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Framework – GDI 2013
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Critiques Bad
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Shells
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1NC Shell
1. Interpretation: The aff should defend the hypothetical enactment of a topical
plan
2. “United States Federal Government should” means the debate is solely about
the outcome of a policy established by governmental means
Ericson, California Polytechnic Dean Emeritus, 03
(Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s
Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)
The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key
elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented
propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a
policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of
the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to
follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program
or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the
action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would,
for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or
discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred.
The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you
accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience
to perform the future action that you propose.
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3. Prefer our interpretation:
a. Ground: allowing un-topical affs kills ground, all neg ground is based
off of a policy happening. Absent a stable locus for links and
competition, debate is shallow, killing education
b. Predictable limits: government action is key to create a limit on the
topic, allowing different methods or framings to be the 1ac explodes
neg research burden and kills core generics. Prefer our limits because
they are predictably based off of the resolution
c. Topic education: the topic is about the effects of US policies toward
regions of Latin America. A discussion of policies accesses a
knowledge of politics, which is the largest portable impact to debate
d. Aff conditionality: without the plan text as a stable source of the
offense the aff can shift their advocacy to get out of offense which
discourages research and clash. Voting issue
e. Switch side debate solves their offense – critiquing the topic on the
neg produces the same discussion.
f. Framework is a voting issue for the reasons above
4. Roleplaying is good and key to in-depth political knowledge – the process of
debating politics and counterplans is key
Zwarensteyn, Grand Valley State Masters’ student, 12
[Ellen C., 8-1-2012 “High School Policy Debate as an Enduring Pathway to Political Education: Evaluating
Possibilities for Political Learning”
http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1034&context=theses accessed: 7/5/13 EYS]
The first trend to emerge concerns how debate fosters in-depth political knowledge. Immediately,
every resolution calls for analysis of United States federal government action. Given that each debater
may debate in over a hundred different unique rounds, there is a competitive incentive thoroughly
research as many credible, viable, and in-depth strategies as possible. Moreover, the requirement to
debate both affirmative and negative sides of the topic injects a creative necessity to defend viable
arguments from a multitude of perspectives.
As a result, the depth of knowledge spans questions not only of what, if anything, should be done in
response to a policy question, but also questions of who, when, where, and why. This opens the door
to evaluating intricacies of government branch, committee, agency, and even specific persons who
may yield different cost-benefit outcomes to conducting policy action. Consider the following responses:
I think debate helped me understand how Congress works and policies actually happen which is
different than what government classes teach you. Process counterplans are huge - reading and
understanding how delegation works means you understand that it is not just congress passes a bill and
the president signs. You understand that policies can happen in different methods. Executive orders,
congress, and courts counterplans have all helped me understand that policies don’t just happen the
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way we learn in government. There are huge chunks of processes that you don't learn about in
government that you do learn about in debate.
Similarly,
Debate has certainly aided [my political knowledge]. The nature of policy-making requires you to be
knowledgeable of the political process because process does effect the outcome. Solvency questions,
agent counterplans, and politics are tied to process questions.
When addressing the overall higher level of awareness of agency interaction and ability to identify pros
and cons of various committee, agency, or branch activity, most respondents traced this knowledge to
the politics research spanning from their affirmative cases, solvency debates, counterplan ideas, and
political disadvantages.
One of the recurring topics concerns congressional vs. executive vs. court action and how all of that
works. To be good at debate you really do need to have a good grasp of that. There is really something
to be said for high school debate - because without debate I wouldn’t have gone to the library to read a
book about how the Supreme Court works, read it, and be interested in it. Maybe I would’ve been a
lawyer anyway and I would’ve learned some of that but I can’t imagine at 16 or 17 I would’ve had that
desire and have gone to the law library at a local campus to track down a law review that might be
important for a case. That aspect of debate in unparalleled - the competitive drive pushes you to find
new materials.
Similarly,
I think [my political knowledge] comes from the politics research that we have to do. You read a lot of
names name-dropped in articles. You know who has influence in different parts of congress. You know
how different leaders would feel about different policies and how much clout they have. This comes
from links and internal links.
Overall, competitive debaters must have a depth of political knowledge on hand to respond to and
formulate numerous arguments. It appears debaters then internalize both the information itself and
the motivation to learn more. This aids the PEP value of intellectual pluralism as debaters seek not
only an oversimplified ‘both’ sides of an issue, but multiple angles of many arguments. Debaters
uniquely approach arguments from a multitude of perspectives – often challenging traditional
conventions of argument. With knowledge of multiple perspectives, debaters often acknowledge their
relative dismay with television news and traditional outlets of news media as superficial outlets for
information.
5. That turns the aff – focusing on the details and inner-workings of government
policy-making is productive – critical approaches can’t resolve real world
problems like poverty, racism and war
McClean, Mollow College Philosophy Professor, 01
[David E., Adjunct Professor of Philosophy, Molloy College, New York, 2001 “The Cultural Left and the
Limits of Social Hope,” Presented at the 2001 Annual Conference of the Society for the Advancement of
American Philosophy, Available Online at www.americanphilosophy.org/archives/past_conference_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/david_mcclean.htm,
JMP, Accessed on July 5, 2013)][SP]
Yet for some reason, at least partially explicated in Richard Rorty's Achieving Our Country, a book
that I think is long overdue, leftist critics continue to cite and refer to the eccentric and often a
priori ruminations of people like those just mentioned, and a litany of others including Derrida,
Deleuze, Lyotard, Jameson, and Lacan, who are to me hugely more irrelevant than Habermas in
their narrative attempts to suggest policy prescriptions (when they actually do suggest them)
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aimed at curing the ills of homelessness, poverty, market greed, national belligerence and racism .
I would like to suggest that it is time for American social critics who are enamored with this group,
those who actually want to be relevant, to recognize that they have a disease, and a disease
regarding which I myself must remember to stay faithful to my own twelve step program of
recovery. The disease is the need for elaborate theoretical "remedies" wrapped in neological and
multi-syllabic jargon. These elaborate theoretical remedies are more "interesting," to be sure,
than the pragmatically settled questions about what shape democracy should take in various
contexts, or whether private property should be protected by the state, or regarding our basic
human nature (described, if not defined (heaven forbid!), in such statements as "We don't like to
starve" and "We like to speak our minds without fear of death" and "We like to keep our children
safe from poverty"). As Rorty puts it, "When one of today's academic leftists says that some topic
has been 'inadequately theorized,' you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either
philosophy of language, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist version of economic
determinism. . . . These futile attempts to philosophize one's way into political relevance are a
symptom of what happens when a Left retreats from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach
to the problems of its country. Disengagement from practice produces theoretical
hallucinations"(italics mine).(1) Or as John Dewey put it in his The Need for a Recovery of
Philosophy, "I believe that philosophy in America will be lost between chewing a historical cud
long since reduced to woody fiber, or an apologetics for lost causes, . . . . or a scholastic,
schematic formalism, unless it can somehow bring to consciousness America's own needs and its
own implicit principle of successful action." Those who suffer or have suffered from this disease
Rorty refers to as the Cultural Left, which left is juxtaposed to the Political Left that Rorty prefers
and prefers for good reason. Another attribute of the Cultural Left is that its members fancy
themselves pure culture critics who view the successes of America and the West, rather than
some of the barbarous methods for achieving those successes, as mostly evil, and who view
anything like national pride as equally evil even when that pride is tempered with the knowledge
and admission of the nation's shortcomings. In other words, the Cultural Left, in this country, too
often dismiss American society as beyond reform and redemption. And Rorty correctly argues that
this is a disastrous conclusion, i.e. disastrous for the Cultural Left. I think it may also be disastrous
for our social hopes, as I will explain. Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable
talents to better use if they bury some of their cynicism about America's social and political
prospects and help forge public and political possibilities in a spirit of determination to, indeed,
achieve our country - the country of Jefferson and King; the country of John Dewey and Malcom X;
the country of Franklin Roosevelt and Bayard Rustin, and of the later George Wallace and the later
Barry Goldwater. To invoke the words of King, and with reference to the American society, the time
is always ripe to seize the opportunity to help create the "beloved community," one woven with
the thread of agape into a conceptually single yet diverse tapestry that shoots for nothing less than
a true intra-American cosmopolitan ethos, one wherein both same sex unions and faith-based
initiatives will be able to be part of the same social reality, one wherein business interests and the
university are not seen as belonging to two separate galaxies but as part of the same answer to the
threat of social and ethical nihilism. We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to create
from within ourselves and from within our ranks a new kind of public intellectual who has both a
hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to move past high theory to
other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" but more important to the
prospect of our flourishing - questions such as "How is it possible to develop a citizenry that
cherishes a certain hexis, one which prizes the character of the Samaritan on the road to Jericho
almost more than any other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds the
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fantasy of a missile defense system with the need to treat America as but one member in a
community of nations under a "law of peoples?" The new public philosopher might seek to
understand labor law and military and trade theory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus
value; the logic of international markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of
commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the politics of power (all of which can
still be done from our arm chairs.) This means going down deep into the guts of our quotidian
social institutions, into the grimy pragmatic details where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but
where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult and often unpleasant,
imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and it means making honest attempts to truly
understand how those institutions actually function in the actual world before howling for their
overthrow commences. This might help keep us from being slapped down in debates by true
policy pros who actually know what they are talking about but who lack awareness of the
dogmatic assumptions from which they proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to
listen to jargon-riddled lectures from philosophers and culture critics with their snobish
disrespect for the so-called "managerial class."
6. Topic Specific Education - Role playing and decision making solves Latin
American education failure in the US.
Cook, Education Practitioner, 85
[Kay K., September 1985, “Latin American Studies”, http://www.ericdigests.org/pre923/latin.htm, accessed 7/7/13, ALT]
Gallup polls indicate that Latin America--Mexico, Central America, South America, and the independent
countries of the Caribbean--is a region about which United States citizens are poorly informed (Glab
1981). Yet for practical reasons of politics and economics, as well as cultural and historical reasons,
United States citizens should be well informed about Latin America.
This Digest considers the present status of Latin American studies in elementary and secondary schools.
It discusses the need and rationale for Latin American studies, effective teaching techniques, and
resources to supplement textbooks which treat Latin America inadequately.
THE PRESENT STATE OF TEACHING ABOUT LATIN AMERICA
Social studies textbooks and media often present an incomplete or biased portrait of the countries
comprising Latin America. Newspapers and television news programs tend to focus on such spectacular
events as earthquakes, terrorism, coups, and American foreign policy related to the region. "It is rare to
find stories on the arts, humanities, or culture of Latin America" (Glab 1981).
The same is true of textbook representation. A recent survey of ten high school texts revealed that "with
the exception of one textbook, little recognition was given to cultural characteristics" (Fleming 1982).
Latin American history was presented primarily in the context of United States foreign policy. The point
of view of Latin American countries was rarely considered. Textbooks often created or reinforced
negative stereotypes of Latin America and its citizens.
THE NEED AND RATIONALE FOR TEACHING ABOUT LATIN AMERICA
Glab (1981) offers the following considerations for including more about Latin America in the
curriculum:
--Foreign Policy. International controversies over the influence of other governments in the politics of
Latin America need analysis and examination.
--Physical Proximity. Latin American countries are virtually next-door neighbors, "with close political,
commercial, and cultural interactions with the United States extending over many years."
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--The American Heritage. Latin American culture and the Spanish language are part of the American
heritage, exerting early and continuing influence on what are now the states of Texas, California, New
Mexico, and Arizona.
--Negative Stereotyping. It is well documented that Hispanic-Americans in general "suffer from explicit
negative stereotyping."
In addition to those suggested by Glab, other considerations, based on commonality, exist. Shared
problems include traffic congestion, pollution, and crime related to urbanization; unemployment and
slow economic growth; concentration of ownership of agricultural land; and government debt.
EFFECTIVE APPROACHES TO TEACHING LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES
In his analysis of high school textbook treatment of Latin America, Fleming (1982) points out that "a
major source of information on Latin America should be the social studies classroom." The world history
course offers an especially fertile ground for introducing a Latin American perspective into a study of
world events. As an article in the WORLD HISTORY BULLETIN stresses, "The New World was not simply
the passive recipient of European civilization; rather, it modified and changed Europe's civilization and
contributed to the development of the Old World" (Burns 1984).
Case studies, decision-making exercises, and role playing have been effective methods of introducing
Latin American culture and erasing preconceived notions about that region.
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2AC Frontline
1. Interpretation: The role of the ballot is to decide between a topical plan and the
status quo or a competitive policy alternative.
Prefer our interpretation:
a. Limits: tons of unpredictable K frameworks, weighing our advantages
is key to informed decisions
b. Ground: They can leverage framework to moot the 1AC, structural
advantages like the block makes preserving aff ground a priority
c. Topic education: their framework encourages generic Ks that get
rehashed every year. We change the topic to learn about new things.
d. Solves their offense – they can read their K as a DA or offer a policy
alternative to the plan that resolves the harms outlined in the K.
2. Limits are good- Agreement on what is being debated is a prior question that
must be resolved first – it is a pre-condition for debate to occur
Shively, Assistant Prof Political Science at Texas A&M, 2K — [Ruth Lessl, Assistant Prof
Political Science at Texas A&M, 2000 “Partisan Politics and Political Theory,” p. 181-2, Accessed on July
5, 2013)][SP]
The requirements given thus far are primarily negative. The ambiguists must say "no" to-they must
reject and limit-some ideas and actions. In what follows, we will also find that they must say "yes" to
some things. In particular, they must say "yes" to the idea of rational persuasion. This means, first,
that they must recognize the role of agreement in political contest, or the basic accord that is
necessary to discord. The mistake that the ambiguists make here is a common one. The mistake is in
thinking that agreement marks the end of contest-that consensus kills debate. But this is true only if
the agreement is perfect-if there is nothing at all left to question or contest. In most cases, however,
our agreements are highly imperfect. We agree on some matters but not on others, on generalities
but not on specifics, on principles but not on their applications, and so on. And this kind of limited
agreement is the starting condition of contest and debate. As John Courtney Murray writes: We hold
certain truths; therefore we can argue about them. It seems to have been one of the corruptions of
intelligence by positivism to assume that argument ends when agreement is reached. In a basic sense,
the reverse is true. There can be no argument except on the premise, and within a context, of
agreement. (Murray 1960, 10) In other words, we cannot argue about something if we are not
communicating: if we cannot agree on the topic and terms of argument or if we have utterly different
ideas about what counts as evidence or good argument. At the very least, we must agree about what
it is that is being debated before we can debate it. For instance, one cannot have an argument about
euthanasia with someone who thinks euthanasia is a musical group. One cannot successfully stage a sitin if one's target audience simply thinks everyone is resting or if those doing the sitting have no
complaints. Nor can one demonstrate resistance to a policy if no one knows that it is a policy. In other
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words, contest is meaningless if there is a lack of agreement or communication about what is being
contested. Resisters, demonstrators, and debaters must have some shared ideas about the subject
and/or the terms of their disagreements. The participants and the target of a sit-in must share an
understanding of the complaint at hand. And a demonstrator's audience must know what is being
resisted. In short, the contesting of an idea presumes some agreement about what that idea is and
how one might go about intelligibly contesting it. In other words, contestation rests on some basic
agreement or harmony.
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Definitions
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2nc – Federal government
“Federal Government” means the central government in Washington D.C.
Encarta ‘2K
(Online Encyclopedia, http://encarta.msn.com)
“The federal government of the United States is centered in Washington DC”
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2nc – Resolved
Resolved” requires a vote on a formal resolution
American Heritage Dictionary 11 (The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fifth
Edition copyright ©2011 by Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company., “resolved” 2011,
http://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=resolved&submit.x=-826&submit.y=-210, accessed
July 6, 2013, QDKM)
re·solve (rĭ. re·solved, re·solv·ing, re·solves
v.tr.
1.a. To make a firm decision about: resolved that I would do better next time. See Synonyms at decide.
b. To decide or express by formal vote: The legislature resolved that the official should be impeached.
2. A formal resolution made by a deliberative body.
A resolution requires not only a formal vote, but a formal proposition that was
submitted to those voting upon it.
Black’s Law Dictionary ‘9
(The Law Dictionary Featuring Black's Law Dictionary Free Online Legal Dictionary “What is
RESOLUTION? definition of RESOLUTION “ October 23, 2009, http://thelawdictionary.org/resolution/,
accessed July 7, 2013, QDKM)
A motion or formal proposition offered for adoption by such a body. In legislative practice. The term is
usually employed to denote the adoption of a motion, the subject-matter of which would not
properly constitute a statute; such as a mere expression of opinion; an alteration of the rules ; a vote
of thanks or of censure,
“Resolved” means to enact a resolution
Merriam-Webster 13 (“resolve”, Merriam-Webster, Incorporated, 2013, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/resolve, accessed July 7, 2013, QDKM)
re·solve verb \ri-ˈzälv, -ˈzȯlv also -ˈzäv or -ˈzȯv\
re·solvedre·solv·ing
Definition of RESOLVE
3
: to cause resolution of (a pathological state)
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2nc – Should
“Should” requires we perform the actions of the following verb, it’s a necessity
Cambridge Dictionary 13 (published by Cambridge University Press, “Should” [American Version],
2013, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/american-english/should_1?q=should, accessed July 6,
2013, QDKM)
should
modal verb (DUTY) /ʃʊd, ʃəd/
Definition
› used to express that it is necessary, desirable, or important to perform the action of the following
verb
“Should” is mandatory, in legal context it must be obeyed
Oxford English Dictionary 13 (“Shall- should”[American-Business Version], Oxford University Press,
Copyright © 2013,
Press.http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/177350?isAdvanced=true&result=10&rskey=XZ3VE5&, accessed
July 6, 2013, QDKM)
II. Followed by an infinitive (without to).
Except for a few instances of shall will, shall may (mowe), shall conne in the 15th c., the infinitive after
shall is always either that of a principal verb or of have or be.
2. In general statements of what is right or becoming: = ‘ought’. Obs. (Superseded by the pa.
subjunctive should: see sense 18)
In Old English the subjunctive present sometimes occurs in this use (e.g. c888 in A. 4).
c. In conditional clause, accompanying the statement of a necessary condition: = ‘is to’.
4. Indicating what is appointed or settled to take place = the modern ‘is to’, ‘am to’, etc. Obs.
5. In commands or instructions.
“Should” requires a mandate, implies that the action will be followed through
Merriam-Webster Dictionary 13 (“Should”, Merriam-Webster Incorporated, 2013,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/should?show=0&t=1373233008, accessed July 7, 2013,
QDKM)
should verbal auxiliary \shəd, ˈshu̇ d\
Definition of SHOULD
1
—used in auxiliary function to express condition <if he should leave his father, his father would die —
Genesis 44:22(Revised Standard Version)>
2
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—used in auxiliary function to express obligation, propriety, or expediency <'tis commanded I should
do so — Shakespeare> <this is as it should be — H. L. Savage> <you should brush your teeth after each
meal>
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2NC Extensions
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2nc – Stasis DA
Stasis – the resolution orients debate around a clear and specific controversial point of
government action which creates argumentative stasis – the aff promotes a model of
debate with much less equal footing. The best mechanism to facilitate debate is the
resolution
Zwarensteyn, Grand Valley State Masters’ student, 12
[Ellen C., 8-1-2012 “High School Policy Debate as an Enduring Pathway to Political Education: Evaluating
Possibilities for Political Learning”
http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1034&context=theses accessed: 7/5/13 EYS]
Galloway (2007) also advances an argument concerning the privileging of the resolution as a basis for
debating. Galloway (2007) cites three pedagogical advantages to seeing the resolution and the first
affirmative constructive as an invitation to dialogue. “First, all teams have equal access to the
resolution. Second, teams spend the entire year preparing approaches for and against the resolution.
Finally, the resolution represents a community consensus of worthwhile and equitably debatable
topics rooted in a collective history and experience of debate” (p. 13). An important starting point for
conversation, the resolution helps frame political conversations humanely. It preserves basic means
for equality of access to base research and argumentation. Having a year-long stable resolution invites
depth of argument and continuously rewards adaptive research once various topics have surfaced
through practice or at debate tournaments.
Agreement on what is being debated is a prior question that must be resolved first – it
is a pre-condition for debate to occur
Shively, Assistant Prof Political Science at Texas A&M, 2K — [Ruth Lessl, Assistant Prof
Political Science at Texas A&M, 2000 “Partisan Politics and Political Theory,” p. 181-2, Accessed on July
5, 2013)][SP]
The requirements given thus far are primarily negative. The ambiguists must say "no" to-they must
reject and limit-some ideas and actions. In what follows, we will also find that they must say "yes" to
some things. In particular, they must say "yes" to the idea of rational persuasion. This means, first,
that they must recognize the role of agreement in political contest, or the basic accord that is
necessary to discord. The mistake that the ambiguists make here is a common one. The mistake is in
thinking that agreement marks the end of contest-that consensus kills debate. But this is true only if
the agreement is perfect-if there is nothing at all left to question or contest. In most cases, however,
our agreements are highly imperfect. We agree on some matters but not on others, on generalities
but not on specifics, on principles but not on their applications, and so on. And this kind of limited
agreement is the starting condition of contest and debate. As John Courtney Murray writes: We hold
certain truths; therefore we can argue about them. It seems to have been one of the corruptions of
intelligence by positivism to assume that argument ends when agreement is reached. In a basic sense,
the reverse is true. There can be no argument except on the premise, and within a context, of
agreement. (Murray 1960, 10) In other words, we cannot argue about something if we are not
communicating: if we cannot agree on the topic and terms of argument or if we have utterly different
ideas about what counts as evidence or good argument. At the very least, we must agree about what
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it is that is being debated before we can debate it. For instance, one cannot have an argument about
euthanasia with someone who thinks euthanasia is a musical group. One cannot successfully stage a sitin if one's target audience simply thinks everyone is resting or if those doing the sitting have no
complaints. Nor can one demonstrate resistance to a policy if no one knows that it is a policy. In other
words, contest is meaningless if there is a lack of agreement or communication about what is being
contested. Resisters, demonstrators, and debaters must have some shared ideas about the subject
and/or the terms of their disagreements. The participants and the target of a sit-in must share an
understanding of the complaint at hand. And a demonstrator's audience must know what is being
resisted. In short, the contesting of an idea presumes some agreement about what that idea is and
how one might go about intelligibly contesting it. In other words, contestation rests on some basic
agreement or harmony.
This is a d-rule – impossible to be negative without prior agreement on the terms of
the resolution
Shively, Assistant Prof Political Science at Texas A&M, 2K — [Ruth Lessl, Assistant Prof
Political Science at Texas A&M, 2000 “Partisan Politics and Political Theory,” p. 182-3, Accessed on July
5, 2013)][SP]
The point may seem trite, as surely the ambiguists would agree that basic terms must be shared
before they can be resisted and problematized. In fact, they are often very candid about this seeming
paradox in their approach: the paradoxical or "parasitic" need of the subversive for an order to subvert.
But admitting the paradox is not helpful if, as usually happens here, its implications are ignored; or if the
only implication drawn is that order or harmony is an unhappy fixture of human life. For what the
paradox should tell us is that some kinds of harmonies or orders are, in fact, good for resistance; and
some ought to be fully supported. As such, it should counsel against the kind of careless rhetoric that
lumps all orders or harmonies together as arbitrary and inhumane. Clearly some basic accord about
the terms of contest is a necessary ground for all further contest. It may be that if the ambiguists wish
to remain full-fledged ambiguists, they cannot admit to these implications, for to open the door to
some agreements or reasons as good and some orders as helpful or necessary, is to open the door to
some sort of rationalism. Perhaps they might just continue to insist that this initial condition is ironic,
but that the irony should not stand in the way of the real business of subversion. Yet difficulties remain.
For and then proceed to debate without attention to further agreements. For debate and contest are
forms of dialogue: that is, they are activities premised on the building of progressive agreements.
Imagine, for instance, that two people are having an argument about the issue of gun control. As noted
earlier, in any argument, certain initial agreements will be needed just to begin the discussion. At the
very least, the two discussants must agree on basic terms: for example, they must have some shared
sense of what gun control is about; what is at issue in arguing about it; what facts are being contested,
and so on. They must also agree—and they do so simply by entering into debate—that they will not use
violence or threats in making their cases and that they are willing to listen to, and to be persuaded by,
good arguments. Such agreements are simply implicit in the act of argumentation.
Clash is key to productive debate and effective change.
Freeley, John Caroll University, and Steinberg, University of Miami, 8
[Austin L. and David L., 2/13/2008, “Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for
Reasoned Decision Making”, 12th edition,
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http://teddykw2.files.wordpress.com/2012/06/argumentation-and-debate.pdf, p. 4344, accessed 7/4/13, ALT]
Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion¶ or a conflict of
interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement¶ on a fact or value or policy, there is
no need for debate; the matter can be settled by¶ unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be
pointless to attempt to debate¶ “Resolved: That two plus two equals four,” because there is simply no
controversy¶ about this statement. Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is
no¶ clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate.¶ In
addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of¶ a question or
questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur¶ about the broad topic of illegal
immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the¶ United States? What is the impact of illegal
immigration and immigrants on our¶ economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they
commit crimes? Do¶ they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social¶
services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of¶ employers to
discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers?¶ Should they have the opportunity
to gain citizenship? Does illegal immigration¶ pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants
do work that American¶ workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings
at risk¶ due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and¶ businesses?
How are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and¶ philosophical obligation of a
nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a¶ wall on the Mexican border, establish a national
identification card, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become
U.S. citizens?¶ Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation¶ about
the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this “debate” is likely to¶ be emotional and intense.
However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and
identification of a line demarcating sides in the¶ controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively,
controversies must be stated¶ clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor
decisions,¶ frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States¶
Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.
Someone disturbed by the problem of a growing underclass of poorly educated,¶ socially disenfranchised
youths might observe, “Public schools are doing a terrible¶ job! They are overcrowded, and many
teachers are poorly qualified in their subject¶ areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than
struggle to maintain order in¶ their classrooms.” That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of
issues,¶ might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as “We ought to do something about¶ this” or, worse,
“It’s too complicated a problem to deal with.” Groups of concerned¶ citizens worried about the state
of public education could join together to express¶ their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and
emotions regarding the schools, but¶ without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree
about the sorry state of¶ education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe
session¶ would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as “What can be done to improve public
education?”—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up¶ simply by placing a focus on the
search for a concrete solution step. One or more¶ judgments can be phrased in the form of debate
propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements
“Resolved: That the¶ federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk
communities” and “Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher¶ program” more
clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems¶ in a manageable form, suitable for
debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of
difference.
