China CP
Mexico
China wants to increase trade with Mexico – saves Mexican economy
BBC 6/4 (BBC Worldwide Monitoring is a new site, June 4, 2013, “China ready to discuss
possible talks on free trade deal with Mexico - president,”
http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/results/docview/docview.do?docLi
nkInd=true&risb=21_T17775109382&format=GNBFI&sort=BOOLEAN&startDocNo=1&results
UrlKey=29_T17775109386&cisb=22_T17775109385&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=10962&
docNo=9, //RM)
Xi's three-day stay in Mexico starting later Tuesday will include his second meeting with
Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto in less than two months.¶ He will also meet parliament
leaders, entrepreneurs and members of the Chinese community.¶ The two sides are expected to
sign a series of economic and trade agreements and issue a joint statement on further
development of bilateral ties.¶ China is Mexico's second-largest trading partner, while the latter
is China's second-largest in Latin America. Two-way trade jumped from about 5bn U.S. dollars
in 2003 to more than 36bn dollars in 2012.¶ In a written interview with Mexican media before
his three-nation Latin American tour, Xi said China was ready to work with Mexico to expand
and optimize bilateral trade, raising the possibility of starting negotiations on a bilateral free
trade deal.¶ Officials and experts believe trade relations between China and Mexico are
complementary rather than competitive, and the two countries should make more efforts to
identify the complementarities in their economies.¶ In a trip to China in early April, four months
after he took office, Pena Nieto met Xi in China's southern city of Sanya and the two leaders
agreed to work together to enhance trust and achieve win-win cooperation.¶ During the visit,
Pena Nieto announced the establishment of a government agency to handle trade issues with
China.¶ "For Mexico, China represents an opportunity to increase its productive investment, and
multiply and diversify its export capacity. China's economic dynamism, the size of its market
and its high demand for goods turn China into an attractive market for Mexico," he said in an
interview with Xinhua in April.¶ Ulises Granados, professor at the Autonomous Technological
Institute of Mexico, said the new Mexican government attaches greater importance to the
country's relations with China.¶ The two countries have huge potential for mutual investment, as
the Mexican government vowed repeatedly to improve infrastructure to drive the country's
overall development, he said.¶ Teofilo Torres Corzo, head of the Mexican Senate's Foreign Affairs
Committee for the Asia-Pacific, said Mexico should strengthen cooperation with China, one of
the world's most dynamic economies.¶ Corzo expected China to have a bigger role on the
international stage and greater presence in international politics in the years to come and it
"should be an opportunity for Mexico, and Mexicans are beginning to understand that we can
benefit better from the second largest economy in the world."¶ He said China represents a
potential market with a growing middle class and increasing demand for new products in which
Mexico has export interest.¶ "The mutually beneficial China-Mexico relationship will become
closer with joint efforts of the two governments," Corzo said.
China and Mexico will cooperate – recent agreements prove
Gao 6/7 (Xi Gao, Editor of the US – China Policy Foundation, “PRESIDENT XI JINPING’S
TRIP TO LATIN AMERICA”, http://uscpf.org/v3/2013/06/10/president-xi-jinpings-trip-tolatin-america/, 6/7/13, 7/10/13, //CW)
Although China and Mexico are seen as competitors in the global economy, competing with each other to export
manufactured goods to the U.S., the two are attempting to cooperate more. During his three day trip in Mexico, Xi,
with President Peña Nieto, announced a series of cooperative agreements.¶ The two presidents agreed on
a number of steps to promote the development of bilateral trade and investment. The two sides
agreed to establish a high-level working group, comprised of distinguished entrepreneurs, in a bid to promote
economic and trade relations and find new opportunities for cooperation. They also agreed to improve the bilateral
high level working group between China’s Ministry of Commerce and Mexico’s Ministry of Economy so that the group can play a
more active role in bilateral economic dialogue. In addition, they will open a department in charge of Mexico-China economic affairs
under the Mexican Embassy in China. China also promised to import more pork and tequila from Mexico.¶ In addition to trade
relations, both countries place an importance on cultural understanding. Mexico has the most Confucius
Institutes in Latin America and the National Autonomous University of Mexico will set up a Mexican cultural center in China. China
will open a Chinese cultural center in Mexico City. In addition, China will offer summer vacations to 100 Mexican children this year,
and will provide 100 scholarships to Mexican students each year for the next three years.
China and Mexico will cooperate – economic interests
Stock Market Daily 6/3 (Stock Market Daily, A stock market monitoring blog that
reports on economic developments, “Xi Jinping’s visit to Latin America boosting bilateral
relations between the three countries closer”,
http://www.stockmarkettodayblog.com/2013/06/03/xi-jinpings-visit-to-latin-americaboosting-bilateral-relations-between-the-three-countries-closer.html”, 6/3/13, 7/10/13, //CW)
Recently, as China’s
increasing influence in Latin America, the United States worried that conservative forces,
China and Latin American efforts to develop relations, Sino-Latin American trade and
investment growth, pose a threat to the United States, and thus, China ” Insert the U.S. backyard “,” poaching “said rampant.¶
The Chinese President Xi Jinping on the day Latin American trip, it was the same day Biden to leave Latin America, this dramatic
“pass” by the U.S. media as “back to back” before and after foot access, “the United States in Latin America, the game” such words as
many media headlines.¶ combined with the recent, including the President of Uruguay, President of Peru, the President of Mexico
and other Latin American leaders to visit China, coupled with Chinese Vice President Mr Li took his new position after the first
election in the same visit to Latin America Venezuela and Argentina, there was expert analysis, said Xi’s visit continues the situation
of China’s new leadership since he took office, opening diplomatic momentum, reflecting China will further deepen
the all-round relations with Latin American countries.¶ two governments have any rhetoric? In 521 days of
Chinese Foreign Ministry’s regular press conference, asked, “U.S. leaders recently visited Latin American countries, this is a
coincidence, or reflect the competition between the two countries in Latin America” ??is? Foreign Ministry spokesman
Hong Lei responded that China and Latin American countries to maintain good bilateral
relations. We believe that the United States can play to their respective advantages in Latin
America cooperate together for the development of Latin American countries to play an active
role.¶ 522 days in the White House on Biden’s visit to Latin America briefing, a reporter asked Biden and Xi Jinping visited Latin
America, the United States worried that China will weaken the U.S. commitment to Latin impression in people’s minds? The White
House’s answer is the same in Latin America is not a particular country to compete.¶ In addition to the political level of the fiery
Latin American relations in the past twelve, China is also a change in the economic level in Latin America to
be “marginalized” in the image of trading partners, have not only with Chile, Peru, Costa Rica signed the Three
Kingdoms free trade agreements, while China is now second only to the United States in Latin America
and the EU’s third largest trading partner.¶ Inter-American Development Bank President Luis Moreno to predict that China will
become the V to the Latin American region’s largest trading partner. Moreno pointed out that China’s weight in the world economy
increasingly heavy impact on the Latin American country’s economy is becoming increasingly evident, as Latin America’s export
growth in the major promoter.¶ Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, deputy director of the Latin American Economic Research
LATIN believes that China is still developing and Latin American relations from their own national interests, which pull the
complementarity and cooperation potential point of view. “Whether Trinidad and Tobago, Costa Rica, or Mexico, on the first or in
the presence of great economic complementarity, Latin America is rich in resources, China’s development needs of raw materials.”
LATIN the reporter said, “The second is the role of China in Latin America more important, such as Costa Rica and China trade is in
surplus, which is very important for Costa Rica, the two countries signed a free trade agreement between, for such a small country,
China is a huge market. Ҧ Shanghai International of the Institute of International Strategic assistant director of cattle Haibin also
believe that, do not read too much into Chinese and U.S. leaders to visit Latin America. “The United States are global power in the
diplomatic agenda overlap, are not just expand the ‘competition’ means.” He said, also has a new leader came to power in Latin
America, the United States and Latin American leaders need to create new work or personal relationship.
China key to decrease development gap
Hu, 3 (Hu, Xuan, writer for China Daily, North American ed,“Gaining common prosperity”, 03
June 2003, Proquest//ACK)
Narrowing the North-South gap and facilitating common development is the foremost issue facing the
international community in an era of globalization.¶ With economic growth and international co-operation at
the top of the agenda, leaders from both the developed and developing nations such as China, India and
Mexico met at the informal North-South dialogue meeting on Sunday in the French resort of Evian.¶ This indicates greater significance was paid
to the search for common development by enriching the South-North co-operation.¶ This informal summit was
held just ahead of the meeting of the Group of Eight (G8) which comprises the world's most influential and leading industrialized nations - Britain, Canada, France, Germany,
development, the major focus of current times, are closely related to each other.
widening North-South development
gap can bring global instability.¶ The world economy has long lacked the momentum for recovery.
Trade protectionism has emerged in some developed countries, while little importance has been attached to the
development problems of poorer nations.¶ However, as the world becomes increasingly interdependent as a result of
accelerated globalization, the growing gap threatens the interests of not only the South, but also the North, by undermining the economic stability and
sustainability of the rich.¶ Without economic development in the poverty-stricken nations, the world market will
continue to wither. The disturbances and contradictions created and intensified by an imbalance in economic development will worsen the investment and trade
environment and even result in a new round of worldwide unrest, to which, for example, the growth of international terrorism is partly attributable.¶ An unjust world
is an unsafe world. It is imperative to promote a benign cycle of the world economy, to which the concerted
co- operation of the South and the North can contribute.¶ As globalization advances, the leading industrialized countries
ought to make their contribution to establishing a new world economic order, one which is essential for increasing the development capacity of the
Italy, Japan, the United States and Russia.¶ Peace and
Facts have repeatedly shown that in addition to slowing down the process of economic globalization, the
third world by correcting or eliminating unfair and irrational rules.¶ For their part, the developing nations, instead of relying on policy changes by the North, should pursue their
own development strategies.
China-mexico relations solve development gap
Asia News Monitor , 9 (Asia News Monitor, Thai News Service Group, “China/Mexico:
Xi raises proposals for maintaining Sino-Mexico economic, trade development”, 11 Feb 2009,
Proquest//ACK)
Visiting Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping on Tuesday (February 10, 2009) raised a five-point proposal for maintaining
the rapid
development of Sino-Mexican economic and trade cooperation at a luncheon hosted by Chinese and Mexican
entrepreneurs.¶ First, Xi said both sides should treat and advance their economic and trade cooperation from a strategic perspective.¶ As big
developing countries, China and Mexico are influential in world economy, trade and finance, Xi
said, adding that both sides should be fully aware the significance of enhancing economic and trade cooperation for
promoting their own development and safeguarding the common interests of developing countries.¶ The
two countries should further tap the potentials, enrich the contents and ways, and open new
channels and fields, to raise their economic and trade cooperation to a new level, Xi added.¶ Xi reiterated that
opening-up to the outside world is the basic national policy of China, and the Chinese market will always be open. He said China does not seek a trade
surplus with Mexico, but a trade balance between the two markets. ¶ Second, he asked the two governments
to further improve
their services. In recent years, the Chinese and Mexican governments have maintained close
collaborations over the development of bilateral economic and trade cooperation, and have signed a
series of documents to create legal assurances and better conditions for the trade. ¶ He asked the two governments to more actively eliminate the
obstacles in bilateral trade and investment, and to improve the efficiency and convenience for those business activities. ¶ Third, the vice president asked
the two sides to actively promote cooperation in important sectors, such as mining, telecommunications, agriculture, fisheries, processing and assembly
and new energy.¶ Fourth, Xi urged Chinese
and Mexican enterprises to be the main force in bilateral
economic and trade cooperation.¶ The businesses of the two countries have sincere will to enhance
mutually beneficial cooperation and pursue interests amid economic globalization and they are
the main force in furthering the Sino-Mexican economic and trade cooperation, Xi said.¶ He expressed
hope that both businesses could broaden their contacts, enhance mutual understanding, tap potentials and strengthen strategic cooperation to move
toward complementing each other with respective advantages. ¶ Fifth, the Chinese leader asked both countries to expand cooperation in international
economic affairs.¶ As economic
globalization continues to develop, China and Mexico have seen growing
collaboration and cooperation in world and regional economic affairs, Xi said.¶ At present, the two countries
can enhance consultations and expand cooperation over addressing the financial crisis, reforming the international financial system, advancing the
Doha round of world trade talks, to jointly safeguard the legitimate rights of developing countries, Xi added. ¶ Xi is on a three-day visit to Mexico from
Monday to Wednesday. He will also visit Jamaica, Colombia, Venezuela, Brazil and Malta, which will last until Feb. 22. – PNA
Mexico Renewables
CP Text: China should economically engage with Mexico by providing
assistance and investment with renewable technology
We get the only internal link to modeling – China is a global leader in
renewables
Also the card cites China’s leadership in PV panels, the only type of energy specified in the 1ac other than
wind
WorldWatch Institute 13 (China on Pace to Become Global Leader in Renewable Energy, cites “Powering
China’s Development: The Role of Renewable Energy” (2007) written by WorldWatch senior fellow Eric Martinot and
Vice Chair of China’s Renewable Energy Society in Beijing, Li Junfeng, http://www.worldwatch.org/node/5497
//OP)
China will likely achieve—and may even exceed—its target to obtain 15 percent of its
energy from renewables by 2020, according to a new report released by the Worldwatch Institute. If China’s
commitment to diversifying its energy supply and becoming a global leader in renewables
manufacturing persists, renewable energy could provide over 30 percent of the nation’s energy
by 2050.¶ That is the major conclusion of Powering China’s Development: The Role of Renewable Energy, written by Beijing-based researcher Eric
Martinot, a Worldwatch senior fellow, and Li Junfeng, Vice Chair of China’s Renewable Energy Society in Beijing. “A combination of
policy leadership and entrepreneurial savvy is leading to spectacular growth in renewable
energy, increasing its share of the market for electricity, heating, and transport fuels,” said Martinot. “China is poised to become a
leader in renewables manufacturing, which will have global implications for the future of
the technology.Ӧ More than $50 billion was invested in renewable energy worldwide in 2006, and China is expected to invest over $10 billion
in new renewables capacity in 2007, second only to Germany. Wind and solar energy are expanding particularly
rapidly in China, with production of wind turbines and solar cells both doubling in 2006. China is poised to pass world solar and
wind manufacturing leaders in Europe, Japan, and North America in the next three years, and it
already dominates the markets for solar hot water and small hydropower.¶ “Our ingenuity and manufacturing prowess are being
harnessed to provide leadership to the world on renewables,” said Li Junfeng. “ China’s position
Washington, D.C. –
provides a strong example for other developing countries, while helping to drive
down renewable energy costs to become competitive with fossil fuels for all
countries the world over .”¶ The report discusses China’s advances in wind power, solar photovoltaics (PV), solar heating,
biomass power, and biofuels. Impressive gains in these sectors include:¶ Wind power is the fastest growing powergeneration technology in China, with existing capacity doubling during 2006 alone. By 2007, China was home to four major
Chinese manufacturers of wind turbines, another six foreign subsidiary manufacturers, and more than 40 firms developing prototypes and aspiring to produce turbines
.¶ Solar PV production capacity in China jumped from 350 megawatts (MW) in 2005 to
over 1,000 MW in 2006, with 1,500 MW expected in 2007. With high-profile initial public stock offerings for several Chinese
companies, some valued in the billions of dollars, global attention has been riveted to China’s solar PV industry. Growth in
commercially
solar hot water systems has been rapid, rising from 35 million square meters of installed capacity in 2000 to 100 million square meters by the end of 2006. China added 20
million square meters of new capacity in 2006 alone. Chinese companies now produce the solar heaters—an increasingly desirable consumer appliance—at costs one-fifth to
Wastes from agricultural facilities in China could yield 80 billion
cubic meters of biogas annually, well above the government’s target of 44 billion cubic meters
annually by 2020. In 2006, China had about 2 gigawatts (GW) of biomass power generation capacity, mostly from combined heat-and-power (CHP) plants with
one-eighth those found in the United States and Europe.¶
sugarcane waste as the primary feedstock.¶ Total ethanol production in China in 2006 was about 1 billion liters, compared with global production of 37 billion liters, primarily in
the United States and Brazil. Higher corn prices and concern about competition with food supplies led to a moratorium on corn-based ethanol, leaving sorghum, cassava, and
Prospects for significant ethanol expansion in China rest primarily on
the future of cellulose-to-ethanol technology, the viability of which experts expect will be proven
within the next 10 years.¶ With its booming economy and rapidly expanding energy consumption—particularly its use of coal and oil—it is imperative for China to diversify its energy
sugar cane as the current feedstocks of choice.
