disorder.
The aggregate data suggests otherwise , however. A fundamental
conclusion from a recent report by the Institute for Economics and Peace is that “the
average level of peacefulness in 2012
is approximately the same as it was in 2007.”20 Interstate violence in particular has declined since
the start of the financial crisis—as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great
Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict ; the secular decline in violence that started with the end of the
Cold War has not been reversed.21
2NC US Not Key
( ) US not key—global economies decoupling
Caryl ‘10
[Christian Caryl is a Editor at Foreign Policy and Newsweek and a Senior Fellow of the CSIS at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
“Crisis? What Crisis?” 4/5/10 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/04/05/crisis_what_crisis?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full]
We went through a terrifying moment back in the fall of 2008. The financial system in the United States was imploding. It was
impossible to predict how the effects would ripple through the rest of the world, but one outcome seemed inevitable: Developing economies were
going to take a terrible hit. There was just no way they could escape the maelstrom without seeing millions of their citizens impoverished. Many
emerging-market countries did experience sharp drops in GDP. Their capital markets tanked. Dominique Strauss-Kahn, managing director of
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), sounded downright apocalyptic: "All this will affect dramatically unemployment, and
beyond unemployment for many countries it will be at the roots of social unrest, some threat to democracy, and maybe for some cases it can
also end in war." The Economist recently noted, "The Institute of International Finance (IIF), a think-tank in Washington, DC, forecast that
net private capital flows into poor countries in 2009 would be 72% lower than at their peak in 2007, an unprecedented shrinkage." Virtually
everyone expected to see the countries that had benefited so dramatically from growth in the years leading up to the crisis to suffer
disproportionately in its wake. An entirely rational assumption -- except it hasn't turned out that way at all. To be sure, there were far
too many poor people in the world before the crisis, and that still remains the case. Some 3 billion people still live on less
than $2.50 a day. But the global economic crisis hasn't added appreciably to their ranks. Just take China, India, and
Indonesia, Asia's three biggest emerging markets. Although growth in all three slowed, it never went into reverse.
China's robust growth through the crisis has been much publicized -- but Indonesia's, much less conspicuously. Those countries, as well as
Brazil and Russia, have rebounded dramatically. The Institute of International Finance -- the same people who gave that dramatically
skepticism-inducing estimate earlier -- now says that net private capital flows to developing countries could reach $672 billion this year (double
the 2009 amount). That's less than the high point of 2007, to be sure. But it still seems remarkable in light of the dire predictions . In
short, the countries that have worked the hardest to join the global marketplace are showing remarkable resilience. It
wasn't always this way. Recall what happened back in 1997 and 1998, when the Thai government's devaluation of its currency triggered the
Asian financial crisis. Rioting across Indonesia brought down the Suharto government. The administration of Filipino President Joseph Estrada
collapsed. The turbulence echoed throughout the region and into the wider world, culminating in the Russian government default and August
1998 ruble devaluation. Brazil and Argentina trembled. The IMF was everywhere, dispensing advice and dictating conditions. It was the
emerging markets that bore the brunt of that crisis. So what's different this time around? The answers differ from place to place, but
there are some common denominators. Many of the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China) learned vital lessons from the trauma of
the late 1990s, hence the IMF's relatively low-key profile this time around. (The fund has been most active in Africa, where
they still need the help -- unless you count Greece, of course.) Many emerging economies entered the 2008-2009 crisis with
healthy balance sheets. In most cases governments reacted quickly and flexibly, rolling out stimulus programs or
even expanding poverty-reduction programs. Increasingly, the same countries that have embraced globalization and
markets are starting to build social safety nets . And there's another factor: Trade is becoming more evenly distributed
throughout the world. China is now a bigger market for Asian exporters than the United States . Some economists are
talking about "emerging market decoupling." Jonathan Anderson, an emerging-markets economist at the Swiss bank UBS, showed in
one recent report how car sales in emerging markets have actually been rising during this latest bout of turmoil -- powerful
evidence that emerging economies no longer have to sneeze when America catches a cold . Aphitchaya Nguanbanchong, a
consultant for the British-based aid organization Oxfam, has studied the crisis's effects on Southeast Asian economies. "The research so far shows
that the result of the crisis isn't as bad as we were expecting," she says. Indonesia is a case in point: " People in this region and at the
policy level learned a lot from the past crisis." Healthy domestic demand cushioned the shock when the crisis hit
export-oriented industries; the government weighed in immediately with hefty stimulus measures. Nguanbanchong says that she has been
surprised by the extent to which families throughout the region have kept spending money on education even as incomes have declined for some.
And that, she says, reinforces a major lesson that emerging-market governments can take away from the crisis:
"Governments should focus more on social policy, on health, education, and services. They shouldn't be intervening so much
directly in the economy itself." This ought to be a big story. But you won't have much luck finding it in the newspapers -- perhaps because it runs
so contrary to our habitual thinking about the world economy. The U.N. Development Programme and the Asian Development Bank recently
published a report that attempts to assess what effect the crisis will have on the world's progress toward the U.N. Millennium Development Goals,
benchmarks that are supposed to be achieved by 2015. At first glance the report's predictions are daunting: It states that 21 million people in the
developing world are "at risk" of slipping into extreme poverty and warns that the goals are unlikely to be met. Many experts wonder, of course,
whether the V-shaped crisis we've witnessed so far is going to turn into a W, with another sharp downturn still to come. Some argue that the
Great Recession's real damage has yet to be felt. Yet the report also contains some interesting indications that this might not be the case. "The
global economic crisis has been widely predicted to affect international migration and remittances adversely," it notes. "But as the crisis unfolds,
it is becoming clear that the patterns of migration and remittances may be more complex than was previously imagined." In other words, these
interconnections are proving to be much more resilient than anyone might have predicted earlier. As the report notes,
receipts of remittances have so far actually increased in Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, and Sri Lanka. Perhaps
migrant workers -- those global experts in entrepreneurship and risk-taking -- know something that a lot of the rest of us don't. So why should we
care? Anirudh Krishna, a Duke University political scientist who studies poverty reduction, says that there's a moral to the story: "Certainly
cutting countries and people off from markets is no longer a sensible thing to do. Expanding those connections, bringing in a
larger part of a talent pool into the high-growth sector -- that is what would make most countries grow faster and more individuals climb out of
poverty." Echoing Nguanbanchong, he argues that governments are well-advised to concentrate on providing their citizens with education and
health care -- the great enablers in the fight for social betterment. Microfinance and income subsidy programs can fill important gaps -- as long as
they aim to empower future entrepreneurs, not create cultures of entitlement. This is not to say the outlook is bright on every front, of course. As
the Economist noted, the number of people facing hunger recently topped 1 billion, the highest since 1970. The reason for that has more to do
with the 2007-2008 spike in food prices than with the financial crisis. (Remember how the price of rice shot up?) We are still a long way from
conquering poverty. There is still a huge -- and in some cases growing -- gap between the world's rich and poor. Yet how remarkable it
would be if we could one day look back on the 2008-2009 crisis as the beginning of a more equitable global
economy.
( ) The U.S is not key – Asia fill-in and decoupling
Xinbo ‘10
(Wu, a professor and deputy director of the Center for American Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai, and a member of TWQ’s editorial
board“Understanding the Geopolitical Implications of the Global Financial Crisis” The Washington Quarterly – 33:4 pp. –
155163http://www.twq.com/10october/docs/10oct_Xinbo.pdf)
While China suffered moderately from
the crisis economically, it has gained remarkably in politico-economic
terms. For one thing, the Chinese model of development_ featured by a strong role of the state in economic development,
stress on the real rather than the virtual economy, a high savings rate, measured financial market liberalization, etc._has empowered
China to better resist the financial storm and minimize the losses associated with it. As a developing country,
China’s experience appears more applicable to the developing world. For instance, as Alex Perry of Time
magazine observed, ‘‘African governments look at Western economic instability over the past two years and find a better model in Asia’s
extraordinary growth.’’8 In the post—ColdWar era, the U.S. model used to be hailed as the only way to economic prosperity. Now, the Chinese
model seems to provide an alternative. To be sure, the Chinese model is not perfect and is actually confronted with many challenges such as a
widening income gap, serious environment pollution, and rampant corruption. Yet, the record of tiding over two financial crises (the 1998—1999
Asian financial crisis and the 2008—2009 global financial crisis) and securing three decades of a high economic growth rate testifies to its
strength. Unlike Washington, Beijing
does not like to boast of its model and impose it on others, but the
increased appeal of the Chinese experience will certainly enhance Beijing’s international status and augment its
influence among developing countries. Even before the recent crisis, there was already discussion of decoupling Asian
economies from the United States, given growing intra-Asian economic activities.9 The reality that China has
already become the largest trading partner to some major regional economies, such as Japan, South Korea, and
Taiwan, provided an additional incentive to further East Asian regional economic cooperation. Even in Japan,
where the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) rose to power during the crisis in August 2009, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama noted that: [T]he
recent financial crisis has suggested to many people that the era of American unilateralism may come to an end. It has also made people harbor
doubts about the permanence of the dollar as the key global currency. I also feel that as a result of the failure of the Iraq war and the financial
crisis, the era of US-led globalism is coming to an end and that we are moving away from a unipolar world toward an era of multipolarity.10
Hatoyama continued that, ‘‘Current
developments show clearly that China, which has by far the world’s largest population,
will become one of the world’s leading economic nations, while also continuing to expand its military power.’’11 He
pledged to strengthen relations with Asian countries, particularly China, and work to build an East Asian Community. Behind this lies a
recognition of China’s growing importance to Japan’s economic future. South Korea also expressed enthusiasm for forging a free trade agreement
with China as early as possible. Taiwan signed the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) with mainland China in June 2009,
marking a major step forward in relations across the Taiwan Strait. The agreement, focusing on tariff concession and easier market access, will
remove tariffs within two years on 539 Taiwan export items to the mainland worth $13.84 billion, as well as 267 mainland export items to
Taiwan valued at $2.86 billion. The pact will also give Taiwan firms access to 11 service sectors on the mainland including banking, accounting,
insurance, and hospitals.12 The financial crisis also prompted Beijing to boost its domestic consumption.