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2nc – Switch Side Debate Solves K Offense
Our argument doesn’t preclude revolutionary conceptions of the resolution –
grounding radical activism in the rules of political contest is the only truly subversive
act
Shively, Assistant Prof Political Science at Texas A&M, 2K — [Ruth Lessl, Assistant Prof
Political Science at Texas A&M, 2000 “Partisan Politics and Political Theory,” p. 180, Accessed on July 5,
2013)][SP]
Thus far, I have argued that if the ambiguists mean to be subversive about anything, they need to
be conservative about some things. They need to be steadfast supporters of the structures of
openness and democracy: willing to say "no" to certain forms of contest; willing to set up certain
clear limitations about acceptable behavior. To this, finally, I would add that if the ambiguists mean
to stretch the boundaries of behavior—if they want to be revolutionary and disruptive in their
skepticism and iconoclasm—they need first to be firm believers in something. Which is to say,
again, they need to set clear limits about what they will and will not support, what they do and do
not believe to be best. As G. K. Chesterton observed, the true revolutionary has always willed
something "definite and limited." For example, "The Jacobin could tell you not only the system he
would rebel against, but (what was more important) the system he would not rebel against..." He
"desired the freedoms of democracy." He "wished to have votes and not to have titles . . ." But
"because the new rebel is a skeptic"—because he cannot bring himself to will something definite
and limited— "he cannot be a revolutionary." For "the fact that he wants to doubt everything
really gets in his way when he wants to denounce anything" (Chesterton 1959,41). Thus, the most
radical skepticism ends in the most radical conservatism. In other words, a refusal to judge among
ideas and activities is, in the end, an endorsement of the status quo. To embrace everything is to
be unable to embrace a particular plan of action, for to embrace a particular plan of action is to
reject all others, at least for that moment. Moreover, as observed in our discussion of openness, to
embrace everything is to embrace self-contradiction: to hold to both one's purposes and to that
which defeats one's purposes—to tolerance and intolerance, open-mindedness and closemindedness, democracy and tyranny. In the same manner, then, the ambiguists' refusals to will
something "definite and limited" undermines their revolutionary impulses. In their refusal to say
what they will not celebrate and what they will not rebel against, they deny themselves (and
everyone else in their political world) a particular plan or ground to work from. By refusing to deny
incivility, they deny themselves a civil public space from which to speak. They cannot say "no" to
the terrorist who would silence dissent. They cannot turn their backs on the bullying of the white
supremacist. And, as such, in refusing to bar the tactics of the anti-democrat, they refuse to support
the tactics of the democrat. In short, then, to be a true ambiguist, there must be some limit to
what is ambiguous. To fully support political contest, one must fully support some uncontested
rules and reasons. To generally reject the silencing or exclusion of others, one must sometimes
silence or exclude those who reject civility and democracy.
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2nc – Limits
Limits – their model of debate disincentives in depth debate and pre round prep – it’s
impossible to prepare for the infinite number of possible advocacies which means the
aff is always ahead because they can develop issue-specific tricks to beat generics –
they spent a bunch of time researching, practicing, and refining the 1ac – this means
novices quit the activity – someone who has no experience can’t have a debate about
debate
Rowland, Kansas University communications professor, 84 –
(Robert C., Baylor U., “Topic Selection in Debate”, American Forensics in Perspective. Ed. Parson, p. 534)
The first major problem identified by the work group as relating to topic selection is the decline in
participation in the National Debate Tournament (NDT) policy debate. As Boman notes: There is a
growing dissatisfaction with academic debate that utilizes a policy proposition. Programs which are
oriented toward debating the national policy debate proposition, so-called “NDT” programs, are
diminishing in scope and size.4 This decline in policy debate is tied, many in the work group believe, to
excessively broad topics. The most obvious characteristic of some recent policy debate topics is extreme
breath. A resolution calling for regulation of land use literally and figuratively covers a lot of ground.
Naitonal debate topics have not always been so broad. Before the late 1960s the topic often specified a
particular policy change.5 The move from narrow to broad topics has had, according to some, the effect
of limiting the number of students who participate in policy debate. First, the breadth of the topics has all
but destroyed novice debate. Paul Gaske argues that because the stock issues of policy debate are clearly
defined, it is superior to value debate as a means of introducing students to the debate process.6
Despite this advantage of policy debate, Gaske belives that NDT debate is not the best vehicle for
teaching beginners. The problem is that broad policy topics terrify novice debaters, especially those who
lack high school debate experience. They are unable to cope with the breadth of the topic and experience
“negophobia,”7 the fear of debating negative. As a consequence, the educational advantages associated
with teaching novices through policy debate are lost: “Yet all of these benefits fly out the window as
rookies in their formative stage quickly experience humiliation at being caugh without evidence or
substantive awareness of the issues that confront them at a tournament.”8 The ultimate result is that
fewer novices participate in NDT, thus lessening the educational value of the activity and limiting the
number of debaters or eventually participate in more advanced divisions of policy debate. In addition to
noting the effect on novices, participants argued that broad topics also discourage experienced debaters
from continued participation in policy debate. Here, the claim is that it takes so much times and effort to
be competitive on a broad topic that students who are concerned with doing more than just debate are
forced out of the activity.9 Gaske notes, that “broad topics discourage participation because of
insufficient time to do requisite research.”10 The final effect may be that entire programs either cease
functioning or shift to value debate as a way to avoid unreasonable research burdens. Boman supports
this point: “It is this expanding necessity of evidence, and thereby research, which has created a
competitive imbalance between institutions that participate in academic debate.”11 In this view, it is
the competitive imbalance resulting from the use of broad topics that has led some small schools to
cancel their programs.
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That turns education – the education in debate doesn’t come from the other team
lecturing you it comes from the discussion that occurs within the round – if we win
they make that discussion impossible that’s a reason they can’t solve any of their
offense –otherwise result in the same authoritative exclusion that they critique
Morson, Northwestern Prof, 4
(Greg, Bakhtinian Perspectives on Language, Literacy, and Learning, 317-23)
Sarah Freedman and Arnetha Ball describe learning as a dialogic process. It is not merely a transmission
of knowledge, but an activity in which whole selves are formed and acquire new capacities for
development. We live in a world of enormous cultural diversity, and the various languages and points of
view – ideologies in Bakhtin’s sense – of students have become a fact that cannot be ignored. Teachers
need to enter into a dialogue with those points of view and to help students do the same. For difference
may best be understood not as an obstacle but as an opportunity. ¶ The range of “authoritative” and
“innerly persuasive discourses” in our classrooms appears to be growing along with our cultural
diversity. Freedman and Ball observe: “This rich and complex ‘contact zone’ inside the classroom yields
plentiful opportunity for students to decide what will be internally persuasive for them, and
consequently for them to develop their ideologies. This diversity presents both challenges and
opportunities as teachers seek to guide their students on this developmental journey” (pp. 8– 9, this
volume). The journey they have in mind does not so much lead to a particular goal as establish an everenriching process of learning. ¶ Freedman and Ball’s approach grows out of Bakhtin’s key concepts,
especially one that has been largely neglected in research on him: “ideological becoming” (see Chapter
1, this volume). The implications of the essays in this volume therefore extend well beyond educational
theory and practice to the humanities and social sciences generally. How does a thinking person– and
we are all thinking people – develop? What happens when ideas, embodied in specific people with
particular voices, come into dialogic contact? What factors guide the creation of a point of view on the
world? The specific problematic of pedagogy serves as a lens to make the broader implications of such
questions clearer.¶ 318¶ Authority and testing ¶ How does a person develop a point of view on the
world, a set of attitudes for interpreting and evaluating it ? How systematic is that point of view? Is our
fundamental take on the world a philosophy with implicit doctrines or is it more like a set of inclinations
and a way of probing? Perhaps it is not one, but a collection of ways of probing, a panoply of skills and
habits, which a person tries out one after another the way in which one may, in performing a physical
task, reach for one tool after another? What does our point of view have to do with our sense of
ourselves, whether as individuals or as members of groups? What role does formal education play in
acquiring and shaping it? What happens when contrary evidence confronts us or when the radical
uncertainty of the world impinges on us? Whatever that “point of view” is, how does it change over time
? ¶ In any given culture or subculture, there tends to be what Bakhtin would call an “authoritative”
perspective. However, the role of that perspective is not necessarily authoritarian. Despite Bakhtin’s
experience as a Soviet citizen, where the right perspective on just about all publicly identified
perspectives was held to be already known and certain, he was well aware that outside that circle of
presumed certainty life was still governed by opinion. It is not just that rival ideologies – Christian,
liberal, and many others – were still present; beyond that, each individual’s experiences led to halfformed but strongly held beliefs that enjoyed no formal expression. Totalitarianism was surely an
aspiration of the Soviet and other such regimes, but it could never realize its ideal of uniformity–“the
new Soviet man” who was all of a piece – for some of the same reasons it could not make a centrally
planned economy work. There is always too much contingent, unexpected, particular, local, and
idiosyncratic, with a historical or personal background that does not fit. ¶ Bakhtin may be viewed as the
great philosopher of all that does not fit. He saw the world as irreducibly messy, unsystematizable, and
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contingent, and he regarded it as all the better for that. For life to have meaning, it must possess what
he called “surprisingness.” If individual people are to act morally, they cannot displace their
responsibility onto some systematic ideology, whether Marxist, Christian, or any other. What I do now is
not reducible to any ethical, political, or metaphysical system; and I – each “I”– must take responsibility
for his or her acts at this moment. As Bakhtin liked to say, there is “no alibi.” ¶ Authoritative words in
their fully expressed form purport to offer an alibi. They say, like Dostoevsky’s Grand Inquisitor: we
speak the truth and you need not question, only obey, for your conscience to be at rest. Yet, every
authoritative word is spoken or heard in a milieu of difference. It may try to insulate itself from dialogue
with reverential tones, a special script, and all the other signs of the authority fused to it, but at the
margins¶ 319¶ dialogue waits with a challenge: you may be right, but you have to convince me. Once
the authoritative word responds to that challenge, it ceases to be fully authoritative. To be sure, it may
still command considerable deference by virtue of its past, its moral aura, and its omnipresence. But it
has ceased to be free from dialogue and its authority has changed from unquestioned to dialogically
tested. Every educator crosses this line when he or she gives reasons for a truth. ¶ My daughter once
had a math teacher who, when asked why a certain procedure was used to solve an equation, would
reply, “because some old, dead guy said so.” Of course, no answer could be further from the spirit of
mathematics, where logic counts for everything and authority for nothing. Nobody proves the
Pythagorean theorem by saying Pythagoras said so. Compare this reply with actually showing the logic
of a procedure so the student understands the “why.” In that case, one immediately admits that there
must be a good reason for proceeding in a certain way, and that it needs to be shown. The procedure
does not end up as less sure because of this questioning; quite the contrary. Rather, questioning is seen
as intrinsic to mathematics itself, which enjoys its authority precisely because it has survived such
questioning. ¶ Even in fields that do not admit of mathematical proof, an authoritative word does not
necessarily lose all authority when questioning enters into it. We can give no mathematically sure
reason why democracy is preferable to dictatorship or market economies are generally more productive
than command economies. But we can give reasons, which admit the possibilities of challenges we had
not foreseen and may have to think about. Education and all inquiry are fundamentally different when
the need for reasons is acknowledged and when questioning becomes part of the process of learning.
Truth becomes dialogically tested and forever testable. ¶ In short, authoritative words may or may not
be authoritarian. In the Soviet Union, authoritarian words were the norm and questioning was seen as
suspect. One no more questioned Marxism-Leninism than one questioned the law of gravity (a common
comparison, suggesting that each was equally sure). What the Party said was right because it was the
outcome of sure historical laws guaranteeing the correctness of its rulings. Education reflected this
spirit. Bakhtin’s embrace of dialogue, then, challenged not so much the economic or historical theories
the regime propounded, but its very concept of truth and the language of truth it embraced. Dialogue by
its very nature invites questioning, thrives on it, demands it. ¶ It follows from Bakhtin’s argument that
nonauthoritarian authoritative words are not necessarily weaker than authoritarian ones. After all, one
may believe something all the more because one has questioned it, provided that defenders have been
willing to answer and have been more or less cogent in their defense. They need not answer all
objections perfectly – we are often convinced with qualifications, with a “just in case,” with
“loopholes.”¶ 320¶ However, they must demonstrate that the authority is based on generally sound
reasons. Morever, for many, enormous persuasive power lies in the very fact that the authoritative
belief is so widely held. Everyone speaks it, even if with ironizing quotation marks. ¶ An authoritative
word of this nonauthoritarian kind functions not as a voice speaking the Truth, but as a voice speaking
the one point of view that must be attended to. It may be contested, rejected, or modified, the way in
which church dogmas are modified over time by believers, but it cannot be ignored. Think of Huck Finn
(discussed by Mark Dressman, this volume). Even when he cannot bring himself to turn in Jim as a
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runaway slave, he accepts the authority of the social voice telling him that such an action would be right.
He does not question that voice, just realizes he will not follow it and will do “wrong.” Much of the
moral complexity of this book lies in Huck’s self-questioning, as he does what we believe to be right but
what he thinks of as wrong; and if we read this book sensitively, we may ask ourselves how much of our
own behavior is Huckish in this respect. Perhaps our failure to live up to our ideals bespeaks our
intuition without overt expression that there is something wrong with those ideals. What Huck
demonstrates is that there may be a wisdom, even a belief system, in behavior itself: we always know
more than we know, and our moral sensitivity may be different from, and wiser than, our professed
beliefs. ¶ our own authoritative words ¶ The basic power of an authoritative voice comes from its status
as the one that everyone hears. Everyone has heard that democracy is good and apartheid is bad, that
the environment needs preserving, that church must not be merged with state; and people who spend
their lives in an academic environment may add many more to the list. In our academic subculture, we
are, almost all of us, persuaded of the rightness of greater economic equality, of plans for inclusion and
affirmative action, of abortion rights, of peace, of greater efforts to reach out to all the people in the
world in all their amazing diversity. These are our authoritative voices, and , too, we may accept either
because they are simply not to be questioned or because we have sought out intelligent opponents
who have questioned them and have thought about, if not ultimately accepted, their answers. Again,
educators know the moment when a student from a background different from ours questions one of
our beliefs and we experience the temptation to reply like that math teacher. Thinking of ourselves as
oppositional, we often forget that we, too, have our own authoritative discourse and must work to
remember that, in a world of difference, authority may not extend to those unlike us. ¶ The testable
authoritative voice: we hear it always, and though some may disagree with it, they cannot ignore it. Its
nonauthoritarian power is based¶ 321¶ above all on its ubiquity. In a society that is relatively open to
diverse values, that minimal, but still significant, function of an authoritative voice is the most
important one. It demands not adherence but attention. And such a voice is likely to survive far longer
than an authoritarian voice whose rejection is necessarily its destruction. We have all these accounts
of Soviet dissidents – say, Solzhenitsyn – who tell their story as a “narrative of rethinking” (to use
Christian Knoeller’s phrase): they once believed in Communist ideology, but events caused them to raise
some questions that by their nature could not be publicly voiced, and that silence itself proved most
telling. You can hear silence if it follows a pistol shot. If silence does not succeed in ending private
questioning, the word that silence defends is decisively weakened. The story of Soviet dissidents is
typically one in which, at some point, questioning moved from a private, furtive activity accompanied by
guilt to the opposite extreme, a clear rejection in which the authoritative voice lost all hold altogether.
Vulnerability accompanies too much power. ¶ But in more open societies, and in healthier kinds of
individual development, an authoritative voice of the whole society, or of a particular community (like
our own academic community), still sounds, still speaks to us in our minds. In fact, we commonly see
that people who have questioned and rejected an authoritative voice find that it survives within them as
a possible alternative, like the minority opinion in a court decision. When they are older, they discover
that experience has vindicated some part of what they had summarily rejected. Perhaps the
authoritative voice had more to it than we thought when young? Now that we are teachers, perhaps we
see some of the reasons for practices we objected to? Can we, then, combine in a new practice both the
practices of our teachers and the new insights we have had? When we do, a flexible authoritative word
emerges, one that has become to a great extent an innerly persuasive one. By a lengthy process, the
word has, with many changes, become our own, and our own word has in the process acquired the
intonations of authority. ¶ In much the same way, we react to the advice of our parents. At some point
it may seem dated, no more than what an earlier generation unfortunately thought, or we may greet it
with the sign of regret that our parents have forgotten what they experienced when our age. However,
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the dialogue goes on. At a later point, we may say, you know, there was wisdom in what our parents
said, only why did they express it so badly? If only I had known! We may even come to the point where
we express some modified form of parental wisdom in a convincing voice. We translate it into our own
idiolect, confident that we will not make the mistakes of our parents when we talk to our children. Then
our children listen, and find our own idiolect, to which we have devoted such painful ideological and
verbal work, hopelessly dated, and the process may start again. ¶ It is always a difficult moment when
we realize that our own voice is now the authority, especially because we have made it different,
persuasive in its¶ 322¶ own terms, not like our parents’ voice. When we reflect on how our children see
us, we may even realize that our parents’ authoritative words may not have been the product of blind
acceptance, but the result of a process much like our own. They may have done the same thing we did –
question, reject, adapt, arrive at a new version – and that rigid voice of authority we heard from them
was partly in our own ears. Can we somehow convey to our students our own words so they do not
sound so rigid? We all think we can. But so did our parents (and other authorities).¶ Dialogue, Laughter,
And Surprise ¶ Bakhtin viewed the whole process of “ideological” (in the sense of ideas and values,
however unsystematic) development as an endless dialogue. As teachers, we find it difficult to avoid a
voice of authority, however much we may think of ours as the rebel’s voice, because our
rebelliousness against society at large speaks in the authoritative voice of our subculture. We speak
the language and thoughts of academic educators, even when we imagine we are speaking in no
jargon at all, and that jargon, inaudible to us, sounds with all the overtones of authority to our
students. We are so prone to think of ourselves as fighting oppression that it takes some work to
realize that we ourselves may be felt as oppressive and overbearing, and that our own voice may
provoke the same reactions that we feel when we hear an authoritative voice with which we disagree.
¶ So it is often helpful to think back on the great authoritative oppressors and reconstruct their selfimage: helpful, but often painful. I remember, many years ago, when, as a recent student rebel and
activist, I taught a course on “The Theme of the Rebel” and discovered, to my considerable chagrin, that
many of the great rebels of history were the very same people as the great oppressors. There is a
famous exchange between Erasmus and Luther, who hoped to bring the great Dutch humanist over to
the Reformation, but Erasmus kept asking Luther how he could be so certain of so many doctrinal
points. We must accept a few things to be Christians at all, Erasmus wrote, but surely beyond that there
must be room for us highly fallible beings to disagree. Luther would have none of such tentativeness. He
knew, he was sure. The Protestant rebels were, for a while, far more intolerant than their orthodox
opponents. Often enough, the oppressors are the ones who present themselves and really think of
themselves as liberators. Certainty that one knows the root cause of evil: isn’t that itself often the root
cause? ¶ We know from Tsar Ivan the Terrible’s letters denouncing Prince Kurbsky, a general who
escaped to Poland, that Ivan saw himself as someone who had been oppressed by noblemen as a child
and pictured himself as the great rebel against traditional authority when he killed masses of people or
destroyed whole towns. There is something in the nature of maximal rebellion against authority that
produces ever greater intolerance, unless one is very careful. ¶ 323¶ For the skills of fighting or
refuting an oppressive power are not those of openness, self-skepticism, or real dialogue. In preparing
for my course, I remember my dismay at reading Hitler’s Mein Kampf and discovering that his selfconsciousness was precisely that of the rebel speaking in the name of oppressed Germans, and that
much of his amazing appeal – otherwise so inexplicable – was to the German sense that they were
rebelling victims. In our time, the Serbian Communist and nationalist leader Slobodan Milosevic
exploited much the same appeal. Bakhtin surely knew that Communist totalitarianism, the Gulag, and
the unprecedented censorship were constructed by rebels who had come to power. His favorite
writer, Dostoevsky, used to emphasize that the worst oppression comes from those who, with the
rebellious psychology of “the insulted and humiliated,” have seized power – unless they have somehow
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cultivated the value of dialogue, as Lenin surely had not, but which Eva, in the essay by Knoeller about
teaching The Autobiography of Malcolm X, surely had. ¶ Rebels often make the worst tyrants because
their word, the voice they hear in their consciousness, has borrowed something crucial from the
authoritative word it opposed, and perhaps exaggerated it: the aura of righteous authority. If one’s
ideological becoming is understood as a struggle in which one has at last achieved the truth, one is
likely to want to impose that truth with maximal authority; and rebels of the next generation may
proceed in much the same way, in an ongoing spiral of intolerance. By contrast, if one’s rebellion
against an authoritative word is truly dialogic, that is unlikely to happen, or to be subject to more of a
self-check if it does. Then one questions one’s own certainties and invites skepticism, lest one become
what one has opposed. One may even step back and laugh at oneself. ¶ Laughter at oneself invites the
perspective of the other. Laughter is implicitly pluralist. Instead of looking at one’s opponents as the
unconditionally wrong, one imagines how one sounds to them. Regarding earlier authorities, one thinks:
that voice of authority, it is not my voice, but perhaps it has something to say, however wrongly put. It
comes from a specific experience, which I must understand. I will correct it, but to do that I must
measure it, test it, against my own experience. Dialogue is a process of real testing, and one of the
characteristics of a genuine test is that the result is not guaranteed. It may turn out that sometimes the
voice of earlier authority turns out to be right on some point. Well, we will incorporate that much into
our own “innerly persuasive voice.” Once one has done this, once one has allowed one’s own evolving
convictions to be tested by experience and by other convictions
Debate doesn’t need to avoid being creative, but they still have to have a specific
focus.
Freeley, John Caroll University, and Steinberg, University of Miami, 8
[Austin L. and David L., 2/13/2008, “Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for
Reasoned Decision Making”, 12th edition,
http://teddykw2.files.wordpress.com/2012/06/argumentation-and-debate.pdf, p. 45,
accessed 7/4/13, ALT]
To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits
on the decision to be made, the basis for argument¶ should be clearly defined. If we merely talk
about “homelessness” or “abortion”¶ or “crime” or “global warming” we are likely to have an
interesting discussion¶ but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement¶
“Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword” is debatable, yet fails to¶ provide much basis for
clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean¶ that the written word is more effective than
physical force for some purposes,¶ we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of
writing or physical force for a specific purpose.
Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem.¶ It is still too broad, too
loosely worded to promote well-organized argument.¶ What sort of writing are we concerned with—
poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does
“effectiveness”¶ mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling
swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question¶ might be, “Would a mutual
defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Laurania of our support in a certain
crisis?” The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as “Resolved: That the¶
United States should enter into a mutual defense treaty with Laurania.Ӧ Negative advocates might
oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say
that debates should completely¶ avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or
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that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact,¶ these sorts
of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided
by focus on a particular point of difference,¶ which will be outlined in the following discussion.
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2nc – Predictability
Predictability – Diversion from topic focus unfairly gives shifts ground — hurts debate
Galloway, Samford University communications professor, 07 — [Ryan Galloway, professor
of communications at Samford University (“Dinner And Conversation At The Argumentative Table:
Reconceptualizing Debate As An Argumentative Dialogue”, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate,
Vol. 28 (2007), ebsco)][SP]
Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair
opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position
articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the
topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in
fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point
of departure.
Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic
consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical
arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to
fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table.
When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the
respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally
denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as
dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition
of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. Far from being a banal request for
links to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice
backed by literally months upon months of preparation, research, and critical thinking not be silenced.
Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms operate to exclude particular negative strategies.
Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a
dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and
power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning:
Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their
own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions. Opposition is necessary because it
sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed
people who subordinate decisions of any kind, because it is only through such discussion that we reach
agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals
must find expression in many formal and informal institutions (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197).
Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality
for the sake of the conversation (Farrell, 1985, p. 114).
For example, an affirmative case on the 2007-2008 college topic might defend neither state nor
international action in the Middle East, and yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case
essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions in the international arena
are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the
interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative subverts any
meaningful role to the negative team, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and
undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. Germaneness and other substitutes
for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits of topical advocacy.
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That makes research impossible and destroys education
Hanghøj, University of Bristol Author, 08 —
[Thorkild Hanghøj, author affiliated with Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media
Materials, research the Centre for Learning, Knowledge, and Interactive Technologies (L-KIT), the
Institute of Education at the University of Bristol and the institute formerly known as Learning Lab
Denmark at the School of Education, 2008 (“PLAYFUL KNOWLEDGE: An Explorative Study of Educational
Gaming,” University of Southern Denmark, p. 50-51 Available Online at
http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information_til/Studerende_ved_SDU/Din_uddannelse/phd_hum/
afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf, Accessed on July 7, 2013)][SP]
Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be
debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ
from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to
actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of
mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological
dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games.
In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two
different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of
representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to
understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will
draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all
forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981).
A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a
range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality
of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point
where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take
teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going
negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is
it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching
for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical
space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of
The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes
of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly,
the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless
possibilities for researching, preparing, presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political
issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation
between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’
game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines
different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning
resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election
scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and
game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on
the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent
possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality
of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and
“dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the
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Socrates/Plato dialogues in which the teacher never learns anything new from the students, despite
Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised
when “someone who knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in
error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin,
1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able
to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996).
At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are
per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a
normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis,
2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games.
At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most
important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).
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2nc – Debate About Government Key
Discussion of state policy is key to skill development and breaking down of
preconceived notions
Esberg and Sagan, special assistant to the director at New York University's and
Professor at Stanford, Center 12
(Jane Esberg is special assistant to the director at New York University's Center on. International
Cooperation. She was the winner of 2009 Firestone Medal, AND Scott Sagan is a professor of political
science and director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation “NEGOTIATING
NONPROLIFERATION: Scholarship, Pedagogy, and Nuclear Weapons Policy,” The Nonproliferation
Review, 19:1, 95-108 accessed 5-7-13, RRR
These government or quasi-government think tank simulations often provide very similar lessons for
high-level players as are learned by students in educational simulations. Government participants
learn about the importance of understanding foreign perspectives, the need to practice internal
coordination, and the necessity to compromise and coordinate with other governments in
negotiations and crises. During the Cold War, political scientist Robert Mandel noted how crisis
exercises and war games forced government officials to overcome “bureaucratic myopia,” moving
beyond their normal organizational roles and thinking more creatively about how others might react
in a crisis or conflict.6 The skills of imagination and the subsequent ability to predict foreign interests
and reactions remain critical for real-world foreign policy makers. For example, simulations of the
Iranian nuclear crisis—held in 2009 and 2010 at the Brookings Institution's Saban Center and at Harvard
University's Belfer Center, and involving former US senior officials and regional experts—highlighted the
dangers of misunderstanding foreign governments’ preferences and misinterpreting their subsequent
behavior. In both simulations, the primary criticism of the US negotiating team lay in a failure to predict
accurately how other states, both allies and adversaries, would behave in response to US policy
initiatives.7
By university age, students often have a pre-defined view of international affairs, and the literature on
simulations in education has long emphasized how such exercises force students to challenge their
assumptions about how other governments behave and how their own government works.8 Since
simulations became more common as a teaching tool in the late 1950s, educational literature has
expounded on their benefits, from encouraging engagement by breaking from the typical lecture
format, to improving communication skills, to promoting teamwork.9 More broadly, simulations can
deepen understanding by asking students to link fact and theory, providing a context for facts while
bringing theory into the realm of practice.10 These exercises are particularly valuable in teaching
international affairs for many of the same reasons they are useful for policy makers: they force
participants to “grapple with the issues arising from a world in flux.”11 Simulations have been used
successfully to teach students about such disparate topics as European politics, the Kashmir crisis, and
US response to the mass killings in Darfur.12 Role-playing exercises certainly encourage students to
learn political and technical facts—but they learn them in a more active style. Rather than sitting in a
classroom and merely receiving knowledge, students actively research “their” government's positions
and actively argue, brief, and negotiate with others.13 Facts can change quickly; simulations teach
students how to contextualize and act on information.