supplies. The country has suffered frequent power shortages due to its breakneck economic development. China’s urban population, which uses nearly three times more electricity and commercial energy per
person than rural residents do, increased from 375 million in 1999 to 577 million in 2006. The country’s automobile fleet also continues to balloon, with an estimated 1,000 new cars appearing on Beijing’s streets
every day.¶ Coal now provides 80 percent of China’s electricity, and national electricity demand doubled between 2000 and 2006. As a result, China’s economic development, environment, and public health are
severely affected: for example, only 1 percent of urban Chinese breathe air that meets European air quality standards. Coal generation also leads to the build up of toxic metals, such as mercury, in water supplies
and on agricultural fields throughout China.¶ China’s carbon dioxide emissions are on the rise and are expected to exceed total U.S. carbon dioxide emissions shortly, although Chinese per-capita emissions remain
about one-sixth those of the United States. Nuclear power provides just 7 GW of China’s electric capacity, and even with the additional plants planned in the next few decades, it is unlikely to provide more than 5
Worldwatch President Christopher Flavin praised China’s growing commitment to
renewables: “ The combination of ambitious targets supported by strong government
percent of the country’s electricity.¶
policies and entrepreneurial acumen may soon allow China’s renewable energy
sector to ’leapfrog’ many developed nations .”
China is committed now – investments prove
Bloomberg News 13 (July 30, China’s Spending on Renewable Energy May Total 1.8 Trillion Yuan,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-30/china-s-spending-on-renewable-energy-may-total-1-8-trillion-yuan.html //OP)
China’s spending to develop renewable energy may total 1.8 trillion yuan ($294 billion) in the five years
through 2015 as part of the nation’s efforts to counter climate change, according to a government official.¶ China may
invest another 2.3 trillion yuan in key energy-saving and emission-reducing projects, Xie Zhenhua, vice
chairman of the National Development and Reform Commission, said today at a conference in Beijing. China stands by its pledge to cut carbon emissions per unit of economic
. The increased reliance on renewable sources of energy
fits with efforts by China, the world’s biggest carbon emitter, to help mitigate the effects of pollution blanketing its major
cities. Along with renewables investments, the environment ministry is considering stricter
controls on vehicle and industry pollution.¶ The government aims to have 100 gigawatts of wind-power installed capacity and more than 35
gigawatts of solar power by 2015, Xie reiterated today. China’s targets have encouraged companies including China
Petrochemical Corp., also known as Sinopec Group, to strengthen their commitment to protect the
environment.¶ Sinopec yesterday said it will invest 22.9 billion yuan on an environmental protection plan.¶ China asked seven cities and provinces last year to put in
output by as much as 45 percent before 2020 from 2005 levels, he said
place regional caps and pilot programs for trading emission rights.¶ The country will gradually expand the regions falling under its carbon trading pilot program starting from
2015 in order to explore the potential for a national system, Xie said.
China can invest in Latin American renewables, especially solar –
empirics prove
Renewable Energy World 12
(Latin America Report: Region Offers New Direction for China's Solar
Giants, 8/10/12, http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2012/08/latin-america-report-region-an-emergingoutlet-for-chinas-solar-giants //OP)
Suntech recently passed the 1 gigawatt (GW) mark in the Americas, and of course, the vast share of those installations were done in
the more mature, lucrative and stable North America region.¶ But if Suntech is to achieve its second GW in half the time, as they are
suggesting, they’ll likely find an increasing share of their sales coming from Latin America. That’s an area all manufacturers
it’s a region Chinese module makers are especially well-positioned to serve.¶ Brazil’s
But the nation’s local content
approach is unlikely to be replicated by any of its regional neighbors, where energy needs are high
and where the thirst for renewables is growing by the day.¶ Consider places like Haiti, a nation with severe
are targeting, and
plan to spur a solar industry built on local manufacturing is running into some trouble.
energy challenges stemming from the 2010 catastrophic earthquake and a growing need for stable, and often distributed solutions.
Or a place like Chile, which wants low-cost dispatchable sources to power a thriving mining industry. Or Mexico, which has all of 6
MW installed nationwide, where the jobs created by investing in solar would create a massive installation industry .¶ This puts
Latin America in line to take advantage of the plummeting cost of PV and perhaps the rise of innovative
technologies like high concentrated photovoltaics (HCPV). And it will give companies like Suntech a growing
market for its panels. As the United States and European markets put a premium on domestically manufactured solar
panels, China module makers will step up the effort to open new opportunities. It’s already
starting to happen, and the trade issues will only speed up that process.
Here’s solvency for wind – they want China to do it
Nielsen 12 (Stephan, Writer for Bloomberg, Renewable Energy World, China Grabs Share in Latin America
Wind Energy with Cheap Loans, http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2012/11/china-grabs-share-inlatin-america-wind-energy-with-cheap-loans //OP)
Chinese wind-turbine makers have broken into the South American market, the world's fastest-growing,
by offering government-backed loans at interest rates as much as 50 percent lower than local offerings.¶ The
package deals
can get buyers to choose Chinese machines over those of Western manufacturers such as Vestas Wind
Systems A/S of Denmark or General Electric Co., much in the way the U.S. government helps American exporters sell everything
from cotton to satellites by guaranteeing loans or insurance.¶ In one of the latest transactions, China Development Bank Corp.
agreed on Nov. 15 to loan $261 million for a Grupo Isolux Corsan SA project in Argentina that will use 100 megawatts of turbines
from Xiangtan, China-based XEMC Windpower Co. The state-run bank is talking to Argentine developer Geassa to support a $3.5
billion wind project that would be the continent’s largest.¶ “The name of the game here is the loan,” Geassa Executive Vice President
Eduardo Restuccia said in an interview. The Buenos Aires-based company is negotiating to borrow $3 billion from China
Development for its planned 1,350-megawatt wind project in southern Argentina’s Chubut province. “It’s not possible to get a longterm loan from a commercial bank.”¶ South American banks see multiyear loans for wind energy as too
risky compared with lending on cars or homes. That has opened the door for Chinese turbine makers that
provide both turbines and financing to establish a toehold in the world’s fastest-growing wind market,
Restuccia said.¶ Chinese Loan¶ Geassa, short for Generadora Eolica Argentina del Sur SA, is seeking a 12-year loan with a two-year
grace period and an annual interest rate of 6 percent above Libor, the London interbank offered rate. The financing may be complete
by June, he said. The company will use Chinese turbines and hasn’t selected a supplier.¶ Benchmark three-month Libor rate for U.S.
dollar- denominated financing is about 0.31 percent. That makes the loan Geassa is seeking less than half the cost of financing from
Argentina’s development lender Banco de Inversion y Comercio Exterior, which offers loans for infrastructure projects at about 15
percent, said Eduardo Tabbush, an analyst at Bloomberg New Energy Finance in London.¶ Commercial banks in Latin
America are often reluctant to offer loans for the lifetime of wind projects, which may exceed 15
years, Tabbush said. Chinese banks are less skittish, and willing to push out repayment until
after the projects begin selling power and generating revenue.¶ Growing Market“Emerging markets,
with limited financing lines and high financing costs, are a priority for Chinese suppliers,” Tabbush
said in an interview. “ Latin America is a strategic area to deploy their excess capacity .” South
America has about 2,200 megawatts of wind farms in operation now, using mostly Western turbines, up from 76 megawatts in 2005,
a growth rate that exceeds all other regions, said Tabbush Isolux, a Spanish engineering company, expects to borrow $261 million
from China Development for 12 years at 6 percent above Libor for its Loma Blanca wind farm, also in Argentina’s Chubut province,
said Juan Carlos de Goycoechea, president of the company’s Argentine unit. The Chinese bank offered better rates than South
American lenders, he said.
We still access tech transfer – it solves better with China
Lewis 13 (Joanne, citing her book “Green Innovation in China: China’s Wind Power Industry and the Global
Transition to a Low-Carbon Economy” Assistant Professor of science, technology, and international affairs in
Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service, PROFESSOR EXPLORES CHINA'S SURGE IN GREEN ENERGY,
http://www.georgetown.edu/news/joanna-lewis-china-energy-book.html //OP)
JANUARY 23, 2013 – DURING THE PAST DECADE, China has emerged as a top user of green-energy
technologies despite being a latecomer to the movement, says Georgetown professor Joanna Lewis in her new book. Lewis, an
assistant professor of science, technology and international affairs in Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service, says her new book,
Green Innovation in China: China’s Wind Power Industry and the Global Transition to a Low-Carbon Economy (Columbia
University Press, 2012), examines the model China used to utilize, develop and manufacture wind energy technology.¶ “What I’m
really trying to look at is how China has been able to utilize technologies that were initially developed by
and for the developed world, how the country has integrated these technologies into their own economy and what this
means for its ability to transition to cleaner technologies,” she says.¶ EMERGING INDUSTRY¶ Lewis says China used models
of technology transfers – which allow companies to license a technology, such as a wind turbine, from
an international company and manufacture it domestically.¶ These models of technology transfer
have allowed the country to emerge as the No. 1 user of wind energy in the world, says Lewis.
The United States ranks No. 2. “It’s really an industry that has emerged over the past decade,” says the SFS professor.¶
LONG WAY TO GO¶ Lewis says technology transfers have allowed the Chinese to “build a knowledge
base in this sector,” leading to “a handful of companies in China able to innovate and develop
the next generation of wind turbines” and thus build out their innovation infrastructure.
