Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith
P E T I T I O N E R : Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon
R E S P O N D E N T : Alfred Smith et al.
D O C K E T N O . 88-1213
D E C I D E D B Y : Rehnquist Court (1988-1990)
L O W E R C O U R T : Oregon Supreme Court
C I T A T I O N : 494 US 872 (1990)
A R G U E D : Nov 6, 1989
D E C I D E D : Apr 17, 1990
ADVOCATES:
Craig J. Dorsay argued the cause for the respondents
David B. Frohnmayer for petitioners
Facts of the case:
Two Native Americans who worked as counselors for a private drug rehabilitation organization, ingested
peyote -- a powerful hallucinogen -- as part of their religious ceremonies as members of the Native
American Church. As a result of this conduct, the rehabilitation organization fired the counselors. The
counselors filed a claim for unemployment compensation. The government denied them benefits because
the reason for their dismissal was considered work-related "misconduct." The counselors lost their battle
in state court. But the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Oregon Supreme Court's judgment against the
disgruntled employees, and returned the case to the Oregon courts to determine whether or not
sacramental use of illegal drugs violated Oregon's state drug laws (485 U.S. 660 (1988)). On remand, the
Oregon Supreme Court concluded that while Oregon drug law prohibited the consumption of illegal drugs
for sacramental religious uses, this prohibition violated the free exercise clause. The case returned to the
U.S. Supreme Court in this new posture.
Question:
Can a state deny unemployment benefits to a worker fired for using illegal drugs for religious purposes?
Conclusion:
Yes. Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority, observed that the Court has never held that an
individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting
conduct that government is free to regulate. Allowing exceptions to every state law or regulation affecting
religion "would open the prospect of constitutionally required exemptions from civic obligations of
almost every conceivable kind." Scalia cited as examples compulsory military service, payment of taxes,
vaccination requirements, and child-neglect laws.
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Sherbert v.Verner
A P P E L L A N T : Sherbert
A P P E L L E E : Verner
L O C A T I O N : Beaumont Mills
D O C K E T N O . 526
D E C I D E D B Y : Warren Court (1962-1965)
C I T A T I O N : 374 US 398 (1963)
A R G U E D : Apr 24, 1963
D E C I D E D : Jun 17, 1963
Facts of the case:
Adeil Sherbert, a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, was fired from her job after she refused
to work on Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her faith. The South Carolina Employment Security Commission
denied her benefits, finding unacceptable her religious justification for refusing Saturday work.
Question:
Did the denial of unemployment compensation violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments?
Conclusion:
Yes. The Court held that the state's eligibility restrictions for unemployment compensation imposed a
significant burden on Sherbert's ability to freely exercise her faith. Furthermore, there was no compelling
state interest which justified such a substantial burden on this basic First Amendment right.
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Wisconsin v.Yoder
P E T I T I O N E R : Wisconsin
R E S P O N D E N T : Yoder
L O C A T I O N : Wisconsin State Capitol
D O C K E T N O . 70-110
D E C I D E D B Y : Burger Court (1972-1975)
L O W E R C O U R T : Wisconsin Supreme Court
C I T A T I O N : 406 US 205 (1972)
A R G U E D : Dec 8, 1971
D E C I D E D : May 15, 1972
ADVOCATES:
John W. Calhoun Argued the cause for the petitioner
William B. Ball Argued the cause for the respondents
Facts of the case:
Jonas Yoder and Wallace Miller, both members of the Old Order Amish religion, and Adin Yutzy, a member of
the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church, were prosecuted under a Wisconsin law that required all children to
attend public schools until age 16. The three parents refused to send their children to such schools after the
eighth grade, arguing that high school attendance was contrary to their religious beliefs.
Question:
Did Wisconsin's requirement that all parents send their children to school at least until age 16 violate the First
Amendment by criminalizing the conduct of parents who refused to send their children to school for religious
reasons?
Conclusion:
In a unanimous decision, the Court held that individual's interests in the free exercise of religion under the First
Amendment outweighed the State's interests in compelling school attendance beyond the eighth grade. In the
majority opinion by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, the Court found that the values and programs of secondary
school were "in sharp conflict with the fundamental mode of life mandated by the Amish religion," and that an
additional one or two years of high school would not produce the benefits of public education cited by
Wisconsin to justify the law. Justice William O. Douglas filed a partial dissent but joined with the majority
regarding Yoder.
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Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores
P E T I T I O N E R : Sylvia Burwell, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.
R E S P O N D E N T : Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.
L O C A T I O N : Hobby Lobby Stores Inc.