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2nc – Plans Solve Spectatorship
Kritiks need policy in order to solve- spectatorship.
McClean Rutgers Philosophy Professor 1
[David E., Annual Conference of the Society for the Advancement of American
Philosophy, “The Cultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope”, http://www.americanphilosophy.org/archives/past_conference_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/davi
d_mcclean.htm]
Yet for some reason, at least partially explicated in Richard Rorty's Achieving Our Country, a book that I
think is long overdue, leftist critics continue to cite and refer to the eccentric and often a priori
ruminations of people like those just mentioned, and a litany of others including Derrida, Deleuze,
Lyotard, Jameson, and Lacan, who are to me hugely more irrelevant than Habermas in their narrative
attempts to suggest policy prescriptions (when they actually do suggest them) aimed at curing the ills
of homelessness, poverty, market greed, national belligerence and racism. I would like to suggest that
it is time for American social critics who are enamored with this group, those who actually want to be
relevant, to recognize that they have a disease, and a disease regarding which I myself must remember
to stay faithful to my own twelve step program of recovery. The disease is the need for elaborate
theoretical "remedies" wrapped in neological and multi-syllabic jargon. These elaborate theoretical
remedies are more "interesting," to be sure, than the pragmatically settled questions about what
shape democracy should take in various contexts, or whether private property should be protected by
the state, or regarding our basic human nature (described, if not defined (heaven forbid!), in such
statements as "We don't like to starve" and "We like to speak our minds without fear of death" and "We
like to keep our children safe from poverty"). As Rorty puts it, "When one of today's academic leftists
says that some topic has been 'inadequately theorized,' you can be pretty certain that he or she is
going to drag in either philosophy of language, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist
version of economic determinism. . . . These futile attempts to philosophize one's way into political
relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left retreats from activism and adopts a
spectatorial approach to the problems of its country. Disengagement from practice produces
theoretical hallucinations"(italics mine).(1) Or as John Dewey put it in his The Need for a Recovery of
Philosophy, "I believe that philosophy in America will be lost between chewing a historical cud long since
reduced to woody fiber, or an apologetics for lost causes, . . . . or a scholastic, schematic formalism,
unless it can somehow bring to consciousness America's own needs and its own implicit principle of
successful action."
Those who suffer or have suffered from this disease Rorty refers to as the Cultural Left, which left is
juxtaposed to the Political Left that Rorty prefers and prefers for good reason. Another attribute of the
Cultural Left is that its members fancy themselves pure culture critics who view the successes of
America and the West, rather than some of the barbarous methods for achieving those successes, as
mostly evil, and who view anything like national pride as equally evil even when that pride is tempered
with the knowledge and admission of the nation's shortcomings. In other words, the Cultural Left, in
this country, too often dismiss American society as beyond reform and redemption. And Rorty
correctly argues that this is a disastrous conclusion, i.e. disastrous for the Cultural Left. I think it may
also be disastrous for our social hopes, as I will explain.
Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talents to better use if they bury some
of their cynicism about America's social and political prospects and help forge public and political
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possibilities in a spirit of determination to, indeed, achieve our country - the country of Jefferson and
King; the country of John Dewey and Malcom X; the country of Franklin Roosevelt and Bayard Rustin,
and of the later George Wallace and the later Barry Goldwater. To invoke the words of King, and with
reference to the American society, the time is always ripe to seize the opportunity to help create the
"beloved community," one woven with the thread of agape into a conceptually single yet diverse
tapestry that shoots for nothing less than a true intra-American cosmopolitan ethos, one wherein both
same sex unions and faith-based initiatives will be able to be part of the same social reality, one wherein
business interests and the university are not seen as belonging to two separate galaxies but as part of
the same answer to the threat of social and ethical nihilism. We who fancy ourselves philosophers
would do well to create from within ourselves and from within our ranks a new kind of public
intellectual who has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to
move past high theory to other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" but
more important to the prospect of our flourishing - questions such as "How is it possible to develop a
citizenry that cherishes a certain hexis, one which prizes the character of the Samaritan on the road to
Jericho almost more than any other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds the
fantasy of a missile defense system with the need to treat America as but one member in a community
of nations under a "law of peoples?"
The new public philosopher might seek to understand labor law and military and trade theory and
doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international markets and trade agreements
as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the politics of power
(all of which can still be done from our arm chairs.) This means going down deep into the guts of our
quotidian social institutions, into the grimy pragmatic details where intellectuals are loathe to dwell
but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult and often unpleasant,
imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and it means making honest attempts to truly
understand how those institutions actually function in the actual world before howling for their
overthrow commences. This might help keep us from being slapped down in debates by true policy
pros who actually know what they are talking about but who lack awareness of the dogmatic
assumptions from which they proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to listen to jargonriddled lectures from philosophers and culture critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called
"managerial class."
Social philosophies need to be moved away from just cultural critics in order to affect
real change.
McClean Rutgers Philosophy Professor 1
[David E., Annual Conference of the Society for the Advancement of American
Philosophy, “The Cultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope”, http://www.americanphilosophy.org/archives/past_conference_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/davi
d_mcclean.htm]
Is it really possible to philosophize by holding Foucault in one hand and the Code of Federal Regulation
or the Congressional Record in the other? Given that whatever it has meant to be a philosopher has
been under siege at various levels, I see no reason why referring to the way things are actually done in
the actual world (I mean really done, not done as we might imagine) as we think through issues of public
morality and social issues of justice shouldn't be considered a viable alternative to the way philosophy
has proceeded in the past. Instead of replacing epistemology with hermeneutics or God knows what
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else as the foundation of philosophical practice, we should move social philosophers in the direction
of becoming more like social and cultural auditors rather than further in the direction of mere culture
critics. We might be able to recast philosophers who take-up questions of social justice in a serious way
as the ones in society able to traverse not only disciplines but the distances between the towers of the
academy and the bastions of bureaucracies seeking to honestly and sometimes dishonestly assess both
their failings and achievements. This we can do with a special advantage over economists, social
scientists and policy specialists who are apt to take the narrow view of most issues. We do have
examples of such persons. John Dewey and Karl Popper come to mind as but two examples, but in
neither case was there enough grasp of the actual workings of social institutions that I believe will be
called for in order to properly minister to a nation in need of helpful philosophical insights in policy
formation. Or it may just be that the real work will be performed by philosophically grounded and
socially engaged practitioners rather than academics. People like George Soros come to mind here.
But there are few people like George Soros around, and I think that the improbability of
philosophers emerging as a special class of social auditor also marks the limits of social hope,
inasmuch as philosophers are the class most likely to see the places at which bridges of true
understanding can be built not only between an inimical Right and Left, but between public policy and
the deep and relevant reflections upon our humanity in which philosophers routinely engage. If
philosophers seek to remain what the public thinks we are anyway, a class of persons of whom it can be
said, as Orwell put it,
One has to belong to the intelligentsia to believe things like that; no ordinary man could be such a
fool, then I do not know from what other class of persons to turn to navigate the complicated
intellectual and emotional obstacles that prevent us from the achievement of our country. For I do not
see how policy wonks, political hacks, politicians, religious ideologues and special interests will do the
work that needs to be done to achieve the kind of civic consensus envisioned in our Constitution and
Declaration of Independence. Without a courageous new breed of public intellectual, one that is able
to help articulate new visions for community and social well being without fear of reaching out to
others that may not share the narrow views of the Cultural Left and Cultural Right, I do not see how
America moves beyond a mere land of toleration and oligarchy.
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2nc – Decisionmaking Skills outweigh
Debate is most valuable for the attained skills, decision making is a prerequisite.
Strait, George Mason University, and Wallace, George Washington University
Communications Professors, 7
[L. Paul and Brett, “The Scope of Negative Fiat and the Logic of Decision Making”,
http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/2007/The%20Scope%20of%20Negative%20Fiat%
20and%20the%20Logic%20of%20Decision%20Making.pdf, p. A-5, accessed 7/6/13, ALT]
Negative claims that excluding critical alternatives is detrimental to education fail to be persuasive
when decision-making logic is taken into account. Critical intellectuals and policymakers both take
into account the probability that their actions will be successful. Fiating that individuals alter their
method of thinking circumvents these questions of probability and thus not only destroys education
about policymaking, but offers a flawed approach to activism (or any other purview of action/
philosophy the negative is advocating). Intellectuals and activists have many important considerations
relating to resources, press coverage, political clout and method. These questions all are directly related
to who is taking action. Alternative debates thus often become frustrating because they do a poor job
of explaining who the subject is. Consider the popular Nietzschean alternative, ‘do nothing.” Who is it
that the negative wants to do nothing? Does the USFG de nothing? Is it the debaters? Is it the judge
who does nothing? Is it every individual, or just individuals in Africa that have to do with the affirmative
harm area? All of these questions directly implicate the desirability of the alternative, and thus the
education that we can receive from this mode of debate. Alternatives like “vote negative to reject
capitalism,” “detach truth from power.” or ‘embrace an infinite responsibility to the other" fall prey to
similar concerns. This inability to pin the negative down to a course of action allows them to be shifty in
their second rebuttal, and sculpt their alternative in a way that avoids the affirmative’s offense. Rather
than increasing education, critical frameworks are often a ruse that allows the negative to inflate their
importance and ignore crucial decision-making considerations. Several other offensive arguments can
be leveraged by the affirmative in order to insulate them from negative claims that critical debate is a
unique and important type of education that the affirmative excludes. The first is discussed above, that
the most important benefit to participation in policy debate is not the content of our arguments, but
the skills we learn from debating. As was just explained, since the ability to make decisions is a skill
activists and intellectuals must use as well, decision- making is a prerequisite to effective education
about any subject. The strength of this argument is enhanced when we realize that debate is a game.
Since debaters are forced to switch sides they go into each debate knowing that a non-personal
mindset will be necessary at some point because they will inevitably be forced to argue against their
own convictions. Members of the activity are all smart enough to realize that a vote for an argument in
a debate does not reflect an absolute truth, but merely that a team making that argument did the
better debating. When it comes to education about content, the number of times someone will change
their personal convictions because of something that happens in a debate round is extremely low,
because everyone knows it is a game. On the other hand with cognitive skills like the decision-making
process which is taught through argument and debate, repetition is vital .The best way to strengthen
decision-making’s cognitive thinking skills is to have students practice them in social settings like
debate rounds. Moreover, a lot of the decision-making process happens in strategy sessions and during
research periods — debaters hear about a particular affirmative plan and are tasked with developing the
best response. If they are conditioned to believe that alternate agent counterplans or utopian
philosophical alternatives are legitimate responses, a vital teaching opportunity will have been lost.
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Policy debate has value not only in the role of speech, but rather education in critical thinking
and prioritizing.
Lundberg University of North Carolina Communications Professor 10
[Christian 0., January 2010, “ The Allred Initiative and Debate Across the Curriculum:
Reinventing the Tradition of Debate at North Carolina”,
http://academia.edu/968401/LundbergOnDebate, p. 311, accessed 7/5/13, ALT]
The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and
democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities.
But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech—as indicated earlier, debate
builds capacity for critical thinking, analysis of public claims, informed decision making, and better
public judgment. If the picture of modern political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a
pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific
and technological change, outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and everexpanding insular special-interest and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue
that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to
rearticulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry’s
capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Dewey in
The Public and Its Problems place such a high premium on deducation (Dewey 1988, 63, 154). Debate
provides an indispensable form of education in the modern articulation of democracy because it
builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions
that impact them, to sort through and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for
and against a policy in an increasingly information-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and
political energies toward policies that matter the most to them.
Specifically, critically thinking is key to ethical decision making.
Freeley, John Caroll University, and Steinberg, University of Miami, 8
[Austin L. and David L., 2/13/2008, “Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for
Reasoned Decision Making”, 12th edition,
http://teddykw2.files.wordpress.com/2012/06/argumentation-and-debate.pdf, p. 17,
accessed 7/4/13, ALT]
Debate offers the ideal tool for examining the ethical implications of any¶ decision, and critical
thinking should also be ethical thinking.¶ How do we reach a decision on any matters of importance?
We are under¶ constant pressure to make unreasoned decisions, and we often make decisions¶
carelessly. But which method is most likely to lead to wise decisions? To make¶ wise judgments, we
should rely on critical thinking. In many situations argumentation’s emphasis on reasoned
considerations and debate’s confrontation of opposing sides give us our best, and perhaps only,
opportunity to reach reasoned¶ conclusions. In any case it is in the public interest to promote debate,
and it is¶ in our own intelligent self-interest to know the principles of argumentation and¶ to be able
to apply critical thinking in debate.
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2nc – Solves K Offense
Policy debate has value not only in the role of speech, but rather education in critical
thinking and prioritizing.
Lundberg University of North Carolina Communications Professor 10
[Christian 0., January 2010, “ The Allred Initiative and Debate Across the Curriculum:
Reinventing the Tradition of Debate at North Carolina”,
http://academia.edu/968401/LundbergOnDebate, p. 311, accessed 7/5/13, ALT]
The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and
democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities.
But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech—as indicated earlier, debate
builds capacity for critical thinking, analysis of public claims, informed decision making, and better
public judgment. If the picture of modern political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a
pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific
and technological change, outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and everexpanding insular special-interest and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue
that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to
rearticulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry’s
capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Dewey in
The Public and Its Problems place such a high premium on deducation (Dewey 1988, 63, 154). Debate
provides an indispensable form of education in the modern articulation of democracy because it
builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions
that impact them, to sort through and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for
and against a policy in an increasingly information-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and
political energies toward policies that matter the most to them.
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2nc – Warming impact
There’s an external warming impact – Switch-side debate inculcates skills that
empirically improve climate policy outcomes
Mitchell, University of Pittsburgh communication professor, 10
[Gordon R., “Switch-Side Debating Meets Demand-Driven Rhetoric of Science,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs;
Spring 2010, Vol. 13 Issue 1, p95-120,]
The watchwords for the intelligence community’s debating initiative— collaboration, critical thinking,
collective awareness—resonate with key terms anchoring the study of deliberative democracy. In a
major new text, John Gastil defines deliberation as a process whereby people “carefully examine a
problem and arrive at a well-reasoned solution aft er a period of inclusive, respectful consideration of
diverse points of view.”40 Gastil and his colleagues in organizations such as the Kettering Foundation
and the National Coalition for Dialogue and Deliberation are pursuing a research program that
foregrounds the democratic telos of deliberative processes. Work in this area features a blend of
concrete interventions and studies of citizen empowerment.41 Notably, a key theme in much of this
literature concerns the relationship between deliberation and debate, with the latter term often
loaded with pejorative baggage and working as a negative foil to highlight the positive qualities of
deliberation.42 “Most political discussions, however, are debates. Stories in the media turn politics into
a never-ending series of contests. People get swept into taking sides; their energy goes into figuring out
who or what they’re for or against,” says Kettering president David Mathews and coauthor Noelle
McAfee. “Deliberation is different. It is neither a partisan argument where opposing sides try to win nor
a casual conversation conducted with polite civility. Public deliberation is a means by which citizens
make tough choices about basic purposes and directions for their communities and their country. It is a
way of reasoning and talking together.”43 Mathews and McAfee’s distrust of the debate process is
almost paradigmatic amongst theorists and practitioners of Kettering-style deliberative democracy.
One conceptual mechanism for reinforcing this debate-deliberation opposition is characterization of
debate as a process inimical to deliberative aims, with debaters adopting dogmatic and fixed positions
that frustrate the deliberative objective of “choice work.” In this register, Emily Robertson observes,
“unlike deliberators, debaters are typically not open to the possibility of being shown wrong. . . .
Debaters are not trying to find the best solution by keeping an open mind about the opponent’s point of
view.”44 Similarly, founding documents from the University of Houston–Downtown’s Center for Public
Deliberation state, “Public deliberation is about choice work, which is different from a dialogue or a
debate. In dialogue, people oft en look to relate to each other, to understand each other, and to talk
about more informal issues. In debate, there are generally two positions and people are generally
looking to ‘win’ their side.”45 Debate, cast here as the theoretical scapegoat, provides a convenient,
low-water benchmark for explaining how other forms of deliberative interaction better promote
cooperative “choice work.”
The Kettering-inspired framework receives support from perversions of the debate process such as
vapid presidential debates and verbal pyrotechnics found on Crossfire-style television shows.46 In
contrast, the intelligence community’s debating initiative stands as a nettlesome anomaly for these
theoretical frameworks, with debate serving, rather than frustrating, the ends of deliberation. The
presence of such an anomaly would seem to point to the wisdom of fashioning a theoretical orientation
that frames the debate-deliberation connection in contingent, rather than static terms, with the
relationship between the categories shift ing along with the various contexts in which they manifest in
practice.47 Such an approach gestures toward the importance of rhetorically informed critical work on
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multiple levels. First, the contingency of situated practice invites analysis geared to assess, in particular
cases, the extent to which debate practices enable and/ or constrain deliberative objectives. Regarding
the intelligence community’s debating initiative, such an analytical perspective highlights, for example,
the tight connection between the deliberative goals established by intelligence officials and the cultural
technology manifest in the bridge project’s online debating applications such as Hot Grinds.
An additional dimension of nuance emerging from this avenue of analysis pertains to the precise nature
of the deliberative goals set by bridge. Program descriptions notably eschew Kettering-style references
to democratic citizen empowerment, yet feature deliberation prominently as a key ingredient of strong
intelligence tradecraft . Th is caveat is especially salient to consider when it comes to the second
category of rhetorically informed critical work invited by the contingent aspect of specific debate
initiatives. To grasp this layer it is useful to appreciate how the name of the bridge project constitutes
an invitation for those outside the intelligence community to participate in the analytic outreach eff ort.
According to Doney, bridge “provides an environment for Analytic Outreach—a place where IC analysts
can reach out to expertise elsewhere in federal, state, and local government, in academia, and industry.
New communities of interest can form quickly in bridge through the ‘web of trust’ access control
model—access to minds outside the intelligence community creates an analytic force multiplier.”48 This
presents a moment of choice for academic scholars in a position to respond to Doney’s invitation; it is an
opportunity to convert scholarly expertise into an “analytic force multiplier.”
In reflexively pondering this invitation, it may be valuable for scholars to read Greene and Hicks’s
proposition that switch-side debating should be viewed as a cultural technology in light of Langdon
Winner’s maxim that “technological artifacts have politics.”49 In the case of bridge, politics are informed
by the history of intelligence community policies and practices. Commenter Th omas Lord puts this point
in high relief in a post off ered in response to a news story on the topic: “[W]hy should this thing
(‘bridge’) be? . . . [Th e intelligence community] on the one hand sometimes provides useful information
to the military or to the civilian branches and on the other hand it is a dangerous, out of control, relic
that by all external appearances is not the slightest bit reformed, other than superficially, from such
excesses as became exposed in the cointelpro and mkultra hearings of the 1970s.”50 A debate scholar
need not agree with Lord’s full-throated criticism of the intelligence community (he goes on to observe
that it bears an alarming resemblance to organized crime) to understand that participation in the
community’s Analytic Outreach program may serve the ends of deliberation, but not necessarily
democracy, or even a defensible politics. Demand-driven rhetoric of science necessarily raises questions
about what’s driving the demand, questions that scholars with relevant expertise would do well to
ponder carefully before embracing invitations to contribute their argumentative expertise to
deliberative projects. By the same token, it would be prudent to bear in mind that the technological
determinism about switch-side debate endorsed by Greene and Hicks may tend to flatten reflexive
assessments regarding the wisdom of supporting a given debate initiative—as the next section
illustrates, manifest differences among initiatives warrant context-sensitive judgments regarding the
normative political dimensions featured in each case.
Public Debates in the EPA Policy Process
The preceding analysis of U.S. intelligence community debating initiatives highlighted how analysts are
challenged to navigate discursively the heteroglossia of vast amounts of diff erent kinds of data flowing
through intelligence streams. Public policy planners are tested in like manner when they attempt to
stitch together institutional arguments from various and sundry inputs ranging from expert testimony,
to historical precedent, to public comment. Just as intelligence managers find that algorithmic, formal
methods of analysis often don’t work when it comes to the task of interpreting and synthesizing
copious amounts of disparate data, public-policy planners encounter similar challenges.
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In fact, the argumentative turn in public-policy planning elaborates an approach to public-policy
analysis that foregrounds deliberative interchange and critical thinking as alternatives to “decisionism,”
the formulaic application of “objective” decision algorithms to the public policy process. Stating the
matter plainly, Majone suggests, “whether in written or oral form, argument is central in all stages of the
policy process.” Accordingly, he notes, “we miss a great deal if we try to understand policy-making
solely in terms of power, influence, and bargaining, to the exclusion of debate and argument.”51 One can
see similar rationales driving Goodwin and Davis’s EPA debating project, where debaters are invited to
conduct on-site public debates covering resolutions craft ed to reflect key points of stasis in the EPA
decision-making process. For example, in the 2008 Water Wars debates held at EPA headquarters in
Washington, D.C., resolutions were craft ed to focus attention on the topic of water pollution, with one
resolution focusing on downstream states’ authority to control upstream states’ discharges and sources
of pollutants, and a second resolution exploring the policy merits of bottled water and toilet paper taxes
as revenue sources to fund water infrastructure projects. In the first debate on interstate river pollution,
the team of Seth Gannon and Seungwon Chung from Wake Forest University argued in favor of
downstream state control, with the Michigan State University team of Carly Wunderlich and Garrett
Abelkop providing opposition. In the second debate on taxation policy, Kevin Kallmyer and Matthew
Struth from University of Mary Washington defended taxes on bottled water and toilet paper, while
their opponents from Howard University, Dominique Scott and Jarred McKee, argued against this
proposal. Reflecting on the project, Goodwin noted how the intercollegiate Switch-Side Debating Meets
Demand-Driven Rhetoric of Science 107 debaters’ ability to act as “honest brokers” in the policy
arguments contributed positively to internal EPA deliberation on both issues.52 Davis observed that
since the invited debaters “didn’t have a dog in the fight,” they were able to give voice to previously
buried arguments that some EPA subject matter experts felt reticent to elucidate because of their
institutional affiliations.53
Such findings are consistent with the views of policy analysts advocating the argumentative turn in
policy planning. As Majone claims, “Dialectical confrontation between generalists and experts often
succeeds in bringing out unstated assumptions, conflicting interpretations of the facts, and the risks
posed by new projects.”54 Frank Fischer goes even further in this context, explicitly appropriating
rhetorical scholar Charles Willard’s concept of argumentative “epistemics” to flesh out his vision for
policy studies: Uncovering the epistemic dynamics of public controversies would allow for a more
enlightened understanding of what is at stake in a particular dispute, making possible a sophisticated
evaluation of the various viewpoints and merits of diff erent policy options. In so doing, the diff ering,
oft en tacitly held contextual perspectives and values could be juxtaposed; the viewpoints and demands
of experts, special interest groups, and the wider public could be directly compared; and the dynamics
among the participants could be scrutizined. This would by no means sideline or even exclude scientific
assessment; it would only situate it within the framework of a more comprehensive evaluation.55
As Davis notes, institutional constraints present within the EPA communicative milieu can complicate eff
orts to provide a full airing of all relevant arguments pertaining to a given regulatory issue. Thus,
intercollegiate debaters can play key roles in retrieving and amplifying positions that might otherwise
remain sedimented in the policy process. Th e dynamics entailed in this symbiotic relationship are
underscored by deliberative planner John Forester, who observes, “If planners and public administrators
are to make democratic political debate and argument possible, they will need strategically located
allies to avoid being fully thwarted by the characteristic self-protecting behaviors of the planning
organizations and bureaucracies within which they work.”56 Here, an institution’s need for “strategically
located allies” to support deliberative practice constitutes the demand for rhetorically informed
expertise, setting up what can be considered a demand-driven rhetoric of science. As an instance of
rhetoric of science scholarship, this type of “switch-side public 108 Rhetoric & Public Affairs debate”
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diff ers both from insular contest tournament debating, where the main focus is on the pedagogical
benefit for student participants, and first-generation rhetoric of science scholarship, where critics
concentrated on unmasking the rhetoricity of scientific artifacts circulating in what many perceived to
be purely technical spheres of knowledge production.58 As a form of demand-driven rhetoric of
science, switch-side debating connects directly with the communication field’s performative tradition
of argumentative engagement in public controversy—a different route of theoretical grounding than
rhetorical criticism’s tendency to locate its foundations in the English field’s tradition of literary criticism
and textual analysis.59
Given this genealogy, it is not surprising to learn how Davis’s response to the EPA’s institutional need for
rhetorical expertise took the form of a public debate proposal, shaped by Davis’s dual background as a
practitioner and historian of intercollegiate debate. Davis competed as an undergraduate policy debater
for Howard University in the 1970s, and then went on to enjoy substantial success as coach of the
Howard team in the new millennium. In an essay reviewing the broad sweep of debating history, Davis
notes, “Academic debate began at least 2,400 years ago when the scholar Protagoras of Abdera (481–
411 bc), known as the father of debate, conducted debates among his students in Athens.”60 As John
Poulakos points out, “older” Sophists such as Protagoras taught Greek students the value of dissoi
logoi, or pulling apart complex questions by debating two sides of an issue.61 Th e few surviving
fragments of Protagoras’s work suggest that his notion of dissoi logoi stood for the principle that “two
accounts [logoi] are present about every ‘thing,’ opposed to each other,” and further, that humans
could “measure” the relative soundness of knowledge claims by engaging in give-and-take where parties
would make the “weaker argument stronger” to activate the generative aspect of rhetorical practice, a
key element of the Sophistical tradition.62
Following in Protagoras’s wake, Isocrates would complement this centrifugal push with the pull of
synerchesthe, a centripetal exercise of “coming together” deliberatively to listen, respond, and form
common social bonds.63 Isocrates incorporated Protagorean dissoi logoi into synerchesthe, a broader
concept that he used flexibly to express interlocking senses of (1) inquiry, as in groups convening to
search for answers to common questions through discussion;64 (2) deliberation, with interlocutors
gathering in a political setting to deliberate about proposed courses of action;65 and (3) alliance
formation, a form of collective action typical at festivals,66 or in the exchange of pledges that deepen
social ties.67 Switch-Side Debating Meets Demand-Driven Rhetoric of Science 109
Returning once again to the Kettering-informed sharp distinction between debate and deliberation, one
sees in Isocratic synerchesthe, as well as in the EPA debating initiative, a fusion of debate with
deliberative functions. Echoing a theme raised in this essay’s earlier discussion of intelligence tradecraft
, such a fusion troubles categorical attempts to classify debate and deliberation as fundamentally
opposed activities. Th e significance of such a finding is amplified by the frequency of attempts in the
deliberative democracy literature to insist on the theoretical bifurcation of debate and deliberation as
an article of theoretical faith.
