“Its” CP
Notes
Normalizing “its” economic relations is not what the solvency cards for the affirmative support. “Its” economic relations would be the economic
relationship between the federal government and Cuba, not the United States and Cuba. The counterplan removes all barriers to private
engagement but doesn’t engage governmentally. Some of the solvency deficits (embassy creation, for example) aren’t topical – so be sure to call
bluffs.
This is distinct from the non-state CP in v2 because it removes all barriers to two-way private trade – not just open barriers for US investment in
Cuba.
The net-benefits:
(1) Aid tradeoff
(2) Dip Cap
(3) Politics – this is only OK, but the CP will solve whatever link turn that the aff forwards about the embargo or private investment. The
aff link turns have a poor defense of spending USFG dollars.
(4) Solvency turn – Including the government triggers backlash because it’s perceived as governmental interference / democracy
promotion.
1nc
The United States federal government should normalize private economic relations
with Cuba and not federally engage Cuba.
The counterplan solves best – including FEDERAL engagement corrupts solvency
Huddleston 10 – US Diplomat, was Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Haiti, and Director and Deputy Director of Cuban
Affairs at the U.S. Department of State. Prior to joining the U.S. Department of State, she was a Visiting Scholar at Brookings Institution
(Vicki and Carlos Pascual, “Learning to Salsa: New Steps in U.S.-Cuba Relations,” p. 212)//BB
A Cuban American opinion leader thought that the administration could avoid being denounced by hard-liners
within the community if
the White House, like the Republicans, used surrogates to forge policy, relying on select
wouldn't have to be the architect of a
controversial Cuba policy, because there are enough points of consensus within the Cuban American
progressive community to allow the president to design and lead a more open and engaged approach to
Cuba using surrogates. According to a Cuban American academic, a very robust cultural diplomacy strategy would be
the top priority for policy. Fostering the interaction of civil society on both sides of the Florida Straits
Cuban American organizations for this purpose. President Obama
is most likely to promote diverse voices and reform in Cuba. Miami is already culturally engaged, but
more is needed .¶ Mechanisms to expand and fund educational exchanges, promote the arts, and allow NGOs to interact freely
with civil society in Cuba would need to be found. But
no new policies can be effective if they are linked
to a strategy of regime change or state building, as has been the case with many of USAID-funded activities ,
especially those tied to Cuban American groups that hold a specific ideology. The Obama administration should therefore align itself
with the progressive sector of the Cuban American community. This is the sector that voted for him and expects that he will spearhead a
real change in policy, even if there is no consensus within the community.
2nc Solvency
Unrestricted private engagement solves – allows informal interactions and
dramatically increases growth.
BUT including federal engagement (like diplomacy, aid and USAID development
practices) leads to backlash which tanks solvency – that’s Huddleston – prefer her –
she’s a former US diplomat and knows intricacies of State Department policymaking.
Compare the counterplan vs. status quo, not counterplan vs. the plan. Even if the
plan is optimal, the counterplan is sufficient – that’s 1ac ev.
Including governmental engagement tanks solvency – Cuba will deliberately
provoke the government to derail progress
Carbonell, 9 - international public affairs consultant
(Nestor, “Think Again: Engaging Cuba: Why dealing with the Castro regime is a
fool's errand” 4/10, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/04/09/think_again_engaging_cuba)
Watch out! Before embarking on any attempt at rapprochement with the Castro regime, U.S. President Barack Obama would be wise to
review his predecessors' experiences.¶ Gerald Ford's negotiations with Fidel Castro's representatives had to be
called off when 15,000 Cuban troops landed in Angola. Jimmy Carter's efforts led to the opening of
interest sections in Havana and Washington, but hopes for normalization were quashed when the
Castro regime deployed troops to Ethiopia and subsequently unleashed the Mariel boatlift, which
brought 125,000 refugees to Florida, including more than 2,700 convicted criminals and misfits. Several foreign-policy experts called
the boatlift an act of migratory aggression.¶ With the Cold War over, President Bill Clinton tried anew to improve U.S.
relations with Cuba, fostering people-to-people contacts. These efforts were foiled by a crisis of
refugee rafters in 1994 and again in 1996 when Cuban jet fighters shot down two unarmed planes
flying over international waters on a humanitarian mission.¶ The circumstances have changed since then, but the Cuban
regime (now under the dual leadership of the Castro brothers) essentially remains the same. So, at the very least, caution
and a step-by-step approach are called for in any new attempt to engage with this wily regime, which has managed to exploit naivit and
signs of weakness to its advantage.
Trade solves, but leave the USFG out of it – that’s comparatively more effective
than active federal involvement
Hidalgo and Vasquez, 09 - Vasquez the director of the Cato Institute’s Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity. He is a member of
the Mont Pelerin Society and has been a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Prior to joining the Cato Institute in 1992, Vásquez
worked on inter-American issues at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and Caribbean/Latin American Action, Hidalgo is a Policy
Analyst on Latin America at the Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity. Previously he was Latin America director of the International Policy
Network. Juan Carlos Hidalgo and Ian Vasquez, “Cato Handbook for Policymakers” http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/catohandbook-policymakers/2009/9/hb111-57.pdf)//GPastor
Cuba Must Determine Its Own Destiny Perhaps the biggest shortcoming of U.S. policy toward Cuba is its false
assumption that democratic capitalism can somehow be forcibly exported from Washington to
Havana. That assumption is explicitly stated in the Helms-Burton Act, the first purpose of which is ‘‘to assist the Cuban people in
regaining their freedom and prosperity, as well as in joining the community of democratic countries that are flourishing in the Western
Hemisphere.’’ But the shift toward democratic capitalism that began in the Western Hemisphere almost three decades ago had little to do
with Washington’s efforts to export democracy. Rather, it had to do with Latin America’s realization that previous policies and regimes
had failed to provide self-sustaining growth and increasing prosperity. By the same token, the more recent rise of populism in some
Latin-American countries is not the result of U.S. policy toward the region but a result of those countries’ failure to implement a
coherent set of mutually supportive market reforms. Those outcomes, again, depend entirely on Latin-American countries, not on the
United States. Unfortunately, the Bush administration’s Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba continues in Washington’s meddling
tradition. The administration adopted the commission’s recommendation to tighten the embargo by restricting travel and remittances to
the island even further. The commission also endorsed the administration’s policy of providing aid to Cuban opposition groups, thus
lending a semblance of credibility to Castro’s claims that dissident groups are agents of Washington, undermining their standing. Cuban
exiles should be allowed to participate in the transformation
of Cuban society. However, their participation need not
require the U.S. government’s active involvement . Thus, Radio and TV Marti, government entities that
broadcast to Cuba, should be privatized or closed down. If the exile community believes that those stations are a useful resource in its
struggle against the Castro regime, it has the means—there are no legal impediments—to finance such an operation. A New Cuba Policy
Based on American Principles Washington’s policies toward Cuba should be consistent with traditional American principles. First, the
United States should restore the practice of granting political asylum to Cuban refugees. The 1994 and 1995 immigration accords
between the Clinton administration and the Cuban government have turned the United States into Havana’s de jure partner in oppressing
those Cubans who risk their lives to escape repression. The ‘‘wet feet, dry feet’’ policy, which grants political asylum to Cuban refugees
who make it to the U.S. shore on their own and forces the U.S. Coast Guard to return to Cuba those refugees that it picks up at sea,
should be eliminated. Instead, the U.S. government should grant political asylum to all Cubans who escape the island. There is no reason
to believe that Cuban refugees would not continue to help the U.S. economy as they always have. The 1980 boatlift, in which 120,000
Cuban refugees reached U.S. shores, proved a boon to the economy of southern Florida. In addition, since the Cuban-American
community has repeatedly demonstrated its ability and desire to provide for refugees until they can provide for themselves, such a policy
need not cost U.S. taxpayers. Second, the U.S. government should protect its own citizens’ inalienable rights and
recognize that free trade is itself a human right. As James Dorn of the Cato Institute says: ‘‘The supposed dichotomy between the
right to trade and human rights is a false one. . . . As moral agents, individuals necessarily claim the rights to liberty and property in
order to live fully and to pursue their interests in a responsible manner.’’ In the case of Cuba, U.S. citizens and
companies should be allowed to decide for themselves—as they are in the case of dozens of countries around the
world whose political and human rights records are less than admirable—whether and how they should trade with it.
Third, the U.S. government should also respect the right of its own citizens to travel abroad freely and lift the travel ban to Cuba.
Currently, U.S. citizens can travel more or less freely to such countries as Iran and North Korea, but not to Cuba. Government bans on
the free movement of people are inconsistent with the values of freedom on which the United States was founded. As Rep. Jeff Flake (RAZ) puts it, ‘‘If somebody should limit your travel, it should be a Communist. It should be someone other than us.’’ Fourth, U.S. policy
toward Cuba should focus on national security interests, not on transforming Cuban society or micromanaging the affairs of a
transitional government as current law obliges Washington to do. That means lifting the embargo and establishing the types of
diplomatic ties with Cuba that the United States maintains with other states, even dictatorial states that do not threaten its national
security. Those measures, especially the ending of current sanctions, will ensure a more peaceful and smooth transition in Cuba.
Conclusion Signs of increasing political dissatisfaction with the embargo show that the tide of opinion is clearly turning. A February
2008 Gallup poll showed that 61 percent of Americans favored reestablishing diplomatic ties with Cuba—a 6 percentage point increase
since 2004. Business groups such as agricultural producers have grown increasingly critical of the embargo since it deprives them of a
potentially lucrative market. For example, since the enactment of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act in 2000,
which allows cash-only sales to Cuba of U.S. farm products and medical supplies, U.S. agricultural exports to the island went from zero
to $447 million in 2007. The International Trade Commission estimates that lifting the embargo could
further increase U.S. farm sales to Cuba by between $175 million and $350 million per year.
According to the American Farm Bureau, Cuba could eventually become a $1 billion agricultural
export market for U.S. farmers. It is important that, as trade expands and relations normalize,
Washington resists calls to provide export credits or other official assistance to U.S. businesses or
the Cuban government. Such corporate welfare and
foreign aid have a poor record at promoting
development . Support has also been mounting in Congress in favor of relaxing the trade embargo and travel ban. In December
2006, a bipartisan congressional delegation traveled to Cuba and met with government officials there, in one of the highest-ranking visits
by U.S. authorities since former president Jimmy Carter traveled to Havana in May 2002. Several bipartisan measures were introduced
in the 110th Congress intended to end the trade embargo and travel ban—one of them (H.R. 654) having as many as 120 cosponsors—
but they lack broad backing by congressional leaders. Ending the embargo will not save communism from itself. Only internal reform
will bring sustained investment and growth to Cuba. A transition may be forthcoming on the island, and the United
States can help by lifting the embargo.
Even if there is a benefit to diplomacy, it’s too far off to matter
Hanson 13 – associate director and coordinating editor at CFR.org, the website of the Council on Foreign Relations
(Stephanie, and Brianna Lee, “U.S.-Cuba Relations,” Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113)//BB
What is the status of U.S.-Cuba relations?¶ They are virtually nonexistent. There is a U.S. mission in Havana, Cuba's capital, but it has
minimal communication with the Cuban government. Since 1961, the official U.S. policy toward Cuba has been two-
pronged: economic embargo and diplomatic isolation . The George W. Bush administration strongly
enforced the embargo and increased travel restrictions. Americans with immediate family in Cuba could visit once every three years for
a maximum of two weeks, while family remittances to Cuba were reduced from $3,000 to just $300 in 2004. However, in April 2009,
President Obama eased some of these policies. He went further in 2011 to undo many of the restrictions imposed by the Bush
administration, thus allowing U.S. citizens to send remittances to non-family members in Cuba and to travel to Cuba for educational or
religious purposes.¶ Congress amended the trade embargo in 2000 to allow agricultural exports from the United States to Cuba. In 2008,
U.S. companies exported roughly $710 million worth of food and agricultural products to the island nation, according to the U.S.-Cuba
Trade and Economic Council. However, that number fell by about 50 percent in 2012. Total agricultural exports since 2001 reached $3.5
billion as of February 2012. Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Texas have all brokered agricultural deals with Cuba in recent years. ¶ Despite
initial optimism over Obama's election, Cuban politicians and citizens are less hopeful of a positive relationship developing between the
two countries.¶ Tension between Cuba and the United States flared in December 2009 with Cuba's arrest of Alan
Gross, a USAID subcontractor who traveled to the country to deliver communications equipment and arrange Internet access for its
Jewish community. Cuban authorities alleged Gross was attempting to destabilize the Cuban regime through a USAID-sponsored
"democracy promotion" program, and he was subsequently sentenced to fifteen years in prison. ¶ Despite initial optimism over Obama's
election, Cuban politicians and citizens are less hopeful of a positive relationship developing between the two countries. Raúl and Fidel
Castro have both criticized the Obama administration. In a 2009 speech, Raúl Castro accused the United States of "giving new breath to
open and undercover subversion against Cuba."¶ What is U.S. public opinion on the isolation of Cuba?¶ Some U.S. constituencies would
like to resume relations. U.S. agricultural groups already deal with Cuba, and other economic sectors want access to the Cuban market.
Many Cuban-Americans were angered by the Bush administration's strict limits on travel and remittances, though a small but vocal
contingent of hard-line Cuban exiles, many of them based in Florida, does not want to normalize relations until the
Communist regime is gone. "When they're polled, the
majority of Cuban-Americans say that the embargo has
failed, and support lifting the travel ban or loosening the embargo or some steps along that continuum of liberalization
and normalization," says Julia E. Sweig, CFR director of Latin American studies.¶ Ending the economic embargo against Cuba would
require congressional approval. Opinions in Congress are mixed: A group of influential Republican lawmakers from Florida, including
former representative Lincoln Diaz-Balart, his brother Mario Diaz-Balart, and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen are stridently anti-Castro. Still, many
favor improving relations with Cuba. In 2009, Sen. Richard Lugar (R-IN), the top-ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, released a report calling for U.S. policy changes. He said: "We must recognize the ineffectiveness of our current policy and
deal with the Cuban regime in a way that enhances U.S. interests" (PDF). ¶ What is the likelihood that the United States and Cuba will
resume diplomatic relations?¶ Given the range of issues dividing the two countries, experts say a
long process would
precede resumption of diplomatic relations . Daniel P. Erikson of the Inter-American Dialogue says that
though "you could have the resumption of bilateral talks on issues related to counternarcotics or immigration, or a period of détente,
you are
probably
not going to see
the full
restoration of diplomatic relations " in the near term.
No benefit and other states fill-in
Stephens and Laverty, 2011- Center for Democracy in the Americas Collin has a magnificent combination of traits; he is an
intellectual, a quintessential American whose personal relationships run deep among Cubans, and a loyal friend to CDA. Sarah Stephens,
Executive Director of CDA, “Cuba’s New Resolve Economic Reform and its Implications for U.S. Policy”
What More Can Be Done in Cuba to Make the Reforms Succeed? http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/CDA_Cubas_New_Resolve.pdf)//GP
Our final recommendation is to stop funding the USAID Cuba program. The U.S. government
wastes millions of dollars each year to bring about the type of economic and political
transition it sees fit for Cuba but the effect of the program increases suspicion and tension between
the two governments. A failure of the program in 2009 resulted in the arrest and imprisonment of
Alan P. Gross, a U.S. subcontractor. It is impossible, under the current circumstances, for USAID to take part in
meaningful programs welcomed by the Cuban government, such as those that Brazilian and
Spanish development agencies carry out. “Development assistance,” USAID’s actual mandate, should be discussed
bilaterally between the two countries, leading to the establishment of programs agreed upon by both countries (as is done in the rest of
the world). It will take time for trust to be restored, but it’s in the interest of both countries to start now.
2nc Solvency – All of the 1ac ev
Asbhy is neg
Ashby 13, Senior Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs. He served in the U.S. Commerce Department's International
Trade Administration as Director of the Office of Mexico and the Caribbean and acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for the Western
Hemisphere(Timothy, "Preserving Stability in Cuba After Normalizing Relations with the United States – The Importance of Trading with StateOwned Enterprises" 3/29/13, Council on Hemispheric Affairs, http://www.coha.org/preserving-stability-in-cuba-timothy-ashby/)//AD
Cuba under Raúl Castro has entered a new period of economic, social, and political transformation.
Reforms instituted within the past few years have brought the expansion of private sector
entrepreneurial activity, including lifting restrictions on the sales of residential real estate, automobiles,
and electronic goods. Additional reforms included, more than a million hectares of idle land has been
leased to private farmers, where citizens have been granted permission to stay in hotels previously
reserved for tourists, and freedom being granted for most Cubans to travel abroad.
Stating that it was time for the “gradual transfer” of “key roles to new generations,” President Raúl
Castro announced that he will retire by 2018, and named as his possible successor a man who was not
even born at the time of the Cuban Revolution. [1]
The twilight of the Castro era presents challenges and opportunities for US policy makers. Normalization
of relations is inevitable, regardless of timing, yet external and internal factors may accelerate or retard
the process.
The death of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez is likely to undermine the already dysfunctional
Cuban economy, if it leads to reductions in oil imports and other forms of aid. This could bring social
chaos, especially among the island’s disaffected youth. Such an outcome would generate adverse
consequences for US national and regional security. To maintain Cuba’s social and economic stability
while reforms are maturing, the United States must throw itself open to unrestricted bilateral trade
with all Cuban enterprises, both private and state-owned.
The collapse of Cuba’s tottering economy could seismically impact the United States and neighboring
countries. It certainly did during the Mariel Boatlift of 1980, precipitated by a downturn in the Cuban
economy which led to tensions on the island. Over 125,000 Cuban refugees landed in the Miami area,
including 31,000 criminals and mental patients. Today, the United States defines its national security
interests regarding Cuba as follows:
• Avoid one or more mass migrations;
• Prevent Cuba from becoming another porous border that allows continuous large-scale migration to the
hemisphere;
• Prevent Cuba from becoming a major source or transshipment point for the illegal drug trade;
• Avoid Cuba becoming a state with ungoverned spaces that could provide a platform for terrorists and
others wishing to harm the United States. [2]
All of these national security threats are directly related to economic and social conditions within Cuba.
US policy specifically supports “a market-oriented economic system” [3] toward Cuba, yet regulations
prohibit the importation of any goods of Cuban origin, whether from the island’s potentially booming
private sector – including 300,000 agricultural producers – or State-Owned Enterprises (“SOEs”). [4]
Such a policy is counterproductive to US interests. Regardless of over 400,000 entrepreneurs, including
agricultural cultivators, it could be many years, if ever, when Cuba’s private sector would be ready to
serve as the engine of economic growth. SOEs employ 72 percent of Cuban workers. [5]
A rational commercial rapprochement towards Cuba would therefore require a change in current laws and
in the system of regulations prohibiting the importation of Cuban goods and products. Normalized
bilateral trade will benefit the Cuban people by helping to provide economic stability and fostering
the growth of a middle class – both of which are essential for the foundation of democratic
institutions. Two-way trade must include both Cuba’s private sector as well as SOEs.
So it Johnson
Johnson, et al, 10 – Andy Johnson is a director in the national security program at The Third Way (“End
the Embargo of Cuba”, The National Security Program, 9/6/10,
http://content.thirdway.org/publications/326/Third_Way_Memo_-_End_the_Embargo_of_Cuba.pdf)//EX
Keeping the embargo in place requires that the US government devote time and resources to fighting a Cold War-era threat. Senator Chris Dodd
argued in a 2005 oped that the US spends “extraordinary resources” each year to enforce the sanctions instead of
devoting such resources to the fight against terrorism.4 While the financial resources dedicated to enforcing the embargo may
be limited compared to resources dedicated to other causes, lifting the Cuban embargo could put the US in a better
position to fight terrorist organizations by freeing up resources currently enforcing the embargo. ¶ For
example, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), which governs travel and trade between
the US and Cuba, is also responsible for maintaining sanctions against truly problematic countries, including
Iran and North Korea. OFAC also is responsible for responding to economic threats posed by terrorist
organizations and narcotics traffickers. By ending OFAC’s need to regulate the Cuban embargo, OFAC
could instead devote those resources to respond to the current threats posed by rogue states and terrorist
networks.Cuba also remains on the State Department’s state sponsor of terrorism list along with Iran, Syria, and Sudan,5 despite claims by
experts such as former National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism Richard Clarke that Cuba is only on the list for domestic political
reasons.6 A 1998 report by the US Intelligence Community determined that Cuba does not pose a threat to US national security,7 yet the State
Department continues to keep Cuba on the list. By normalizing relations with Cuba and removing Cuba from the list, the State Department could
better focus on actual state sponsors of terror and instead use resources in the Western Hemisphere bureau to initiate a new path for engaging
Cuba.
Burgsdorff proves we solve multilat
Burgsdorff, 9– Ph. D in Political Science from Freiburg University, EU Fellow at the University of
Miami (Sven Kühn von, “Problems and Opportunities for the Incoming Obama Administration”,
http://aei.pitt.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/11047/1/vonBurgsdorfUSvsCubalong09edi.pdf)//NG
At international level all major actors would clearly welcome an
end to the embargo. While the sanctions policy allowed European, Canadian and, more recently,
Venezuelan, Chinese, Brazilian and Russian to become more involved with Cuba in the absence of competitors
from the US (with the exception of agriculture produce), most of the foreign powers, and in particular the EU and Latin
American countries, would clearly support a definite lifting of the coercive measures. Ending the
6.3 How would the international community react?
embargo would be perceived as a decision carrying a momentum of powerful symbolism since it would
signal a newly found willingness in Washington to reconsider the usefulness of acting unilaterally and
outside the international legal framework. As a matter of fact, together with other measures such as closing Guantanamo, signing
up to the Kyoto Protocol and putting into practice the succeeding agreement under the Bali conference, and possibly, joining the International
Criminal Court as well as ratifying further international human rights treaties such as the 1990 Convention on the Rights of the Child, it would
be interpreted by the international community as steps towards effective multilateralism.
This is the closest aff ev to winning a solvency deficit – but “normalizing relations”
doesn’t distinguish between FEDERAL and PRIVATE relations. It is clearly
referencing the Embargo – which is private relations
Grandin 10 – teaches history at New York University and is a member of the American Academy of
Arts and Sciences (Greg, “Empire's Senescence: U.S. Policy in Latin America,” New Labor Forum, 19:1,
Winter 2010, pg. 14-23)//SJF
Washington’s relations with Latin America—particularly in terms of the gap between what its policy
toward the region is and what it could be—precisely measure the degree to which domestic ideologies,
narrow corporate and sectional interests, and a sclerotic political system are hastening the decline of the
United States as a global power. As a result, the U.S. is deepening its dependence on unstable policies in
order to leverage its dwindling influence in the hemisphere. It is easy to imagine an improved U.S.
diplomacy toward Latin America, designed not to advance a set of altruistic ideals but merely to defend
its interests—broadly defined to mean stable politics and economies that are open to U.S. capital and
commodities—and to achieve what those in the liberal wing of the foreign policy establishment have long advocated: a
maximization of U.S. “soft power.” Harvard’s Joseph S. Nye defines soft power as “the ability to get what you want
through attraction rather than coercion,” through an enhanced understanding and utilization of multilateral
institutions, mutually beneficial policies, cultural exchanges, and commercial relations.1 There are no immediate
threats to the U.S. in Latin America. A majority of the region’s political elite—even most of its current govern- ing leftists—share many of the
same values the United States claims to embody, even more so following the election of the first African-American president, who is wildly
popular in Latin America. As a result, there is no other place in the world that offers U.S. president Barack Obama the
opportunity to put into place the kind of intelligent foreign policy that he and his closest advisors, such as
United Nations (U.N.) ambassador Susan Rice, believe is necessary to stop the hemorrhaging of U.S. prestige—one
that would both improve Washington’s ability to deploy its many competitive advantages, while
removing key points of friction. Here’s what such a policy could look like: Washington would concede to longstanding Brazilian
demands by reducing tariffs and subsidies that protect the U.S. agricultural industry, opening its market to Brazilian com- modities, especially soy
and sugar, as well as value-added ethanol. It would yield on other issues that have stalled the proposed Free Trade Agreement of the Americas
(FTAA), such as a demand for strident intellectual property rights enforcement, which Brazil objects to because it would disadvantage its own
pharmaceutical industry and hinder its ability to provide low-cost medicine to those infected with the HIV virus. Such concessions would
provide an incentive for Brasilia to take the lead in jumpstarting the FTAA, a treaty that would ultimately benefit U.S. corporations, yet would be
meaningless without Brazil, South America’s largest and most dynamic economy.
