Sean Barker
History 201
Section 001
4/18/2012
How Terrorist Actions by the African National Congress and Umkhonto we Sizwe
Prolonged the Rule of Apartheid Government in South Africa.
On December 16, 1961, Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK), or the “Spear of the Nation” was
born. Over the next 30 years, this organization would fight against the apartheid government of
South Africa in an effort to end the human rights violations and racial oppression targeting nonwhites living in the country. MK would act as the armed wing of the African National Congress
(ANC), providing a means of armed resistance for the ANC in their struggle against the
Apartheid government. MK grew from the minds of the increasingly radical ANC Youth League
(ANCYL), whose figureheads included such notable individuals as Nelson Mandela, the onetime president of the ANC and the first black president of South Africa, Walter Sisulu, and
Oliver Tambo. While there is no definitive record of where the idea to turn to armed resistance
originated, one suggestion is that Mandela himself first pitched the idea to the ANC in June of
1960.1 Mandela supports this suggestion in his autobiography, A Long Walk to Freedom, saying
"If the government reaction is to crush by naked force our non-violent struggle, we will have to
reconsider our tactics. In my mind we are closing a chapter on this question of a non-violent
policy."2 Mandela would insist that the violence carried out by MK under his leadership would
target government buildings but would not result in deaths, saying “Sabotage did not involve loss
of life, and it offered the best hope for future race relations.”3 In the six months between the
1
“Nelson Mandela Biography,” Nobel Media,
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1993/mandela-bio.html (accessed March 21, 2012).
2
Nelson Mandela. Long Walk to Freedom, (United Kingdom: Little Brown and Co. 1995), 320.
3
Nelson Mandela, Speech at Pretoria Palace of Justice, “Nelson Mandela’s Statement From the Dock at the
Opening of the Defence Case in the Rivonia Trial,” (April 20, 1961).
1
founding of MK and the first acts of sabotage, the MK high command would set up regional
commands in main city centers, choosing members of these commands based on individuals who
had the “…necessary military or technical skills.”4 These regional commands would be
responsible for carrying out the acts of sabotage in their respective regions as planned by the
high command. The armed wing of the ANC served to radicalize the ANC, causing the ANC to
be disregarded as a legitimate political movement by South African and foreign governments
alike, while reversing the victim-aggressor roles of the apartheid government and those resisting
oppression, thereby weakening support for anti-apartheid movements and prolonging the
oppressive rule of apartheid.
Background and Historiography:
Although Joe Slovo, one of the leading members of the ANC, believed that the form of
resistance originally sponsored by MK was not terrorism, he maintained a flawed understanding
of what constituted terrorism, saying the tactic of sabotage “…would be a graphic pointer to the
need for carefully planned action rather than spontaneous or terrorist acts of retaliation which
were already in evidence.”5 While the definition of terrorism remains rather controversial, Bruce
Hoffman, a specialist in terrorism and counter insurgency at Georgetown University, contends
that there are certain key elements of terrorism. Hoffman believes that terrorism is “ineluctably
political in aims and motives, violent (or uses threat of violence), designed to have far reaching
psychological repercussions, conducted by an organization with an identifiable chain of
command, whose members wear no uniform or insignia, and is perpetrated by a subnational
South African History Online, “Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK)” South African History Online,
http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/umkhonto-we-sizwe-mk (accessed 4/13/2012).
5
Ibid.
4
2
group or non-state entity.”6 It is apparent that all of these criteria apply to MK as they carried
out their acts of sabotage. Furthermore, Hoffman includes sabotage as a type of terrorist attack
and not as something separate of terrorism as Mandela believed.7 To these ends, the South
African Apartheid Government declared MK and the ANC as terrorist organizations in 1960.8
The United States Government followed suit that same year, along with the United Kingdom.9
These moves guaranteed that little foreign aid would be provided to the resistance movement,
and none from the wealthiest western nations of the time.