As the great potential of its internal market is further released, it will serve both to thicken China’s economic ties with regional partners and to
strengthen its role as an East Asian economic hub. In a nutshell,
the financial and economic turmoil underscored China’s
position as the engine of the Asian regional economy and even the global economy as well . In international politics,
political and economic relations always follow each other. AfterWorldWar II, many regional members developed close economic ties with the
United States, following tight political and security arrangements with Washington. By the same token, today and in the future, China’s
deepening economic connections with its regional partners promise to expand its political clout
in East Asia. Given China’s growing economic size and its excellent performance during the crisis, it is no surprise that the financial
turmoil served to raise China’s status in global economic governance. The G-20 emerged from the crisis as the premier forum
for international economic cooperation, shadowing the traditional role of the G-8 in world economy. China, as the world’s
third largest economy and the largest foreign reserve holder, ascended to center stage within the G-20. The idea of a G-2,
consisting of Beijing and Washington governing the world economy or managing international geopolitics, was tossed around among U.S.
scholars and former government officials (although not endorsed by either Beijing or Washington), reflecting
a recognition of
China’s newly-accrued economic and geopolitical weight. In April 2010, the World Bank decided to increase
China’s voting rights, making it the third largest voter in the institution. The IMF is also expected to raise China’s representation in its current
round of reconstruction endeavors. All in all, the
financial crisis benefited China by quickening the pace of the
global economic and financial power transition, turning China from a peripheral member into a key player. Last but not
least, the crisis gave credit to China’s currency Renminbi (RMB) for its strength and stability. Even before the
crisis, the RMB was already used in some of China’s neighboring countries for settling accounts in border
trade. The financial storm revealed the volatility of the U.S. dollar and highlighted the strength of the Chinese
yuan. Although the RMB is not yet freely convertible, some of China’s major trading partners saw the
desirability of increasing its holding as the U.S. dollar has been getting weaker, arousing concerns that an
unstable dollar would lead to increased costs and risks for traders. Since the onset of the crisis, China has signed bilateral currency swap
agreements with Argentina, Belarus, Iceland, Indonesia, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Singapore, and South Korea, with a total amount of 803.5 billion
yuan (about $118.1 billion). Some
countries also moved to take the RMB as one of its reserve currencies.
It was the crisis that caused Beijing to think seriously about the regionalization of the RMB. To
enhance that goal, the Chinese government undertook to push the RMB settlement pilots in the trade between China’s two most important
exporting regions, Guangdong and the Yangtze River Delta, with Hong Kong and Macao, and between two Chinese provinces bordering
Southeast Asia, Gaungxi and Yunnan, with the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In early 2009, Beijing also
approved Shanghai’s ambitious goal of turning itself into an international financial center by 2020, matching China’s economic influence and the
yuan’s international position. It will be a long journey for theRMBto become a major international reserve currency, but it seems that the
global financial crisis has turned out to be its starting point.
2NC AT: Diversionary Theory
Diversionary war theory is false
Boehmer ‘7
(Charles, political science professor at the University of Texas, Politics & Policy, 35:4, “The Effects of Economic Crisis, Domestic Discord, and
State Efficacy on the Decision to Initiate Interstate Conflict”)
This article examines the contemporaneous effect of low economic growth and domestic instability on the threat of regime change and/ or
involvement in external militarized conflicts. Many studies
of diversionary conflict argue that lower rates of economic
growth should heighten the risk of international conflict. Yet we know that militarized interstate conflicts, and
especially wars, are generally rare events whereas lower rates of growth are not. Additionally, a growing body of literature shows that regime
changes are also associated with lower rates of economic growth. The question then becomes which event, militarized interstate conflict or
regime change, is the most likely to occur with domestic discord and lower rates of economic growth? Diversionary
theory claims
that leaders seek to divert attention away from domestic problems such as a bad economy or political
scandals, or to garner increased support prior to elections. Leaders then supposedly externalize discontented domestic sentiments onto other
nations, sometimes as scapegoats based on the similar in-group/out-group dynamic found in the research of Coser (1956) and Simmel (1955),
where foreign countries are blamed for domestic problems. This process is said to involve a “rally-round-the-flag” effect, where a leader can
expect a short-term boost in popularity with the threat or use of force (Blechman, Kaplan, and Hall 1978; Mueller 1973). Scholarship on
diversionary conflict has focused most often on the American case1 but recent studies have sought to identify this possible behavior in other
countries.2 The Falklands War is often a popular example of diversionary conflict (Levy and Vakili 1992). Argentina was reeling from
hyperinflation and rampant unemployment associated with the Latin American debt crisis. It is plausible that a success in the Falklands War may
have helped to rally support for the governing Galtieri regime, although Argentina lost the war and the ruling regime lost power. How many other
attempts to use diversionary tactics, if they indeed occur, can be seen to generate a similar outcome? The goal of this article is to provide an
assessment of the extent to which diversionary strategy is a threat to peace. Is
this a colorful theory kept alive by
academics that has little bearing upon real events, or is this a real problem that policy makers should be concerned with?
If it is a strategy readily available to leaders, then it is important to know what domestic factors trigger this gambit. Moreover, to know that
requires an understanding of the context in external conflict, which occurs relative to regime changes. Theories
of diversionary
conflict usually emphasize the potential benefits of diversionary tactics, although few pay equal
attention to the prospective costs associated with such behavior. It is not contentious to claim that leaders typically seek to remain
in office. However, whether they can successfully manipulate public opinion regularly during periods of domestic
unpopularity through their states’ participation in foreign militarized conflicts—especially outside of the American case—is a question
open for debate. Furthermore, there appears to be a logical disconnect between diversionary theories and extant studies of domestic
conflict and regime change. Lower rates of economic growth are purported to increase the risk of both militarized interstate conflicts (and internal
conflicts) as well as regime changes (Bloomberg and Hess 2002). This implies that if
leaders do, in fact, undertake diversionary
conflicts, many may still be thrown from the seat of power—especially if the outcome is defeat to a
foreign enemy. Diversionary conflict would thus seem to be a risky gambit (Smith 1996). Scholars such as MacFie (1938) and Blainey (1988)
have nevertheless questioned the validity of the
diversionary thesis. As noted by Levy (1989), this perspective is rarely
formulated as a cohesive and comprehensive theory, and there has been little or no knowledge cumulation. Later analyses do not
necessarily build on past studies and the discrepancies between inquiries are often difficult to unravel. “ Studies have used a variety
of research designs, different dependent variables (uses of force, major uses of force, militarized disputes), different estimation
techniques, and different data sets covering different time periods and different states” (Bennett and Nordstrom 2000, 39). To these
problems, we should add a lack of theoretical precision and incomplete model specification. By a lack of theoretical precision, I am referring to
the linkages between economic conditions and domestic strife that remain unclear in some studies (Miller 1995; Russett 1990). Consequently,
extant studies are to a degree incommensurate; they offer a step in the right direction but do not provide robust cross-national explanations and
tests of economic growth and interstate conflict. Yet a few studies have attempted to provide deductive explanations about when and how
diversionary tactics might be employed. Using a Bayesian updating game, Richards and others (1993) theorize that while the use of force would
appear to offer leaders a means to boost their popularity, a poorly performing economy acts as a signal to a leader’s constituents about his or her
competence. Hence, attempts
to use diversion are likely to fail either because incompetent leaders will
likewise fail in foreign policy or people will recognize the gambit for what it is. Instead, these two models
conclude that diversion is likely to be undertaken particularly by risk-acceptant leaders. This stress on a heightened risk of removal from office is
also apparent in the work of Bueno de Mesquita and others (1999), and Downs and Rocke (1994), where leaders may “gamble for resurrection,”
although the diversionary scenario in the former study is only a partial extension of their theory on selectorates, winning coalitions, and leader
survival. Again, how often do leaders fail in the process or are removed from positions of power before they can even initiate diversionary
tactics? A few studies focusing on leader tenure have examined the removal of leaders following war, although almost no study in the
diversionary literature has looked at the effects of domestic problems on the relative risks of regime change, interstate conflict, or both events
occurring in the same year.3
Low growth makes politicians cautious—they don’t want to risk war because it makes
them vulnerable
Boehmer ‘7
(Charles, political science professor at the University of Texas, Politics & Policy, 35:4, “The Effects of Economic Crisis, Domestic Discord, and
State Efficacy on the Decision to Initiate Interstate Conflict”)
Economic Growth and Fatal MIDs The theory presented earlier predicts that lower
rates of growth suppress participation
in foreign conflicts, particularly concerning conflict initiation and escalation to combat. To
sustain combat, states need to be militarily prepared and not open up a second front when they
are already fighting, or may fear, domestic opposition. A good example would be when the various Afghani resistance fighters expelled
the Soviet Union from their territory, but the Taliban crumbled when it had to face the combined forces of the United States and Northern
considering that
there are many reasons why states fight, the logic presented earlier should hold especially in
regard to the risk of participating in more severe conflicts. Threats to use military force may be
safe to make and may be made with both external and internal actors in mind, but in the end may
remain mere cheap talk that does not risk escalation if there is a chance to back down. Chiozza and Goemans (2004b)
Alliance insurrection. Yet the coefficient for GDP growth and MID initiations was negative but insignificant. However,
found that secure leaders were more likely to become involved in war than insecure leaders, supporting the theory and evidence presented here.