The U.S. would scale back its military operations in Colombia—including recent con- troversial plans to establish a series of military bases which have raised strong criticisms from the
governments of Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela. Brazil’s president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva—who is entering the last year of his second and last term—has become
the spokesperson for the collective discontent, an indication of his country’s regional authority. In exchange for the U.S. dialing down its military presence, a soon-to-be post-Lula Brazil might
Washington would also drop the five-decade-old trade embargo
on Cuba, thus burying a Cold War relic that continues to tarnish the U.S. image. Normalizing relations with Cuba
would create an additional enticement for Brazil to cooperate with the U.S., since its formidable agro-industry is beginning to invest
find it convenient to tilt away from Venezuela and toward the United States.
in Cuba and is therefore well-placed to export to the U.S. market. Politically, Washington would formally recommit to a multilateral foreign policy, even as it set up a de facto arrangement with
Brazil to administer the region. This would mean demonstrating its willingness to work through the Organization of American States (OAS). More importantly, it would mean leashing the
quasi-privatized “democracy promotion” organizations—largely funded by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the Agency for International Development, and run by the
International Republican Institute—that have become vectors of trans- national, conservative coalition building throughout the hemisphere. These groups today do overtly what the CIA used to
do covertly, as NED's first president, Allen Weinstein, admitted—they fund oppositional “civil soci- ety” groups that use the rhetoric of democracy and human rights to menace Left governments throughout the region, including the promotion of an aborted coup in Venezuela in 2002 and successful ones in Haiti in 2004 and Honduras in 2009.2 Similar destabilization efforts tried
to topple Bolivia’s Evo Morales in 2008 but failed, at least partly because Brazil and Chile let it be known that they would not accept those kinds of machinations in their backyards. It would be
easy for the Obama administration to rein these groups in, and to agree to Latin American demands to make their funding more transparent and their actions more accountable. Washington would
also take a number of other initiatives to modernize hemispheric diplomacy, including deescalating its failed “War on Drugs,” as Latin America’s leading intellectuals and policymakers—
including many former presidents—are demanding; in the last few months, both Mexico and Argentina have legalized some drug use and possession, including small quantities of cocaine and
heroin.3 The U.S. would renew its assault weapons ban, as Mexico—battered by over five thousand narcotics-related murders a year, many of them committed with smuggled U.S. guns—is
begging. It could also pass meaningful immigration reform, providing a path to U.S. citizenship for the millions of undocumented Latin Americans, mostly from Mexico, Central America, the
Caribbean, and the Andes, but also Brazil. Such a move would go a long way toward improving relations with south- ern neighbors. It would also be good domestic politics for the Democrats,
guaranteeing the loyalty of the Latino vote in 2012 and moving Texas, by creating millions of new vot- ers, closer to swing-state status. It could also provide progressives and the Democratic
Party with a real wedge issue: Catholics, increasingly pulled into the con- servative camp by issues such as abortion and gay rights, overwhelmingly favor immigration reform. Any one of the
above steps would go far in reestablishing U.S. legitimacy in Latin America. Taken together they could serve as a diplomatic revolution, one which would not weaken U.S. power but consolidate
it much the way the Good Neighbor Policy did, allowing Washington to project its power in the region through stable multilateral mechanisms freed from the burdens of confrontation and
militarism. A retooled FTAA, updated for the post-Great Recession world and stripped of the ideologi- cal baggage of failed neoliberal globalization, might provide a blueprint for a sustainable
a reinvigorated hemispheric diplomacy
could serve as a model for the rest of the world, a design for a practical twenty-first century
multilateralism, capable of responding to transnational problems—both those that concern liberals, such as climate
change, poverty, and migration, and those that concern conservatives, such as crime and ter- rorism—while respecting, at least rhetorically,
regional economy, one that balances national development and corporate profit.4 And like the Good Neighbor Policy,
the sovereignty of individual nations. In short, the Western Hemisphere offers an unparalleled opportunity to realize the vision of Barack Obama’s September 2009 address to the United
Nations—hailed by many as a clarion call for a new internationalism—to, in his words, “embrace a new era of engagement based on mutual interest and mutual respect.” It’s not going to happen.
Efforts to implement any one of the above policy changes would be blocked by powerful domestic interests. Take biofuels. The idea to liberalize the U.S. agricultural market—and have the
rhetoric of free trade somewhat match the reality—is recommended by all mainstream think tanks, including the Council on Foreign Relations and the Brookings Institution, as an important step
to win back Brazil. Obama recognizes the importance of Brazil, having nominated George W. Bush’s outgoing assistant secretary of state for Latin America, Thomas Shannon—respected in
establishment circles as, according to the journal Foreign Policy, “the most talented and successful individual” to serve as Washington’s envoy to Latin America “in at least two decades”—as its
ambassador. Yet Shannon’s confirmation had been threatened by Senator Chuck Grassley, representing the agro-industry state of Iowa, who objected to the then-nominee’s comment during his
confirma- tion hearings that removing a fifty-four-cent per gallon tariff on imported ethanol would be good for U.S. foreign policy. The White House immediately declared that it had no plans to
change tariff policy, and Grassley allowed the confirmation to proceed.5 The White House’s quick buckling probably has to do with its fruitless attempt to win over Grassley for health care
reform, a further indicator of how foreign policy is held hostage by domestic politics. Similar obstacles stand in the way of other foreign policy reforms. The Cuban lobby, along with the broader
conservative Right, prevents a normalization of relations with Havana. Fear of the National Rifle Association halts a renewal of the assault weapons ban. As to the “War on Drugs,” the
Democratic Party is deeply committed to “Plan Colombia,” the centerpiece of that war. It is, after all, a legacy of Bill Clinton’s foreign policy, and much of the $6 billion spent to fight it thus far
goes directly into the coffers of corporate sponsors of the Democratic Party like Connecticut’s United Technologies and other northeastern defense contractors (it was Bill Clinton who in 1997,
acting on behalf of Lockheed Martin, lifted a twenty-year ban on high-tech weapons sales to Latin America, kicking off an arms build-up, in which Colombia, Chile, and Brazil have taken the
lead).6 As to immigration reform—also recom- mended by influential establishment groups to improve U.S. standing in Latin America— Obama, in Mexico, said it would have to wait until next
year. He has a near-filibuster-proof majority in the Senate and a large majority in the House, yet he says there aren’t enough votes and “there is not, by any means, con- sensus across the table.”7
Obama could easily assemble a majority coalition on this issue—comprised of business interests who want cheap labor, Hispanics, progressives, social justice Catholics, and members of the
labor movement (who long ago signaled their support for immigration reform)—yet fear of a backlash fueled by a contracting economy has led him to back- burner the issue. The same
conditions that make Latin America the best venue in which to modernize U.S. diplomacy—namely that there is no immediate threat emerging from the region, no equivalent of North Korea or
Iran on the verge of acquiring a nuclear bomb, no insurgency bogging down U.S. troops as in Afghanistan, and no conflict threatening access to vital resources (Washington’s main antagonist in
the region, Venezuela, continues to sell most of its oil to the U.S.)—also mean that there are no real incentives for Obama’s fledgling foreign policy coalition to expend political capital on trying
to improve policy there. Analysts of the American empire—from Charles A. Beard in the 1930s to William Appleman Williams in the 1960s and 1970s— have emphasized the U.S.’s unique
ability to subsume competing economic, ideological, and sectional interests into a flexible and vital diplomacy in defense of a general “national interest,” which has led America to unprecedented global power.8 Yet now—confronted with a sustained economic contraction, the fallout from a disastrous overleveraging of military power in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the emergence of
a post-Cold War, post-neoliberal world with multiple power centers—expansion has given way to involution. The U.S. political system seems to be literally devouring itself from within,
paralyzing the ability of foreign policymakers to adjust to a rapidly changing world.
Unable to leverage its soft, smart power even in its own
hemisphere, Washington is ever more dependent on the military and corporate mercenary forces
that have transformed Colombia into a citadel of U.S. hard power in the Andes. As a candidate, Obama—referring to Bush’s
decision to invade Iraq—said he wasn’t opposed to all wars, just stupid ones. Washington’s “War on Drugs” in Latin America is the stupid- est war one can imagine. As the centerpiece of that
war, “Plan Colombia”—a program, established by Bill Clinton and extended by George W. Bush and Barack Obama, that has provided Colombia with billions of dollars of aid, mostly for the
military’s counternarcotic and counterinsurgent operations—has served to entrench paramilitary power, enrich pri- vate contractors (such as the Virginia-based DynCorp), and turn more than
four million Colombians into refugees.9 It has also fore- closed the possibility of a negotiated, regionally brokered solution to the crisis and inflamed a conflict that has already once spilled
beyond national borders—in March 2008, Colombian troops launched a military raid into Ecuador to assassinate members of the insurgent Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia. And,
while it has not lessened narcotics exports to the United States, the drug war has spread the violence associated with the illegal narcotics trade up through Central America and into Mexico,
accounting for the staggeringly high number of homicides in the region. Much like the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, Washington’s militarization of the drug problem in Latin America
has worsened what it sought to solve, thus pro- viding an excuse for even more militarism. Thus Southcom—which runs the Department of Defense’s South American operations—is expanding
its presence in Colombia, recently brokering a deal that will give the U.S. military access to at least seven bases, running from the Caribbean to the Andes. Colombia and the U.S. insist that this
expansion is directed to ensure Colombia’s internal security; but Brazil’s military is concerned that the bases give the U.S. the ability to project its power deep into South America. Colombia
serves as the anchor of a broader strategic shift on the part of the U.S., one that reflects its position as a declining hegemon. Throughout much of the twentieth century, the U.S.— confident of its
ascension as a world power—treated Latin America largely as a unified region, working through inter-American organizations set up via the Good Neighbor Policy and during World War II,
such as the OAS and the Rio Pact (a mutual defense treaty that became the model for NATO). When one or another country tried to break out of its dependent relationship with the U.S.—i.e.,
Cuba in the 1960s, Chile in the early 1970s, or Nicaragua in the 1980s—the U.S. took independent, often covert steps either to isolate it or bring it back into the fold. Yet throughout the Cold
today, the U.S. is increasingly
relying on a strategy of divide and rule. Washington’s relationship with Colombia is the centerpiece of this new approach, and the Andean country functions as
something like Latin America’s Israel: a heavily militarized U.S. ally that allows Washington to project its power into a hostile region. Like Israel, its preemptive, unilateral actions
are encouraged by Washington in the name of national security. Colombia’s reckless raid into Ecuador in 2008—denounced by every South
War (and for about a decade following the Cold War), Washington continued to view the region as a single administrative zone. But
American country—was endorsed not just by George W. Bush but by then- U.S. presidential candidates Hillary Clinton, John McCain, and Barack Obama. Like Israel, Colombia’s security
forces serve as a model and a resource for wars elsewhere. Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has co mmented that “many of us from all over the world can learn from
what has happened with respect to the very successful develop- ments of ‘Plan Colombia,’” and suggested that it be franchised “specifically to Afghanistan.”10 Some of private military
contractor Xe’s—née Blackwater—best recruits are retired Colombian soldiers, trained for Middle East operations on Colombian military bases; before taking control of the murderous Iraq
Special Operations Forces, U.S. brigadier gen- eral Simeon Trombitas served in Colombia.11 Recently, Colombian paramilitaries have been recruited as mercenaries by Honduran plantation
owners, to protect their property in the wake of the crisis unleashed by the coup.12 Colombia also boasts one of the most sophisticated intelligence apparatuses in its region—bolstered by
massive infusions of U.S. dollars—capable of carrying out not just widespread surveillance but covert operations, including attempts to destabilize neighboring Venezuela.13 On the diplomatic
circuit, an embassy posting in Colombia has become a way station toward a more prominent role in the Great Game. Current ambassadors to Afghanistan and Pakistan—William Wood and Anne
Paterson, respectively—previously served as Bush’s envoys to Colombia. Like Israel, Colombia inspires many who see it as an exemplar of how to balance democracy—a place that offers
relatively free elections, with three independent (at least in principle) branches of government—and security. “Colombia is what Iraq should eventually look like, in our best dreams,” writes
influen- tial Atlantic contributor Robert Kaplan. “Colombian President Alvaro Uribe has fought—and is winning—a counterinsurgency war even as he has liberalized the economy, strengthened
institutions, and improved human rights.”14 The Council on Foreign Relations has put aside its earlier strong criticism of “Plan Colombia” and now hails it as a success for having established a
state presence in “many regions previously con- trolled by illegal armed groups, reestablishing elected governments, building and rebuilding public infrastructure, and reaffirming the rule of
law.” The Council recommends a similar solution for violence-plagued Mexico and Central America.15 Throughout Latin America, a resurgent Right looks to Colombia for inspira- tion and
Uribe as its standard bearer, a backstop against Hugo Chávez-style populism. As Forrest Hylton has argued, Uribe’s suc- cess at consolidating power rests on an alliance between death-squad
paramilitaries—who have used “Plan Colombia” as a cover to execute an enormous land grab and to establish their rule in the countryside—and drug traffickers who have decided to stop
fighting the state and become part of it. Medellín, the showcase city of Latin America’s New Right, has the eighth highest murder rate in the world; Uribe himself has deep ties to both
paramilitaries and drug cartels.16 Colombia also serves as an anchor to a new geopolitics, an attempt by Washington to build a “security corridor” running from Mexico, through Central
America, and into Colombia. Under the auspices of such programs as the Merida Initiative, “Plan Puebla-Panama,” and the Security and Prosperity Partnership, the objective is to integrate the
region’s trans- portation and communications infrastructure, energy production and distribution network, and, most importantly, its military capacities. Call it top-down, transnational state formation, an attempt to coordinate the region’s intelligence agencies, militaries, and police (as well as mercenary corporations like DynCorp), subordinated under the direction of the U.S. military.
In other words, the
U.S. is retrenching, pulling back from efforts to preside over the entirety of Latin America, instead
consolidating its authority over a circumscribed territory, with a deepening reliance on applied
Thomas Shannon, Bush’s envoy to Latin America and now Obama’s ambassador to Brazil, described it in a moment of candor as “armoring NAFTA.”
military power . This shift is significant, and could unleash a period of heightened instability. One
consequence of Washington’s past strategy of treating Latin America as a single unit was that inter-state
conflicts were contained; since the 1930s, most bloodletting was internally directed, aimed at trade unionists, peasant activists, intellectuals, reformist politicians, and
progressive religious leaders demanding a more equitable share of economic and political power. But now, with a waning superpower banking its
authority on “armoring” one region in order to contain another, that might be changing—as evinced by Colombia’s 2008
raid into Ecuador and recent tensions caused by U.S. plans to expand its military footprint in the Andean country. As Adam Isacson, of the Center for International Policy, says of Washington’s
new Colombian bases, the U.S. is “creating a new capability in South America, and capabilities often get used.”17 Adding to the potential for instability is the regrouping of the Right. Political
scientist Miguel Tinker-Salas notes that “for some time, the Right has been rebuilding in Latin America; hosting conferences, sharing experiences, refining their message, working with the
media, and building ties with allies in the United States. This is not the lunatic right-wing fringe, but rather the mainstream Right with powerful allies in the middle-class that used to consider
themselves center, but have been frightened by recent Left electoral victories and the rise of social movements.”18 This nascent reaction has been buoyed by the June 2009 Honduran coup, which
the right-wing sees as the first successful rollback of populism since the 2004 overthrow of Aristide, as well as by recent victories at the ballot box: in May, a conservative millionaire won the
presidency in Panama. In Argentina, Cristina Fernández’s center-left Peronist party has recently suffered a midterm electoral defeat and lost control of Congress. And polls show that presidential
elections coming up in Chile and Brazil will be close, possibly dealing further losses to progressives, containing the South American Left to Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador, and the Central
American Left to El Salvador and Nicaragua. Two broad arcs of crises have defined U.S.-Latin American relations. The first began in the early nineteenth century and paralleled the first,
youthful phase of U.S. territorial and economic expansion. Latin American intellectuals, politicians, and nationalists reacted with increasing hostility toward not only the growing influence of
U.S. capital—which both displaced European economic interests and subordinated aspiring domestic elites—but toward ever more frequent and threatening military interventions: the MexicanAmerican War; the Spanish-American War; the creation of Panama; and invasions and occupations throughout the Caribbean basin. The second round coincided with the advent of the Cold War
and marked the U.S.’s maturity as a global power. It intensified with Eisenhower’s over- throw of Guatemala’s democratically elected government in 1954, and continued with the 1959 Cuban
Revolution and the series of right- wing coups in the 1960s and 1970s, culminating with the violent repression of Central American insurgencies in the 1980s, which paved the way for the
this time driven less by the tendency toward expansion
that marked the U.S.’s global ascension than by a frantic attempt to hold on to what it has left as it
enters its senescence—as domestic ideologues, unchecked corporate power, and political paralysis
quicken the U.S.’s fall.
neoliberal restructuring of the 1990s. It seems we are entering a third period of conflict—
The counterplan solves perceptions of unilateralism –BUT THE PLAN DOESN’T –
including GOVERNMENTAL assistance leads to backlash
Dickerson 10 – Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, paper submitted in fulfillment of a Master of Strategic Studies Degree at the US Army War
College (Sergio M, “UNITED STATES SECURITY STRATEGY TOWARDS CUBA,” 1/14/10,
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a518053.pdf)//SJF
At the international political level, President Obama sees resuming relations with Cuba as a real step
towards multilateralism and leadership. U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon made the following
statement about then President-elect Barrack Obama’s national election. “He spoke about a “new era of
global partnership…I am confident that we can look forward to an era of renewed partnership and a new
multilateralism." To highlight this point further, U.N. nations have voted overwhelmingly since 1992 to
overturn the Cuban Embargo. In 2007, 184 nations voted against the embargo5 - a powerful statement
about U.S. unilateralism with regards to Cuba . The argument can also be made that the U.S. has
foreign relations with China, Saudi Arabia and other non-democratic governments while applying a
different standard towards Cuba. With growing perception that Cuba no longer poses a credible threat to
the U.S., it appears that U.S. policy has changed from coercive to punitive following the end of the Cold
War. With a renewed focus on multilateralism, President Obama could go a long way to break this image
by spreading the seeds of a “new beginning” in U.S.-Cuba relations.
While dismissing Cuba’s immediate security threat to the U.S., we cannot ignore their 90-mile proximity to the U.S. shore. As we struggle to
contain the illegal Mexican exodus into the U.S. and all the security concerns it poses, we neglect to see the historical similarities in past
encounters with the Cuban government that led to similar incursions. So if we critically reexamine the current U.S. – Cuba embargo, why does
the U.S. believe it will only lead to Cuban democratization? What about government collapse? A Cuban government collapse akin to Somalia
could create a significant refugee situation not to mention an implied U.S. responsibility to provide humanitarian and even stability operations in
Cuba. If catastrophe does occur, a search for causes would certainly lead back to our punitive approaches to U.S. diplomacy towards Cuba.
On the other hand, consider that foreign diplomacy achieves a breakthrough under Raul’s Cuba. It could certainly hedge our influence in Latin
America. According to Dr. DeShazo, “close bilateral relationships with Venezuela is a product of Fidel Castro-Hugo Chavez friendship and does
not enjoy much popular support in Cuba-nor with Raul.” If true, perhaps having a U.S. - Cuba option can become an alternative to that
relationship post Fidel Castro. Loosening or lifting the embargo could also be mutually beneficial. Cuba’s need and America’s surplus capability
could be mutually beneficial - and eventually addictive to Cuba. Under these conditions, diplomacy has a better chance to flourish. If
negotiations break down and a decision to continue the embargo is reached, international support would be easier to garner .
Almost 21 years since the wall fell in Berlin, it is time to chip away at the diplomatic wall that still remains between U.S. and Cuba. This paper
will further define our interests in Cuba and why President Obama should continue his quest for renewed diplomatic relations with Cuba. It will
discuss potential risks associated with retaining the current 50-year diplomatic policy and give some broad suggestions regarding a new U.S. –
Cuba foreign policy.
Policy and National Interest
Present U.S. policy towards Cuba is economic isolation imposed via embargo to coerce Cuba into establishing a representative government.
While the basic policy remains unchanged, the same is not true about U.S. interests in Cuba. During the Cold War, stated U.S. interest was to
contain Communism, the leading edge of which was Cuba. More than anything the U.S. wanted Castro’s demise but international support hinged
on preventing the spread of communism. After 1989, communism was under siege and capitalism was on the rise. U.S. interests now shifted
towards peace and regional stability. Of course, removing the Castro regime was still the preferred method, but without Soviet collusion Castro’s
Cuba was no longer a credible threat to the U.S. Not surprisingly, international support quickly dwindled leaving the U.S. as the unilateral
enforcer. In hindsight many argued it was the right time to loosen the embargo and seek better relations with Cuba. Instead, a renewed passion to
topple Castro and establish democracy fractured any hopes to rekindle relations. In retrospect, Kennedy could not have foreseen a 50-year
embargo that survives the Soviet Union’s demise but fails to remove Castro. The same cannot be said about the Obama Administration today.
This section will analyze U.S. – Cuba policy, past opportunities and ultimate failure over the past 50 years.
From 1959 to1964, beginning with President Eisenhower but shaped primarily by the Kennedy Administration, U.S. policy was to remove Fidel
Castro and establish Democracy in Cuba.6 It can be argued that this policy resonates today but during the early period the U.S. actively pursued
removal as the decisive action that would lead to Democracy in Cuba. Political and military efforts to remove Castro in 1961 were reinforced by
the initial embargo implementation and tightening that was most effective. Between1965 and 1970, U.S. attempts to maintain a multilateral
embargo failed and its effectiveness withered as western governments refused to acquiesce to U.S. - led sanctions. By the time the OAS officially
lifted the embargo, Cuba had successfully diversified its trade portfolio and by 1974, 45% of Cuba’s exports came from western governments.7
The period 1965-1972, although officially endorsing the previous administration’s tough stance, largely ignored its neighbor while it dealt with
the more pressing conflict in Viet Nam. Containment and a period of Presidential ambivalence towards Cuba allowed tensions to cool between
nations. This coupled with a growing fatigue with the Viet Nam War resulted in a renewed engagement to normalize relations with Cuba. A
policy of “rapprochement” or normalization began with the Nixon Administration and received promising traction under the Carter
Administration in 1977. The rapprochement period, 1973 – 1980, was President Carter’s attempt to curtail communism in Africa and Latin
America. By normalizing relations with Cuba, President Carter could leverage this good will to reverse Cuban presence in Ethiopia, Angola and
Zaire. Several overt measures were taken to reduce embargo restrictions and in February, 1977 State Department spokesmen Fred Brown
“publically acknowledged and accepted a Cuban proposal to begin bilateral talks on maritime boundaries and fishing rights.”8 In June, U.S.
National Security Council decided to end the practice of blacklisting foreign ships that called on Cuban ports. Perhaps the most notable
improvement that year was to allow foreign diplomats to occupy each other’s embassies. This allowed direct communication between countries;
the previous practice had been to use Swiss and Czech proxies.9 Several incidents including the “Soviet Brigade” and the “Mariel Boatlift” in
1980 intensified this opposition and quickly derailed Carter’s initiatives in Congress.
As President Reagan took office in 1980, U.S. – Cuba relations had already soured. The Reagan Administration would reinforce the weakened
embargo and a return to a containment strategy under the auspices that Cuba was “promoting terrorism and subversion in virtually every Latin
American country”. But strong Congressional opposition against normalizing relations took center stage during the 1980 presidential elections.
Several incidents including the “Soviet Brigade” and the “Mariel Boatlift” in 1980 intensified this opposition and quickly derailed Carter’s
initiatives in Congress. 10 The White House policy was to “disrupt and destabilize the island’s economy, terminate the Cuban-Soviet alliance,
end Cuba’s internationalism, and finally reinsert Cuba within the capitalist politicaleconomic orbit.”11 President Reagan made every attempt to
return to an “airtight” embargo but Cuba’s persistent trade with the west subverted the effort. In fact, British and Canadian companies could
conduct trade in “America’s back garden without having to compete with U.S. companies.”12 Reagan did however, exact a toll on Cuba’s
economy by preventing other nations from allowing Cuba to reschedule its debt: “a process of negotiating new loans to replace existing
obligations, either by lengthening maturities, deferring of loan principal payment.”13 This action compelled Cuba to make its most overt
concessions towards normalizing U.S. - Cuban relations. Castro removed troops from Africa and reclaimed 2,700 Cuban refugees that had
departed to America during the 1980 Mariel Boatlift. Castro even allowed a U.S. Human Rights delegation to visit prisoners in Cuba. In return,
the Reagan and Bush Administrations made no significant concessions to Cuba and status quo between countries remained.
