Understanding the Sources and Way Out of the Ongoing Financial Upheaval PASEF Susan M. Wachter Richard B. Worley Professor of Financial Management The Wharton School University of Pennsylvania Bank for International Settlements Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research University of Pennsylvania April 23, 2009 Global Downturn • The economy is in the worst downturn since the Great Depression. • Capital market crisis—more than a “recession” credit flow ended, globally and global economy is withering. • A self-reinforcing adverse cycle: – The financial system crisis is upending the economy, putting further pressure on the financial system • US public policy response without precedent. – Fiscal stimulus package – Federal Reserve has vastly expanded its role – What more is needed: for private credit flows to resume, confidence in the financial system itself must be restored – This requires understanding what went wrong and rebuilding the architecture of the financial system The Economic Backdrop • Economy in “Great Recession” – Unemployment at 8.5% – 4th quarter decline in GDP at 6.2%, global decline 1.5% • Volatility in global stock markets – US and global stock prices are more than 40% down • Angst in the banking system and credit markets remain badly shaken – Banks still not lending The Economic Backdrop-Capital Markets Source: Moody’s Economy.com The Damage Is Not Over • Real GDP began to fall in Q4 of 2007- fall continuing. • 2.6 million jobs have already been lost and the unemployment rate is still rising. • Consumer confidence has crashed to its lowest reading ever Source: Mark Zandi, Moody’s Economy.com Response to the Crisis • Fiscal Stimulus – Unprecedented stimulus ($1 trillion) • Monetary Stimulus – Federal Funds Rate near zero – Quantitative easing • Banking Bailout – TARP • Missing: New Financial Architecture – Need to understand what went wrong Impact of Stimulus Measures Source: Mark Zandi, Moody’s Economy.com Monetary Stimulus Source: Mark Zandi, Moody’s Economy.com The state and local impacts Source: Mark Zandi, Moody’s Economy.com The Collapse-from housing to financial markets: still missing, the new financial architecture March, 2007 January, 2008 September, 2008 Global Financial Crisis: Made in the USA • Triggered by actual and prospective losses on US mortgages-leveraged losses far greater • Global meltdown: Bad luck or inevitable? • Boom-bust housing price cycle: Why? • Reckless decline in mortgage lending standards (followed by credit crisis and no private lending) • Increased housing prices beyond sustainable heights • Unprecedented house price rises hid problem loans-teaser rates, no doc/low doc, option arm’s, NINJA loans • Loans made that could not be repaid-betting on ever increasing house price to rescue loans A Severe National Housing Downturn Figure 6: Price Appreciation Controlled for Volatility 2 1 0.5 -1 -1.5 -2 US Home Price Canada Home Price Australia Home Price UK Home Price France Home Price Thailand Home Price Japan Home Price Hong Kong Home Price 20 08 20 06 20 04 20 02 20 00 19 98 19 96 19 94 -0.5 19 92 0 19 90 Annual Percent Change 1.5 WHY? • Private label securitized mortgages, backed leveraged derivatives, synthetics • Decades of securitization—not the problem • Interest rate risk securitized historically • PLS securitized default risk, relied on diversification—not Marked-to-Market, but rather Marked-to-Model • Expansion of toxic debt as asset, based on collateral, and ever increasing house prices Chronic imbalances Sectoral contribution to U.S. gross debt Percentage of GDP Gross debt by U.S. sector Percentage of GDP 140% 400% 350% 120% Financial Companies 300% Financial Companies 100% Households 80% Nonfinancial Companies 250% 200% Household 60% 150% Government 40% 100% Nonfinancial Companies 20% 50% Government 0% 1975 0% 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 1975 1985 1995 2005 15 Source: U.S. Federal Reserve, Bureau of Economic Analysis Increased use of non-traditional products Mortgage originations by product FHA/VA Conv/Conf Jumbo Subprime Alt A HEL 2001 8% 57% 20% 7% 2% 5% 2002 7% 63% 21% 1% 2% 6% 2003 6% 62% 16% 8% 2% 6% 2004 4% 41% 17% 18% 6% 12% 2005 3% 35% 18% 20% 12% 12% 2006 3% 33% 16% 20% 13% 14% 2007 4% 48% 14% 8% 11% 15% Deterioration of lending standards, 2002 to 2006: Leverage w/out Docs Table 3 ARMS Orig Yr CLTV CLTV>80 Seconds Full Doc IO% DTI FICO<700 Investor WAC SpdtoWAC Prime 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 66.4 68.2 73.5 74.1 75.3 4.1 10.1 20.7 21.7 26.2 1.9 10.9 23.1 26.8 35.3 56.0 48.6 51.2 47.3 33.6 46 53 71 81 91 31.0 31.8 33.5 33.6 37.2 20.7 21.8 22.0 18.9 19.5 0.7 1.6 2.1 1.9 2.3 5.5 4.6 4.5 5.4 6.2 - Alt A 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 