Morgan Norval, who has acted as CEO for the Selous Foundation that studies
unconventional warfare, terrorism and subversion and has had seven books on terrorism and
counter-insurgency published, also calls the ANC a terrorist organization in his book Inside the
ANC: The Evolution of a Terrorist Organization.10 Norval believes that the ANC, and by
extension MK, became a terrorist organization when they moved to a policy of armed resistance.
What is original about Norval’s claims is that he believes the ANC continued to be a terrorist
organization after the end of Apartheid, calling them “vicious and subversive.”11
There are some individuals that believe that the label of “terrorist” need not stick with a
group or person forever. Dr. Immanuel Wallerstein, a noted sociologist who has taught at
universities all over the world, presents the argument that Nelson Mandela was a terrorist, and
the ANC and MK were terrorist organizations bent on overthrowing the Apartheid government
6
Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, (New York, Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University Press
2006), 30-31.
7
Ibid, 32.
8
Unwembi, “African National Congress, South Africa’s National Liberation Movement,” ANC,
http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=206 (accessed 3/11/2012).
9
“Terrorist Organization Profile (South Africa),” National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and
Responses to Terrorism, University of Maryland
http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=305 (accessed March 15,
2012).
10
Morgan Norval. Inside the ANC: The Evolution of a Terrorist Organization. (Washington D.C.: Selous
Foundation Press, 1991.), 11.
11
Ibid, 44.
3
which was engaging in state-terrorism.12 Dr. Wallerstein believes that through time, the roles
have reversed, and it is now Mandela and the ANC/MK that should be lauded as heroes
struggling against the Apartheid government that was actively engaging in this state-terrorism.
This allows Dr. Wallerstein to satisfy the technically accurate descriptor of terrorism without
condemning a group of revolutionaries that struggled against the blatant human rights violations
that were sponsored by the Apartheid government, an effort seen as laudable in the eyes of most
humanitarian individuals.
In contrast to these ideas, however, is that view that is held by Dr. Stephen Zunes of the
University of San Francisco’s Middle Eastern Studies. Dr. Zunes also serves as the chair of the
academic advisory committee for the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict.13 Dr. Zunes
believes that the non-violent struggle that took place was a major factor in the downfall of
Apartheid in South Africa.14 He acknowledges that most predictions were that the transition
could only come about “through violent revolutionary cataclysm,” but provides several reasons
why the non-violence proved to be a major factor.15 This was due primarily to the economic
structure of the country, which relied heavily on a black work force that cooperated with white
rule, combined with the fact that there were conditions that were working against an armed
overthrow of the government, conditions that did not rest so heavily on non-violent resistance.16
Among these conditions that worked against armed overthrow was South Africa’s control of
some of the richest mineral deposits in the world—including 1/3 of the earth’s gold deposits—a
large military force in an area that lacked any other large conventional force, and an incredibly
Immanuel Wallerstein. “Terrorists, Liberators, and the Rest of Us.” Binghamton University, Fernand
Braudel Center, March 1, 1999, http://www2.binghamton.edu/fbc/archive/11en.htm (Accessed 3/17/2012).
13
Stephen Zunes. “Stephen Zunes.” http://stephenzunes.org/ (accessed 4/19/2012).
14
Stephen Zunes. “The Role of non-violent action in the downfall of apartheid,” abstract, The Journal of
Modern African Studies, 37, 1, (1999) http://www.jstor.org/stable/161471 (accessed 4/19/2012).
15
Ibid.
16
Ibid.
12
4
elaborate security system.17 Dr. Zunes believes that this unique situation is what gave nonviolent resistance its power. The Apartheid government was incredibly powerful, but the source
of that power is what ultimately made it vulnerable to non-violent resistance, as the white
minority regime was dependent on the black minority and the industrialized west that imported
much of the mineral wealth of South Africa to maintain both modernization and oppressive
power.18 A focused, nonviolent resistance effort that included large-scale, organized labor
strikes would have been able to strike the South African government where its strength would
work against it, the economy.