The last meaningful opportunity for change occurred after the fall of the Berlin Wall and particularly the window it presented the U.S. following
the collapse in Soviet – Cuba relations. During the period 1990 – 1993, internal and economic turmoil following the Soviet Union’s break-up led
to a drastic cut in Soviet subsidies and trade relations with Cuba. This action compelled Cuba to make its most overt concessions towards
normalizing U.S. - Cuban relations. Castro removed troops from Africa and reclaimed 2,700 Cuban refugees that had departed to America during
the 1980 Mariel Boatlift. Castro even allowed a U.S. Human Rights delegation to visit prisoners in Cuba. In return, the Reagan and Bush
Administrations made no significant concessions to Cuba and status quo between countries remained. 14 This led to a 34% drop in Cuban
economy forcing Castro to renew western trade options and relook his own draconian business and commercial practices. The first Bush
Administration passed on this precious opportunity, ignoring Cuba’s overt concessions late in the previous administration and choosing instead to
enact the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act reversing Carter’s amendment to allow third country U.S. companies from trading with Cuba.15
By the time President Clinton came to office, momentum had already shifted in Cuba’s favor. Cuba’s economy began to rise in 1994 reaching its
apex in 1996 with a 41% increase thanks to foreign investments in tourism. The introduction of the HelmsBurton legislation in 1996 gained
Congressional traction after the Cuban Air force shot down two, anti-Castro “Brothers in Rescue,” planes over Cuba. The Helms-Burton Act
created unrealistic expectations for the Cuban government before U.S. would loosen restrictions with Cuba. A total of eight requirements had to
be met and the most controversial of these included; a transitional government in place unlike the Castro regime; the dissolution of the
Department of State; Cuba must hold free and fair elections and a controversial property law that allowed property owners that left Cuba as early
as 1959, to make claims in U.S. Courts on that property. With Cuba’s economy on the rise, this new measure to tighten the noose failed terribly
and only succeeded in further alienating both governments.
The second Bush Administration did little to engage Cuba and after September 11, 2001, was completely engrossed in the War on Terror. U.S.
policy towards Cuba has changed little in 50 years. Although the embargo continues to fail despite our best efforts to tighten it, our policy has
remained steadfast and the U.S. is no closer to normalizing relations with Cuba.
A History of Anger and Distrust
After 50 years, deep-seated distrust and anger exists between the U.S. and Cuba. Perhaps an obvious assessment, but one that if ignored could
undermine attempts to repair diplomatic relations between countries. Several diplomatic pitfalls developed over the years could hinder any
attempt to reestablish relations. They could spell disaster and set an already tenuous relationship back decades. These triggers are subtle but
recognizable over a long and tumultuous period in U.S. – Cuba relations. A historical account will help identify these political impasses and
create favorable conditions for diplomatic success in future U.S. – Cuba relations.
Experts argue over who’s started the dispute between nations: was it the Cuban Agrarian Reform Act in 1959 that nationalized agrarian land in
Cuba to include U.S. owned lands? Could it have been Cuba’s decision to resume trade with the Soviet 9Union that led to a U.S. imposed
embargo on Cuba in 1960? Perhaps the bigger issue was how diplomatic, economic and military efforts by both countries continued to aggravate
already strained relations.16 In 1961, Cuban exiles supported by the Central Intelligence Agency failed to topple the Castro government. The Bay
of Pigs fiasco sent Cuba a clear signal that the U.S. was not interested in negotiation. Castro answered immediately by allowing Soviets to
position nuclear missiles in Cuba, threatening U.S. vital security and leading to the Cuban Missile Crises. These intentions have survived to the
present undermining any attempt to pursue common interest and reduce tensions. The underlying fear that U.S. remains
committed to toppling the Cuban government constitutes the first diplomatic pitfall in U.S. – Cuban
relations. For this very reason, democratic reform will not succeed as a diplomatic bargaining tool with
Cuba. Suspicions run deep among Cuban leaders and any inferences to government reform, albeit noble,
will impede meaningful relations. Human rights advocacy, free trade and limited business opportunities in
Cuba may be more plausible and could eventually encourage the long-term changes U.S. wants in Cuba.
The embargo
itself remains a perpetual albatross that continues to undermine any real diplomatic progress between nations. A series
of coercive measures designed to topple the Castro regime began with U.S. – led efforts to expel Cuba from the Organization of American States
(OAS) in January 1962 followed by trade prohibitions on imports and exports to Cuba by the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control
(OFAC). 17 This was achieved by leveraging an existing 1954 OAS Caracas Resolution designed to prevent trade with communist countries
called Trading with the Enemy.18 After bilateral sanctions are established, U.S. pursued broader international support by 10enacting the October
1962 Battle Act prohibiting U.S. assistance to any country that traded with Cuba. An early attempt to persuade the North American Treaty
Organization (NATO) nations to comply with the embargo yielded limited success.19 However, a new perceived security threat brought on by
the Cuban Missile Crises in late 1962 gave U.S. the leverage it needed in February 1964 to convince NATO nations to effectively cease trade
with Cuba. In July 1964, OAS followed NATO’s lead; U.S. had succeeded in isolating Cuba from its western traders.20
Tightening the noose placed extraordinary economic pressure on Cuba considering U.S. multilateral efforts reduced western trade by 73% in
1964. Cuba was obliged to subsidize this deficit with the Soviet Union and China between1961 – 1973. This trend continued by enticing Latin
American and other western countries like Canada and England in the 1980s and following the Soviet fall in the 1990s.21Commensurately,
Presidential administrations have loosened and tightened the embargo repeatedly as the climate between nations improved or deteriorated. The
Cuban Defense Act in 1992 and the Helms Burton Act in 1996 tightened embargo restrictions signaling continued U.S. intentions to remove the
Castro regime. But the U.S. - led embargo played right into Castro’s hand. Castro accused the U.S. calling it “another economic aggression” and
stating that Cubans would have to undergo “long years of sacrifice.”22 By demonizing U.S. policy, he was able to galvanize Cuban support
during the toughest times. The embargo helped create the American enemy, removing any popular support for rebellion and elevating Castro’s
struggle to a legitimate Cuban struggle.11Castro was also complicit in the failure to mend U.S. – Cuba relations. Hiscontinued attempts to export
communism began in Africa with a total 55,000 troops in Angola and Ethiopia by 1978. He focused efforts closer to Latin America by supporting
Puerto Rican independence movement in 1975, the Sandinistas overthrow in Nicaragua in 1979 and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation
(FMLN) in El Salvador. Cuba’s support to Columbia’s M19 (Columbian Election Day April 19, 1970) guerilla movement labeled Cuba a “state
sponsor of terrorism” in 1982.23 Castro’s expansion efforts fueled U.S. security paranoia and prevented several overt efforts by the Carter
Administration to improve relations with Cuba. In April 1980, an incident at the U.S. Mission in Havana led 120,000 Cubans to depart Mariel
Port by boat to the U.S.24 The incident better known as the “Mariel Boatlift” became the tipping point that inhibited further relations with Cuba.
Despite the growing tensions between the U.S. and Cuba, trade between the west and Cuba increased. NATO compliance with U.S. - brokered
trade restrictions broke down after 1966 in particular due to British and Canadian opposition. U.S. efforts to use the OAS embargo to influence
the United Nations also failed. In 1974, Latin American leaders pushed to end the OAS embargo. In 1975 the OAS lifted the embargo with Cuba
and the embargo returned to a bilateral embargo now condemnedby most western countries.25 In 1982, Cuba’s failing economy led Castro to
pursue western trade with a renewed vigor. By “1987, more than 370 firms from twenty-three European, Latin American, and Asian countries
participated in Cuba’s largest ever annual trade fair.”26
Castro’s interest in improving U.S. - Cuba relations was perhaps the greatest from 1982-1988. Castro made statements in 1982 to resume talks
with the U.S.; he took back more than 1000 Mariel Boatlift criminals that came to the U.S. in 1987 and pulled troops out of Angola in 1988 to
mention a few. These rare moments and apparent seams in Castro’s armor were left unanswered by the Reagan and Bush Administrations.
Instead renewed efforts to continue ratcheting a now largely ineffective bilateral embargo served only to increase animosity between both
countries.
It is difficult to quantify, but essential to note, that U.S. action over the years seems to support a hatred for Fidel Castro that interferes with any
attempt to established diplomatic relations with Cuba. If true, to neglect this assumption could undermine any efforts to reverse our seemingly
punitive approach. Perhaps it can be traced to his support for a Soviet-style communism. After all, few things in 1960 America were feared and
despised more than communism. Any country affiliated with the communist movement became an affront to the American way of life.
Furthermore, Americans shed blood in Cuba during the 1898 Spanish American War leading to Cuban Independence in 1902.27 Fidel Castro
became evil’s face in Cuba and any attempt to partner with Castro seemed equally tainted. Fast forwarding to the present, with communism no
longer a threat, perhaps it’s time to let the anger fade and deal with Cuba for its’ diplomatic merit not past indiscretions. The question remains
whether clear objectiveness leads U.S. diplomatic efforts with Cuba? It is important to note that what’s at stake here is U.S. national interests and
not the legacy of Fidel Castro.
Another important pitfall is to exploit democracy as a precondition for diplomacy and economic engagement in Cuba. If democracy is virtuous,
then why must we exploit it? It casts a negative shadow on a positive change in government. There is a common perception that U.S. policy with
regards to security and stability can only exist under the precondition of a “Democratic Cuba”. It has prevented any real progress in U.S. – Cuba
relations because of well placed fears that we mean to subvert the Cuban government. A popular Cuban American lobby group, The Cuban
American National Foundation summarizes traditional U.S. beliefs towards Cuba. They suggest, “U.S. – Cuba policy should focus on (1)
advancing U.S. interests and security in the region and (2) empowering Cuban people in their quest for democracy and prosperity…that these are
“intertwined and one cannot be individually accomplished without the other.”28 The recommendation then focuses largely on steps to pursue a
democratic Cuba.
To separate security and stability from democratic pursuits in Cuba could benefit both causes. Focusing on better diplomatic relations could
further democracy as a byproduct of increased exposure to open markets, businesses and globalization. China is a good example. The U.S. has
diffused tensions with China by exposing them to open markets. Although they continue to embrace communism, their version of communism
has been somewhat diluted as they modified their business practices, trade and other aspects to compete in the global marketplace. If you take
into account that Cuba’s Growth National Product (GDP) decreased by 4% since 2006 while their debt grew by 16% to almost $20B in 2008,
Cuba certainly has incentive to do the same.29 By imposing democracy we jeopardize diplomatic avenues to our principal security and stability
pursuits. To assuage the Cuban America position on this issue may be simpler today than 10 years ago. Today’s younger Cuban-American
generation is more amenable to closer relations with Cuba. The anger carried by their immigrant forefathers14after 50 years may be passing and
perhaps the time is right to leverage this new Cuban American generation to open dialogue with Cuba without the democratic preconditions tied
to negotiations.
As we pursue diplomatic relations with Cuba we should not expect full disclosure, immediate results and a Cuban government anxious to please
the U.S. We should expect a cautious and limited first engagement that appears noticeably weighted in U.S. effort. Let us assume the U.S. makes
significant diplomatic and economic concessions but Cuba is less willing to provide some reciprocal offering. U.S. policy could conclude that
Cuba has no genuine desire to consummate new diplomatic relations and diplomacy could fail. It is imperative to understand that the U.S. has
done most of the “taking” and hence will, at least for the near future, do most of the “giving”. A steady, patient and continued engagement is
needed until Cuba has the confidence to commit to further diplomatic relations.
Current U.S.-Cuba Policy Analysis
Understanding the deep-seated animosity and distrust that continues to fuel U.S. - Cuba tensions will aid us in properly analyzing the feasibility,
acceptability and suitability (FAS) of current and future U.S. policy with Cuba. Identifying FAS applications to diplomacy, information, military,
economic, finance, intelligence and law enforcement (DIME-FIL) will highlight weaknesses in current U.S. – Cuba relations that can be modified
for future improvement.
The logical question with regards to current U.S. – Cuba policy is whether it’s feasible to continue the current policy. At least for the foreseeable
future, the answer is yes. It equates to doing nothing diplomatically, militarily and economically. Perhaps this 15option is appealing given a
robust domestic agenda and U.S. involvement in two wars. According to Professor Schwab and other experts however, the U.S. has lost the
information campaign targeted at the Cuban people. It has only, “buttressed Fidel’s popularity in Cuba and elsewhere, which eviscerates the very
purposes the embargo was set up for.”30 It’s like the classic biblical story of David triumphing over Goliath – the bigger the oppressor the greater
the victory. True or not, Fidel has made the case successfully to the Cuban people. While it’s feasible for the U.S. to pursue the current course
there is no evidence it will succeed.
How acceptable is it to U.S. foreign policy? There are three elements of national power that highlight our current policy: diplomacy, economy
and law enforcement. It is subjective to evaluate acceptability strictly in terms of current national power invested and subsequent pay offs in
foreign policy. U.S. needs international cooperation to achieve the coercive effects that only complete economic strangulation can accomplish.
This is tough to do and North Korea and Iran bear this true. If we look at it from a broader international and economic perspective we can begin
to see why it’s not acceptable. Take a UN General Assembly vote renouncing the U.S.-led embargo on Cuba for instance; since1992 there has
been overwhelming vote to end the embargo.31 In essence, it has garnered sympathy for Castro and encouraged western nations like Canada and
Spain to continue open relations with Cuba. Even if the embargo could work, U.S. diplomacy has failed to yield the international tourniquet
needed to bring change in Cuba. Applying economic force without first garnering the necessary diplomatic support failed to achieve intended
changes succeeding instead in hurting the Cuban people it hoped to protect. Whether or not an embargo can work in Cuba is suspect but
succeeding without international support is impossible. Since the embargo hinges on a larger multinational participation, international and not just
U.S. acceptability is necessary to achieve U.S. ends in Cuba.
Several embargo refinements over the years like the Libertad Act have further tightened restrictions on Cuba. These restrictions have placed a
heavy burden on the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) particularly in Miami. A 2007
GAO report highlights these burdens and how they impede other more important Law Enforcement activities in defense of the homeland.32 GAO
findings suggest there’s a real need to balance U.S. paranoia for “everything Cuba.” This rebalancing purports an unacceptable cost-benefit to the
current law enforcement aspect of the embargo. It diminishes our greater need to defend against terrorist, criminals and other real threats to our
national security. In essence, our efforts to impose embargo restrictions are unacceptable tradeoffs for homeland security.
In the final analysis, U.S. – Cuba policy is not sustainable because it has failed to meet desired national ends: Cuban democracy and human
rights. Prior to 1989, the U.S. could make the argument that the embargo contained communism and generally marginalized the Castro
government. It failed however, to depose Fidel Castro and democratize the Cuban government. A post Cold War Cuba no longer poses a threat to
the U.S. - communism is contained and Cuba is still under embargo. Despite a 50-year failure to affect change in Castro’s government, our policy
with regards to Cuba remains unchanged. We have foregone diplomatic engagement and chosen coercive economic power as our only political
tool.
Does Cuba Pose A Security Threat to the U.S.?
Let’s begin by asking this question: can we afford to escort commerce through Caribbean waters from Cuban pirates? This sounds as farfetched
as an attack from an Afghan-based Al-Qaida using commercial airliners to destroy the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. This scenario while
unexpected is completely contrary to our policy objectives in Cuba. The greater possibility that “something” unfavorable happens in Cuba that
threatens U.S. national interests is certainly more relevant. Although Cuba poses no traditional threats to the U.S., geographically, their 90-mile
proximity should concern us. Our proximity to Cuba assures U.S. involvement, be it voluntary or involuntary, in a major crisis. Consider a
disease outbreak that begins in Cuba over a break down in hygiene, government pollution or other misfortune attributable to economic strife. The
disease has no boundaries and quickly reaches the Florida shores via travelling Cuban American citizens. This scenario could be mitigated or
even preventable under the auspices of better relations. Aside from the obvious medical benefits a partnership provides, established
communications with Cuba would likely prevent an uncontrolled spread in the U.S. There are definite advantages to having healthy regional
partnerships to deal with regional problems.
While economic pressure has failed to bring about government change, it could trigger a government collapse. If Cuba becomes a “failing” or
“failed state” we could see a huge refugee flood into the U.S., increased crime and drug trafficking across U.S. borders, and renewed security and
stability issue in the region. In 1980, 120,000 Cuban refugees fled Mariel and 20,000 more in 1994 after Cuba declared an open immigration
policy.33 From 2004 – 2007, 131,000 Cubans have made residence in the U.S. Almost 38,000 settled in Florida alone in 2006. Although it’s mere
speculation to presume Cuba will fail, if it did, there is no question where Cubans would seek refuge. A failed state could eventually draw U.S.
involvement into nation building in Cuba taking a greater toll on our national resources. This scenario, while unexpected, is completely contrary
to our policy objectives in Cuba. Current U.S. policy is no longer a sustainable option to achieving our national interests in Cuba. Until
realignment can bring national policy back in line with national interests, conditions will not exist for real change in U.S. – Cuba relations.
Proposed U.S.-Cuba Policy Analysis
If today marks President Obama’s “new strategy” towards Cuba we must begin with U.S. National interests in the broader Latin American
context. Over the past 50 years our approach has been germane to Cuba and not the larger Latin American construct. In so doing we have isolated
Cuba from Latin America for coercive reasons yes, but also for the very democratic principles we hoped Cuba would follow.
The State Department’s Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (covers Canada and Cuba) has set the following goals for the region: “Economic
partners that are democratic, stable, and prosperous; Friendly neighbors that help secure our region against terrorism and illegal drugs; Nations
that work together in the world to advance shared political and economic values.”34 To simplify these goals, let us just say stability, economic
prosperity and democracy. Using these as a benchmark, I propose our new diplomatic strategy towards Cuba must be similar - achieve economic
stability, security and a representative government as the “end state” goal and not the prerequisite for engagement. President Obama can
implement this policy by first building American and Congressional support for engagement. He should establish a formal infrastructure that
communicates to Cuba and the International Community at large that we’re serious about diplomatic engagement with Cuba. Finally, we must
loosen embargo restrictions and expose Cubans to U.S. open markets, business opportunities and 21st Century living. This combination will
improve relations with Cuba by regaining their trust, improving their living conditions and exposing them to the democratic enticements we hope
they will emulate.
Achieving Congressional approval will be difficult although not impossible in the present economic recession. The economic benefits associated
with new business opportunities in Cuba can encourage skeptics in Congress to mobilize. As a counterargument to a continued embargo, the
President can point to the dangers associated with failed states like Somalia inadvertently caused by the very environment sanctions create. A
strong communication strategy to gain American support coupled with a softening Cuban American stance, shrouded in economic opportunity,
could encourage Congressional dialogue and resolution. President Obama can succeed if he sets realistic goals and expresses these to the
American public before the media or his opposition defines these.
We’ve established that coercive means have failed to achieve democracy and economic stability in Cuba. I’m suggesting there is another
mutually beneficial alternative. Using China as an example, their exposure and need to compete in free global markets broadened their horizons
and shifted their hard line communist approach to international diplomacy. This was a feat that coercive diplomacy has not accomplished in
Cuba. Yet we still have civil disagreements with China on human rights issues, Taiwan’s right to independence and other contentious issues
without resorting to coercive measures. Why should Cuba receive different treatment? The confusion lies with our tendency to impose democracy
as a precondition for diplomatic relations. How can Cuba subscribe to small business practices, a free economy building block, if business
opportunities are not available? Diplomatic engagement and economic encouragement has a better chance. Cuba’s economic condition
incentivizes their willingness to begin diplomatic negotiations. The U.S. should begin by focusing efforts to establish diplomatic relations through
incentives rather than coercion. We must also set the democratic precondition aside to pursue when the relationship matures and trust is
reestablished. Exposing them to new opportunities will eventually, through their own discovery and U.S. shepherding, lead them to a more
representative government.
If we accept that reestablishing relations with Cuba is the first real step to a democratic end-state then the
first action must be to appoint an Ambassador to Cuba. This diplomatic gesture signals that U.S. is
serious about foreign relations. The Ambassador’s first actions must include setting the conditions with
Cuba to allow a loosening of embargo restrictions. President Obama, in the spirit of multilateralism,
should pursue international solidarity since some countries enjoying exclusive trade with Cuba would
certainly protest the immediate competition. Choosing a time-phased removal would protect U.S. assets
and interests in the remote possibility that Cuba fails to comply with the agreed bi-national or
international terms. It might also sooth domestic and partisan anxiety regarding open trade with Cuba.
President Obama must accomplish this early in his first term to allow time to reap success or mitigate
failure before the next elections.
The U.S. cannot afford to miss another opportunity to normalize relations with Cuba. A Cuba without
Fidel is an opportunity – whether it is Raul or his replacement in 2013. The U.S. must lay the foundation
today for renewed U.S. Cuba relations. Delaying could also signal the contrary to Raul Castro
suspiciously awaiting the true purpose of recent U.S. concessions.
While a long term goal may be to influence change in government, it cannot be the basis for initial
success and continued diplomacy. With diplomatic patience and a prosperous Cuba, we have reason to
believe, like China and Russia that capitalism will prevail over communism. But new politicians and a
younger generation of Americans who measure success between terms and administrations will not
understand if results aren’t immediate or commensurate to U.S. efforts. Instead, the strategy pursued must
occur with a measured diplomatic optimism that insures immediate setbacks don’t derail the restoration of
trust that must occur before complete reciprocation can be expected.
Conclusion
Today, 20 years have passed since the fall of the Berlin Wall – it’s time to chip away at the diplomatic
wall that still remains between U.S. and Cuba. As we seek a new foreign policy with Cuba it is imperative
that we take into consideration that distrust will characterize negotiations with the Cuban government. On
the other hand, consider that loosening or lifting the embargo could also be mutually beneficial. Cuba’s
need and America’s surplus capability to provide goods and services could be profitable and eventually
addictive to Cuba. Under these conditions, diplomacy has a better chance to flourish.
If the Cuban model succeeds President Obama will be seen as a true leader for multilateralism. Success in
Cuba could afford the international momentum and credibility to solve other seemingly “wicked
problems” like the Middle East and Kashmir . President Obama could leverage this international
reputation with other rogue nations like Iran and North Korea who might associate their plight with
Cuba.35 The U.S. could begin to lead again and reverse its perceived decline in the greater global order
bringing true peace for years to come.
Solving bilateral trade is sufficient. If it’s not, the aff doesn’t solve either – it
deosn’t lift the travel ban and doesn’t give back Guantanamo
Koenig, 10 – US Army Colonel, paper submitted for a Masters in Strategic Studies at the US Army War
College (Lance, “Time for a New Cuba Policy” http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA518130)
The option with the greatest possibility of success and reward for the United States is to support the
Cuban people, but not the Cuban government. The United States should take the following actions
unilaterally:
• Lift completely the economic embargo. Establish banking and financial relationships to facilitate the
trading of goods and services between the two countries.
• Lift completely the travel ban to allow not only Cuban-Americans with relatives but also all other
Americans to travel to Cuba. This interaction of Americans with Cubans will help raise the awareness of
Cubans about their northern neighbor.
• Next, the United States should engage the Cuban government to develop a bilateral trade agreement.
The goal of this initiative would be to achieve normal trade relations between the two countries.
This leaves the issue of compensation for United States companies and individuals whose property was
expropriated by the Cuban government. With the embargo lifted, the United States should enlist the
assistance of the European Union and Canada to apply pressure to Cuba as well as to assist in
negotiations with the World Trade Organization to address issues with illegally confiscated property.36
The United States will gain leverage with the Cuban government as relations improve, and that will be
the time to address human rights in Cuba. The return of the Cuban Five, a group of Cuban spies arrested
and convicted in Florida, should be worth some human rights concessions. In Cuba, these men are known
as the “Cinco Heroes” and their plight is well known.37
So what leverage do we have now that we have unilaterally given the Cuban government most of what
they have wanted? Offer to return back to Cuba the Guantanamo Naval Base after the government of
Cuba shifts towards a representative orm of government. The foundation for this action has already been
laid with the Libertad Act. “The future of the Guantanamo base, a provision in the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 states that once a democratically elected Cuban government is in
place, United States policy is to be prepared to enter into negotiations either to return the base to Cuba or
to renegotiate the present agreement under mutually agreeable terms.” 38 The United States Congress
should soften the language referring to a democratically elected government and instead substitute that a
representative form of government is required before entering into negotiations for the Guantanamo base.
