Ayn Marx
2015
“The Fallacy of Identity: On Feminism, Identity, and MetaHierarchy”
In pursuing gender equality, feminist movements often organize themselves
around, and orient themselves to a presupposed subject, or identity. This subject/identity
is “woman,” or “women.” Though it may seem like a practical necessity for any
movement to have some presupposed subject, or identity to “fight for;” Judith Butler
critiques this saying, ““[f]eminist critique ought also to understand how the category of
“women,” the subject of feminism, is produced and restrained by the very structures of
power through which emancipation is sought.”1 This implies two things: first, that the
identity “women,” which feminist movements and theory usually conceive of as existing
before and outside of social hierarchies, is actually constructed and shaped within those
hierarchies. And second, that this presupposed subject is in fact limited and restricted,
therefore, movements whose actions are based on the subject “women” are also limited.
This paper will argue that by not questioning the subject “women,” and not
conceiving (or raising the possibility of conceiving) of it, as Butler argues, as a
construction or “script”, that is shaped, enforced, and reinforced by repeated “acts,”2 and
intersecting webs of hierarchy; women’s movements limit themselves, in terms of their
actions and efficacy. Feminist movements are limited by this in a couple chief ways: 1)
their ability to include and represent alternate portrayals of the identity “women” (that is,
alternate with respect to a given movement’s idea of “women”) is limited. 2) The actions
Judith Butler, “Gender Trouble,” in Theorizing Feminisms: A Reader, ed. Elizabeth
Hackett and Sally Haslanger. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). 354.
2 Judith Butler, “Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in
Phenomenology and Feminist Theory,” in Performing Feminisms and Feminist:
Feminist Critical Theory and Theatre, ed. Sue-Ellen Case. (London: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1989) 271-272.
1
feminist movements may take, or plan to take, and the results of those actions will be
limited. As, any action taken on the basis of the presupposed subject is confined to the
level of hierarchy that directly correlates to that subject. That is, women’s movements, in
only acting for the presupposed, or “natural” identity “women,” can only hope to act
against patriarchy; which is only one part of the multi-faceted, multi-leveled system of
intersecting and interacting hierarchies (what this paper calls “meta-hierarchy”) that all
individuals, including women, are subject to at any given moment. These limited actions
may, in fact, have the contradictory effects of reinforcing gender norms, reinforcing
gender hierarchy, and perpetuating meta-hierarchy.
This paper will elucidate and argue these points respectively in the following
sections. First, there will be a very brief explanation (as a true explanation would take a
volume of books larger than Marx and Engel’s Das Kapital) of meta-hierarchy and
identity/subject construction. Then, the two major limits imposed by presupposed
identity will be discussed.
Meta-Hierarchy, Discipline, and Identity Construction
Michel Foucault’s idea of discipline as being engrained in every facet of modern
life, reinforcing certain actions and behaviors, and punishing others,3 fits well with Judith
Butler’s idea that gender identity is a performative construction, made of “scripts” and
“acts” repeated over time, which if performed “incorrectly” results in some punitive
backlash and enforcement.4 That is, gender (and all other identity) is a construction, or
“performance”. These performances of identity are constructed by “scripts” and “acts,”
Michel Foucault “Panopticism,” in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of The Prison, by
Michel Foucault, Trans. Alan Sheridan. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975). 209213.
4 Judith Butler, “Performative Acts and Gender Constitution,” 271-273.
3
(i.e. a certain way of dressing or speaking) and are reinforced by the threat of
punishment, not only from the state or some authority, but by society generally and even
by oneself. These scripts, acts, and the threat of punishment are the discipline of gender
identity (and identity generally). We can then take Gayle Rubin’s understanding of
sexual hierarchy, that sexualities are constructed and conceived of in a hierarchy of
“good” and “bad,” or “right” and “wrong,” and expand this to understand gender and
other identity.5 Pairing this with intersectional theory we can come to an understanding
that is: identity, gender specifically for the purposes of this paper, is constructed. Its
construction is based on conditions (social, economic, political, etc.), which are defined
and shaped by the intersections and interactions of all different hierarchies in the complex
web of hierarchy, meta-hierarchy. Identities are arranged in hierarchies of “good” and
“bad,” “authentic” and “inauthentic.” The proper performances of identity (i.e.
normative gender identification and heterosexuality) are “good,” or “authentic.” The
improper performances of identity (i.e. transgender identification or homosexuality) are
“bad,” or “inauthentic.”