Tandem analysis of the EPA and intelligence community debating initiatives also brings to light
dimensions of contrast at the third level of Isocratic synerchesthe, alliance formation. The intelligence
community’s Analytic Outreach initiative invites largely one-way communication flowing from outside
experts into the black box of classified intelligence analysis. On the contrary, the EPA debating program
gestures toward a more expansive project of deliberative alliance building. In this vein, Howard
University’s participation in the 2008 EPA Water Wars debates can be seen as the harbinger of a trend
by historically black colleges and universities (hbcus) to catalyze their debate programs in a strategy that
evinces Davis’s dual-focus vision. On the one hand, Davis aims to recuperate Wiley College’s tradition of
competitive excellence in intercollegiate debate, depicted so powerfully in the feature film The Great
Debaters, by starting a wave of new debate programs housed in hbcus across the nation.68 On the other
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hand, Davis sees potential for these new programs to complement their competitive debate
programming with participation in the EPA’s public debating initiative.
This dual-focus vision recalls Douglas Ehninger’s and Wayne Brockriede’s vision of “total” debate
programs that blend switch-side intercollegiate tournament debating with forms of public debate
designed to contribute to wider communities beyond the tournament setting.69 Whereas the political
telos animating Davis’s dual-focus vision certainly embraces background assumptions that Greene and
Hicks would find disconcerting—notions of liberal political agency, the idea of debate using “words as
weapons”70—there is little doubt that the project of pursuing environmental protection by tapping the
creative energy of hbcu-leveraged dissoi logoi diff ers significantly from the intelligence community’s eff
ort to improve its tradecraft through online digital debate programming. Such diff erence is especially
evident in light of the EPA’s commitment to extend debates to public realms, with the attendant
possible benefits unpacked by Jane Munksgaard and Damien Pfister: 110 Rhetoric & Public Affairs
Having a public debater argue against their convictions, or confess their indecision on a subject and
subsequent embrace of argument as a way to seek clarity, could shake up the prevailing view of debate
as a war of words. Public uptake of the possibility of switch-sides debate may help lessen the
polarization of issues inherent in prevailing debate formats because students are no longer seen as
wedded to their arguments. This could transform public debate from a tussle between advocates, with
each public debater trying to convince the audience in a Manichean struggle about the truth of their
side, to a more inviting exchange focused on the content of the other’s argumentation and the process
of deliberative exchange.71
Reflection on the EPA debating initiative reveals a striking convergence among (1) the expressed need
for dissoi logoi by government agency officials wrestling with the challenges of inverted rhetorical
situations, (2) theoretical claims by scholars regarding the centrality of argumentation in the public
policy process, and (3) the practical wherewithal of intercollegiate debaters to tailor public switch-side
debating performances in specific ways requested by agency collaborators. These points of
convergence both underscore previously articulated theoretical assertions regarding the relationship of
debate to deliberation, as well as deepen understanding of the political role of deliberation in
institutional decision making. But they also suggest how decisions by rhetorical scholars about whether
to contribute switch-side debating acumen to meet demand-driven rhetoric of science initiatives ought
to involve careful reflection. Such an approach mirrors the way policy planning in the “argumentative
turn” is designed to respond to the weaknesses of formal, decisionistic paradigms of policy planning
with situated, contingent judgments informed by reflective deliberation.
Conclusion
Dilip Gaonkar’s criticism of first-generation rhetoric of science scholarship rests on a key claim regarding
what he sees as the inherent “thinness” of the ancient Greek rhetorical lexicon.72 That lexicon, by virtue
of the fact that it was invented primarily to teach rhetorical performance, is ill equipped in his view to
support the kind of nuanced discriminations required for eff ective interpretation and critique of
rhetorical texts. Although Gaonkar isolates rhetoric of science as a main target of this critique, his choice
of subject matter Switch-Side Debating Meets Demand-Driven Rhetoric of Science 111 positions him to
toggle back and forth between specific engagement with rhetoric of science scholarship and discussion
of broader themes touching on the metatheoretical controversy over rhetoric’s proper scope as a field
of inquiry (the so-called big vs. little rhetoric dispute).73 Gaonkar’s familiar refrain in both contexts is a
warning about the dangers of “universalizing” or “globalizing” rhetorical inquiry, especially in attempts
that “stretch” the classical Greek rhetorical vocabulary into a hermeneutic metadiscourse, one pressed
into service as a master key for interpretation of any and all types of communicative artifacts. In other
words, Gaonkar warns against the dangers of rhetoricians pursuing what might be called supply-side
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epistemology, rhetoric’s project of pushing for greater disciplinary relevance by attempting to extend its
reach into far-flung areas of inquiry such as the hard sciences.
Yet this essay highlights how rhetorical scholarship’s relevance can be credibly established by outsiders,
who seek access to the creative energy flowing from the classical Greek rhetorical lexicon in its native
mode, that is, as a tool of invention designed to spur and hone rhetorical performance. Analysis of the
intelligence community and EPA debating initiatives shows how this is the case, with government
agencies calling for assistance to animate rhetorical processes such as dissoi logoi (debating different
sides) and synerchesthe (the performative task of coming together deliberately for the purpose of joint
inquiry, collective choice-making, and renewal of communicative bonds).74 Th is demand-driven
epistemology is different in kind from the globalization project so roundly criticized by Gaonkar. Rather
than rhetoric venturing out from its own academic home to proselytize about its epistemological
universality for all knowers, instead here we have actors not formally trained in the rhetorical tradition
articulating how their own deliberative objectives call for incorporation of rhetorical practice and even
recruitment of “strategically located allies”75 to assist in the process. Since the productivist content in
the classical Greek vocabulary serves as a critical resource for joint collaboration in this regard, demanddriven rhetoric of science turns Gaonkar’s original critique on its head.
In fairness to Gaonkar, it should be stipulated that his 1993 intervention challenged the way rhetoric of
science had been done to date, not the universe of ways rhetoric of science might be done in the future.
And to his partial credit, Gaonkar did acknowledge the promise of a performance-oriented rhetoric of
science, especially one informed by classical thinkers other than Aristotle.76 In his Ph.D. dissertation on
“Aspects of Sophistic Pedagogy,” Gaonkar documents how the ancient sophists were “the greatest
champions” 112 Rhetoric & Public Affairs of “socially useful” science,77 and also how the sophists
essentially practiced the art of rhetoric in a translational, performative register: Th e sophists could not
blithely go about their business of making science useful, while science itself stood still due to lack of
communal support and recognition. Besides, sophistic pedagogy was becoming increasingly dependent
on the findings of contemporary speculation in philosophy and science. Take for instance, the eminently
practical art of rhetoric. As taught by the best of the sophists, it was not simply a handbook of recipes
which anyone could mechanically employ to his advantage. On the contrary, the strength and vitality of
sophistic rhetoric came from their ability to incorporate the relevant information obtained from the
on-going research in other fields.78
Of course, deep trans-historical differences make uncritical appropriation of classical Greek rhetoric for
contemporary use a fool’s errand. But to gauge from Robert Hariman’s recent reflections on the
enduring salience of Isocrates, “timely, suitable, and eloquent appropriations” can help us postmoderns
“forge a new political language” suitable for addressing the complex raft of intertwined problems
facing global society. Such retrospection is long overdue, says Hariman, as “the history, literature,
philosophy, oratory, art, and political thought of Greece and Rome have never been more accessible or
less appreciated.”79
This essay has explored ways that some of the most venerable elements of the ancient Greek rhetorical
tradition—those dealing with debate and deliberation—can be retrieved and adapted to answer calls in
the contemporary milieu for cultural technologies capable of dealing with one of our time’s most
daunting challenges. This challenge involves finding meaning in inverted rhetorical situations
characterized by an endemic surplus of heterogeneous content.
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2nc – Dogmatism impact
Our framework forces debates on both sides of a social issue which stimulates critical
thinking and helps students understand the complexities of policy dilemmas – this is
critical to check dogmatism
Keller, University of Chicago School of Social Service Administration Professor, et. al,
01 – [Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago (Thomas E., James K., and
Tracly K., Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago, professor of Social Work,
and doctoral student School of Social Work, 2001 (“Student debates in policy courses: promoting policy
practice skills and knowledge through active learning,” Journal of Social Work Education, Spr/Summer
2001, EBSCOhost, Accessed on July 5, 2013)][SP]
SOCIAL WORKERS HAVE a professional responsibility to shape social policy and legislation (National
Association of Social Workers, 1996). In recent decades, the concept of policy practice has
encouraged social workers to consider the ways in which their work can be advanced through
active participation in the policy arena (Jansson, 1984, 1994; Wyers, 1991). The emergence of the
policy practice framework has focused greater attention on the competencies required for social
workers to influence social policy and placed greater emphasis on preparing social work students
for policy intervention (Dear & Patti, 1981; Jansson, 1984, 1994; Mahaffey & Hanks, 1982; McInnisDittrich, 1994). The curriculum standards of the Council on Social Work Education (CSWE) require
the teaching of knowledge and skills in the political process (CSWE, 1994). With this formal
expectation of policy education in schools of social work, the best instructional methods must be
employed to ensure students acquire the requisite policy practice skills and perspectives . The
authors believe that structured student debates have great potential for promoting competence
in policy practice and in-depth knowledge of substantive topics relevant to social policy. Like
other interactive assignments designed to more closely resemble "real-world" activities, issueoriented debates actively engage students in course content. Debates also allow students to
develop and exercise skills that may translate to political activities, such as testifying before
legislative committees. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, debates may help to stimulate
critical thinking by shaking students free from established opinions and helping them to
appreciate the complexities involved in policy dilemmas. Relationships between Policy Practice
Skills, Critical Thinking, and Learning Policy practice encompasses social workers' "efforts to
influence the development, enactment, implementation, or assessment of social policies" (Jansson,
1994, p. 8). Effective policy practice involves analytic activities, such as defining issues, gathering
data, conducting research, identifying and prioritizing policy options, and creating policy proposals
(Jansson, 1994). It also involves persuasive activities intended to influence opinions and outcomes,
such as discussing and debating issues, organizing coalitions and task forces, and providing
testimony. According to Jansson (1984,pp. 57-58), social workers rely upon five fundamental skills
when pursuing policy practice activities: value-clarification skills for identifying and assessing the
underlying values inherent in policy positions; conceptual skills for identifying and evaluating the
relative merits of different policy options; interactional skills for interpreting the values and
positions of others and conveying one's own point of view in a convincing manner; political skills
for developing coalitions and developing effective strategies; and position-taking skills for
recommending, advocating, and defending a particular policy. These policy practice skills reflect
the hallmarks of critical thinking (see Brookfield, 1987; Gambrill, 1997). The central activities of
critical thinking are identifying and challenging underlying assumptions, exploring alternative ways
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of thinking and acting, and arriving at commitments after a period of questioning, analysis, and
reflection (Brookfield, 1987). Significant parallels exist with the policy-making process--identifying
the values underlying policy choices, recognizing and evaluating multiple alternatives, and taking a
position and advocating for its adoption. Developing policy practice skills seems to share much in
common with developing capacities for critical thinking. R.W. Paul (as cited in Gambrill, 1997)
states that critical thinkers acknowledge the imperative to argue from opposing points of view
and to seek to identify weakness and limitations in one's own position. Critical thinkers are
aware that there are many legitimate points of view, each of which (when thought through) may
yield some level of insight. (p. 126) John Dewey, the philosopher and educational reformer,
suggested that the initial advance in the development of reflective thought occurs in the
transition from holding fixed, static ideas to an attitude of doubt and questioning engendered by
exposure to alternative views in social discourse (Baker, 1955, pp. 36-40). Doubt, confusion, and
conflict resulting from discussion of diverse perspectives "force comparison, selection, and
reformulation of ideas and meanings" (Baker, 1955, p. 45). Subsequent educational theorists have
contended that learning requires openness to divergent ideas in combination with the ability to
synthesize disparate views into a purposeful resolution (Kolb, 1984; Perry, 1970). On the one
hand, clinging to the certainty of one's beliefs risks dogmatism, rigidity, and the inability to learn
from new experiences. On the other hand, if one's opinion is altered by every new experience, the
result is insecurity, paralysis, and the inability to take effective action. The educator's role is to help
students develop the capacity to incorporate new and sometimes conflicting ideas and experiences
into a coherent cognitive framework. Kolb suggests that, "if the education process begins by
bringing out the learner's beliefs and theories, examining and testing them, and then integrating
the new, more refined ideas in the person's belief systems, the learning process will be facilitated"
(p. 28). The authors believe that involving students in substantive debates challenges them to
learn and grow in the fashion described by Dewey and Kolb. Participation in a debate stimulates
clarification and critical evaluation of the evidence, logic, and values underlying one's own policy
position. In addition, to debate effectively students must understand and accurately evaluate the
opposing perspective. The ensuing tension between two distinct but legitimate views is designed
to yield a reevaluation and reconstruction of knowledge and beliefs pertaining to the issue.
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2NC – Democracy Impact
Political discourse is key to effective democracies—empirics prove.
Levasseur, West Chester University Prof, & Carlin, U of Kansas Prof, 1
[David G. & Diana B., professors of communication studies, Fall 2001, “Egocentric Argument and the
Public Sphere: Citizen Deliberations on Public Policy and Policymakers,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs, Vol 3,
n. 4, p. 407, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v004/4.3levasseur.html,
accessed 7/7/13, MC]
Democracies are built on discourse. As Harold Lasswell expressed several decades ago, "Democracy
depends on talk, [and] the methods of talk need to aid in the discovery of sound public policy." 1
Because talk matters, contemporary scholarship has lavished great attention upon civic discourse. The
majority of this attention has focused upon diagnosing and rejuvenating the ailing public sphere. While
this sphere is defined somewhat differently by individual scholars, in a broad sense this sphere involves
"citizens deliberating about common affairs, as distinct from personal or private concerns."
Within the expansive literature on the ailing public sphere, theoretical writings far outnumber empirical
ones. However, the public sphere is not only a "normative" construct, but it is also a dialogic process
subject to "empirical" examination. Gerard A. Hauser has advocated taking an "empirical attitude" to
the study of this discursive realm, and he argues that such an empirical "framework draws its
inferences about publics, public spheres, and public opinions from actual social practices of
discourse." Focusing upon the empirical nature of the public sphere promises to yield valuable insights;
just as an ailing patient is best diagnosed by an actual examination, assessing and improving the health
of the public sphere is best accomplished through an actual examination of the discourse within this
communicative space.
Discourse by the people instead of the elites is the best way to improve
democracy.
Levasseur, West Chester University Prof, & Carlin, U of Kansas Prof, 1
[David G. & Diana B., professors of communication studies, Fall 2001, “Egocentric Argument and the
Public Sphere: Citizen Deliberations on Public Policy and Policymakers,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs, Vol 3,
n. 4, p. 408, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v004/4.3levasseur.html,
accessed 7/7/13, MC]
Such empirical examinations should pay particular attention to ordinary citizens' deliberative
discourse. After all, democracy is built upon the discursive acts of ordinary people in ordinary
conversation. 5 Yet scholars have paid little attention to such ordinary citizens, who, Alexis de
Tocqueville observed, "reign over the American political world as God rules over the universe." 6
Consequently, our knowledge of the public sphere would benefit from a shift in focus: shifting our
attention from the discourse of elites to the discourse of the larger citizenry. 7
While few studies have examined the conversations of ordinary citizens, some scholars have breached
this veiled communicative space. Scholars have used citizen focus groups to explore the relationship
between political discussion and television programs, 8 the construction of political action frames, 9
citizen reactions to political debates, 10 and political choices during presidential campaigns. 11 Scholars
also observed citizen discussions during the National Issues Forum in 1996. 12 While all of these studies
have enhanced our understanding of citizens' public policy deliberations, none of these studies has
examined citizen dialogue within the rich scholarly tradition of the public sphere. However, Thomas W.
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Benson explored the public sphere as constituted in citizens' political discussions on Internet bulletin
boards. 13 His study's significant empirical insights were limited by the distinct sample population
(Internet political newsgroup members) and by the limited communicative medium (e-mail messaging)
used by these members. Mitchell S. McKinney's dissertation used citizen focus group data to examine
voter anger and alienation. 14 His study was grounded in public sphere literature to develop
recommendations for improving the state of civic discourse.
Debate is essential—gives us access to effective methods of discourse, improving
understanding of the public sphere.
Levasseur, West Chester University Prof, & Carlin, U of Kansas Prof, 1
[David G. & Diana B., professors of communication studies, Fall 2001, “Egocentric Argument and the
Public Sphere: Citizen Deliberations on Public Policy and Policymakers,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs, Vol 3,
n. 4, p. 425, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/rhetoric_and_public_affairs/v004/4.3levasseur.html,
accessed 7/7/13, MC]
The problem of polling also points to the importance of examining citizen discourse in an effort to
understand the public sphere. Citizen discourse must be examined because it differs in important
ways from the elite discourse that commonly pervades studies of the public sphere. Studies centered
on such elite discourse have lamented the growth of a rhetoric of polls in our political process. 60 While
such rhetoric certainly plays a prominent role in politician and media discourse, it played very little role
in our citizen discussion groups; citizens simply did not refer to polls to advance their policy arguments.
Studying citizen groups also presents a different picture with regard to the fourth commonly cited
ailment confronting the public sphere: the rise of a rhetoric of technical expertise. Writers ranging from
Dryzek to Habermas have complained about a "lifeworld" colonized by the discourse of expert
cultures. 61 The lifeworld represented within our group deliberations did not reveal such colonization.
Discourse deferring to technical expertise was largely absent from these discussions. On the other hand,
the discourse of personal expertise substantiated through personal narratives dominated these
discussions. In fact, these citizen conversations might have benefitted from some expert discourse that
would have helped participants frame their experiences within a broader context of knowledge.
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Roleplaying
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Roleplaying Good – Education
Roleplaying through fiat simulates and encourages learning and empowerment.
Innes, Berkeley Director, and Booher, Visiting Scholar, 99
(Judith and David, Journal of the American Planning Association, Winter, Vol. 65, Iss. 1)
Our observation and practice of consensus building suggests that the analogy to role-playing games
will help to illuminate the dynamic of effective consensus processes. Even when the dispute
seems intractable, role playing in consensus building allows players to let go of actual or assumed
constraints and to develop ideas for creating new conditions and possibilities. Drama and
suspension of reality allows competing, even bitterly opposed interests to collaborate, and engages
individual players emotionally over many months. Scenario building and storytelling can make
collective sense of complexity, of predicting possibilities in an uncertain world, and can allow the
playful imagination, which people normally suppress, to go to work. In the course of engaging in
various roles, participants develop identities for themselves and others and become more effective
participants, representing their stakeholders' interests more clearly. In many of their most
productive moments, participants in consensus building engage not only in playing out scenarios,
but also in a kind of collective, speculative tinkering, or bricolage, similar in principle to what game
participants do. That is, they play with heterogeneous concepts, strategies, and actions with which
various individuals in the group have experience, and try combining them until they create a new
scenario that they collectively believe will work. This bricolage, discussed further below, is a type of
reasoning and collective creativity fundamentally different from the more familiar types,
argumentation and tradeoffs.[sup11] The latter modes of problem solving or dispute resolution
typically allow zero sum allocation of resources among participants or finding the actions
acceptable to everyone. Bricolage, however, produces, rather than a solution to a known problem,
a new way of framing the situation and of developing unanticipated combinations of actions that
are qualitatively different from the options on the table at the outset. The result of this collective
tinkering with new scenarios is, most importantly, learning and change among the players, and
growth in their sophistication about each other, about the issues, and about the futures they could
seek. Both consensus building and roleplaying games center on learning, innovation, and change,
in a process that is entertaining and-when conducted effectively-in some fundamental sense
empowers individuals.
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Roleplaying Good – Devil’s Advocate
Malcolm X proves that roleplaying lets us learn about other peoples’ opinions.
Branham, former professor at Bates College, 95
[Robert James, author of Sweet Freedom's Song: "My Country 'Tis of Thee" and
Democracy in America, as well as, Winter 1995, “`I was gone on debating': Malcolm X's
prison debates and public confrontations.” Augmentation & Advocacy, Vol. 31 Issue 3,
p117, http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?sid=7168f836-d2df-45ac-9bd105260d853860%40sessionmgr15&vid=1&hid=14&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%
3d%3d#db=ufh&AN=9604057858, accessed 7/5/13, MC]
Norfolk had a fine library of several thousand volumes and prisoners were able to check out books of
their choice. Malcolm X became a voracious and critical reader, discovering "new evidence to
document the Muslim teachings" in books ranging from accounts of the slave trade to Milton's Paradise
Lost (X, 1965b, pp. 185186). Malcolm X's "prison education, including Elijah Muhammad," writes Baraka,
"gives him the form with which overtly to combine consciousness with his actual life" (p. 26). As
Malcolm X sought new outlets for his heightened political consciousness, he turned to the weekly
formal debates sponsored by the inmate team. "My reading had my mind like steam under pressure,"
he recounted; "Some way, I had to start telling the white man about himself to his face. I decided to do
this by putting my name down to debate" (1965b, p. 184).
Malcolm X's prison debate experience allowed him to bring his newly acquired historical knowledge
and critical ideology to bear on a wide variety of social issues. "Whichever side of the selected subject
was assigned to me, I'd track down and study everything I could find on it," wrote Malcolm X. "I'd put
myself in my opponent's place and decide how I'd try to win if I had the other side; and then I'd figure
out a way to knock down those points" (1965b, p. 184). Preparation for each debate included four or
five practice sessions. Debaters conducted individual research and also worked collaboratively in
research teams (Bender, 1993). Visiting debaters "could not understand how we had the material to
debate with them," recalls Malcolm Jarvis, Malcolm X's debate partner at Norfolk. "They were at the
mercy of people with M.A.s and Ph.D.s to teach them," he explains.
The weekly Norfolk debates attracted large audiences, generally filling the three-hundred-seat prison
theater. Most prisoners attended and the sessions also attracted curious visitors, usually invited
representatives of organizations connected to the topic under discussion. These debates provided
Malcolm X with the first large audiences of his speaking career.
I will tell you that right there, in the prison, debating, speaking to a crowd, was as exhilirating to me as
the discovery of knowledge through reading had been. Standing up there, the faces looking up at me,
the things in my head coming out of my mouth, while my brain searched for the next best thing to
follow what I was saying, and if I could sway them to my side by handling it right, then I had won the
debate -- once my feet got wet, I was gone on debating. (1965b, p. 184)
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Roleplaying Good – Decisionmaking
Roleplaying is empowering and helps us better make decisions.
Rawls, former Harvard Professor, 99
[John, 2009, “The Law of the Peoples,” University of Chicago Law Review, The Law of
Peoples, vol.64: no.3, p. 54-7,
http://nw18.american.edu/~dfagel/Philosophers/Rawls/TheLawOfPeoples.pdf, accessed 7/5/13, MC]
Developing the Law of Peoples within a liberal conception of justice, we work out the ideals and
principles of the foreign policy of a reasonably just liberal people. I distinguish between the public
reason of liberal peoples and the public reason of the Society of Peoples. The first is the public reason
of equal citizens of domestic society debating the constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice
concerning their own government; the second is the public reason of free and equal liberal peoples
debating their mutual relations as peoples. The Law of Peoples with its political concepts and
principles, ideals and criteria, is the content of this latter public reason. Although these two public
reasons do not have the same content, the role of public reason among free and equal peoples is
analogous to its role in a constitutional democratic regime among free and equal citizens. Political
liberalism proposes that, in a constitutional democratic regime, comprehensive doctrines of truth or of
right are to be replaced in public reason by an idea of the politically reasonable addressed to citizens
as citizens. Here note the parallel: public reason is invoked by members of the Society of Peoples, and
its principles are addressed to peoples as peoples. They are not expressed in terms of comprehensive
doctrines of truth or of right, which may hold sway in this or that society, but in terms that can be
shared by different peoples. 6.2. Ideal of Public Reason. Distinct from the idea of public reason is the
ideal of public reason. In domestic society this ideal is realized, or satisfied, whenever judges,
legislators, chief executives, and other government officials, as well as candidates for public office, act
from and follow the idea of public reason and explain to other citizens their reasons for supporting
fundamental political questions in terms of the political conception of justice that they regard as the
most reasonable. In this way they fulfill what I shall call their duty of civility to one another and to other
citizens. Hence whether judges, legislators, and chief executives act from and follow public reason is
continually shown in their speech and conduct. How is the ideal of public reason realized by citizens who
are not government officials? In a representative government, citizens vote for representatives-chief
executives, legislators, and the like-not for particular laws (except at a state or local level where they
may vote directly on referenda questions, which are not usually fundamental questions). To answer this
question, we say that, ideally, citizens are to think of themselves as if they were legislators and ask
themselves what statutes, supported by what reasons satisfying the criterion of reciprocity, they would
think it most reasonable to enact.7l When firm and widespread, the disposition of citizens to view
themselves as ideal legislators, and to repudiate government officials and candidates for public office
who violate public reason, forms part of the political and social basis of liberal democracy and is vital
for its enduring strength and vigor. Thus in domestic society citizens fulfill their duty of civility and
support the idea of public reason, while doing what they can to hold government officials to it. This
duty, like other political rights and duties, is an intrinsically moral duty. I emphasize that it is not a legal
duty, for in that case it would be incompatible with freedom of speech.