We should find that leaders who face domestic opposition and a poorly performing economy shy
away from situations that could escalate to combat if doing so would compromise their ability to
retain power.
2NC Decline Doesn’t Cause War
Economic decline doesn’t cause war
Jervis,’11
(Robert, Professor PolSci Columbia, December, “Force in Our Times” Survival, Vol 25 No 4, p 403-425)
Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful
world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one
example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening
of the current economic difficulties,
back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor
economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to
lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic
which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring
interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen
internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even
if the more extreme versions of free trade and
economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting
high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their
countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only
become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does
not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the
very fact that we
have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the
solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war
thinkable.
Multipolarity makes your arguments untrue—economic decline doesn’t cause war
Thirlwell ‘10
—MPhil in economics from Oxford U, postgraduate qualifications in applied finance from Macquarie U, program director in International Economy for the Lowy Institute for International
Policy (Mark, September 2010, “The Return of Geo-economics: Globalisation and National Security”, Lowy Institute for International Policy, google scholar,)
Summing up the evidence, then, I would judge that while empirical support for the Pax Mercatoria is not conclusive, nevertheless it’s still
strongly supportive of the general idea that international integration is good for peace, all else equal. Since there is also even stronger evidence
that peace is good for trade, this raises
the possibility of a nice virtuous circle: globalisation (trade) promotes peace,
which in turn promotes more globalisation. In this kind of world, we should not worry too much about the
big power shifts described in the previous section, since they are taking place against a backdrop of greater economic integration which
should help smooth the whole process. ¶ Instead of ending this section on that optimistic note, however, it’s worth thinking about some reasons
why the Pax Mercatoria might nevertheless turn out to be a poor, or at least overly optimistic, guide to our future.¶
The first is captured by that all important get-out-of-gaol-free card, ‘all else equal’. It’s quite possible that the peace-promoting effects of
international commerce will end up being swamped by other factors, just as they were in 1914. ¶ Second, perhaps the theory itself is wrong.
Certainly, a realist like John Mearsheimer would seem to have little time for the optimistic consequences of the rise of new powers implied by the
theory. Here’s Mearsheimer on how the US should view China’s economic progress, for example: ¶ ‘ . . . the United States has a profound interest
in seeing Chinese economic growth slow considerably in the years ahead . . . A wealthy China would not be a status quo power but an aggressive
state determined to achieve regional hegemony.’ 62¶ Such pessimistic (or are they tragic?) views of the world would also seem to run the risk of
being self-fulfilling prophecies if they end up guiding actual policy. ¶ Finally, there is the risk that the
shift to a multipolar world
might indirectly undermine some of the supports needed to deliver globalisation. Here I am thinking about some simple
variant on the idea of hegemonic stability theory (HST) – the proposition that the global economy needs a leader (or ‘hegemon’)
that is both able and willing to provide the sorts of international public goods that are required for its smooth
functioning: open markets (liberal or ‘free’ trade), a smoothly functioning monetary regime, liberal capital flows,
and a lender of last resort function. 63 Charles Kindleberger argued that ‘the 1929 depression was so wide, so deep, and
so long because the international economic system was rendered unstable by British inability and US
unwillingness to assume responsibility for stabilizing it’, drawing on the failures of the Great Depression to make the original case for
HST:¶ ‘ . . . the international economic and monetary system needs leadership , a country that is prepared . . .
to set standards of conduct for other countries and to seek to get others to follow them, to take on an undue share of the
burdens of the system, and in particular to take on its support in adversity...’ 64 ¶ Kindleberger’s assessment appears to capture a rough empirical
regularity: As Findlay and O’Rourke remind us, ‘periods
of sustained expansion in world trade have tended to coincided with
the infrastructure of law and order necessary to keep trade routes open being provided by a
dominant “hegemon” or imperial power’. 65
Thus periods of globalisation have typically been associated with periods of hegemonic or imperial power,
such as the Pax Mongolica, the Pax Britannica and, most recently, the Pax Americana (Figure 9). ¶ The risk, then, is that by reducing the
economic clout of the United States, it is possible that the shift to a multipolar world economy might
undermine either the willingness or the ability (or both) of Washington to continue to supply the international
public goods needed to sustain a (relatively) smoothly functioning world economy. 66 That in turn could
undermine the potential virtuous circle identified above.
Solvency
1NC
Maduro must say “no”. The upside of plan gets outweighed by domestic politics. If he
accepts, he’ll get destroyed politically.
Shifter ‘13
Michael is an Adjunct Professor of Latin American Studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. He is a member of the Council
on Foreign Relations and writes for the Council's journal Foreign Affairs. He serves as the President of Inter-American Dialogue. “A Bolivarian
Dream Deferred” – Foreign Policy, June 24, 2013 – http://thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3338
It makes sense for Venezuela to reach out to the United States, but at least in the short term, Maduro
will have a tough time holding back on his strident, anti-American rhetoric . For political survival, he
needs to prove his Chavista bona fides to the base that brought him to the presidency. Whatever
happens abroad, Maduro will be increasingly consumed by Venezuela's staggering problems at home. Chávez left a
country devoid of institutions. Instead, he bequeathed cronies like
Maduro who has so far been able to fend off criticism from
his neighbors but
is hardly in a position to lead the kind of broad ideological movement that Chávez was
able to cobble together in his glory days.
Snowden affair confirms US has no leverage over Venezuela.
Sanchez ‘13
W. Alex Sanchez, Research Fellow, Council on Hemispheric Affairs – “Asylum for Snowden? Why are Venezuela, Nicaragua, others in Latin
America doing this?” – Matisak Blog – July 7th – http://matisak.wordpress.com/2013/07/07/asylum-for-snowden-why-are-venezuela-nicaraguaothers-in-latin-america-doing-this/
It wouldn’t be outrageous to assume that if Venezuela or Nicaragua accept Snowden, Washington
may want to apply soft power/soft pressure as some kind of “punishment,” this may mean calling back
ambassadors and diplomatic staff (though at this point I’m amazed there are any U.S. diplomats in Venezuela after the Chavez era), expelling
diplomatic staff from these nations from the U.S., or maybe Washington
could cancel some trade deals or impose some
kind of trade embargo. For example Ecuador withdrew from the ATPDEA treaty at the same time that it was considering to accept
Snowden. But that treaty was going to expire soon anyways and it seemed unlikely that the U.S. would want to renew it (especially if the Quito
had accepted Snowden).
When it comes to Venezuela, it seems clear that Maduro has little interest in
strengthening trade or diplomatic relations with the U.S. , so any kind of “punishment” from Washington. With that said, I am
slightly surprised about Nicaragua. Certainly, Ortega was no friend of the U.S. during the Cold War, but modern-day Nicaragua-U.S. relations are
not particularly bad, or as bad as U.S.-Venezuela relations at least. Recently, SOUTHCOM donated parachutes and some other military
equipment to Nicaragua’s special forces (this happened in late June), so some military cooperation between the two governments does exist.
I
think Nicaragua potentially stands to lose a lot if Snowden does touch Nicaraguan soil, as
compared if the American ends up in Venezuela.