Mexico says yes – huge economic benefits
Xizhi and Maurice 13 ( Liang Xizhi, Peter Saldana Maurice, Interview: Mexican senator calls for stronger
ties with China, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90883/8268661.html //OP)
Mexico should strengthen cooperation with China, one of the world's most dynamic
Senator Teofilo Torres Corzo said ahead of Chinese President Xi Jinping's upcoming visit to the country.¶ Expecting China to
have bigger role on the international stage and greater presence in international politics in the years to come, Corzo said the country
"should be an opportunity for Mexico, and Mexicans are beginning to understand that we can
benefit better from the second largest economy in the world."¶ Also, China should be regarded as a factor for
bolstering Mexico's national competitiveness, as both countries have the potential and opportunity to develop
MEXICO CITY, June 3 (Xinhua) -economies,
greater economic cooperation, he said.¶ China and Mexico have maintained close dialogue at the
highest level in recent years, and they need to expand such cooperation to the fields of science,
technology, culture and education, said the senator, who chairs the Mexican Senate's foreign affairs committee for the Asia-Pacific.¶ He
called for the two sides to find new possibilities, improve mutual understanding, and expand cooperation and mutual understanding.¶ Mexico,
Corzo said, should continue to work with China to promote international ecological cooperation, the
development of alternative energy sources , conservation and rational use of water, and the construction of a new
international financial system.¶ With "very promising" prospects, the Mexico-China relationship has the potential to
benefit both nations as well as their respective regions, he added.@ The senator also said Mexico and China should
strengthen cooperation in infrastructure construction, aviation and maritime transport, tourism, energy, mining and other fields.¶ Corzo believed that
Xi's upcoming visit will effectively promote the development of the bilateral relations.¶ "The
mutually beneficial China-Mexico
relationship will become closer with joint efforts of the two governments," he said.
US ceding control to China now—China key to make renewables competitive,
empirics prove
MSN 13 (MSN is a news agency. “US cedes green energy future to China” http://money.msn.com/technologyinvestment/blog--us-cedes-green-energy-future-to-china jun 19, 2013) SC
Renewable energy is like any technology -- it starts out expensive and grows cheaper over time. ¶
Money is its primary fuel; money for research, money for start-ups and money to get early
versions into the market.¶ ¶ To fuel the new market, Western countries have created various
subsidies, such as "feed-in" tariffs and loan guarantees on risky breakthroughs. It's just what we
did with computing, transistors and the Internet, creating market conditions before a market
exists, setting the stage for a boom.¶ ¶ So now that the boom is on the horizon, politicians are
doing all they can to hand the fruit of this labor to China.¶ ¶ The biggest turnaround likely is in
Australia, where a coming conservative government is expected to scrap programs that have the
country on track to get more than 22% of its energy from wind, waves and the sun by 2020, The
Guardian has reported. The local Limbaugh, named Alan Jones, even led a rally claiming wind
energy "terrorizes" small towns, reported the Daily Telegraph.¶ ¶ Germany is going to cut its
subsidies in half after the next election, according to CleanTechnica, and the U.S. House of
Representatives plans to cut our subsidies in half as part of its next budget, according to The
Hill.¶ ¶ Thankfully, a move by states to protect local markets from out-of-state renewable
competition was recently killed by the U.S. Circuit Court. The decision was posted to
EENews.Net.¶ ¶ Big win for Chinese solar panel makers¶ The question becomes, whom does this
benefit? While advocates of coal may think it benefits them, and advocates of nuclear may feel
the new trend benefits them, the big winners in all this are more likely to be the Chinese solar
companies, such as Yingli Green Energy (YGE -2.30%), LDK Solar (LDK -6.13%) and Canadian
Solar (CSIQ -1.88%).¶ ¶ These are the companies that survived the brutal market shakeout of the
last few years and, in the process, brought the costs of solar cells using polysilicon down to less
than 50 cents/watt, the point at which an efficient channel can create cost parity with other
forms of grid energy.¶ ¶ At these prices, all sorts of new buyers are appearing. Latin America and
Africa are now emerging as major markets for renewable energy projects, writes
SustainableBusiness.com.¶ ¶ The business isn't going to go away. The question is who will get the
business. In the present environment, it's unlikely to be companies such as Sunpower (SPWR
0.00%), First Solar (FSLR -1.77%) and privately held Stion, which can't yet compete directly on
price but can win contracts using Renewable Energy Certificates, feed-in tariffs and some oldfashioned jingoism.¶ ¶ Schools, factories, and cities are right now planning a host of mediumsized projects, anywhere from 100 Mwatt to 2 Gwatt in size, writes RenewableEnergyWorld,
representing 60% of the U.S. deal stream. But U.S. suppliers are unlikely to win much of that
business if utilities are forced, by subsidy cuts, to go with the low-cost supplier. Because right
now that low-cost supplier is in China.¶ Foot off the gas pedal ¶ Just as the market is ready to take
off, with the growth ramp dead ahead, and just as game-changing technologies like graphene,
printable solar cells and biological cells are approaching the market, we're taking our foot off the
gas and pressing the brake.¶ ¶ But this is how economic power shifts. The aging power cares more
for what was than what will be. And if that's the way we're going to play it then I, for one,
welcome our new Chinese overlords.
China solves and key to coop and warming
Brandt et al 12 (Jon, Nicole Adams, Christina Dinh, Devin Kleinfeld-Hayes, Andrew Tuck, Derek Hottle, nav
Aujla, Kirsten Kaufman, Wanlin Ren are all writing for the American University School of International Services.
“Chinese Engagement in Latin America ¶ and the Caribbean: ¶ Implications for US Foreign Policy”
http://www.american.edu/sis/usfp/upload/Chinese-Engagement-in-LAC-AU_US-Congress-FINAL.pdf December
2012) SC
Resulting from three decades of continuous economic growth, urbanization and a massive ¶
social transformation, China is one of the world’s most important players in the LAC ¶ energy
sector. However, with only one percent of the world’s proven oil reserves and the ¶ second largest
in terms of consumption, the country has no option but to secure ¶ sustainable supply sources
elsewhere. Countries in Latin America (especially Argentina, ¶ Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador and
Venezuela) are among China’s premier investment ¶ destinations. 74% of all Chinese lines of
credit to LAC is in oil loans to guarantee future ¶ energy supply and energy security.28 While
China’s quest for energy security is not a ¶ direct threat to US energy security, the relationship
between China and Latin American ¶ oil exporters should be closely monitored.¶ One area of
potential growth and trilateral cooperation is in renewable energy investment. ¶ Historically
speaking, the United States has led the way in renewable energy investment, ¶ but over the past
several years, China has made remarkable advances with a surge of new ¶ investment in and
emphasis on renewable energy technology. Investments in renewable ¶ energy reached new
heights in 2011, topping $257 billion, up from only $39.4 billion in ¶ 2004 (552 percent increase
in eight years).29 China has surpassed the US in the volume of ¶ renewable energy investment, is
second behind the EU, and is looking to expand its ¶ markets for renewable energy.¶ China and
other Asian countries have set ambitious targets for renewable energy as part ¶ of their primary
energy portfolios. Government grants, subsidies and other tax incentives ¶ have prompted a wave
of Chinese manufacturing in wind turbines, solar photovoltaic ¶ panels and other renewable
products. For example, Chinese solar panel production has ¶ actually outpaced demand globally
and the Chinese are aggressively trying to develop ¶ Latin America’s market for solar panels.
Latin America provides an attractive market for ¶ Asia in the renewable sector and there is great
potential to foster increased cooperation in ¶ the energy security of both regions as they strive to
become less dependent on expensive ¶ and dwindling hydrocarbons. Alternative energy provides
a green platform to promote ¶ closer economic ties, ultimately helping to mitigate the allinclusive threat of climate ¶ change.
China solves – Recent Memorandum Proves
Business Mexico Online 6-6 (Business Mexico Online, A reputable site for an update
on the Mexican economy and business world, http://business-mexico-online.com/mexico-andchina-sign-memorandum-of-understanding-to-cooperate-on-renewable-energy-eu-imposesanti-dumping-tariffs-on-chinese-solar-panels/, 6/6/13, Accessed 7/8/13, //CW)
The Mexican Secretary of Energy and the Chinese head of the National Development and Reform Commission
agreed to cooperate on renewable energy programs, just as the European Union slaps tariffs on China for
dumping solar panels.¶ Mexican Secretary of Energy Pedro Joaquín Coldwell and Xu Shaoshi, President of the
Chinese National Development and Reform Commission signed a memorandum of
understanding making cooperation on renewable and clean energy programs, such as solar energy and
carbon dioxide recovery, a priority between the two countries, according to a press release issued by the Secretariat of Entergy.¶
The memorandum of understanding, signed during the state visit to Mexico of Chinese
President Xi Jinping, calls for working groups to meet in China in the second half of this year to determine areas in
which China and Mexico can cooperate on energy projects.¶ The announcement comes just as the European Union placed 11.8
percent anti-dumping tariffs on the importation of Chinese solar panels, accusing China of selling solar panels in the EU below cost,
the European Commission announced this week. The alleged dumping in Europe threatens 25,000 jobs in the European solar
industry, according to the Commission.¶ The tariffs of 11.8 percent that go into effect today are a temporary measure designed to
encourage China to negotiate with the Commission and will last two months. If no further agreement with China is reached, those
tariffs will go up to an average of 47.6 percent in August. The move by the European Commission is widely seen a measure that could
provoke retaliatory measures by China in European exports to that country.
China’s international status key for international coop on renewables
Eynde and Chang 13 (Sarah Van PhD. Researcher on International and Chinese climate
governance at HIVA-K.U.Leuven Pei-fei is research fellow at the Institute for International and
European Policy and junior member of the Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies
Explaining the development of China’s renewable energy policies: comparing wind and solar
power https://hiva.kuleuven.be/resources/pdf/anderepublicaties/HIVA_WP2013_01.pdf
In first instance, the focus is on policies because investors, technology solution providers,
technology buyers and other market participa nts in the Chinese renewable energy sector agree
that government support is the main factor driving renewable energy sector development. The
industrial policies related to strategic emerging industries, followed by targets in renewable
energy, GHG emission s 14 and carbon intensity are considered the most important among
those actors ( CGTI 2012:51; interviews 2009 - 2012). Second, international cooperation in the
area of renewable energy is indispensable given that current environmental and economic
development s disregard national boundaries. Furthermore, now that China has become a
leader in the area of renewable energy, both the government and companies are seeking to
capitalize on the country’s successes abroad and deepen international collaboration and coope
ration while continuing to secure resources and technologies.
Mexico Nanotech
China can solve – they surpass the US in nanotech
Mackenzie 9
( Tom, China's giant step into nanotech Nanotechnology is big business conducted on an atomic scale. China is a major player, using
it for a speaker just 1mm thick - or super-strong armour http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2009/mar/26/nanotechnologychina //OP)
Fan's nano-speaker is just the tip if the iceberg in China's sweeping nanotech programme, which has the
potential to transform its export-based economy and nearly every aspect of our lives, from food and
clothes to medicine and the military. Nanotechnology - the manipulation of matter on an atomic scale to develop new
materials - is an industry predicted to be worth nearly £1.5tn pounds by 2012, and China is determined to corner the
biggest chunk of the market.¶ Its investment has already surpassed that of any other country after
the US. Since 1999, China's spending on research and development (R&D) has gone up by more than 20%
each year. A further boost will come from the £400bn economic stimulus package announced by the Chinese government this
year, £12bn of which has been ringfenced for R&D.¶ Tiny superpower¶ "The overall trends are irrefutable," says Dr James Wilsdon,
director of the Science Policy Centre at the Royal Society, and author of the Demos report "China: The Next Science Superpower?".
"China is snapping at the heels of the most developed nations, in terms of research and
investment, in terms of active scientists in the field, in terms of publications and in terms of
patents." Fan hopes the economic crisis, which has led to thousands of Chinese factories closing, will force the country to move
from the manufacture of low-end products such as toys and trainers to more hi-tech goods such as nano-touchscreens for mobile
phones. His team is working on a material to replace the indium tin oxide (ITO) used in the kind of touch panels found on
BlackBerrys and iPhones. "ITO is very expensive and breaks if bent," he says. "We're developing thin nanotube films to replace ITO.
It can bend and it's much cheaper."¶ China now produces more papers on nanotech than any other nation.