The specifics of an individual’s identity are based on that individual’s specific
experiences and conditions, but generally they adhere to the general features, and
discipline of their society’s conception of that identity. For example, a cis-white man
from the South Eastern United States and a cis-white man from the North Western United
States may have different identity features that are regionally based (or based on some
other difference), but they will generally conform to the mainstream American discipline
and conceptions around masculinity and whiteness.
Gayle S. Rubin, “Thinking Sex,” in Theorizing Feminisms, ed. Elizabeth Hackett and
Sally Haslanger. (New york: Oxford, 2006) 531-532.
5
In the same way, social movements, such as feminist movements, may construct
their own versions of identity, such as “woman” or “black,” but these identities will still
have some features of the overarching societally held construction of that identity (based
on location, culture, conditions, etc.), i.e. the biological requirements of being “woman.”
In conceiving these identities, movements/groups assume certain essential qualities of an
identity. They then establish this identity and its qualities as the “good” and “authentic”
identity and qualities, and exclude other identities, relegating them to the “inauthentic”
and “bad” side of the scale. Thus reinforcing the mainstream essentialist notions of
identity and the corresponding forms of discipline. This pattern/theory of action and
constructions can be seen in feminist movements’ defining of “women” and exclusion of
those who claim to be women but do not fit “women.”
Feminist Movements: “Women” and the Exclusion of Women.
As was previously stated, most feminist movements organize around some
presupposed idea of “women.” This, while perhaps creating strong solidarity within a
group, is exclusionary. It excludes anyone who identities as a woman, but does not fit the
supposed “immutable” characteristics of “women.” Two of the most obvious examples
of this kind of exclusion exist in the exclusion of certain racial, ethnic, sexual, and class
identities, mostly in the “second wave” of feminism, and the more recent (or recently
more obvious) exclusion of transwomen from women’s movements and organizations.
The exclusion of racial, ethnic, sexual, and class identity groups will be discussed first,
then the more recent, and perhaps more salient to undermining the idea of presupposed
identity, exclusion of trans-women will be discussed.
In the 1970s some of the first transnational and international feminist movements
to become noticeably active in the mainstream United States were made up of
predominantly white, heterosexual, middle class women.6 This is because of their
relative privilege in terms of resources available, garnering media attention, and position
in the meta-hierarchy. Even though other groups, i.e. black women’s or poor women’s
groups, may have organized earlier or contemporarily, their positions in the metahierarchy (not just gender hierarchy, as no one is ever just “woman,” or just “black,” or
just “middle class”), and failure to fulfill the requirements of “woman,” (as defined by
those higher in the metahierarchy) prevented them from being recognized in mainstream
culture.7 Here one can see how the intersections of hierarchies, and mainstream society’s
conception of “women” (and its more general presupposed ideal “person” identity) as
presupposed, non-constructed (that is, existing before and outside of meta-hierarchy), and
having certain “natural” features (i.e. white, heterosexual, middle class, Christian-Judaic
etc.), limited women, whose portrayal of “woman” did not meet the supposed “true”
identity of “women,” in their ability to act on/voice their interests; and also, how their
interests that were voiced were excluded from mainstream discourse.
It is probably not surprising that the mainstream of a racist, misogynist, heteronormative, and classist society would be so exclusive. What may be surprising is the
extent to which feminist movements were also exclusive. These movements (such as,
NOW) were primarily white, middle class, and heterosexual, therefore, their subject
“women,” and that subject’s interests were white, middle class, and heterosexual. There
She’s Beautiful When She’s Angry, film. Directed by Mary Dore. Executive
Producers: Pamela Tanner Boll and Elizabeth Driehaus. 2014.
7 Ibid.
6
is nothing problematic with an organization that focuses on the needs and interests of a
specific group (i.e. black power movements, workers unions, etc.). What is problematic
is the definition of a specific identity’s characteristics and interests (both of which are
socially constructed by and in metahierarchy) as the “natural characteristics,” or the
“authentic interests,” of a generalized identity. That is, in defining the white, middle
class, heterosexual woman as “women,” and their interests as all “women’s” interests,
these feminist organizations participated in the construction and reinforcement of the
notion of the essential and exclusive identity that is “women,” or “woman.”