QPQ Negotiations can’t work. Too much tension, too little mutual respect
O’Reilly ‘13
Andrew O'Reilly – Writer/Producer for @FoxNewsLatino. “U.S.-Venezuelan Relations Remain Tense Under Maduro, Experts Claim” – Fox
News Latino – April 17 – http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2013/04/17/us-venezuelan-relations-remain-tense-under-maduro-expertsclaim/#ixzz2YYYnvrAl
While the ultimate impact of the Venezuelan presidential election remains to be seen, what's for sure is that relations between the
United States and the administration of President-elect Nicolás Maduro will continue to be as tense as under the
late Hugo Chávez, experts said. After voting on Sunday in a Caracas slum, Maduro said that while he would like to reestablish relations
with the U.S. “in terms of equality and respect,” Washington will always try to undermine his rule. These words followed a steady rhetoric on
the campaign trail of Maduro accusing the U.S. of conspiring against him and causing disruptions in Venezuela to unseat his rule, including
Maduro’s anti-American
sentiments leading up to the election, as well as the controversy surrounding his victory and the
polarization in Venezuela, there is little hope for a change in relations between the countries. “It’s hard to see
[Maduro] backing off his rhetoric in the aftermath of the election,” Eric Hershberg, the director of American
working with opposition labor unions and causing electric power blackouts.
Experts argue that given
University’s Center for Latin American and Latino Studies, told Fox News Latino. “ Americans
that he is not going to give them .”
will insist on a level of respect
2NC Snowden Proves
Maduro’s making political calculations with Snowden – proves say no
Grand 7/6/10, “Edward Snowden Asylum: Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro is Trolling the U.S.”, Gabe
Grand is an editorialist for PolicyMic and an avid scholar of Latin American affairs,
http://www.policymic.com/articles/53099/edward-snowden-asylum-venezuelan-president-nicolas-maduro-istrolling-the-u-s Mollie
On Friday, Venezuela's recently elected President Nicolás Maduro offered asylum to Edward Snowden, making
Venezuela the first country to open its arms to the rogue intelligence contractor. Before a military parade marking
Venezuela's independence day, July 5, Maduro announced, "I have decided to offer humanitarian
asylum to Edward Snowden so that he can come and live in the homeland of Bolivar and
Chavez, away from the persecution of North American imperialism." "He is a young man who has
told the truth, in the spirit of rebellion, about the United States spying on the whole world." While Maduro's
asylum offer may have answered several pressing questions about Snowden's immediate future, it leaves us to
wonder about the motivation behind Maduro's decision. Why, after watching dozens of countries reject
Snowden's asylum applications, did Maduro decide to take the whistleblower in? What political implications
does this move have for the Maduro presidency, both in Venezuela and in its diplomatic relations with the United
States? And why now? It's important to keep in mind that Maduro is far from secure in his office as Venezuelan
president. In the wake of the death of Hugo Chávez in March, Maduro rode a wave of pro-Chávez support into
office and has been striving to fill his mentor's shoes ever since. Having pledged to continue the policies of
Chávismo, Maduro has yet to distinguish himself from his predecessor before the Venezuelan people or the
international public. Granting asylum to Edward Snowden on the anniversary of Venezuela's independence
from Spain is a politically genius move that was designed to stick the middle finger to Washington and gain
Maduro recognition before the greater Latin American community. Need proof? Just take a look at the
rhetoric that Maduro employed in his speech. "I'd like to announce something in the name of the dignity of
Latin America," he began. He went on to explain that he had conferred with other Latin American presidents the
previous day, and that "Several Latin American governments have expressed their willingness to assume the stance
that I am about to announce." Nicolás Maduro's decision to extend asylum to Edward Snowden has, in fact, very
little to do with Edward Snowden himself. It is a symbolic move calculated to invoke Latin American unity
and solidarity in the face of what many Latin Americans perceive as the impending threat of imperialism.
Anti-U.S. sentiment in Latin America is starting to boil, and Maduro's timing couldn't be better. His
announcement comes just days after the United States bullied France, Spain, Italy, and Portugal into obstructing the
jet of Bolivian President Evo Morales on the suspicion that Snowden was on board.
Sets the tone for Maduro’s policies
Grand 7/6/10, “Edward Snowden Asylum: Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro is Trolling the U.S.”, Gabe
Grand is an editorialist for PolicyMic and an avid scholar of Latin American affairs,
http://www.policymic.com/articles/53099/edward-snowden-asylum-venezuelan-president-nicolas-maduro-istrolling-the-u-s Mollie
Whether or not Snowden will end up in Venezuela remains to be seen. Even if he decides to accept Maduro's
offer, he will have to figure out a way to get there from Moscow's Sheremedevo International Airport, where he has
been stuck without a valid passport for nearly two weeks. Regardless, Nicolás Maduro's decision to extend
asylum to Snowden provides us with the first clear signal of what Venezuelan foreign policy will
look like during the Maduro presidency. It demonstrates a lack of faith in Washington's ability to cooperate
equally with Latin America that stems from a history of political and economic exploitation.
Snowden will go to Venezuela – relations are officially irreparable and Maduro will say no
Forero and Englund 7/8/13, Juan Forero and Will Englund, Juan Forero is based in Bogota, Colombia, for
The Washington Post and is responsible for covering South America. Before joining The Post in September 2006, he
was the Bogota bureau chief for the New York Times, covering the Andean region for six years. A native of Bogota,
he has also been a staff writer at the Star-Ledger of Newark, N.J., New York Newsday, the San Diego UnionTribune and other papers. He has also reported from Mexico, Cuba, Nicaragua and other countries., A Pulitzer Prize
winner, Will Englund is on his third tour as a Moscow correspondent -- along with his wife, Kathy Lally. In the
1990s he did two stints in Russia for the Baltimore Sun. He was also co-author of a project on shipbreaking that won
the Pulitzer for investigative reporting as well as an Overseas Press Club award and a George Polk award. He joined
the Post in October 2010. “With Snowden offer, Venezuela’s Maduro is on world stage”,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/with-snowden-offer-venezuelas-maduro-is-on-worldstage/2013/07/08/35d83f42-e812-11e2-818e-aa29e855f3ab_story.html Mollie
BOGOTA, Colombia —American fugitive Edward Snowden’s diminishing possibilities of remaining free to
continue releasing information about secret U.S. surveillance programs increasingly appear to hinge on
Venezuela, which awaited word Monday on whether the former National Security Agency contractor would accept
its offer of asylum and fly to the oil-rich country. Bolivia and Nicaragua also say they could give refuge to
Snowden, who is on the run from American officials and is thought to be marooned in the vast transit zone of
Moscow’s Sheremetyevo International Airport. And the president of communist Cuba, Raúl Castro, on Sunday
expressed support for Latin American allies that might take in the 30-year-old computer expert, opening the
possibility that Snowden could fly through Havana as a first leg on his flight to asylum. Among those offering
sanctuary to Snowden, anti-imperialist Venezuela stands out: a country with an intense antipathy toward the
United States and just enough muscle to make his escape from American law enforcement a possibility. It also
appears that Russian officials, eager to end the diplomatic fallout of having Snowden in Moscow, see their
close ally, Venezuela, as offering the clearest solution. “The situation with Snowden is creating additional
tension in relations with Washington that are complex as they are,” Alexei Pushkov, head of the foreign affairs
committee of the lower house of the Russian parliament, told the newspaper Kommersant on Monday.Pushkov,
whose comments dependably reflect the Kremlin’s position on foreign affairs, said the Snowden saga needed to be
settled before President Obama arrives in September to meet with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin. “And
judging by the way things are unfolding,” Pushkov told the newspaper, “this is how it’s going to be.”Over the
weekend, Pushkov had also said that giving asylum to Snowden in Venezuela could not damage Venezuelan
President Nicolás Maduro, because his government’s relations with Washington are already in tatters. “It
can’t get worse,” Pushkov said in a Twitter message. Late Tuesday afternoon, Pushkov said on Twitter that
Snowden, “as expected,” had accepted Maduro’s offer of asylum, but he didn’t address the question of how
Snowden might get to Caracas. Shortly afterward, the tweet was deleted. Pushkov then tweeted again, claiming he
had heard the news about Snowden on Russian television. “Direct all your questions to them,” he wrote. By Tuesday
evening, Pushkov had issued yet a third tweet: “According to News 24 [a TV news program], with reference to
Maduro, Snowden accepted his offer of asylum. If so, he has found that to be the safest option.” Newly elected and
facing staggering economic problems at home despite the country’s oil wealth, Maduro appears to have made
a high-pitched, openly hostile position against the Obama administration a cornerstone of his government’s
foreign policy. He took his most provocative stand Friday in announcing that Venezuela would take in Snowden.
On Monday, Maduro said that a letter from Snowden requesting asylum had been received and that the young
American would simply have to decide when to fly to Caracas.
Snowden affair means the US-side will breakdown Venezuelan negotiations.
Negroponte ‘13
Diana Villiers Negroponte is a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, specializing in Latin America. She previously worked at the
U.S. Institute of Peace. She travels frequently to Latin America. “Consequences for Venezuela if Maduro Offers Asylum to Edward Snowden” –
Brookings Blogs – July 2nd – http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/07/02-snowden-venezuela-asylum-negroponte
Within these relations, Secretary of State Kerry met with Foreign Minister Elías Jaua on the margins of the recent OAS meeting in Guatemala.