74.3 78.0 82.6 83.5 85.0 20.8 33.3 46.9 49.6 55.4 2.7 23.4 39.1 46.9 55.4 29.3 28.1 32.6 28.3 19.0 26 56 75 83 87 35.4 35.3 36.2 37.0 38.3 46.4 44.7 44.3 40.5 44.2 9.9 12.9 15.3 16.5 13.5 6.3 5.6 5.5 6.0 6.8 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.6 0.6 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 81.2 83.5 85.3 86.6 86.7 46.8 55.6 61.1 64.4 64.0 3.7 9.9 19.1 28.1 31.0 66.9 63.5 59.9 55.9 54.6 1 5 20 32 20 40.0 40.2 40.6 41.2 42.1 93.4 91.6 90.6 89.7 91.8 4.7 4.9 5.3 5.4 5.7 8.5 7.5 7.1 7.3 8.2 3.0 2.9 2.6 1.9 2.0 Subprime Spreads declined Source: Loan Performance data as of November 2006. UBS, April 16, 2007, Thomas Zimmerman, "How Did We Get Here and What Lies Ahead" CLTV (leverage) increases % Full Doc declined 18 Nonprime mortgage lending replaced the “American Mortgage”: where and why? A Housing Bubble Starting in 2003, Especially in the “Sand States” Prices by City (Case-Shiller) 300.00 250.00 200.00 phnx 150.00 la 100.00 miami 50.00 tampa lv February 13, 2009 Susan M. Wachter September 2007 July 2006 May 2005 March 2004 January 2003 November 2001 September 2000 July 1999 May 1998 March 1997 January 1996 November 1994 September 1993 July 1992 May 1991 March 1990 January 1989 0.00 chicago mnpls 20 Percent of All Loans—Adjustable Rate 1999 a r m_ p 0% t o 25% February 13, 2009 >25% t o 50% 2006 >50% t o 75% >75% t o 100% a r m_ p Susan M. Wachter 0% t o 25% >25% t o 50% >50% t o 75% >75% t o 21 100% Percent of All Loans—Low Documentation- by 2006, 25% of loans 1999 l o wd o c _ p 0% t o 25% February 13, 2009 >25% t o 50% 2006 >50% t o 75% >75% t o 100% l o wd o c _ p Susan M. Wachter 0% t o 25% >25% t o 50% >50% t o 75% >75% t o 22 100% Percent of Adjustable Rate Loans— Teaser (2006) t easer _p February 13, 2009 0% t o 25% >25% t o 50% Susan M. Wachter >50% t o 75% >75% t o 100% 23 Number of Subprime Loans Source: www.newyorkfed.org/mortgagemaps Increase in House Price Index Source: www.newyorkfed.org/mortgagemaps Projected Peak-to-Trough House Price Decline, % >-20% -20<-10% -10%<0% No correction Sources: Fiserv Lending Solutions, Moody's Economy.com, OFHEO How did we get here? Investors • Borrowers Lack of short sales, CDS Where does the buck stop? Rating Agencies • • Agency incentives misaligned“current conditions” out Secondary Market • Securities marked to models not to market/assignee liability exemption Borrowed at teaser rates-not able/expected(?) to pay at reset Originators / Brokers • Originate to distribute Deregulation and Regulatory Arbitrage: “Competitive Regulation” • Charter competition fueled a race to the bottom in underwriting standards • Migration to federal bank and thrift charters • At the federal level, regulation and examinations of nonbank mortgage lending subsidiaries were lax February 13, 2009 Susan M. Wachter 29 Deregulation • The proposed Federal Reserve Board Regulatory Oversight of mortgages not implemented until 2008, HOEPA (Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act, 1994) irrelevant,<1% loans • 2004 act SEC allowed investment firms to – increase leverage to 40 to 1 – to voluntarily measure their capital, and – decrease SEC oversight • 2000 State reserving for CDS issued by insurance companies, Fed govt precludes February 13, 2009 Susan M. Wachter 30 Market and Regulatory Failure • Risk taking without accountability – Too big to fail, too small to sue • Underpriced risk is inevitable, compensation for generating risk without accountability WHY? • Decades of securitization, 1980-2000—no problem • Historically-interest rate risk securitized, default risk controlled for and not priced, only prime mortgages securitized • “Innovation:” Private label securitization of default risk • Private label mortgage backed securities did not trade • Priced based on Marked-to-Model paradigm Not Marked-to-Market, • Market and regulatory discipline absent New Financial Architecture • Replace Basel II – Basel II: regime of self-regulation • End “Competitive Regulation” – Race to the bottom • Single Regulator • Asset Bubbles – What is a single regulator regulating? – How do we regulate asset bubbles? February 13, 2009 Susan M. Wachter 33 Perspective The events of the past year or two have highlighted regulatory gaps and deficiencies that we must address to improve the structure of our markets and the resiliency of our economy. As we recover from the current crisis, it will be important to address these issues as soon as possible, to develop a regulatory structure that will better respond to future economic challenges. --Ben Bernanke Thank You Susan M. Wachter Richard B. Worley Professor of Financial Management Professor of Real Estate and Finance The Wharton School University of Pennsylvania wachter@wharton.upenn.edu