Nanotech plants have sprung up in cities from Beijing in the north to Shenzhen in the south, working
on products including exhaust-absorbing tarmac and carbon nanotube-coated clothes that can monitor health. Last month,
researchers from Nanjing University and colleagues from New York University unveiled a two-armed
nanorobot that can alter genetic code. It enables the creation of new DNA structures, and could be turned into a
factory for assembling the building blocks of new materials.¶ "There's no end of areas in which nanotech is already being used," says
Wilsdon. "It's the product of targeted investment for the development and refinement of novel nanomaterials. And the reason
the Chinese focus on that area is because it's closer to the market."¶
Nanotech in China is safe and regulated – expert supervision and
accountability programs prove
Jarvis and Richmond 11
(Darryl S.L Jarvis and Noah Richmond 'Regulation and Governance of Nanotechnology in China: Regulatory Challenges
and Effectiveness' European Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 2, No.3, 2011
http://ejlt.org/article/viewFile/94/182 // OP)
China's science and technology programs are situated around a central policy architecture announced by Deng Xiaoping in 1986, the
National High Technology Research and Development Program, known as the 863 program. The 863 Program aims at promoting
the development of key novel materials and advanced manufacturing technologies for raising industry competitiveness' including
nanomaterials (Ministry of Science and Technology of China 2008: 323). The 863 Program is implemented through successive FiveYear Plans and is the key government program behind the national research and development (R&D) capacity in support of
domestic innovation. Indeed, from 1990-2002 the 863 Plan funded over 1000 nanotech projects with a total investment of USD 27
million. Similar to the MLP, the Chinese government has recognized the importance of linking S&T to
economic growth through targeted research projects. To help achieve this, the 863 Program is
managed by an expert responsibility system , with field-/sector-specific expert committees
and panels consisting of top scientists who supervise, advise, and asse ss projects.¶ The first
project adhering to the 863 Program goals was the Climbing Project on Nanomaterial Science instigated from 1990-1999 and
overseen by the State Science and Technology Commission (SSTC), the predecessor to the current Ministry of Science and
Technology (MOST, accessed on March 23, 2010). Given the Program's success, the government subsequently
renewed its commitment to funding basic research on nanomaterials and nanostructures (i.e., carbon
nanotubes) with the initiation of China's National Basic Research Program (973 Program) in 1997. This
complements the 863 Program and is an evolving research agenda for nanotechnology research. Since 2006, 10 nanotechnology
research projects have received a combined USD 30 Million (USD three million each) under the Program (MOST briefing paper,
2010).¶ The 973 Program also supports fundamental research that enhances domestic capacity and knowledge on nanotechnologies
while complementing the 863 Program in applied research. Two other notable projects under the 973 Program concern the
standardization of procedures and assessment/test protocols which form the basic framework for the regulation of nanomaterials.
The first, the standardization for the key measurement techniques in nanotechnology is led by Professor Jiang Chao at the National
Center for Nanoscience and Technology (NCNST), and the second, the Controlled Synthesis of Nanometer-sized Reference Materials
for Metrology and Measurement: Scaling-up and Standardization of Nanofabrication Methods, is led by Professor Wu Xiaochun also
at the NCNST (interviews, NCNST officials, March 2010; interviews MOST officials, March 2010). Each is a standards-
based series of protocols designed for benchmarking nanoscience research and findings.¶ In
addition to nanotechnology research funding, the 10th Five-Year Plan (2001-2005) also addressed priorities for the
commercialization and development of nanotechnology (interview, MOST, March 2010). The government disaggregated
nanotechnology development between short (development of nanomaterials), medium (development of bio- nanotechnology and
nano medical technology), and long-term projects (development of nano electronics and nano chips). The Five-Year Plan
prioritized bridging the gap between nanotechnology research and market demand to form a
complete national innovation system. The 11th Five-Year Plan (2007-2012) in turn places emphasis on innovative
technologies, including the development of new materials for information, biological, and aerospace industries, and commercializing
the technology for 90-nanometer and smaller integrated circuits.¶ As part of China's longer term S&T policy objectives, the MLP
2006-2020 is a follow-up to the Five-Year Plan and designed to provide China with the necessary technical capacity for sustained
technology innovation that contributes to national economic development and China's ambitions to become a global leader in S&T
research (MLP 2006-2020). Indeed, the MLP 2006-2020 plan calls on S&T to address current
development bottlenecks such as environmental degradation and energy efficiency and thus
avert negative externalities associated with accelerated growth. Importantly, under the MLP, nanotechnology
development is given priority status and is identified as one of science's 'megaprojects' (MLP 2006-2020). It calls for R and D to be
undertaken on nanomaterials and devices, design and manufacturing technology, nano-scale complementary metal-oxide
semiconductor devices, nano drug carriers, energy conversion and environmental purification materials, and information storage
material. Between 2006 and 2008, the MLP funded 29 nanotechnology projects in 22 universities and research institutes across the
country, totaling USD 38.2 million (MLP 2006-2020).¶ To help oversee the various nano projects the National Steering
Committee for Nanoscience and Nanotechnology (NSCNN) was established in 2000 to
coordinate and streamline all national research activities. The NSCNN is directed by Dr. Chunli Bai and it
consists of MOST, the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), National Natural Science Foundation (NSFC), the National Development
and Reform Commission (NDRC), the Ministry of Education (MOE) and the Chinese Academy of Engineering (CAE) (interviews,
NSCNN, March and October 2010). The NSCNN membership excludes other regulatory bodies such as health, environment and
worker safety ministries. The NSCNN is chaired by the Minister of MOST and includes twenty-one
scientists from universities and research institutions and seven officials from government
agencies (see Figure 1). The preliminary results of our interviews suggest that the approval of research grants by the NSCNN
depends primarily on demonstrating the commercial utility of projects, and that NSCNN is focused predominantly on
commercialization objectives.
Extensive safety and regulations for Chinese nano-tech exist in the
squo
Jarvis and Richmond 11
(Darryl S.L Jarvis and Noah Richmond 'Regulation and Governance of Nanotechnology in China: Regulatory Challenges
and Effectiveness' European Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 2, No.3, 2011
http://ejlt.org/article/viewFile/94/182 // OP)
As the complexity of nano-based research (pure and applied) has increased in line with increased government funding, and as the
number of industrial applications for nanomaterials has grown, China has moved to identify measurement,
handling, exposure, toxicity, and safety standards. Nanotechnology standards are reviewed by
the National Nanotechnology Standardization Technical Committee (NSTC), and the Technical Committee 279, a
nanomaterial- specific sub-committee under the Standardization Administration of China (SAC). It is housed
within the NCNST. The SAC/TC279 serves as the coordinating body for the purposes of drafting
essential nanotechnology standards including terminology, methodology, and safety in the fields
of nano-scale measurements, materials and nano-scale biomedicine.
The NSTC-TC also develops test protocols and technical standards used by manufacturing firms. The Committee oversees applied
research for industry and metrology, and laboratory measurement instruments in particular. SAC/TC279 is also
constructing a database for nano-material toxicology studies to assist in the establishment of
safety standards for nano-material production, packaging, and transportation. The NSTC-TC has five
core research working groups: 1) micro-fabrication, 2) nano-metrology, 3) health, safety and the environment, 4) nano-indentation
testing and 5) scanning probing microscopy (see Figure 2) (interviews, March 2010). Standards are usually published,
administered, and enforced by TC279's parent agency, the General Administration of Quality
Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ) (interview, NSTC, October 2010). Technical standards are
distinguished between GB (mandatory), GB/T (voluntary) and GB/Z (technical guide).
Canada has safe nanotech research
Tang et al 11 (Li University of California, Los Angeles - The Anderson School of
Management, New Jersey Institute of Technology, Beijing Institute of Technology¶ Visualizing
nanotechnology research in Canada: evidence¶ from publication activities, 1990–2009¶
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1019&context=li_tang)
Table¶ 3¶ lists the distribution of Canadian internationally-collaborated nano articles¶ sorted by
the number of participating countries. The United States, China, and Germany—¶ the top three
‘‘nano countries’’—are also those countries most intensively collaborating¶ with Canada,
representing more than 56% of the partners in Canadian international col-¶ laborations. Not
surprisingly, the United States is Canada’s #1 research partner. Approx-¶ imately 40% of
Canadian internationally collaborated research in nanotechnology involves¶ at least one
researcher from the United States—suggesting a significant volume of tech-¶ nology transfer
between these countries, followed by China (11%) and Germany (10%).¶ Starting from an
initially low number of research collaborations, the Canada–US collab-¶ oration has increased
sharply from only two nanotechnology articles in 1990 to more than¶ 400 articles in 2009.
When benchmarked against the other countries, Canada–US co-¶ authorship is notably higher
than Canadian co-publishing efforts with the remainder of Canada’s most frequent
collaborators. Figure¶ 3¶ highlights the consistently leading role¶ assumed by the United States
in Canada’s international research collaboration.¶
That proves Chinese expertise solves
Tang et al 11 (Li University of California, Los Angeles - The Anderson School of
Management, New Jersey Institute of Technology, Beijing Institute of Technology¶ Visualizing
nanotechnology research in Canada: evidence¶ from publication activities, 1990–2009¶
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1019&context=li_tang)
An interesting finding revealed by the present bibliometric analysis is that ethnic
Chinese researchers play a critical role in Canadian nanotechnology research. Over one
third of Canadian nanotechnology research articles involve at least one researcher with a
Chinese family name. This is especially noteworthy given that only 11% of Canadian
articles were jointly published with researchers with Chinese affiliations. This outcome
may be explained in two ways: one plausible explanation is that Canada has successfully
attracted Chinese researchers to stay in Canada; alternatively, it may also suggest that the
bridging role of Canada-based Chinese researchers is not as influential as would be expected
with regard to connecting the two geographically distant scientific communities
in China and Canada
Venezuela Oil
China’s tech experience and initial investment solves the case
McAleavey 7/29/13 [ Energy Global press release by Emma McAleavey. “CNPC takes the
lead in Latin America.”
http://www.energyglobal.com/news/processing/articles/CNPC_takes_the_lead514.aspx#.UfglO421Fsk//HK]
China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has made significant investments in place of
Venezuela’s state owned oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela (PdV), which retreated from its
international commitments following the death of Hugo Chavez, suggests Jeffrey Kerr,
Managing Analyst for Downstream Oil & Gas at GlobalData.¶ CNPC has signed deals in both
Costa Rica and Ecuador. Both projects were negotiated primarily by PdV.¶ Kerr has said that
‘despite PdV being an initial partner and key driving force behind projects, representatives from
the company were largely missing from signing ceremonies, which suggests that it is scaling
back from these investments following the President’s death earlier this year.¶ ‘CNPC now
appears to be stepping up in PdV’s place to operate within the open market’.¶ In Costa Rica,
CNPC has teamed up with state owned oil company, Recope, signing a deal for a US$ 1.5 billion
upgrade of the 25 000 bpd Porto Limon refinery. The upgrade includes an atmospheric
distillation unit boost to 60 000 bpd and is scheduled for completion in 2016.¶ In Ecuador,
CNPC and PetroEcuador plan to build a 300 000 bpd refinery in El Aromo, on the Pacific Coast.
GlobalData anticipate that the project will facilitate future cooperation between the two
companies, additionally allowing CNPC to gain exploration and production rights for its own
upstream business in Ecuador.¶ Kerr has emphasised that CNPC already has production deals in
place in Venezuela, hence these more recent contracts represent a strengthening of CNPC’s
foothold within the region over the coming years.
Venezuela solves the case – investment in the squo – tech and
expertise
Kotschwar et al 12 [Barbara Kotschwar, research fellow, has been associated with the
Peterson Institute for International Economics since 2007. Her research focuses on trade,
investment, and regional integration. Recent projects include comparative analyses of Latin
American experiences with free trade agreements, Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in
Latin America, an assessment of Mexico's economy, and studies on commercial relations
between the United States and Middle East and North Africa (MENA) partners. Kotschwar is
also adjunct professor of Latin American studies and economics at Georgetown University,
where she has taught courses on political economy and trade and integration in the Americas
since 1998. “Chinese Investment in Latin American Resources:
The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly.” http://www.iie.com/publications/wp/wp12-3.pdf//HK]
Chinese investment in extractive industries in the developing world is a subject of growing
controversy ¶ and concern. Is China locking up the world’s resource base, to the detriment of
non-Chinese users ¶ and consumers around the globe? Is China perpetuating a new era of
“resource curse” outcomes, with ¶ diversion of revenues to corrupt elites and marginalization of
local populations in regions with oil or ¶ minerals? ¶ In Africa, Chinese investment in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo is represented, on the ¶ one hand, as a “Marshall Plan” for
that beleaguered state, and, on the other hand, as a fresh era of ¶ neocolonialism. Chinese
investment in Angola, for example, involves bribery of tragic—or tragic-comic—¶ proportions
(see appendix V on Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa).1¶ China’s need for vast
amounts of minerals to sustain its high economic growth rate has increasingly ¶ turned Chinese
investors towards Latin America. This demand has propelled China into third place ¶ among
Latin American investors, directing over $15 billion (about 9 percent of total FDI) to the region ¶
in 2010 (ECLAC 2011).2¶ Over 90 percent of this investment has been targeted towards
extractive ¶ industries. China’s voracious appetite for minerals investment is often seen as a
boon to Latin American ¶ countries—a chance to diversify away from reliance on traditional
markets and a steady and ready source ¶ of funds, and, as the ECLAC study points out, an
opportunity for Latin American countries that need ¶ capital and technology. ¶ But this possible
benefit will be far outshadowed by bad news if it turns out that the economic, ¶ social, and
environmental framework within which Chinese companies operate is different from—and ¶
inferior to—the best-practice standards that the major established oil and mining companies
typically ¶ maintain. Individual host countries in the developing world may be exposed to
resource curse practices ¶ of illicit payments, graft, and corruption, plus poor worker treatment
and lax environmental standards. ¶ UNCTAD’S World Investment Report devoted to
transnational corporations, extractive industries, and ¶ development notes (as do other
authoritative sources) that non-Organization for Economic Cooperation ¶ and Development
(OECD) investors—most prominently Chinese investors, operating under a doctrine ¶ officially
labeled “noninterference in domestic affairs”—have often undermined hard-won governance ¶
standards observed by multinational corporations subject to home country legislation that
conforms to ¶ the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery (including the US Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act), and ¶ ignored or bypassed the best-practice environmental standards insisted
upon elsewhere (UNCTAD 2007). ¶ In recent years, China has used financing arrangements and
direct investment to gain secure access ¶ to oil, metals, and foodstuffs from governments around
Latin America. In many cases loans are secured ¶ against revenues from future sales to Chinese
companies or granted at rates subsidized by the statecontrolled China Development Bank
(CDB). Most prominent are deals to obtain oil from Brazil and ¶ Venezuela (China has promised
to provide more than $32 billion to the Chavez government, which will ¶ pay off its debt in oil),
and soy, wheat, and natural gas from Argentina. Official data shows that Venezuela ¶ now sends
about 460,000 barrels a day (about 20 percent of its oil exports) to China. In Ecuador, the ¶
Chinese oil company PetroChina has lent $1 billion to state company PetroEcuador in exchange
for ¶ oil deliveries. The China Development Bank also agreed to lend $1 billion to Ecuador’s
government, to ¶ be repaid through oil exports. In the case of Venezuela and countries like
Argentina and Ecuador, who ¶ have both previously defaulted on international debt, access to
such amounts of capital would otherwise ¶ be very difficult. According to a study of CDB’s
activities “virtually no other financial institutions were ¶ willing to lend such large amounts of
capital for such long terms” (Downs 2011, 1).¶ China has also been active in infrastructure
development projects in Latin America. The CDB ¶ has offered a $2.6 billion 10-year loan to
revive a freight train system connecting Buenos Aires to much ¶ of Argentina’s central heartland.