The report of the meeting indicated that Kerry was firm and insisted that improvements had to be made in specific areas before diplomatic
relations at the Ambassadorial level could resume. Among those areas of collaboration was Venezuelan permission for Drug Enforcement Agents
to carry out counter-narcotics investigations and improvement of airport security. Without serious progress in these areas, relations with
Washington would not improve. More recently, the State Department has sent the message to Jaua through his Charge d’Affaire in Washington,
Calixto Ortega, that the grant of asylum to Snowden would jeopardize all bilateral projects. In appointing Ortega to Washington, bilateral
relations had begun to improve. “Ortega has a lot of knowledge of U.S. society, and we know that he will contribute a lot towards increasing
dialogue…We want to have the best ties with all the world’s governments, and the U.S. government, but on the basis of respect. There can be no
threats,” said Maduro in his April 24th statement reported by www.venezuelanalysis.com. “I have decided to name Calixto Ortega so that
dialogue with U.S. society can increase, with the universities, the academic world, the social and union world, the Afro-American community, the
Latino community, Congress, senators, representatives, the economic, trade and energy sectors.” Ortega,
the former Venezuelan
minister to the Latin American parliament was well received at the State Department and hope exists in
Washington that bilateral relations can improve on a steady and pragmatic basis. However,
flying Snowden to Venezuela and granting him asylum will blow apart the prospects for improved
relations . The recently formed Continental Coalition of Social Movements in support of the Bolivarian Alliance (ALBA) may rejoice that
Snowden can operate and speak freely in Venezuela, but the prospects of dialogue with U.S. economic, trade and
energy sectors will fizzle out. Without U.S. support, few nations will step in to help meet Venezuela’s rising debt repayments and
falling foreign reserves. In deciding whether to give Snowden a way out of Moscow, Maduro must balance the economic wellbeing of Venezuela
against the short term notoriety of saving Snowden.
US-Venezuelan relations are tanked and Venezuela will refuse to cooperate—tensions over
Snowden
Global Post ’13 (Global Post- community of international news correspondents and journalists. July 6, 2013. “Venezuela, Nicaragua Offer
Asylum To NSA Whistleblower Snowden.” http://www.mintpressnews.com/venezuela-nicaragua-offer-asylum-to-nsa-whistleblowersnowden/164898/)
Leaders of Venezuela and Nicaragua said Friday they would grant asylum to US intelligence
leaker Edward Snowden, the first countries to offer shelter to the whistleblower wanted for
leaking details about widespread U.S. surveillance programs. “I have decided to offer humanitarian asylum to
Edward Snowden … to protect this young man from the persecution unleashed by the world’s most powerful empire,” Venezuelan President
Nicolas Maduro said during an event marking Venezuela’s independence day, according to Argentina’s La Nacion news website. Venezuela’s
close ally Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega made a similar offer. “We have the sovereign right to help a person who felt remorse after finding
out how the United States was using technology to spy on the whole world, and especially its European allies,” Ortega said, according to The
Associated Press. The gestures came after Latin American leaders expressed outrage following the rerouting of the Bolivian president’s plane
when rumors swirled in Europe that he had spirited Snowden away from Russia. Many suspect the US government was behind the rumor. The
former U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) contractor is still believed to be holed up in Moscow’s airport, facing charges of Espionage Act
crimes and, if caught, possibly decades in prison. The Snowden saga has already hit China and Russia, and angered U.S. allies in Europe. But
Friday’s asylum offers put the issue squarely in Latin America, where many distrust Washington
and root for whistleblowers who appear to confirm their suspicions of its wrongdoing. The
remarks by Venezuela’s leader, the chosen successor of President Hugo Chavez, signal the
country’s U.S. relations remain very rocky even after the death of the longtime ruler in March.
U.S. lawmakers in recent years have voiced concern about Iran’s coziness with countries such as
Venezuela and Nicaragua. If either country welcomes a wanted super-leaker like Snowden it
would likely put further strain on Washington’s tense relations in the region.
2NC XT: Say No
Maduro hates Obama—he won’t take any benefits from him
France-Presse 5/5 (Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro blasts ‘devil’ Obama By Agence France-Presse Sunday, May 5, 2013
http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2013/05/05/venezuelan-president-nicolas-maduro-blasts-devil-obama/ nkj)
Maduro, however, begs to differ. He charged the United States with financially backing the Venezuelan opposition.
“It is Obama himself — as the puppet of the imperial power — who is behind the financing in dollars of this right
wing that is seeking to destroy Venezuela’s democracy,” Maduro alleged.
Tensions have been running high since the election to replace the larger-than-life Chavez.
The government says nine people died in protests in the days after the election.
Opposition and pro-government lawmakers exchanged punches and kicks in a spectacular brawl at the National
Assembly on Tuesday. Maduro said this was “planned” ahead of Obama’s trip to Mexico and Central America.
Each side held dueling May Day marches on Wednesday, with Maduro calling Capriles a “crybaby” who could not accept defeat.
Venezuela defends iran - relations strong - will say no
AP 6/18/13 - (Associated press, "Venezuela's Maduro to meet Iran's new president-elect Hassan Rowhani, further
strengthen ties"
http://www.canada.com/business/Venezuelas+Maduro+meet+Irans+presidentelect+Hassan+Rowhani+further/85423
58/story.html)
CARACAS, Venezuela - Venezuela's President Nicolas Maduro says he'll meet soon with Iran's President-elect
Hassan Rowhani to further strengthen already close relations.
Maduro announced plans for a meeting through Twitter on Tuesday, saying that he recently spoke with Rowhani
and they agreed to meet. He did not offer details.
Venezuela deepened trade with Iran under the leadership of the late president Hugo Chavez. Iranian companies were
enlisted to help build public housing in the South American country.
Iran and Venezuela also launched joint ventures including a tractor factory and dairy plants, and the two countries
have been united in their opposition to what they say is Washington's hegemony in international affairs.
Venezuela defends Iran's nuclear energy program. The West suspects Iran intends to build nuclear weapons, a
charge Iran denies.
Maduro will say “no” – domestic politics dictates that he must.
Forero ‘13
Juan Forero is The Washington Post's correspondent for Colombia and Venezuela, having previously been The New York Times' Bogotá bureau
chief. He joined the Post in September 2006. “With Snowden offer, Venezuela’s Maduro is on world stage” – Washington Post – July 8th –
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/with-snowden-offer-venezuelas-maduro-is-on-world-stage/2013/07/08/35d83f42-e812-11e2-818eaa29e855f3ab_story.html
The Snowden saga — a young American revealing secrets the U.S. government wants to contain — provided the perfect
opportunity for Maduro to take on the Obama administration, said Eduardo Semtei, a former Venezuelan
government official. “To figure internationally, to show that he is a player among big powers, he offered asylum
to Snowden,” said Semtei, who had been close to Chávez’s brother, Adán, a leading ideologue in the late president’s radical movement.
“This grabs headlines, and it shows that he’s a strong president, one with character, and that he’s capable of challenging
the United States.” Maduro and Venezuela came late to the Snowden saga, as tiny Ecuador, an ally also committed to opposing
American initiatives, heaped praise on Snowden and expressed a willingness to help him after he had flown from Hong Kong to Moscow on June
23 to avoid American justice. When Ecuador backed away from its initial enthusiasm over Snowden, Venezuela stepped in last week as Maduro
arrived in Moscow for an energy summit. The 50-year-old Maduro, who found his political calling as a socialist activist with close ties to
Cuba, took
a sharply anti- imperialist stand in embracing Snowden. He said the United States had
“created an evil system, half Orwellian, that intends to control the communications of the world,” and characterized
Snowden as an antiwar activist and hero who had unmasked the dastardly plans of America’s ruling elite. Political analysts say the
opportunity to take sides against Washington was simply irresistible for a government that has for
years characterized itself as a moral force speaking out for the weak against “the empire,” as the United States is
known in Caracas. And the fact that the secrets Snowden divulged were embarrassing to the Obama administration only gave more fuel to
Venezuela, former Venezuelan diplomats and political analysts in Caracas said. “Edward Snowden
became the symbol for the
anti-imperialist rhetoric, for progressivism, for international radicalism,” said Carlos Romero, an analyst and author who closely
tracks Venezuela’s international diplomacy. Venezuela helped channel the fury of Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Uruguay and Suriname after
Bolivian President Evo Morales’s plane was apparently refused entry into the airspace of as many as four European countries last Tuesday
because of the belief that Snowden was hiding aboard. And on Monday, Venezuela’s state media apparatus seemed to take more offense than the
Brazilian government over revelations that the NSA had collected data on countless telephone and e-mail conversations in Brazil. But former
diplomats familiar with Venezuela say that there are other aspects to consider in deciphering
Maduro’s support for Snowden. Ignacio Arcaya, a diplomat who served the Chávez government in the United States in the early
part of his presidency, said Maduro has had the challenge of trying to ease the concerns of radicalized
sectors in his movement that have been worried about a resumption of relations with Washington
now that Chávez is gone. Indeed, until recently, Maduro was spearheading an effort at rapprochement, as shown by a meeting in
Guatemala on June 5 between Secretary of State John F. Kerry and his Venezuelan counterpart, Elías Jaua. “What Maduro is doing
is aimed at quieting the radical sectors of his party who think he is negotiating with the United States
and think that he’s talking to private industry,” Arcaya said. Maduro also has to consider his own unstable political
position after the April 14 election, which is being contested by his challenger, Henrique Capriles, who says the vote was stolen
from him. At the same time, Maduro faces millions of Venezuelans tired of the country’s sky-high inflation, rampant homicide rate and serious
shortages of everything from chicken to toilet paper. Myles R.R. Frechette, a retired American diplomat who served in Venezuela and other
Latin American countries, said Maduro
is using a tried-and-true strategy: loudly oppose the United States
to distract from domestic problems. “It plays very well,” said Frechette. “It’s the card to play. It’s what you’ve
always got in your drawer. You open your drawer and play to your most radical elements.”
