Mexican War:
Winfield Scott
Lsn 5-6
Agenda
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Winfield Scott
Vera Cruz
Cerro Gordo
Logistics
Contreras and Churubusco
Mexico City
Influence on the Civil War
Winfield Scott
• Epitomized the
professional officer
– Served in War of
1812, brevetted to
major general
– Studied European
tactics
– Became general-inchief in 1841
• Selected by President
Polk to lead a second
major campaign in
Mexico (Zachary
Taylor’s was the first)
Winfield Scott
• Objective as a principal of war
– When undertaking any
mission, commanders
should have a clear
understanding of the
expected outcome and its
impact
– Commanders need to
appreciate political ends and
understand how the military
conditions they achieve
contribute to them.
• Winfield Scott saw Mexico as a
war of limited objectives, to be
waged by limited means
Winfield Scott
• Based on this belief, Scott developed a
largely political strategy
• Believed that Mexican political life centered
around Mexico City so completely that
capturing the capital would paralyze the
country and oblige the Mexican government
to sue for peace in order to remain a
government at all
• Therefore his objective was to capture
Mexico City, not to destroy the Mexican army
Scott’s Concept
• Mexico City must be approached from Vera Cruz rather
than Monterrey
• Speed was necessary to avoid the vomito (yellow fever)
around Vera Cruz
• The need for speed precluded the use of any port other
than Vera Cruz
• Fort San Juan de Ulua protected Vera Cruz from direct
assault
• Vera Cruz could be taken by siege
• Special boats would be necessary to land the army
outside the range of San Juan de Ulua’s guns
Building the Force
• Scott increased the estimate of his
required force from 10,000 to 20,000
• Collecting the ships was more difficult than
collecting the men
– Quartermaster General Thomas Jesup
resourcefully gathered up the necessary
ships, many of which belonged to civilian
merchantmen or had to be built
Relations with Polk
• As early as May, 1846, Scott had
recognized the political machinations of
the Polk Administration
– Scott was fearful of receiving “a fire upon my
rear, from Washington, and a fire, in front,
from the Mexicans”
– An option of creating the new rank of
lieutenant general was being considered and
many thought Polk would award it to Senator
Thomas Hart Benton
Vera Cruz
• By March 2, 1847, Scott had assembled
12,000 men with sufficient landing craft
• He ordered his force forward from Lobos
to Vera Cruz
• In conjunction with Commodore David
Conner, Scott developed a plan to land on
the Collada beach
• Against only negligible fire, the landing
was completed on March 9
Vera Cruz
• Population of 15,000 crowded into little
area
• City surrounded by a wall and protected by
Forts Santiago and Conception
• Some officers like Worth favored a direct
assault, but Scott decided to lay siege
– He built a trench line some two miles from the
city
Vera Cruz
• Scott began his bombardment on March
21
– His heavy mortars had not yet arrived and
Scott reluctantly accepted Conner’s offer of
heavy naval guns
– When Commodore Matthew Perry replaced
Conner, the good spirit of Army-Navy
cooperation continued
– Scott’s engineers were critical in emplacing
the guns
Vera Cruz
• Mexican civilians bore the brunt of the
bombardment
• Under pressure from foreign consuls,
Mexican General Juan Morales feigned
illness and turned his command over to
General J. J. Landero who surrendered on
March 27
– Scott granted generous terms including
guaranteeing the civil and religious rights of
the people of Vera Cruz
Vera Cruz
• Scott imposed strict discipline on his troops and
safeguarded the lives and property of the Mexicans
– He scrupulously regulated his soldiers’ conduct and interaction
with Mexican civilians, reducing contact to the minimum
necessary for the sustenance of his army and the morale of his
troops
– He made every effort to confine bloodshed and suffering to the
Mexican army rather than the civilian population
– He courted the Roman Catholic Church, even ordering his men
to salute priests and attending a mass himself
• Buoyed by Scott’s success, Polk dispatched Nicholas
Trist to Mexico to be “ready to take advantage of
circumstances as they might arise to negotiate for
peace”
After Vera Cruz
• From Vera Cruz, Scott
had two choices– the
National Road or the
Orzaba Road
• Both were predictable,
well-defended avenues
of approach, but Scott
picked the National Road
because it was in better
condition
• Wanted to avoid frontal
assaults by maneuver
Turning Movement
• Maneuver
– As both an element of combat power and a principle
of war, maneuver concentrates and disperses combat
power to place and keep the enemy at a
disadvantage
– Achieves results that would otherwise be more costly
– Keeps enemies off balance by making them confront
new problems and new dangers faster than they can
deal with them
• The form of maneuver that Scott relied on in
Mexico was the turning movement
Turning Movement
• In a turning movement the
attacking force seeks to
avoid the enemy's principal
defensive positions by
seizing objectives to the
enemy rear and causing the
enemy to move out of his
current positions or divert
major forces to meet the
threat.