In the country’s Rio Negro province, the Metallurgical Corporation ¶ of China has invested $80
million to reactivate an iron ore mine, and China’s Beidahuang Group has ¶ promised $1.4 billion
in irrigation infrastructure in exchange for a 20-year contract to grow corn, wheat, ¶ soy, and
dairy on otherwise dry land for Chinese consumers.¶ Latin America has grown in importance to
China over the past decade: Over half of Chinese ¶ investment in natural resources is in Latin
American countries, concentrated in some thirty-four major ¶ projects (see appendix I) that
stretch from Venezuela and Ecuador, through Brazil, Bolivia, and Peru, to ¶ Argentina and Chile.
Since initiating its “going out” strategy, encouraging its companies to become more ¶
competitive, China’s total FDI in Latin America has increased nearly six-fold: from $285 million
in 2004 ¶ to $1.6 billion in 2009.3¶ What are the implications of Chinese investments in Latin
American resources for world markets, ¶ and for individual Latin American host countries? Are
these investments part of a Chinese strategy ¶ to capture the world’s resource base for China? Are
there clear differences between Chinese owned ¶ and managed resource projects, and similar
projects owned and managed by OECD-headquartered ¶ investors—with regard to labor
practices, environmental practices, questionable payments, and corporate ¶ social responsibility?
How can host policies in Latin America be structured—and enforced—to achieve ¶ most benefit
from Chinese resource investments?
Chinese investment solves the case – financing, specific banks and
interest
Gallagher 13 [Kevin is a staff writer for the Guardian. “Latin America playing a risky game by
welcoming in the Chinese dragon.”http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/povertymatters/2013/may/30/latin-america-risky-chinese-dragon//HK]
The Chinese president, Xi Jinping, travels to the US and Latin America this week, for the first
time since he took office in March. What a difference a decade makes. Ten years ago, there
would hardly have been any fanfare about a Chinese visit to the region. Now, for Brazil, Chile
and others, China is the most important trade and investment partner. China-Latin America
trade surpassed $250bn (£165bn) last year.¶ Although China's impact in Africa receives the most
attention, China trades just as much in Latin America as in Africa, and has more investments in
the region. Chinese finance in Latin America – chiefly from the China Development Bank and
the Export-Import Bank of China – is staggeringly large and growing. In a recently updated
report, colleagues and I estimate that, since 2005, China has provided loan commitments of
more than $86bn to Latin American countries. That is more than the World Bank or the InterAmerican Development Bank have provided to the region during the same period.¶ China's
presence is a great opportunity for Latin America, but it brings new risks. If the region can seize
the new opportunities that come with Chinese finance, countries could come closer to their
development goals, and pose a real challenge to the way western-backed development banks do
business. However, if Latin American nations don't channel this new trade and investment
toward long-term growth and sustainability, the risks may take away many of the rewards.¶ First,
the positive side. Chinese trade and investment is partly a blessing for Latin America because it
diversifies the sources of finance – finance that for too long has relied on the west. The US and
European economies have been anaemic since 2008, and trade with China has tugged Latin
American growth rates to impressive levels. Every 1% increase in Chinese growth is correlated
with a 1.2% increase in Latin American growth.¶ Chinese finance is more in tune with what Latin
American nations want, rather than with what western development experts say they "need".
Whereas the US and international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank and IMF
tend to finance in line with the latest development fads such as trade liberalisation and microanti-poverty programmes, Chinese loans tend to go into energy and infrastructure projects in a
region that has an annual infrastructure gap of $260bn.¶ Neither do Chinese loans come with the
harsh strings attached to IFI finance. The IFIs are notorious for their "conditionalities" that
make borrowers sign up to austerity and structural adjustment programmes that have had
questionable outcomes on growth and equality in the region.¶ But there are risks. While the
Chinese do not attach policy conditions to their loans, they have required that borrowers
contract Chinese firms, buy Chinese equipment, and sometimes sign oil sale agreements that
require nations to send oil to China in exchange for the loans instead of local currency.¶ Chinese
investment accentuates the deindustrialisation of Latin America. Large scale, capital intensive
commodities production is not very employment-intensive, nor does it link well with other
sectors of an economy. Dependence on commodities can cause a "resource curse" where the
exchange rate appreciates such that exporters of manufacturing and services industries can't
compete in world markets – and thus contribute to deindustrialisation and economic
vulnerability.¶ Producing natural resource-based commodities also brings major environmental
risk. Many of China's iron, soy and copper projects are found in Latin America's most
environmentally sensitive areas. In areas such as the Amazon and the Andean highlands,
conflict over natural resources, property rights and sustainable livelihoods have been rife for
decades.¶ In our report, we find that Chinese banks actually operate under a set of environmental
guidelines that surpass those of their western counterparts when at China's stage of
development. Nevertheless, those guidelines are not on par with 21st century standards for
development banking. Stronger standards should be in place at a time when environmental
concerns are at an all-time high.¶ With every opportunity comes a challenge. Latin Americans
have access to a new source of finance that gives them more leeway to meet their own
development goals. If Latin America doesn't channel some of the finance to support
macroeconomic stability, economic diversification, equality and environmental protection, this
new source of finance could bring great risk.
China has the expertise for oil and has had bilateral projects with
Venezuela
Ríos 13 (Xulio Director en Observatorio de la Política China; China and Venezuela: Ambitions
and Complexities of an Improving Relationship http://link.springer.com/search?facetauthor=%22Xulio+R%C3%ADos%22)
2004. by agreement, Venezuela licensed to the China National Petroleum¶ Corporation (CNPC)
12 wells Zumano mature oil field, which has large reserves of¶ heavy crude. To this end
Petrozumano SA was created, to perform exploration and¶ production activities in the states of
Anzoategui and Monagas.¶ In September 2009 ii was announced an agreement between the two
countries to¶ extract together about 450,000 bpd of extra heavy crude in the Orinoco oil belt,
the¶ main energy reserve of the Latin American region. Thus, China’s investment (US$¶ 16.000
million dollars) was added to Russia (US$ 20.000 million dollars) in the area.¶ China also built
drilling and oil platforms, railways and housing.
China has expertise and relations high now
Ríos 13 (Xulio Director en Observatorio de la Política China; China and Venezuela: Ambitions
and Complexities of an Improving Relationship http://link.springer.com/search?facetauthor=%22Xulio+R%C3%ADos%22)
The projected commitments meant that in 2010, Venezuela cherish the goal of¶ exporting to
China about I million barrels a day. - to the US currently exports 1.5¶ million. Others delayed to
2012 the culniination of this figure. On the other hand, the¶ state oil company Petroleos de
Venezuela (PDVSA), took to build three oil refineries¶ in the Chinese territory and Chinese oil
companies involved in the construction and¶ operation of refineries in the Orinoco basin, with
the goal of not only exporting to¶ China, but also to third countries. Furthermore, Chinese
shipyards are building for¶ Venezuela three double-hull super tankers to transport Venezuelan
crude to China.¶ Venezuela craves its own fleet of tankers to not depend on middlemen and save
costs.¶
Oil coop spills over to every sector of the economy
Giacalone and Ruiz 13 (Rita has a PhD in history from Indiana University. She is
professor¶ at the Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences of the University of the Andes José
Briceño has a PhD in Political Science at the Institute d’Etudes¶ Politiques d’Aix-en-Provence,
France. The Chinese–Venezuelan Oil¶ Agreements: Material and¶ Nonmaterial Goals
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/lamp.12006/pdf)
In the 2000s, China developed a new type of agreement—“oil for credits”¶ (Bingwen et al., 2010,
p. 9). The agreements signed in 2007, 2009, and 2011¶ between the Chinese National Petroleum
Corporation (CNPC) and Petroleum of¶ Venezuela (PDVSA) fall under this type of agreement.
China’s objective has been¶ to obtain a steady supply of energy for at least the next decade
(Rodríguez¶ Holkemeyer, 2011). These agreements—energy for credit lines—began in 2004¶ and
specified that borrowers must buy goods and services from Chinese com-¶ panies,¶ 2¶ showing
the coordination between Chinese firms and the Chinese gov-¶ ernment through the China
Development Bank (CDB) (Downs, 2011, p. 2).¶ In addition to the CNPC, other Chinese
companies are participating in these¶ agreements to develop the necessary infrastructure for
moving supplies out of¶ the region and obtaining the full benefits of the government lines of
credit. In¶ Venezuela, the China Railway Engineering Corporation has an agreement to¶ build a
railway between Tinaco and Anaco, at a cost of US$75 million, mostly¶ provided by the CDB
through the Joint Chinese–Venezuelan Fund (Heavy Fund)¶ established in 2007. The project is
part of a multimodal link that would go from¶ the confluence of the Orinoco and Caroni rivers in
eastern Venezuela to the¶ Pacific coastline in Colombia (Rodríguez Holkemeyer, 2011) and
includes the¶ construction of towns along the way for lower-income people. PDVSA (2007,¶ p.
169) reported the formation of a mixed socialist agro-industrial enterprise¶ between China’s
Helongjiang Xinliang Grains & Oil Group Co. Ltd. and PDVSA-¶ Agrícola. Its projects include the
building of grain storage areas, rice and soy¶ cultivation, and the production of balanced animal
food, as well as pork, mainly¶ in the Orinoco Belt. In the industrial sector, joint companies
would be developed¶ in telecommunications for the production of cell phones in Venezuela
with¶ Chinese technology. The same would be done with electric appliances (refrigera-¶ tors,
stoves, air conditioners) by means of an agreement between the Chinese¶ Electric Appliances
Corporation and the Venezuelan Corporation of Intermediate¶ Industry (Carlson, 2007). The
fund would also financed five metro lines, a train¶ from Cúa to Encrucijada, and a highway
(Downs, 2011, p. 49).
Solely China and Venezuela coop solves-heavy investment
Giacalone and Ruiz 13 (Rita has a PhD in history from Indiana University. She is
professor¶ at the Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences of the University of the Andes José
Briceño has a PhD in Political Science at the Institute d’Etudes¶ Politiques d’Aix-en-Provence,
France. The Chinese–Venezuelan Oil¶ Agreements: Material and¶ Nonmaterial Goals
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/lamp.12006/pdf)
In addition to more than US$28 billion granted since 2007, including US$8¶ billion to capitalize
the Heavy Fund, the CDB gave Venezuela loans of US$20.6¶ billion in 2010. The new deal
encompassed three agreements: a US$10 billion loan¶ incorporated under English law, a RMB
70 billion loan governed by Chinese law,¶ and an oil supply contract between CNCP and PDVSA
under Venezuelan law¶ (Downs, 2011, p. 49). The second loan and US$4 billion of the first one
would fund¶ projects jointly selected and implemented and seemingly conditioned to hiring¶
Chinese firms (e.g., the contract granted to China’s CITIC Group to build housing ¶ units in
Venezuela). The expanded role of CDB in determining how funds should¶ be spent and of
Chinese firms in implementing them signals a departure from¶ previous agreements. It is
probably a risk-mitigating factor, because the lengths¶ of the repayment periods necessitate
guarantees that they would be repaid even¶ after the present government is out of office (Downs,
2011, p. 53).
China Venezuela coop spills over to to other sectors
Giacalone and Ruiz 13 (Rita has a PhD in history from Indiana University. She is
professor¶ at the Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences of the University of the Andes José
Briceño has a PhD in Political Science at the Institute d’Etudes¶ Politiques d’Aix-en-Provence,
France. The Chinese–Venezuelan Oil¶ Agreements: Material and¶ Nonmaterial Goals
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/lamp.12006/pdf)
In general, the agreements specify that Venezuela would increase its supply of¶ oil to China and
that China would invest in Venezuelan agriculture, infrastruc-¶ ture, mining, and energy
production, increasing annual trade between the two¶ countries that already had grown from
less than a half a billion dollars in 2003 to¶ US$5 billion in 2008 (Suggett, 2009). The
implementation of these measures has¶ made Venezuela China’s major Latin American trade
partner.¶ 3¶ A decade before,¶ China’s largest trade partners in Latin America were Mexico, Brazil,
Argentina,¶ Chile, and Cuba, and its main exports were textiles, light industry, and machin-¶ ery
and equipment, in exchange for iron, copper, wheat, wool, sugar, and paper¶ pulp (Xu, 1996, p.