Roleplaying Good – Politics
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Roleplaying is key to decision making — teaches us both pragmatic and philosophical
values – detachment from the personal is key
Hanghøj, University of Bristol Author, 08 —
[Thorkild Hanghøj, author affiliated with Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media
Materials, research the Centre for Learning, Knowledge, and Interactive Technologies (L-KIT), the
Institute of Education at the University of Bristol and the institute formerly known as Learning Lab
Denmark at the School of Education, 2008 (“PLAYFUL KNOWLEDGE: An Explorative Study of Educational
Gaming,” University of Southern Denmark, p. 50-51 Available Online at
http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information_til/Studerende_ved_SDU/Din_uddannelse/phd_hum/
afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf, Accessed on July 7, 2013)][SP]
Joas’ re-interpretation of Dewey’s pragmatism as a “theory of situated creativity” raises a critique of
humans as purely rational agents that navigate instrumentally through meansends- schemes (Joas,
1996: 133f). This critique is particularly important when trying to understand how games are enacted
and validated within the realm of educational institutions that by definition are inscribed in the great
modernistic narrative of “progress” where nation states, teachers and parents expect students to
acquire specific skills and competencies (Popkewitz, 1998; cf. chapter 3). However, as Dewey argues, the
actual doings of educational gaming cannot be reduced to rational means-ends schemes. Instead, the
situated interaction between teachers, students, and learning resources are played out as contingent redistributions of means, ends and ends in view, which often make classroom contexts seem “messy” from
an outsider’s perspective (Barab & Squire, 2004). 4.2.3. Dramatic rehearsal The two preceding sections
discussed how Dewey views play as an imaginative activity of educational value, and how his
assumptions on creativity and playful actions represent a critique of rational means-end schemes. For
now, I will turn to Dewey’s concept of dramatic rehearsal, which assumes that social actors deliberate
by projecting and choosing between various scenarios for future action. Dewey uses the concept
dramatic rehearsal several times in his work but presents the most extensive elaboration in Human
Nature and Conduct: Deliberation is a dramatic rehearsal (in imagination) of various competing
possible lines of action… [It] is an experiment in finding out what the various lines of possible action are
really like (...) Thought runs ahead and foresees outcomes, and thereby avoids having to await the
instruction of actual failure and disaster. An act overtly tried out is irrevocable, its consequences cannot
be blotted out. An act tried out in imagination is not final or fatal. It is retrievable (Dewey, 1922: 1323). This excerpt illustrates how Dewey views the process of decision making (deliberation) through
the lens of an imaginative drama metaphor. Thus, decisions are made through the imaginative
projection of outcomes, where the “possible competing lines of action” are resolved through a thought
experiment. Moreover, Dewey’s compelling use of the drama metaphor also implies that decisions
cannot be reduced to utilitarian, rational or mechanical exercises, but that they have emotional, creative
and personal qualities as well. Interestingly, there are relatively few discussions within the vast research
literature on Dewey of his concept of dramatic rehearsal. A notable exception is the phenomenologist
Alfred Schütz, who praises Dewey’s concept as a “fortunate image” for understanding everyday
rationality (Schütz, 1943: 140). Other attempts are primarily related to overall discussions on moral or
ethical deliberation (Caspary, 1991, 2000, 2006; Fesmire, 1995, 2003; Rönssön, 2003; McVea, 2006). As
Fesmire points out, dramatic rehearsal is intended to describe an important phase of deliberation that
does not characterise the whole process of making moral decisions, which includes “duties and
contractual obligations, short and long-term consequences, traits of character to be affected, and rights”
(Fesmire, 2003: 70). Instead, dramatic rehearsal should be seen as the process of “crystallizing
possibilities and transforming them into directive hypotheses” (Fesmire, 2003: 70). Thus, deliberation
can in no way guarantee that the response of a “thought experiment” will be successful. But what it
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can do is make the process of choosing more intelligent than would be the case with “blind” trial-anderror (Biesta, 2006: 8). The notion of dramatic rehearsal provides a valuable perspective for
understanding educational gaming as a simultaneously real and imagined inquiry into domain-specific
scenarios. Dewey defines dramatic rehearsal as the capacity to stage and evaluate “acts”, which implies
an “irrevocable” difference between acts that are “tried out in imagination” and acts that are “overtly
tried out” with real-life consequences (Dewey, 1922: 132-3). This description shares obvious similarities
with games as they require participants to inquire into and resolve scenario-specific problems (cf.
chapter 2). On the other hand, there is also a striking difference between moral deliberation and
educational game activities in terms of the actual consequences that follow particular actions. Thus,
when it comes to educational games, acts are both imagined and tried out, but without all the real-life
consequences of the practices, knowledge forms and outcomes that are being simulated in the game
world. Simply put, there is a difference in realism between the dramatic rehearsals of everyday life and
in games, which only “play at” or simulate the stakes and risks that characterise the “serious” nature of
moral deliberation, i.e. a real-life politician trying to win a parliamentary election experiences more
personal and emotional risk than students trying to win the election scenario of The Power Game. At the
same time, the lack of real-life consequences in educational games makes it possible to design a
relatively safe learning environment, where teachers can stage particular game scenarios to be enacted
and validated for educational purposes. In this sense, educational games are able to provide a safe but
meaningful way of letting teachers and students make mistakes (e.g. by giving a poor political
presentation) and dramatically rehearse particular “competing possible lines of action” that are
relevant to particular educational goals (Dewey, 1922: 132). Seen from this pragmatist perspective, the
educational value of games is not so much a question of learning facts or giving the “right” answers,
but more a question of exploring the contingent outcomes and domain-specific processes of problembased scenarios.
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Roleplaying Good - Tolerance
Role play allows students to discover their political identity and overcome
stereotypes.
Mitchell, Northwestern Professor & Chair of Communication, 2k
[Gordon R., Winter 2000, “Simulated Public Argument As a Pedagogical Play on Worlds.”
Argumentation & Advocacy, Vol. 36: Issue 3,
http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?sid=a9c07ac0-6cfa-4915-a9d07fa94af5f6d8%40sessionmgr11&vid=1&hid=14&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3
d%3d#db=ufh&AN=2667253, accessed 7/5/13, MC]
When we assume the posture of the other in dramatic performance, we tap into who we are as
persons, since our interpretation of others is deeply colored by our own senses of selfhood. By
encouraging experimentation in identity construction, role-play "helps students discover divergent
viewpoints and overcome stereotypes as they examine subjects from multiple perspectives..."
(Moore, p. 190). Kincheloe points to the importance of this sort of reflexive critical awareness as an
essential feature of educational practice in postmodern times. "Applying the notion of the postmodern
analysis of the self, we come to see that hyperreality invites a heteroglossia of being," Kincheloe
explains; "Drawing upon a multiplicity of voices, individuals live out a variety of possibilities, refusing
to suppress particular voices. As men and women appropriate the various forms of expression, they are
empowered to uncover new dimensions of existence that were previously hidden" (1993,p. 96).
This process is particularly crucial in the public argument context, since a key guarantor of inequality
and exploitation in contemporary society is the widespread and uncritical acceptance by citizens of
politically inert self-identities. The problems of political alienation, apathy and withdrawal have
received lavish treatment as perennial topics of scholarly analysis (see e.g. Fishkin 1997; Grossberg
1992; Hart 1998; Loeb 1994). Unfortunately, comparatively less energy has been devoted to the
development of pedagogical strategies for countering this alarming political trend.
However, some scholars have taken up the task of theorizing emancipatory and critical pedagogies,
and argumentation scholars interested in expanding the learning potential of debate would do well to
note their work (see e.g. Apple 1995, 1988, 1979; Britzman 1991; Giroux 1997, 1988, 1987; Greene
1978; McLaren 1993, 1989; Simon 1992; Weis and Fine 1993). In this area of educational scholarship,
the curriculum theory of currere, a method of teaching pioneered by Pinar and Grumet (1976), speaks
directly to many of the issues already discussed in this essay. As the Latin root of the word "curriculum,"
currere translates roughly as the investigation of public life (see Kincheloe 1993, p. 146). According to
Pinar, "the method of currere is one way to work to liberate one from the web of political, cultural, and
economic influences that are perhaps buried from conscious view but nonetheless comprise the living
web that is a person's biographic situation" (Pinar 1994, p. 108). The objectives of role-play pedagogy
resonate with the currere method. By opening discursive spaces for students to explore their identities
as public actors, simulated public arguments provide occasions for students to survey and appraise
submerged aspects of their political identities. Since many aspects of cultural and political life work
currently to reinforce political passivity, critical argumentation pedagogies that highlight this
component of students' self-identities carry significant emancipatory potential.
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Roleplaying Good – Solves Exclusion
Pretending to fill the role of policymakers is key to prevent exclusion and fight political
passivity
Kulynych, PolySci Professor at Winthorp University 97 [Jessica, Winter 1997, “Performing
Politics: Foucault, Habermas, and Postmodern Participation,” Polity, Vol. 30: No. 2, p. 344-5, JFS]
Unfortunately, it is precisely these elements of citizen action that cannot be explained by a theory of
communicative action. It is here that a performative conception of political action implicitly informs
Hager’s discussion. From a performative perspective, the goal of action is not only to secure a realm for
deliberative politics, but to disrupt and resist the norms and identities that structure such a realm and
its participants. While Habermas theorizes that political solutions will emerge from dialogue, a
performative understanding of participation highlights the limits of dialogue and the creative and
often uncontrollable effect of unpremeditated action on the very foundations of communication. When
we look at the success of citizen initiatives from a performative perspective, we look precisely at those
moments of defiance and disruption that bring the invisible and unimaginable into view. Although
citizens were minimally successful in influencing or controlling the outcome of the policy debate and
experienced a considerable lack of autonomy in their coercion into the technical debate, the goaloriented debate within the energy commissions could be seen as a defiant moment of performative
politics. The existence of a goal-oriented debate within a technically dominated arena defied the
normalizing separation between expert policymakers and consuming citizens. Citizens momentarily
recreated themselves as policymakers in a system that defined citizens out of the policy process,
thereby refusing their construction as passive clients.
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Roleplaying Good – Democracy
Affirming a policy through roleplaying allows us to access liberal democratic
participation.
Rawls, former Harvard Professor, 99
[John, 2009, “The Law of the Peoples,” University of Chicago Law Review, The Law of
Peoples, vol.64: no.3, p. 56-57
http://nw18.american.edu/~dfagel/Philosophers/Rawls/TheLawOfPeoples.pdf, accessed 7/5/13, MC]
To answer this question, we say that, ideally, citizens are to think of themselves as if they were
legislators and ask themselves what statutes, supported by what reasons satisfying the criterion of
reciprocity, they would think it most reasonable to enact. When firm and widespread, the disposition
of citizens to view themselves as ideal legislators, and to repudiate government officials and candidates
for public office who violate public reason, forms part of the political and social basis of liberal
democracy and is vital for its enduring strength and vigor. Thus in domestic society citizens fulfill their
duty of civility and support the idea of public reason, while doing what they can to hold government
officials to it. This duty, like other political rights and duties, is an intrinsically moral duty. I emphasize
that it is not a legal duty, for in that case it would be incompatible with freedom of speech. Similarly, the
ideal of the public reason of free and equal peoples is realized, or satisfied, whenever chief executives
and legislators, and other government officials, as well as candidates for public office, act from and
follow the principles of the Law of Peoples and explain to other peoples their reasons for pursuing or
revising a people’s foreign policy and affairs of state that involve other societies. As for private citizens,
we say, as before, that ideally citizens are to think of themselves as if they were executives and
legislators and ask themselves what foreign policy supported by what considerations they would think
it most reasonable to advance. Once again, when firm and widespread, the disposition of citizens to
view themselves as ideal executives and legislators, and to repudiate government officials and
candidates for public office who violate the public reason of free and equal peoples, is part of the
political and social basis of peace and understanding among peoples.
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State Good
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2nc – turns the aff
Yes the government has flawed components but challenging our understanding of
government is important and valuable through discussion of federal policies--Learning that language allows us to confront and challenge those institutions outside
of this round and resolves a lot of the impacts they discuss
Hoppe, Twente University policy professor, 99
[Robbert, Professor of Policy and knowledge in the Faculty of Management and Governance at Twente
University “Argumentative Turn,” Science and Public Policy, volume 26, number 3, June 1999, pages
201–210]
ACCORDING TO LASSWELL (1971), policy science is about the production and application of knowledge
of and in policy. Policy-makers who desire to tackle problems on the political agenda successfully, should
be able to mobilise the best available knowledge. This requires high-quality knowledge in policy. Policymakers and, in a democracy, citizens, also need to know how policy processes really evolve. This
demands precise knowledge of policy.
There is an obvious link between the two: the more and better the knowledge of policy, the easier it is
to mobilise knowledge in policy. Lasswell expresses this interdependence by defining the policy
scientist's operational task as eliciting the maximum rational judgement of all those involved in policymaking.
For the applied policy scientist or policy analyst this implies the development of two skills. First, for the
sake of mobilising the best available knowledge in policy, he/she should be able to mediate between
different scientific disciplines. Second, to optimise the interdependence between science in and of
policy, she/he should be able to mediate between science and politics. Hence Dunn's (1994, page 84)
formal definition of policy analysis as an applied social science discipline that uses multiple research
methods in a context of argumentation, public debate [and political struggle] to create, evaluate
critically, and communicate policy-relevant knowledge.
Historically, the differentiation and successful institutionalisation of policy science can be
interpreted as the spread of the functions of knowledge organisation, storage, dissemination
and application in the knowledge system (Dunn and Holzner, 1988; van de Graaf and Hoppe,
1989, page 29). Moreover, this scientification of hitherto 'unscientised' functions, by
including science of policy explicitly, aimed to gear them to the political system. In that sense,
Lerner and Lasswell's (1951) call for policy sciences anticipated, and probably helped bring
about, the scientification of politics. Peter Weingart (1999) sees the development of the
science-policy nexus as a dialectical process of the scientification of politics/policy and the
politicisation of science. Numerous studies of political controversies indeed show that science
advisors behave like any other self-interested actor (Nelkin, 1995). Yet science somehow
managed to maintain its functional cognitive authority in politics. This may be because of its
changing shape, which has been characterised as the emergence of a post-parliamentary and
post-national network democracy (Andersen and Burns, 1996, pages 227-251). National
political developments are put in the background by ideas about uncontrollable, but
apparently inevitable, international developments; in Europe, national state authority and
power in public policy-making is leaking away to a new political and administrative elite,
situated in the institutional ensemble of the European Union. National representation is in
the hands of political parties which no longer control ideological debate. The authority and
policy-making power of national governments is also leaking away towards increasingly
powerful policy-issue networks, dominated by functional representation by interest groups
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and practical experts. In this situation, public debate has become even more fragile than it
was. It has become diluted by the predominance of purely pragmatic, managerial and
administrative argument, and under-articulated as a result of an explosion of new political
schemata that crowd out the more conventional ideologies. The new schemata do feed on the
ideologies; but in larger part they consist of a random and unarticulated 'mish-mash' of
attitudes and images derived from ethnic, local-cultural, professional, religious, social
movement and personal political experiences. The market-place of political ideas and
arguments is thriving; but on the other hand, politicians and citizens are at a loss to judge
its nature and quality. Neither political parties, nor public officials, interest
groups, nor social movements and citizen groups, nor even the public media
show any inclination, let alone competency, in ordering this inchoate field. In
such conditions, scientific debate provides a much needed minimal amount of
order and articulation of concepts, arguments and ideas. Although frequently more in
rhetoric than substance, reference to scientific 'validation' does provide politicians, public
officials and citizens alike with some sort of compass in an ideological universe in
disarray. For policy analysis to have any political impact under such conditions,
it should be able somehow to continue 'speaking truth' to political elites who are
ideologically uprooted, but cling to power; to the elites of administrators,
managers, professionals and experts who vie for power in the jungle of organisations
populating the functional policy domains of post-parliamentary democracy; and to a broader
audience of an ideologically disoriented and politically disenchanted citizenry.
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2nc – advocacy skills impact
Our framework is socially productive – forcing students to assert policy solutions has
tremendous research and education benefits and encourages them to become
advocates for change rather than mere spectators
Joyner, Georgetown University International Law in the Government Department
Professor, 99 –
[Professor of International Law in the Government Department at Georgetown University, 1999
(Christopher C., Spring, 199, 5 ILSA J Int'l & Comp L 377, Accessed on July 5, 2013)][SP]
Use of the debate can be an effective pedagogical tool for education in the social sciences.
Debates, like other role-playing simulations, help students understand different perspectives on a
policy issue by adopting a perspective as their own. But, unlike other simulation games, debates
do not require that a student participate directly in order to realize the benefit of the game. Instead
of developing policy alternatives and experiencing the consequences of different choices in a
traditional role-playing game, debates present the alternatives and consequences in a formal,
rhetorical fashion before a judgmental audience. Having the class audience serve as jury helps
each student develop a well-thought-out opinion on the issue by providing contrasting facts and
views and enabling audience members to pose challenges to each debating team. These debates
ask undergraduate students to examine the international legal implications of various United States
foreign policy actions. Their chief tasks are to assess the aims of the policy in question, determine
their relevance to United States national interests, ascertain what legal principles are involved, and
conclude how the United States policy in question squares with relevant principles of international
law. Debate questions are formulated as resolutions, along the lines of: "Resolved: The United
States should deny most-favored-nation status to China on human rights grounds;" or "Resolved:
The United States should resort to military force to ensure inspection of Iraq's possible nuclear,
chemical and biological weapons facilities;" or "Resolved: The United States' invasion of Grenada in
1983 was a lawful use of force;" or "Resolved: The United States should kill Saddam Hussein." In
addressing both sides of these legal propositions, the student debaters must consult the vast
literature of international law, especially the nearly 100 professional law-school-sponsored
international law journals now being published in the United States. This literature furnishes an
incredibly rich body of legal analysis that often treats topics affecting United States foreign policy,
as well as other more esoteric international legal subjects. Although most of these journals are
accessible in good law schools, they are largely unknown to the political science community
specializing in international relations, much less to the average undergraduate. By assessing the
role of international law in United States foreign policy- making, students realize that United States
actions do not always measure up to international legal expectations; that at times, international
legal strictures get compromised for the sake of perceived national interests, and that concepts and
principles of international law, like domestic law, can be interpreted and twisted in order to justify
United States policy in various international circumstances. In this way, the debate format gives
students the benefits ascribed to simulations and other action learning techniques, in that it
makes them become actively engaged with their subjects, and not be mere passive consumers.
Rather than spectators, students become legal advocates, observing, reacting to, and structuring
political and legal perceptions to fit the merits of their case. The debate exercises carry several
specific educational objectives. First, students on each team must work together to refine a
cogent argument that compellingly asserts their legal position on a foreign policy issue
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confronting the United States. In this way, they gain greater insight into the real-world legal
dilemmas faced by policy makers. Second, as they work with other members of their team, they
realize the complexities of applying and implementing international law, and the difficulty of
bridging the gaps between United States policy and international legal principles, either by
reworking the former or creatively reinterpreting the latter. Finally, research for the debates forces
students to become familiarized with contemporary issues on the United States foreign policy
agenda and the role that international law plays in formulating and executing these policies. 8 The
debate thus becomes an excellent vehicle for pushing students beyond stale arguments over
principles into the real world of policy analysis, political critique, and legal defense.
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2nc – state key
The aff can’t alter society without confronting the state
Subotnik Professor of Law, Touro College ’98
(Subotnik, Professor of Law, College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, 7 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol'y,
1998, QDKM)
Having traced a major strand in the development of CRT, we turn now to the strands' effect on the
relationships of CRATs with each other and with outsiders. As the foregoing material suggests, the
central CRT message is not simply that minorities are being treated unfairly, or even that individuals
out there are in pain - assertions for which there are data to serve as grist for the academic mill - but
that the minority scholar himself or herself hurts and hurts badly. An important problem that concerns
the very definition of the scholarly enterprise now comes into focus. What can an academic trained to
[*694] question and to doubt n72 possibly say to Patricia Williams when effectively she announces, "I
hurt bad"? n73 "No, you don't hurt"? "You shouldn't hurt"? "Other people hurt too"? Or, most
dangerously - and perhaps most tellingly - "What do you expect when you keep shooting yourself in the
foot?" If the majority were perceived as having the well- being of minority groups in mind, these
responses might be acceptable, even welcomed. And they might lead to real conversation. But, writes
Williams, the failure by those "cushioned within the invisible privileges of race and power... to
incorporate a sense of precarious connection as a part of our lives is... ultimately obliterating." n74
"Precarious." "Obliterating." These words will clearly invite responses only from fools and sociopaths;
they will, by effectively precluding objection, disconcert and disunite others. "I hurt," in academic
discourse, has three broad though interrelated effects. First, it demands priority from the reader's
conscience. It is for this reason that law review editors, waiving usual standards, have privileged a long
trail of undisciplined - even silly n75 - destructive and, above all, self-destructive arti cles. n76 Second,
by emphasizing the emotional bond between those who hurt in a similar way, "I hurt" discourages
fellow sufferers from abstracting themselves from their pain in order to gain perspective on their
condition. n77 [*696] Last, as we have seen, it precludes the possibility of open and structured
conversation with others. n78 [*697] It is because of this conversation-stopping effect of what they
insensitively call "first-person agony stories" that Farber and Sherry deplore their use. "The norms of
academic civility hamper readers from challenging the accuracy of the researcher's account; it would be
rather difficult, for example, to criticize a law review article by questioning the author's emotional
stability or veracity." n79 Perhaps, a better practice would be to put the scholar's experience on the
table, along with other relevant material, but to subject that experience to the same level of scrutiny. If
through the foregoing rhetorical strategies CRATs succeeded in limiting academic debate, why do they
not have greater influence on public policy? Discouraging white legal scholars from entering the national
conversation about race, n80 I suggest, has generated a kind of cynicism in white audiences which, in
turn, has had precisely the reverse effect of that ostensibly desired by CRATs. It drives the American
public to the right and ensures that anything CRT offers is reflexively rejected. In the absence of
scholarly work by white males in the area of race, of course, it is difficult to be sure what reasons they
would give for not having rallied behind CRT. Two things, however, are certain. First, the kinds of issues
raised by Williams are too important in their implications [*698] for American life to be confined to
communities of color. If the lives of minorities are heavily constrained, if not fully defined, by the
thoughts and actions of the majority elements in society, it would seem to be of great importance
that white thinkers and doers participate in open discourse to bring about change. Second, given the
lack of engagement of CRT by the community of legal scholars as a whole, the discourse that should be
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taking place at the highest scholarly levels has, by default, been displaced to faculty offices and, more
generally, the streets and the airwaves.
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Topic Specific
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Uniqueness – Topic Education Low Now
We are too ignorant of Latin American affairs—topic specific education is key to
forming knowledgeable opinions.
World Politics Review Editors, 7
[World Politics Review, organization staffed with experienced analysts that are dedicated to publishing
information and analysis of world policy and international affairs, 8/21/07, “Americans' Ignorance of
Latin America,” http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/1051/americans-ignorance-of-latinamerica, accessed 7/6/13, MC]
LULA WHO? SAY MOST AMERICANS -- There's an old journalism adage that says Americans are willing
to do anything for neighboring Latin America, except read about it. Nothing much has changed in that
regard, according to a new Zogby Interactive poll. Having surveyed 7,362 adults nationwide, Zogby
concludes that Americans "show a stunning ignorance" about the region. Only 10 percent of online poll
respondents said they were familiar with Luiz Inacio "Lula" da Silva, the second-term president of Brazil.
Twenty percent recognized the name of Felipe Calderon, the president of Mexico.
The poll showed 56 percent of adults feel the United States should remove travel restrictions on Cuba,
and end the economic embargo. Fifty-eight percent believed that the United States should start talking
to the Cubans. Respondents also placed Colombia as number three in a list of countries that were least
friendly to the United States. Colombia has been one of America's closest allies -- and the beneficiary
of half-a-billion U.S. dollars a year to fight drugs. Only 26 percent of American adults think President
Bush has done a good job in handling U.S. relations with Latin America, and 29 percent thought the
president was doing an adequate job. But, given the level of ignorance about the region, how valid can
their judgment be?
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Key To Decisionmaking
Latin American education key to decision making in new era of globalization.
Marcotte Yale Programs in International Education Research 13
[Margaret, 2013, “Educational Outreach/Teacher Training Program”,
http://www.yale.edu/macmillan/lais/outreach.html, accessed 7/7/13, ALT]
Our mission is to enhance and promote an open and critical understanding of the socio-economic,
political and cultural changes and continuities that define Latin American societies. From a
multidisciplinary perspective, our purpose is to engage the interests, knowledge and practices of
educators who teach about Latin America at all levels with those of researchers, policy-makers and
grass-roots activists, who are also pursuing a deeper understanding of the diverse societies and
identities of Latin America within local, regional and worldwide developments. It is important to learn
about other cultures, especially Latin American cultures, in order to enhance our understanding of
historical developments through multiple forms of education, guided by universal principles of social
tolerance, social equity, and respect for human dignity and human rights. An education that promotes
intercultural dialogue and understanding is based on an appreciation and reaffirmation of diversity and
cultural identities, and can prevent conflicts through non-violent means as individuals create and
embrace social changes amid contexts of social cohesion. These educational goals aim to improve the
ways in which societies can collaborate with each other towards a more equitable and sustainable socioeconomic development and, thus, to the improvement of the quality of life of all. Achieving this goal,
international education, and specifically education about Latin America, will enable students of all ages
to critically address and participate in dialogues and decision-making aimed at better defining the
dynamics and changes brought by an era of globalization, new technological and economic
developments, transnational arrangements, and vast and rapid information and migration patterns that
have resulted in new multi-cultural social realities. In short, learning about Latin America and other
world regions will allow today’s youth to be better equipped with the tools and skills needed in order
to be active and productive global citizens.
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Scholarship Benefits
Latin American policy good: cultural and political diversity, and role in global studies.
Dirzo Stanford University Latin American Studies Director 12
[Rodolfo, Enlace Year in Review, “Year In Review”,
http://issuu.com/icastanford/docs/clas_2012_enlace/1, p. 5, accessed 7/6/13, ALT]
One might ask, why bring this litany of multi-faceted (and seemingly disconnected) examples of Latin
American news to the table? And the answer is to emphasize: i) the plethoric diversity of issues in
history, culture, policy, politics, and science that emerge from this region of the world; ii) what an
important geopolitical entity the region is— in and of itself and in the context of the global
community; and iii) the extent to which the region continues to be an exciting, fertile laboratory for
international studies, which deserves the continued interest of scholars and students who wish to
engage in interdisciplinary research and training for our understanding of the world. It is my
aspiration that CLAS, with the support of the general Stanford Latin American community (students,
faculty and visiting scholars) becomes an even stronger venue that fosters the study and appreciation of
the region’s resources, people, and actual and potential contributions to the world.
Latin American studies incorporates an innovate, interdisciplinary approach.
Carpenter University of Derby Research Manager 13 [Victoria, Society for Latin American
Studies, “Why Study Latin America?”, http://www.slas.org.uk/studyingLA/whyLatinA.htm, accessed
7/7/13, ALT]
Latin American Studies is a vibrant and expanding area of academic activity attracting scholars from a
wide range of disciplines and interests, including history, music, film and media studies, economics,
languages, geography, politics, anthropology, international relations, sociology and literature.
Latin Americanists are interested primarily in the region or individual countries and this gives them
a well-rounded knowledge of their specialist area, incorporating history, contemporary life and the
arts, as well as their own niche topic. The interdisciplinary nature of Latin American studies encourages
scholars to think in a fluid and imaginative way about issues and events, borrowing ideas from
different academic approaches and creating an eclectic response.
Students of Latin America study important traditional topics, such as poverty, injustice and
inequality, but also exciting contemporary developments such as the indigenous resurgence across the
region, Brazil’s Afroreggae movement and the rise of new left political projects. As such, Latin
American studies also provides an important window on power, society and life beyond the region,
having the potential to bring important new perspectives to the study of so-called developed
countries as well as presenting a distinctive experience of the colonial condition.
