AN ANALYSIS OF EU-SOUTHERN
AFRICAN RELATIONS
Medicine Masiiwa
University of Zimbabwe
mmasiiwa@science.uz.ac.zw
INTRODUCTION
• The paper analyses the EU-Southern Africa
relations from the period 2000 to the present.
• It highlights problems, contradictions and
future perspectives of the relationship.
• The negotiation for a new partnership within
the context of ACP-EU relations dominates.
• Analysis is done from the perspective of
Southern Africa in general and from that of
Zimbabwe in particular.
Background
• The relations dates back to the dark ages of
slavery and colonialism.
• The early 1970s ushered a new era of a
relationship that is based on some degree of
mutual respect and equality (Lomé
Agreement).
The Lomé Agreement
• Came into effect in 1975 comprising firstly
France and its former colonies with the former
British colonies joining later.
• EU (colonial mothers) granted the former
colonies non-reciprocal market access
preferences (complemented by development
aid) in return for access to natural resources.
Expiry of Lomé
• Before the expiry of Lomé IV Agreement in
2000, the EU had already made it clear that it
would not renew it and wanted to negotiate a
new partnership agreement compatible with
the World Trade Organization (WTO)
provisions (esp. MFN principle).
• Southern African countries reluctantly
accepted the EU’s position & signed the
Cotonou Agreement.
The Cotonou Agreement
• Signed in June 2000 in Cotonou, the capital of
Benin.
• Based on the principle of reciprocity.
• Aims to have sustainable development and
poverty reduction (with eventual aim of
eliminating it) and the gradual integration of
the ACP countries into the world economy.
The Cotonou Agreement (cont.)
• Based on five pillars, which are economic and
trade cooperation, political dialogue,
involvement of civil society, the private sector
and other non-state actors, poverty reduction
as well as rationalization of financial
instruments.
• Paved way for the negotiation of a new
trading arrangement compatible with the
WTO requirements (EPAs)
Initial EPA debate
Against (by S. African states)
• Principle of reciprocity was
impractical. It would lead to
further de-industrialization,
destroy peoples’ livelihoods
and increase poverty.
• EPA negotiations are
divisive and undermine
regional integration
initiatives already in
progress in Southern Africa.
For (mainly by EU)
• EPAs would make Southern
African countries’ policies
more predictable. This would
attract Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI), diversify the
economy, contributes to good
governance etc.
• EPAs would lower prices for
imported industrial inputs and
thereby lead to growth or
creation of new industries.
Initial EPA debate
Against (by S. African states)
For (mainly by EU)
• Divisions (SADC, ESA, SACU,
S. Africa, LDCs) - Problems
of trade diversion, deflation
and loss of revenue etc.
• EPAs would increase
competition, enhance
efficiency in production, &
increase specialisation.
The Interim EPAs
• Southern African countries signed the Interim
EPAs by December 2007 (despite being
unprepared. Angola, Namibia & SA have not
yet signed).
• Goods only agreement.
• WTO compatibility achieved.
• Stepping stone towards a full EPA.
Interim EPA controversy
• Southern African countries did not get the
best out of it.
• It seems the initial hypothesis that EPAs would
undermine development and regional
integration in Southern Africa was confirmed.
• Countries in the same regional grouping
liberalised different baskets of products and
thereby created new barriers to intra-regional
trade.
Interim EPA controversy
• Revenue loss: Zimbabwe will lose about 48 %
of its trade revenue during the first trance of
liberalization. The Seychelles will lose a
whopping 99 %, Mauritius 21 % and
Madagascar 42%.
• MFN clause (relations with third parties).
Interim EPA controversy
• Negotiations for full EPAs still on (services,
government procurement, competition policy,
investment, trade-related intellectual property
rights (TRIPS) etc).
• Southern African countries are not keen: They
feel that they do not have the necessary
regulatory environment and relevant institutions
in place and therefore do not have the capacity
and ability to make informed decisions on these
issues. They fear that they would endanger their
much needed policy space to develop.
The power game
Why should Southern African countries enter into
negotiations they are not sure will benefit them?
• Dependency: Virtually all of them are
economically and financially dependent on the
EU. As a result, they fear opposing it, in case that
support maybe withdrawn. Apparently the EU
uses this fear to control their less-fortunate
partners.
• History shows that this has always been the case.
The power game
• But there is something called “Hope”. It can
also be used to gain control. That hope is
needed in Southern Africa; not “Fear”.
END
Thank You
EPA negotiations
• Started in 2004 (after 2 years delay).
• Should have been concluded at the end of
December 2007.
• Key problems: unbalanced negotiation
capacity, risk of revenue loss, adjustment costs
as well as speed and level of the trade
liberalization.