193).
China solves Venezuela 5 warrants
Giacalone and Ruiz 13 (Rita has a PhD in history from Indiana University. She is
professor¶ at the Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences of the University of the Andes José
Briceño has a PhD in Political Science at the Institute d’Etudes¶ Politiques d’Aix-en-Provence,
France. The Chinese–Venezuelan Oil¶ Agreements: Material and¶ Nonmaterial Goals
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/lamp.12006/pdf)
There are at least five categories of agreements related to oil and energy issues:¶ (1) oil supply
agreements, by which Venezuela is engaged in the provision of oil¶ to China; (2) agreements to
promote Chinese participation in the exploration and¶ exploitation of oil in the Orinoco Belt; (3)
financial cooperation agreements in¶ which China provides loans to develop economic and
social projects, and Ven-¶ ezuela pays them by sending fuel and crude oil to China; (4)
agreements in which¶ China supplies capital goods, such as drills or tankers, or services; and
(5)¶ agreements on infrastructure, in particular the construction of refineries in China¶ to
process Venezuelan oil. X
Venezuela wants to expand its oil market toward China
Sullivan and Ribando 2006¶ (Mark P. Specialist in Latin American Affairs¶
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division¶ Clare M. Analyst in Latin American
Affairs¶ Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade DivisionLatin America: Energy Supply,
Political¶ Developments, and U.S. Policy Approaches
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33693_20061017.pdf)
Some observers, however, have raised ques¶ tions about the security of Venezuela¶ as a major
supplier of foreign oil. There¶ are also concerns that¶ Venezuela is looking¶ to develop China as a
replacement market¶ , although Venezuelan officials maintain¶ that they are only attempting to
diversify Venezuela’s oil markets. Energy analysts¶ maintain that there are two major difficulties
with Venezuela substantially increasing¶ its exports to China: first, China’s limited capability to
refine Venezuela’s heavy¶ crude oil, and second, high freight costs¶ because of the large distance
between the¶ two countries.¶ 15¶ Nevertheless, PdVSA announced¶ in May 2006 that it would buy
18¶ oil tankers from China that would help Venezuela increase its oil exports to Asia.¶ During his
August 2006 visit to China, Pr¶ esident Chávez announced that Venezuela¶ would boost its oil
exports to China to¶ 500,000 barrels per day (bpd) in five years¶ from a current level of 150,000
bpd. China ha¶ s also promised investment of $5¶ billion in energy projects in Venezuela by
2012¶
Venezuela Agriculture
China has the means to invest in agriculture
7/26/13 [“ China eyes food security options in Venezeuela.”
http://www.upi.com/Science_News/Technology/2013/07/26/China-eyes-food-security-options-in-Venezuela/UPI29031374816180//HK]
CARACAS, Venezuela, July 26 (UPI) -- China is considering investment in Venezuela's
agriculture industries as part of a global strategy to secure diverse sources of food supplies for its
burgeoning population.¶ Senior Venezuelan officials announced after recent talks in Beijing
Chinese investment could cover 30 million hectares of land in the Latin American country.¶
Venezuelan agriculture has suffered under frequent state interventions -- from outright
nationalization to implementation of agricultural policies criticized as being removed from
reality.¶ Oil-rich Venezuela is recovering slowly from a recession the government blames on
weather vagaries, including frequent drought conditions. Opposition critics say state
mismanagement of agriculture is partly to blame.¶ Venezuelan Vice President Jorge Arreaza
indicates his talks in Beijing gave him hope joint ventures involving China could bring great
benefit to a sector seen to be performing well before capacity.¶ Beiing has been touting its
agricultural prowess and optimum exploitation of land resources. Critics cite China's
environmental problems as an indication that progress has been patchy.¶ Venezuela under
former President Hugo Chavez pursued close collaboration with China in energy, defense and
security, and technology. Chavez died of cancer in March, soon after handing over power to
hand-picked successor Nicolas Maduro. President Maduro's inner circle includes Arreaza,
husband to the late Chavez' eldest daughter Rosa Virgina.¶ Before he was appointed vice
president under Maduro, Arreaza was minister of science and technology.¶ Arreaza indicated
that bilateral talks on agricultural collaboration advanced after Chinese Vice President Li
Yuanchao visited the country in May. "Venezuela has 30 million hectares of prime land and
great agricultural potential."¶ Arreaza said Venezuela's agriculture suffered from lack of inaction
by its absentee landowners. He blamed "bourgeois" landowners for the problem.¶ Both Chinese
and Venezuelan officials say China has every reason to be driven by the need to build
agriculture-based alliances worldwide. China's own soil has limited potential, which has been
further diminished by recent urbanization in rural areas.¶ Arreaza discounted criticism of
Chinese interest in Venezuela's land, blaming it on opponents inspired by "U.S. imperialism"
and past U.S. policies in the region. Both Chavez and Maduro have blown hot and cold on
normalizing ties with Washington.¶ One of the ideas being pursued in Venezuela will be modeled
after a Chinese model for establishing special economic zones to stimulate the economy, he
said.¶ Maduro's government aims to continue Chavez's ideal of reversing a prolonged neglect of
Venezuelan agricultural sector that began with the discovery of oil in the 1950s.¶ Right up to the
start of the oil boom, agriculture, fishing and forestry earned more than half of the national
income. By 1988 that ratio dropped to 5.9 percent of Venezuela's gross domestic product, the
rest supported by industrialization and oil exports, both of which declined in later years due to a
spate of nationalizations by Chavez.
Cuba Oil
CP solves – investment interest and risk calculus
Feinberg 12 [Felllow at the Brookings Institute. “The New Cuban ¶ Economy¶ What Roles for Foreign
¶ Investment?” http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/12/cuba%20economy%20feinberg/cuba%20economy%20feinberg%209.pdf//HK]
There is another type of JV that has populated the Cuban landscape: not the established
multinational but rather the individual foreign entrepreneur with an unusually strong appetite
for ¶ risk . Among the list of top JVs, Sherritt International is the prime example of this type of
business venture . Sherritt’s Cuban operations were the brainchild of a Canadian investment
banker ¶ who cemented a strong personal relationship with Fidel Castro . Another partnership
that, until ¶ 2010, would have been on a list of top JVs, Rio Zaza, was the creation of a Chilean
exile-turnedentrepreneur and also a favorite of Fidel’s . However, Rio Zaza has since been seized
by the Cuban ¶ authorities, making for a fascinating case study that shows the perils of political
entrepreneurship .¶ Yet even multinational giants are not immune to the shifting political
currents in enigmatic Cuba, ¶ as the contested Unilever case underscores .¶ The seven case studies
are of firms that are leaders in major sectors of the Cuban economy (Table ¶ 3 .1) . In the mining
sector, Sherritt is the leading producer of Cuba’s most important merchandise ¶ export: nickel .
Imperial Tobacco markets world-famous Cohiba cigars, exemplifying premium brand ¶ exports
derived from Cuba’s agricultural produce (the French marketing giant, Pernod Ricard,
distributes Havana Club rum, the distillate from sugar) . A visible presence throughout the
island, ¶ Sol Meliá, the Spanish hospitality chain, owns and manages many outstanding Cuban
hotels ¶ and resorts . Four of the other cases (Nestlé, Souza Cruz, Unilever, Rio Zaza) distributed
their topselling consumer products in the domestic market .¶ Sherritt is also engaged in oil and
gas . Not considered here are the petroleum production-sharing arrangements which may
become important if exploratory drilling in Cuba’s special economic ¶ zone proves productive,
but these are a different animal altogether in their corporate and capital ¶ structures . Also not
considered here are state-to-state investments, of the sort established between ¶ Chinese and
Venezuelan state-owned enterprises and their Cuban partners . They, too, are different ¶
creatures and there is insufficient information on the public record to permit much outside
scrutiny .¶ 44
Involvement and expertise proves China is sufficient to solve the case
Feinberg 12 [Felllow at the Brookings Institute. “The New Cuban ¶ Economy¶ What Roles for Foreign
¶ Investment?” http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/12/cuba%20economy%20feinberg/cuba%20economy%20feinberg%209.pdf//HK]
Finally, China is another promising source of foreign investment . Only in 2007 did Costa Rica
establish diplomatic relations with Beijing, such that through 2011 Chinese investment in Costa
Rica ¶ totaled only $11 .5 million . Now, according to official Costa Rican sources, the Chinese
National Petroleum Company expects to invest $1 billion in a joint venture with the state oil
firm, RECOPE, to build a new refinery . The China Development Bank is undertaking a
feasibility study to construct a ¶ FTZ to serve as a hub where Chinese firms could manufacture
and distribute products throughout ¶ the Americas
China is situated to solve the case
Bousquet 10 [Earl is staff writer for China.org. “China's refinery deal helps Cuba's oil
exploration.” http://www.china.org.cn/business/2010-12/07/content_21495604.htm//HK]
It was announced this week that China's National Petroleum Corporation had signed a US$6
billion agreement for an oil refinery important to Cuba's drilling explorations.¶ The refinery,
located in Cienfuegos province, is jointly owned by Cuba and Venezuela.¶ Caribbean analysts see
the latest Chinese investment in Cuba as another example of the increasing role China has been
playing of late in the search for oil in Latin America and the Caribbean.¶ In the past two years,
Chinese investments have also financed energy projects and formed joint ventures in Venezuela,
Brazil and Ecuador.¶ In addition, China has leased a petroleum storage facility on St Eustatius in
the Netherland Antilles, the Dutch-speaking Caribbean islands.¶ There have also been reports in
the Caribbean and US press that China's national oil corporation has been having talks with the
Texas-based refining giant, Valero, about purchasing its refinery on Aruba, another Dutch
island.¶ But these China initiatives are only a few of the many being undertaken in the Caribbean
and Latin America by international oil giants and rising oil companies.¶ In the Dutch Antilles,
the US-based Hess Oil Corporation and Venezuela's national oil company Petroven jointly run a
major oil facility in Curacao, the main island in the Dutch chain.¶ In the English-speaking
Caribbean, oil-rich Trinidad & Tobago continues to extend and expand its exploration and
extraction activities as researchers start to warn that reserves could start dwindling.¶ Guyana, in
South America, has had many exploratory initiatives over the past two decades, including one by
Chevron-Texaco, none yielding positive results.¶ But earlier this month English-speaking Guyana
and neighboring Dutch-speaking Suriname – South American mainland-based Caribbean
Community (Caricom) member-states that have had battles over rights to oil in waters shared by
them – both announced new developments in their respective petroleum sectors.¶ Guyana
announced that a Canadian company, CGX, had teamed up with Spanish oil giant Repsol, to
form a consortium to begin exploring for oil this month in the Guyana-Surinam basin.¶ CGX had
launched a similar exploration exercise back in 2000, but was chased by sea pirates and
bandits.¶ Surinam announced last week that it will soon start receiving oil from Venezuela as
part of its PetroCaribe initiative, through which the oil-rich, Spanish-speaking South American
and Caribbean state already delivers petroleum to most Caricom states with preferential prices
and treatment.¶ Meanwhile, with world petroleum prices rising constantly and reserves
dwindling in traditional source countries, Latin American and Caribbean nations have been
increasing their searches for new sources of oil.¶ But they are also investing more time, energy
and resources in similar searches for alternative sources of energy.¶ In many cases, investment
have been made in Caribbean territories in harnessing solar and wind energy, as well as
hydroelectricity.¶ China recently signed a multi-billion-dollar deal to finance a major
hydroelectricity project in Guyana.¶ In St. Lucia, a small US-based company, Qualibou, says it
has found more potential power than it earlier thought at the island's active volcanic west coast
Sulphur Springs and is now seeking capital to fund exploration.¶ St. Lucia also earlier this year
signed an agreement with a small Canada-based entity, Elementa Group and Island Green
Energy of Sault Ste. Marie, to generate power from municipal waste.
China investment solve the case – backroom workings ensure
Hearn 12 [Dr. Adrian H. Hearn is Australian Research Council (ARC) Future
Fellow at the University of Sydney and co-chair of the Latin American
Studies Association (LASA) Section for Asia and the Americas. Recent
publications include Cuba: Religion, Social Capital, and Development (Duke
University Press, 2008) and (as editor) China Engages Latin America: Tracing the Trajectory
(Lynne Rienner, 2011).“China, Global Governance and the Future of Cuba, in: Journal of
Current Chinese Affairs, 41, 1, 155-179.” ISSN: 1868-4874 (online), ISSN: 1868-1026 (print).
www.CurrentChineseAffairs.org http://journals.sub.unihamburg.de/giga/jcca/article/viewFile/498/496//HK]
With few exceptions (e.g. Gonzalez-Vicente 2011; Hearn and León Manríquez 2011; Kotschwar,
Moran, and Muir 2011), little attention has ¶ been paid to the influence of China’s rise on the
coordination and development of Latin American industrial sectors, and how this influence
resonates – or not – with international conventions of governance. The ¶ case of Cuba is
instructive, as no other country is so openly condemned ¶ by Washington and so publicly
praised by Beijing. With bilateral trade ¶ exceeding 1.8 billion USD in 2010 (down from a preGFC high of 2.3 ¶ billion USD in 2008), China is Cuba’s second-largest trading partner, and ¶ the
two countries have pursued state-led cooperation in sectors as diverse as biomedicine, tourism,
industrial manufacturing, nickel and oil ¶ mining, and oil refining (UN-COMTRADE 2011). The
workings of ¶ Sino-Cuban initiatives are guarded as state secrets, provoking concerns ¶ from
external observers about their intentions, capacities, and potential ¶ threats to the United States.