This practice and its exclusionary consequences are clearly evidence by the
massive backlash in theory and action against mainstream feminist movements by black
women’s, poor women’s, lesbian women’s, etc. movements.8 This can be seen in the
publishing of the “Black Women’s Manifesto,” which criticizes the ignorance of black
women’s identity, experiences, and interests.9 This is also evidenced by the construction
of the “lavender menace” (a construction that portrayed lesbian visibility as a threat to the
feminist movement) and the subsequent action against it at the Second Congress to Unite
Women in 1970.10 Clearly, we can see how the presupposition of a single identity,
“woman,” leads to the construction and enforcement of one understanding of that identity
and the scripts and actions, the discipline, that compose it. This collective construction
then leads to the exclusion of identities that do not fit that of the presupposed “woman,”
such as, “black woman,” or “lesbian woman.”
Ibid.
The Third World Women’s Alliance, The Black Women’s Manifesto, (Third World
Women’s Alliance, U.S., 1970) 2-5.
10 She’s Beautiful When She’s Angry. Directed by Mary Dore.
8
9
In contemporary society there is perhaps no better example of the exclusion and
definition of certain identities as “inauthentic,” on the basis of not conforming to a
presupposed conception of the identity “women” and its essential qualities, than the
exclusion and treatment of transwomen by feminist movements. The 2003 case of
Kimberly Nixon is an example of this. In 1995, male to female transsexual Kimberly
Nixon, after going through required training, was not allowed to be a counselor at the
Vancouver Rape Relief Center.11 Though accounts of how Nixon was denied differ, the
reason for denial remains the same; that, “transwomen like Nixon do ‘not meet the Rape
Relief’s community membership criterion,’ of women as, ‘those who have lived their
entire lives as females.’”12 This reasoning and the court’s eventual decision against
Nixon in 2003 are telling and have deep implications.
The first implication is that there are essential qualities to the identity “woman,”
and that organizations have the right to arbitrarily define identities and qualities (so long
as they fit overarching societal norms), and exclude on the basis of these. Patricia Elliot
sums this up nicely, saying, “the Rape Relief’s contention that ‘the experience of living
exclusively as a female’ has ‘political and therapeutic’ significance’ for its [the Rape
Relief Community’s] work and that those without such experiences ought to be
excluded.”13 Considering the idea of identity construction and performance discussed
earlier, this assertion is ludicrous. It falls apart immediately if applied elsewhere. For
example: is it similarly justifiable for a black woman to be denied a counseling position
Patricia Elliot, “Who Gets to Be a Woman?: Feminist Politics and the Question of
Trans-Inclusion,” in Atlantis: Critical Studies in Gender, Culture, and Social Justice,
29(1)(2004), 14.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid. 15.
11
at a center that sees mostly white clients, because her experiences and identity as a black
woman are not “woman-enough,” and they do not represent the kind of “woman”? Of
course not. Is the “black” facet of the black woman’s identity as “woman” any more or
less legitimate than the “trans” facet of the transwoman’s identity as “woman”? Again
no, as the identities “black” and “black woman,” and “trans” and “transwoman,” are both
constructed and defined by the interactions and intersections of hierarchies and the
resulting conditions.
The former implication was ludicrous this next implication is offensive. This
implication is that transwomen aren’t really women; they are instead, “deep down,” men
pretending to be women.14 One can see a troubling amount of agreement and support for
this idea in responses to Nixon’s case. Support of this can be seen in Rape Relief
member Lee Lakeman saying “[transwomen] aren’t women. They don’t know what it is
like to be treated like a woman. They can’t fully appreciate what kind of fear and
oppression women live with.”15 This statement betrays ignorance, but not nearly so
much as Columnist Michel Landberg writing “want to cross dress and send up our
culture’s gender strictures by playing the vamp with a feather boa and sequins? Fine.
But don’t show up at the rape crisis center and ask to counsel women who have been
victimized by male sexual violence.”16 Both of these explicitly state that transwomen are
not authentic women, because they do not possess the essential qualities of “women” set
forth by the Rape Relief Center, which are being born biologically female. Therefore,
transwomen, according to this account, do not have authentic experiences as women.