• A major threat to his rear
forces the enemy to attack
or withdraw rearward, thus
“turning” him out of his
defensive positions.
Cerro Gordo
• Santa Anna anticipated Scott’s use of the
National Road and sent forward three infantry
brigades commanded by General Valentin
Canalizo
• Canalizo secured key positions including Cerro
Gordo
– Cerro Gordo (Fat Mountain) was a broad thousand
foot high elevation on the left of the National Road
– On the right were steep cliffs and then Rio del Plan, a
substantial stream
Cerro Gordo
• Lee summarized the problem writing that “The right of
the Mexican line rested on the river at a perpendicular
rock, unscalable by man or beast, and their left on
impassable ravines; the main road was defended by field
works containing thirty-five cannon; in their rear was the
mountain of Cerro Gordo, surrounded by intrenchments
in which were cannon and crowned by a tower
overlooking all-- it was around this army that it was
intended to lead our troops”
Cerro Gordo
• About a half-mile northeast
of Cerro Gordo was a flattopped high named La
Atalaya
• Between La Atalya and a
deep ravine that ran into the
National Road was solid
chaparral, cut by gullies and
hills
• Santa Anna was confident
no attack would come from
this direction and he put only
a small outpost on La
Atalaya
Cerro Gordo
• Brigadier General David
Twiggs led Scott’s march
• On April 11, 1847, Twiggs
stopped just short of Cerro
Gordo
• As Twiggs was preparing to
attack, Scott reached the
position on April 14
• He wanted to avoid a costly
frontal assault so he had
Captain Robert E. Lee and
other engineers recon a
possible route around Santa
Anna’s flank
Cerro Gordo
• Lee initially followed a route reconned earlier by
Lieutenant Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard which
worked around the Mexican left to La Ayatala
• Lee then continued further to the Mexican rear until he
was well passed the Mexican main flank
• Slowly Lee worked his way up the ravines north of the
river.
– The terrain was difficult, but Lee thought it would not be
impossible to construct a crude road over it.
• At one point Lee had to hide behind a large brushcovered log to avoid detection by the Mexicans
• Mexican soldiers even sat on the log Lee hid behind, and
he had to wait until darkness to escape
Cerro Gordo
• Upon returning to American lines, Lee compared
notes with Major Smith who, on his own
reconnaissance, had come to similar
conclusions as Lee
• Scott directed them to continue their
reconnaissance the next day and detailed to Lee
a work party to cut a trail
• By the end of that day, Lee and his crew had
prepared a passable new trail up the ravine
Cerro Gordo
• Not only was Lee responsible
for finding the route and
building the road, Scott also
entrusted him with serving as
guide for Brigadier General
David Twiggs’s division in the
conduct of the attack
• Lee led Twiggs’s men up the
ravines that passed around
Santa Anna’s left, emplaced
an artillery battery, and guided
a brigade around the northern
flank of Cerro Gordo with the
intention of cutting off the
enemy retreat
Cerro Gordo
• Lee’s work allowed Scott to outflank the Mexican
defenders, bypass the main defensive positions,
and strike the Mexican rear
• Cerro Gordo was the first of many turning
movements Scott executed in his march to Mexico
City
– To make these movements possible Scott relied on the
reconnaissance of Lee and other engineers
• Scott wrote that Lee was “indefatigable during
these operations, in reconnaissance as daring as
laborious, and of the utmost value.”