Regional studies are key to preparing ourselves to tackle U.S. problems.
Gallucci, Former Georgetown Foreign Service Dean, 12
[Robert L., president of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, has 21 years of government
service, former Special Envoy for United States on proliferation, 11/26/12, The Chronicle of Higher
Education, “How Scholars Can Improve International Relations,” http://chronicle.com/article/HowScholars-Can-Improve/135898/, accessed 7/7/13, MC]
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To these recommendations, I would add two more: first, a robust embrace of regional studies. Nothing
can replace the value of insights that emerge from the integration of knowledge and research on the
history, economics, politics, culture, religion, and geography of a region. Second, consideration of
rigorous, policy-relevant theory and analysis should be among the requirements for hiring, tenure, and
promotion.
My organization, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, supports efforts in this regard,
but it is incumbent upon all who teach and study international relations to think about the problems
we face as a nation, and those humankind faces across the planet. Think about the needs of
governments, and of the vast range of organizations at work in the world. Find practical ways to
prepare people to be useful and effective. Our universities have the country's intellectual firepower,
trained expertise, and the careers of the most promising young people in their hands. I am asking that
they please do something useful with them.
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Best Policy Option
Within growing global role and importance, dialogue and collaboration are key to find
solutions.
Garza Baker Institute Latin Americn Institute Director 8
[Erika de la Garza, 10/3/08, James A Baker Institute for Public Policy, “The Americas Project: Bringing
Together Emerging Leaders of the Western Hemisphere”, http://www.bakerinstitute.org/programs/theamericas-project, accessed 7/7/13, ALT]
We share a hemispheric space in the Americas that increasingly requires multinational atten- tion to
convergent interests and concerns. These include trade and structural reforms, the flow of capital and
labor within the region, growing intraregional trade, shared consumer tastes and marketing,
challenges to the order of law, and a common concern for the environment. The need to manage the
growing interdependence among the American countries is creating a new and quite different policy
climate. The Americas—particularly the developing nations of Latin America—occupy an increasingly
vital position on our world’s economic, political, cultural, and social map. From Mexico to Venezuela to
Chile, these emerging countries are assuming a vital presence on the world’s stage.
The Americas Project Fellows meet at the Baker Institute over a four-day period. This is a period of
critical involvement for the fellows that includes several components:
Significant discussion activity. The fundamental thrust of the project is to create dialogue and lay out
the groundwork for innovative solutions to some of the most pressing challenges con- fronting the
nations of the Americas. Toward the end of the colloquium, fellows draft a position paper articulating
the conclusions reached in their discussions. The resulting document serves as the conference’s final
report and is disseminated through the Organization of American States to policymakers throughout the
hemisphere.
Lectures from prominent voices in the international arena. These lectures keynote specific concerns and
topics of the colloquium and are open to the community, often attracting a wide audience of media,
faculty, students and community leaders.
Interaction with senior scholars from Rice and other academic institutions. Fellows have a chance to
capitalize on Rice’s formidable intellectual resources through personal interaction with academicians
and scholars.Each colloquium focuses on a different subject that we anticipate will yield a significant
number of tangible results in key areas:
Leadership. By harnessing the collective energy of exceptional young leaders, the Americas Proj- ect
helps foster leadership throughout the hemisphere. Americas Project Fellows—future indus- trial
chieftains, up-and-coming political office holders, and nascent social and cultural trendset- ters—will
return to their home countries emboldened to carry the mantle of leadership.
Networking. The Americas Project helps forge alliances among future North and South Ameri- can
leaders, something that is vital as our world becomes increasingly interdependent. After their tenure in
the project, fellows will be able to draw upon relationships with their counter- parts in other countries
of the region.
Dialogue. The Americas Project recognizes that solutions to pressing world challenges require
interaction, collaboration and dialogue. Through this effort, we can promote forward-thinking
discussions on the many concerns facing the North and South American continents. Our hope is that this
constructive dialogue will endure beyond the four-day seminar, leading to increased collaboration in
the years to come.
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International Relations
Discussion of IR Policy is critical for skill development and advocacy skills
Starkley and Blake, University of Maryland, 2001 (Brigid and Elizabeth, Simulation in
international relations education, http://maaz.ihmc.us/rid=1K7F7521P-2BS8TQRV0T/Garcia%20Carbonell%20et%20al%20-%20Simulation.pdf#page=94, Accessed- 7-6-13, RRR)
For the past 50 years, scholars and practitioners of international relations have used simulations to
model real-world environments. Simulations can be conducted as experimental tools to allow
researchers to develop and test theories of decision making and other processes. Simulations can also
be used as predictive tools to help policy makers weigh various outcomes. Finally, simulations can be
used as educational tools to help student participants understand the way the international system
works and to apply decision-making theory to the solution of real-world problems.1 Although the
reasons for simulating the international system have remained relatively constant over time, the types
and structures of these simulations have changed dramatically since 1950, owing in part to shifts in
theory and politics during that period. Of particular interest is the role that technology has played in
fostering innovation in the design and delivery of simulation exercises for educational purposes.
Although the use of simulations for research purposes has declined since the 1950s and 1960s, the use
of international relations (IR) simulations for teaching purposes has rapidly expanded, with
representations becoming more complex owing to the technology-mediated tools available.2 In
education, simulations give students the opportunity to learn experientially and have been shown to
“develop different skills from [conventional] classroom teaching—especially those of being
imaginative and innovative” (Winham, 1991, p. 417). Such exercises place participants in roles and
require them to overcome various obstacles in their pursuit of goals (Walcott, 1980, p. 1). Simulations
of the international system can create worldwide laboratories for learners, helping them to gain
understanding of the complexity of key issues (Starkey & Wilkenfeld, 1996, p. 25) by navigating the
international system from the perspective of real-world decision makers.3
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Answers To
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A2: No Internal Link to Policymaking
Scholars play an essential role in effective policy making
Gallucci, Former Georgetown Foreign Service Dean, 12
[Robert L., president of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, has 21 years of government
service, former Special Envoy for United States on proliferation, 11/26/12, The Chronicle of Higher
Education, “How Scholars Can Improve International Relations,” http://chronicle.com/article/HowScholars-Can-Improve/135898/, accessed 7/7/13, MC]
Something is seriously wrong in the relationship between universities and the policy community in the
field of international relations. The worlds of policy making and academic research should be in
constant, productive conversation, and scholars and researchers should be an invaluable resource for
policy makers, but they are not.
One hears perennial laments from those in academe that their valuable work is being ignored by policy
makers. And, on the other hand, policy makers complain they can get nothing useful from the academy.
They may all be right.
Now would be a good time for policy makers and scholars to be deeply engaged on some of the
highest-priority issues for the United States and international security. Consider, for example:
The causes and implications—immediate and long term—of the Arab Spring for that region and for its
relevance to future social and political change elsewhere.
The real consequences of an Iranian nuclear-weapons program for the political dynamics of the Middle
East, as well as for the durability of the global norm against nuclear-weapons proliferation.
The complicated internal politics of Pakistan, how they relate to that country's political and economic
development, and their importance to America's policies in South Asia.
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A2: Kills agency
Politicizing education allows students to construct meaningful understandings.
Hodson, U of Toronto Professor of Education, 9
[Derek, 2009, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education at the University of Toronto,
“Putting Your Money Where Your Mouth Is: Towards an Action-oriented Science
Curriculum,” http://www.wepaste.org/Resources/JASTE_1-1_1-Hodson.pdf, accessed
7/7/13, MC]
Politicization of science education can be achieved by giving students the opportunity to confront real
world issues that have a scientific, technological or environmental dimension. By grounding content in
socially and personally relevant contexts, an issues-based approach can provide the motivation that is
absent from current abstract, de-contextualized approaches and can form a base from which students
can construct understanding that is personally relevant, meaningful and important. It can provide
increased opportunities for active learning, inquiry-based learning, collaborative learning and direct
experience of the situatedness and multidimensionality of scientific and technological practice. In the
Western contemporary world, technology is all pervasive; its social and environmental impact is clear;
its disconcerting social implications and disturbing moral-ethical dilemmas are made apparent almost
every day in popular newspapers, TV news bulletins and Internet postings. In many ways, it is much
easier to recognize how technology is determined by the sociocultural context in which it is located than
to see how science is driven by such factors. It is much easier to see the environmental impact of
technology than to see the ways in which science impacts on society and environment. For these kinds
of reasons, it makes good sense to use problems and issues in technology and engineering as the major
vehicles for contextualizing the science curriculum. This is categorically not an argument against
teaching science; rather, it is an argument for teaching the science that informs an understanding of
everyday technological problems and may assist students in reaching tentative solutions about where
they stand on key SSI.
Debate empowers students. Framework is a prerequisite—any alt must go through
policy means first if it’s to achieve actual change
Zwarensteyn, Grand Valley State Masters’ student, 12 [Ellen C., 8-1-2012 “High School Policy
Debate as an Enduring Pathway to Political Education: Evaluating Possibilities for Political Learning”
http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1034&context=theses accessed: 7/5/13 EYS]
A debate education becomes a way for students to think of themselves as activists and critics of
society. This is a practice of empowerment. Warner and Brushke (2001) continue to highlight how
practicing public speaking itself may be vitally empowering. Speaking in a highly engaged academic
environment where the goal is analytical victory would put many on edge. Taking academic risks in a
debate round, however, yields additional benefits. The process of debating allows students to practice
listening and conceiving and re-conceiving ideas based on in-round cooperation. This cooperation,
even between competing teams, establishes respect for the process of deliberation. This practice may
in turn empower students to use speaking and listening skills outside the debate round and in their
local communities skills making students more comfortable talking to people who are different from
them (Warner and Brushke, 2001, p. 4-7). Moreover, there is inherent value in turning the traditional
tables of learning around. Reversing the traditional classroom demonstrates students taking control
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of their own learning through the praxis of argumentation. Students learn to depend on themselves
and their colleagues for information and knowledge and must cooperate through the debate process.
Taken together, policy debate aids academic achievement, student behavior, critical thinking, and
empowers students to view themselves as qualified agents for social change.
Role – playing is a prerequisite to real life decision making and agency
Hanghøj, University of Bristol Author, 08 —
[Thorkild Hanghøj, author affiliated with Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media
Materials, research the Centre for Learning, Knowledge, and Interactive Technologies (L-KIT), the
Institute of Education at the University of Bristol and the institute formerly known as Learning Lab
Denmark at the School of Education, 2008 (“PLAYFUL KNOWLEDGE: An Explorative Study of Educational
Gaming,” University of Southern Denmark, p. 50-51 Available Online at
http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information_til/Studerende_ved_SDU/Din_uddannelse/phd_hum/
afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf, Accessed on July 7, 2013)][SP]
Thus, debate games require teachers to balance the centripetal/centrifugal forces of gaming and
teaching, to be able to reconfigure their discursive authority, and to orchestrate the multiple voices of a
dialogical game space in relation to particular goals. These Bakhtinian perspectives provide a valuable
analytical framework for describing the discursive interplay between different practices and knowledge
aspects when enacting (debate) game scenarios. In addition to this, Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy also
offers an explanation of why debate games (and other game types) may be valuable within an
educational context. One of the central features of multi-player games is that players are expected to
experience a simultaneously real and imagined scenario both in relation to an insider’s (participant)
perspective and to an outsider’s (co-participant) perspective. According to Bakhtin, the outsider’s
perspective reflects a fundamental aspect of human understanding: In order to understand, it is
immensely important for the person who understands to be located outside the object of his or her
creative understanding – in time, in space, in culture. For one cannot even really see one's own exterior
and comprehend it as a whole, and no mirrors or photographs can help; our real exterior can be seen
and understood only by other people, because they are located outside us in space, and because they
are others (Bakhtin, 1986: 7). As the quote suggests, every person is influenced by others in an
inescapably intertwined way, and consequently no voice can be said to be isolated. Thus, it is in the
interaction with other voices that individuals are able to reach understanding and find their own
voice. Bakhtin also refers to the ontological process of finding a voice as “ideological becoming”, which
represents “the process of selectively assimilating the words of others” (Bakhtin, 1981: 341). Thus, by
teaching and playing debate scenarios, it is possible to support students in their process of becoming
not only themselves, but also in becoming articulate and responsive citizens in a democratic society.
Debate is uniquely important for high school students discovering themselves through
political engagement
Zwarensteyn, Grand Valley State Masters’ student, 12 [Ellen C., 8-1-2012 “High School Policy
Debate as an Enduring Pathway to Political Education: Evaluating Possibilities for Political Learning”
http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1034&context=theses accessed: 7/5/13 EYS]
High school students experience unique developmental challenges as they search for their own
identities and establish relationships with authority and their peers. In addition to social changes, high
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school students also actively seek information, challenge systems of power, and negotiate their own
world-views amid conflicting messages of childhood and emerging adult expectations. High school
debate may heighten this search as students seek to know more about their own political identity
through relatively mature exchanges of information. These maturing dialogues do not trade-off with
stereotypical teen-aged irresponsible acts of foolishness. From a sociological perspective, Fine (2004)
investigated the high school debate community and observed students’ behavior, attitudes, and
characteristics. Fine (2004) advances that adolescents are agents of theirown world. They interact with
institutions and persons that determine their sense of self and their world-views. What those
experiences are that influence that child’s development help determine immediate behavior and longterm identity. Thus, “…adolescents shape their actions in light of how they are viewed and treated by
adults and adult institutions, how they are viewed and treated by their peers, and how they desire to
view themselves” (Fine, 2004, p. 2). Both mature and childish, high school debaters “…have the power
to construct their own lifeworlds, but not always in ways that adults endorse” (Fine, 2004, p.7).
Questions of moral and ethical development surround what type of arguments students are exposed to,
what type of competition students experience, and overall how coaching can impact a child’s
development. Each of these questions raises ethical questions within the debate community.
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A2: Ideological rigidity
Debate breaks down the ideological preconceptions of the participants
Zwarensteyn, Grand Valley State Masters’ student, 12 [Ellen C., 8-1-2012 “High School Policy
Debate as an Enduring Pathway to Political Education: Evaluating Possibilities for Political Learning”
http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1034&context=theses accessed: 7/5/13 EYS]
Other scholars note benefits to debate outside traditional academic achievement or behavioral
measures. These studies theorize the importance in face-to-face communication and adversarial
dialectics. Galloway, Debate Director at Samford University, studies the benefits to communication
through dialogue and the switch-side requirement of policy debate. Galloway (2007) encourages
audiences to view debate as a critical dialogue, where every argument is crafted to begin a meaningful,
if not strategic, dialogue. The values not only advance intellectual gain, but also to look for
argumentative consistency and personal validity.
[I]n a dialogical exchange, debaters come to realize the positions other than their own have value, and
that reasonable minds can disagree on controversial issues. This respect encourages debaters to
modify and adapt their own positions on critical issues without the threat of being labeled a hypocrite.
The conceptualization of debate as a dialogue allows challenges to take place from a wide variety of
perspectives. By offering a stable referent the affirmative must uphold, the negative can choose to
engage the affirmative on the widest possible array of “counterwords,” enhancing the pedagogical
process produced by debate (p. 12).
Viewing debate as a dialogue helps move understanding debate beyond students set in one political
ideology to those who must consider the best in arguments from multiple sides of an argument. One
of the most compelling arguments as to how debate increases empathy, regards the practice of
debating multiple sides of the same issue. This practice is one of political understanding as it helps
create empathy by humanizing people who advance opposing arguments. This practice bridges the
world of argument with political and personal understanding. “[T]he unique distinctions between
debate and public speaking allow debaters the opportunity to learn about a wide range of issues from
multiple perspectives. This allows debaters to formulate their own opinions about controversial
subjects through an in-depth process of research and testing of ideas”(Galloway, 2007, p. 13).
Students already have preconceived notions about how the world operates--government policy discussion is vital to force engagement with competing
perspectives
Esberg and Sagan, special assistant to the director at New York University's and
Professor at Stanford, Center 12 *
Jane Esberg is special assistant to the director at New York University's Center on. International
Cooperation. She was the winner of 2009 Firestone Medal, AND Scott Sagan is a professor of political
science and director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation “NEGOTIATING
NONPROLIFERATION: Scholarship, Pedagogy, and Nuclear Weapons Policy,” The Nonproliferation
Review, 19:1, 95-108 accessed 5-7-13, RRR
These government or quasi-government think tank simulations often provide very similar lessons for
high-level players as are learned by students in educational simulations. Government participants
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learn about the importance of understanding foreign perspectives, the need to practice internal
coordination, and the necessity to compromise and coordinate with other governments in
negotiations and crises. During the Cold War, political scientist Robert Mandel noted how crisis
exercises and war games forced government officials to overcome “bureaucratic myopia,” moving
beyond their normal organizational roles and thinking more creatively about how others might react
in a crisis or conflict.6 The skills of imagination and the subsequent ability to predict foreign interests
and reactions remain critical for real-world foreign policy makers. For example, simulations of the
Iranian nuclear crisis—held in 2009 and 2010 at the Brookings Institution's Saban Center and at Harvard
University's Belfer Center, and involving former US senior officials and regional experts—highlighted the
dangers of misunderstanding foreign governments’ preferences and misinterpreting their subsequent
behavior. In both simulations, the primary criticism of the US negotiating team lay in a failure to predict
accurately how other states, both allies and adversaries, would behave in response to US policy
initiatives.7
By university age, students often have a pre-defined view of international affairs, and the literature on
simulations in education has long emphasized how such exercises force students to challenge their
assumptions about how other governments behave and how their own government works.8 Since
simulations became more common as a teaching tool in the late 1950s, educational literature has
expounded on their benefits, from encouraging engagement by breaking from the typical lecture
format, to improving communication skills, to promoting teamwork.9 More broadly, simulations can
deepen understanding by asking students to link fact and theory, providing a context for facts while
bringing theory into the realm of practice.10 These exercises are particularly valuable in teaching
international affairs for many of the same reasons they are useful for policy makers: they force
participants to “grapple with the issues arising from a world in flux.”11 Simulations have been used
successfully to teach students about such disparate topics as European politics, the Kashmir crisis, and
US response to the mass killings in Darfur.12 Role-playing exercises certainly encourage students to
learn political and technical facts—but they learn them in a more active style. Rather than sitting in a
classroom and merely receiving knowledge, students actively research “their” government's positions
and actively argue, brief, and negotiate with others.13 Facts can change quickly; simulations teach
students how to contextualize and act on information.
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A2: K is a Prereq to Policy
K is not a prereq – there is a widening gap between theory and policy, making it
impossible to have interrelationship
Bertucci, Universidad de San Andres, et al 12 (Mariano E., Fabian Borges-Herrero, University of
Southern California, Claudia Fuentes-Julio, University of Denver, International Studies Perspectives
(2012), 1–19 “Toward “Best Practices” in Scholar–Practitioner Relations: Insights from the Field of InterAmerican Affairs”, pg. 2 date accessed 7/12/13 igm)
The literature on scholar–practitioner interactions in International Relations (IR) is dominated by a
sense of chasm. 2 Practitioners generally conceive schol arly outputs as abstract discussions
specifically tailored to satisfy the intellectual demands of other scholars rather than responding to
the pressing issues policy makers must deal with on a daily basis. Many scholars, in turn, disdain the
over simplifications and lack of analytical rigor they often attribute to policy officials. IR is often
described as a self-regulated field in which professional success depends almost entirely on one’s
reputation among peers. In this field, there is a strong incentive to produce highly specialized and
methodologically rigorous research because this type of work, as opposed to teaching or public
service, is what a scholar’s career advancement is predicated on. Hence, IR scholars focus on
generating novel arguments that will impress other scholars, rather than poli cymakers. Policymakers,
on their part, want to know how events occur and pursue knowledge specific to the policy process, that
is, about what policy levers to acti vate in order to shape outcomes in the desired direction, as opposed
to knowing why events occur and producing general explanations that abstract from the workings of
policy processes (George 1993; Kruzel 1994; Lepgold and Nincic 2001; Jentleson 2002; Walt 2005; Nau
2008; Nye 2008a; Krasner 2011).
This perceived gap, according to some observers, is growing larger. Even though there have been
several examples of how the study of international rela tions could and did contribute useful insights
to foreign policy practitioners (e. g., research on nuclear strategy and arms control was widely used by
U.S. policy makers during the Cold War and research on “democratic peace theory”—that democracies
do not fight each other—has recently entered popular discourse and also shaped policy in the United
States), these contributions have allegedly become more scarce as IR scholars increasingly turn to
theoretical models that only qualified insiders can penetrate and that policymakers consider
irrelevant (Nye 2008a:654).
Critique can’t influence policy – policymakers need empiricism to fill their academic
niche, scholars prescriptive ideas are not received in the decision-making process
Bertucci, Universidad de San Andres, et al 12 (Mariano E., Fabian Borges-Herrero, University of
Southern California, Claudia Fuentes-Julio, University of Denver, International Studies Perspectives
(2012), 1–19 “Toward “Best Practices” in Scholar–Practitioner Relations: Insights from the Field of InterAmerican Affairs”, pg. 9 date accessed 7/12/13 igm)
The influence of scholarly ideas on policymakers is contingent on factors beyond the control of
scholars. These factors are usually related but not limited to the politicized and haphazard nature of
public policy decision-making processes.
Scholarly contributions, if defined as findings published in leading academic journals, do not often
directly affect policymaking. As discussed above, only in the case of USAID’s democracy promotion
efforts academic findings informed policymaking. Particularly in the fields of Comparative Politics and
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IR, actual scholarly contributions do not appear to systematically impact policy. 16 Rather, it is
“prescriptive ideas”, for which there is no empirical evidence but that resonates within universities
because the common layperson sees them as the right thing to do—for example, the issue of
“responsibility to protect” 17—that end up influencing policy. “Prescriptive ideas” are logical
arguments about why they would provide better policy outcomes vis-a`-vis other policies, but these
ideas are not actually demonstrated by empirical evidence—whether a new idea would make the
world safer or better cannot be empirically demonstrated before the policy is actually implemented
(Krasner 2011). As a general rule, in academia, where scholars strive to “publish or perish” in leading
journals, scholars do not care about what one another “think” about a certain issue; what matters is
what can be shown through systematically collected empirical evidence .
Criticism can’t influence policy – lack of interior advocates, lack of communication
interoperability and timing all trump theory
Bertucci, Universidad de San Andres, et al 12 (Mariano E., Fabian Borges-Herrero, University of
Southern California, Claudia Fuentes-Julio, University of Denver, International Studies Perspectives
(2012), 1–19 “Toward “Best Practices” in Scholar–Practitioner Relations: Insights from the Field of InterAmerican Affairs”, pg. 10 date accessed 7/12/13 igm)
Scholarly success in influencing policymaking also depends on the existence of receptive allies within
government institutions—what Rafael Fernandez de Castro calls “brokers”—that are willing to advance
policy recommendations based on sound scholarly research (Fernandez de Castro 2011:6). However,
not all efforts at effectively influencing policy are reducible to nurturing relations with government
“brokers”. The United States was well on its way to creating the FTAA when countries like Brazil blocked
the path. In this case, the United States let the moment pass, while other Latin American countries, such
as Argentina, turned their back to the FTAA as soon as free trade-friendly governments left office,
strengthening the position of the already ambiguous Brazilians. Thus, government “brokers” are
important, but timing is also a factor that may facilitate or impede the effective influence of scholarly
outputs on policy (Feinberg 2011).
Communicating the fruits of rigorous and policy-relevant research in “user friendly” ways presents
another challenge for scholars seeking to influence policy. Scholars, in general, are trained to write for
peers interested in theory development, rather than for practitioners, interested in absorbing jargonfree policy recommendations based on rigorous diagnoses. Practitioners have no time to read books
and articles written for a scholarly audience that require readers to immerse themselves in academic
debates.
To be sure, scholarly influence on policy is a two-way street—practitioners must also be willing to listen
to scholars and respect the value of their work. However, practitioners’ likelihood of paying attention
to expert knowledge appears to be tied to issue-specific perceptions. For instance, the success of
economists in influencing policy can be explained by the widespread perception that economic
policymaking requires technical knowledge. There is no similar consensus behind the idea that
technical knowledge is needed for crafting foreign policy, for example. This is certainly the case in the
area of citizen security, where “no one” assumes that technical knowledge is a prerequisite for
speaking about the issue (Casas-Zamora 2011).
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A2: Psychic violence
Anderson, prof of English at Johns Hopkins 05
(Amanda, October 24, 2005, The Way We Argue Now, p. 37-39, QDKM)
MY RECENT BOOK, The Way We Argue Now, has in a sense two theses. In the first place, the book makes
the case for the importance of debate and argument to any vital democratic or pluralistic intellectual
culture. This is in many ways an unexceptional position, but the premise of the book is that the claims
of reasoned argument are often trumped, within the current intellectual terrain, by appeals to cultural
identity and what I gather more broadly under the rubric of ethos, which includes cultural identity but
also forms of ethical piety and charismatic authority. In promoting argument as a universal practice
keyed to a human capacity for communicative reason, my book is a critique of relativism and identity
politics, or the notion that forms of cultural authenticity or group identity have a certain unquestioned
legitimacy, one that cannot or should not be subjected to the challenges of reason or principle,
precisely because reason and what is often called "false universalism" are, according to this pattern of
thinking, always involved in forms of exclusion, power, or domination. My book insists, by contrast,
that argument is a form of respect, that the ideals of democracy, whether conceived from a nationalist
or an internationalist perspective, rely fundamentally upon procedures of argumentation and debate
in order to legitimate themselves and to keep their central institutions vital. And the idea that one
should be protected from debate, that argument is somehow injurious to persons if it does not honor
their desire to have their basic beliefs and claims and solidarities accepted without challenge, is
strenuously opposed. As is the notion that any attempt to ask people to agree upon processes of
reason-giving argument is somehow necessarily to impose a coercive norm, one that will disable the
free expression and performance of identities, feelings, or solidarities. Disagreement is, by the terms
of my book, a form of respect, not a form of disrespect. And by disagreement, I don't mean simply to
say that we should expect disagreement rather than agreement, which is a frequently voiced-if
misconceived-criticism of Habermas. Of course we should expect disagreement. My point is that we
should focus on the moment of dissatisfaction in the face of disagreement-the internal dynamic in
argument that imagines argument might be the beginning of a process of persuasion and exchange
that could end in agreement (or partial agreement). For those who advocate reconciling ourselves to
disagreements rather than arguing them out, by contrast, there is a complacent-and in some versions,
even celebratory-attitude toward fixed disagreement. Refusing these options, I make the case for
dissatisfied disagreement in the final chapter of the book and argue that people should be willing to
justify their positions in dialogue with one another, especially if they hope to live together in a posttraditional pluralist society.