These apprehensions dovetail with a broader ¶ discourse on the negative influence that China
may bear on development ¶ and democracy in Latin America. ¶ This article argues that in spite of
continuing differences between ¶ international conventions of governance and China’s approach
to foreign engagement, the line between the two is narrowing. The first half of ¶ the article traces
the key points of contention to diverging evaluations of ¶ state intervention but finds that these
tensions are diminishing as multilateral institutions evolve to accommodate China’s influence.
For instance, adjustments to fiscal reserve policies within the International ¶ Monetary Fund
(IMF), as well as the gradual relaxation of the IMF’s ¶ benchmark guidelines on public sector
expenditure, resonate with China’s vision of public–private integration as a basis for economic
development.
No deficits to cooperation – China controls
Hearn 12 [Dr. Adrian H. Hearn is Australian Research Council (ARC) Future ¶ Fellow at the
University of Sydney and co-chair of the Latin American ¶ Studies Association (LASA) Section
for Asia and the Americas. Recent ¶ publications include Cuba: Religion, Social Capital, and
Development (Duke ¶ University Press, 2008) and (as editor) China Engages Latin America:
Tracing the Trajectory (Lynne Rienner, 2011).“China, Global Governance and the Future of
Cuba, in: Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 41, 1, 155-179.” ISSN: 1868-4874 (online), ISSN:
1868-1026 (print). www.CurrentChineseAffairs.org
http://journals.sub.unihamburg.de/giga/jcca/article/viewFile/498/496//HK]
China’s incremental approach to market expansion in Cuba is one ¶ component of a broader
strategy of state-guided development that has ¶ proven successful across East Asia (Hira 2007:
87-96). A related component is the linkage of distinct industrial sectors into an integrated
system, ¶ a process that analysts argue has given the Chinese government an unusual degree of
control over international production chains (Ellis 2005). ¶ As Joshua Kurlantzick writes: ¶ The
Chinese government wants to control the entire process, from ¶ taking commodities out of the
ground to shipping them back to China, because it does not trust world markets to ensure
continuous supplies of key resources. It is purchasing stakes in important oil and gas ¶ firms
abroad, constructing the infrastructure necessary to get those ¶ industries’ resources to port, and
building close relations with refiners ¶ and shippers (Kurlantzick 2008: 200).
China just owns the process
Hearn 12 [Dr. Adrian H. Hearn is Australian Research Council (ARC) Future ¶ Fellow at the
University of Sydney and co-chair of the Latin American ¶ Studies Association (LASA) Section for Asia
and the Americas. Recent ¶ publications include Cuba: Religion, Social Capital, and Development (Duke ¶ University Press, 2008)
and (as editor) China Engages Latin America: Tracing the Trajectory (Lynne Rienner, 2011).“China, Global Governance and the
Future of Cuba, in: Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 41, 1, 155-179.” ISSN: 1868-4874 (online), ISSN: 1868-1026 (print).
www.CurrentChineseAffairs.org http://journals.sub.unihamburg.de/giga/jcca/article/viewFile/498/496//HK]
In November 2010, president of the Cuban National Assembly Ricardo Alarcón visited Beijing
and officially recognised the relevance of ¶ China’s economic evolution to Cuba’s development.
Raúl Castro had ¶ already expressed this sentiment during his visits in 1997 and 2005, ¶ which
focused on labour market reform and the creation of hybrid state–¶ market economic structures.
In China’s experience, particularly since ¶ joining the World Trade Organization, these
transformations were ¶ achieved through a blend of state oversight and privatisation, an
approach that Chinese officials now routinely recommend to Cuba. When ¶ Chinese VicePresident Xi Jinping and CNPC President Jiang Jiemin ¶ visited Havana in June 2011, they not
only signed memorandums of ¶ understanding on oil and gas investments, but also discussed
banking ¶ and economic planning. According to Feinberg, the Chinese government ¶ would like
to see Cuba quicken the pace of reform, and has offered to ¶ help lay the groundwork: “Cuba”,
said a Chinese official, “needs assistance in making five-year plans” (quoted in Feinberg 2011:
31-32). As ¶ Feinberg notes, “Some observers opine, albeit with some exaggeration, ¶ that China
has become Cuba’s IMF!” (Feinberg 2011: 42). ¶ Cuban leaders have rejected the notion that
they intend to follow a ¶ “China model” of development. A historically accrued wariness of
excessive foreign influence has long coloured the character of the island’s ¶ international
engagement, and relations with China appear to be no exception. Spanish colonialism in the
nineteenth century, along with US ¶ domination in the first half of the twentieth century and
Soviet micromanagement in the second half each provoked strong nationalistic responses. Cuba
learned from the Cold War that it was poorly served by ¶ Soviet-style centralised bureaucratic
structures, an admission made by ¶ Fidel Castro himself (1988). In the wake of the Soviet
collapse, the Cuban government began to experiment with decentralisation, manifested ¶ in the
constitutional reforms of 1992, which facilitated the division of ¶ Havana into 93 (subsequently
105) Popular Councils, and the passage of ¶ Decree Law 143, which allowed local management of
Havana’s historic ¶ centre, the country’s most dynamic economic zone. While the “revitalisation”
of Old Havana under the Office of the Historian of the City was a considerable success, the
broader push for decentralisation exhibited ¶ more ambivalent results. The liberalisation of
resources and the devolution of executive capacities did not keep pace with local plans, and
overly rigid structures of monitoring and compliance diminished local creativity ¶ (Fernández
Soriano 1999).
China key to expand Cuba oil
Frank, 10 (Frank, Marc, Writer for Finical Times, Nov 24, 2010, “China group's Cuba oil
deal”, Proquest//ACK)
China National Petroleum Corp has won a bid to expand a Cuban oil refinery in a deal that could be worth
as much as $6bn, making it one of the communist island's largest investments to date.¶ The refinery, jointly owned by state-owned
Cubapetroleo (CUPET) and Venezuela's Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) is located in central Cienfuegos
province on Cuba's southern coast and forms part of Havana's efforts to explore for offshore oil.¶ The refinery will be
expanded from its current 65,000 barrels a day capacity to 150,000 b/d and will eventually include a
petrochemical complex and a liquefied natural gas terminal.¶ Huanqiu Contracting and Engineering Corp, a unit of
CNPC, will be the manager of the project, which will be financed largely by Chinese banks and backed by guarantees from
Venezuelan oil revenues, people familiar with the project said.¶ Chinese construction equipment has begun arriving, with earth
moving scheduled to begin next year, although Cuban projects are often delayed.¶ None of the parties involved have commented on
the deal.¶ PDVSA is also expected to be one of several companies to drill exploration wells in Cuba's
Gulf of Mexico waters next year, after the arrival of an Italian-owned but Chinese-built rig that gets around a US ban on the
use of more than 10 per cent of its technology in Cuban projects.¶ ¶ Spanish oil company Repsol YPF, Malaysia's Petronas, Gazprom
of Russia and India's Oil and Natural Gas Corporation also plan to begin drilling next year. US oil companies cannot bid for Cuban
drilling rights due to the 50-year embargo.¶ The US Geological Survey estimates that Cuba has about 5bn barrels of oil
offshore, although Havana says it could have 20bn barrels.¶ Venezuela is now a partner in almost all of Cuba's
downstream infrastructure through the 50-50 joint venture between PDVSA and CUPET, called Cuvenpetrol, which includes a
planned 150,000 b/d refinery in Matanzas province, east of Havana.
China’s Oil has ongoing energy relationship with Cuba
IBD, 8 (Investor's Business Daily, a national newspaper in the United States, published
Monday through Friday, that covers international business, finance, and the global economy,
“Surf And Turf And Oil”, 09 June 2008, Proquest//ACK)
Energy: Mexico and the United States engage in an energy dispute in the Gulf of Mexico. So why does Mexico want to protect and
develop its offshore oil but we don't?¶ On May 13, Sen. Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y., rose on the Senate floor to demand that arms sales
to Saudi Arabia cease unless that kingdom "increases its oil production by one million barrels a day" -- coincidentally the amount
that would be flowing from the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge today had President Clinton not vetoed drilling in its frozen tundra in
1995.¶ In arguing that Saudi Arabia "holds the key to reducing gas prices in the short term," Schumer showed that even Democrats
recognize the law of supply and demand.¶ As for the long term, Schumer et al. have no interest in drilling in ANWR or anywhere else.
They say the added supply would take 10 years to reach our gas tanks, something they've been arguing for at least the last 10 years.¶
Well, Shell Oil is busy trying to increase our oil supply by drilling in the deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico. Oil companies are forced
to go farther and deeper as abundant oil and natural gas reserves are placed off-limits by a Congress that rails against high prices
and profits.¶ Shell is now spending millions of those "windfall" profits to build and deploy an oil drilling platform known as Perdido.
It's as tall as the Eiffel Tower and will be anchored to the seabed by moorings spanning an area the size of downtown Houston. Set to
begin production next year, Perdido is expected to yield 100,000 barrels of badly needed crude a day.¶ The problem is that undersea
pools of oil do not respect geographical boundaries, and Perdido is just eight miles north of a maritime boundary defined by a
Carter-era treaty dividing the Gulf for purposes of resource development into areas controlled by the U.S., Mexico and Cuba.¶ Shell,
partnering in the project with BP and Chevron, believes the oil is pooled solely on the U.S. side. Mexico claims Perdido will siphon
oil from the Mexican side. Mexico could join the group, but its state-owned oil company, Pemex, is forbidden by law from
participating with foreigners in developing its crude. As a result, its isolated oil industry is atrophying and needs foreign help. So
both situations may soon change.¶ The irony here is that while we drill for oil close to Mexico, we can't drill for oil close to the United
States. And we turn a blind eye while others do.¶ Cuba's state-run oil company, Cubapetroleo, has inked a
deal with China's Sinopec to explore for oil in its half of the Florida Strait, and is using Chinese-made
drilling equipment to conduct the exploration. The U.S. Geological Survey estimated the North Cuban Basin
contains 4.6 billion barrels of oil.¶ Since 1992, oil companies have drilled more than 2,100 wells in the
Gulf at depths greater than 1,000 feet. Each can cost $100 million or more. Not all hit pay dirt. One that
did was Jack No. 2, a joint venture by two oil companies. In deep water 270 miles southwest of New Orleans, Jack tapped a field with
perhaps 15 billion barrels of oil.¶ The U.S. Minerals Management Service says that, all told, offshore areas
that are off-limits to drilling contain upwards of 86 billion barrels of oil and 420 trillion cubic
feet of natural gas.¶ In sum, the oil is there, and oil companies are willing to go after it if we let them.
Just think of it: American oil creating American jobs while lowering gas prices! Deep wells such as Perdido and Jack No. 2 can help
solve our energy and economic woes. But when it comes to energy, Democrats don't know Jack.
AT: Cuba Says No
China just owns the process
Hearn 12 [Dr. Adrian H. Hearn is Australian Research Council (ARC) Future ¶ Fellow at the
University of Sydney and co-chair of the Latin American ¶ Studies Association (LASA) Section for Asia
and the Americas. Recent ¶ publications include Cuba: Religion, Social Capital, and Development (Duke ¶ University Press, 2008)
and (as editor) China Engages Latin America: Tracing the Trajectory (Lynne Rienner, 2011).“China, Global Governance and the
Future of Cuba, in: Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 41, 1, 155-179.” ISSN: 1868-4874 (online), ISSN: 1868-1026 (print).
www.CurrentChineseAffairs.org http://journals.sub.unihamburg.de/giga/jcca/article/viewFile/498/496//HK]
As Cuba’s need for capital deepens, its leaders have expressed “no ¶ principled position against
relations with the IMF or World Bank” ¶ (quoted in Feinberg 2011: 67). Having defaulted on IMF
loans and reporting requirements in the early years of the revolution, Cuba preempted expulsion
by voluntarily withdrawing from the institution in 1964 ¶ (and subsequently repaying its debt).
The United States remains firmly ¶ opposed to Cuba’s reentry, but as Feinberg has argued,
Cuba–IMF dialogue could prove beneficial across a range of topics, from developing ¶ microenterprise to sharing insights from previous Eastern European ¶ and Asian transitions (Feinberg
2011: 74, 78-83). The internal evolution ¶ of the IMF to accommodate changing global
conditions, including China’s deepening influence, makes engagement with Cuba more likely. ¶
Growing international reliance on the renminbi and greater provisions for ¶ public spending are
important in this regard, but equally important are ¶ Cuba’s domestic reforms, which are
bringing the island into closer ¶ alignment with conventions of economic governance. China sits
at the ¶ crossroads of these local and global developments, encouraging Cuba ¶ toward
rapprochement with international norms even as it works to ¶ reform them.