– Lee was brevetted to major “for gallant and meritorious
conduct in the battle of Cerro Gordo”
Cerro Gordo
• Scott had 8,500 men against 12,000 to 18,000
Mexicans
• On April 17, he sent Twiggs down the new cut
road to occupy La Atalaya in preparation for a
main attack on Cerro Gordo the next day
• Instead, Twiggs became decisively engaged and
suffered heavy losses
– Santa Anna thought he had defeated the main
American attack
Cerro Gordo
• Scott issued orders that on April 18, Twiggs
would press forward, followed by Worth, and
Pillow would launch a secondary attack near the
river and then turn left or right to attack the
Mexican artillery
– Twiggs’s attack succeeded, but Pillow’s failed
• Pillow had expressed doubts from the very beginning, calling
the attack “a desperate undertaking”
• He also argued with Lieutenant Zealous Tower, the engineer
who had done the recon, over the best approach route
• Pillow soon disappeared from the battlefield after receiving a
minor wound in the arm
Cerro Gordo
• In spite of Pillow’s failure, Twiggs’s attacks,
especially the portion led by Brigadier General
James Shields, so unnerved Santa Anna that he
fled the field
• The Americans lost 63 killed and 368 wounded
• Estimates of Mexican losses range from 350 to
1,000
– 3,000 were taken prisoner, including five generals
Cerro Gordo
• Comparison between Scott and Taylor’s
generalship:
– Taylor took few prisoners. Scott took 7,000 at Vera
Cruz and 3,000 at Cerro Gordo
– Scott suffered much fewer friendly losses than did
Taylor
– Taylor commanded only what was under his
immediate supervision while Scott’s generalship was
much more sophisticated, making strong use of
reconnaissance, delegation, and staff officers
Jalapa
• Scott occupied Jalapa which was much more
hospitable than Vera Cruz had been
– It was still in the fringe of the yellow fever region, and
Scott did not want to stay there long
• While in Jalapa, Scott continued his policy of
kind treatment to the Mexican citizenry, most of
whom showed indifference to the invaders
– Scott meted out strict punishments to his soldiers who
violated discipline
• Scott’s most serious problem at Jalapa was that
in May, the one year term of enlistment for 3,000
of his volunteers expired
Logistics
• On May 28, Scott moved forward to
Puebla
• The departure of the volunteers left Scott
with a little over 7,000 men
• He could not afford to further reduce his
manpower by garrisoning his supply bases
at Vera Cruz, Jalapa, and Perote
– To do so would have reduced his active army
to 5,820
Logistics
• Scott made the bold decision to abandon
all stations between Vera Cruz and Puebla
• He would cut his supply line with the coast
and live off the land
• The Duke of Wellington declared, “Scott is
lost! He has been carried away by
successes! He can’t take the city, and he
can’t fall back on his bases.”
Logistics: Ulysses Grant
• Served as a quartermaster in Mexico and personally saw
the results of Scott cutting lose from his supply line
– Grant made a similar move at Vicksburg
• In Mexico Grant learned “the intricacies of military
logistics from the bottom up. For a man who would go
on to command large armies, no training could have
been more valuable. During the Civil War, Grant’s
armies might occasionally have straggled, discipline
might sometimes have been lax, but food and
ammunition trains were always expertly handled. While
Grant’s military fame deservedly rests on his battlefield
victories, those victories depended on his skill as a
quartermaster. Unlike many Union armies, the forces he
led never wanted the tools of war.”
