Is Isn’t Not anymore But, used to be Wish they were… Of course, I’m talking about being “COOL” › Cool is a highly prized virtue › It has replaced goodness, quality, and servitude as the modern, secular virtue Cool is… › An attitude of defiance to authority and tradition › A “permanent state of private rebellion” › An unashamed amalgam of “narcissism, ironic detachment, and hedonism” Cool is not just a contemporary concept › Is has a long and distinguished heritage over many centuries and continents Of course if hasn’t always been called “cool” › But, the attitude of cool can be identified in many places and in many time periods When we talk about attitudes we talk about them as something people “have” › “She has an attitude.” or “He has an attitude problem!” › We talk as though people can have an attitude in the same way they have an ear, a toe, or a new car › We give “attitude” the status of a noun, like it is something real and tangible, and that influences the behavior of the “attitude-owner” › We don’t really stop to think about what we mean when we talk about attitudes But, it hasn’t always been that way › The concept of attitude can be traced back to 1710 when it was first introduced to the English language › It was used by sociologist Herbert Spencer and biologist Charles Darwin in the mid to late 1800s › Used in the early 19th century to refer to a physiological state or physical orientation So, “attitude” has not always been a part of the common sense we take it to be now To date, attitudes have been the single most researched topic in social psychology But, the definitions, models, and theories of attitudes used by social psychologists are more often than not vague and inconsistent So it is useful for us to be clear about what social psychologists typically mean by “attitude” › “… attitudes are defined at least implicitly as responses that locate ‘objects of thought’ on ‘dimensions of judgment’.” › And… › “…[an attitude is] a general and enduring positive or negative feeling about some person, object or issue.” Thus, attitudes are first and foremost evaluations › They convey what we think and how we feel about some object, or attitude referent All attitudes have a referent, an “object of thought,” a “stimulus object” › Referents may be specific and tangible like… But, referents may also be abstract or intangible like liberalism, equality and “awesomeness” By indicating the attitude-holder’s “orientation” to the referent, an attitude conveys that person’s evaluation of the referent Attitudes are expressed in the language of “like/dislike,” “approach/avoid,” and “good/bad” › i.e. they are evaluative Thus, when the object of the attitude is important to the person, the evaluation of the object produces an affective, or emotional, reaction in that person Important features of attitudes › First, attitudes have specific referents, and thus will only be relevant when a particular object, person or issue is categorized as being attituderelevant This implies that activation of an attitude requires at least some minimal cognitive effort However, this effort is so minimal that attitudes can be activated and can function automatically It has been argued that an attitude is represented in memory by An object label and rules for applying that label An evaluative summary of that object A knowledge structure supporting that evaluation Second, attitudes are relatively enduring › Although attitudes can change, as a result of new experience or following some persuasive communication, an attitude is not usually considered to be a transitory evaluation Rather, it is considered an expression of a largely stable body of knowledge and experience with a particular object, person or issue The dimensions of judgment upon which attitudes fall may be universal or specific, socially shared or unique to a single individual › Ex. All referents: George W. Bush, brussels sprouts, Jack Daniels, liberalism, equality, and “awesomeness” can be placed somewhere on a dimension ranging from bad to good, or like to dislike › But, not all referents can be located on a dimension from stupid to smart, or “cool” to “lame” The definition of attitude as evaluation is becoming increasingly common, but still not universal It is replacing a previously widespread 3part explanation of attitudes: the ABC model › Divides attitudes into 3 components: affect, behavior, and cognition › For this model, attitudes are predispositions to respond to some class of stimuli with certain classes of responses › The 3 major classes of response are cognitive, affective, and behavioral Cognitive responses are the knowledge and beliefs a person has about a particular stimulus object Affective responses are simply how the person feels about a stimulus object Behavioral responses are simply overt behaviors ATTITUDE COGNITIVE AFFECTIVE Knowledge and beliefs Feelings and emotion BEHAVIORAL Overt behavior The model allows for these 3 responses to be inconsistent with one another › Which is helpful because more often than not they are › Ex. Sally does not like olives (cognitive and affective), based on this, one would expect Sally not to eat olives (behavior) But, the degree of discrepancy between the 3 presumed components of the same attitude held by one person towards a single object is usually so large that the tri-component model has largely been dismissed But, Sally is dating Tommy and really wants his mother to like her (cognitive) Sally goes to Tommy’s mother’s house for dinner and eats a dish filled with olives (behavior) rather than tell Tommy’s mother she doesn’t like the food Also, by defining behavior as just a component of attitude, any supposed relationship between attitude and behavior is simply defined away This is not a helpful resolution of one of social psychology’s major problems: › Do attitudes predict behavior? Attitudes are conceptualized as having a definite structure with 2 parts › Intra-attitudinal structure The structure that derives from the relationships between the affective and cognitive (and perhaps behavioral) components of a particular attitude › Inter-attitudinal structure The structure that exists across attitudes and that organizes the associations between attitudes to a range of different attitude objects Additionally, the concept of attitudes as knowledge structures (or schemas) gives rise to important properties of attitudes, including their accessibility and potential for automatic activation In many ways an attitudes is like a schema › Except that attitudes have the evaluation of that referent as their defining and central element 3 aspects of attitudes deriving from their structure as schemas are particularly important: › Accessibility, activation, and the possibility of ambivalent attitudes Some attitudes come to mind more easily than others Social psychology distinguishes between the availability of an attitude and its accessibility › An attitude is available if it exists within a person’s cognitive structure › Attitude accessibility is the ease with which a particular attitude can be retrieved from memory That is, if the person actually possesses that attitude Usually operationalized as the speed with which the attitude can be assessed The accessibility of an attitude at any given time is affected by: › › The structural properties of the attitude (attitude strength) And aspects of the context that serve to “prime” particular attitudes as being relevant to that context Accessibility is an important property of attitudes because accessible attitudes govern behavior more strongly than do less accessible attitudes Most of the enduring differences between people in the accessibility of particular attitudes are considered to be due to the strength of their attitudes An attitude is said to be strong if there is a consistent, wellrehearsed link between an attitude object and its evaluation › The strength of an attitude does not refer to its extremity (i.e. the degree of positivity or negativity in the