Ibid. 16.
Ibid 15.
16Ibid. 16
14
15
The latter statement also makes very offensive assumptions about trans lifestyles based
on offensive stereotypes. Some statistics on violence and the transsexual/transgender
community also undermine these statements. For example, a 2008 survey on transgender
discrimination in the United States found that 63% of participants experienced serious
acts of discrimination.17 These include: bullying, harassment, sexual and physical
assault, denial of medical care, loss of job, homelessness, and/or incarceration.18 Perhaps
transgender persons might have some understanding of fear and oppression.
So, Feminist movements have historically organized around the presupposed
subject “women.” In the past this subject has been defined by white, middle class, and
heterosexual norms, and so it led to the exclusion of women of colour, poor women, and
lesbian women. Contemporary feminist movements still organize around the
presupposed notion of “women,” only now it is defined by the experience of being born
female and living one’s whole life as a woman,19 and so it excludes transwomen. This
presupposition is fallacious as it assumes that all women, born female, all around the
world have the same experiences as women, which is simply not true. It also asserts the
arbitrary authenticity of “natural women” and rejects the experiences and identities of
transwomen. Movements that do this effectively silence the voices of transwomen, just
as past movements silenced those of women of colour, poor women, or lesbian women.
This perpetuates harmful, oppressive hierarchies of gender and gender normativity.
The National Center for Transgender Equality, “National Transgender
Discrimination Survey: Full Report,” 2008. Last updated September 11, 2012.
Accessed on March 18, 2015. At
http://www.transequality.org/issues/resources/national-transgenderdiscrimination-survey-full-report
18 Ibid.
19 Patricia Elliot, “Who Gets to Be a Woman,” 13-14.
17
Not only are movements that do this discriminatory, they are destructive and
counter productive to the larger feminist movement and cause. Just as past exclusion
based on race, class, and sexuality resulted in division between feminist movements and
alienated possible bases of support. So too does this exclusion create divisions within
feminist movements, and between feminist movements and transgender equality
movements, while also alienating the large amounts of support that trans communities
and transpeople could offer feminist movements. Clearly this is practically, rationally,
and morally wrong.
The Limitations of Action and Effect
By acting on the basis of a presupposed identity with essential qualities, feminist
movements not only exclude women and weaken their bases of support; they also limit
their actions and the effectiveness of those actions. By not questioning identity, and
acting on a basis of essential, or inherent identity feminist movements miss the larger
picture of identity construction within hierarchy. They miss the ways in which “women”
is constructed within hierarchy, and also the ways in which the identity “men” is
constructed. If one acts on a limited basis (presupposed identity) then the results of that
action will be equally limited. This has implications in terms of feminist movements’
struggle against patriarchy, and in their struggle against oppression generally.
Judith Butler assesses the limitations imposed on the struggle against patriarchy
excellently, stating, “The transformation of social relations becomes a matter, then, of
transforming hegemonic social conditions rather than individual acts that are spawned by
these conditions.”20 That is, feminist movements must do more than actively fight the
20
Judith Butler, “Performative Acts and Gender Constitution,” 276.
individual injustices committed against women and those who commit them (often men),
they must also fight the overarching hierarchy that creates these injustices and the actors
that commit them, patriarchy. But, feminist movements that conceive of identity as
presupposed are limited in their ability to do this, as not only do they conceive of
women’s identity as fixed, they also conceive of men’s identity as fixed. One place this
fixed view of identity, and consequentially interaction, becomes especially obvious and
problematic is in the case of rape.
As Sharon Marcus describes in her piece “Fighting Bodies, Fighting Words: A
Theory and Politics of Rape Prevention,” the interactions that occur during rape are part
of a “script,” a script that hinges on the assumed essential qualities of men and women
(i.e. that men are aggressive, dominating, and predisposed to violence; and that women
are timid, passive, vulnerable, and violable).21 Marcus proposes combating rape by
interrupting the script of rape.22 This is done by questioning the suppositions made about
men and women’s identities and places in the script.23
We can understand rape as one of the many scripts and actions that make up
gender identity. Just as opposing the script of rape requires the rewriting of the script and
its actors, so too does the overall opposition of patriarchy require rewriting the scripts and
actors defined and created in it. Feminist movements that imagine the fixed identity
“woman,” and so necessarily imagine the correlative fixed identity “man,” cannot hope to
do this, as they are limited by their fixed conception of identity. How can movements
Sharon Marcus, “Fighting Bodies, Fighting Words: A Theory and Politics of Rape
Prevention,” in Theorizing Feminisms: A Reader, ed. Elizabeth Hackett and Sally
Haslanger. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) 372-372.