Maduro won’t engage with the US
Shinkman ‘13
Paul – National Security Reporter at U.S. News & World Report – internally quoting Doug Farah, a former Washington Post investigative
reporter who is now a senior fellow at the Virginia-based International Assessment and Strategy Center. “Iranian-Sponsored Narco-Terrorism in
Venezuela: How Will Maduro Respond?” – US News and World Report – April 24th –
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/04/24/iranian-sponsored-narco-terrorism-in-venezuela-how-will-maduro-respond?page=2
[Maduro] has been and will continue to be forced to take all the unpopular macroeconomic steps and corrections that are painful, but Chavez
never took," Farah says. "There is going to be, I would guess, a great temptation to turn to [the elites] for money." ¶ "Most
criminalized
elements of the Boliavarian structure will gain more power because he needs them," he says, adding "it
won't be as chummy a relationship" as they enjoyed with the ever-charismatic Chavez.¶
U.S. officials might try to engage the new
Venezuelan president first in the hopes of improving the strained ties between the two countries.¶ But
Maduro has never been close with the senior military class in his home country, and will likely
adopt a more confrontational approach to the United States to prove his credentials to these
Bolivarian elites.¶ "Maybe if he were operating in different circumstances, he could be a
pragmatist," Farah says. "I don't think he can be a pragmatist right now."
2NC XT: Posturing
Venezuela will say no – any positive action is just political posturing on Maduro’s part.
Meacham, 13 -- director of the CSIS Americas Program. He joined CSIS from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC), where he served on the professional staff for Senator
Richard Lugar (R-IN) for over a decade. He served as the senior adviser for Latin America and the Caribbean on the committee, the most senior Republican Senate staff position for this region.
In that capacity, he travelled extensively to the region to work with foreign governments, private-sector organizations, and civil society groups. He was also responsible for managing the
committee’s relationship with the State Department regarding the Western Hemisphere and overseeing its $2 billion budget. (Carl, June 21st, “The Kerry-Jaua Meeting: Resetting U.S.-Venezuela
Relations?,” CSIS, http://csis.org/publication/kerry-jaua-meeting-resetting-us-venezuela-relations, amils)
. Earlier this year, the Venezuelan government suspended
talks between the U.S. State Department and Venezuelan Foreign Ministry that had begun in late
2012, citing alleged U.S. meddling in Venezuela’s April election. The Maduro government has also largely
followed the Chávez playbook, constantly accusing the United States of assassination plots, spying,
and economic and political sabotage. While the Kerry-Jaua meeting may have made for nice headlines, it’s difficult to imagine
that the Venezuelan government will not play the anti-U.S. card again, if needed. This week, Calixto Ortega—appointed to
Despite recent discussions with the United States, it doesn’t seem to be the case
handle matters with the United States—will meet with Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roberta Jacobson to continue discussions and establish a new set of concrete
good-faith gestures made by the Venezuelan government are neither new
nor unheard of. Despite recent efforts, U.S. policymakers should temper any positive
expectations, as a core basis of Chavismo is its anti-U.S. ideology. It’s of course difficult to
improve relations with a government that consistently defines itself as vehemently against your
foreign policy agenda. This suggests that Venezuela may be looking to reestablish a purely economic
relationship—one that will eliminate U.S. sanctions. Still, even if certain positive steps are taken, history suggests that
the Venezuelan government could quickly scuttle progress made, likely with the goal of Maduro
shoring up support within his own ranks.
goals to guide the relationship forward. These
2NC AT: Oil Leverage
Venezuela will say no
a) empirically uncooperative on terror
El Colombiano 10, Global Newsroom Berta Lucia Villa Isaza, "U.S. says Venezuela is uncooperative in fight
against terror", www.ecbloguer.com/globalnewsroom/?p=8445 Mollie
In its “Country Reports on Terrorism 2009”, the U.S. State Department
concluded that Venezuela does
not fully cooperate with counter terrorism strategy and allows groups like Farc and the Eln to use
its territory. The department stressed in its report that Venezuela has reduced cooperation to “an
absolute minimum”, especially since the 2009 signing of a military cooperation agreement which allows the
United States’ military to use bases in Colombia. It also highlights that Venezuelan President, Hugo Chavez, has
continued to strengthen ties with Iran, a country the U.S. has qualified as “the most active state
sponsor of terrorism”.The document points out that, based on information available, groups like Farc and
the Eln use Venezuela as a place to “rest and regroup” as well as kidnap and extort money from
residents in an effort to finance their illegal activities. However, the U.S. says the “degree to which the Venezuelan
Government has provided support” for these armed groups during the period in question remains unclear. While the
U.S. recalls that Colombia has often accused Venezuela of being a safe-haven for Farc leaders, it did
not specifically make reference to the most recent evidence provided by the Uribe administration to the
OAS this past July 22, an episode that led Hugo Chavez to immediately break diplomatic ties with
Colombia.
b) Posada
Reel 05, Monte Reel, Monte Reel is a former South America correspondent for the Washington Post, and he also
reported for the newspaper in Washington and Iraq. His first book, The Last of the Tribe (2010), chronicles the story
of the last surviving member of an indigenous tribe in the Amazon rainforest., "Venezuela's demand to U.S.:
'respect' / Chavez wields oil supply as potent weapon", SF Gate, originally Washington Post,
www.sfgate.com/politics/article/Venezuela-s-demand-to-U-S-respect-Chavez-2620697.php#page-2 Mollie
Venezuelan authorities bristle at suggestions that they are being uncooperative in law
enforcement. They argue that the U.S. government follows a double standard, pointing in
particular to the case of Luis Posada Carriles, a former CIA operative who participated in the failed
Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961. A naturalized Venezuelan citizen now in a Texas prison on
immigration charges, Posada, 77, has been accused of bombing a Cuban airliner in 1976, killing all 73
aboard. He was arrested in Venezuela on terrorism charges but escaped from prison in 1985. After
becoming embroiled in a network run by former White House aide Oliver North to smuggle weapons to
anti-government rebels in Nicaragua, and an alleged assassination attempt against Cuban President Fidel
Castro for which he was imprisoned in Panama, Posada was spotted in Miami earlier this year. U. S. officials
indicated they were unaware of his whereabouts, but in May, after he was interviewed by the Miami Herald, he was
arrested and sent to a detention facility in El Paso, Texas. Now, Posada is seeking asylum to protect him
from a Venezuelan extradition request. He faces a hearing in August. The Posada case is as complex
as a spy novel, but Venezuelan authorities say it boils down to this: If the United States is serious
about prosecuting the war on terrorism, it should extradite Posada -- whom they compare to
Osama bin Laden -- to face justice in the airliner bombing.
c) no incentive – weapons ban proves
Bodzin 10, Bloomberg, Steven Bodzin, lived in Venezuela, correspondant for the Christian Science Monitor,
3/15/10,"Venezuela gets Chinese military jets to replace U.S.",
www.chinapost.com.tw/international/americas/2010/03/15/248330/Venezuela-gets.htm Mollie
CARACAS -- Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez inspected the country's first delivery of six
Chinese-made K-8W military training jets as he seeks to equip his armed forces with planes
made outside the U.S. Chavez review of the planes at an air base in the city of Barquisimeto was
broadcast on state television. Each jet can fire air-to-ground missiles and drop bombs, and is
capable of 5 hours of flight without refueling, Alejandro Gonzalez, a colonel in the Venezuelan
air force, told Chavez during the broadcast. Venezuela is blocked from buying U.S. military
equipment to maintain or replace its aging fleet of F-5 and F-16 jets because the U.S. lists the
country as uncooperative against drug smuggling. Chavez has previously bought Russian-made
Sukhoi fighters. The U.S. blocked Chavez's purchases of jets from Brazil and the Czech
Republic.
“These men have been trained and developed only to defend the fatherland,” Chavez said of the
first group of 11 pilots, who he said were trained in China. “We have no plans for aggression
against anyone.” Chavez said buying K-8 jets reduces the ability of the U.S. to control
Venezuela's military. He announced the purchase of the Chinese jets in 2008.
7 massive alt causes
CSIS 13, Center for Strategic & International Studies, "Post-Chavez Outlook for Venezuelan Oil Production",
Sarah O. Ladislaw is co-director and senior fellow with the Energy and National Security Program at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Frank Verrastro is senior vice president and James
R. Schlesinger Chair for Energy & Geopolitics at CSIS. csis.org/publication/post-chavez-outlook-venezuelan-oilproduction, Mollie
Even under the best of circumstances, reform in the energy sector will take a long time to emerge.