evaluation) › Ex. If someone thinks about George W. Bush regularly, and each time evaluates him in a moderately negative way, that person will be said to develop a strong attitude towards George W. Bush Rather, it refers to the frequency and consistency of its expression The association between an object and its evaluation becomes well developed through repetition making an attitude strong › Thus, strong attitudes are more accessible (more easily and quickly activated) than weaker attitudes, and are therefore more influential on behavior Not all our attitudes are active at any one time › It almost goes without saying that only a small set of our stock pile of attitudes is active at any given moment Attitudes must be activated, or “turned on” somehow The process of attitude activation has received considerable research attention and much of this work has drawn from principles of cognitive psychology › Attitudes are conceived as nodes in memory, connected in an associative network › Nodes are activated when we categorize some experience in terms of them, and multiple nodes become connected through experience of co-activation Ex. “kitten” and “cute” or “reality television” and “crazy” › The more frequently any connection is experience the stronger that connection becomes Reality TV Crazy It has been argued, based on the associative network of attitudes, that an attitude is an association between a referent (object, person, issue) and its subjective evaluation Thus, noticing an object in the environment and categorizing it as an instance of a particular type of object activates the node corresponding to that type of object in memory After this initial activation, activation will “spread” from the object node to the evaluation node associated with it, in proportion to the strength of the association When the association between the object and its evaluation is strong enough, simply noticing the object will cause the evaluation to become activated Reality TV Identified as a reality show Crazy Some connections become so well rehearsed that when one node is activated, the other is automatically activated Automatic activation is said to occur if merely thinking about or noticing the attitude object produces the evaluation of that object even if evaluation of the object is not intended at that time Crazy Several studies have found evidence for automatic activation of attitudes › Positive or negative attitude objects are used as primes for positive or negative adjectives › Results have shown clear evidence for automatic activation of the evaluation associated with an attitude object Although, there is some disagreement about whether all attitudes are automatically activated, or if this effect holds only for strong attitudes Bargh et al (1996) › Found that both strong and weak attitudes produced an automatic evaluation effect Positive attitude object primes facilitated faster reaction times for responding to positive adjectives Negative attitude object primes facilitated faster reaction times for responding to negative adjectives Following the evidence that attitudes can be activated without deliberate intention or conscious awareness, in recent years social psychologists have begun to consider whether we may have attitudes that are outside of our conscious awareness If conscious processing is not required for an attitude to be activated and have an effect, maybe we don’t need to be consciously aware of all the attitudes we have Attitudes we are unaware that we have are called implicit attitudes Implicit attitudes are like conscious attitudes in that they consist of a relatively stable association between an object and its evaluation › The BIG difference is that with implicit attitudes, the person holding the attitude may be unaware that they hold it › Implicit attitudes are “…introspectively unidentified (or inaccurately identified) traces of past experience that mediate favorable or unfavorable feeling, thought, or action toward social objects.” › In other words, implicit attitudes are evaluations of objects that people are unaware they hold If we accept that: › A) we may hold attitudes that we are unaware of, AND/OR › B) that our automatic attitudes may be different from those attitudes that we are willing to deliberately endorse A whole new problem for attitude theorists is created: › If our implicit and explicit attitudes are inconsistent or even contradictory, which should be considered to be our “true” attitude? Wegner and Bargh › Argue that people are inclined to see automatic responses as more genuine because they are not subject to the selfpresentation concerns that may affect the expression of more controlled responses Meaning, since we can’t change an automatic response to make ourselves look better, it’s probably more genuine › Also argue that automatically activated attitudes are more important in some respects than controlled attitudes, because they are more likely to predict behavior Dovidio et al. › Argued against a universal preference for automatic attitudes › Propose instead that implicit (automatic) attitudes may be important in predicting automatic behavior, while explicit (controlled) attitudes may be more likely to predict deliberate, considered behavior If attitudes have multiple cognitive and affective elements, it follows that these different elements may not always lead to the same evaluation People are said to have ambivalent attitudes when they have both positive and negative evaluations of the same target Ambivalent attitudes are perhaps particularly likely for targets that are complex and differentiated and with which we have numerous encounters › Such as groups of people rather than for simple targets like olives The possibility of attitude ambivalence has long been acknowledged by psychologists › Ambivalence has been associated with attitude instability and amplification Ambivalent attitudes are considered unstable › The evaluation that is expressed in a particular moment will depend on which elements of the attitude are most accessible at that time › And, as there are large variations in the evaluations associated with different elements of ambivalent attitudes, the expressed evaluations of the target are likely to be correspondingly variable Amplification › Refers to the tendency for people to make more extreme evaluations of targets toward which they hold ambivalent attitudes and less extreme evaluations of targets when attitudes are more straightforward The realization that people often hold ambivalent attitudes has led to a rethinking of how attitudes should be measured Traditionally, attitudes were measured by rating objects on bipolar evaluative dimensions › Good/bad, pleasant/unpleasant, warm/cold, etc. However, these types of bipolar attitude measure facilitate a “midpoint problem” › Should neutral ratings on bipolar scales be interpreted as reflecting ambivalence or indifference towards the attitude object? A person who selects a midpoint rating on a bipolar scale that rates politicians from good to bad may: › A) believe that some politicians are very good and others are very bad › B) believe that politicians have some very good qualities (like intelligence, public mindedness, enthusiasm) and other very negative qualities (like vanity, dishonesty, ruthlessness) › C) not have strong opinions about politicians So, how do we know? Kaplan’s solution: › Separate traditional bipolar semantic differential scales into separate unipolar measures of positive and negative attributes Although this method has been adopted by researchers in a number of areas, notably in the measurement of intergroup attitudes › The use of bipolar semantic differentials is still common in many areas of attitude assessment Work on the spread of activation of attitudes largely assumes that each attitude exists as a discrete node in an associative network › Which has no structure other than horizontal associations formed through repeated co-exposure and rehearsal However, in addition to these