One example of the trumping of argument by ethos is the form that was taken by the late stage of the
Foucault/Habermas debate, where an appeal to ethos-specifically, an appeal to Foucault's style of ironic
or negative critique, often seen as most in evidence in the interviews, where he would playfully refuse
labels or evade direct answers-was used to exemplify an alternative to the forms of argument employed
by Habermas and like-minded critics. (I should pause to say that I provide this example, and the framing
summary of the book that surrounds it, not to take up airtime through expansive self-reference, but
because neither of my respondents provided any contextualizing summary of the book's central
arguments, though one certainly gets an incremental sense of the book's claims from Bruce Robbins.
Because I don't assume that readers of this forum have necessarily read the book, and because I believe
that it is the obligation of forum participants to provide sufficient context for their remarks, I will
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perform this task as economically as I can, with the recognition that it might have carried more weight if
provided by a respondent rather than the author.)
The Foucauldian counter-critique importantly emphasizes a relation between style and position, but it
obscures (1) the importance or value of the Habermasian critique and (2) the possibility that the other
side of the debate might have its own ethos to advocate, one that has precisely to do with an ethos of
argument, an ideal of reciprocal debate that involves taking distance on one's pre-given forms of
identity or the norms of one's community, both so as to talk across differences and to articulate one's
claims in relation to shared and even universal ideals. And this leads to the second thesis of the book,
the insistence that an emphasis on ethos and character is interestingly present if not widely recognized
in contemporary theory, and one of the ways its vitality and existential pertinence makes itself felt (even
despite the occurrence of the kinds of unfair trumping moves I have mentioned). We often fail to notice
this, because identity has so uniformly come to mean sociological, ascribed, or group identity-race,
gender, class, nationality, ethnicity, sexuality, and so forth. Instances of the move toward character and
ethos include the later Foucault (for whom ethos is a central concept), cosmopolitanism (whose
aspiration it is to turn universalism into an ethos), and, more controversially, proceduralist ethics and
politics (with its emphasis on sincerity and civility). Another version of this attentiveness to ethos and
character appears in contemporary pragmatism, with its insistence on casualness of attitude, or
insouciance in the face of contingency-recommendations that get elevated into full-fledged exemplary
personae in Richard Rorty's notion of the "ironist" or Barbara Herrnstein Smiths portrait of the
"postmodern skeptic." These examples-and the larger claim they support-are meant to defend theory as
still living, despite the many reports of its demise, and in fact still interestingly and incessantly reelaborating its relation to practice. This second aspect of the project is at once descriptive, motivated by
the notion that characterology within theory is intrinsically interesting, and critical, in its attempt to
identify how characterology can itself be used to cover or evade the claims of rational argument, as in
appeals to charismatic authority or in what I identify as narrow personifications of theory (pragmatism,
in its insistence on insouciance in the face of contingency, is a prime example of this second form). And
as a complement to the critical agenda, there is a reconstructive agenda as well, an attempt to
recuperate liberalism and proceduralism, in part by advocating the possibility, as I have suggested, of an
ethos of argument.
Robbins, in his extraordinarily rich and challenging response, zeroes in immediately on a crucial issue:
who is to say exactly when argument is occurring or not, and what do we do when there is
disagreement over the fundamentals (the primary one being over what counts as proper reasoning)?
Interestingly, Robbins approaches this issue after first observing a certain tension in the book: on the
one hand, The Way We Argue Now calls for dialogue, debate, argument; on the other, its project is
"potentially something a bit stricter, or pushier: getting us all to agree on what should and should not
count as true argument." What this point of entry into the larger issue reveals is a kind of blur that the
book, I am now aware, invites. On the one hand, the book anatomizes academic debates, and in doing
so is quite "debaterly" This can give the impression that what I mean by argument is a very specific form
unique to disciplinary methodologies in higher education. But the book is not generally advocating a
narrow practice of formal and philosophical argumentation in the culture at large, however much its
author may relish adherence to the principle of non-contradiction in scholarly argument. I take pains to
elaborate an ethos of argument that is linked to democratic debate and the forms of dissent that
constitutional patriotism allows and even promotes. In this sense, while argument here is necessarily
contextualized sociohistorically, the concept is not merely academic. It is a practice seen as integral to
specific political forms and institutions in modern democracies, and to the more general activity of
critique within modern societies-to the tradition of the public sphere, to speak in broad terms.
Additionally, insofar as argument impels one to take distance on embedded customs, norms, and senses
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of given identity, it is a practice that at once acknowledges identity, the need to understand the
perspectives of others, and the shared commitment to commonality and generality, to finding a way to
live together under conditions of difference.
More than this: the book also discusses at great length and from several different angles the issue that
Robbins inexplicably claims I entirely ignore: the question of disagreement about what counts as
argument. In the opening essay, "Debatable Performances," I fault the proponents of communicative
ethics for not having a broader understanding of public expression, one that would include the
disruptions of spectacle and performance. I return to and underscore this point in my final chapter,
where I espouse a democratic politics that can embrace and accommodate a wide variety of
expressions and modes. This is certainly a discussion of what counts as dialogue and hence argument in
the broad sense in which I mean it, and in fact I fully acknowledge that taking distance from cultural
norms and given identities can be advanced not only through critical reflection, but through ironic
critique and defamiliarizing performance as well. But I do insist-and this is where I take a position on
the fundamental disagreements that have arisen with respect to communicative ethics-that when they
have an effect, these other dimensions of experience do not remain unreflective, and insofar as they
do become reflective, they are contributing to the very form of reasoned analysis that their champions
sometimes imagine they must refuse in order to liberate other modes of being (the affective, the
narrative, the performative, the nonrational). If a narrative of human rights violation is persuasive in
court, or in the broader cultural public sphere, it is because it draws attention to a violation of
humanity that is condemned on principle; if a performance jolts people out of their normative
understandings of sexuality and gender, it prompts forms of understanding that can be affirmed and
communicated and also can be used to justify political positions and legislative agendas.
If the state is racist as the aff purposes, then there is no way to fix the state but
engage with and make it non-racist. Rejecting the state as a whole will solve nothing.
We defend the biggest solvency mechanism to solve for the impacts of the 1AC.
Anderson, prof. John Hokins University, 07 (Amanda, “Reply to my Critic(s)” 2007,
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/criticism/v048/48.2anderson.html, accessed July 5, 2013, QDKM)
Disagreement is, by the terms of my book, a form of respect, not a form of disrespect. And by
disagreement, I don't mean simply to say that we should expect disagreement rather than agreement,
which is a frequently voiced—if misconceived—criticism of Habermas. Of course we should expect
disagreement. My point is that we should focus on the moment of dissatisfaction in the face of
disagreement—the internal dynamic in argument that imagines argument might be the beginning of
[End Page 281] a process of persuasion and exchange that could end in agreement (or partial
agreement). For those who advocate reconciling ourselves to disagreements rather than arguing them
out, by contrast, there is a complacent—and in some versions, even celebratory—attitude toward fixed
disagreement. Refusing these options, I make the case for dissatisfied disagreement in the final chapter
of the book and argue that people should be willing to justify their positions in dialogue with one
another, especially if they hope to live together in a post-traditional pluralist society.
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A2: Pragmatism bad
Pragmatism doesn’t focus on the morality of claims, rather it hopes to question norms
Rorty, philosopher, 82 [Richard, 1982, “Consequences of Pragmatism”
http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/rorty.htm 7/5/13 EYS]
The essays in this book are attempts to draw consequences from a pragmatist theory about truth. This
theory says that truth is not the sort of thing one should expect to have a philosophically interesting
theory about. For pragmatists, “truth” is just the name of a property which all true statements share. It
is what is common to “Bacon did not write Shakespeare,” “It rained yesterday,” “E = mc2” “Love is
better than hate,” “The Allegory of Painting was Vermeer’s best work,” “2 plus 2 is 4,” and “There are
nondenumerable infinities.” Pragmatists doubt that there is much to be said about this common
feature. They doubt this for the same reason they doubt that there is much to be said about the
common feature shared by such morally praiseworthy actions as Susan leaving her husband, America
joining the war against the Nazis, America pulling out of Vietnam, Socrates not escaping from jail, Roger
picking up litter from the trail, and the suicide of the Jews at Masada. They see certain acts as good
ones to perform, under the circumstances, but doubt that there is anything general and useful to say
about what makes them all good. The assertion of a given sentence – or the adoption of a disposition to
assert the sentence, the conscious acquisition of a belief – is a justifiable, praiseworthy act in certain
circumstances. But, a fortiori, it is not likely that there is something general and useful to be said about
what makes All such actions good-about the common feature of all the sentences which one should
acquire a disposition to assert.
Pragmatists think that the history of attempts to isolate the True or the Good, or to define the word
“true” or “good,” supports their suspicion that there is no interesting work to be done in this area. It
might, of course, have turned out otherwise. People have, oddly enough, found something interesting to
say about the essence of Force and the definition of “number.” They might have found something
interesting to say about the essence of Truth. But in fact they haven’t. The history of attempts to do so,
and of criticisms of such attempts, is roughly coextensive with the history of that literary genre we call
“philosophy” – a genre founded by Plato. So pragmatists see the Platonic tradition as having outlived its
usefulness. This does not mean that they have a new, non-Platonic set of answers to Platonic questions
to offer, but rather that they do not think we should ask those questions any more. When they suggest
that we not ask questions about the nature of Truth and Goodness, they do not invoke a theory about
the nature of reality or knowledge or man which says that “there is no such thing” as Truth or
Goodness. Nor do they have a “relativistic” or “subjectivist” theory of Truth or Goodness. They would
simply like to change the subject. They are in a position analogous to that of secularists who urge that
research concerning the Nature, or the Will, of God does not get us anywhere. Such secularists are not
saying that God does not exist, exactly; they feel unclear about what it would mean to affirm His
existence, and thus about the point of denying it. Nor do they have some special, funny, heretical view
about God. They just doubt that the vocabulary of theology is one we ought to be using. Similarly,
pragmatists keep trying to find ways of making anti-philosophical points in non-philosophical language.
For they face a dilemma if their language is too unphilosophical, too “literary,” they will be accused of
changing the subject; if it is too philosophical it will embody Platonic assumptions which will make it
impossible for the pragmatist to state the conclusion he wants to reach.
All this is complicated by the fact that “philosophy,” like “truth” and “goodness,” is ambiguous.
Uncapitalised, “truth” and “goodness” name properties of sentences, or of actions and situations.
Capitalised, they are the proper names of objects – goals or standards which can be loved with all one’s
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heart and soul and mind, objects of ultimate concern. Similarly, “Philosophy” can mean simply what
Sellars calls “an attempt to see how things, in the broadest possible sense of the term, hang together,
in the broadest possible sense of the term.” Pericles, for example, was using this sense of the term when
he praised the Athenians for “philosophising without unmanliness” (philosophein aneu malakias). In this
sense, Blake is as much a philosopher as Fichte, Henry Adams more of a philosopher than Frege. No one
would be dubious about philosophy, taken in this sense. But the word can also denote something more
specialised, and very dubious indeed. In this second sense, it can mean following Plato’s and Kant’s
lead, asking questions about the nature of certain normative notions (e.g., “truth,” “rationality,”
“goodness”) in the hope of better obeying such norms. The idea is to believe more truths or do more
good or be more rational by knowing more about Truth or Goodness or Rationality. I shall capitalise the
term “philosophy” when used in this second sense, in order to help make the point that Philosophy,
Truth, Goodness, and Rationality are interlocked Platonic notions. Pragmatists are saying that the best
hope for philosophy is not to practise Philosophy. They think it will not help to say something true to
think about Truth, nor will it help to act well to think about Goodness, nor will it help to be rational to
think about Rationality.
Pragmatism questions the individual
Rorty, philosopher, 82 [Richard, 1982, “Consequences of Pragmatism”
http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/rorty.htm 7/5/13 EYS]
So far, however, my description of pragmatism has left an important distinction out of account. Within
Philosophy, there has been a traditional difference of opinion about the Nature of Truth, a battle
between (as Plato put it) the gods and the giants. On the one hand there have been Philosophers like
Plato himself who were otherworldly, possessed of a larger hope. They urged that human beings were
entitled to self-respect only because they had one foot beyond space and time. On the other hand –
especially since Galileo showed how spatio-temporal events could be brought under the sort of elegant
mathematical law which Plato suspected might hold only for another world – there have been
philosophers (e.g., Hobbes, Marx) who insisted that space and time make up the only Reality there is,
and that Truth is Correspondence to that Reality. In the nineteenth century, this opposition crystallised
into one between “the transcendental philosophy” and “the empirical philosophy,” between the
“Platonists” and the “positivists.” Such terms were, even then, hopelessly vague, but every intellectual
knew roughly where he stood in relation to the two movements. To be on the transcendental side was
to think that natural science was not the last word – that there was more Truth to be found. To be on
the empirical side was to think that natural science – facts about how spatio-temporal things worked –
was all the Truth there was. To side with Hegel or Green was to think that some normative sentences
about rationality and goodness corresponded to something real, but invisible to natural science. To side
with Comte or Mach was to think that such sentences either “reduced” to sentences about spatiotemporal events or were not subjects for serious reflection.
It is important to realise that the empirical philosophers – the positivists – were still doing Philosophy.
The Platonic presupposition which unites the gods and the giants, Plato with Democritus, Kant with Mill,
Husserl with Russell, is that what the vulgar call “truth” the assemblage of true statements – should be
thought of as divided into a lower and an upper division, the division between (in Plato’s terms) mere
opinion and genuine knowledge. It is the work of the Philosopher to establish an invidious distinction
between such statements as “It rained yesterday” and “Men should try to be just in their dealings.” For
Plato the former sort of statement was second-rate, mere pistis or doxa. The latter, if perhaps not yet
episteme, was at least a plausible candidate. For the positivist tradition which runs from Hobbes to
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Carnap, the former sentence was a paradigm of what Truth looked like, but the latter was either a
prediction about the causal effects of certain events or an “expression of emotion.” What the
transcendental philosophers saw as the spiritual, the empirical philosophers saw as the emotional. What
the empirical philosophers saw as the achievements of natural science in discovering the nature of
Reality, the transcendental philosophers saw as banausic, as true but irrelevant to Truth.
Pragmatism cuts across this transcendental/empirical distinction by questioning the common
presupposition that there is an invidious distinction to be drawn between kinds of truths. For the
pragmatist, true sentences are not true because they correspond to reality, and so there is no need to
worry what sort of reality, if any, a given sentence corresponds to – no need to worry about what
“makes” it true. (Just as there is no need to worry, once one has determined what one should do,
whether there is something in Reality which makes that act the Right one to perform.) So the pragmatist
sees no need to worry about whether Plato or Kant was right in thinking that something non-spatiotemporal made moral judgments true, nor about whether the absence of such a thing means that
such judgments are is merely expressions of emotion” or “merely conventional” or “merely
subjective. “
This insouciance brings down the scorn of both kinds of Philosophers upon the pragmatist. The Platonist
sees the pragmatist as merely a fuzzy-minded sort of positivist. The positivist sees him as lending aid and
comfort to Platonism by leveling down the distinction between Objective Truth – the sort of true
sentence attained by “the scientific method” – and sentences which lack the precious “correspondence
to reality” which only that method can induce. Both join in thinking the pragmatist is not really a
philosopher, on the ground that he is not a Philosopher. The pragmatist tries to defend himself by saying
that one can be a philosopher precisely by being anti-Philosophical, that the best way to make things
hang together is to step back from the issues between Platonists and positivists, and thereby give up the
presuppositions of Philosophy.
One difficulty the pragmatist has in making his position clear, therefore, is that he must struggle with the
positivist for the position of radical anti-Platonist. He wants to attack Plato with different weapons from
those of the positivist, but at first glance he looks like just another variety of positivist. He shares with
the positivist the Baconian and Hobbesian notion that knowledge is power, a tool for coping with reality.
But he carries this Baconian point through to its extreme, as the positivist does not. He drops the notion
of truth as correspondence with reality altogether, and says that modern science does not enable us to
cope because it corresponds, it just plain enables us to cope. His argument for the view is that several
hundred years of effort have failed to make interesting sense of the notion of “correspondence” (either
of thoughts to things or of words to things). The pragmatist takes the moral of this discouraging history
to be that “true sentences work because they correspond to the way things are” is no more illuminating
than “it is right because it fulfils the Moral Law.” Both remarks, in the pragmatist’s eyes, are empt y
metaphysical compliments – harmless as rhetorical pats on the back to the successful inquirer or agent,
but troublesome if taken seriously and “clarified” philosophically.
It is the impossible attempt to step outside our skins – the traditions, linguistic and other, within
which we do our thinking and self-criticism – and compare ourselves with something absolute. This
Platonic urge to escape from the finitude of one’s time and place, the “merely conventional” and
contingent aspects of one’s life, is responsible for the original Platonic distinction between two kinds of
true sentence. By attacking this latter distinction, the holistic “pragmaticising” strain in analytic
philosophy has helped us see how the metaphysical urge – common to fuzzy Whiteheadians and razorsharp “scientific realists” – works. It has helped us be sceptical about the idea that some particular
science (say physics) or some particular literary genre (say Romantic poetry, or transcendental
philosophy) gives us that species of true sentence which is not just a true sentence, but rather a piece
of Truth itself. Such sentences may be very useful indeed, but there is not going to be a Philosophical
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explanation of this utility. That explanation, like the original justification of the assertion of the
sentence, will be a parochial matter – a comparison of the sentence with alternative sentences
formulated in the same or in other vocabularies. But such comparisons are the business of, for
example, the physicist or the poet, or perhaps of the philosopher – not of the Philosopher, the outside
expert on the utility, or function, or metaphysical status of Language or of Thought.
Only pragmatic philosophy can evade the logical harms of the K and still take action
against great atrocities – We’re not committed to their slippery slope link args
Rorty, philosopher, 82 [Richard, 1982, “Consequences of Pragmatism”
http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/rorty.htm 7/5/13 EYS]
The most powerful reason for thinking that no such culture is possible is that seeing all criteria as no
more than temporary resting-places, constructed by a community to facilitate its inquiries, seems
morally humiliating. Suppose that Socrates was wrong, that we have not once seen the Truth, and so
will not, intuitively, recognise it when we see it again. This means that when the secret police come,
when the torturers violate the innocent, there is nothing to be said to them of the form “There is
something within you which you are betraying. Though you embody the practices of a totalitarian
society which will endure forever, there is something beyond those practices which condemns you.”
This thought is hard to live with, as is Sartre’s remark:
Tomorrow, after my death, certain people may decide to establish fascism, and the others may be
cowardly or miserable enough to let them get away with it. At that moment, fascism will be the truth
of man, and so much the worse for us. In reality, things will be as much as man has decided they are.
This hard saying brings out what ties Dewey and Foucault, James and Nietzsche, together- the sense that
there is nothing deep down inside us except what we have put there ourselves, no criterion that we
have not created in the course of creating a practice, no standard of rationality that is not an appeal
to such a criterion, no rigorous argumentation that is not obedience to our own conventions.
A post-philosophical culture, then, would be one in which men and women felt themselves alone,
merely finite, with no links to something Beyond. On the pragmatist’s account, position was only a
halfway stage in the development of such a culture-the progress toward, as Sartre puts it, doing without
God. For positivism preserved a god in its notion of Science (and in its notion of “scientific philosophy”),
the notion of a portion of culture where we touched something not ourselves, where we found Truth
naked, relative to no description. The culture of positivism thus produced endless swings of the
pendulum between the view that “values are merely ‘relative’ (or ‘emotive,’ or ‘subjective’)” and the
view that bringing the “scientific method” to bear on questions of political and moral choice was the
solution to all our problems. Pragmatism, by contrast, does not erect Science as an idol to fill the place
once held by God. It views science as one genre of literature-or, put the other way around, literature
and the arts as inquiries, on the same footing as scientific inquiries. Thus it sees ethics as neither more
“relative” or “subjective” than scientific theory, nor as needing to be made “scientific.” Physics is a
way of trying to cope with various bits of the universe; ethics is a matter of trying to cope with other
bits. Mathematics helps physics do its job; literature and the arts help ethics do its. Some of these
inquiries come up with propositions, some with narratives, some with paintings. The question of what
propositions to assert, which pictures to look at, what narratives to listen to and comment on and retell,
are all questions about what will help us get what we want (or about what we should want).
No. The question of whether the pragmatist view of truth-that it is t a profitable topic-is itself true is
thus a question about whether a post-Philosophical culture is a good thing to try for. It is not a
question about what the word “true” means, nor about the requirements of an adequate philosophy of
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language, nor about whether the world “exists independently of our minds,” nor about whether the
intuitions of our culture are captured in the pragmatists’ slogans. There is no way in which the issue
between the pragmatist and his opponent can be tightened up and resolved according to criteria agreed
to by both sides. This is one of those issues which puts everything up for grabs at once -where there is
no point in trying to find agreement about “the data” or about what would count as deciding the
question. But the messiness of the issue is not a reason for setting it aside. The issue between religion
and secularism was no less messy, but it was important that it got decided as it did.
If the account of the contemporary philosophical scene which I offer in these essays is correct, then the
issue about the truth of pragmatism is the issue which all the most important cultural developments
since Hegel have conspired to put before us. But, like its predecessor, it is not going to be resolved by
any sudden new discovery of how things really are. It will be decided, if history allows us the leisure to
decide such issues, only by a slow and painful choice between alternative self-images.
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A2: Narratives good
Personal narratives undermine their own solvency by limiting discussion to either
sympathy or silence
Coughlin, Vanderbilt Law Professor, 95 [Anne M., August 1995, “REGULATING THE SELF:
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL PERFORMANCES IN OUTSIDER SCHOLARSHIP” Virginia Law Review, Volume: 81, p.
1229 EYS]
The warning this episode conveys to readers signals more than a textual incoherence or the failure of
Williams's own collaborative engagement. More fundamentally, it reveals the inherent inadequacy of
autobiography as a tool of social criticism. The institutional spaces where the outsider stories have
their existence, including the lecture tour podium and the pages of scholarly journals, are arenas that
foster, indeed, depend on, vigorous inquiry and dialectical exchange. Before we agree to reorder
society along lines a group of scholars may propose, scrupulous testing of their theories seems wholly
appropriate. Yet, as Williams's bitter rebuke of her editors portends, personal stories tend to pre-empt
responses other than sympathy or silence, precisely because any critical commentary or desire for
clarification may be dismissed as ad hominem-and any criticism necessarily is ad hominem, since the
material available for criticism or clarification is the scholar's personal experience.193 Ironically,
therefore, the power of the autobiographical exchange to inspire readers' sympathy turns out to be a
significant shortcoming within the context of an academy whose participants, even when sympathetic
to an idea, are committed to immediate, often face-to-face, critical inquiry and debate.194 By rejecting
any critical reaction as a treacherous failure of sympathy for the author's pain, if not as the product of
prejudiced ignorance, and dismissing criticism as a personal attack on the author's character,
autobiographical rhetoric is no less coercive of readers than the legal rhetoric that the outsiders desire
to supersede.195
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A2: Roleplaying = utopian
Utopianism good – key to change
Streeten, BU econ professor, 99 [Paul, 1999, Development, v. 42 n.2 ingenta, JFS]
First, Utopian thinking can be useful as a framework for analysis. Just as physicists assume an
atmospheric vacuum for some purposes, so policy analysts can assume a political vacuum from
which they can start afresh. The physicists’ assumption plainly would not be useful for the design
of parachutes, but can serve other purposes well. Similarly, when thinking of tomorrow’s problems,
Utopianism is not helpful. But for long-term strategic purposes it is essential. Second, the Utopian
vision gives a sense of direction, which can get lost in approaches that are preoccupied with the
feasible. In a world that is regarded as the second-best of all feasible worlds, everything becomes
a necessary constraint. All vision is lost. Third, excessive concern with the feasible tends to
reinforce the status quo. In negotiations, it strengthens the hand of those opposed to any reform.
Unless the case for change can be represented in the same detail as the case for no change, it tends
to be lost. Fourth, it is sometimes the case that the conjuncture of circumstances changes quite
suddenly and that the constellation of forces, unexpectedly, turns out to be favourable to even
radical innovation. Unless we are prepared with a carefully worked out, detailed plan, that
yesterday could have appeared utterly Utopian, the reformers will lose out by default. Only a few
years ago nobody would have expected the end of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, the
disappearance of the Soviet Union, the unification of Germany, the break-up of Yugoslavia, the
marketization of China, the end of apartheid in South Africa. And the handshake on the White
House lawn between Mr Peres and Mr Arafat. Fifth, the Utopian reformers themselves can
constitute a pressure group, countervailing the self interested pressures of the obstructionist
groups. Ideas thought to be Utopian have become realistic at moments in history when large
numbers of people support them, and those in power have to yield to their demands. The demand
for ending slavery is a historical example. It is for these five reasons that Utopians should not be
discouraged from formulating their proposals and from thinking the unthinkable, unencumbered
by the inhibitions and obstacles of political constraints. They should elaborate them in the same
detail that the defenders of the status quo devote to its elaboration and celebration. Utopianism
and idealism will then turn out to be the most realistic vision. It is well known that there are three
types of economists: those who can count and those who can’t. But being able to count up to two, I
want to distinguish between two types of people. Let us call them, for want of a better name, the
Pedants and the Utopians. The names are due to Peter Berger, who uses them in a different
context. The Pedants or technicians are those who know all the details about the way things are
and work, and they have acquired an emotional vested interest in keeping them this way. I have
come across them in the British civil service, in the bureaucracy ofthe World Bank, and elsewhere.
They are admirable people but they are conservative, and no good companions for reform. On the
other hand, there are the Utopians, the idealists, the visionaries who dare think the unthinkable.
They are also admirable, many of them young people. But they lack the attention to detail that the
Pedants have. When the day of the revolution comes, they will have entered it on the wrong date
in their diaries and fail to turn up, or, if they do turn up, they will be on the wrong side of the
barricades. What we need is a marriage between the Pedants and the Utopians, between the
technicians who pay attention to the details and the idealists who have the vision of a better
future. There will be tensions in combining the two, but they will be creative tensions. We need
Pedantic Utopian Pedants who will work out in considerable detail the ideal world and ways of
getting to it, and promote the good cause with informed fantasy. Otherwise, when the
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opportunity arises, we shall miss it for lack of preparedness and lose out to the opponents of
reform, to those who want to preserve the status quo.
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Critiques Good
Note: this should just supplement what specific evidence you have about your aff.
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Definitions
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Resolved
“Resolved” doesn’t mean to enact laws, the definition is to prompt an action to
change the state of mind, which is what the aff does
Oxford English Dictionary 10 (Oxford English Dictionary, premier English dictionary, March 10th,
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/163734?redirectedFrom=Resolved&, accessed July 5, 2013, QDKM)
Resolved, adj.
1. a. Of the mind, etc.: freed from doubt or uncertainty; settled. Obs.
b. Of a person: convinced, satisfied, or certain of something. Obs.
c. Of doctrine: adopted or accepted after careful deliberation. Obs.
2. a. Of a person: that has resolved to do something; having a fixed intention; determined, decided.