The damage that has been done to not only PDVSA but to the institutions of the state and civil society could
take years to rehabilitate. A few key reasons for this include: 1. revenue from the oil and gas sector
that is diverted for political purposes and not reinvested in a way that will drive new production
will be hard to direct back to useful investment in the sector, 2. much of the private sector has been
driven away from investment in Venezuela and may be reluctant to return, or for the companies in
country to re-invest in the short-term given their experience in the 2000s. 3. oil field mismanagement and
damage may have likely occurred over the last decade and it will take time and investment to revitalize, 4. many
of Venezuela’s core assets are in technologically complex and capital-intensive heavy oil
projects that take time and resources to develop and must now be viewed in light of the global array of
upstream options that are now on the table for international oil investors as compared to a decade ago, 5. some of
Venezuela’s current commercial relationships on the upstream or export side may have to be
revisited in light of a more commercially-based hydrocarbon policy, 6. Venezuela’s energy sector
is dominated by the state’s decisions and management and it will take time to replace the
managerial competency that once existed, 7. highly subsidized oil is a key feature of Venezuelan
society and the political will to reform the entire energy sector into one that is more market-based and
open to private investment will necessarily have to feed into the domestic demand-side of that equation.
Venezuela sees oil as THEIR bargaining chip – they will say no
Reel 05, Monte Reel, Monte Reel is a former South America correspondent for the Washington Post, and he also
reported for the newspaper in Washington and Iraq. His first book, The Last of the Tribe (2010), chronicles the story
of the last surviving member of an indigenous tribe in the Amazon rainforest., "Venezuela's demand to U.S.:
'respect' / Chavez wields oil supply as potent weapon", SF Gate, originally Washington Post,
www.sfgate.com/politics/article/Venezuela-s-demand-to-U-S-respect-Chavez-2620697.php#page-2 Mollie
There is little doubt, however, that relations between Venezuela and the United States, strained for
years, are plunging to new lows. Chavez has always been outspoken in condemning what he
calls "U.S. imperialism," mocking President Bush as "Mr. Danger" and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld as
"Mr. War." Nevertheless, Venezuelan officials insist his recent threats to sever ties with Washington -- thereby
suspending the export of 1.5 million barrels of oil per day -- are more than the rhetoric of a populist rallying
domestic support. "When the president talks, it is not a joke," said Mary Pili Hernandez, a senior Foreign Ministry
official. "The only country Venezuela has bad relations with is the United States; with all other
countries, we have good or very good relations. But with just one word, the U.S. could resolve all
of the problems. That word is 'respect.' " Chavez asserts that the 21st century equivalent of the
Cold War is the industrial world's thirst for oil -- and its attempts to manipulate weaker
governments to secure it. Oil-rich Venezuela sells 60 to 65 percent of its crude oil to the United
States, making it the fourth-largest supplier to the U. S. market. This year, near-record oil prices have
helped Chavez finance a variety of social programs that he pledges will make Venezuela more
independent of American influence. Observers say the oil revenue also has emboldened Chavez's
foreign policy strategy. He recently signed oil agreements with Argentina, Brazil and his
Caribbean neighbors and has begun to strengthen ties with China through oil accords. Rafael Quiroz,
an oil industry analyst in Caracas, said the Chavez government believes the conflict between
developing countries endowed with such natural resources and nations with high demands will
only intensify in coming years. Chavez would like to precipitate that conflict, Quiroz said. "I think he's correct
to try to speed up that kind of confrontation, because the developing world -- where 85 percent of world reserves are
-- will stand in a better place after that," Quiroz said. " Every day, it is more apparent that oil is
fundamental for Venezuela in its international relations, and it is the main ingredient Chavez
uses to form strategic alliances."
1NC Stability Turn
Venezuela will say no to the aff
El Colombiano 10, Global Newsroom Berta Lucia Villa Isaza, "U.S. says Venezuela is uncooperative in fight
against terror", www.ecbloguer.com/globalnewsroom/?p=8445 Mollie
In its “Country Reports on Terrorism 2009”, the U.S. State Department
concluded that Venezuela does
not fully cooperate with counter terrorism strategy and allows groups like Farc and the Eln to use
its territory. The department stressed in its report that Venezuela has reduced cooperation to “an
absolute minimum”, especially since the 2009 signing of a military cooperation agreement which allows the
United States’ military to use bases in Colombia. It also highlights that Venezuelan President, Hugo Chavez, has
continued to strengthen ties with Iran, a country the U.S. has qualified as “the most active state
sponsor of terrorism”.The document points out that, based on information available, groups like Farc and
the Eln use Venezuela as a place to “rest and regroup” as well as kidnap and extort money from
residents in an effort to finance their illegal activities. However, the U.S. says the “degree to which the Venezuelan
Government has provided support” for these armed groups during the period in question remains unclear. While the
U.S. recalls that Colombia has often accused Venezuela of being a safe-haven for Farc leaders, it did
not specifically make reference to the most recent evidence provided by the Uribe administration to the
OAS this past July 22, an episode that led Hugo Chavez to immediately break diplomatic ties with
Colombia.
That causes massive instability in Venezuela and kills the peaceful transition
CSIS 13, Center for Strategic & International Studies, "Post-Chavez Outlook for Venezuelan Oil Production",
Sarah O. Ladislaw is co-director and senior fellow with the Energy and National Security Program at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Frank Verrastro is senior vice president and James
R. Schlesinger Chair for Energy & Geopolitics at CSIS. csis.org/publication/post-chavez-outlook-venezuelan-oilproduction, Mollie
What about Venezuela’s relationship with the United States? Over the last ten years the sustained trading
relationship between the United States and Venezuela has been one of the stabilizing forces in an
otherwise contentious and sometimes volatile relationship. U.S. refineries in the Gulf Coast are
specifically designed to process Venezuela’s sour and medium to heavy crude and serves as its natural
market. Despite oil production being down, the United States still imports just under a million barrels of
crude per day from Venezuela (down from a peak of 1.4 mmbd in 1997) and, as stated earlier, the
government of Venezuela is highly dependent on those revenues for their ongoing stability,
especially as revenue from other exports and domestic consumption decline. As we look ahead to
another period of transition in Venezuela it is important to be mindful of the potential for
disruption and to look for ways to mitigate the impacts of such disruption, but it is equally important to remember
the trade ties that bind the two countries for the time being and to find opportunities to drive change in a positive
direction.
AT: Relations
Multiple structural barriers to cooperation the aff doesn’t resolve.
Meacham, 13 -- director of the CSIS Americas Program. He joined CSIS from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC), where he served on the professional staff for Senator
Richard Lugar (R-IN) for over a decade. He served as the senior adviser for Latin America and the Caribbean on the committee, the most senior Republican Senate staff position for this region.
In that capacity, he travelled extensively to the region to work with foreign governments, private-sector organizations, and civil society groups. He was also responsible for managing the
committee’s relationship with the State Department regarding the Western Hemisphere and overseeing its $2 billion budget. (Carl, June 21st, “The Kerry-Jaua Meeting: Resetting U.S.-Venezuela
Relations?,” CSIS, http://csis.org/publication/kerry-jaua-meeting-resetting-us-venezuela-relations, amils)
genuine improvements in the relationship have been hard to
come by. Various U.S. government agencies hold sanctions against elements of the Venezuelan
government, including on state oil company Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) for trading with
Iran; on a former Iran-Venezuela Bank (IVB) for handling money transfers with a Chinese bank
on behalf of the Export Development Bank of Iran (EDBI); and on the state-owned Venezuelan
Military Industry Company after it traded with Iran, North Korea, and Syria. The U.S.
Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), over the past five years,
has also designated more than half a dozen Venezuelan government officials for acting for, or on
behalf of, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), designated a narco-terrorist organization by the U.S.
agency. And, let’s not forget that the reason there are no ambassadors in Caracas or D.C. was Chávez’s
refusal in 2010 to accept Obama’s nominee for the post in Venezuela. Similarly, Venezuela severed
ties with the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) in 2005. On the day Chávez’s death was announced, Maduro, as caretaker, expelled two
U.S. air force attachés based in the Caracas embassy, accusing them of espionage. The United States retaliated in kind. The Maduro government also
arrested U.S. filmmaker Tim Tracy for allegedly instigating postelection violence, though many pointed out he
was simply in Venezuela to film a documentary on politics in the country. (Tracy was released without further explanation the same morning Kerry and Jaua met.) Suggestions by
members of the Venezuelan government that the United States may have given Chávez the
cancer that caused his death have certainly not helped relations either, neither have repeated
accusations targeted at former officials and U.S. military and intelligence involvement in
countless evidence-free plots. Given the complex reality of the bilateral relationship, it looks like
both sides have a long road ahead of them if they seek to enact positive changes.