As difficult as it can be to label the noble efforts of the ANC and MK in the resistance
against the Apartheid government as terroristic, it is important to be objective in studying these
groups. Thus, an objective analysis of this explosive topic should not be construed as a defense
of the apartheid government, or the role which that government played in human rights
violations, segregation and oppression for more than 4 decades. The ANC and MK were
terrorist organizations, and continued to be such until they ceased to commit violent acts for
political and ideological reasons. While the actions carried out did make these groups terrorist
organizations, the term terrorist should not necessarily carry a negative connotation. Actions
either are or are not terrorism, and that label exists independent of time or circumstance. Careful
analysis of individual actions will reveal the effect they have, as well as the moral implications
of the results, and only through this analysis can a positive or negative label be placed on the
actions. In the case of the ANC and MK, the tactics used were terroristic, but they were
implemented against a government that engaged in state terrorism, and grossly violated human
Stephen Zunes. “The Role of non-violent action in the downfall of apartheid,” The Journal of Modern
African Studies, 37, 1, (1999):1 http://www.jstor.org/stable/161471 (accessed 4/19/2012).
18
Ibid.
17
5
rights. However justified these tactics may have been they nonetheless functioned to prolong
apartheid rule by delegitimizing the ANC as a political movement, allowing the apartheid
government to claim that they were the victim in the struggle, and weakening support for antiapartheid movements.
Legitimacy as Political Movement Destroyed:
After the establishment of MK, both the ANC and MK would be labeled a terrorist
organization, taking away the legitimacy of the ANC. While the ANC was banned in 1960,
before the creation of MK, they were still seen by many as a legitimate political movement until
they were appropriately designated a terrorist organization. This move drastically hurt the ANC,
which operated as a legitimate political movement from 1912-1960. In fact, the ANC’s greatest
pre-ban resistance period took place in the 1950s, just prior to the ban. The Defiance Campaign
of 1952 saw the ANC partner with the South African Indian Congress and the Coloured People’s
Congress to wage the first large-scale, multi-racial political protest. The volunteer protesters
walked into facilities designated for one race only, failed to carry passes, and violated curfew.19
The Defiance Campaign may have been one of the driving catalysts that spurred the apartheid
government to pass the Public Safety Act in 1953. This act allowed a declaration of state of
emergency, giving the government power to override existing laws as well as ceasing oversight
by the courts.20 This broad expansion of power would give the apartheid government the ability
to arrest hundreds of resistance leaders and suspend their hearings, or arbitrarily extend their
incarceration. This would leave many of the resistance leaders jailed long past the time that they
should have been free to rejoin the resistance movements.
19
“South Africa: Overcoming Apartheid Building Democracy, Sharpeville Massacre” Michigan State
University, http://overcomingapartheid.msu.edu/multimedia.php?id=13 (accessed 3/21/2012).
20
“South Africa: Overcoming Apartheid Building Democracy, The Defiance Campaign” Michigan State
University, http://overcomingapartheid.msu.edu/multimedia.php?id=8 (accessed 4/18/2012).
6
Following the banning of the group, the ANC was forced to meet clandestinely. The
meetings would, of necessity, be held most often at night and in out of the way places so that the
members could attempt to avoid the notice of the military and police forces that would have
arrested them.21 While the ANC was still able to muster up new members, it was undeniably
more difficult to recruit individuals into a secret organization than one that can have offices on
the street. The ANC was further damaged by the banning when the United States and United
Kingdom followed suit the same year, as these two countries represented two of the wealthiest
western nations that the resistance movement could have hoped to obtain financial and political
support from.
In the 1960’s, there were few signs of resistance after the initial two years of heavy
sabotage from December 1961 to June 1963.22 This was due in large part to the high numbers of
the most influential resistance members to either go into voluntary exile or face arrest. 23 In
either case, many of the most influential members of the ANC and MK were separated from the
resistance movement in a way that made them ineffectual in the fight against apartheid. This
lack of resistance may have led the Apartheid government to believe that they had been
successful in quelling rebellion. As a result the “Apartheid system grew stronger and extended
its control over all aspects of people’s lives.”24 This extended control would encase South Africa
in a more rigid set of laws that would make it continually harder to make changes to the system
once the resistance began to pick up steam again.