Once Cuba makes changes towards a representative form of government the United States can start
working on democratic reforms. The carrot is to offer Cuba, in exchange for changes to a democratic
form of government, support for their return to the Organization of American States (OAS). Until Cuba
makes changes towards democracy, the United States should block the request of several member states
to let Cuba into the organization. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said it well in a recent interview.
“Many member countries originally sought to lift the 1962 suspension and allow Cuba to return
immediately, without conditions, others agreed with us that the right approach was to replace the
suspension — which has outlived its purpose after nearly half a century — with a process of dialogue and
a future decision that will turn on Cuba’s commitment to the organization’s values.”39 These values
include promoting democracy and defending human rights.
The window of opportunity is open now for this type of change. The Obama administration has taken
some steps in this direction with the lifting of remittance limits, unlimited visits to relatives in Cuba, and
the ability to provide cell phones to relatives in Cuba. The other recent change is the new majority of
Cuban-Americans, in Florida, that support removal of the embargo. Based on votes in the United Nations
and the European Union it is clear that world opinion would definitely be supportive of this action. The
combination of the above mentioned events now points to an opportunity to make real progress that will
benefit both nations. The United States would gain in soft power, gain an additional economic trading
partner, and have a chance to influence the type of changes in the Cuban government as the Castro
influence wanes. Clearly, support to the Cuban people will indirectly provide support to the Cuban
government, but that could work against the regime as well if the people realize that improvements in
their living conditions are not the result of communism, but from the interaction with the capitalist world.
There is a sound reason for unilaterally lifting the trade and travel embargoes without first seeing
positive actions from the Cuban government . From Cuba expert Carlos A. Saladrigas, Co-Chairman,
Cuba Study Group, “We can go back in the history -- in the 50-year history of United States-Cuba
relations and clearly see that any time we begin to see a little bit of relaxation of tensions in the
relationship, whenever we begin to see a little bit of openness on the part of the United States or Cuba,
historically the Cuban government has done something to counteract that trend and significantly revert
back to their playbook.” 40 The United States needs to take the initiative away from the Castro regime,
and have them react to actions they have publicly called for (removal of the embargo), but in reality are
unsure of the second and third order effects and their ability to control the outcome.
One of the first problems for the Cuban government after the removal of the embargo will be the excuse
for the poor performing economy. “… the embargo and the United States policy of confrontation and
isolation have been incredibly useful to the Cuban regime as an alibi for the failures of the regime to meet
the fundamental needs of the people on the island, but also is a significant source of legitimacy, both
internal and external.” 41 This situation may present the United States with the opportunity to step in to
assist with market reforms if the Cuban economy sputters and the government realizes they don’t have a
scapegoat.
Conclusion
The efforts expended by the United States to keep the embargo effective, the loss of trade, and the loss of
soft power in most of the world are clearly not worth it in comparison to the threat that Cuba poses today.
The gains to be achieved by following any path other than the unilateral removal of the economic and
travel embargoes are small in comparison to the overall costs of continuing the current failed policy. The
United States is losing far too much soft power in its efforts to punish and isolate the government of
Cuba. American firms could be left out of any economic gains as Cuba continues to grow its economy.
As Cuba emerges from the economic difficulties of the last two decades, the United States has an
opportunity to influence the future direction of our southern neighbor. The current United States policy
has many passionate defenders, and their criticism of the Castro regime is justified. Nevertheless, we must
recognize the ineffectiveness of our current policy and deal with the Cuban regime in a way that enhances
United States interests.42
The United States cannot afford to miss out on the window of opportunity to affect a positive change in
the relationship with Cuba. If Cuba is able to continue on a path of economic progress and emerge once
again as a true regional power, with communism intact, the United States will be the loser in this half
century struggle. Cuba is spreading its limited influence to Venezuela, Honduras, Nicaragua, and will be
ready to bring in any other countries in the Americas that want to move away from the United States
orbit. The United States can’t stand by and watch Cuba regain strength, intact as a communist country,
but must take this opportunity to create an inflection point for Cuba that guides her onto a path that will
benefit the nations of the Americas.
Any step short of unconditional removal won’t create the same symbol of multilateralism
Vivanco 6- LLM from Harvard Law School, Americas director of Humans Rights Watch
(Jose Miguel, “Restraint, not force, will bring change to Cuba”, humans rights watch, 12/22/06,
http://www.hrw.org/news/2006/12/21/restraint-not-force-will-bring-change-cuba, google scholar)//KW
This reluctance would be understandable but misguided. Most Cubans do want change. If they do not call
for it after Mr Castro's death, it will be largely for the same reason they did not during his lifetime: the
country's repressive machinery, which ruined countless lives, remains intact today.
If the international community misreads this silence, it will miss a historic opportunity. Immediately after
Mr Castro's death, the Cuban government will be more vulnerable to pressure for change than ever
before. Raúl Castro, who has already taken over the reigns of power, may wield the same old instruments
of repression. But he will not enjoy his brother's revolutionary stature, which at times has been as vital as
the repression for perpetuating the regime. This window of opportunity is unlikely to last. Raul Castro
may never match his brother's unique combination of personal charisma and political cunning; yet, he
could easily acquire the other trait that Fidel exploited so effectively: the heroic image of the Latin
American David confronting the US Goliath.
Whether Raúl Castro can claim the "David" role will depend largely on Washington. He will be virtually
guaranteed the part if the Bush administration stays the 40–year course of unilateral embargo and
unconditional ultimatum. It is hard to think of a policy that has a longer track record of failure. Cuba is no
more open now than when the embargo was first imposed four decades ago. If anything, the policy
consolidated Mr Castro's hold by giving his government an excuse for its problems and a pretext for its
abuses. Moreover, because the policy was imposed in such heavy–handed fashion, it enabled Mr Castro to
garner sympathy abroad , neutralising international pressure rather than increasing it. While other
governments may have been concerned about political repression in Cuba, they were unwilling to be
seen as siding with a bully.
To its credit, the Bush administration responded to news of Mr Castro's decline in August with surprising
restraint, with President George W. Bush saying Cuba's citizens should determine their future. But if
Washington hopes for influence in Cuba, it must do much more. First, it will need to lift the embargo.
Nothing short of this will work , not even the "calibrated response" espoused by the Clinton
administration, in which the US would ease the embargo in response to Cuban reforms. Why would the
Cuban government make concessions when the embargo helps keep it in power?
Yet, it would be naïve to think the embargo's end would prompt the Cuban government to change its
ways. Instead, a more measured and multilateral approach is needed, in which other governments in the
region take the lead in pressing Cuba to respect political freedoms. Finding allies willing to assume this
role will not be easy. But it may be the only hope for real change. By making the effort, the US could
begin to reverse the dynamic that helped keep Mr Castro in power. Only when the US stops acting like
Goliath will Cuba stop looking like David.
CP Solves Sugar
CP solves Sugar
Soligo & Jaffe, 10, their 1ac card– Rice Scholar at the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University AND
Wallace S. Wilson Fellow in Energy Studies at Rice University (Ronald AND Amy Myers, Cuba's Energy Future Strategic Approaches to
Cooperation, p. )//NG
The Structure of an Ethanol Industry If Cuba decides to develop an ethanol industry it will have to decide on how
to
structure it. In particular, it will have to decide on the relative roles of the Cuban state and private citizens as
well as the role of foreign companies . There are several models that Cuba can choose from. One is to resuscitate a national,
state-owned sugar industry with the addition of state-owned biorefineries. Sugarcane would be grown on state farms and cooperatives, processed
in state-owned biorefineries, and marketed by an agency of the government. Past experience suggests that the state has not been able to
operate the sugar industry in a cost-competitive way. Recent land reforms are motivated by that experience. Agriculture
depends on rapid decisionmaking in response to changing location-specific information such as weather patterns, soil conditions, and pest
infestations. Successful agriculture depends on decentralized decisionmaking with proper incentives given
to the decentralized manager, a lesson learned in all highly centralized economies. In addition to these efficiency
considerations, the Cuban government would have great difficulty in raising the enormous amounts of capital
necessary to revive large-scale sugar cultivation and construct biorefineries and other needed
infrastructure if these were to be solely within the state sector. Another option is to follow the policies
used in the oil and nickel industries, where foreign private firms currently operate. These firms provide
the technology, management expertise, and capital, while the state provides labor. Workers would have to be well
paid and well treated— otherwise this approach might be politically difficult, since it would hark back to the sugar plantations of the
prerevolution years. Under this model Cuba is able to get access to needed resources, yet still maintain “control” of the industry and the
egalitarian income policies that characterize the Cuban socialist model. Finally, Cuba can continue its agricultural reforms
and
encourage sugarcane cultivation by individual farmers or cooperatives who could sell their output to
biorefineries owned and operated by privately owned domestic or foreign firms. This option might
attract foreign capital and expertise in the biorefinery end of the industry, but it is difficult to see where private and
cooperative farms would get access to the large amount of capital needed to rebuild the agricultural capacity of the country. Farmers would
require access to credit to purchase inputs needed in the cultivation of sugarcane. In the absence of U.S.
sanctions, Cuba would have access to the resources from the international banking institutions (World
Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank), but resources from these institutions come with controls and constraints that
the Cuban government would find uncomfortable. Furthermore, relying on more independent farmers would also create a class of private and
cooperative farmers whose incomes would not be subject to state control, and could lead to income inequalities.
CP Solves Ag
The plan jumpstarts US investment in Cuban organoponics – causing a widespread
global urban agricultural revolution
Shkolnick, 12 - J.D. Candidate, Drake University Law School (Jacob, “SIN EMBARGO: n1 THE CUBAN AGRICULTURAL
REVOLUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR THE UNITED STATES” 17 Drake J. Agric. L. 683, Fall, lexis)
VI. New Opportunities While investment in Cuban businesses and sales or purchases of Cuban
products must still
move through official channels under the joint venture law or other Cuban programs, the time is ripe for
organizations in the United States to begin laying groundwork for closer ties with Cuban agricultural
entities. Recent regulatory changes implemented by the U.S. government provide a means for individuals
and businesses to begin forming the relationships with their Cuban counterparts that will lead to future
trade opportunities. n161 As previously mentioned, recent changes in U.S. policy now allow for any individual in
the United States, not simply relatives, to donate money to Cuban citizens, though not to exceed $ 500 for any three month
consecutive period, with the only restriction being that the recipient is not an official in the Cuban [*704] government or the Communist Party.
n162 Specifically written into these new regulations is the idea that these remittances may be spent "to
support the development of private businesses." n163 A five hundred dollar infusion of capital to support a fledging
business or farm can be enormously beneficial when the average monthly salary is only 448 pesos, or approximately twenty dollars. n164
Additional capital will enable small Cuban farms to expand operations by hiring additional help or
perhaps purchasing additional farm animals. While purchasing a tractor may seem like an obvious choice
for a growing farm, Medardo Naranjo Valdes of the Organoponico Vivero Alamar, a UBPC just outside of Havana, indicated that
farm animals such as oxen would remain the preferred choice for the foreseeable future on the small and
midsized farms that make up the majority of the newer agricultural cooperatives. n165 Not only do farm
animals not require gasoline or incur maintenance costs beyond perhaps an occasional veterinarian
charge, their waste can be used as fertilizer. Apart from additional labor, funds provided to agricultural cooperatives could be put
to use in developing innovative pest control techniques that do not require the use of expensive pesticides or other chemicals. The Vivero Alamar
is currently experimenting with a variety of natural pest control techniques such as introducing plants that serve as natural repellents to insects
and the introduction of other insects that feed on harmful pests without harming the crops. n166 Investment in agricultural
cooperatives done in this manner will likely fail to see much return on the investment for their foreseeable future,
until policies in both the United States and Cuba are changed. n167 For a relatively small sum, American investors will
get not only the benefit of a close relationship with a Cuban farm that will become a new source of both
import and export business in the future, but potentially gain access to innovative agricultural techniques
that could be used in the United States immediately. n168 Because the logistical structure needed to
transport goods from large rural farms into city markets remains underdeveloped, urban and suburban agriculture
makes up a growing portion of the food produced and consumed in Cuba. n169 As in other countries, the population trends in Cuba have
continued to shift away from rural areas to more concentrated urban and suburban areas, with about [*705] three-fourths of Cubans living in
cities. n170 With this shift in population has also come a shift in the country's agricultural system. As of 2007, about 15% of all agriculture in
Cuba could be classified as urban agriculture. n171 Not only have agricultural practices changed, but eating habits have as well. Without the
Soviet Union to provide a ready source of income and the machinery needed to engage in large-scale livestock production, vegetable
consumption has increased dramatically. n172 Nearly every urban area has direct access to a wide variety of locally grown, organic produce.
n173 Many of the urban farms in Cuba, including the Vivero Alamar, make use of organoponics, a system where crops are produced in raised
beds of soil on land that would otherwise be incapable of supporting intensive agricultural production. n174 Many of these raised beds can be
constructed in a concentrated area to support a wide variety of produce, with the typical organoponic garden covering anywhere from one half to
several hectares in size. n175 The rise of the organoponic production method was a shift away from the earlier centralized production model
employed by the state. It has been supported through intensive research and development by a variety of state agencies, such as the National
Institute of Agricultural Science, and continued development has been guided through intensive training and educational programs. n176 The
organoponic system is not limited in its application to Cuban urban farms, but maintains potential to be applied worldwide, including in the
United States. Urban agriculture in Cuba revitalized and put to use previously abandoned and unused land. A similar approach could be applied to
the United States as a means to restore blighted areas. n177 Applying Cuban-derived organoponics in U.S. cities could potentially open up an
enormous amount of land that was previously unusable. From a business perspective, investing in an organoponic agricultural program in the
United States is also a sound decision since the demand for local produce reached $ 4.8 billion in 2008 and is only expected to grow further,
potentially reaching $ 7 billion in 2012. n178 [*706] In an American city beset with high unemployment such as Detroit, Michigan, for example,
investing in urban agriculture could potentially generate as many as five thousand new jobs. n179 By utilizing Cuba's system of organoponics, the
need to use expensive and complex farm machinery could be significantly reduced. Already companies in the United States,
such as Farmscape Gardens in southern California, recognize what Cuba's organoponic system could
achieve and have integrated it into their business practices. n180 Rachel Bailin, a partner in the company,
indicated that it was Cuba's organic farming practices that helped inspire them to start a company devoted
to urban agriculture. n181 They have already used Cuba's organoponic farming methods to produce more
than 50,000 pounds of produce since the spring of 2009. n182 The potential for future growth in this industry is huge, as
Farmscape Gardens' current levels of production make it the largest urban agriculture company in the state of California. n183 Cuba not only
offers attractive prospects for trading in the future, but methods of agriculture pioneered out of necessity have broad prospects if applied to
agriculture in the United States. As the demand for locally grown produce continues to increase, a cost-effective and proven agricultural model
like Cuba's organoponic system may be just what is needed to allow for urban agriculture to flourish.
CP solves Ag
Boughner and Coleman, 02 - Office of Industries, U.S. International Trade Commission (Devry S. Boughner and Jonathan R. Coleman,
“Normalizing Trade Relations with Cuba: GATT-compliant Options for the Allocation of the U.S. Sugar Tariff-rate Quota”, The Estey Centre
Journal of International Law and Trade Policy, http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/23911/1/03010046.pdf)//GPastor
The freehold buying and selling of residential real property became legal in Cuba on November 10, 2010,
marking a major milestone on the island’s road to economic liberalization. The Cuban government is
encouraging the creation of small businesses and private farming. More than 180,000 “self-employment” licenses have
been issued since 2010, and the government has turned over four million acres of land to 143,000 private farmers
since 2008. Today there are over 350,000 small private farmers in Cuba, producing 57 percent of the food
consumed on the island and 60 percent of agricultural exports on just 24 percent of the land. The Cuban state
owns more than 70 percent of the arable land on the island, of which some 50 percent lies fallow. Yet even this situation is changing as economic
reforms accelerate. Last month, Cuban authorities announced that the island’s private farmers would be eligible to receive land grants extending
to 67 hectares (170 acres), up from the current maximum of thirteen hectares (33 acres). Cuba’s private farmers are an
entrepreneurial class with growing disposable income. Cuba buys imported foreign goods, including new
automobiles (now also legal), and are eager to sell its agricultural products to the United States. Sadly, Cuban
agricultural products are still banned from import into the USA. Cuban private farmers and businessmen think this is
ironic considering that the U.S. has exported nearly USD four billion worth of food and agricultural products to Cuba since 2001 . While the
U.S. will undoubtedly seek to help stabilize Cuba economically when relations are ultimately normalized,
it will be constrained by Washington’s massive budget deficit and significantly reduced foreign aid
allocations. Official U.S. policy is to encourage the growth of Cuba’s private sector as a means of
developing democratic institutions. The U.S. government could concretely help the development of
Cuba’s private sector – at no cost to the U.S. taxpayer – by introducing legislation that would allow
preferential market access for Cuban agricultural products before the official end of the trade
embargo against Havana. This most likely would require that the U.S. implement preferential (including
protected) trade access for the island’s products, which are of agricultural origin and would not compete
with products traditionally grown in the U.S. The U.S. has a history of providing development assistance
and preferential trade access to developing countries, particularly to its Latin American and Caribbean
neighbors. Several existing programs offer special access to the U.S. market for certain agricultural and manufactured goods from developing
countries. Specifically, the U.S. has developed a Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), in addition to several regional preferential trade
programs, such as the Caribbean Basin Initiative, the Andean Trade Preference program and the African Growth and Opportunity program. The
President retains ultimate decision-making authority as to which countries and products are eligible for GSP status. There are certain mandatory
criteria that countries must measure up to in order to be considered eligible for GSP treatment. Of particular interest with respect to
Cuba, communist countries are not eligible for GSP treatment “unless the country receives Normal Trade
Relations (NTR) status, is a World Trade Organization (WTO) member and a member of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), and is not dominated by international communism.”
CP Solves transition
Private sector key to Cuba’s economy
Stephens and Laverty, 2011- Center for Democracy in the Americas Collin has a magnificent combination of traits; he is an
intellectual, a quintessential American whose personal relationships run deep among Cubans, and a loyal friend to CDA. Sarah Stephens,
Executive Director of CDA, “Cuba’s New Resolve Economic Reform and its Implications for U.S. Policy”
What More Can Be Done in Cuba to Make the Reforms Succeed? http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/CDA_Cubas_New_Resolve.pdf)//GP
Unresolved issues in Cuba’s economic program that the government is likely to address in what might be
called Phase 2 include: • Steps at the macro-level to identify existing sectors for reinvestment that were
previously “de-capitalized,” productive sectors such as oil production and bio-technology that can do better, or new endeavors that can
be cultivated to create wealth; • Steps to increase productivity by clarifying the roles and powers of producers and heads of enterprises
to make autonomous decisions; • Steps to ensure that credit and capital are available for business formation and
expansion, and that non-state enterprises are connected, to large scale production for supply chains; • Steps at
the micro-economic level to provide training in entrepreneurship for Cubans who want to start their own businesses; • Steps to develop a national
tax system that is understood and followed by individuals and companies, public and private. Cuba’s caution—its concern about making changes
too quickly that fall too harshly on the population and which may not work—is understandable. Whether it can afford cash transfer and income
supports, recommended by a number of outside analysts including at the Brookings Institution,125 or connect more Cubans to sources of
remittances from overseas, remains to be seen. President Castro promised at the 6th Party Congress “The Revolution will not leave
any Cuban helpless.”126 Keeping this commitment to Cuba’s most vulnerable will help sustain the Cuban public as it faces the difficult
times that lie ahead.
Privatization stops OFAC resources from being allocated to Cuba
Dickerson 10 – Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, paper submitted in fulfillment of a Master of Strategic Studies Degree at the US Army
War College (Sergio M, “UNITED STATES SECURITY STRATEGY TOWARDS CUBA,” 1/14/10,
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a518053.pdf)//GPastor
Experts argue over who’s started the dispute between nations: was it the Cuban Agrarian Reform Act in 1959 that nationalized agrarian land in Cuba to include U.S.
owned lands? Could it have been Cuba’s decision to resume trade with the Soviet 9Union that led to a U.S. imposed embargo on Cuba in 1960? Perhaps the bigger
issue was how diplomatic, economic and military efforts by both countries continued to aggravate already strained relations.16 In
1961, Cuban exiles
supported by the Central Intelligence Agency failed to topple the Castro government. The Bay of Pigs
fiasco sent Cuba a clear signal that the U.S. was not interested in negotiation. Castro answered immediately by allowing
Soviets to position nuclear missiles in Cuba, threatening U.S. vital security and leading to the Cuban Missile Crises. These intentions have survived to the present
undermining any attempt to pursue common interest and reduce tensions. The underlying fear that U.S. remains committed to toppling the Cuban
government constitutes the first diplomatic pitfall in U.S. – Cuban relations. For this very reason, democratic reform will not succeed as a
diplomatic bargaining tool with Cuba. Suspicions run deep among Cuban leaders and any inferences to government reform, albeit noble, will
impede meaningful relations. Human rights advocacy, free trade and limited business opportunities in Cuba
may be more plausible and could eventually encourage the long-term changes U.S. wants in Cuba. The
embargo itself remains a perpetual albatross that continues to undermine any real diplomatic progress between nations. A series of
coercive measures designed to topple the Castro regime began with U.S. – led efforts to expel Cuba from the Organization of
American States (OAS) in January 1962 followed by trade prohibitions on imports and exports to Cuba by the U.S.
Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). 17 This was achieved by leveraging an existing 1954 OAS Caracas Resolution
designed to prevent trade with communist countries called Trading with the Enemy.18 After bilateral sanctions are established, U.S. pursued broader international
support by 10enacting the October 1962 Battle Act prohibiting U.S. assistance to any country that traded with Cuba. An early attempt to persuade the North American
Treaty Organization (NATO) nations to comply with the embargo yielded limited success.19 However, a new perceived security threat brought on by the Cuban
Missile Crises in late 1962 gave U.S. the leverage it needed in February 1964 to convince NATO nations to effectively cease trade with Cuba. In July 1964, OAS
followed NATO’s lead; U.S. had succeeded in isolating Cuba from its western traders.20
Solves gradually
Stephens and Laverty, 2011- Center for Democracy in the Americas Collin has a magnificent combination of traits; he is an
intellectual, a quintessential American whose personal relationships run deep among Cubans, and a loyal friend to CDA. Sarah Stephens,
Executive Director of CDA, “Cuba’s New Resolve Economic Reform and its Implications for U.S. Policy”
What More Can Be Done in Cuba to Make the Reforms Succeed? http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/CDA_Cubas_New_Resolve.pdf)//GP
In the final analysis, ending the embargo and normalizing relations with Cuba ought to be a foreign policy priority of the United States. As Steve
Clemons, editor at-large of The Atlantic, noted: “Failure of the U.S. to finally snuff out the last vestiges of the Cold War in the U.S.-Cuba
embargo signals impotence in American strategic vision and capability. Those who support the embargo undermine the empowerment of Cuban
citizens, harming them economically and robbing them of choices that could evolve through greater engagement—exactly what we have seen in
transitioning communist countries like Vietnam and China.”133 In the interim, these recommendations could make an important difference. They
would put the interests of the United States into alignment with the humanitarian interests of the Cuban people, send a long overdue message of
encouragement to the advocates of reform on the island, and demonstrate that our country is finally ready to move beyond Cold War policies of
the past and modernize our approach toward Cuba for the 21st Century. None of these actions would sit well with the hardest of the hardliners in
the Cuban American community or their representatives in Washington. Their terms of surrender for Cuba, as Phil Peters pointed out in his
Cuban Triangle Blog, are written into the statutes of the U.S. embargo. In Congress, legislators including Representatives Mario Díaz-Balart,
David Rivera and others, are trying to reverse President Obama’s travel reforms, dialing back family travel and remittances to the levels imposed
by President Bush.134 They will certainly fight actions that loosen restrictions to help push along Cuba’s economic reforms. Nevertheless, we
believe that the political dynamic of the Cuban American community has already shifted—many have moved from supporting isolation and
aggression toward the island’s government to building on family ties and helping their relatives prosper and live more autonomous lives in
Cuba’s new economic environment. The potential for home ownership in Cuba, and the U.S. expansion of travel and remittances, are enabling
Cuban Americans to invest in the goal of helping Cuba succeed. But this effort should go far beyond the Cuban family. It should become the
motivating force behind U.S. policy. These changes are in the broad national interest of the United States, and it is time for our policy makers to
respond affirmatively and creatively to the process of reform underway in Cuba today.