22 Ibid. 373.
23 Ibid.
21
that imagine men as inherently violent, dominant, and aggressive, ever hope to eliminate
patriarchy, short of eradicating, segregating, or subjugating men? They cannot. The only
solution is to understand that patriarchy constructs the identity “men” just as it does
“women.” Action that targets these constructions and attempts to rewrite the scripts and
actions that reinforce/enforce them (for example, providing education targeted at young
children that promotes gender tolerance and teaches conceptions of gender that do not
portray patriarchal norms), is the true and most effective way of eliminating patriarchy.
The limits of presupposed identity on feminist movements are even clearer when
examining opposition to general oppression outside of patriarchy. Movements based
around a presupposed subject will deem certain forms of oppression and hierarchy as
beyond their scope, because these do not affect those whose identities match the subject.
This can be seen in the ignorance of the different interests, needs, and experiences of
women of colour in 1970s feminist movements.24 It can also be seen in the current
ignorance of the needs, experiences, and interests of transwomen.25 The fallacy of this is
the assumption that hierarchies and oppression, like presupposed subjects, exist in a
vacuum. That is, that a woman is only subject to women’s problems and women’s
oppression, and that other hierarchies wont complicate, add to, or change these problems
or oppression. This is not true.
This fallacy of this thinking is evidenced by Andrea Smith’s work on American
Indian women and feminism. American Indian women are often caught between their
24
25
The Third World Women’s Alliance, The Black Women’s Manifesto, 11-14.
Patricia Elliot, “Who Gets to Be a Woman,” 17.
identity as American Indians and their identity as women.26 Because feminist
movements usually do no account for the significance of colonialism and sovereignty in
the lives of native women, and sovereignty movements often do no account for the
significance of abuse and misogyny in the lives of native women there is a void, or
expanse between movements. One must choose as side, it seems; either be an American
Indian, oppose colonialism and support sovereignty while accepting gender hierarchy, or
be a woman and oppose gender hierarchy while accepting colonialism and relinquishing
sovereignty.27 This void perpetuates racism and colonialism, misogyny and gender
oppression.
The Black Women’s Manifesto, articulates the limitations of presupposed identity
well, saying, “If women were suddenly able to achieve equality with men tomorrow,
black women would continue to carry the entire array of utterly oppressive handicaps
associated with race.”28 Hierarchies and oppressions do not exist separately, in some
kind of vacuum. If gender hierarchy was ended today, women of colour would still be
oppressed as people of colour, poor women would still be oppressed as poor people,
lesbian women would still be oppressed on account of their sexuality, and transwomen
women would still be oppressed as transpeople. Therefore, movements that seek only to
address the problems specific to “women” are not enough. What is needed are
movements that recognize the effects of interacting/intersecting hierarchies in the
construction of identities, and in the shaping of the experiences, needs, and interests of
Andrea Smith, “Native American Feminism, Sovereignty, and Social Change,” in
Feminist Studies 31 (1)(2005). 116-117.
27 Andrea Smith, “Native American Feminism, Sovereignty, and Social Change,” 116120.
28 Third World Women’s Alliance, The Black Women’s Manifesto, 2.
26
the wide variety of people who identity as women, but are not only the presupposed
subject “women.”
Similarly, in the more specific fight against patriarchy there must be movements
willing to let go of presupposed identity and venture down the more difficult, but
effective path of constructed identity. These movements must identity the scripts, acts,
and hierarchies that shape both men’s and women’s identities as “man” and “woman.”
They must seek to subvert these and “rewrite” them. In this way, the very actors that
patriarchy cyclically creates and relies upon to repeat scripts and actions, and therefore
enforce discipline, will be removed and patriarchy will crumble.