Douglas O. Linder. “The Nelson Mandela (Rivonia) Trial: An Account,” University of Missouri-Kansas
City. http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/mandela/mandelaaccount.html (accessed 3/18/12).
22
South African History Online, “Umkhonto we Sizwe Launches its First Acts of Sabotage,” South African
History Online, http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/umkhoto-wesizwe-mk-launches-its-first-actssabotage (accessed 4/29/2012).
23
Unwembi, “African National Congress, South Africa’s National Liberation Movement,” ANC,
http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=206 (accessed 3/11/2012).
24
Ibid.
21
7
It is also important to note the large numbers of people that fled South Africa to receive
military and guerilla-warfare training, of which Nelson Mandela was one.25 Large numbers of
people, predominantly young individuals, fled South Africa to receive training in exile, with
hundreds swelling the ranks of MK after the 1976 Soweto Uprising.26 The large numbers of
people flocking to join MK helped to make the apartheid government see the ANC and MK as a
serious threat again, which helped MK to increase the level of sabotage attacks again from 19761978.27 This reestablishment of threat to apartheid rule would not help to regain legitimacy,
however, as it served to underscore the image of violent revolutionaries rather than political
movement.
Victim-Aggressor Roles Reversed:
After 15 years of minimal sabotage, MK would drastically increase the number of attacks
in 1978. This long time period between active sabotage campaigns would allow the Apartheid
government to act as though they were the injured party. The ever increasing violence and acts
of sabotage against railroads, police stations, and other government properties switched the
victim-aggressor roles, with MK being demonized as a group bent on destroying the economic
system of South Africa. This portrayal was made easier with MK being born of (among others)
the ANC and the South African Communist Party, as the Apartheid government could point to
the communist ties as the “real reason” MK was bent on overthrowing the capitalist Apartheid
government. 28
25
Nelson Mandela. Long Walk to Freedom, (United Kingdom: Little Brown and Co. 1995), 62.
South African History Online, “Timeline: Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK),” South African History Online,
http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/timeline-umkhonto-we-sizwe-mk (accessed 4/29/2012).
27
Ibid.
28
South African History Online, “Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK)” South African History Online,
http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/umkhonto-we-sizwe-mk (accessed 4/13/2012).
26
8
Whether Chief Albert Luthuli, president of the ANC from 1952 until his death in 1967,
recognized the government’s attempt to point to economic issues as the real reason of resistance,
or was merely foresighted enough to see the problems that would arise from a policy of armed
resistance is unclear, but he did initially seek to maintain a policy of peaceful resistance. He
would ultimately be persuaded by Mandela and others that they must move to a path of violent
resistance if they were to effect any changes. In June, 1961 Chief Luthuli was finally convinced
at the meeting of the National Executive in Durban, saying “If anyone thinks I am a pacifist, let
him try to take my chickens and he will see how wrong he is.”29 Though Chief Luthuli was
convinced of the need to move to armed resistance, he wanted to maintain the ANC as a nonviolent organization. To this end, he insisted on the creation of MK as a separate entity that was
allied with the ANC, thereby allowing ANC members to disavow any knowledge of armed
resistance or violent action.30
While it appears as though Chief Luthuli had accepted armed resistance as a necessary
evil, it is clear that he never embraced it. Just months later, in December, Chief Luthuli
delivered his Nobel Peace Prize speech at Oslo University, in which he said “We in our situation
have chosen the path of non-violence of our own volition. Along this path we have organized
many heroic campaigns. All the strength of progressive leadership in South Africa, all my life
and strength has been given to the pursuance of this method, in an attempt to avert disaster in the
interests of South Africa.”31 It appears that Chief Luthuli believed that violent resistance would
result in “disaster” for the “interests of South Africa,” and so attempted to prevent the adoption
Scott Couper. “Luthuli and Armed Struggle,” Ghandi-Luthuli Documentation Centre,
http://scnc.ukzn.ac.za/doc/B/lutuli/Luthuli_Articles/Couper,_S_Luthuli_and_Armed_Struggle.pdf (Accessed
4/19/2012).