Increased private sector involvement in Cuba solves regime collapse/Cuban stability
best
Hidalgo and Vasquez, 09 - Vasquez the director of the Cato Institute’s Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity. He is a member of
the Mont Pelerin Society and has been a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Prior to joining the Cato Institute in 1992, Vásquez
worked on inter-American issues at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and Caribbean/Latin American Action, Hidalgo is a Policy
Analyst on Latin America at the Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity. Previously he was Latin America director of the International Policy
Network. Juan Carlos Hidalgo and Ian Vasquez, “Cato Handbook for Policymakers” http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/catohandbook-policymakers/2009/9/hb111-57.pdf)//GPastor
In 1996, Congress passed the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act, a bill that President Clinton had threatened to
veto but instead signed into law in the aftermath of the downing of two U.S. civilian planes by Cuban fighter jets in international
airspace. The Unintended Consequences of a Flawed Policy The Libertad Act, better known as the Helms-Burton Act for its
sponsors Sen. Jesse Helms (R-NC) and Rep. Dan Burton (R-IN), is
an ill-conceived law. It grants U.S. citizens
whose property was expropriated by Castro the right to sue in U.S. courts foreign companies and
citizens ‘‘trafficking’’ in that property (Title III). That right—not granted to U.S. citizens who may
have lost property in other countries—is problematic because it essentially extends U.S. jurisdiction
to the results of events that occurred in foreign territory. By imposing sanctions on foreign companies profiting from property
confiscated by the Castro regime, the Helms-Burton Act seeks to discourage investment in Cuba. However,
while Helms-Burton may have slowed investment in the island, U.S. allies (in particular Canada,
Mexico, and members of the European Union) have not welcomed that attempt to influence their
foreign policy by threat of U.S. sanctions. Consequently, they have repeatedly threatened to impose retaliatory sanctions
and to take the United States to the World Trade Organization. In May 1998, the Clinton administration and the European Union reached
a tentative agreement that would exclude citizens of EU countries from Titles III and IV (denying entry visas to the
executives of companies ‘‘trafficking’’ in confiscated property) of the Helms-Burton Act in exchange for
guarantees from the EU not to subsidize investments in expropriated properties. The Bush administration continued the policy of
repeatedly waiving Title III of the act. But because only Congress can repeal Titles III and IV, the possibility that the EU will impose
retaliatory sanctions or take the United States to the WTO remains. That confrontation has risked poisoning U.S. relations with
otherwise friendly countries that are far more important than Cuba to the economic well-being and security of the United States.
Moreover, the embargo continues to be the best—and now the only— excuse that the communist regime has for its failed policies.
Cuban officials, who have estimated the cumulative cost of the embargo at more than $40 billion, incessantly condemn U.S. policies for
causing the meager existence of their people, even though Cuba accepted more than $100 billion in subsidies and credits from the Soviet
Union during their three-decade relationship and has received approximately $12 billion in the form of subsidized oil from Venezuela’s
Hugo Cha´vez since 1999. Elizardo Sa´nchez Santa Cruz, a leading dissident in Cuba, has aptly summed up that strategy: ‘‘[Castro]
wants to continue exaggerating the image of the external enemy which has been vital for the Cuban Government during decades, an
external enemy which can be blamed for the failure of the totalitarian model implanted here.’’ Ironically, the embargo has also become
somewhat of a U.S. security liability itself. A recent report by the Government Accountability Office points out that enforcing the
embargo and travel ban diverts limited resources from homeland security that could be used to keep terrorists and criminals out of the
United States. The GAO report warned that arrival inspections from Cuba intended to enforce the embargo are ‘‘straining Customs and
Border Patrol’s capacity to inspect other travelers according to its mission of keeping terrorists, criminals, and inadmissible aliens out of
the country.’’ Undermining of Tyranny through Free Exchange Aiming to increase agricultural productivity, Rau´l Castro has introduced
reforms such as transferring idle state-owned land to individual farmers and authorizing state stores to sell supplies and equipment
directly to private producers. Even before those measures took place, the agricultural productivity of the nonstate sector (comprising
cooperatives and small private farmers) was 25 percent higher than that of the state sector. As Cuban farmers increase their
efficiency and productivity, normal trade ties with the United States would benefit them directly by
opening up a market of 300 million consumers. Ending the embargo could contribute to democracy
in Cuba by empowering a nascent private sector that is increasingly independent of the
government. Other recent reforms—such as new licenses for private bus and taxi operators and lifting bans on the consumption of
electronic appliances—may encourage this development. As a Hoover Institution study pointed out: ‘‘In time, increasing amounts [of
expanded tourism, trade, and investment] would go beyond the state, and although economics will not single-handedly liberate Cuba, it
may contribute some to that end. This is so, in part, because the repressive Cubans within the state apparatus are subject to influences
that can tilt their allegiances in positive ways.’’ Even though Cuba—unlike other communist countries with which the United States
actively trades, such as China or Vietnam—has not undertaken substantial market reforms,
an open U.S. trade policy is
likely to be more subversive of its system than is an embargo. Proponents of the Cuban embargo
vastly underestimate the extent to which increased foreign trade and investment can undermine
Cuban communism even if that business is conducted with state entities. Replacing the allencompassing state with one that allows greater space for voluntary interaction requires
strengthening elements of civil society, that is, groups not dependent on the state. That development is more
likely to come about in an environment of increased interaction with outside groups than in an
environment of increased isolation and state control.
AT: Perm Do Both
The perm includes “federal engagement” – triggers link to DAs
---Tanks solvency because perceived as promoting regime change
---overstretches state department
---spends USFG dollars – triggers USAID tradeoff and politics links
AT: Perm Do CP / “We are Only Private”
Severs “its” – in the plan “its” refers to “federal government” – that’s distinct from
removing restrictions for private sector interaction
Independently, “its” is exclusive – all of the CP solvency arguments CAN’T be
topical components of the aff
Brent 10 – attorney
(“Reply Brief on Threshold Issues of Cricket Communications, Inc.,” online: http://psc.ky.gov/PSCSCF/2010%20cases/201000131/20100602_Crickets_Reply_Brief_on_Threshold_Issues.PDF)
Upon this unstated (and inaccurate) premise AT&T asserts that “the ICA was already extended”; id. at 14, and “the ICA Cricket seeks to
extend was extended by Sprint . . . .”; id. at 15, and, finally, “Cricket cannot extend the same ICA a second time . . . .” Id. (emphasis
added in all). Note that in the quoted portions of the AT&T brief (and elsewhere) AT&T uses vague and imprecise language when
referring to either the Sprint Kentucky Agreement, or the Cricket Kentucky Agreement, in hopes that the Commission will treat the two
contracts as one and the same.¶ But it would be a mistake to do so. The contract governing AT&T’s duties and obligations with Sprint is
a legally distinct and separate contract from that which governs AT&T’s duties with Cricket. The Sprint Kentucky Agreement was
approved by the Commission in September of 2001 in Case Number 2000-00480. The Cricket Kentucky Agreement was approved by
the Commission in September of 2008 in Case Number 2008-033 1.¶ AT&T ignores the fact that these are two separate and distinct
contracts because it knows that the merger commitments apply to each agreement that an individual telecommunications carrier has
with AT&T. Notably, Merger Commitment 7.4 states that “AT&T/BellSouth ILECs shall permit a requesting telecommunications
carrier to extend its current interconnection agreement . . . . As written, the commitment allows any carrier to extend “its” agreement.
Clearly, the use of the pronoun “its” in this context is possessive, such that the term “its” means - that particular carrier’s agreement with
AT&T (and not any other carrier’s agreement). Thus, the merger commitment applies to each agreement that an individual carrier may
have with AT&T. It necessarily follows then, that Cricket’s right to extend its agreement under Merger Commitment 7.4 is separate and
distinct right from another carrier’s right to extend its agreement with AT&T (or whether such agreement has been extended).
Severance is a voting issue – kills competition and skews block strategy
The counterplan isn’t topical – means they can’t permute to do the CP. Perms must
include a topical element, otherwise they haven’t proven the resolution sufficient if
the optimal policy is non-topical.
Here are the things that the plan includes and the counterplan excludes:
a) No diplomacy
Fields 7 – PhD in IR @ USC, senior analyst at the Department of Defense
(Jeff, “Adversaries and Statecraft: Explaining U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Rogue States,” p. 304)//BB
I define engagement as a diplomatic posture that employs direct
(even if it is at a low level)
political contact as a strategy to foster cooperation, build confidence, reduce tensions, or to
create a space for further interaction.1 ' I separate the use of¶ incentives from the definition, though positive incentives can
be an important part of an engagement strategy. Engagement in and of itself without the use of incentives can signal a willingness to
cooperate on issues or at a minimum that relations between two states are important enough to maintain a vehicle for direct diplomacy.
The United States has engaged Syria for many years. Even after Washington recalled its ambassador in 2005 the
talk with Syria about regional matters. The negotiations that eventually
disarmed Libya took place in secret over the course of a decade - while Washington and Tripoli did not have diplomatic
relations. These are notable cases of engagement that stand in contrast the episodes of isolation of Iran and North Korea.
United States continued to
b) No State Department – prefer it because it’s specific to “its economic relations”
Ambrose 7 – M.A. Candidate in International Development at The Fletcher School
(Jennifer, “Summer Internship,” http://cmcholocaustcenter.blogspot.com/2007/07/summer-internship.html)//BB
Thanks to support from the Center, I have had the opportunity this summer to live in Washington, DC, and intern at the
U.S.
Department of State. I am working in the Bureau of African Affairs, which I selected because of my interest in Africa and issues
relevent to the continent, such as economic development, public health, and human rights. The Bureau placed me on its Economic Policy
Staff, the office that conducts all of the U.S. government's economic relations with sub-Saharan Africa.
This placement has turned out to be a great way for me to combine my interests in economic development, foreign aid, and international
trade.
c) No USAID
US Department of State 8
(“Country Reports on Terrorism 2007,” http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2007/104118.htm)//BB
The U.S. strategy of Total Economic Engagement pursues economic reform,
rule of law, and global
economic integration, including countries with predominantly Muslim populations. Total Economic Engagement
includes:
•
Regular bilateral discussions on these topics with host government officials, with both U.S. Embassy officials
and officials from a wide range of U.S. agencies participating;
•
Formal structured dialogues, high-level Economic
Dialogues, and Trade and Investment Framework
Agreement (TIFA) Councils;
U.S. bilateral and multilateral assistance programs for economic reform, trade capacitybuilding, and rule of law managed chiefly through USAID, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), and the
State Department's Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI). Programs are often complemented with technical assistance
•
provided by specialized U.S. agencies and offices;
•
Coordinated multilateral policies and assistance strategies to advance reform goals by
working with such
international organizations as the (IMF, WB, World Trade Organization (WTO), and OECD (MENA-OECD Investment), and
other multilateral donors; and
•
Working with NGOs, such as Transparency International, and U.S. and foreign business associations, such as American
Chambers of Commerce and Business Councils, to advance reform issues of mutual concern.
Prefer our interpretation – they get advantages based on federal engagement –
predictable because that’s the rez.
Governmental engagement includes aid
Peterson 12 – PhD @ GA Tech, Professor of Marketing @ Wyoming
Mark, “Sustainable Enterprise: A Macromarketing Approach,” p. 454
Aid in the Context of Total Overseas Economic Engagement
Since 1950. support for aid has gone up and down. But since 9/11, support for aid has surged as governments of developed
countries became keen to stabilize the development of poor countries during the fight against global terrorism (Hiddell, 2007, p. 5). The
total aid given by developed country governments to developing countries doubled from $52 billion in 2001 to $ 100 billion in 2005.
But
government aid is just one part of the total economic engagement of developed countries
with developing countries. Figure 14 1 depicts private investment, official Mows, remittances, and private philanthropy of
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries to developing countries from 1099 to 2009 (Hudson
Institute, 2011. p 15) As shown, official flows to developing countries was the top component in overall
economic engagement in 1991, but in 2009, it was only the third-leading element in overall economic engagement at $120
billion Private investment (foreign direct investment by firms) topped all elements in 2009 at $228 billion, while remittances (money
sent back home from expatriates working overseas) came in second at $1 71 billion. Private philanthropy came in fourth at $53 billion in
200** using the more complete data of the Hudson Institute's Center for Global Prosperity (CGP).
The Cuban government recognizes the difference between the plan and the
counterplan
Lucio and Crespo, 97 – Lucio: born in cuba and graduated from Harvard College and Harvard Law. He was chairman of the
International Business Committee of the Florida Bar International Law and is a member of the Board of Directors of the World Trade Center
(Saturnino E. Lucio II and Nicolás Crespo “IMPACT OF THE HELMS-BURTON LAW (THE CUBAN LIBERTY ACT) ON CUBAN
TOURISM” http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume7/pdfs/Crespo2.pdf)//GP
Cuba’s government has exploited the so-called U.S. embargo to present itself as a victim of imperialist U.S. policies. Noticeably, it has
always referred to the U.S. Government as a separate entity, somehow divorced from the people of the United States. In contrast, the
Cuban Government and the people of Cuba, they claim, are one and the same. There is, it is argued, a tacit and permanent mandate from
the Cuban people to allow the Cuban Government to act on its behalf. Perhaps this would explain the implicit acceptance of the
deprivation of the Cuban people of any meaningful opportunity to visit the tourism installations in Cuba or to develop, invest in, own,
manage, and enjoy the fruits of their work in the tourism industry. Perhaps it may also justify why foreigners and any of their foreign
employees may own shares on their employers’ equity and participate in their profits while the Cubans are not themselves allowed to do
so. It seems that the Helms-Burton Law is used as an argument to perpetrate this inequity.
Reference c-x, or any of the ev below.
AT: Perm Do CP – 1ac Evidence that Supports Competition
Double bind – either they link to Dip Cap or they don’t solve multilateralism
Dickerson 10, their 1ac card – Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, paper submitted in fulfillment of a Master of Strategic Studies Degree at the US
Army War College (Sergio M, “UNITED STATES SECURITY STRATEGY TOWARDS CUBA,” 1/14/10,
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a518053.pdf)//GPastor
If we accept that reestablishing relations with Cuba is the first real step to a democratic end-state then the first action must be to appoint an
Ambassador to Cuba. This diplomatic gesture signals that U.S. is serious about foreign relations. The Ambassador’s first actions must include
setting the conditions with Cuba to allow a loosening of embargo restrictions. President Obama, in the spirit of multilateralism, should pursue
international solidarity since some countries enjoying exclusive trade with Cuba would certainly protest the immediate competition. Choosing a
time-phased removal would protect U.S. assets and interests in the remote possibility that Cuba fails to comply with the agreed bi-national or
international terms. It might also sooth domestic and partisan anxiety regarding open trade with Cuba. President Obama must accomplish this
early in his first term to allow time to reap success or mitigate failure before the next elections. The U.S. cannot afford to miss another
opportunity to normalize relations with Cuba. A Cuba without Fidel is an opportunity – whether it is Raul or his replacement in 2013. The U.S.
must lay the foundation today for renewed U.S. Cuba relations. Delaying could also signal the contrary to Raul Castro suspiciously awaiting the
true purpose of recent U.S. concessions. While a long term goal may be to influence change in government, it cannot be the basis for initial
success and continued diplomacy. With diplomatic patience and a prosperous Cuba, we have reason to believe, like China and Russia that
capitalism will prevail over communism. But new politicians and a younger generation of Americans who measure success between terms and
administrations will not understand if results aren’t immediate or commensurate to U.S. efforts. Instead, the strategy pursued must occur with a
measured diplomatic optimism that insures immediate setbacks don’t derail the restoration of trust that must occur before complete reciprocation
can be expected. Conclusion Today, 20 years have passed since the fall of the Berlin Wall – it’s time to chip away at the diplomatic wall that still
remains between U.S. and Cuba. As we seek a new foreign policy with Cuba it is imperative that we take into consideration that distrust will
characterize negotiations with the Cuban government. On the other hand, consider that loosening or lifting the embargo could also be mutually
beneficial. Cuba’s need and America’s surplus capability to provide goods and services could be profitable and eventually addictive to Cuba.
Under these conditions, diplomacy has a better chance to flourish. If the Cuban model succeeds President Obama will be seen as a true leader
for multilateralism. Success in Cuba could afford the international momentum and credibility to solve other seemingly “wicked problems”
like the Middle East and Kashmir. President Obama could leverage this international reputation with other rogue nations like Iran and North
Korea who might associate their plight with Cuba. 35 The U.S. could begin to lead again and reverse its perceived decline in the greater global
order bringing true peace for years to come.
Aff increases diplomatic relations with Cuba
Dickerson 10, their 1ac card – Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, paper submitted in fulfillment of a Master of Strategic Studies Degree at the US
Army War College (Sergio M, “UNITED STATES SECURITY STRATEGY TOWARDS CUBA,” 1/14/10,
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a518053.pdf)//GPastor
It is difficult to quantify, but essential to note, that U.S. action over the years seems to support a hatred for Fidel Castro that interferes with any
attempt to established diplomatic relations with Cuba. If true, to neglect this assumption could undermine any efforts to reverse our seemingly
punitive approach. Perhaps it can be traced to his support for a Soviet-style communism. After all, few things in 1960 America were feared and
despised more than communism. Any country affiliated with the communist movement became an affront to the American way of life.
Furthermore, Americans shed blood in Cuba during the 1898 Spanish American War leading to Cuban Independence in 1902.27 Fidel Castro
became evil’s face in Cuba and any attempt to partner with Castro seemed equally tainted. Fast forwarding to the present, with communism no
longer a threat, perhaps it’s time to let the anger fade and deal with Cuba for its’ diplomatic merit not past indiscretions. The question remains
whether clear objectiveness leads U.S. diplomatic efforts with Cuba? It is important to note that what’s at stake here is U.S. national interests and
not the legacy of Fidel Castro. Another important pitfall is to exploit democracy as a precondition for diplomacy and economic engagement in
Cuba. If democracy is virtuous, then why must we exploit it? It casts a negative shadow on a positive change in government. There is a common
perception that U.S. policy with regards to security and stability can only exist under the precondition of a “Democratic Cuba”. It has prevented
any real progress in U.S. – Cuba relations because of well placed fears that we mean to subvert the Cuban government. A popular Cuban
American lobby group, The Cuban American National Foundation summarizes traditional U.S. beliefs towards Cuba. They suggest, “U.S. – Cuba
policy should focus on (1) advancing U.S. interests and security in the region and (2) empowering Cuban people in their quest for democracy and
prosperity…that these are “intertwined and one cannot be individually accomplished without the other.”28 The recommendation then focuses
largely on steps to pursue a democratic Cuba. To separate security and stability from democratic pursuits in Cuba could benefit both causes.
Focusing on better diplomatic relations could further democracy as a byproduct of increased exposure to open markets, businesses and
globalization. China is a good example. The U.S. has diffused tensions with China by exposing them to open markets. Although they continue to
embrace communism, their version of communism has been somewhat diluted as they modified their business practices, trade and other aspects
to compete in the global marketplace. If you take into account that Cuba’s Growth National Product (GDP) decreased by 4% since 2006 while
their debt grew by 16% to almost $20B in 2008, Cuba certainly has incentive to do the same.29 By imposing democracy we jeopardize
diplomatic avenues to our principal security and stability pursuits. To assuage the Cuban America position on this issue may be simpler today
than 10 years ago. Today’s younger Cuban-American generation is more amenable to closer relations with Cuba. The anger carried by their
immigrant forefathers14after 50 years may be passing and perhaps the time is right to leverage this new Cuban American generation to open
dialogue with Cuba without the democratic preconditions tied to negotiations. As we pursue diplomatic relations with Cuba we should not
expect full disclosure, immediate results and a Cuban government anxious to please the U.S. We should expect a cautious and limited first
engagement that appears noticeably weighted in U.S. effort. Let us assume the U.S. makes significant diplomatic and economic concessions but
Cuba is less willing to provide some reciprocal offering. U.S. policy could conclude that Cuba has no genuine desire to consummate new
diplomatic relations and diplomacy could fail. It is imperative to understand that the U.S. has done most of the “taking” and hence will, at least
for the near future, do most of the “giving”. A steady, patient and continued engagement is needed until Cuba has the confidence to commit to
further diplomatic relations. Current U.S.-Cuba Policy Analysis Understanding the deep-seated animosity and distrust that continues to fuel
U.S. - Cuba tensions will aid us in properly analyzing the feasibility, acceptability and suitability (FAS) of current and future U.S. policy with
Cuba. Identifying FAS applications to diplomacy, information, military, economic, finance, intelligence and law enforcement (DIME-FIL)
will highlight weaknesses in current U.S. – Cuba relations that can be modified for future improvement. The logical question with regards to
current U.S. – Cuba policy is whether it’s feasible to continue the current policy. At least for the foreseeable future, the answer is yes. It equates
to doing nothing diplomatically, militarily and economically. Perhaps this 15option is appealing given a robust domestic agenda and U.S.
involvement in two wars. According to Professor Schwab and other experts however, the U.S. has lost the information campaign targeted at the
Cuban people. It has only, “buttressed Fidel’s popularity in Cuba and elsewhere, which eviscerates the very purposes the embargo was set up
for.”30 It’s like the classic biblical story of David triumphing over Goliath – the bigger the oppressor the greater the victory. True or not, Fidel
has made the case successfully to the Cuban people. While it’s feasible for the U.S. to pursue the current course there is no evidence it will
succeed. How acceptable is it to U.S. foreign policy? There are three elements of national power that highlight our current policy: diplomacy,
economy and law enforcement. It is subjective to evaluate acceptability strictly in terms of current national power invested and subsequent pay
offs in foreign policy. U.S. needs international cooperation to achieve the coercive effects that only complete economic strangulation can
accomplish. This is tough to do and North Korea and Iran bear this true. If we look at it from a broader international and economic perspective we
can begin to see why it’s not acceptable. Take a UN General Assembly vote renouncing the U.S.-led embargo on Cuba for instance; since1992
there has been overwhelming vote to end the embargo.31 In essence, it has garnered sympathy for Castro and encouraged western nations like
Canada and Spain to continue open relations with Cuba. Even if the embargo could work, U.S. diplomacy has failed to yield the international
tourniquet needed to bring change in Cuba. Applying economic force without first garnering the necessary diplomatic support failed to
achieve intended changes succeeding instead in hurting the Cuban people it hoped to protect. Whether or not an embargo can work in Cuba is
suspect but succeeding without international support is impossible. Since the embargo hinges on a larger multinational participation, international
and not just U.S. acceptability is necessary to achieve U.S. ends in Cuba.
Aff increases diplomacy with Cuba
Dickerson 10, their 1ac card – Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, paper submitted in fulfillment of a Master of Strategic Studies Degree at the US
Army War College (Sergio M, “UNITED STATES SECURITY STRATEGY TOWARDS CUBA,” 1/14/10,
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a518053.pdf)//GPastor
The State Department’s Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (covers Canada and Cuba) has set the following goals for the region: “Economic
partners that are democratic, stable, and prosperous; Friendly neighbors that help secure our region against terrorism and illegal drugs; Nations
that work together in the world to advance shared political and economic values.”34 To simplify these goals, let us just say stability, economic
prosperity and democracy. Using these as a benchmark, I propose our new diplomatic strategy towards Cuba must be similar - achieve economic
stability, security and a representative government as the “end state” goal and not the prerequisite for engagement. President Obama can
implement this policy by first building American and Congressional support for engagement. He should establish a formal infrastructure that
communicates to Cuba and the International Community at large that we’re serious about diplomatic engagement with Cuba. Finally, we must
loosen embargo restrictions and expose Cubans to U.S. open markets, business opportunities and 21st Century living. This combination will
improve relations with Cuba by regaining their trust, improving their living conditions and exposing them to the democratic enticements we hope
they will emulate. Achieving Congressional approval will be difficult although not impossible in the present economic recession. The economic
benefits associated with new business opportunities in Cuba can encourage skeptics in Congress to mobilize. As a counterargument to a
continued embargo, the President can point to the dangers associated with failed states like Somalia inadvertently caused by the very environment
sanctions create. A strong communication strategy to gain American support coupled with a softening Cuban American stance, shrouded in
economic opportunity, could encourage Congressional dialogue and resolution. President Obama can succeed if he sets realistic goals and
expresses these to the American public before the media or his opposition defines these. We’ve established that coercive means have failed to
achieve democracy and economic stability in Cuba. I’m suggesting there is another mutually beneficial alternative. Using China as an example,
their exposure and need to compete in free global markets broadened their horizons and shifted their hard line communist approach to
international diplomacy. This was a feat that coercive diplomacy has not accomplished in Cuba. Yet we still have civil disagreements with China
on human rights issues, Taiwan’s right to independence and other contentious issues without resorting to coercive measures. Why should Cuba
receive different treatment? The confusion lies with our tendency to impose democracy as a precondition for diplomatic relations. How can Cuba
subscribe to small business practices, a free economy building block, if business opportunities are not available? Diplomatic engagement and
economic encouragement has a better chance. Cuba’s economic condition incentivizes their willingness to begin diplomatic negotiations. The
U.S. should begin by focusing efforts to establish diplomatic relations through incentives rather than coercion. We must also set the democratic
precondition aside to pursue when the relationship matures and trust is reestablished. Exposing them to new opportunities will eventually,
through their own discovery and U.S. shepherding, lead them to a more representative government.