D O C K E T N O . 13-354
D E C I D E D B Y : Roberts Court (2010- )
C I T A T I O N : 573 US _ (2014)
G R A N T E D : Nov 26, 2013
A R G U E D : Mar 25, 2014
D E C I D E D : Jun 30, 2014
Facts of the case
The Green family owns and operates Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., a national arts and crafts chain with over
500 stores and over 13,000 employees. The Green family has organized the business around the
principles of the Christian faith and has explicitly expressed the desire to run the company according to
Biblical precepts, one of which is the belief that the use of contraception is immoral. Under the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), employment-based group health care plans must provide
certain types of preventative care, such as FDA-approved contraceptive methods. While there are
exemptions available for religious employers and non-profit religious institutions, there are no
exemptions available for for-profit institutions such as Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.
On September 12, 2012, the Greens, as representatives of Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., sued Kathleen
Sebelius, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, and challenged the
contraception requirement. The plaintiffs argued that the requirement that the employment-based group
health care plan cover contraception violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA). The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to
prevent the enforcement of tax penalties, which the district court denied and a two-judge panel of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court also denied relief, and the plaintiffs
filed for an en banc hearing of the Court of Appeals. The en banc panel of the Court of Appeals reversed
and held that corporations were "persons" for the purposes of RFRA and had protected rights under the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
Question
Does the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 allow a for-profit company to deny its employees
health coverage of contraception to which the employees would otherwise be entitled based on the
religious objections of the company's owners?
Conclusion
Yes. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that Congress
intended for the RFRA to be read as applying to corporations since they are composed of individuals who
use them to achieve desired ends. Because the contraception requirement forces religious corporations
to fund what they consider abortion, which goes against their stated religious principles, or face
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significant fines, it creates a substantial burden that is not the least restrictive method of satisfying the
government's interests. In fact, a less restrictive method exists in the form of the Department of Health
and Human Services' exemption for non-profit religious organizations, which the Court held can and
should be applied to for-profit corporations such as Hobby Lobby. Additionally, the Court held that this
ruling only applies to the contraceptive mandate in question rather than to all possible objections to the
Affordable Care Act on religious grounds, as the principal dissent fears.
In his concurrence, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote that the government had not met its burden to
show that there was a meaningful difference between non-profit religious institutions and for-profit
religious corporations under the RFRA. Because the contraception requirement accommodates the
former while imposing a more restrictive requirement on the later without showing proper cause, the
requirement violates the RFRA.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissent in which she argued that the majority's decision was
precluded by the Court's decision in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v.
Smith in which the Court held that there is no violation of the freedom of religion when an infringement
on that right is merely an incidental consequence of an otherwise valid statute. Additionally, judicial
precedent states that religious beliefs or observances must not impinge on the rights of third parties, as
the sought-after exemption would do to women seeking contraception in this case. Justice Ginsburg also
wrote that the majority opinion misconstrued the RFRA as a bold legislative statement with sweeping
consequences. Because for-profit corporations cannot be considered religious entities, the burden the
respondents claim is not substantial, and the government has shown a sufficiently compelling interest,
Justice Ginsburg argued that the contraception mandate does not violate the RFRA. Justice Sonia
Sotomayor, Justice Stephen G. Breyer, and Justice Elena Kagan joined in the dissent. In their separate
dissent, Justice Breyer and Justice Kagan wrote that the Court need not decide whether for-profit
corporations or their owners may sue under the RFRA.
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Reynolds v.United States
P E T I T I O N E R : George Reynolds
R E S P O N D E N T : United States
D O C K E T N O . None
D E C I D E D B Y : Waite Court (1877-1880)
L O W E R C O U R T : Supreme Court for the Utah Territory
C I T A T I O N : 98 US 145 (1879)
A R G U E D : Nov 14 - 15, 1878
D E C I D E D : Jan 6, 1879
ADVOCATES:
George W. Biddlefor Reynolds
Ben Sheeksfor Reynolds
Charles DevensAttorney General, Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States
Samuel Field PhillipsSolicitor General, Department of Justice, argued the cause for the United States
Facts of the case
George Reynolds, secretary to Mormon Church leader Brigham Young, challenged the federal anti-bigamy
statute. Reynolds was convicted in a Utah territorial district court. His conviction was affirmed by the
Utah territorial supreme court.
Question
Does the federal anti-bigamy statute violate the First Amendment's free exercise clause because plural
marriage is part of religious practice?
Conclusion
UNANIMOUS DECISION FOR UNITED STATES
The federal anti-bigamy statute does not violate the religious Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment.
No. Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite, writing for a unanimous court, held that the statute can punish
criminal activity without regard to religious belief. The First Amendment protected religious belief, but it
did not protect religious practices that were judged to be criminal such as bigamy. Those who practice
polygamy could no more be exempt from the law than those who may wish to practice human sacrifice as
part of their religious belief.
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Essential Questions
1. How has the right to freedom of religion come into conflict with other rights in the United
States?
2. How has the U.S. Supreme Court resolved conflicts around religious freedom and other rights
in the past?
3. How are claims for religious freedom being used to limit the advancement of LGBT rights?
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