30
South African History Online, “Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK)” South African History Online,
http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/umkhonto-we-sizwe-mk (accessed 4/13/2012).
31
Albert Luthuli, Speech at Oslo University, “Nobel Prize Speech by Chief Albert Luthuli at the Oslo
University,” (December 11, 1961).
29
9
of violence as a means by the ANC, settling on allowing the creation of MK to function as the
armed wing, which allowed the ANC to maintain at least some distance. Luthuli would fail
however, as MK and the ANC were ultimately lumped together by their common goals and
membership, if not their common means. Luthuli was correct in seeing the disaster however, as
this violence strengthened the Apartheid government, allowing it to remain in power beyond
when it should have.
The Apartheid government would further take advantage of the ANC violence by
enacting new laws that would increase penalties for violent resistance. One such law, the
Sabotage Act of 1962 defined sabotage broadly enough to include strike action, and made
sabotage a capital crime.32 Another example of the harsh legislative response to MK violence
was the General Law Amendment Act of 1963, which allowed a South African police officer to
detain individuals suspected of politically motivated crimes without a warrant or access to a
lawyer for up to 90 days.33 The apartheid government enacted these laws to make criminals of
political resistors, to further distort the victim-aggressor relationship between the government
and dissidents.
During the first 18 months of violent resistance, MK would carry out over 200 acts of
sabotage.34 These shows of defiance would cause the state to pass laws such as the Sabotage Act
of 1962 and the General Amendment Act of 1963. These laws would continue to make
resistance more dangerous and difficult, and are a likely component to the lack of heavy
resistance later in the 1960s, which as discussed appears to have set the resistance movement
O’Malley, Padraig. “1962. Sabotage Act General Laws Amendment Act No 76.” Nelson Mandela
Centre of Memory and Dialogue. http://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/ (accessed 4/29/2012).
33
O’Malley, Padraig. “1963. General Laws Amendment Act No 37.” Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory
and Dialogue, http://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/ (accessed 4/29/2012).
34
Unwembi, “African National Congress, South Africa’s National Liberation Movement,” ANC,
http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=206 (accessed 3/11/2012).
32
10
back as much as a decade. As the resistance continued, the government tried harder to track
down the leadership of MK, knowing that without this leadership, MK would likely be
demoralized if not at least marginally incapacitated. On July 10, 1963 Lieutenant van Wyk and
his informant were finally able to locate the ANC and MK headquarters at Rivonia.35 The next
day, police officers would enter the building and surrounding outbuildings, arresting 8 suspects
and confiscating incriminating documents. These men, along with others already in custody,
would be put on trial for sabotage in what would become known as the “Rivonia Trial.”36
The Apartheid government was further able to claim injury when arrested leaders of the
resistance publicly admitted to their role in the violence. In October of 1963, the Rivonia Trial
witnessed eleven prominent MK leaders tried for their roles in over 193 acts of sabotage.37
Mandela delivered a speech at the docks during the trial, saying
“I do not deny that I planned sabotage. I did not plan it in a spirit of recklessness, nor
because I have any love of violence. I planned it as a result of a calm and sober
assessment of the political situation that had arisen after many years of tyranny,
exploitation, and oppression of my people by the Whites. I admit immediately that I
was one of the persons who helped to form Umkhonto we Sizwe, and that I played a
prominent role in its affairs until I was arrested in August 1962.”38
While Mandela’s words most certainly inspired other members of the resistance, as well as
helped to recruit new members, they also most assuredly incensed the Apartheid government.