associated connections, we can also think of attitudes as existing in hierarchical relations to each other › In this view, some specific attitudes are thought to be instances of broader, more generalized attitudes Ex. A person’s attitude towards paid maternity leave may reflect and/or be derived from the person’s more general attitude towards working mothers › Which may in turn reflect the person’s attitudes towards various aspects of feminism Kerlinger (1984) structure of political attitudes › Concerned with how social and political attitudes are organized › Prior research had suggested that these attitudes could be arranged in a bipolar way, ranging from liberal to conservative In this view, liberalism is the opposite of conservatism Someone who agrees strongly with a liberal item in an attitude scale is also presumed to disagree strongly with a conservative item in the scale Kerlinger suggested that the two ideologies of liberalism and conservatism do not exist in opposition to one another, but, rather are independent of one another This model starts with social referents – the objects of social and political attitudes, such as abortion, real estate, trade unions, money, racial equality and patriotism Some of the referents are said to be criterial for liberals and are criterial for conservatives › A referent is said to be criterial for someone if it is significant, or salient, to that person Bipolar models would assume that referents criterial for liberals are also negatively criterial for conservatives, and vice versa Kerlinger argues that liberals do not care about conservative referents and conservatives do not care about liberal referents › › In other words, criteriality is generally positive or neutral, not negative As an ideology, liberalism has one set of criterial referents and conservatism has its own set, and the two are independent Evidence for this model relies on the factor analysis of criterial ratings (both liberal and conservative) of a large number of referents by a large number of people › That is, the structure Kerlinger talks about is identified across, not within people Although, it may also be represented as a structure within one person Factor analysis of criterial ratings typically produces about a dozen first-order factors (like religiosity, racial equality, civil rights, morality, etc.) When these first-order factors are themselves factor analyzed, they produce two orthogonal second-order factors: liberalism and conservatism › These second-order factors are what Kerlinger labels as ideologies – a collection of shared beliefs, attitudes and values organized around some coherent core and often associated with a particular group in a social structure Ideologies are shared › It is not possible for one person to “have” an ideology › They do not “exist” or “reside” within any one person › Rather, they are bodies of thought themselves They only have life to the extent they are shared, an hence can be said to be truly and only social – they are the product of social relations Considering the structure of social and political attitudes as being built upon ideologies returns us to issues raised at the start of the chapter › Most of the work on attitudes has concerned the intra-individual structure of attitudes Their accessibility Whether they are changed to maintain consistency How, if at all, attitudes are related to behaviors Work on the ideological nature of attitudes is relatively scarce, but still important Intra-individual and inter-individual research are complementary to each other › Intra-individual, or micro-level, focuses on how attitudes work › Inter-individual, or macro-level, places attitudes in a social context, and illustrates their fundamental social character Attitudes are social, in origin, function and consequence They originate in social life, they communicate meaning, they are shared, and they have social consequences What are the functions of attitudes? Psychologists have attempted to answer this question in two different eras › In the 1950s and from the mid-1980s on Not much was done in between › In both of these eras, the focus is on the functions attitudes serve for the individual attitude-holder, and has ignored the broader social functions Katz (1960) proposed 4 functions of attitudes › 1) Knowledge function Similar to the common understanding of what an attitude does Attitudes help us explain and understand the world around us Definition: an attitude is a memorial representation of an object, and associated with that representation are rules about the labeling of the object, an evaluative summary of the object and a knowledge structure about the object The knowledge function of attitudes helps us know the world around us 2) Utilitarian function › Attitudes help us gain rewards and avoid › › › › punishments Utilitarian function emphasizes the social consequences that follow from the expression of certain attitudes To be “politically correct” is to hold and display attitudes for utilitarian reasons The idea that attitudes can have utilitarian functions underscores the flexibility in people’s expression of their attitudes People are likely to alter their “attitude” to some social object according to the social context they are in 3) value-expressive function › The expression of an attitude can sometimes be no more than a public statement of what a person believes or identifies with (probably strongly) Ex. Political statements Stickers on car windows Slogan T-shirts Uniforms or sports teams Displayed clothing labels These are all public signs intended to convey a message about the owner They signal to the world that you’re a Lions fan, a mother, support world peace, miss Dale Earnhardt, that you can afford designer cloths and don’t buy from K-Mart, etc. There is no real point to these expressions other than to tell the world something about who you are Thus, attitudes serve a value-expressive function 4) ego-defensive function › These attitudes are usually deep-seated, difficult to change and hostile to the attitude object Ex. Homophobia and xenophobia › According to Katz, at least some people who hold such attitudes do so because they are unconsciously denying some aspect of their own self Ex. Homophobics may be so hostile to homosexuals and homosexuality because they deny and don’t want to confront aspects of their own sexuality › Attitudes that serve this function thus project outward what are really internal, intrapsychic conflicts Ex. Adams, Wright and Lohr (1996) › Measured the sexual and physiological arousal of heterosexual men while they viewed sexually explicit videos of men engaged in homosexual activity › Results: Participants who had previously identified as holding negative attitudes towards homosexuality and homosexual men showed greater sexual arousal while watching the videos than did the participants with more positive attitudes towards homosexuality › The researchers argued that the expression of negative attitudes towards homosexuality provides a defense against the assumed ego-threat experienced by straight men who experience some level of homosexual arousal Attitudes may simultaneously serve more than one function and may be held or expressed for different reasons at different times › Ex. A person’s attitudes to medically assisted reproduction may largely serve a knowledge function, being based on what that person knows about IVF, donor insemination, etc. and depending on how much that person needs to formulate an attitude to assisted reproduction › But, the same attitude may also aid that person’s relationship with an infertile relative › Or, it may also be the expression of more deeply held beliefs about God’s will and the Chruch’s position on procreation › Or, it may also reflect that person’s own, perhaps unconscious, conflicted sense of their own sexuality or fertility, or doubts about their genealogy Several theorists have reformulated Katz’s typology of attitudes › Smith et al. Object-appraisal function = Katz’s