Conclusion
In sum, identities are constructed. They are constructed by the interactions and
intersections hierarchies in the vast web hierarchies that is meta-hierarchy, and the
resulting conditions of these intersections and interactions. Identities are unique from
person to person and place to place, but generally conform to overarching societally held
ideals of identity. These are reinforced and enforced by scripts, repeated acts, and the
threat of punishment for playing the part incorrectly.29 This is what Foucault calls
discipline. It is engrained in every aspect of a given society, i.e. media, culture, religion,
economics, government and policy, its individual citizens, etc.
Feminist movements, as a matter of practicality, organize around the identity
“women.” They presuppose this identity as having certain essential qualities. This
presupposition has resulted in, and continues to result in the exclusion of those women
who, because they lack the essential qualities of “women,” are not represented in
29
Judith Butler, “Performative Acts and Gender Constitution,” 271-271.
movements. This can be seen in the exclusion of women of colour, poor women, and
lesbian women from the predominantly white, heterosexual, and middle class mainstream
feminist movements of the 1970s. In contemporary society this can be seen in the
exclusion of transwomen, because they lack the essential quality of being born female
and so their experiences as women are considered inauthentic.
These practices are not only exclusive and ethically problematic. They are also
practically problematic, as they create division in feminist movements, and alienate
possible bases of support for both feminist and transgender movements.
The organization around presupposed identity with essential qualities also
seriously limits feminist movement’s actions and efficacy of those actions. Movements
are limited both in their struggle against patriarchy specifically, and in their struggle
against oppression generally.
In the struggle against patriarchy those movements that only view identity in fixed
terms can only hope to perpetually oppose the individual injustices committed against
women. They can never directly affect the actual overarching causes of those injustices.
In combating overall oppression those groups who conceive of identity, hierarchy,
and oppression as existing in a vacuum can never hope to be effective. As, they can only
target and act against one kind of oppression. That is, if feminist movements only
conceive of themselves as working in the interests of the presupposed subject “women,”
then they can only effectively work against one hierarchy, on set of scripts and acts, one
form of discipline, this is patriarchy. Some may argue that this is reasonable to expect, as
the goal of feminism is to work towards the interests and liberation of women. This is a
fallacious proposition though, as no woman (no human being for that matter) is just
“woman.” All women’s, and people’s, identities are multi-faceted, they are all
constructed and affected by metahierarchy and its resulting conditions. To work for the
liberation of one presupposed identity is to work for the liberation of no one. As, no one
exists with a purely one-dimensional identity.
What is needed, then, is a departure from fixed, or presupposed identities.
Movements must question the identity “woman” and the fixed, essentialist notion of
identity in general. In doing this feminist movements must reach out to other liberatory
movements and engage in dialogue with them. In this way, they may be able to discuss
and understand the various hierarchies and oppressions that each other are subject to, and
how those interact. By doing this, and by investigating the construction of identity,
feminist movements can outline and engage in multifaceted, multilayered actions in
conjunction with other movements against oppression and metahierarchy. In this way,
we may be able to identity the scripts and acts that make up hegemonic identities and
rewrite them, thereby removing the agents (us) and discipline necessary for hierarchy to
function.
In many ways the “path” of presupposed identity is a practical one. It is a safe
one. It is simpler and there is no risk of the loss of self, identity, or purpose. It is also, as
Elliot describes in the case of Nixon, “I would describe the location of feminist politics in
a presumed universal and stable identity of “women” as the problematic basis on which
Nixon’s claim to womanhood has been rejected.”30 A basis of presupposed identity is a
source of exclusion, and is a limiting and futile basis. To act on a presupposed notion of
“women” is to exclude and erase the voices and experiences of millions of women. It is
30
Patricia Elliot, “Who Gets to Be a Woman,” 15.
to resign to the continuous restructuring of the same oppressions. We must engage in,
and create dialogue between people of diverse identities. In doing this, we may be able to
identify the underlying scripts and acts, the discipline, of our society. Through this, we
may be able to come to understand how and where identity is constructed, and how this,
cyclically, perpetuates and is perpetuated by metahierarchy and oppression.
Understanding, I believe, is the basis of true knowledge. True knowledge is the basis of
real action. If we come to understand the nature of identity and hierarchy, then we will
have true knowledge of them. If we have knowledge of them, we can effectively
organize and act against them and free ourselves at last. I do not believe that this is a
choice, a question of “should we investigate identity.” It is a necessity. We must
question identity and its reality if we ever hope to truly be free.