– Jean Edward Smith
Nicholas Trist
• Trist arrived at Vera Cruz on May 6, 1847
• Trist was sick when he arrived and could not
meet Scott personally
– Instead he forwarded several sealed documents to
Scott for delivery to Mexico City, but instructed Scott
not to look at them
– The easily-bruised Scott perceived this as a
tremendous insult and a threat to his authority and the
safety of the army
– On June 4, he wrote, “I beg to be recalled from this
army the moment that it may be safe for any person
to embark at Vera Cruz…”
Puebla
• Scott remained in Puebla for three months
– He dealt with disciplinary matters including a court of
inquiry that found Worth guilty of issuing an
unfounded warning that the Mexicans were planning
to poison the drinking water
– He patched things up with Trist
– He received reinforcements that brought his force up
to 14,000 men (which included about 3,000 who were
sick or convalescing)
• Santa Anna had 36,000
Santa Anna’s Defenses
• Wanted to defend as far forward of Mexico
City as possible and take advantage of the
limited road network and the three lakes
that canalized the approach
– Lakes Texcoco, Xochimilco, and Chalco
• Santa Anna focused on the National Road
at El Penon, just south of Lake Texcoco
– Between Lakes Xochimilco and Chalco was a
narrow isthmus which gave Scott a possible
approach from the south
El Penon
• Scott marched out of Puebla on August 7, 1847,
with Twiggs’s division in the lead
– Scott kept his divisions within half a day’s march of
each other
• Twiggs reached El Penon on August 12 and
Scott then had to decide whether to continue to
Mexico City head-on or turn south of Lake
Chalco and approach indirectly
– Based on a previous map study led by chief
topographical engineer Major William Turnbull and
Lee, Scott had tentatively decided on the indirect
approach
El Penon
• Lee set out on a recon and quickly determined
El Penon to be too strongly defended to assault
• He also determined a small road that branched
off of the National Road to Mexicalcingo was too
restricted
• He did find a previously unreported road that led
south of Lake Chalco and then joined the
Acapulco Road at San Agustin, directly south of
Mexico City
El Penon
• Lee reported these preliminary findings to
Scott who ordered Worth to recon the San
Agustin Road
– Worth sent Lieutenant Colonel James Duncan
to confirm Lee’s findings, which he did
• Scott decided on this southern approach
– On August 13, Scott began his march with
Worth, Pillow, and Quitman while leaving
Twiggs to threaten El Penon
Contreras and Churubusco
• Santa Anna was aware that Scott was up
to something, but did not acknowledge
until August 17 that Scott was moving
south
– Santa Anna then had to move from his strong
position at El Penon
– He established a new line behind the
Churubusco River
– He had some 20,000 men; about twice as
many as Scott
Contreras and Churubusco
• On August 18, Scott
had marched 25 miles
and was closing in on
San Agustin
• His lead elements
made heavy contact
with the Mexicans and
then learned the
enemy could not be
outflanked because of
a large lava field called
the Pedregal to the
west and deep water
to the east
Contreras and Churubusco
• Scott’s precarious position was eased by the
tension between Santa Anna and General
Gabriel Valencia, Santa Anna’s chief political
rival and the defender of the Mexican eastern
flank
• Valencia ignored Santa Anna’s instructions to
defend from San Angel and instead moved
forward to a position between Padierna and
Contreras where he hoped to fight and win a
battle independent of Santa Anna
Contreras and Churubusco
• Valencia’s move divided the Mexican force and
left Scott an opening if he could somehow find a
way through the Pedregal
– According to one Mexican officer, “The birds couldn’t
cross the Pedregal.”
• Scott sent Lee on another recon on August 18,
and Lee found a rough trail along the southern
edge of the Pedregal
• Scott decided to envelop Churubusco and San
Antonio from the west
Contreras and Churubusco
• Scott’s plan was for Pillow to lead with a
500 man work party to improve the
Pedregal Road
• Twiggs would provide the security for
Pillow’s men
• Worth would attack through the path
cleared by Pillow and Twiggs while
Quitman remained in reserve at San
Agustin
Contreras and Churubusco
• When the road was nearly completed, the
Americans came under fire
– A jumbled mess ensued in which Pillow asserted
himself as commander but did nothing to affect the
situation
• The Americans were in danger until Persifor
Smith, a brigade commander in Twiggs’s
division rose to the occasion
– With artillery support from Captain John Magruder,
Smith, acting without orders, assessed the situation
and moved through the Pedregal around the right
flank
– He also sent Lee back to inform Scott of the plan
Contreras and Churubusco
• Lee finally reached Scott at 11 p.m., and Scott
sent Lee and Twiggs out to round up troops to
support Smith
• Smith began his attack a little before 3 a.m.