knowledge function Externalization function = Katz’s ego-defensive function Social adjustment function = Katz’s value-expressive and utilitarian functions › Shavitt Makes a more definite tie between attitudes and individual and social identities Has shown how the success of attempts to change an attitude depends on the function that attitude serves the owner Utilitarian function = Katz’s knowledge and utilitarian function and Smith et al.’s object-appraisal function Social identity function = Katz’s value-expressive function and Smith et al.’s social adjustment function Self-esteem maintenance function = Katz’s ego-defensive function and Smith et al.’s externalization function Herek proposes 2 different kinds of attitudes › Evaluative attitudes: attitudes in which the attitude object is an end in itself and the attitude functions to allow the individual access to the object itself Experimental and specific – based on and restricted to a single object (Ex. The dog next door that bit you) Experimental and schematic – based on experience with particular objects, but generalized to a class of objects (Ex. Generalizing your attitude towards the dog next door to all dogs) Anticipatory – based on expected, rather than direct, experience (Ex. You’ve never been bitten by a dog, but expect to be bitten if you come into contact with one) › Expressive (or symbolic) attitudes: Attitudes in which the attitude object is a means to an end, by providing social support, increasing self-esteem or reducing anxiety Social expressive – based on the individual’s need to be accepted by others (Ex. Dressing a certain way to fit in with a new group of friends) Value expressive – based on the individual’s need to define self by expressing important values and aligning self with important reference groups (Ex. After joining a Greek organization, adopting that organization’s ideals and wearing their letters) Defensive – based on the individual’s need to reduce anxiety associated with intrapsychic conflicts (Ex. Expressing hostility towards homosexuals to reduce anxiety caused by one’s own homosexual feelings) Herek suggests that strategies to change attitudes must consider whether attitudes are held for evaluative or expressive/symbolic reasons Also, attitudes formed for different functional reasons are likely to be more or less resistant to change › Ex. Few Australians have a lot of direct contact with Aboriginal people, but this does not prevent them from forming strong anti-Aboriginal attitudes Because these attitudes are based on anticipatory rather than experience, they are hard to disconfirm through direct experience, and hence are hard to change Note that all the functions of attitudes we have discussed emphasize the functions for the individual attitude-holder These functions are mostly theorized at an individual level › That means the “social” functions are conceptualized in terms of the social consequences for an individual holding or expressing a particular attitude Attitudes also serve social functions › But, there is relatively little research in the social cognitive tradition that directly investigates the social functions attitudes serve › So, we’ll talk about the social understandings and their functions a little later when we discuss other theoretical perspectives One of the most enduring questions for social psychologists regards the relationship between attitudes and behavior › The common-sense view would suggest that attitudes directly cause a person to act in a particular way Ex. If you know someone feels strongly about practicing safe sex, you could predict certain things about this individual’s sexual activity like using condoms and birth control But, social psychologists know that the relationship between attitudes and behavior isn’t this simple In reality, behaviors appear to be unrelated to attitudes just as often as they appear to be related › Also, behaviors can “cause” attitudes as much as attitudes can “cause” behaviors › Additionally, some researchers have argued that we need to distinguish between different types of attitudes, like attitudes towards targets and attitudes towards behaviors › Ex. In trying to predict people’s sun protection behavior, it is necessary to consider both their attitudes towards skin cancer AND their attitudes towards applying sunscreen Richard LaPiere (1934) was the first to present evidence that the attitudes a group of people express toward a certain object do not particularly correspond to their behavior towards the same object › In the early 1930s LaPiere traveled with a Chinese couple around › › › › the US west coast, staying in inns and campsites This was a time of strong anti-Chinese feelings throughout the US, yet the trio was only refused accommodation once After the trip, LaPiere wrote to all the managers of the establishments they had visited, and others they hadn’t stayed at, asking if they would accept Chinese guests More than 90% claimed they would not accept Chinese guests Thus, there was a disparity between the expressed attitudes of the managers and their overt behaviors This disparity has been found in many studies over the years › Wicker (1969) summarized the results of 32 different studies, each of which measured individual’s attitudes toward an object and a direct measure of behavior towards the same object The attitude-behavior correlations reported in these studies rarely exceeded +0.3, were often close to zero, and were even negative on some occasions Thus, at best, attitudes appear to explain up to, but rarely more than, 10% of the variance in behavior › So if attitudes are so worthless in predicting behavior, what use is this construct to us? Social psychologists have attempted to understand Wicker’s results › Largely examining under what conditions we do expect attitudes to be related to behavior and under what conditions the two should be unrelated Social psychology has produced 2 broad classes of response to Wicker › Many have attempted to work with the relationship between a single attitude-behavior pair, attempting to find when the link is strong and when it is not › Others have attempted to formulate and test a more elaborated model of the general link between attitudes and behavior Many variables influencing the strength of the attitude-behavior link have been identified › First, attitudes about an object formed through direct experience appear to be more strongly associated with behavior towards that object than attitudes not formed through direct experience It has been suggested that this stronger link is due to: Attitudes formed through experience are held with more confidence, clarity and certainty These attitudes are more accessible (able to be brought into consciousness easily) and stronger And these attitudes are automatically activated in the presence of the attitude object Second, it has been suggested that more stable attitudes show greater attitude-behavior consistency than less stable attitudes › This proposal has 2 components 1) the greater the time between measuring the attitude and measuring the behavior, the less strong the attitude-behavior link will be 2) the attitude-behavior link will be stronger for more general attitudes, as opposed to more specific attitudes Lastly, several individual differences have been found to affect the strength of the attitude-behavior link › Self-awareness › Self-monitoring › Reasons for attitudes › Should attitudes correspond to behavior? People who have been made self-aware (usually by placing a mirror next to them while they complete attitude scales) typically display much greater attitude-behavior consistency than do people not made selfaware People who are high in self-monitoring (people who monitor and regulate their own reactions through the reactions of others) typically show lower attitude-behavior consistency than those people who are low in selfmonitoring (people who monitor internal reactions, rather than others’ reactions) Being asked to provide reasons for