AT: CP Doesn’t Go to Cuban SOIs
CP solves – it allows trade between the all actors besides the USFG. The phrase
“engage Cuba” is in both the plan and the counterplan – so the recipient actor is
equivalent.
AT: CP Uses the USFG
USFG acting is different than USFG engaging. The CP prevents any federal
interaction, and lets the private sector create interlinkages and boost growth
AT: Plan Solves Regime Change
Our link is perception based – USAID is PERCEIVED as having democratic-strings
attached – triggers backlash even if the intent of the plan is benign
Eaton 10 –
(Tracey, “Factions spar over U.S. aid for Cuba,” Houston Chronicle, http://www.chron.com/opinion/outlook/article/Factions-spar-over-U-S-aidfor-Cuba-1702985.php)//BB
But U .S.
government programs
aimed at helping dissidents and boosting democracy in Cuba remain
controversial in both Havana and Washington. Cuban authorities see the pro-democracy programs
as an attempt at regime change. And they say they have living proof: Alan Gross, a development worker who was detained in
Cuba one year ago this month and accused of distributing illegal satellite communication gear. ¶ Gross, 61, of Potomac, Md., was
working for a U.S. subcontractor that was carrying out a pro-democracy program on behalf of the U.S. Agency for
International Development, or AID.¶ The agency has spent at least $140 million on pro-democracy programs in Cuba since
1996. AID says it has used the money to help dissidents, political prisoners and their families, to
strengthen civil society organizations, and to improve the flow of information to and from the island.¶ Ads by
Google¶ Syrian Orphan Sponsorship¶ For $50 a month, you can sustain a Syrian orphan who lost everything¶ www.ssfusa.org¶ Fun Brain
Test Games¶ Test and Improve your Brain With Scientifically Designed Exercises¶ www.lumosity.com¶ World War 2 Photos¶ Explore
Photos of Historical Events With the Google Cultural Institute.¶ google.com/culturalinstitute¶ "There are many groups and individuals
inside and outside Cuba who believe the funds are useful in supporting their ability to carry out their activities and promote fundamental
freedoms …" AID responded to a request for comment for this story.¶ Some critics question the legality of AID programs in Cuba.
"Sadly, I believe Alan
Gross may stay in jail
a long time,
as long as these programs continue ,"
said Tony Martinez, editor of the United States Cuba Policy & Business blog. "I see the
key to unlocking his freedom lies
in our ending these covert and subversive programs."¶ Defenders of the programs scoff at that kind of talk. They say the
Obama administration needs to strengthen - not weaken - its support for Cuban dissidents. But as pro-democracy advocate Frank Calzon
sees it, American diplomats have adopted a policy of "aggressive niceness" toward the socialist government. ¶ "The message they are
sending on the ground is that they don't care about Cuba's dissidents anymore and that's music to the regime's ears," said Mauricio
Claver-Carone, a board member of the pro-embargo U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC.¶ A source who is knowledgeable about U.S. programs
in Cuba found that accusation puzzling. American diplomats spend a "huge amount of time and effort … supporting civil society
issues."¶ AID programs in Cuba have been under fire since 2006 when the Government Accountability Office said some
grantees had kept poor records and misused funds, buying such items as Nintendo Gameboys, cashmere sweaters and Godiva
chocolates.¶ The trouble continued in 2008 when Felipe Sixto admitted stealing more than a half million dollars while working at the
Center for a Free Cuba, a major recipient of AID funds. ¶ Some of the agency's critics, including Sen. John Kerry, D-Mass., and Rep.
Howard Berman, D-Calif., have demanded greater accountability.¶ "These programs were a mess for a long time. Nobody
knew where the money was going, who was getting it, whether any of it was getting to the island," said a congressional source who
asked not to be identified.¶ "The programs are undergoing a course correction. The intent is to make them less hostile," the source said.
But hard-line activists and officials are "fighting tooth and nail to keep them as they were under Bush." ¶ Reversing Bush policies has
been a struggle, a former State Department officer agreed.¶ "The bureaucracy has basically hijacked this policy, which then
puts the political people in the position of trying to wrestle it away from them. But, boy, that's like taking cocaine from an addict."¶ AID
supporters, meantime, have accused Secretary of State Hillary Clinton of paralyzing the agency. ¶ "When it comes to Cuba, the recent
actions by the regime to arrest an American citizen have totally frozen our actions," said Sen. Robert Menendez, D-N.J., during an
exchange with Clinton in February. "Are we going to have a permanent freeze …? Is that the policy of the State Department?" ¶ No,
Clinton replied, but "an intense review" is under way.¶ These bureaucratic tangles have slowed disbursement of AID
funds. Only in recent months has the agency been distributing $15.62 million that was budgeted for the 2009 fiscal year that ended
Sept. 30, 2009.¶ "The vast majority of this money is intended for individuals on the ground in Cuba," said an AID statement that was
posted on the Internet. "Our objective is to maximize the amount of support that benefits Cubans on the island. Since the $15.62 million
in fiscal year 2009 funds has recently been programmed, it is too early to have a precise figure at this point, but the overall goal is to
have the funds directly benefit Cubans on the island."¶ The AID statement caught the eye of Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez,
who read parts of it before the United Nations General Assembly on Oct. 26. Cuba "will change everything that needs to be changed, for
the benefit of Cubans, but we will not ask the U.S. government's opinion," he said. "We freely chose our destiny." ¶ Fidel Castro
reiterated the foreign minister's speech on Nov. 1 and vowed
that U.S. measures would not defeat the Cuban
revolution. Cuba scholars Nelson Valdes and Saul Landau question whether aggressive U.S. tactics during the Bush
administration violated U.S. law. They contend that American officials in Havana were trying to create chaos
to undermine the socialist government. Instead, Cuban authorities arrested Roque and 74 other pro-democracy activists in
March 2003 and sent them to jail.
AT: CP Links to Politics
New federal engagement costs capital –
Link differentials matter – if the CP links less, there is less likelihood CIR is
influenced
PRIVATE engagement is popular
Bipartisan support for easing the embargo
Weinmann 2004- Master of international affairs from the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University
(Lissa,“Washington's Irrational Cuba Policy”, World Policy Institute, Spring 2004, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40209899, JSTOR)//KW
Just as the Cuban- American community and Florida are changing, so is the
U.S. Congress. Sentiment among lawmakers has shifted dramatically in favor of easing the embargo
on Cuba. The passage of the 2000 Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act, which lifted the ban on food sales to
Cuba, was propelled chiefly by farm-state Republicans, one of the leaders being the former senator from Missouri, John
Ashcroft. The new law encourages those who doubted the embargo could be eased in an election year. Momentum has continued to
build. Fifty-two members of the House and twelve senators have formed bipartisan Cuba working
groups action on Cuba, which function as caucuses to help rally action on Cuba.
Congress: The Real Battleground
The public supports lifting the embargo
Holmes, 10– B.A. from Georgetown, Master’s Thesis (Michael G., June 21, 2010, “Seizing the Moment”,
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/553334/holmesMichael.pdf?sequence=1, pg. 64-65)//NG
With the exception perhaps of the Cuban American Lobby,
there will be little to no backlash from the American public
resulting from the removal of the embargo. However even within the large Cuban-exile community, which has
traditionally been pro-embargo, many have changed course and begun to see the benefit of lifting the embargo. A
2009 poll of 400 Cuban- Americans conducted by the Miami Herald, found that 41 percent of those
polled were against the United States maintaining the embargo. 40 percent felt the embargo should remain and 19
percent were undecided.
4 Although 41 percent
is not a super majority, it is a majority. Furthermore when presented with sound data highlighting
undecided 19 percent could be persuaded to see the longterm benefits of this policy change. Those Cuban-Americans and lobbyist who continue to support the
embargo, such as the Center for A Free Cuba will tend to argue that removing it simply rewards the Castro regime.
the benefits of removing the embargo versus keeping it, the
Furthermore by rewarding the regime in this way the United States encourages it to continue to behave in the manner in which it has for so many
decades. The flaw in this argument is clearly that leaving the embargo in place has produced the very result
pro-embargo Cuban Americans are trying to discourage.
Majority of Americans support lifting the embargo
Gavel 10 - Associate Director for Media Relations & Public Affairs at Harvard Kennedy School of Government (Douglas, “Changing
Course: Using American Soft Power to Affect U.S.-Cuban Relations”, Harvard University UMI Dissertations Publishing, ProQuest)//ID
American citizens have varied interests in regard to U.S.-Cuban relations. While a vocal minority of Cuban Diaspora in the United States
remain adamantly
opposed to renewing relations with the Cuban government, at least not before major structural changes occur
Americans are quite supportive of the idea. A 2009 public opinion survey
found that a clear majority of the American people, 59 percent, believe that it is “time to try a new
approach to Cuba, because Cuba may be ready for a change.” Seventy-five percent favored dialogue
between top government officials and 69 percent of those surveyed told pollsters that they favored re-establishing diplomatic
relations between the two countries.25 These data provide rather unambiguous evidence of American public support for changing the
United States‟ current Cuba policy and seem to clearly indicate that the American people would back U.S. government
efforts to push forward with reengagement with Havana.
(see further analysis below), most
Plan popular among Florida Cuban Americans
Safran 2012 -Master of Science in Global Affairs (with distinction) at New York University
(Brian, “End the Cuban Embargo”, 2012, http://brian-safran-4.quora.com/End-the-Cuban-Embargo-Brian-Safran, google scholar)//KW
In addition, U.S. public opinion appears to be shifting in favor of eliminating the embargo. By virtue of its geography,
influence in national elections, near even split in terms of ideological composition, and preponderance of Cuban-Americans living within its
borders, U.S.-Cuban policy is often procured by considering the views of the now anti-embargo Floridian constituency (Schechner, 7, 1994).
Traditionally, Cuban-Americans living in Florida have tended to support the embargo, seeing it as a way to force democracy upon
Cuba so as to make the Cuban government more responsive to the demands of the Cuban people, and by extension, their own interests abroad.
(Schechner, 1994, 7) In recent years however, many have begun to view the embargo as a failure of foreign policy. In addition,
the U.S. government has placed numerous restrictions upon them, prohibiting them from visiting their families in Cuba more than once every
three years, and decreasing the amount of remittance that they are entitled to provide for their Cuban relatives. (Lovato, 2004, 23) Based in part
upon changing public opinion, the U.S. Congress has enacted numerous measures to decrease the extent of the Cuban embargo, including the
Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, which allowed for limited sales of U.S. agricultural products and medical
supplies. (Griswold, 2005, 2) In 2003, both the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate passed measures designed to prevent the U.S.
treasury from providing the funding necessary to enforce the ban on Cuban travel. (Weinmann, 2004, 28) Even within the Bush administration,
many senior officials remain highly divided on how to best confront Cuban politics. (Weinmann, 2004, 25) Thus, many U.S. citizens and
politicians believe the Cuban embargo to be unfounded and unnecessary in the contemporary world.
The oil lobby is pressuring to ease the embargo
Sadowski, 11 – JD, Hofstra University School of Law, and Managing Editor of the Journal of International Business and Law (Richard, “Cuban
Offshore Drilling: Preparation and Prevention within the Framework of the United States’ Embargo”, 12 Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol’y 37,
lexis)//KW
ECONOMICS: U.S. COMPANIES WANT IN For U.S. companies, the
embargo creates concern that they will lose out on
an opportunity to develop a nearby resource. 35 Oil companies have a long history of utilizing political
pressure for self-serving purposes.36 American politicians, ever fearful of high energy costs, are especially susceptible to oil-lobby
pressures. 37 This dynamic was exemplified in 2008, when then-Vice President Dick Cheney told the board of directors of the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce that "oil is being drilled right now sixty miles off the coast of Florida. But we're not doing it, the Chinese are, in cooperation with the
Cuban government. Even the communists have figured out that a good answer to high prices is more supply."38
This pressure for U.S. investment in oil is exacerbated by America's expected increase in consumption rates.39 Oil
company stocks are valued in large part on access to reserves.40 Thus, more leases, including those in Cuban waters, equal higher stock
valuation. 41 "The last thing that American energy companies want is to be trapped on the sidelines by sanctions while European, Canadian and
Latin American rivals are free to develop new oil resources on the doorstep of the United States." 42
THE BP DISASTER ADDS TO CONCERNS Further pressure on the embargo comes from those voicing environmental
concerns about Cuba's drilling plans.43 These concerns are undoubtedly more poignant in the wake of British Petroleum's ("BP")
historically tragic Deepwater Horizon oil spill. 44 Currently, there is no agreement between the United States and Cuba to
deal with oil spills. 45 The embargo would prevent, or at least hamper, any efforts by U.S. companies to aid
any cleanup efforts. 46 In addition, the embargo bans U.S. technologies designed to prevent or contain oil
spills from being sold to Cuba.47 David Guggenheim, a senior fellow at the Washington Ocean Foundation punctuated the United
States' concerns over the potential impacts of Cuba's drilling by remarking that "the Gulf isn't going to respect any boundaries when it comes to
oil spills." 48 This statement was recently exemplified by Cuba's own expressed fears that oil from the BP disaster would reach its shores. 49
The Deep Horizon oil spill's threat was enough that several Cuban leaders called for the reexamination of Cuba's own plan to extract oil off its
shores.50 Nonetheless, Cuba's oil exploration plans seem unfazed.5'
Farm lobby supports the plan and it outweighs the opposition of hardliners on Cuba
Zimmerman 10 (Chelsea A., “Rethinking The Cuban Trade Embargo: An Opportune Time To Mend a Broken Policy”, Barnard
College, http://cspc.nonprofitsoapbox.com/storage/documents/Fellows2010/Zimmerman.pdf)//ID
The probability of implementing these changes within the next six months seems likely. The political
strength of the farm lobby has eclipsed the power of Florida’s Cuban-American community, which did
not play a significant role in the election of President Obama. Because all of these reform measures , with
the exception of lifting the travel ban, can be adopted through administrative action rather than Congressional or executive
action,1 a political showdown would not be necessary to accomplish these measures.
The business lobby supports lifting the embargo
Gavel 10 - Associate Director for Media Relations & Public Affairs at Harvard Kennedy School of Government (Douglas, “Changing
Course: Using American Soft Power to Affect U.S.-Cuban Relations”, Harvard University UMI Dissertations Publishing, ProQuest)//ID
U.S. and multi-national corporate entities represent another major stakeholder in this analysis. The evidence indicates that a preponderance of
American and multinational corporations and business organizations favor lifting economic sanctions. Their
motivations are driven primarily by the potentially lucrative
export opportunities available should the two nations
resume normal commercial trading activities.
The United States Chamber of Commerce, representing three million business owners, has expressed its
support for efforts to ease trade restrictions and to “broaden economic engagement with the island.”28 The Chamber,
along with 11 other business organizations, including the American Farm Bureau Federation, Grocery Manufacturers Association
and National Retail Federation, signed onto a letter sent to President-elect Obama in December 2008 urging him to end the
embargo and reevaluate the United States‟ Cuban policy: “it is clear that the embargo is not having – and will not have – the
type of economic impact that might influence the behavior of the Cuban government . It is time to consider
new approaches that would benefit U.S. national security and economic interests, as well as the Cuban people.”29 The letter cites a
2001 study by the U.S. International Trade Commission which estimated $1.2 billion in annual lost sales for American
exporters due to the embargo.30
Although the chamber and other business organizations seek enhanced trade and economic opportunities with Cuba, there remain a handful
of powerful American and multi-national corporations whose Cuban-based assets were seized by the Castro
government after the revolution that continue to support the embargo and oppose efforts to improve diplomatic relations.
According to the U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, there are more than 5900 outstanding compensable
corporate claims against the Cuban government totaling $1.8 billion.31 Corporations with outstanding claims
include Borden, General Motors, Goodyear, Hilton, Procter and Gamble, and United Brands. The Joint Committee on
Cuban Claims, a voluntary non profit organization that represents the aggrieved companies, is unequivocal in its view: “The
uncompensated taking of the property of United States citizens must be resolved before normal, productive trade and tourist
relations between the two nations can be restarted.”32 It can be expected that the committee and the corporations it
represents will continue to vehemently oppose diplomatic efforts to bridge the divide between the U.S. and Cuba until
its conditions are met.
Net-benefits
Uniqueness
Aid cuts now
CDA 13
(Center for Democracy in the Americas, “USAID may slash Cuba program, while Office of Cuba Broadcasting carries on as usual,”
http://www.democracyinamericas.org/blog-post/usaid-may-slash-cuba-program-while-office-of-cuba-broadcasting-carries-on-as-usual/)//BB
At a time when the national news is dominated by talk of deficits, budget cuts and sequestration, at least two Senators are incensed that
USAID is proposing a modest 6% cut in its 2014 fiscal year budget.¶ Rajiv Shah, USAID’s administrator, explained to
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “We have made tough choices so that we are working where we will have greatest impact, and
shifting personnel and funding resources towards programs that will achieve the most meaningful results.” ¶ Included in the
proposed cuts is a 25% reduction in USAID’s Cuba program, which had been controversial for many years,
but was not salient to many until Alan Gross, a subcontractor under the program, was arrested in 2009 in Cuba, where he remains in
prison.¶ In his post, “USAID may slash Cuba program,” investigative journalist Tracey Eaton reports on the reactions of
Senators Bob Menendez and Marco Rubio to the cut and their attempts to talk some sense into Mr. Shah.
CP bans federal engagement – solves uniqueness presses
Plan Includes Aid
Governmental engagement is economic aid
Resnik, 1 – Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University (Evan, Journal of International Affairs, “Defining Engagement”
v54, n2, political science complete)
*remember the humanitarian issue with this card
A REFINED DEFINITION OF ENGAGEMENT In order to establish a more effective framework for dealing with unsavory regimes, I
propose that we define engagement as the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state
through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issueareas (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, cultural). The following is a brief list of the specific forms that such contacts might include:
DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS Extension of diplomatic recognition; normalization of diplomatic relations Promotion of target-state
membership in international institutions and regimes Summit meetings and other visits by the head of state and other senior government
officials of sender state to target state and vice-versa MILITARY CONTACTS Visits of senior military officials of the sender state to
the target state and vice-versa Arms transfers Military aid and cooperation Military exchange and training programs Confidence and
security-building measures Intelligence sharing ECONOMIC CONTACTS Trade agreements and promotion
Foreign economic and humanitarian aid
in the form of loans and/or grants CULTURAL CONTACTS Cultural
treaties Inauguration of travel and tourism links Sport, artistic and academic exchanges(n25) Engagement is an iterated process in which
the sender and target state develop a relationship of increasing interdependence, culminating in the endpoint of "normalized relations"
characterized by a high level of interactions across multiple domains. Engagement is a quintessential exchange relationship: the target
state wants the prestige and material resources that would accrue to it from increased contacts with the sender state, while the sender
state seeks to modify the domestic and/or foreign policy behavior of the target state. This deductive logic could adopt a number of
different forms or strategies when deployed in practice.(n26) For instance, individual contacts can be established by the sender state at
either a low or a high level of conditionality.(n27) Additionally, the sender state can achieve its objectives using engagement through
any one of the following causal processes: by directly modifying the behavior of the target regime; by manipulating or reinforcing the
target states' domestic balance of political power between competing factions that advocate divergent policies; or by shifting preferences
at the grassroots level in the hope that this will precipitate political change from below within the target state. This definition implies that
three necessary conditions must hold for engagement to constitute an effective foreign policy instrument. First, the overall magnitude of
contacts between the sender and target states must initially be low. If two states are already bound by dense contacts in multiple domains
(i.e., are already in a highly interdependent relationship), engagement loses its impact as an effective policy tool. Hence, one could not
reasonably invoke the possibility of the US engaging Canada or Japan in order to effect a change in either country's political behavior.
Second, the material or prestige needs of the target state must be significant, as engagement derives its power from the promise that it
can fulfill those needs. The greater the needs of the target state, the more amenable to engagement it is likely to be. For example, North
Korea's receptivity to engagement by the US dramatically increased in the wake of the demise of its chief patron, the Soviet Union, and
the near-total collapse of its national economy.(n28) Third, the target state must perceive the engager and the international order it
represents as a potential source of the material or prestige resources it desires. This means that autarkic, revolutionary and unlimited
regimes which eschew the norms and institutions of the prevailing order, such as Stalin's Soviet Union or Hitler's Germany, will not be
seduced by the potential benefits of engagement. This reformulated conceptualization avoids the pitfalls of prevailing scholarly
conceptions of engagement. It considers the policy as a set of means rather than ends, does not delimit the types of states that can either
engage or be engaged, explicitly encompasses contacts in multiple issue-areas, allows for the existence of multiple objectives in any
given instance of engagement and, as will be shown below, permits the elucidation of multiple types of positive sanctions.
This aid is through USAID
USAID, 01 (United States Agency for International Development, “Profile of the USAID Cuba Program Program Overview and Funding
Authority”, USAID,
http://lobby.la.psu.edu/_107th/095_Cuba_Sanctions/Agency_Activities/USAID/USAID_Profile_of_the_USAID_Cuba_Program.htm)//GP
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is the principal U.S. federal agency
implementing America's foreign economic
and humanitarian assistance programs around the world.
Since 1961, USAID has extended assistance to countries recovering from disaster, working to alleviate poverty, and engaging in
democratic reforms. USAID expends approximately $500 million per year on 72 country and regional
programs that support democracy and good governance.2 Pro-democracy activities range from
enhancing the capacity of state institutions to supporting grassroots civic education campaigns. With
some notable exceptions, the vast majority of USAID-funded democracy and good governance programs are carried out collaboratively
and with the consent of the governments in the countries where activities take place. For a variety of reasons detailed in this report, the
Cuba Program is an exceptional case. USAID's Cuba Program was established under the Cuban
Democracy Act of 1992 (Section 1705g), and the Cuban Liberty and Democratic (LIBERTAD)
Solidarity Act of 1996 (Section 109a)-widely known as the Helms-Burton Act. Arising from longstanding
conflictual relations between the United States and the Government of Cuba since 1959, the
Helms-Burton Act states that: The repression of the Cuban people, including a ban on free and fair
democratic elections, and continuing violations of fundamental human rights, have isolated the
Cuban regime as the only completely nondemocratic government in the Western Hemisphere...The
totalitarian nature of the Castro regime has deprived the Cuban people of any peaceful means to improve their condition and has led
thousands of Cuban citizens to risk or lose their lives in dangerous attempts to escape Cuba to freedom…The consistent policy of the
United States toward Cuba since the beginning of the Castro regime, carried out by both Democratic and Republican administrations,
has sought to keep faith with the people of Cuba, and has been effective in sanctioning the totalitarian regime...The Congress has
historically and consistently manifested its solidarity and the solidarity of the American people with the democratic aspirations of the
Cuban people. Pursuant to these findings, the Helms-Burton Act states that the policy of the United States includes the
following goals: To
encourage the Cuban people to empower themselves with a government which
reflects the self-determination of the Cuban people...To recognize the potential for a difficult
transition from the current regime in Cuba...[And] in solidarity with the Cuban people to provide appropriate forms of assistance...to
facilitate a peaceful transition to representative democracy and a market economy in Cuba and to consolidate democracy in Cuba. In
October 1995, President Clinton announced a series of measures to encourage peaceful transition to a free and open society in Cuba.
The President stated that the U.S. would promote democracy and the free flow of ideas, and would
increase the ability of Americans and U.S. non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to contribute to
the strengthening of Cuban civil society. From 1996 to April 2000, the USAID Cuba Program has made grant awards
totaling $6,419,275 to 15 U.S. NGOs and three universities. USAID's Cuba Program supports the U.S. foreign
policy goal of promoting a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba by encouraging the
development of Cuban civil society. Its strategy is to "increase the free flow of accurate information on democracy, human
rights, and free enterprise development to, from and within Cuba." 3 The USAID grants were awarded pursuant to the
authority provided in the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 (Section 1705g), which permits the U.S.