– The cold weather had caused the Mexican pickets to
retreat to shelter, giving Smith the element of surprise
• Smith’s assault broke Valencia’s line in just
seventeen minutes
– Santa Anna refused to send reinforcements and
began a general withdrawal
– Smith had attacked with 4,500 men against 7,000
Contreras and Churubusco
• Santa Anna decided to bring whatever
troops could be saved back within the
walls of Mexico City
– To protect the retreat he had to hold the
bridge at Churubusco
– Among the defenders was the San Patricio
Battalion, a group of American deserters
– Scott pursued head-on, suffering heavy
casualties
Contreras and Churubusco
• The ensuing Battle of Churubusco was fought as
three independent actions at the Churubusco
Bridge by Worth and Pillow, at the San Meto
Convent that protected it by Twiggs, and a
turning movement led by Shields and Pierce to
Portales
– By committing all his forces, Scott personally had little
ability to influence the battle
– Still the independent actions carried the day with the
bridge and then the convent falling
– The pursuit of the turning movement was hamstrung
by the restrictive causeways
Contreras and Churubusco
• In all the fighting on August 20, Santa Anna lost
4,000 killed and wounded
– Another 3,000 were captured, including eight
generals
• Scott suffered some 1,000 casualties
• Santa Anna reached Mexico City early in the
afternoon
• If he had pursued vigorously, Scott probably
could have taken Mexico City that day, but he
didn’t
Mexico City
• After peace negotiations failed, Scott
began preparations to attack
• His approaches would be limited to the
few causeways that could support artillery
• The Mexican defenses centered around
the Castle of Chapultepec, the Molino del
Rey (King’s Mill), and the Casa de la Mata
Mexico City
• On September 8, Scott attacked Molino del Rey
with Worth’s division
• Santa Anna had become aware of Scott’s plan
and was ready
• The Americans prevailed, but at great cost
– Scott suffered 116 dead and 671 wounded; more than
Taylor had suffered at Monterrey with a force twice as
large
– It was a battle of little operational consequence
Mexico City
• After Molino del Rey, Scott studied the
situation and favored an attack on
Chapultepec
– He informed his staff and asked their opinions
– Lee and three other engineers favored an
approach from the south, but Beauregard
argued for the attack on Chapultepec
• Scott stuck with his decision to attack
Chapultepec
Mexico City
• Santa Anna distributed his larger force in
several positions and Scott reinforced
Santa Anna’s uncertainty about the exact
point of attack by launching a feint
• On September 12, Scott began an artillery
barrage which he hoped would compel the
Mexicans to surrender
• When they didn’t, Scott prepared to attack
the next day
Mexico City
• The castle of Chapultepec sat on a hill
• The northern and eastern sides of the
castle’s enclosure were too steep to scale
– The gentlest sloping walls were those on the
western side
• Scott directed Pillow to make the main
attack against the western walls, with
Quitman attacking to the southeast
Mexico City
• A breakthough occurred in Quitman’s sector in
which Lieutenant James Longstreet was
wounded and Lieutenent George Pickett picked
up the regimental colors and continued forward
• This initial opening was exploited by Lieutenant
Colonel Joseph Johnston’s Voltiguer Regiment
and the castle fell
• Santa Anna evacuated Mexico City and Scott
triumphantly entered it on September 14
Surrender
• Scott set about to methodically
occupy Mexico City and
establish martial law
• Occupation duty was relatively
easy and the American officers
formed the Aztec Club
• Negotiations were more
problematic and the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo was not
concluded until February 2,
1848
– The US paid Mexico $15 million
and took possession of Texas
north of the Rio Grande,
California, and New Mexico
Influence of the Mexican War on
the Civil War
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Turning Movements
Technology and Tactics
Leadership
Limited War
Turning Movements and the Civil
War
• “The Mexican War created an informal,
unwritten tactical doctrine—to turn the
enemy.” (Archer Jones)
– Civil War battles and campaigns that involved
turning movements include the Peninsula
Campaign, Second Manassas, and Vicksburg
• Nonetheless the Civil War will also include
many costly frontal attacks such as
Fredericksburg and Pickett’s Charge
Technology: Rifles
• Two things that made
these frontal attacks
so costly were the
rifled musket and the
Minie Ball
– A few volunteer units
like the Mississippi
Rifles had rifles in
Mexico, but the
Regular Army
stubbornly held to
smoothbore muskets
At Buena Vista, Jefferson
Davis commanded the
Mississippi Rifles to “Stand
Fast, Mississippians!”