attitudes may lower the consistency between people’s attitudes and behaviors There is also evidence of cross-cultural differences in the tendency to believe that attitudes should correspond to behaviors Festinger’s (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance helps explain how people change their attitudes because of their behaviors, rather than the other way around › The theory simply states that if a person holds two cognitions that are psychologically inconsistent (not necessarily logically inconsistent), this inconsistency create dissonance that is uncomfortable, and the person is motivated to reduce the dissonance Dissonance can be reduced by changing either or both of the cognitions, or by introducing a new cognition Ex. If I smoke and if I also know that smoking is bad for my health I should experience dissonance because these two cognitions are psychologically inconsistent › The dissonance I experience can be alleviated by changing one of the two cognitions or by introducing some new cognition › › Note that there is nothing logically inconsistent, just a psycho-logical discrepancy Ex. I could give up smoking, but that’s a difficult and unlikely thing to happen Ex. I could alter my cognition that smoking is bad for my health (it’s not uncommon for smokers to argue that the evidence against smoking is not as strong as public health campaigns make out) Or, I could introduce some new cognition › Ex. I could accept that smoking is bad for my health, but then get out of it by claiming that I smoke to relieve stress and gain pleasure, or that I am addicted to smoking and therefore unable to quit Thus, we can see that if people engage in a particular behavior, for whatever reason, they are likely to alter their attitudes to correspond to the committed behavior Ex. A young child attending a mostly white primary school with few minority children joins in with a group of older children to tease one particular minority child › The young child may not have had any attitude at all toward minorities before teasing this one child, but it is unlikely that this sill be the case after the incident Especially if the unpleasantness of the behavior is pointed out by a teacher or parent or another child › Rather, the child will alter (or in this case invent) his/her attitude to correspond to the behavior › Any dissonance will be displaced by another cognitive change – in this case, by developing a negative attitude to the minority child, and maybe toward minorities in general On a bigger scale, this principle has been applied to the dehumanization of the Viet Cong by American soldiers and the massacre of Vietnamese civilians at My Lai by American infantrymen › “It never happened and besides they deserved it” Attitudes follow behavior, not the other way around According to cognitive dissonance theorists, this principle applies to any instance where a person engages in a behavior that does not correspond with any attitude held before that behavior occurs Cognitive dissonance is especially likely when one of the conflicting cognitions is about the self Cognitive dissonance theory is known as a consistency theory › It assumes that inconsistency is unpleasant, and that people are motivated to achieve consistency and balance This assumption has been challenged by several critics › Argue that the desire to achieve and maintain consistency is a western phenomenon › That cross-culturally, people are far more tolerant of cognitive and interpersonal inconsistencies than cognitive dissonance theory assumes Cognitive dissonance theory has been challenged in its explanation of attitude change and the relationship between attitudes and behavior One challenge is self-perception theory developed by Daryl Bem (1967, 1972) › Developed to explain the same events as cognitive dissonance theory, but without including an explanation of the psychological processes involved › Bem argued that we infer our own attitudes to object in the same way we infer others’ attitudes, through the process of attribution Attribution theory suggests that observers attribute attitudes to an actor which corresponds with the actor’s behavior, and that this tendency is stronger when the action is chosen freely by the actor So we form an attitude about a person that is similar to their behavior And, we tend to do this more often when the actor isn’t forced to do the behavior, but is doing it of their own freewill Bem proposes a similar process in inferring our own attitudes The major hypothesis of self-perception theory is that “in identifying his [or her] own internal states, an individual partially relies on the same external cues that others use when they infer his [or her] internal states.” Meaning, we think about how others would feel about us due to how we are behaving, and use the same information to figure out how we feel Cognitive dissonance theory vs. selfperception theory… which, if either is right??? To figure it out, we should probably design and conduct studies that pit the two theories against each other › Sadly… this is impossible › Many have tried, but there is always some other explanation that could explain the results… and that’s not how science works A review of research on attitude change finds that: › Self-perception processes seem to operate when the behavior is seems acceptable, or falls in the “latitude of acceptance” › But when the behavior seems unacceptable, or falls outside the “latitude of acceptance,” cognitive dissonance processes appear to operate “latitude of acceptance” and “latitude of rejection” are terms from social judgment theory › Social judgment theory suggests that the dimension characterizing the range of possible attitudes to a particular object may be divided into these two latitudes › Any one person’s latitude of acceptance includes all those attitudes that person finds acceptable › All those attitudes the person finds unacceptable fall into the latitude of rejection The second reaction to Wicker’s (1969) conclusion that attitudes are worthless › Attempted to theorize the attitude-behavior relationship more fully than previous research Major theory by Fishbein and Ajzen: theory of reasoned action › Theory about behavior (“action”), and thus the attitudes that are relevant to this model are attitudes towards behavior Argued that attitudes do not predict behaviors per se, but, rather, behavioral intentions › In this theory behavioral intentions directly predict behavior Behavioral intentions themselves are a function of attitudes to the behavior and what Fishbein and Ajzen called subjective norms › Subjective norms refer to what the individual actor believes his or her significant others believe he or she should do Thus, the theory of reasoned reaction is really only applicable to behaviors under voluntary control Attitudes and subjective norms make up behavioral intentions Behavioral intentions predict behavior Behavioral Intentions Attitudes about the behavior Behavior Subjective Norms The theory of reasoned action has been widely used and has considerable empirical support Has been applied to a wide range of behaviors (actions) › › › › The decision to have an abortion The decision to breast or bottle-feed a baby Smoking marijuana Attending church Meta-analyses have found strong support for this model in correlations between constructs These correlations are much larger than the .30 maximum reported by Wicker (1969) Behavioral Intentions .68 Attitudes about the behavior .53 Subjective Norms .51 Behavior Of course, this theory also has critics › It has been argued that personal norms (individual beliefs about the appropriateness of particular behaviors) and behavioral norms (what everyone else does) are just as important in the formation of behavior as are subjective norms › It has also been suggested that even behavior that is under voluntary control does not necessarily conform to the model Some behavioral routines are so scripted and rehearsed that they are done mindlessly › Similarly, it