The end of the trial would see one of the “Rivonia Eleven” acquitted, with the other ten
accused—including Mandela—being sentenced to one life sentence in prison.39 The judge in the
case elected not to pursue the ultimate penalty, which he considered to be the “appropriate
Douglas O. Linder, “The Nelson Mandela (Rivonia) Trial: An Account,” University of Missouri-Kansas
City, http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/mandela/mandelaaccount.html (accessed 3/18/12).
36
Ibid.
37
Ibid.
38
Nelson Mandela, Speech at Pretoria Palace of Justice, “Nelson Mandela’s Statement From the Dock at
the Opening of the Defence Case in the Rivonia Trial,” (April 20, 1961).
39
Douglas O. Linder, “The Nelson Mandela (Rivonia) Trial: An Account,” University of Missouri-Kansas
City, http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/mandela/mandelaaccount.html (accessed 3/18/12).
35
11
penalty,” to the surprise of many, who did not expect such a show of leniency from the very
court system Mandela and the others had challenged.40 This “show of leniency” was more likely
the result of careful consideration as the government did not want to make the ten men martyrs
that the resistance could rally around, preferring to leave them in prison as a reminder.
Anti-Apartheid Movements Lose Support, Apartheid Prolonged:
As the aforementioned incidents continued to weaken support for anti-Apartheid
movements, they would inexorably slow the movement towards a democratic, non-racial
government. Individuals and organizations that did not embrace the ideas of MK and the ANC
often were attempting to effect change within the system. These people were branded
collaborators, accused of going along with the Apartheid government in exchange for
preferential treatment, which usually took form in political appointments and money. Chief
among these was Mangosuthu Buthelezi, who founded the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) after
leaving the ANC in 1975, because Buthelezi supposedly wanted to work for a peaceful solution
to apartheid, and distrusted the connection between the ANC and MK.41 Buthelezi was not only
a collaborator, accepting money from the apartheid government in exchange for not making
waves, but led the IFP during a time when it was later revealed that the IFP was actively working
to stall negotiations on an end to Apartheid rule.42 As was revealed in the Inkathagate Scandal,
police and military forces supported Inkatha as violence ripped apart South Africa. The clashes
between the ANC/MK and the IFP turned violent resistance into bloody civil war. This war
would continue as the Apartheid government funneled money through Buthelezi to the IFP to
continue fighting. Aiding in the cause were the police and military forces disarming Inkatha
40
Ibid.
Labor Against Apartheid, “The Killing Goes On,” New York Labor Committee Against Apartheid
Publication, (Winter 1992).
42
Ibid.
41
12
opponents while largely ignoring IFP fighters.43 This fighting continued to the negotiation table
where standards and decisions on how to hold the first democratic elections were being set.
Buthelezi, in an effort to hold onto his power as a regional homeland leader, boycotted the
negotiation process until the last minute for a wide range of reasons.44 The wide range of
reasons to boycott and rapid changes in Buthelezi’s demeanor when this boycott was ineffective
suggest that he was grabbing at straws in any effort to hang onto power. The violence between
the ANC and the IFP would slow the process of change, though the people involved attempted to
prevent Buthelezi from stalling, with relative success.45
In addition to the violent clashes, civilian protests against collaborators, the IFP, and the
ANC served to divide the non-white population of South Africa into several smaller groups,
which helped the Apartheid Government to maintain power. These highly publicized protests
targeted specific local, “tribal,” and religious leaders, among others, that were believed to be
collaborating with the Apartheid government. One such protest took place on March 25, 1991,
with ANC supporters distributing pamphlets leading up to the protest featuring the names of
Chief Buthelezi, Mayor Nelson Botile, Reverend Elijah Maswanganyi, Bishop Isaac Mokoena,
and a picture of Mayor Tamsanga Linda. The picture of Mayor Linda was printed with a large
“X” over it, and the words “SELL OUT” underneath.46 As the tensions built around these
leaders, the rift in the black population grew more pronounced, as people were forced to choose
to stay inactive, support the IFP, or support the ANC. This divide would help slow the motor of
43
Ibid.