Despite many fits and starts to advance relations in recent years,
Miscellaneous
Conditional Engagement/Extracting Concessions Bad
Conditional engagement is bad — attempting to extract concessions crushes U.S. credibility
and entrenches Chavista governments
Griffin 13 — editorial writer for the Harvard Crimson (John Griffin, The Harvard Crimson, 04-03-13, “Engage
with Venezuela”, http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2013/4/3/Harvard-Venezuela-Chavez-death/#, Accessed 0701-2013 | AK)
When Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez died in early February, his country was thrown into a period of national mourning as the political equilibrium in Latin America hung in the balance. As
Washington should seek to reverse the current trend of acrid relations
between the two nations and engage with the Venezuelan government in Caracas toward stability and prosperity
in the Western hemisphere. While it might seem likely that relations between the United States and Venezuela would
naturally improve after the death of the combative Chávez, the opposite now seems more likely. Before passing
Venezuela chooses its next president,
away, Chávez had handpicked a successor in Nicholas Maduro, who has assumed power in the interim before the presidential election in April. As Chávez’s handpicked successor,
Maduro has already continued with his mentor’s trend of using anti-American rhetoric to bring
popularity to his government, even declaring that American agents may have infected Chávez with the cancer that killed him. While Washington
has officially declared that it is committed to a more functional relationship with Venezuela, its
actions have not been consistent with this idea: The United States offered no official condolences for Chávez’s death, and both nations have started
expelling diplomats from the other. Neither nation, it seems, is steering toward more congenial relations with the other.
Admittedly, the United States has good reason to be less than enthused about more Chávez-style governance in Venezuela. Calling himself a 21st-century socialist, Chávez nationalized the
lucrative oil industry, developed strong trade and diplomatic relationships with Iran and Cuba, repeatedly decried the United States as an imperialist force, and cooperated with the Iranians in
Engaging in petty diplomat-expulsion spats, however, is no way to deal with any of
these problems, and it in fact only strengthens the Chavistas’ hold on their country. The diplomatic and
economic opportunities that would stem from greater engagement would far outweigh the
meager benefits reaped from our current policies. Diplomatically, positive engagement with Venezuela
would be a major step toward building American credibility in the world at large , especially in Latin
America. Chávez (along with his friends the Castros in Cuba) was able to bolster regional support for his regime by
pointing out the United States’ attempts to forcibly intervene in Venezuelan politics. Soon, a number of populist governments
developing nuclear technology.
in Latin America had rallied around Chávez and his anti-American policies. In 2004, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and three Caribbean nations joined with Venezuela and Cuba to form the
Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America, an organization in direct opposition to the Free Trade Area in the Americas proposed (but never realized) by the Bush administration.
Chávez galvanized these nations—many of whom have experienced American interventionist
tactics—by vilifying America as a common, imperial enemy. Unfortunately for the United States, its general
strategy regarding Venezuela has often strengthened Chávez’s position. Every time Washington chastises
Venezuela for opposing American interests or attempts to bring sanctions against the Latin American
country, the leader in Caracas (whether it be Chávez or Maduro) simply gains more evidence toward his claim that
Washington is a neo-colonialist meddler. This weakens the United States’ diplomatic position,
while simultaneously strengthening Venezuela’s. If Washington wants Latin America to stop its current
trend of electing leftist, Chavista governments, its first step should be to adopt a less astringent tone
in dealing with Venezuela. Caracas will be unable to paint Washington as an aggressor, and
Washington will in turn gain a better image in Latin America . Beyond leading to more amicable,
cooperative relationships with Latin American nations, engagement with Venezuela would also be
economically advisable. With the world’s largest oil reserves, countless other valuable resources,
and stunning natural beauty to attract scores of tourists, Venezuela has quite a bit to offer economically. Even now, America can see the possible
benefits of economic engagement with Caracas by looking at one of the few extant cases of such cooperation: Each year, thousands of needy Americans are able to keep their homes heated
because of the cooperation between Venezuela and a Boston-area oil company.
Engagement with Venezuela would also lead to stronger
economic cooperation with the entirety of Latin America . It was mostly through Venezuela’s efforts that the United States was unable to create a
In a world
where the United States and Venezuela were to enjoy normalized relations, all nations involved would
benefit from such agreements. For both diplomatic and economic reasons, then, positive engagement is the best
“Free Trade Area of the Americas,” an endeavor that would have eliminated most trade barriers among participant nations, thereby leading to more lucrative trade.
course of action for the United States. As it stands, the negative relationship between the countries has created an atmosphere
of animosity in the hemisphere, hindering dialogue and making economic cooperation nearly
impossible. While there is much for which the Venezuelan government can rightly be criticized—
authoritarian rule, abuse of human rights, lack of market-friendly policies—nothing that the United States is doing to counter those
drawbacks is having any effect. The United States should stop playing “tough guy” with Venezuela , bite
the bullet, and work toward stability and prosperity for the entire hemisphere. We aren’t catching
any flies with our vinegar—it’s high time we started trying to catch them with honey.
Cuban Embargo CP
Lifting the Cuban embargo solves the case
Pagano 13 — Project Assistant at the National Democratic Institute and contributing writer to the Truman
Doctrine (James Pagano, Truman National Security Project, 03-18-13, “Moving Venezuela to the Center”,
http://trumanproject.org/doctrine-blog/moving-venezuela-to-the-center/, Accessed 07-03-2013 | AK)
Chavez is now dead, providing U.S. policy makers an opening to mend fences
and steer Venezuela’s next president towards the center. With smart policy and a light touch, the
United States can help Venezuela’s next president lead his country out of the mess that Chavez built.
After over a decade in power, Hugo
Chavez won the presidency in 1999 on a promise to “sow” the oil wealth of Venezuela into its social program. Bolstered by record high oil prices, Chavez spent billions on such programs. While
millions of Venezuelans were able to obtain healthcare and an education, the poorly designed programs left little money to reinvest in oil exploration; output in Venezuela declined threatening
the longevity of all Chavez’s initiatives. Meanwhile, Chavez became an increasingly authoritarian leader, consolidating power in the executive. He blacklisted opposition figures, altered the
Venezuela’s next president
will have to decide whether to reverse these trends, or continue the slide to outright
authoritarianism. The United States can and should influence this decision. The United States must
support the democratic process and engage the likely winner of April’s election, Chavez’s chosen successor, Nicolás Maduro. He will
have a real opportunity to put Venezuela back on the path to a free-market democracy. The next president
constitution and unevenly enforced laws for personal benefit. By creating a steeply slanted playing field, Chavez was able to retain power.
will face an extremely politicized Supreme Court and military and reforms are likely more palatable if made by Maduro. Changes to apportionment, food subsidies or tax rates coming from
the U.S. role be? It must
work with its Latin American allies in the region, Chile, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico to gently pressure Maduro
into making the types of institutional and economic changes necessary for Venezuela to prosper.
Failure to do so could lead to the reemergence of authoritarianism in Latin America, instability in
world oil markets and serious regional security repercussions . Chavez was infamous for his anti-American tirades. George W. Bush’s poor
global standing gave Chavez an easy target. With a more positive global image, the most important step President Obama
can take is to normalize relations with Cuba . As Venezuela’s closest ally, Cuba has remained a
persistent problem in U.S.-Latin American relations. By normalizing relations, Obama would
take a huge step in reducing anti-Americanism in Venezuela . Simultaneously, Obama would ingratiate himself
to the rest of the region by ending the dated embargo. Perhaps most importantly, eliminating this issue would
give Venezuela’s next president the political cover necessary to mend relations with the United
States. The U.S. should push for economic reform with the help of Brazil which seeks a greater role in international and
regional politics. Former Brazilian President Lula da Silva has close ties to Venezuela, and touting the recent successes of his
center-left government in Brazil could help persuade Maduro to moderate his government. Brazil has
made huge societal gains without suffering the kind of economic setbacks seen in Venezuela. Friendly cajoling, along with the promise of
closer economic ties could help lead Maduro onto a path of economic reform necessary to extend
certain “Chavista” social programs. Colombia, Brazil and the U.S. also have a shared interest in
improving Venezuelan security. Under Chavez, Venezuela became on the most violent countries in Latin America, as drug related crimes skyrocketed. Violence is
Enrique Capriles (the opposition candidate) could spark a legal challenge from the supreme court; or worse, opposition from the military. What should
the number one concern of Venezuelans, and significant reductions would be a major political victory for whoever is in power. Brazil and Colombia together should pressure Venezuela to accept
The death of Chavez is a critical
juncture in U.S.-Latin American relations and it is important the United States not miss this
opportunity. Having a stable trustworthy Venezuela would allow the United States to continue to draw
down operations in the ever-volatile Middle East, fight narcotrafficking and expand trade.
Careful, well thought-out overtures and policy changes will help quell lingering anti-Americanism while
also improving regional stability. Ending the Cuban embargo would provide absolute economic gain
for all parties, while providing cover for Maduro to thaw relations with the United States and receive aid to
stop uncontrollable violence. Strategic engagement with regional allies could help spur the
sorely needed D.E.A assistance with the tacit acceptance of modest political reforms, most importantly freer press.
economic and institutional reforms necessary for Venezuela to prosper moving forward. The situation in
Venezuela could be potentially destabilizing to the region. The United must act deliberately to make Hugo Chavez’s passing an unmitigated positive development.