has been shown that behaviors that have occurred in the past are more likely to happen again, simply because they have been performed before and despite the person’s intentions to behave differently Ex. New Year’s resolutions… its difficult to stop certain behaviors despite all the best intentions to change Finally, Ajzen revised the original model of the theory of reasoned action into the theory of planned behavior › This theory accommodates the fact that behaviors are often not under voluntary as assumed by the theory of reasoned reaction The theory of planned behavior still holds that behavior intentions are the central link between attitudes and behavior, and that behavioral intentions are the product of attitudes toward the behavior and subjective norms › But adds an important third factor: perceived behavioral control Perceived behavioral control refers to the person’s perception of the ease or difficulty of performing the behavior › Some behaviors are easy to do once you decide to do them, others are hard › Some behaviors are easy not to do once that has been decided, others are much harder not to do Perceived behavioral control affects the formation of behavioral intentions, and also, importantly, directly affects the production of behavior itself, independent of behavioral intentions Behavioral Intentions Behavior Attitudes Subjective Norms Perceived Behavioral Control A meta-analysis of 185 studies that used the theory of planned behavior The model overall accounted for 27% of the variance in people’s behavior › Accounted for 39% of the variance in people’s behavioral intentions › Also, the theory of planned behavior predicted people’s behavioral intentions better than the theory of reasoned action › That is, perceived behavioral control added to the prediction of behavioral intentions over and above the effects of attitudes toward the behavior and subjective norms Behavioral Intentions Attitudes Perceived Behavioral Control 39% Subjective Norms Behavior 27% So far we have discussed attitudes in terms of the functions they serve in “locating ‘objects of thought’ on ‘dimensions of judgment’” However there is another important sense in which attitudes are “locating”: › Expressing (and concealing) certain attitudes are a powerful way people can locate themselves relative to others in the social environment That is, attitudes serve to locate an individual within the social matrix Earlier when we talked about the value-expressive function of attitudes, it was from the point of view of the attitude-holder But viewed from the other side, the expression of values through attitudes is required for social cohesion and evaluation A group member who is reluctant about expressing an attitude on an issue important to the group will not usually be allowed by the group to remain silent on the issue › The group will enforce or extract an expression of the attitude from the group member › This expression is an important sign of the individual’s position relative to the group › It is important to the group that individual’s positions are not far off from the group’s “prototypical” position › Enforcing or extracting attitudes can be a potent form of social control, requiring a demonstration of group allegiance from the individual › Ex. The social group to which you belong has a general negative attitude towards heavy metal music, if you do not express a similar opinion, sooner or later a group member will ask you your opinion, and will expect it to be similar to the overall opinion of the group Attitudes have long been considered to be embedded in social relationships Heider (1958) influential balance theory: › Specifically, argues that we are motivated to hold attitudes that are similar to those of people we like, and different from those of people we dislike › Also, that our liking or disliking of others can arise from our perception of the extent to which we share the same attitudes Social identity theory and self-categorization theory have taken this idea further › Arguing that similar attitudes can provide the basis for psychological group formation In other words, that shared attitudes can provide the ground on which we divide the world into “us” and “them” › Ex. Pro-choice and pro-life groups Attitudes towards abortion are the basis of these groups Groups can also provide a context in which people can compare their attitudes to those held by similar others, to evaluate the appropriateness of their own attitudes Festinger highlighted the fundamentally social nature of attitudes and the effect of social groups on the development of attitudes › Stating that “an attitude is correct, valid, and proper to the extent that it is anchored in a group of people with similar beliefs, opinions, and attitudes” › Simply put, knowing that people similar to us have attitudes like ours validates our attitudes In thinking about how SIT and SCT can help us understand people’s attitudes it is helpful to distinguish between attitudes towards social groups and attitudes towards other kinds of social and non-social objects › So, attitudes toward social groups vs. attitudes toward individuals and other objects SIT and SCT are fundamentally concerned with the development and expression of attitudes towards one’s own and other social groups › But, they have had much less to say about how group membership might influence a person’s attitudes towards other things SCT can be thought of as providing a theoretical account of the influence of social identities on attitudes: › To the extent that the expression of certain attitudes constitutes a group norm, SCT would predict that identification as a member of that group should lead to the expression of those normative attitudes But, empirical research into this proposal has been very limited › Tends to focus on the ways shared attitudes in a group tend to become more extreme (group polarization) › And the role of social identity in making certain attitudes and norms salient in certain social contexts Social psychologists have known for a long time that people’s attitudes tend to become more extreme following discussion The group polarization effect refers to the phenomenon in which attitudes become more extreme following contact with others who share the same initial evaluation in their attitude (i.e. an initially positive or negative evaluation) Although not all group discussion of attitudes produces group polarization, it is a robust phenomenon that many theorists have attempted to explain Most SIT accounts of the group polarization effect rely on the notion that group discussion provides either › A) informational influence: a new source of persuasive arguments in favor of the initial position More information supporting the initial attitude › B) normative influence: information about others’ view that provides a basis for social comparison Knowing that other people also hold the same view, which validates the view further Informational influence › According to the persuasive arguments account, discussion of attitudes with others provides exposure to arguments and information that may not have been considered in developing the initial attitude › Given the tendency for initial attitudes to be in a particular direction (which is required for group polarization to occur) It follows that these new arguments are likely to support the initial attitude, and lead to a more extreme position in the same direction as the initial attitude Normative influence › The social comparison account of group polarization argues that people seek to enhance their positive differentiation from the group by enhancing their difference from other group members’ attitudes in the direction favored by the group That is, people want to have the most extreme attitude in the group › According to this view, polarization occurs because people initially underestimate the extremity of others’ attitudes, and so “re-adjust” their own attitudes to maintain a more favorable (more extreme) position than