Cooperation possible
Hearn 12 [Dr. Adrian H. Hearn is Australian Research Council (ARC) Future ¶ Fellow at the
University of Sydney and co-chair of the Latin American ¶ Studies Association (LASA) Section
for Asia and the Americas. Recent ¶ publications include Cuba: Religion, Social Capital, and
Development (Duke ¶ University Press, 2008) and (as editor) China Engages Latin America:
Tracing the Trajectory (Lynne Rienner, 2011).“China, Global Governance and the Future of
Cuba, in: Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 41, 1, 155-179.” ISSN: 1868-4874 (online), ISSN:
1868-1026 (print). www.CurrentChineseAffairs.org http://journals.sub.unihamburg.de/giga/jcca/article/viewFile/498/496//HK]
Recent changes in Cuba indicate that even in a country at diplomatic ¶ odds with the United
States, Chinese initiatives are not inimical to mainstream principles of development and
governance. Long-term market ¶ expansion, coordinated industrial sectors, and state oversight of
private ¶ initiative are goals that drive the engineers and policy advisers behind ¶ Sino-Cuban
projects. These goals also resemble the principles advocated ¶ by Latin American, European, and
US officials in the wake of the GFC. ¶ The Cuban reforms formalised by the 2011 Communist
Party Congress ¶ will support a further convergence of positions, as they propose a more ¶
balanced mix of state and market forces. Although Sino-Cuban initiatives ¶ are managed under
the banner of state-to-state cooperation, Chinese ¶ support for Cuba’s liberalisation agenda is
prompting the Western hemisphere’s only communist nation toward alignment with
international ¶ norms. ¶ As China becomes a more active and assertive global player, distinct ¶
perspectives of the state will continue to generate tensions over international development
cooperation. However, China’s growing influence in ¶ the IMF, the United Nations, and other
multilateral institutions will create important opportunities for dialogue on the costs, benefits,
and timing of state intervention. It is crucial that the international community ¶ develop ways to
assimilate Chinese understandings of the state into prevailing regimes of governance and
simultaneously adapt these regimes to ¶ the changing geopolitical landscape.
Border Infrastructure Solvency
China can solve infrastructure.
Esenaro 6/20 (Alberto Esenaro has 15 years of law practice, Mr. Esenaro has helped many
US, European and Asian companies doing business in Mexico for industries such as telecom, IT,
energy, pharmaceutical, health services and medical devices, entertainment, ports, financial
services, automotive and overseas trading, June 20, 2013, “President Xi Jinping sees
Opportunities for Chinese Companies in Mexico,”
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/president-xi-jinping-sees-opportunities-35209/, //RM)
Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto visited China in April with an eye on a more balanced
trade relationship, and Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Mexico earlier in June of this year
with the same objective in mind; increasing commercial and cultural ties between the two
nations.¶ As it stands at the moment, Mexico exports about $5.7 billion in goods including
copper, minerals, oils, cotton, and car parts to China, but Mexico imports $57 billion worth of
goods from China. These goods include plastics, toys, furniture, and electronics.¶ Before Xi’s
arrival in Mexico City, Mexican Foreign Minister Jose Antonio Meade stated: “With China, the
second-most important economy in the world, Mexico has a relationship that is far from the
importance it should have. Mexico’s presence in China is well below its potential, as is China’s in
Mexico.”¶ Peña Nieto is focused on making economic prosperity the “cornerstone” of his
presidency, and he believes improved ties with China are of upmost importance. During his trip
to China, he made an agreement to send China 30,000 barrels of oil a day, an amount he hopes
will increase. President Xi also mentioned the possibility of a free trade agreement between the
two nations.¶ It appears as though oil will present one of the largest opportunities for Chinese
companies in Mexico: if legislation passes allowing foreign investment in the country’s oil
sector, China could very well be the nation that could modernize the aging, outdated
infrastructure and provide the know-how needed for deep water oil exploration. China would
benefit greatly: China is an energy hungry nation and it needs to secure energy resources from
as many sources as possible.¶ However, oil is not the only sector where opportunities exist for
Chinese companies. During his visit to China, the Mexican president spoke of the expertise the
Chinese have in the field of national infrastructure and how Mexico could benefit greatly from
Chinese companies investing in and building much needed public transportation infrastructure.
The telecommunications industry is also opening up to foreign investment; Chinese investment
could be crucial in the Mexican drive to provide affordable, high quality telecommunications to
all of its citizens.¶ Furthermore, during Xi’s visit, the Chinese were seeking to sign over a dozen
agreements in trade, tourism, energy, science, and technology; these agreements weren’t signed,
but interestingly, deals were made on commercial defence, access for Mexican tequila, and for
Mexican pork to the Chinese market.¶ Rafael Valdez Mingramm, who promotes trade with Asia
in general and China in particular, is an entrepreneur in Mexico and author of a book detailing
the last four decades of Mexico-China relations and ties. He wrote: “China must be perceived,
not as a threat, but as a great opportunity for Mexico and Latin America.”
China cannot engage in Mexico – past failure in investment prove.
LAT 6/5 (LA times is a new site, June 5, 2013 “Mexico seeks strong China ties;
With Xi's visit, the Latin nation hopes to begin to rectify a massive trade imbalance,”
http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/results/docview/docview.do?docLi
nkInd=true&risb=21_T17775109382&format=GNBFI&sort=BOOLEAN&startDocNo=1&results
UrlKey=29_T17775109386&cisb=22_T17775109385&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=306910
&docNo=7,//RM)
Mexico hopes a three-day visit by Chinese President Xi Jinping will help the Latin American
nation ramp up exports to China to overcome a severe imbalance with its No. 2 trade partner.¶
Mexico wants to reset its often troubled relationship with China, with both countries apparently
on a mission to expand their reach into the other.¶ This week marks the second meeting between
Xi and Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto in scarcely two months. Xi is accompanied by his
wife, Peng Liyuan, who, like Pena Nieto's wife, Angelica Rivera, is a glamorous celebrity and
former star entertainer. The two women were reportedly planning a tour of Mexican telenovela
sets as a side trip during the state visit.¶ Mexico suffers a huge trade deficit with China. Last year,
imports from China were valued in U.S. dollars at 10 times exports to the Asian giant, according
to the Mexican government statistical agency. Mexico exported about $5.7 billion in copper and
other minerals, oil, cotton and car parts. But Mexico imported from China $57 billion in
electronics, toys, plastics and furniture.¶ "With China, the second-most important economy in
the world, Mexico has a relationship that is far from the importance it should have," Mexican
Foreign Minister Jose Antonio Meade said ahead of Xi's arrival. "Mexico's presence in China is
well below its potential, as is China's in Mexico."¶ Mexico was slow to join the Asian investment
bandwagon. It was the last of the major Latin countries to sign free-trade agreements with
Beijing, losing out as China became the principal trade partner to regional competitors such as
Brazil and Peru, with their abundant supplies of raw materials.¶ Attitudes of xenophobia
lingering from the early 20th century, when Chinese came to Mexico to build railroads, and the
reluctance of some Mexican businesses to compete with cheap Chinese goods stalled trade
expansion. A flurry of interest around the time Mexico and China established diplomatic
relations, 41 years ago, did not translate into enormous gains for either side.
Perm do the plan and then cooperate with China - China will only
invest if border is secure first.
BBC 6/4 (BBC is a new site monitoring Latin America, June 4, 2013, “Chinese envoy says
investment in Mexico depends on improved security,”
http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/results/docview/docview.do?docLi
nkInd=true&risb=21_T17775109382&format=GNBFI&sort=BOOLEAN&startDocNo=1&results
UrlKey=29_T17775109386&cisb=22_T17775109385&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=10962&
docNo=10, //RM)
The Chinese ambassador to our country, Zeng Gang, has stated that the interest of Chinese
enterprises in investing in Mexico would materialize if there is an improvement in public
security and in the business environment.¶ Although there is interest from Asian automakers in
moving their operations into Mexico, some have cancelled their plans because of the insecurity
in our country.¶ In that regard, the ambassador stated that a few years ago there was the case of a
Chinese manufacturer of brass pipes that was the target of six thefts during transit between
Tamaulipas and Manzanillo, a situation causing losses of 2 million dollars.¶ Now, with the visit of
Chinese President Xi Jinping to Mexico from 4 to 6 June, there is expected to be a revitalization
of bilateral relations and forging of closer ties of cooperation in all areas of politics, economy,
trade, education, culture, and technology, among others, the ambassador added. ¶ This is so
because during the administration of President Felipe Calderon, relations were negatively
affected after the former Mexican president's meeting with the Dalai Lama, an incident that
sparked reactions from the Chinese Government, such as halting the export health certificate for
pork and re-approving it just recently on 13 May, the diplomat explained.
A2 Solvency Deficit – Regional Relations
Chinese influence is preferred
ICR 7/22/13 [ Inside Costa Rica “ Poll: Latin Americans prefer China’s influence to that of the
United States.” http://insidecostarica.com/2013/07/22/poll-latin-americans-prefer-chinas-influence-to-that-of-the-us///HK]
July 22nd, 2013 (AFP and ICR) – China’s growing influence in Latin America is preferred in the
region over that of the United States, though maintaining strong ties with its northern neighbor
remains a priority, according to a survey by the Pew Research Center released on Thursday in
Washington.¶ ¶ “While the U.S. is generally stated to have greater impact than China, China’s
influence is seen more positively in most countries,” the survey of more than 6,100 people in
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Mexico and Venezuela said, as part of a
comprehensive global research report on the perception of the two powers in four dozen
countries.¶ ¶ In Venezuela, which has received millions in investment and financing from China,
57% of respondents see Bejing as a positive influence, and the figure rises to 71% if asked about
China’s impact on the economy. This compares to the perception of U.S. influence in the
country, with only 29% seeing the U.S. as a positive influence and just 46% see U.S. influence in
economic affairs as being positive for the country.¶ ¶ Bolivia (31%), Argentina (27%) and Chile
(36%) are those who most see China’s influence in the region as positive, while the United States
finds support in Mexico (33%), El Salvador (51%) and Brazil (46%), although with little margin
over the Chinese.¶ ¶ In the U.S.’s favor is the country’s “soft power,” including its technology,
way of doing business and its popular culture that has been adopted by many in Latin America,
according to the Pew Research Center.¶ ¶ President Barack Obama, who has said that Latin
America represents an “opportunity” for his country, traveled in May to Costa Rica and Mexico,
and has tried to revive his country’s relationship with the region, which has been mostly
overlooked by Washington for the last decade.¶ ¶ But China is on the U.S.’s heels – President Xi
Jinping toured Costa Rica, Mexico, and Trinidad and Tobago later that same month, offering
increased Chinese trade and investment in Latin America.¶ ¶ U.S. influence is still dominant¶ ¶
Still, the study, conducted both in person and over the phone, found that most in the region
believe U.S. influence in the region will continue to prevail.¶ ¶ In Brazil, which is working to
become a regional leader in its own right, 83% said they see a large or moderate influence in
their country’s future, with similar results in El Salvador (76%), Chile (64%), Bolivia (55%),
Argentina (53%) and Mexico (74%).¶ ¶ The only exception is Venezuela, where the same
percentage (47%) believes that both China and the United States are very important to the
country, and China seems to be winning in economic matters, with 57% responding that China’s
influence on the country’s economy is substantial, compared to 47% who said the same about
the U.S.¶ ¶ And despite their preferences for China, most Latin Americans believe it is more
important to have strong ties with the United States (with 71% in El Salvador) or to maintain a
good relationship with both powers.¶ ¶ Only in Venezuela do more citizens believe that Beijing
(38%) is a more important ally than Washington (19%).
Human Trafficking
Asia and Latin America are intertwined in human trafficking –
solving one is key to the other
Le 13 (Christina Le, Private attorney at an immigration law firm in Houston, Texas. She
received her J.D. from the University of Houston Law Center and a B.S. in journalism from
Northwestern University, UPDATE: The Exploitation of Women and Children: A Comparative
Study of Human Trafficking Laws between the United States-Mexico and China-Vietnam,
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Human_Trafficking1.htm, May 2013, 7/9/13, //CW)
While reliable data is hard to come by, data from various international organizations and national ¶ governments suggest that Asia
and Latin America have been severely affected by the surge in human ¶ trafficking in the past two
decades. Both regions have become increasingly integrated into the global ¶ economy and reap the benefits of
increased trade and foreign investment. Yet, by opening their ¶ markets and deregulating their economies, Asian and Latin
American countries have also had to ¶ confront the darker, clandestine aspects of globalization.
Both regions, but arguably Asia to a greater ¶ extent, are important destinations for sex and organ
transplant tourists. Experts estimate that the ¶ great majority of human trafficking victims are originally from Asia (Shelley
2010). Moreover, the ¶ competitiveness pressures confronted by local and international companies have created strong ¶ incentives
for the exploitation of migrant workers in the agricultural, construction, and mining sectors. ¶ The International Labour
Organization (ILO) estimates that approximately half of all trafficking victims ¶ worldwide are subjected to forced labor exploitation
(ILO 2005).¶