Technology: Changing Times
• By the time of the Civil War,
the rifled musket and the
Minie ball will cause a change
in military tactics
– The defense will gain strength
relative to the offense
– Artillery will loose its ability to
safely advance close to the
enemy and breach holes in
defenses
– Close-order formations will
become dangerously vulnerable
Junior Officers: Rehearsal for the
Civil War
• Approximately 194 Federal
generals and 142
Confederate generals
previously served in Mexico
• Lee, Jackson, Hill, Pickett,
Longstreet, Beauregard,
Bragg, etc
• Meade, Grant, Kearney,
McClellan, Hooker, Pope,
McDowell, etc
Junior Officers: Rehearsal for the
Civil War
• After Mexico, Scott described Lee as “the
very best soldier I ever saw in the field,”
and suggested that in the event of war, the
government should insure Lee’s life for $5
million a year
• In addition to proving Lee’s skill as a
soldier, Mexico taught him the value of
reconnaissance and the turning movement
Junior Officers: Rehearsal for the
Civil War
• “The relation of careful reconnaissance to sound
strategy was impressed on Lee by every one of
the battles he saw in Mexico... Lee had shown
special aptitude for this work and he left Mexico
convinced for all time that when battle is
imminent a thorough study of the ground is the
first duty of the commanding officer.
Reconnaissance became second nature to him.”
– Douglas Southall Freeman
Junior Officers: Impact of West
Pointers
• In 1817, Sylvanus Thayer replaced
Captain Alden Partridge as
superintendent of West Point and
began reversing the damage
Partridge had done
• Thayer broadened and
standardized the curriculum,
established a system to measure
class standing, organized classes
around small sections, improved
cadet discipline, created the office
of commandant of cadets, and
improved military training
“The Father of the
Military Academy”
Junior Officers: Impact of West
Pointers
• By the time of the Mexican
War, Thayer’s reforms had
produced a generation of men
who would fill the junior
officers’ ranks in Mexico.
• These lieutenants and
captains stood in sharp
contrast to the older officers
who had not benefited from a
systematic military education
and training.
• The impact of Thayer and
West Point was readily
apparent in Mexico.
West Point was founded in
1802 and was instrumental in
training engineers in the 19th
Century
Junior Officers: Impact of West
Pointers
• Winfield Scott called his West Pointers his “little
cabinet”
• Scott was unwavering in his acknowledgement
of West Pointers declaring,
– “I give it as my fixed opinion that but for our graduated
cadets the war between the United States and Mexico
might, and probably would, have lasted some four or
five years, with, in its first half, more defeats than
victories falling to our share, whereas in two
campaigns we conquered a great country and a
peace without the loss of a single battle or skirmish.”
West Pointers in the Civil War
• West Pointers will play a key role in the
Civil War
– 151 Confederate and 294 Federal generals
were West Point graduates
– Of the Civil War’s 60 major battles, West
Pointers commanded both sides in 55
– A West Pointer commanded on one side in
the other five
Limited War
• Scott carried his ideas about limited war into the
Civil War with his Anaconda Plan
• Many Federals, such as George McClellan,
advocated a strategy of conciliation toward the
Confederacy
• Such an approach was eventually rejected and
the Civil War became increasingly total
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Pope’s General Orders
Emancipation Proclamation
Conscription
Suspension of some civil liberties
Sherman’s March to the Sea
Limited War: Changing Times
• “… while Scott was the preeminent military strategist of
the first half of the nineteenth century, he occupied a
lonely plateau in more senses than one: that at the
zenith of his powers he was already a museum piece, a
soldier of an age gone by whose perceptions of war and
strategy had little influence on most of the very West
Point graduates whose service in Mexico he so
fulsomely praised, because the young graduates
inhabited a new world of very different values from
Scott’s, the military world of Napoleon” (Russell Weigley,
American Way of War, 76).
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• Exam 1