other group members So, when everyone in the group is trying to have the most extreme attitude, they think they have underestimated how extreme others feel, and then make their attitudes more extreme… like a vicious cycle Ex. In discussion of environmental conservation among people who initially express “green” attitudes, people may see the attitudes expressed by other people in the group becoming increasingly “pro-green” as people compete for the position of “greener than thou!” Both of these accounts have been challenged by selfcategorization theory › According to SCT, group polarization is produced by group processes, and cannot be reduced to either informational or social comparative processes Group polarization will only occur to the extent that people psychologically identify with the group in which they are discussing their attitudes and, will occur as a result of the processes of group identification In other words, when people identify themselves as members of a group, they apply the prototypical characteristics, in this case attitudes, of the group to themselves › Prototypical characteristics are those that follow the principle of maximizing between-group differences and minimizing ingroup difference › Thus, in cases where initial attitudes are already tending in a particular direction (positive or negative), the more extreme attitudes (rather than average group attitudes) will tend to be seen as prototypical › Because they differentiate the group from outgroups taking an opposite view The SCT explanation thus explicitly contradicts the social comparison explanation › By arguing that group polarization is produced by conformity to a polarized group norm › Where social comparison suggests that polarization is produced by the need for positive distinctiveness So to sum this up… › Social identity theory: group polarization is due to: New information supporting the attitude Or people’s desire to have the “biggest badest” (i.e. most extreme) attitude in the group (i.e. positive distinctiveness) › Self-categorization theory: group polarization is due to: The desire to maximize differences between groups and minimize ingroup difference So attitudes become more extreme because they serve to maximize the difference between groups taking opposite perspectives As we have already seen, the relationship between attitudes and behavior is problematic Researchers working from the perspectives of SIT and SCT have argued that understanding relationships between attitudes and behavior requires careful attention to: › › The salience of social identities And the attitudes and behavioral norms associated with these social identities Different social identities are associated with different attitudinal and behavioral norms › Ex. Soccer hooligan social identity is associated with extreme positive attitudes towards a favorite team and extreme negative attitudes towards every other team, as well as hostile behavior towards fans of other teams Some researchers have concluded that the influence of social factors (ex. Subjective norms) is relatively weak compared to the influence of personal factors However, Terry et al. have challenged this conclusion › Arguing that the concept of social norms in these models is problematic and is inconsistent with the way social norms are › › › › understood in SIT and SCT Social norms are tied to specific reference groups which are behaviorally relevant in particular situations As such, particular social norms would only be expected to influence behavior when the social identities with which they are associated are salient in a particular instance Ex. Soccer hooligans probably wouldn’t do this… when they are at work, and their social identity of “soccer hooligan” isn’t salient Terry et al. (2000) examined the role of group norms in moderating the attitude-behavior link › Manipulated normative information about the intended career choices of psychology students Students were asked to nominate their preferred career in psychology from a list of three options (clinical psychology, organizational psychology, and sports psychology) Students were then provided with normative information that suggested the career preferences of other psychology students were either similar (norm congruent) or different (norm incongruent) from their own › Students were then given an opportunity to attend an information session on only one of the three career paths, › And were asked about their willingness to take a variety of steps to gain further information about their preferred career path Results › Most students chose to attend a session about the career they had selected › BUT participants in the norm congruent condition were significantly more likely to attend an information session on their original career preference than were participants in the norm incongruent condition Meaning that information about norms effected the link between initial attitudes (career preference) and behavior (which information session was attended) When participants believed that their attitude was the same as other students, it was more likely that they would behave in congruence with that attitude In an earlier study Terry et al. (1999) found: › Participants’ attitudes towards household recycling were predictive of intentions to recycle › But only when they were led to believe that their social group held similar attitudes, as opposed to when they were led to believe that a group of random strangers also held this attitude Taken together, these findings provide some support for the argument that: › The role of attitudinal norms in guiding behavior depends on the extent to which a person identifies with the reference group with which the norms are associated Students’ initial attitudes better predicted behavior when they thought that their attitudes was the norm of other students People were more likely to intend to recycle when their social group held similar attitudes Throughout this chapter it should be clear that social psychology has primarily treated the attitude construct as an individual phenomenon Attitudes have primarily been conceptualized as individual and internal cognitive and affective states › Or, as behavioral intentions and predispositions This contradicts how attitudes were originally formulated when the construct entered the social sciences Early social scientific approaches to attitudes argued that attitudes provide the links that tie individuals to their social groups Giving them a social position and social heritage, and allowing them to live socially › Attitudes were NOT, for early theorists, mental structures › Sociologists accepted this view and extended it to argue that attitudes, like all forms of meaning, arise through social interaction and communication Mainstream social psychology has increasingly individualized the attitude construct Only recently have analyses emerged which reestablish the social nature of attitudes An increasing number of theorists are again emphasizing that attitudes originate in and emerge from social life itself, through our everyday interactions and communications with others › Further, some attitudes are widely shared, providing cultural meaning and substance to everyday life › Shared attitudes are relied on to make sense of the social world and to orient ourselves to that world › The increasing individualization of the attitude construct can be attributed to Gordon Allport’s original edition of A Handbook of Social Psychology Allport defined an attitude as a global stimulusresponse disposition for the purpose of explaining differences in behavior in objectively similar situations › That is, attitudes are why different people behave in different way in similar situations Allport’s view, along with the important development of techniques to measure attitudes, was the start of the individualization of attitudes › The strong desire to measure individuals’ attitudes to just about any and every topic › And to search for individual differences in attitudes