Government to provide assistance "through appropriate non-governmental organizations, for the
support of individuals and organizations to promote nonviolent democratic change in Cuba." The
Helms-Burton Act (Section 109a) further details the types of assistance and support the President is authorized to provide for individuals
and independent NGOs to support democracy-building efforts for Cuba, including: Published and informational matter-such as books,
videos, and cassettes-on transitions to democracy, human rights and market economies, to be made available to independent democratic
groups in Cuba; Humanitarian assistance to victims of political repression, as well as their families; Support for democratic and human
rights groups in Cuba; and Support for visits and permanent deployment of independent international human rights monitors in Cuba.
Constraints on the Program As stated earlier, there are several reasons why USAID cannot work cooperatively or in collaboration with
the Government of Cuba and its dependencies to promote democracy as it does with governments in other countries: No Diplomatic
Relations. The United States does not have full diplomatic relations with Cuba and maintains an
embargo on most trade between the United States and the island. U.S. Law. In addition, U.S. legislation, including the
Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 (Section 1705g) and Helms-Burton Act, prohibits most direct assistance
to the Cuban government and its dependencies
(including many government-sponsored, government-
established, or Communist party-affiliated non-governmental organizations). Cuban Law. Finally, in 1999 the
Cuban
government enacted legislation making it a crime for Cuban citizens to cooperate with the activities
authorized by the Helms-Burton Act. Cooperation is punishable with prison terms of eight to 20 years. This
legislation and the extensive control of the Government of Cuba over organizations with which USAID regularly works to
promote democracy in other countries, such as trade unions, political parties, NGOs, professional
associations, and women's groups limits the activities that can be undertaken through the Cuba
Program. Several constraints complicate the USAID Cuba Program's implementation, monitoring, and evaluation: Overt Nature of
the Program. First, during the decades of the Cold War, U.S. efforts to promote U.S. foreign policy in the closed societies of the
Communist bloc were carried out in substantial part by agencies that operated covertly. In contrast, the USAID Cuba Program, parts of
which appear to be modeled on the Eastern European transition experience, operates publicly and openly, subjecting it and its grantees to
counter pressures, criticism, policy debates, and occasionally complicating publicity. Communication with Cubans. Second,
communication with the Cuban people in person, by mail, and by electronic means is difficult and costly. Cooperation with and by
Cubans on the island is logistically difficult and entails risk.
List of programs that fall under GOVERNMENTAL engagement – USAID, ESF,
FMS, health aid
Derrick, 98 - LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT R. DERRICK United States Army (“ENGAGEMENT: THE NATIONS PREMIER
GRAND STRATEGY, WHO'S IN CHARGE?” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA342695)
Much of the peacetime efforts of the DOS and DOD are engagement. This is in the form of forward presence, regional exercises, and
infrastructure construction projects. The engagement tools of three of our five instruments of our National Power: Military,
Economic and Political, (Geographical and National Will being the other two), listed below in Figure 3, are a few
examples of how the US uses these powers to stay engaged.
Military
Diplomatic
CJCS Exercises
State Recognition
Depl for Trng (DFT)
Presidential Visits
Intl Mil Ed & Tr (IMET)
Demarshe
Counterdrug Spt (CD)
Treaties & Agreements
Mobile Tr Teams (MTT)
Figure 3. National Instruments of Power and Associated Programs
(table converted to Word format by dheidt)
Economic
Agcy for Intl Devi
Econ Spt Fund (ESF)
Fgn Mil Sales (FMS)
Health Aid
Plan increases federal funding for USAID
Secretary of State, 4/10/13 – FY2014 budget proposal for USAID
(http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1868/207305.pdf)//GP
From Manila to Bogota to Nairobi, our diplomats and development
experts are doing more than ever to keep
America safe and prosperous – and doing it with fewer resources. We have reinvigorated our alliances and strengthened
multilateral solutions to shared challenges. We have deepened our diplomatic and economic engagement with
regional powers, while continuing to press forward on issues such as human rights,
nonproliferation, and open and free trade. We request a moderate increase in staffing to position America for global
leadership in the next decade and beyond. The requested staffing level will be able to support the rebalancing in Asia,
helping to bolster economic security and prosperity in the region; strengthen USAID’s civil service
capacity in support of USAID Forward reforms; permit the construction projects necessary to
ensure safe and secure facilities for our personnel overseas; and put in place additional safeguards
necessary to address the cybersecurity threat to our nation. As always, we are constantly challenging ourselves to
do better. For example, USAID Forward was designed to strengthen USAID by embracing new
partnerships, investing in the catalytic role of innovation, and demanding a relentless focus on
results. This budget continues strong support for these initiatives, including an increase in funding
for applied research and other science and technology applications that will help USAID create
transformative solutions to persistent development challenges, contributing to the goal of
eradicating extreme poverty in the next two decades.
Aid Bad – Tanks Solvency
USAID bolsters Cuban resentment towards the US
Marx, 06 - Tribune foreign correspondent (By Gary Marx, July 28, 2006, “Program flawed, wasteful and, in cases, is backfiring”
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2006-07-28/news/0607280193_1_elizardo-sanchez-cuban-sovereignty-cuban-commission)//GP
HAVANA — The Bush administration's plans to send an additional $80 million over the next two years to support Cuba's struggling opposition
movement is being criticized by the very people the money is intended to help. While some dissidents applaud the increase, many opposition
leaders say the decade-old program is ill-conceived, poorly managed and has failed to weaken President Fidel Castro's grip on power. Since the
program began in 1996, the U.S. has allocated more than $50 million to supply opposition activists everything from food to laptop computers.
The money also has been used to train Cuba's independent journalists, bankroll Web sites and magazines critical of the Castro government, and
fund seminars and academic studies related to Cuba. Earlier this month, U.S. officials announced they would spend an additional $80 million
over the next two years to continue the effort, which they described in a 93-page report as having strengthened Cuba's internal opposition. But
critics such as Elizardo Sanchez, an activist who heads the Cuban Commission of Human Rights and National Reconciliation in Havana,
described the increased support as "counterproductive" and said authorities already are using the July 10 announcement to harass the dissidents.
"This is putting gasoline on the fire," he said. "This is fuel for the Cuban government's propaganda." Sanchez said the U.S. aid program is
characterized by "a lot of inconvenient rhetoric from Washington and few practical results." Vladimiro Roca, another prominent opposition
leader, complained that only a small fraction of the assistance actually reaches the dissident community. "What arrives here to us is very limited,"
Roca said. "Fundamental things have to change." One initiative cited by Sanchez and others as ill-conceived is the Georgetown University
Scholarship Program, which received a $400,000 grant to provide family and friends of dissidents two years of study at U.S. community colleges.
Scholarship idea flops The idea was for young Cubans to experience life in a democracy and then take their new knowledge and affinity for
democracy home to Cuba. In 2003, Georgetown selected 20 students out of 400 applicants. Castro wouldn't allow them to participate. The Cuban
leader has long denounced U.S. government-funded programs as violations of Cuban sovereignty .
"[President Bush] shouldn't even think that we would cooperate with a plan aimed at . . . [training] agents of subversion and destabilization to
serve his interventionist and imperial ends," Castro said. Only one of the 20 students has managed to leave Cuba to begin studies. The students
left behind are frustrated and disappointed. "I was so happy when I was chosen," said Flavia Ribot, 21, as she proudly displayed her acceptance
letter to Fox Valley Technical College in Appleton, Wis. "I thought it was a great opportunity." Despite the program's failure, U.S. officials are
allocating $10million of the additional $80million to fund more scholarships for Cubans to study abroad.
Increased pro-democracy efforts receive massive backlash from Cuba and turns
relations
BBC News 06 – (BBC News, July 12, 2006, “Cuba warns dissidents over US aid”
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5171836.stm)//GPastor
A top Cuban official has warned dissidents they will face consequences if they accept funds from a new US plan to promote political change in
Cuba Cuba warns dissidents over US aid Cuba's National Assembly president, Ricardo Alarcon, said the plan was a "politically delirious
provocation". President George W Bush on Monday approved the $80m (£43m) fund which he said would help boost democracy in Cuba. A US
commission has been analysing policy on Cuba after the eventual death of Fidel Castro who is 80 next month. Mr Alarcon told the Spanish news
agency, Efe, that any dissidents who "conspired " with Washington and
accepted its funding
would have to " face
the
consequences ". It would be a crime to accept such money under Cuban law, as it would be in any country, Mr Alarcon aid. "Imagine
that someone in the US were to be supported, trained, equipped and advised by a foreign government, that in itself would be a crime. It would be
a serious crime in the US, punished with far more years in prison than here in Cuba," Mr Alarcon said. The plan drew a mixed reaction among
dissidents in Havana. Several expressed concern that the
new funding
could serve as a pretext for the
Cuban authorities to
step up the pressure on them . "I really appreciate the solidarity of the United States government and people, but I think that
this report is counterproductive," dissident journalist Oscar Espinosa Chepe told foreign news agencies on Monday. But Vladimiro Roca, a
former political prisoner, said he would accept any aid, the Miami Herald newspaper reported. "'It would be more than welcome,"' he said in a
telephone conversation, adding that the Cuban government's aim was to dissuade dissidents from accepting the money. "We need materials,
equipment, clothes, everything." The plan also provoked a strong reaction in Cuba's close regional ally, Venezuela. "They've launched what I
consider a
new imperialist threat ," Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez said in a nationally televised speech. "They've publicised a
plan of transition, they think Fidel is going to die." Successor President Castro, in power since 1959, is preparing to celebrate his birthday in
August. The Cuban government has made recent moves to give a higher profile to his designated successor, his 75-year-old brother Raul Castro.
The report, drawn up by the US Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba, includes measures such as enforcing sanctions already in place
against the communist regime and "providing uncensored information" for Cubans who want change. Since the fall of the US-backed dictatorship
of Fulgencio Batista in 1959, Cuba has been a one-party state led by Mr Castro. Since 1961, the US has maintained a strict economic embargo
against Cuba.
Aid Bad – Gross Turn
Including aid TANKS solvency – encourages backlash from the Cuban government
– ending GOVERNMENT engagement leads to Gross removal
Eaton 10 –
(Tracey, “Factions spar over U.S. aid for Cuba,” Houston Chronicle, http://www.chron.com/opinion/outlook/article/Factions-spar-over-U-S-aidfor-Cuba-1702985.php)//BB
But U .S.
government programs
aimed at helping dissidents and boosting democracy in Cuba remain
controversial in both Havana and Washington. Cuban authorities see the pro-democracy programs
as an attempt at regime change. And they say they have living proof: Alan Gross, a development worker who was detained in
Cuba one year ago this month and accused of distributing illegal satellite communication gear. ¶ Gross, 61, of Potomac, Md., was
working for a U.S. subcontractor that was carrying out a pro-democracy program on behalf of the U.S. Agency for
International Development, or AID.¶ The agency has spent at least $140 million on pro-democracy programs in Cuba since
1996. AID says it has used the money to help dissidents, political prisoners and their families, to
strengthen civil society organizations, and to improve the flow of information to and from the island.¶ Ads by
Google¶ Syrian Orphan Sponsorship¶ For $50 a month, you can sustain a Syrian orphan who lost everything¶ www.ssfusa.org¶ Fun Brain
Test Games¶ Test and Improve your Brain With Scientifically Designed Exercises¶ www.lumosity.com¶ World War 2 Photos¶ Explore
Photos of Historical Events With the Google Cultural Institute.¶ google.com/culturalinstitute¶ "There are many groups and individuals
inside and outside Cuba who believe the funds are useful in supporting their ability to carry out their activities and promote fundamental
freedoms …" AID responded to a request for comment for this story.¶ Some critics question the legality of AID programs in Cuba.
"Sadly, I believe Alan
Gross may stay in jail
a long time,
as long as these programs continue ,"
said Tony Martinez, editor of the United States Cuba Policy & Business blog. "I see the
key to unlocking his freedom lies
in our ending these covert and subversive programs."¶ Defenders of the programs scoff at that kind of talk. They say the
Obama administration needs to strengthen - not weaken - its support for Cuban dissidents. But as pro-democracy advocate Frank Calzon
sees it, American diplomats have adopted a policy of "aggressive niceness" toward the socialist government. ¶ "The message they are
sending on the ground is that they don't care about Cuba's dissidents anymore and that's music to the regime's ears," said Mauricio
Claver-Carone, a board member of the pro-embargo U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC.¶ A source who is knowledgeable about U.S. programs
in Cuba found that accusation puzzling. American diplomats spend a "huge amount of time and effort … supporting civil society
issues."¶ AID programs in Cuba have been under fire since 2006 when the Government Accountability Office said some
grantees had kept poor records and misused funds, buying such items as Nintendo Gameboys, cashmere sweaters and Godiva
chocolates.¶ The trouble continued in 2008 when Felipe Sixto admitted stealing more than a half million dollars while working at the
Center for a Free Cuba, a major recipient of AID funds. ¶ Some of the agency's critics, including Sen. John Kerry, D-Mass., and Rep.
Howard Berman, D-Calif., have demanded greater accountability.¶ "These programs were a mess for a long time. Nobody
knew where the money was going, who was getting it, whether any of it was getting to the island," said a congressional source who
asked not to be identified.¶ "The programs are undergoing a course correction. The intent is to make them less hostile," the source said.
But hard-line activists and officials are "fighting tooth and nail to keep them as they were under Bush."¶ Reversing Bush policies has
been a struggle, a former State Department officer agreed.¶ "The bureaucracy has basically hijacked this policy, which then
puts the political people in the position of trying to wrestle it away from them. But, boy, that's like taking cocaine from an addict."¶ AID
supporters, meantime, have accused Secretary of State Hillary Clinton of paralyzing the agency. ¶ "When it comes to Cuba, the recent
actions by the regime to arrest an American citizen have totally frozen our actions," said Sen. Robert Menendez, D-N.J., during an
exchange with Clinton in February. "Are we going to have a permanent freeze …? Is that the policy of the State Department?" ¶ No,
Clinton replied, but "an intense review" is under way.¶ These bureaucratic tangles have slowed disbursement of AID
funds. Only in recent months has the agency been distributing $15.62 million that was budgeted for the 2009 fiscal year that ended
Sept. 30, 2009.¶ "The vast majority of this money is intended for individuals on the ground in Cuba," said an AID statement that was
posted on the Internet. "Our objective is to maximize the amount of support that benefits Cubans on the island. Since the $15.62 million
in fiscal year 2009 funds has recently been programmed, it is too early to have a precise figure at this point, but the overall goal is to
have the funds directly benefit Cubans on the island."¶ The AID statement caught the eye of Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez,
who read parts of it before the United Nations General Assembly on Oct. 26. Cuba "will change everything that needs to be changed, for
the benefit of Cubans, but we will not ask the U.S. government's opinion," he said. "We freely chose our destiny." ¶ Fidel Castro
reiterated the foreign minister's speech on Nov. 1 and vowed
that U.S. measures would not defeat the Cuban
revolution. Cuba scholars Nelson Valdes and Saul Landau question whether aggressive U.S. tactics during the Bush
administration violated U.S. law. They contend that American officials in Havana were trying to create chaos
to undermine the socialist government. Instead, Cuban authorities arrested Roque and 74 other pro-democracy activists in
March 2003 and sent them to jail.
Key to relations – turns the case
Sullivan, 13 – Specialist in Latin American Affairs (Mark P., “Cuba: US Policy and Issues for the 113th Congress”, Congressional
Research Service, 6/12, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43024.pdf )//VP
Relations took a turn for the worse in December 2009, however, when Alan Gross, an American
subcontractor working on Cuba democracy projects funded by the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) was arrested in Havana state for providing Internet communications equipment to
Cuba’s Jewish community. Since that time, a key impediment to dialogue and improved relations has been
Cuba’s continued detention of Gross, who was convicted in March 2011, and sentenced to 15 years
in prison. U.S. officials and Members of Congress have repeatedly raised the issue with the Cuban
government and asked for his release. While the United States and Cuba continue to cooperate on such issues as
antidrug efforts and oil spill prevention, preparedness, and response,
improvement of relations in other
areas will likely be stymied until Alan Gross is released from prison. While four rounds of migration
talks have been held since 2009, and often included issues beyond migration, the last round was in January 2011 and it is
unclear when additional talks may take place.
Dip Cap Link
Boosting BILATERAL TIES swamps the state department
Landau French, 13 - editor of and a frequent contributor to The Havana Note. She has led more than two dozen research trips to Cuba.
Landau French has published on U.S.-Cuban relations and Cuban affairs for more than a decade (Anya, “Secretary Kerry: Will He or Won't He
Take On Cuba?” 2/10, The Havana Note, http://thehavananote.com/2013/02/secretary_kerry_will_he_or_wont_he_take_cuba)
It is Kerry who has more of a minefield to navigate, if he chooses to navigate it at all, amidst all the other
far more pressing concerns now on his plate.
On the one hand, he’s been a vocal critic not only of our general approach on Cuba but he’s identified specific
programs that he considers non- or even counterproductive, including U.S. taxpayer-backed Radio and TV Marti broadcasting and
USAID’s democracy promotion programs, which Kerry has suggested “provoked” the Cuban government to jail a U.S. government
subcontractor, Alan Gross. There’s no telling how deep the new secretary plans to dig on the next budget, but it would be odd for these
programs to continue business-as-usual under Kerry. Unless, that is, the White House intervenes. Given the outcome of the 2012
elections, which finally dispelled the myth that no president – especially a Democrat – could ease sanctions on Cuba and be re-elected to
tell about it, it’s hard to imagine the White House doing so.
On the other hand, what does Kerry get for his trouble if he does drill deep enough into the Cuba
programs under his purview? His former Senate colleague Bob Menendez, a Cuban American and staunch defender of the embargo,
is not one to shy away from a fight, and surely less so with Kerry’s old gavel in his hand. (Though, with ethics allegations hanging over
the new chairman, it’s not clear how long he may hold that gavel.) House Foreign Affairs Ranking Member Eliot Engel won’t be an ally,
and will likely let committee colleagues Albio Sires and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen call the shots on Cuba.
And, then there’s the Cuban government. As much as many in the Cuban government (particularly the diplomatic corps)
want to reduce tensions with the United States and finally make real progress on long-standing grievances held by both
sides, they aren’t desperate for the big thaw . Many U.S. analysts, including in government, speculate that this is
leaders don’t really want to change the relationship , that strife serves their
needs better than would the alternative. That could be so, but there’s also a hefty amount of skepticism and pride on the
Cuban side, as well. After so many decades and layers of what Cuba calls the U.S. blockade, Cubans are
unwilling to have the terms of any ‘surrender’ dictated to them. In fact, they are bound and
determined that there will be no surrender. They would argue, what is there to surrender but their government’s very
because Cuba’s
existence, something the leadership obviously isn’t going to put on the table.
Many in the Cuban government question whether the U.S. would offer anything that truly matters to Cuba, or honor any commitments
made. Arguably, the last deal the U.S. made good on was struck during the Missile Crisis of October 1963, and Cuba wasn’t even at the
table for that. It’s a lesser known fact that the United States never fully implemented the 1994/1995 migration accords, which committed
both nations to work to prevent migration by irregular means. The U.S. did stop accepting illegal migrants from Cuba found at sea, but it
still accepts them when they reach our shores – thus dubbed our ‘wet foot, dry foot’ policy. And with our generous adjustment policy
offering a green card after one year, the incentive to make the illegal trip remains largely in place.
For the U.S., the key to any movement may truly be the Cubans’ release of Alan Gross, whose cause Secretary Clinton championed for
three years, though her State Department was unable to work with the Cuban government for his release. As I've argued here before, the
conservative Spanish government, no friends of the Cuban government, found itself in a similar position but took a far different
approach (than has the U.S. for Gross) last year when a young Spanish politcian came to the island to work with dissidents and ended up
convicted for vehicular manslaughter in the death of two dissidents. Whatever the U.S. missteps on Gross, there is surely a genuine
desire to bring him home, and right or wrong, the U.S. had, under Secretary Clinton, essentially frozen relations over his case.
If you talk to Cuban diplomats you’re likely to hear that the Cuban Five are their key to moving forward. And while I believe that that is
the Cuban position, I don’t think it’s the only, or necessarily the first way forward. The Cubans have a whole host of grievances they file
under the heading ‘blockade’ that a determined, strategic and informed Secretary of State could begin to seriously address. The
relationship could be addressed either by crafting a secret series of trade-offs (as did Kennedy and Khrushev), or, by starting with
unilateral confidence building measures that either convince or pressure the Cubans to respond. Frankly, if it weren’t for Alan Gross, the
smartest, swiftest and most effective policy of all could be to make all decisions based on the U.S. interest alone, without setting
expectations for a Cuban response at all.
I don’t envy Secretary Kerry, because dealing with our useless Cuba policy, and the difficult
bilateral relationship we seem surprisingly unable to navigate , won’t be quick or easy
or simple . But, whether it’s just for the sake of Alan Gross, or whether to recover the long lost sanity in our policy toward Cuba, it
is an endeavor whose time, and Secretary of State, has surely come.
Turns relations and causes suspicion
Stephens and Laverty, 2011- Center for Democracy in the Americas Collin has a magnificent combination of traits; he is an
intellectual, a quintessential American whose personal relationships run deep among Cubans, and a loyal friend to CDA. Sarah Stephens,
Executive Director of CDA, “Cuba’s New Resolve Economic Reform and its Implications for U.S. Policy”
What More Can Be Done in Cuba to Make the Reforms Succeed? http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/CDA_Cubas_New_Resolve.pdf)//GP
Our final recommendation is to stop funding the USAID Cuba program. The U.S. government
wastes millions of dollars each year to bring about the type of economic and political
transition it sees fit for Cuba but the effect of the program increases suspicion and tension between
the two governments. A failure of the program in 2009 resulted in the arrest and imprisonment of
Alan P. Gross, a U.S. subcontractor. It is impossible, under the current circumstances, for USAID to take part in
meaningful programs welcomed by the Cuban government, such as those that Brazilian and
Spanish development agencies carry out. “Development assistance,” USAID’s actual mandate, should be discussed
bilaterally between the two countries, leading to the establishment of programs agreed upon by both countries (as is done in the rest of
the world). It will take time for trust to be restored, but it’s in the interest of both countries to start now.
Politics Link
Federal engagement triggers Congressional backlash
--the money is poorly managed, no benefit
Eaton 11 – Havana chief for the Dallas Morning News
(Tracey, “Top 10 reasons why USAID's Cuba programs are controversial,” http://alongthemalecon.blogspot.com/2011/03/10-reasons-whyusaids-cuba-programs.html)//BB
But in the United States, the pro-democracy programs that sent Gross to Cuba are not at all black and white. They are
complicated, somewhat mysterious programs,
why the U.S.-funded
charged with politics
and tainted with shades of grays.¶ Here are 10 reasons
Cuba programs are intriguing and controversial:¶ Some programs are semi-covert or treated as
clandestine. Normally, the U.S. Agency for International Development, or USAID, wants the world to know of the agency's work.