“Managing Spoilers At The Bargaining Table: Inkatha And The Talks To End Apartheid, 1990-1994,”
Princeton University,
http://www.princeton.edu/successfulsocieties/content/data/policy_note/PN_id137/Policy_Note_ID137.txt (accessed
March 15, 2012).
45
Ibid.
46
Capital District Coalition Against Apartheid And Racism, “Picket Against Apartheid Collaborators,”
Pamphlet, (March 25, 1991).
44
13
change, and while it was already in motion at the time of this protest, democratic elections would
not be held for another 3 years.
The cause of the violence during this time cannot be easily attributed to just one cause.
Buthelezi certainly helped to instigate this violence in an attempt to avoid being sidelined in the
negotiations, but according to Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, Sociologists engaging in a
study for the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security in Ottawa, there are 5 other
major reasons. These reasons are 1) de Klerk’s double agenda, who like Buthelezi was
attempting to hold on to some sort of power, 2) a “third force” of right-wing elements in the
security establishment, 3) the ANC’s campaign of armed struggle, 4) ingrained tribalism that
resulted in black on black violence (which was coupled with Buthelezi’s supporting the InkathaANC war) and 5) the legacy of Apartheid.47 As the country was mired in turmoil, the violence
threatened to drown the efforts of leaders to transition to a democratic rule. Had the ANC
maintained a policy of non-violent resistance and abandoned the idea to form MK before it came
to fruition, it is possible that the IFP would have had no obvious group to engage in war, and
Buthelezi may not have felt his prominence so threatened. While it cannot be stated with
certainty that events would have played out that way, it is possible that with this removal of three
of the catalysts that Adam and Moodley believe contributed in large part to the violence that
slowed the transition. This may have ended Apartheid earlier while the transition period could
have been a time of relative peace and celebration, rather than violent civil war.
Conclusions:
At the time that MK was founded, peaceful resistance against the Apartheid government
was already taking place in South Africa. The ANC had operated legally for nearly 50 years,
Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, “Political Violence, ‘Tribalism’ and Inkatha,” The Journal of
Modern African Studies, 30, 3, (1992):485 http://www.jstor.org/stable/161169 (accessed 4/20/2012).
47
14
and was attempting to affect change by working peacefully against the system. This process was
undeniably slow and at times seemed to regress. Eventually, Nelson Mandela, Joe Slovo, and
others would reach the conclusion that the practice of working within this system was a lost
cause, and would in fact convince Albert Luthuli of this, even though he was a man of strong
convictions and moral beliefs that discouraged violence. It is impossible to say with any
certainty that Apartheid would have ended earlier had the ANC Youth League contributed their
efforts to the nonviolent movement, but the evidence suggests that the radicalization of the
movement and the violent attacks carried out by MK caused the Apartheid government to react
with stricter laws that further violated human rights, which spurred MK on to greater efforts in a
cycle that would prove difficult to break out of. In this way it can be seen that the armed
resistance struggle and the repercussions of that violence would cause the ANC to lose
legitimacy as a political movement by South African and foreign governments alike, while
reversing the victim-aggressor role between the people and the Apartheid government, which
caused anti-Apartheid movements to split into multiple factions, thereby weakening the
resistance. All of these factors contributed to the prolonging of Apartheid rule and the
oppression that it brought with it.
15
Bibliography:
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(accessed 4/20/2012).
Brians, Paul et al. eds. Reading About the World: Vol. 2, (New York City: Harcourt Brace
Custom Books).
Buthelezi, Mangosuthu. Speech, “Inkatha, ‘Zuluness’ and the Historians,” (September 21,
1991).
Capital District Coalition Against Apartheid and Racism, “Picket Against Apartheid
Collaborators,” Pamphlet, (March 25, 1991).
Labor Against Apartheid, “The Killing Goes On,” New York Labor Committee Against
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