that could predict differences in behavior Attitudes had become objectified, reified cognitive entities with a life of their own inside people’s heads As an individual cognitive and emotional predisposition, the attitude construct took on a methodological individualism that shaped the subsequent nature of attitude theories in social psychology › Meaning, because attitudes became individual predispositions, research methods aimed to study attitudes at the individual level and thus, theories of attitudes were conceptualized at the individual level as well It was argued that this lead not only to the “individualization of the social” but also to the “desocialization of the individual” › Making social things individual and removing the individual from society Contemporary (individualistic) theories of attitudes contrast the more recent emergence of social representations theory › Social representations theory reinstates the collective and social nature of cognitive constructs like attitudes, beliefs, and values As previously defined, social representations refer to the stock of shared common-sense knowledge and beliefs people within a collective use to orient themselves to the social world › Social representations are seen as the building blocks used to construct and thereby understand social reality Some critics have argued that social representations may be the same thing as attitudes However Moscovici warns that social representations are not simply “attitudes” about social objects The concept of social representations has been endowed with a different status than the concept of attitudes › In contrast to the traditional attitude construct, social representations are theorized to be more complex cognitive structure akin to “theories” or “branches of knowledge” and beliefs › Social representations are therefore much more than just evaluations or judgments about specific objects or referents They are frameworks of understanding that give rise to more specific evaluative judgments Ex. Discussion of emerging representations of biotechnology in Europe in Chapter 2 The Eurobarometer Survey, a quantitative questionnaire, was not on its own able to shed light on how favorable, negative, or ambivalent attitudes towards biotechnology are generated › In order to understand where these attitudes came from, researchers had to examine underlying representations and understandings of complex notions such as “nature” and “life” as well as past experiences › These, in turn, were shaped by religious, scientific, and popular “sci-fi” accounts and narratives that were present throughout society › As such, “attitudes” towards biotechnology were shaped and framed by pervasive cultural understandings › Thus, representations can help us understand how attitudes are formed › Hierarchical models of attitudes, such as Kerlinger were developed to account for the complex organization and structure of attitudes Although social representations cannot simply be equated with attitudes, they do have an evaluative dimension › “…the shared understandings encapsulated in social representations also provide a way of expressing evaluative judgments in ways that appear grounded in objective features of the target rather than subjective opinion.” Meaning, if a collective shares a representation of some object that is either positive or negative, a person in that collective can express an evaluation that appears to be based on objective “facts” rather than the individual’s personal opinion Ex. To the extent that “family values” are seen as positive, describing a political party as having policies that promote family values is a subtle way of expressing endorsement of that party Unless you’re Newt Gingrich Moliner and Tafani (1997): attempted to theorize the relationship between attitudes and social representations › “… the evaluative components of a representation can be regarded as pieces of information upon which individuals rely when manifesting their attitudes towards the represented object. In this view, the evaluative components of the representations form the underlying structure of the attitude.” Importantly, this explanation claims that social representations can have multiple evaluative components › Ex. Representations of abortion can comprise evaluations of the rights of unborn fetuses, as well as evaluations of women’s rights to control their bodies (just to name 2) Moliner and Tafani argue that even when there is broad social consensus about the positiveness or negativeness of each component of a social representation › Attitudes towards the object of that representation can still differ if those attitudes are based on different components of that representation › Ex. People can base their attitudes toward abortion on different components of the representation of abortion Someone who bases their attitude on the rights of women to control their bodies, will likely have a different attitude towards abortion than someone who bases their attitude on the rights of unborn fetuses › Also, in abortion debates, people do not usually try to undermine the arguments of the opposing side Ex. Pro-lifers generally do not argue that women should not have control over their bodies › Instead, they work to promote the centrality of the component of the representation their attitude is based on An important and central function of representations and attitudes is that they are a mechanism for the transmission and communication of social beliefs and knowledge › Communication and interaction are social processes that functional approaches to attitudes have relatively neglected The public expression of an attitude by an individual usually provokes some form or reaction from those around › The public reaction to an expressed attitude engages both the individual and the public in a rhetorical dialogue › Positions, views, beliefs, doubts, inconsistencies, related issues, etc. are exchanged and debated These processes force the individual to resolve inconsistencies, to consider one attitude in relation to many, to figure out what he/she believes in and how strongly, to commit publicly to a position › In sort, to think critically about his/her attitude and its object Another social function of social beliefs and representations is that they play an explanatory, and hence justificatory, role in orienting the individual to the social world › An “attitude” of dislike and disdain of the poor, of the unemployed, of people of a different class, of people of a different color, serves not only to orient the individual to that particular social object, but also to position that social object, be it a person or a group, in social space This helps to explain, justify and reproduce the social system which produced those social positions, and to defend the individual’s own social position › We’ll discuss this topic more in depth in chapter 8 To recap: › A social representation is a collectively constructed and shared knowledge and understanding about a particular theme or issue or topic It is almost atmospheric, and is certainly cultural › It is something which all members of a collective can access and use in understanding the events around them › It orients people to social objects, and is then, in this sense, a social “attitude” › Importantly, it is the shared nature of attitudes as social representations that allows members of a collective to identify particular kinds of language and behaviors as evaluations Ex. In our society, the word “jock” is associated with being athletic and generally less intelligent, this is a social representation and there are certain attitudes associated with the word “jock” If we didn’t have this shared representation, we wouldn’t be able to understand that calling someone a “jock” might be a derogatory statement about a person’s intelligence › Thus, without this sharedness, many of the sophisticated means by which we are able to communicate our attitudes would simply not work, because they couldn’t be recognized by others