Agency-financed programs are proudly emblazoned with the USAID logo, but that's not so with Cuba programs. Private contractors
working in Cuba have a blanket waiver on the usual branding requirements. They're allowed to hide the fact that USAID is footing the
bill.¶ They are mysterious. USAID doesn't publicize details of agency-funded operations in Cuba. Some people have tried to obtain
information, but without much success. Dana Lubow, a librarian at LA Valley College, told me she filed some 400 Freedom of
Information Act requests to try to obtain more information, but got "virtually nothing" in return. ¶ They are lucrative, to some people at
least. The U.S. government has spent some $150 million on Cuba-related pro-democracy programs since 1996, when such programs
were authorized under Section 109 of the Libertad Act. That doesn't include $20 million requested in the fiscal 2012 budget. ¶ They are
provocative, considering their relatively small size. The $20 million planned for 2012 is a tiny fraction of the $3.5 trillion federal
budget. For every $1 million that the U.S. government spends, just $5.60 goes to Cuba. USAID told me in a statement in October 2010
that "the majority of this money is intended for individuals on the ground in Cuba. Our objective is to maximize the amount of support
that benefits Cubans on the island." Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez found that statement so troubling that he read it before the
United Nations General Assembly and Fidel Castro then repeated it in one of his Reflections. In practice, some observers say, only a
fraction of the USAID money ever reaches the island. "The destiny of that money is a great
mystery to me because if anything reaches Cuba, I can assure you that it's very little. Crumbs," Cuban
dissident Elizardo Sanchez told me. And some of the American tax dollars fall into the hands of Cuban agents who have infiltrated the
dissident movement, former agent Aleida Godinez said. Still, it doesn't
take much money to ignite the fury of
Cuba's socialist government. Meddling in the country's internal political affairs is a core issue
for Cuba. It's one of those non-negotiable items. It's sacred, one Cuban official told me. And a laptop and $100 per
month in U.S. aid is more than enough to land a Cuban dissident in prison.¶ They are fraught with danger. It is
illegal for Cubans to accept U.S. funds that are aimed at undermining the Cuban government. Miriam Leiva, wife of
Cuban dissident Oscar Espinosa Chepe, told me U.S. funds led to husband's jailing in 2003. He has since been released. ¶ They've been
touched with scandal. One USAID bought "a gas chainsaw, computer gaming equipment and software (including Nintendo Gameboys
and Sony Playstations), a mountain bike, leather coats, cashmere sweaters, crab meat, and Godiva chocolates" with funds that were
supposed to be used for humanitarian aid, according this GAO report (Download 63-page PDF). Another recipient of U.S. funds
embezzled more than a half million dollars and used it to buy a $10,200 piano, $5,000 in artwork and $16,000 in travel and lodging (See
All because of those #!%#& Chinese radios). USAID funds were "unaccountable pots of money," a former Clinton administration
official with knowledge of the Cuba programs told me.¶ They are a window into Florida politics. One Miami politician told
me that
lawmakers fight over the programs . Lawmakers want to have some influence over who gets the
money and they sometimes try to steer
USAID contracts to their political allies, said the politician, who asked not to be
identified. He said he sees USAID money as a form of political patronage. ¶ They are contentious even among CubanAmericans. The Cuban American National Foundation, for instance, has criticized the programs, saying not enough of the money
reaches Cuba. A March 2008 CANF study of USAID programs showed that less than 17 percent of all USAID Cuba funds were used for
direct, on-island assistance. Some 56 percent went to universities and other institutions to study post-Castro scenarios and other issues.
Much of the money was used to pay operating expenses, office costs and salaries. One organization, Grupo de Apoyo a la Democracia,
spent $6,054,079 from 1996 to 2005. Only 4 percent - or $251,077 - reached Cuba.
Federal engagement leads to backlash
Casey 11 – Analyst @ WSJ
(Nicholas, “Jail Term Complicates U.S.-Cuba Relations,”
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704027504576198722239340998.html)//BB
For decades, the U.S. has tried to pry Cuba open to democracy through its economic embargo, aid to Cuban
dissidents and even a 1961 invasion attempt at the Bay of Pigs. But the government has countered the measures with heightened security
and anti-American rhetoric. Recognizing the failures of past presidents to change Cuba, President Barack Obama even
suggested during his campaign that he was open to an unprecedented meeting Cuban President Raul Castro.¶ The meeting
never happened. But last year Mr. Obama began reversing years of increasing tightening restrictions on Cuba, allowing more airports to
fly charter flights to Havana, raising the number of visits those with Cuban families could make to the island and boosting limits on
remittances sent there by relatives. Cuba seemed to respond in kind: it began releasing dozens of political prisoners, long a demand of
the U.S. as it pushes for democratic reforms there.¶ Cuba, in a deep economic crisis, is in the process of laying off as many as two
million state workers, and reviving and expanding a small and moribund private sector. Revived trade, investment and tourism from the
U.S. would go a long way to help Havana cope with its economy.¶ Despite signs of rapprochement, however, Mr. Gross's case lay
waiting in the wings. He had been arrested in 2009 by the government for distributing devices that allowed remote Internet accesses,
something that's highly-controlled in Cuba. Mr. Gross's family said he had done nothing wrong and was only working to improve
Internet access to the island's Jewish community.¶ It also turned out Mr. Gross had been traveling to the island on a tourist visa and was
distributing the devices as part of a covert program run by USAID to promote democracy supporters in Cuba. The year before, USAID
had warned participants, including NGOs and outside contractors, that their work could get them in trouble in Cuba, and that they could
even face jail time.¶ Philip Peters, a Cuba analyst at the Arlington, Va.-based Lexington Institute who has followed the case closely, said
Mr. Gross's situation makes things more difficult between the two countries by highlighting the existence of ongoing covert U.S.
operations on the island. But he said Mr. Obama may choose to continue ahead with changes in policy that he sees "in the national
interest."¶ Mr. Peters said despite the fact that Mr. Gross was apprehended in 2009, the Obama administration hadn't taken control of
the USAID program, which under George W. Bush had expanded from a small program that distributed pro-democracy aid in
Cuba to a $45 million giant seeking high-tech proposals to aid activists.¶ Since Mr. Gross's arrest the program has
come under
attack in Congress as being wasteful and poorly-planned . Mr. Peters agrees: "It's a fools
errand to send development contractors and match them against Cuban intelligence on Cuban
territory," he said.
Case Cards
No Impact to Decline
No impact to Cuban economic collapse or civil war – the thesis of Helms Burton was to starve
the Cuban Economy and it failed
Edhill, 12 - teaches courses in the Caribbean & Latin America and in US Government in Fort Worth, Texas. His publications include
articles in the Yale Journal of International Affairs, The Caribbean Journal, and regular contributions to International Policy Digest. (Michael
W. Edghill, March 6, 2012, “Revisiting Helms-Burton”, International Policy Digest,
http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/author/michael-w-edghill/)//GP
In 1996, the US government enacted the Helms-Burton Act
in an effort to tighten the embargo on Cuba and
bring about the regime change that the Americans have long wanted. Sixteen years later, while Fidel Castro has
stepped aside from his official role as Cuban president, the desired regime change has not taken place. Raul Castro has
made some changes in the government-controlled economy, but no changes have been forthcoming regarding
democracy or human rights. In fact, in testimony before the House Foreign Relations Committee, Normando Hernandez Gonzalez, a
Fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy, spoke of over 600 arbitrary detentions in January alone by the Cuban government. Perhaps
the time has come to revisit the Helms-Burton Act and evaluate what can be done moving forward. As stated, it was “an act to seek
international sanctions against the Castro government in Cuba” and to plan for a democratic transition. The
purpose of Helms-Burton, also known as Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, was to “assist the Cuban people in
regaining their freedom and prosperity, as well as joining the community of democratic countries that are
flourishing in the Western Hemisphere.” At the time, this seemed like a very plausible scenario. Congress
had found that the Cuban economy had experienced a massive contraction to the tune of around 60% during the
previous five years. This was the result of “the end of its subsidization by the former Soviet Union of between 5 billion
and 6 billion dollars annually”, economic mismanagement, and the “extreme decline in trade between Cuba and the
countries of the former Soviet bloc”. In Cuba, this became known as the ‘Special Period’ and was marked by societal regression, food
rationing, and the largest migration of Cubans to the US since the 1960s. Knowing that, it was logical for the US government to
assume that the time was right to tighten the noose on the Castro regime and finally drive them out.
Cuba was on the brink of complete economic ruin and fear of the totalitarian regime could keep
the people from absolute rebellion for only so long. Helms-Burton would be the final nail in the
Castro coffin . The Cuban government would collapse and if they tried to hold onto power by force,
the US government could then consider intervention on a humanitarian basis. What no one could predict was that
Fidel Castro’s mild economic reforms of the mid-1990s; from allowing a small number of private businesses to legalizing the US dollar; would
buy him just enough time. Not many could have foreseen that by 1999, Castro’s Cuba would have another oil-rich benefactor come
along to replace the Soviet Union. Hugo Chavez’s
Venezuela began to provide the same type of support to Cuba that
had helped fill the government coffers for years. In addition, Chavez and Cuba created their own
economic alliance, ALBA, in 2004 that has now grown to include eight Latin American and Caribbean nations
with two more considering membership. It is obvious then that the conditions that existed when HelmsBurton was passed have now ceased. The massive decline of economic stimulus provided by the Soviet Union and its
satellites has been replaced by Venezuela and a new organization of cooperative states. Additionally, we must look
at the fact that Helms-Burton sought “international sanctions” as a way of isolating and economically
starving Cuba. Events of the last decade dramatically changed the landscape surrounding economic sanctions. First and foremost, the
economic conditions that existed in the United States in the 1990s do not exist anymore. The global economic playing field has
become much more competitive. In the 1990s, the US could rely on its regional hegemony to institute rather effective sanctions.
While the US is still the greatest hemispheric power, the power dynamic has been tempered by the growth of nations like
Brazil. While most of the world has spent bulk of the last ten years mired in economic turmoil, Latin America has been relatively
prosperous. Prosperity and their willingness to engage with the Cuban government for trade has negated
the effects that were desired when the US was seeking international sanctions. Investment in Cuba has
been coming from ALBA, Caribbean neighbors, and most notably as of late, Brazil . President Dilma Rousseff
recently completed an official government visit to the island and revealed that Brazil is prepared to invest in Cuba’s
sugar industry and will help renovate the port of Mariel to the tune of $800 million. Brazil’s government is also
willing to extend $550 million worth of credit to Cuba for food purchases and agricultural equipment.
Investment goes well beyond regional neighbors however. After
Venezuela , Cuba’s largest trading partner is China .
They have
signed numerous trade and investment agreements over the last few years that include public
health, telecommunications, interest-free loans, and oil exploration. China, along with Spanish oil company
Repsol, is one of the many partners that Cuba has in its new deep water drilling project in the Florida Straits. At this point, it
is becoming clearer that the isolation from the world that the US was aiming for is not achievable. The
only isolation that is occurring is not Cuba from the world, but the United States from Cuba. This is not to say that the HelmsBurton Act should be repealed immediately because it is ineffective. The purpose was never solely economic. It was
designed to force regime change as peaceably as possible. It was intended to help the Cuban people regain their “freedom
and prosperity”. As the Act also says, the US “has shown a deep commitment, and considers it a moral obligation, to promote and protect
human rights and fundamental freedoms”. The moral obligation is to promote human rights and democracy and neither can be
done if the United States is the only voice that the Cuban people do not hear. The need to facilitate interaction between the US and the Cuban
people has been expressed by Cuban dissident Oscar Espinosa Chepe. In June of 2011, responding to the proposal by Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart (RFL) to roll back travel restrictions and remittances to Cuba, Chepe argued that the continued isolation of Cuba benefits
“the most extreme sectors of the regime in Havana to justify repression and to maintain Cuba as a closed
fortress alleging the danger of the foreign threat.” He goes on to say that the relationships that do exist between Cubans on both
sides of the Straits, despite the efforts of both governments, “have created a flow of information and democratic experiences that has become a
significant political factor”. If the obligation is to promote and protect human rights, then the US needs to engage and support the dissidents in the
country. The argument for a free society that respects human rights is eventually won when a dialogue exists between those in favor of that open
society and those opposed to it. The question that now stands before the United States regarding Cuba is not
whether we lift the trade embargo or not. It is not whether we repeal the Helms-Burton Act or not. Those
questions are secondary. If the US is really interested in helping the Cuban people, then the first question must be how we can help the Cuban
people achieve their freedom and prosperity. The end result that the US wants is a free and democratic Cuba. In revisiting the Helms-Burton Act,
we see that the strategies employed so far have not brought that result any closer. Therefore, a policy that is smarter, more directed towards those
goals and can create a more unified coalition of support is the best move for the US and for the people of Cuba. The time has come to take a fresh
look at US-Cuban relations.
The Purpose of the embargo was to overthrow the Castro regime – failed because of
international trade, means Cuba can never be a failed state
Dickerson 10 – Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, paper submitted in fulfillment of a Master of Strategic Studies Degree at the US Army
War College (Sergio M, “UNITED STATES SECURITY STRATEGY TOWARDS CUBA,” 1/14/10,
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a518053.pdf)//GPastor
U.S. policy towards Cuba is economic isolation imposed via embargo
to coerce Cuba into establishing a representative government. While the basic policy remains unchanged,
the same is not true about U.S. interests in Cuba. During the Cold War, stated U.S. interest was to contain
Communism, the leading edge of which was Cuba. More than anything the U.S. wanted Castro’s demise but international support hinged on
preventing the spread of communism. After 1989, communism was under siege and capitalism was on the rise. U.S.
interests now shifted towards peace and regional stability. Of course, removing the Castro regime was still
the preferred method, but without Soviet collusion Castro’s Cuba was no longer a credible threat to the
Policy and National Interest Present
U.S. Not surprisingly, international support quickly dwindled leaving the U.S. as the unilateral enforcer. In hindsight many argued it was the right
time to loosen the embargo and seek better relations with Cuba. Instead, a renewed passion to topple Castro and establish
democracy fractured any hopes to rekindle relations. In retrospect, Kennedy could not have foreseen a 50-year embargo that
survives the Soviet Union’s demise but fails to remove Castro. The same cannot be said about the Obama Administration today. This section will
analyze U.S. – Cuba policy, past opportunities and ultimate failure over the past 50 years. By the time President Clinton came to office,
momentum had already shifted in Cuba’s favor. Cuba’s
economy began to rise in 1994 reaching its apex in 1996 with a 41%
increase thanks to foreign investments in tourism. The introduction of the Helms Burton legislation in 1996
gained Congressional traction after the Cuban Air force shot down two, anti-Castro “Brothers in Rescue,” planes over Cuba. The
Helms-Burton Act created unrealistic expectations for the Cuban government before U.S. would loosen restrictions with
Cuba. A total of eight requirements had to be met and the most controversial of these included; a
transitional government in place unlike the Castro regime; the dissolution of the Department of State;
Cuba must hold free and fair elections and a controversial property law that allowed property owners that
left Cuba as early as 1959, to make claims in U.S. Courts on that property. With Cuba’s economy on the rise,
this new measure to tighten the noose failed terribly and only succeeded in further alienating both governments. The
second Bush Administration did little to engage Cuba and after September 11, 2001, was completely engrossed in the War on Terror. U.S. policy
towards Cuba has changed little in 50 years. Although the embargo continues to fail despite our best efforts to tighten it, our policy has remained
steadfast and the U.S. is no closer to normalizing relations with Cuba.
Cuba poses no traditional threat to the US – except Disease which they don’t solve
Dickerson 10, their 1ac card – Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, paper submitted in fulfillment of a Master of Strategic Studies
Degree at the US Army War College (Sergio M, “UNITED STATES SECURITY STRATEGY TOWARDS CUBA,” 1/14/10,
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a518053.pdf)//GPastor
Does Cuba Pose A Security Threat to the U.S.? Let’s begin by asking this question: can we afford to escort commerce
through
Caribbean waters from Cuban pirates? This sounds as farfetched as an attack from an Afghan-based
Al-Qaida using commercial airliners to destroy the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. This scenario while
unexpected is completely contrary to our policy objectives in Cuba. The greater possibility that “something” unfavorable
happens in Cuba that threatens U.S. national interests is certainly more relevant. Although Cuba poses no traditional threats to the
U.S., geographically, their 90-mile proximity should concern us. Our proximity to Cuba assures U.S. involvement, be it
voluntary or involuntary, in a major crisis. Consider a disease outbreak that begins in Cuba over a break down in hygiene, government
pollution or other misfortune attributable to economic strife. The disease has no boundaries and quickly reaches the Florida shores via travelling
Cuban American citizens. This scenario could be mitigated or even preventable under the auspices of better relations. Aside from the obvious
medical benefits a partnership provides, established communications with Cuba would likely prevent an uncontrolled spread in the U.S. There are
definite advantages to having healthy regional partnerships to deal with regional problems.
No Impact to prolonging all impediments to normalized relations – Cuba inevitably
succeeds without US support
Dickerson 10 – Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, paper submitted in fulfillment of a Master of Strategic Studies Degree at the US Army
War College (Sergio M, “UNITED STATES SECURITY STRATEGY TOWARDS CUBA,” 1/14/10,
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a518053.pdf)//Gpastor
The logical question with regards to current U.S. – Cuba policy is whether it’s feasible to continue the
current policy. At least for the foreseeable future, the answer is yes . It equates to doing nothing
diplomatically, militarily and economically. Perhaps this 15option is appealing given a robust domestic
agenda and U.S. involvement in two wars. According to Professor Schwab and other experts however, the U.S. has lost the
information campaign targeted at the Cuban people. It has only, “buttressed Fidel’s popularity in Cuba and elsewhere,
which eviscerates the very purposes the embargo was set up for.”30 It’s like the classic biblical story of David
triumphing over Goliath – the bigger the oppressor the greater the victory. True or not, Fidel has made the case successfully to the
Cuban people. While it’s feasible for the U.S. to pursue the current course there is no evidence it will succeed.
How acceptable is it to U.S. foreign policy? There are three elements of national power that highlight our current
policy: diplomacy, economy and law enforcement. It is subjective to evaluate acceptability strictly in terms of current national
power invested and subsequent pay offs in foreign policy. U.S. needs international cooperation to achieve the coercive effects that only complete
economic strangulation can accomplish. This is tough to do and North Korea and Iran bear this true. If we look at it from a broader international
and economic perspective we can begin to see why it’s not acceptable. Take a UN General Assembly vote renouncing the U.S.-led embargo on
Cuba for instance; since1992 there has been overwhelming vote to end the embargo.31 In essence, it has garnered sympathy for Castro and
encouraged western nations like Canada and Spain to continue open relations with Cuba. Even if the embargo could work, U.S.
diplomacy has failed to yield the international tourniquet needed to bring change in Cuba. Applying
economic force without first garnering the necessary diplomatic support failed to achieve intended
changes succeeding instead in hurting the Cuban people it hoped to protect. Whether or not an embargo can work in
Cuba is suspect but succeeding without international support is impossible. Since the embargo hinges on a
larger multinational participation, international and not just U.S. acceptability is necessary to achieve U.S.
ends in Cuba.
Cuba Econ Won’t Decline
Cuba’s economy won’t fail now – investments from Venezuela, china, Vietnam,
Canada, brazil, spain, and aid from catholic church
Stephens and Laverty, 2011- Center for Democracy in the Americas Collin has a magnificent combination of traits; he is an intellectual, a
quintessential American whose personal relationships run deep among Cubans, and a loyal friend to CDA. Sarah Stephens, Executive Director of
CDA, “Cuba’s New Resolve Economic Reform and its Implications for U.S. Policy”
What More Can Be Done in Cuba to Make the Reforms Succeed? http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/CDA_Cubas_New_Resolve.pdf)//GP
While Cuban government officials and scholars assure each other there will be no China model or Vietnam model in Cuba and that the process
will be purely Cuban, they are studying other socialist transformations and looking for a way the international
community can play a role in Cuba’s economic reforms. Improved relations with China in the 1990s coincided with the
Cuban military’s growing role in the economy and a number of military officials have studied there. Prominent Cuban economists recently
traveled to Vietnam to analyze its economic model, and a recent publication of Temas, an academic journal widely read among Cuban
intellectuals, was devoted to studying transitions in other countries. Furthermore, high -level
Cuban officials visited China and
Vietnam following the 6th Party Congress to update leaders there on the country’s economic plans.
Venezuela and China—and other countries—are making significant investments in Cuba’s oil industry, hoping
hundreds of thousands of Canadians continue
to flock to Cuba’s beaches and urban centers, while a Canadian company plays a key role in the nickel
sector. According to Canadian officials, the country hopes to leverage its trade and travel relations with Cuba to
offer technical assistance on economic reforms. Brazil and Spain have also engaged with Cuba on the
to find commercially viable deposits in the Gulf of Mexico. Meanwhile,
reform process, offering funds and technical assistance to make the process run smoother. Spain offered
$5.5 million in microcredit to Cuba to help the development of small businesses,122 and Brazil has made a
similar offer along with assistance in reforming Cuba’s tax structure. The two countries signed an
agreement in March 2010 for Brazil to provide technical assistance to Cuba’s banking sector.123 The Spanish
Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID) has begun engaging with Cuba in capacity-building measures in several areas of the
economy. Canada
has also offered assistance on various aspects of economic reform, such as tax policy. Many
other nations expect to intensify their engagement with Cuba on microfinance and other technical
assistance, once Cuba’s government is ready. The Cuban Catholic Church has played a critical role
in pushing for and creating more pluralistic opportunities for debating change in Cuba. Espacio Laical, the Church’s
official journal, has become a frequent platform for important essays about social and economic change in
Cuba. Additionally, conferences are held by the Church each year to discuss important themes in Cuban society and have expanded in scope to
include Cubans living outside the country and specialists with the government. The Church also offers leadership classes,
focused on building skills related to free-enterprise, such as accounting and marketing. The Church recently
announced it will offer M.B.A. degrees to Cubans through a partnership with a Spanish university124 and
is in talks with the government to expand the limited micro loan program, to a potentially multi-million dollar fund of
credit for entrepreneurs. Each of these efforts—initiated in Cuba and by sympathetic actors—are useful on their own
terms.
Aff Can’t solve Multilat
Cuba Policy can’t solve multilateralism – recent OAS meetings prove several
barriers to multilateralism
Reuters 12, their 1ac card (Brian Ellsworth, “Despite Obama charm, Americas summit boosts U.S. isolation,” 4/16/12,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/16/us-americas-summit-obama-idUSBRE83F0UD20120416)//GPastor
(Reuters) - President Barack Obama sat patiently through diatribes, interruptions and even
the occasional eyeball roll at the weekend Summit of the Americas in an effort to win over Latin American leaders fed up
with U.S. policies. He failed. The United States instead emerged from the summit in Colombia
increasingly isolated as nearly 30 regional heads of state refused to sign a joint declaration in protest against the continued exclusion of
communist-led Cuba from the event. The rare show of unity highlights the steady decline of Washington's influence
in a region that has become less dependent on U.S. trade and investment thanks economic growth rates
that are the envy of the developed world and new opportunities with China. It also signals a further
weakening of the already strained hemispheric system of diplomacy, built around the Organization
of American States (OAS) which has struggled to remain relevant during a time of rapid change for its
members. Seen as an instrument of U.S. policy in Latin America during the Cold War, the OAS has lost
ground in a region that is no longer content with being the backyard of the United States. " It seems the United States still wants to
isolate us from the world, it thinks it can still manipulate Latin America, but that's ending," said Bolivian
President Evo Morales, a fierce critic of U.S. policy in Latin America and staunch ally of Venezuela's leftist leader Hugo Chavez. "What
I think is that this is a rebellion of Latin American countries against the United States." NEWFOUND UNITY White House officials
disagreed with the notion that the failure to agree on issues like Cuba signaled a new dynamic to U.S.
relations within the hemisphere. "We've had disagreements on those issues for decades," a senior Obama
aide said. "They are built into the equation. They are about theater -- not substance."
Castro Says No to the Aff
Castro eliminates free trade with the US – counter-revolutionary
Margulies, 8 – JD, New York University (Michael, “STRONGER TRADE OR STRONGER EMBARGO: WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS FOR
UNITED STATES-CUBA RELATIONS” 8 Asper Rev. Int'l Bus. & Trade L. 147, lexis)
Should all the requisite factors fall into place on the U.S. side in order to ease or lift the existing trade
restrictions against the export of agricultural commodities - or even allow other forms of trade - there is no
guarantee that Cuba will seize the opportunity to enter into such an enhanced relationship with the United
States. As evidenced by its initial rejection of the U.S. offer to export agricultural goods in 2001, immediately
following the adoption of TSRA, n155 Cuba may be less willing [*174] to accept such an offer than an economic
analysis would indicate. For Cuba, U.S. commodities - whether agricultural or of another nature - may be
significantly cheaper than those offered by other trade partners, as a result of the proximity between the
two countries and the related transportation costs. n156 The Cuban government, however, whether under the
leadership of Fidel or Raul, has very strong ideals and convictions when it comes to relations with
the United States. These may impede the expansion of any such trade.
It is well known that one of the central tenets of the Cuban Revolution and the Castro regime is a strong policy against
"neo-liberal globalization," the United States and capitalist imperialism. n157 These convictions may lead
Cuba to balk at the opportunity to take advantage of some forms of trade with the United States. Such
selectivity has been present even under TSRA-authorized trade with Alimport. Cuba has claimed that the reduction in
purchases by Alimport in 2005 came not as a result of tightened restrictions by the Bush administration and
subsequent difficulties working out contracts with U.S. agricultural entities, but rather as a result of
"efforts by the government of the Republic of Cuba to increase the motivation of United Statesbased companies, organization; state and local governmental representatives; and Members of the United States Congress to be more
visible in their lobbying efforts for changes in United States policy, law and regulations." n158