Usually followed by an expression (prepositional phrase, that-clause, or to and infinitive) indicating the
intended action, outcome, etc.
b. Of an action, state of mind, etc.: fully determined upon, deliberate.
c. Of a person: staunch, dedicated; committed, confirmed; that is thoroughly committed to the
specified or implied course of action, practice, religious belief, doctrine, etc.
3. Of a person, the mind, etc.: characterized by determination or firmness of purpose; resolute.
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Should
Should denotes obligation
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 2
Merriam-Webster’s Inc., Tenth Ed., http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary
Used in auxiliary function to express obligation, propriety, or expediency
Debate should be focused on questions of ethical obligations
Duffy, Communication Professor Cal Poly, 83
[Bernard,
Rhetoric PhD – Pitt, “The Ethics of Argumentation in Intercollegiate Debate: A Conservative
Appraisal,” National Forensics Journal, Spring, pp 65-71, accessed at
http://www.nationalforensics.org/journal/vol1no1-6.pdf]
Debate at its worst is an activity which promotes self abnegation rather than self discovery.
Intercollegiate debate ought to educate students in more than structure, credibility, and logical
reasoning. It should teach them the effective use of arguments from definition as well as arguments
from consequence, circumstance and authority. Definitional arguments, better than others, orient
students toward their own beliefs and principles. Logic, fact, and authority wither without ethics, and
debate without ethical judgments sounds hollow and contrived.
I am not proposing that debaters only make arguments they believe in. Students also learn from
articulating the principles which underlie positions they oppose. To ignore principle as a line of
argument and focus instead on mere fact and authority makes debate less effective as a method of
exploring one's own preferences and values.
It might be argued that debate is not dialectic, and that my criticisms require debate to be something we
cannot make it. After all the sophists, not Plato, gave birth to debate. Protagoras saw it as a lesson in
sophistic relativism. If one believes in the relativism of the sophists, it would be absurd for debaters to
search after principles upon which to base their arguments. Of what use, one might ask. are the
eloquently expressed propositions of a bygone era to a scientific age winch bases decisions on calculable
fact? For today's neosophists it would be foolish indeed to think of debate as a philosophical or ethical
enterprise. But in this case, why talk about the ethics of debate at all? If the term only means observing
the rules of the game, it is not particularly significant. Debate should be a thoroughly ethical enterprise.
It should educate students in ethics, as well as requiring them to follow the rules.
Ultimately, it comes down to a matter of choice. Should we as coaches and judges permit the steady
dismantling of debate as a means of educating students? Ought we to praise students for making
sensationalistic arguments, and for relying on appeals to authority, while ignoring arguments from
principle? Should we give ballots to speakers who are the most adept at parroting back the
commonplaces they have learned and to those who can read evidence with the greatest speed and the
least visible understanding? Should we encourage debate as a contest of evidence rather than as a
meeting of minds? No matter how much lip service is given to the educational values of intercollegiate
debate, it cannot now be claimed as an activity which forces students to reflect upon or use their
ethical beliefs in the formulation of arguments.
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Answers To
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A2: Limits
Innovation is a prerequisite to change – limits on a topic restrict the ability to create
new solutions and theories
Bleiker, professor of International Relations, and Leet, Senior Research Officer with
the Brisbane Institute 6 (Roland, and Martin, “From the Sublime to the Subliminal: Fear, Awe and
Wonder in International Politics” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 34(3), pg. 733 igm)
A subliminal orientation is attentive to what is bubbling along under the surface. It is mindful of how
conscious attempts to understand conceal more than they reveal, and purposeful efforts of progressive
change may engender more violence than they erase. For these reasons, Connolly emphasises that
‘ethical artistry’ has an element of naïveté and innocence. One is not quite sure what one is doing. Such
naïveté need not lead us back to the idealism of the romantic period. ‘One should not be naïve about
naïveté’, Simon Critchley would say.56 Rather, the challenge of change is an experiment. It is not
locked up in a predetermined conception of where one is going. It involves tentatively exploring the
limits of one’s being in the world, to see if different interpretations are possible, how those
interpretations might impact upon the affects below the level of conscious thought, and vice versa.
This approach entails drawing upon multiple levels of thinking and being, searching for changes in
sensibilities that could give more weight to minor feelings or to arguments that were previously
ignored.57 Wonder needs to be at the heart of such experiments, in contrast to the resentment of an
intellect angry with its own limitations. The ingredient of wonder is necessary to disrupt and suspend
the normal pressures of returning to conscious habit and control. This exploration beyond the
conscious implies the need for an ethos of theorising and acting that is quite different from the mode
directed towards the cognitive justification of ideas and concepts. Stephen White talks about ‘circuits
of reflection, affect and argumentation’.58 Ideas and principles provide an orientation to practice, the
implications of that practice feed back into our affective outlook, and processes of argumentation
introduce other ideas and affects. The shift, here, is from the ‘vertical’ search for foundations in
‘skyhooks’ above or ‘foundations’ below, to a ‘horizontal’ movement into the unknown.
Limits constrain possible solutions – politics is best informed by different levels of
analysis
Bleiker, professor of International Relations, 3 (Roland, “Discourse and Human Agency”,
Contemopary Political Theory, 2003, 2, Palgrave Macmillan Ltd, pg. 39-40 igm)
Approaching the political - and by extension dilemmas of agency requires tolerance towards various
forms of insight and levels of analysis, even if they contradict each other’s internal logic. Such
differences often only appear as contradictions because we still strive for a universal standard of
reference that is supposed to subsume all the various aspects of life under a single totalizing
standpoint (Adorno, 1992, 17–18). Every process of revealing is at the same time a process of
concealing. Even the most convincing position cannot provide a form of insight that does not at the
same time conceal other perspectives. Revealing always occurs within a frame. Framing is a way of
ordering, and ordering banishes all other forms of revealing. This is, grossly simplified, a position that
resonates throughout much of Heidegger’s work (1954, 35). Taking this argument to heart is to
recognize that one cannot rely on one form of revealing alone. An adequate understanding of human
agency can be reached only by moving back and forth between various insights. The point, then, is not
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to end up with a grand synthesis, but to make most out of each specific form of revealing (for an
exploration of this theme, via an analysis of Kant’s Critique of Judgement, see Deleuze, 1994).
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A2: Predictability
Their cards are not about contest debate, but about dialogic processes of deliberation
- Debate is distinct from deliberative dialogue
Anderson, Professor of Philosophy Babson College, 98
(Albert A., , “Why Dialogue?”, http://www.wordtrade.com/philosophy/ancient/whydialogue.htm)
Dialogue is not debate. Debate differs from discussion in that the verbal exchange usually has a
limited number of positions stipulated at the outset (such as affirmative vs. negative, liberal vs. conservative,
or plaintiff vs. defendant), each competing with the others with the clear goal of winning the contest. Debate
is a zero‑sum game. If one side wins, the other side must lose. The goal in a debate is to win the verbal contest by
persuading others, often without concern for the truth of the matter. It differs from discussion in its single‑minded
purpose of proving a pre‑established position in order to win; to change positions in a debate is to
lose the contest. The adversarial method frequently employed by lawyers is one familiar form of debate. Although it is not necessary for
the legal process to employ this method, when money and power are at stake it is not surprising that a win/lose strategy takes over.
The most important difference between dialogue and these other forms of oral exchange is its primary dedication to what is common or
universal. Conversation often depends on the tastes and inclinations of the participants without an agenda or clear objective. Discussion and
debate, by contrast, are dedicated to presenting and defending a specific position or point of view, usually determined by the context or the
group being represented. Unlike
these other forms of verbal activity, dialogue makes no prior judgment
about the outcome of the process. It is serious inquiry that seeks to understand the nature and activity of whatever subject
matter is being considered. It searches for truth rather than taking it as given at the outset of the inquiry.
Participants in a dialogue are free to change their mind in the course of the exchange.
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A2: Deliberation
Zero sum debate competition makes deliberation impossible
Bartanen, Pacific Lutheran University and Frank, University of Oregon 99
(Michael D. Bartanen and David A. Frank, “Reclaiming a Heritage: A Proposal for Rhetorically Grounded
Academic Debate”, Journal of the National Parliamentary Debate Association, vol 6, #1, p.39-40,
http://www.parlidebate.org/pdf/vol5no5.pdf)
Unfortunately, without compensating for the zero-sum game element of competitive debate, even
parliamentary debate cannot fulfill its potential in encouraging greater civility in the debate process.
Any form of debate works best when arguers interact with their opponents in a context where "risk
taking" occurs. The importance of taking the risk of "being proved wrong." is a vital characteristic of
debate introduced by Wayne Brockriede.25 Debate is just a game when arguers are encouraged to
defend their own arguments without reference to adapting to the views of others.
The structure of both policy and parliamentary debates heavily relies on gaming as an organizing principle.26
The zero sum outcome of the debate round, where one team wins and the other loses, destroys any
incentive to seek common ground or modify any pre-conceived position. Further, the zero sum
outcome encourages debaters to overstate the strength of their own position and denigrate the status
of their opponent's views. Debaters onlv re-examine their own views if those arguments are
competitively unsuccessful, rather than if an opponent has raised substantive flaws in the argument.
Contest debate only produces bad deliberation
Bartanen, Pacific Lutheran University and Frank, University of Oregon 99
(Michael D. Bartanen Pacific Lutheran University and David A. Frank University of Oregon, “Reclaiming a
Heritage: A Proposal for Rhetorically Grounded Academic Debate”, Journal of the National
Parliamentary Debate Association, vol 6, #1, p.40, http://www.parlidebate.org/pdf/vol5no5.pdf)
Both policy and parliamentary debate fail to promote habits of effective argument analysis and
research. Trapp is right that policy debate discourages careful testing of the inferences between
evidence and claims. In addition, policy debate, by emphasizing the use of expert testimony evidence
and discouraging debate about the traditional stock issues, effectively narrows the range of
viewpoints that can be considered. There is a third tendency in policy debate for arguers to develop
positions which mirror those of many other teams. Some of these positions have an almost notorious
reputation (e.g. "Nuke War Disad") for accentuating the tendency in policy debate to prefer "low risk /
high impact" positions rather than ones which effectively test the causal relationships between a
proposed policy change and its potential disadvantages.
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A2: Hanghoj - Deliberation
Can’t solve any of these deliberation claims, have read impacts to a process of debate
that they don’t engage in, this is zero sum contest debate, not the deliberative styles
their cards assume.
Hanghoj ev doesn’t apply, is about a specific debate event called “The Power” used in
Danish secondary schools, he agrees can only evaluate a specific game in its own
context
Hanghoj, PhD Candidate Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies University
of Southern Denmark, 8
(Thorkild, “PLAYFUL KNOWLEDGE: An Explorative Study of Educational Gaming”, ,
http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information_til/Studerende_ved_SDU/Din_uddannelse/phd_hum/
afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf)
First of all, the educational use of games should be understood in relation to how particular games are
enacted in actual contexts. Thus, instead of playing "the definition game", and trying to define the
essence or ontology of games, this thesis presents a more pragmatic approach to the study of actually
playing educational games. More specifically, I have identified a series of game elements - scenarios,
goals, outcomes, rules, roles, resources and dialogue - which are all relevant for understanding the
interplay between a particular game design and the educational context in which it is enacted. These
game elements also reflect how games and education represent different traditions of knowledge,
which involve a range of partially overlapping assertions, modes of representation and social forms of
organisation (Barth, 2002). Finally, both games and education create specific criteria for validating
particular forms of knowledge. In this way, educational gaming represents a tension between two
different traditions of knowledge which I have captured in the term playful knowledge.
Hanghoj conceives of debate that is detached side switching as distinct from
deliberative forums - no internal link to their deliberation impacts
Hanghoj, PhD Candidate Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies University
of Southern Denmark, 8
(Thorkild, “PLAYFUL KNOWLEDGE: An Explorative Study of Educational Gaming”, PhD Dissertation
Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies University of Southern Denmark,
http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information_til/Studerende_ved_SDU/Din_uddannelse/phd_hum/
afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf)
This gradual process of shifting from a pragmatic design perspective toward a more analytically oriented
perspective on the social actors in the game encounters implied a reconceptualisation of my study. For
example, having observed how the game scenario was enacted and validated by the teachers and
students, I decided to modify my initial assumptions about creating a "realistic" game and focus more on
the relevance of the design elements. Furthermore, the end-of-game discussions and post-game
interviews resulted in a significantly high degree of responses about the students' debate practices especially in relation to the students that performed as politicians. This focus was consistent with my
own observations and the analytical themes that emerged when transcribing and coding the video data
from the game session. Moreover, some of the social studies teachers in this study were slightly
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negative toward the label "role-playing" as it had obvious drama pedagogical connotations. Based on
these findings, I decided to reconceptualise the game label from a realistic role-playing game to a
debate game. During the process of relabelling the game, I learned that debate games and debate
education are fairly well-known phenomena in the English speaking world and have a long history
that can be traced back to ancient Greece, where Protagoras and other Sophists taught and debated
on the premise that there are always "many sides" to any subject (Billig, 1996: Snider & Schnurer,
2006). At the same time, the formalised and staged aspects of debate games represent a relatively
unknown phenomenon in the German-Nordic countries, which have a stronger tradition for more
deliberative models of democratic debate (cf. Habermas, 1981). Hopefully, English speaking readers will
bear such difference between various national debate cultures in mind when reading this thesis.
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A2: Freely & Steinberg - Decisionmaking
Our debate accesses all their Freely & Steinberg decision-making– ethics are a
crucial component
Freeley, Late, John Carroll University & Steinberg, University of Miami 8
(Austin j. Freeley, and David L Steinberg, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned
Decision Making, p.16-17)
In addition to making well-reasoned decisions, it is important to make decisions that are ethical. The
consequences of a failure to consider ethical constructs when making decisions range from business
failures (ENRON) to incarceration (Scooter Libbey), to the destruction of personal relationships. Ethics
are a set of constructs that guide our decision making by providing standards of behavior telling us
how we ought to act. While ethics may be based on or reflected in laws, they are not the same as laws.
Similarly, we learn value systems and thus standards for ethical behavior from our communities and
cultures, but that a behavior is a cultural standard or norm does not make it ethical.
According to Thomas White, there are two broad philosophical approaches to understanding ethical
choices: teleological and deontological. The teleological approach is results oriented, and would focus
on the good or bad consequences of an action or a decision. The deontological ethic is process or act
oriented, and is based on the notion that actions have moral value."" Scholars at the Markkula Center
for Applied Ethics at Santa Clara University have suggested that in making ethical decisions one ought
to follow a framework through the following steps:
■ Recognize an ethical issue
■ Get the facts
■ Evaluate alternative actions from various ethical perspectives
■ Make a decision and test it
■ Act, then reflect on the decision later23
Debate offers the ideal tool for examining the ethical implications of any decision, and critical thinking
should also be ethical thinking.
Freeley & Steinberg include creative topicality defenses within the bounds of
answers to the resolutional question that create clash
Freeley, Late, John Carroll University & Steinberg, University of Miami 8
(Austin j. Freeley, Late, John Carroll University and David L Steinberg, University of Miami,
Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making, p.45)
Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too
loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—
poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does
"effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling
swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be, "Would a mutual
defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Laurania of our support in a certain
crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That
the United States should enter into a mutual defense treaty with Laurania." Negative advocates might
oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say
that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or
that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these
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sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance
provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following
discussion.
They agree alternative forms of debate are still debate
Freeley, Late, John Carroll University & Steinberg, University of Miami 8
(Austin j. Freeley, Late, John Carroll University and David L Steinberg, University of Miami,
Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making, p.232-3)
As has been discussed earlier in this book (Chapters 2, 4, and 6), one thing intrinsic to debate is selfexamination and change. Although what you have read thus far in this chapter will provide a sound
traditional framework for policy and value debate, the traditions are slowly evolving. An unbounded
creativity in practice has evolved, with new conceptions of fiat as the reflexive authority of those
participating in the debate round itself, and with critical examination of the battle to give rhetorical
space to marginalized voices and open the debate experience to more viewpoints, standpoints, and
cultures. Debate approaches may disregard the traditional frameworks in favor of storytelling, hiphop, music and film, poetry, and other novel challenges to the conventional approaches. In more
subtle structures, debaters can build their comparative advantage cases with philosophical
foundations. More radical challenges to tradition may offer argumentation (sometimes in aesthetic
forms) to defend the resolution and/or to challenge the framework of policy debate. Critical
approaches focus on philosophical and value-based interpretations of propositional terms, and
performance-based approaches find clash in music, visual communication, role playing, and other
creative forms of self expression. Elizabeth Jones of Louisville University presented the following
rap as a part of her affirmative case in favor of U.S. withdrawal from NATO:
Roma people feel just like me, tired of being deprived of their liberty. Relegated to ghettos, held as slaves,
poor health care leading to early graves. Prison scars, from prison bars, walking round the prison yard. No
running water, no heat, no jobs, and everything you've seemed to love, you've lost.
While the rich get richer, who's paying the cost?
George Soros, Bill Clinton, to Dick Cheney, the so-called bearers of democracy.
NATO represents the military wing, of the all-powerful capitalist regime. While you think gangsters listen
to rap and sag, They really wear suits and carry leather bags.
Politicians with the power to pick, define, and choose who will win and who will lose.
Not hearing the Roma or Palestine,
I guess it depends how genocide is defined.
SOURCE: USED BY PERMISSION OF ELIZABETH JONES.
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A2: Deliberative Democracy Impacts
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Contest debating rewards strategic behavior and domination via attempts to win that
make it impossible to use as a space for deliberative democracy
Lovbrand, Assistant Professor Centre for Climate Science and Policy Research
Linkoping University and Khan, Assistant Professor Environmental and Energy Systems
Studies, Lund University 10
(Eva Lovbrand, and Jamil Khan, “The deliberative turn in green political theory”, Environmental Politics
and Deliberative Democracy: Examining the Promise of New Modes of Governance, Ed. Backstrand)
Deliberative democracy can consequently be understood as an expression of the Enlightenment
devotion to reason as an arbiter of disagreement (Baber and Bartlett, 2005. p. 231). Largely under the
influence of Jurgen Habermas, the theory defends a communicative account of rationality based on
free discussion, sound argument and reliable evidence. In contrast to instrumental forms of rationality
(for example administrative or economic), which according to Habermas (1971) colonize the life-world
and repress individual freedom and creativity, communicative (or deliberative) rationality has been
described as a form of social interaction that emancipates the individual from myth, illusion and
manipulation (Dryzek, 1990). At the core of the theory are a number of procedural criteria that boil
down to two fundamental conditions; inclu-siveness and unconstrained dialogue (Smith. 2003. p. 56).
lnclusiveness requires that all citizens are allowed to participate in public discourse and have equal
rights to advance claims and arguments. The discourse is in turn unconstrained when the only authority
is that of a good argument (Dryzek, 1990, p. 15). Hence, communicative rationality requires that social
interaction is free from domination, manipulation and strategic behaviour.
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A2: Climate Impacts
No internal link to changing climate policy – debates just use to legitimate
bureaucratic decision-making as usual
Backstrand et al, Associate Professor Political Science, Lund University 10
(Karin Backstrand, Jamil Khan, Assistant Professor at the Department of Environmental and Energy
Systems Studies, Annica Kronsell, Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science, all at Lund
University and Eva Lovbrand, Eva Lovbrand is Assistant Professor al the Centre for Climate Science and
Policy Research at Linkoping University, “Environmental politics after the deliberative turn”,
Environmental Politics and Deliberative Democracy: Examining the Promise of New Modes of
Governance, Ed. Backstrand, p.231)
This book has systematically examined the promise of new modes of environmental governance through
eight case studies in policy fields such as climate, water, food safety, forestry and sustainable
development. The most significant and obvious finding is that the win-win rhetoric of new modes fails
to translate into practice. Not surprisingly, the promise to deliver more legitimate and effective
environmental policies seems too ambitious. While many of the governance arrangements analysed in
this book have indeed increased the participation of new actors in environmental politics, the
procedural qualities of these new modes are secondary to the quest for improved policy performance.
At the same time there is no conclusive evidence that the governance arrangements actually generate
more effective environmental problem-solving. Even in cases where environmental policy innovations,
such as the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism, have established an institutional structure
for the monitoring of performance, the environmental effectiveness remains uncertain. The extent to
which new modes of environmental governance will in fact lead to marked improvement of the natural
resource base or decreased pollution levels, therefore remains an open question.
Another central conclusion of this book is that the concept of 'new' modes is misleading. The shadow of
hierarchy, which is the catchword for the continued influence of states, intergovernmental
organization and supranational organizations in environmental politics, is prevalent in all of the
governance arrangements examined in this book. The state and international organizations often
initiate, broker and facilitate new modes of governance that can garner public legitimacy. This finding
does not, however, challenge the claim that environmental politics has taken a deliberative turn in
recent decades. It merely questions the assumption that such a turn is enacted in the absence of
government. In general we have found evidence of a governance trend towards increased public
participation, openness and dialogue. Although the deliberative turn primarily seems to engage
organized societal groups in collaborative decision-making, some of our cases also indicate that the
'softer* forms of steering can enable more inclusive reason-giving among a diversity of actors.
Encouraging examples are to be found in the implementation of the EU Water Directive and
deliberations around GMOs in the EU. While far from the ideal model of deliberative democracy, these
deliberative encounters emerge as an important, albeit piecemeal, complement to representative
democracy that may add legitimacy to decision-making processes.
Their climate policy change impacts assume applied debate, not academic debate
Freeley, Late Communications Professor, John Carroll University & Steinberg, Comm
Professor University of Miami, 8
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(Austin j. Freeley, and David L Steinberg, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned
Decision Making, p.19)
Debate can be classified into two broad categories: applied and educational. Applied debate is
conducted on propositions, questions, and topics in which the advocates have a special interest, and the
debate is presented before a judge or an audience with the power to render a binding decision on the
proposition or respond to the question or topic in a real way. Academic debate is conducted on
propositions in which the advocates have an academic interest, and the debate typically is presented
before a teacher, judge or audience without direct power to render a decision on the proposition. Of
course the audience in an academic debate does form opinions about the subject matter of the debate,
and that personal transformation may ultimately lead to meaningful action. However, the direct impact
of the audience decision in an academic debate is personal, and the decision made by the judge is
limited to identification of the winner of the debate. In fact, in academic debate the judge may be
advised to disregard the merits of the proposition and to render her win/loss decision only on the
merits of the support as presented in the debate itself. The most important identifying characteristic
of an academic debate is that the purpose of the debate is to provide educational opportunities for
the participants.
Deliberation waters down environmental policy to lowest common denominator
Lehtonen, Research Fellow Science and Technology Policy Research, University of
Sussex, 6
(Markku, Sussex Energy Group. Science and Technology Policy Research, The Freeman Centre, University
of Sussex, “Deliberative Democracy, Participation, and OECD Peer Reviews of Environmental Policies”,
American Journal of Evaluation; 27; 185)
Another problem with the OECD's approach from the perspective of true deliberation is that the "soft"
advocacy for policy integration and "win-win" rhetoric that underpin EPRs may win the support of the
more powerful sectors only at the cost of excessively "diluting" the message of sustainable
development. This might lead to the search for consensus around the lowest common denominator,
largely dictated by the more powerful "economist community" within the OECD by transforming
sustainable development into simply an issue of efficient environmental policies. This could imply that
environmental (or social) concerns should be taken into account, but only as long as they do not harm
economic development. One possibility of avoiding such risks would be to abandon the requirement
that, for instance, all public documents produced by the different units of the organization should be in
strict coherence with one another. In concrete terms, instead of attempting to harmonize the views
across the different OECD peer reviews, destined to represent an "OECD view on sustainable
development," it might be more fruitful to allow each one to defend its own perspective, even if this
would lead to contradictory conclusions across the reviews. Of course, this would require that any peer
review would clearly make explicit its underlying basic premises. Such an approach would be more in
line with the ideas of plurality of values, uncertainty, and complexity and recognize the often
irreconcilable differences between the descriptions of reality from different disciplinary and
methodological perspectives (see, e.g.. Norgaard. 1994).
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A2: Switch-Side
Switch side doesn’t solve – it misunderstands the purpose of debate
Greene, University of Minnesota professor of Communication, and Hicks, University of
Denver Associate Professor of communication, 5 (Ronald Walter, Darrin, “Lost Convictions:
Debating Both Sides and the¶ Ethical Self Fashioning of Liberal Subjects”
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=ronaldwaltergreene, pg. 105 date
accessed 7/10/13 igm)
The description of debate as a dialectical method did not mean that the¶ proponents of switch-side
debating rejected the importance of conviction for¶ public argument. They did, however, claim that
sound conviction, as opposed¶ to dogmatism, was a product of debate, not its prerequisite. Baird
(1955),¶ arguing that debate should be understood less as public advocacy and more as a¶ dialectical
method of inquiry, claimed that sound conviction was a product of a¶ rigorous analysis of all aspects
of a question and that this analysis was best¶ conducted through a method which had students
practice defending and¶ rejecting the major arguments on both sides. Thus, debating both sides
should¶ be understood as an educational procedure designed to generate ‘sound’¶ convictions prior to
public advocacy. Baird urged that the critics of switch-side¶ debating should understand the practice
as a pedagogical device and to judge it¶ accordingly. ‘These student exercises’, he told debaters and
their coaches, ‘are¶ to be sharply distinguished from the later ‘practical life’ situations in which you¶ are
preachers, lawyers, business men and women, politicians and community¶ LOST CONVICTIONS
105leaders. Debate and discussion training is essentially training in reflective¶ thinking, in the defence
of different sides (‘role playing’ as some call it), and in¶ the revelation of strength and weakness of
each position’ (p. 6). It was Baird’s¶ recognition that debating both sides was equivalent to role-playing
that¶ warranted re-thinking the fit between the speaker and the words spoken.¶ Furthermore, if a
debater did in fact appear to be shallow, insincere and prone¶ to manipulate public opinion for her or
his own ends, this was certainly not,¶ argued Wayne Thompson (1944) and Nicholas Cripe, the fault of
switch-side¶ debating, but the ‘result of other causes / weakness in the character of the¶ offender or
a misunderstanding of the proper functioning of debate ’¶ (Thompson 1944, p. 296). The proper way to
deal with any ethical¶ shortcomings in debaters, the proponents argued, was for the national¶ forensics
associations to develop a code of ethics that would stress the ethical¶ responsibility of intercollegiate
debaters (to present the best possible case¶ according to facts as the debater understood them) and to
forcefully condemn¶ individual acts of malfeasance such as misconstruing evidence, falsifying¶ sources,
and misrepresenting their opponents’ positions. For Robert Newman¶ (1963), the controversy over
debating both sides was simple to resolve: as long¶ as a good case could be made on each side of the
resolution and individual¶ debaters did not lie or cheat, there simply was no ethical dilemma and¶
certainly no need for a disciplinary-based ethic to guide debate practice.¶ Finally, debate coaches
justified switch-side debate on the pragmatic grounds¶ that it was a necessary component of
tournament debating and that abandoning¶ the practice would mean the end of intercollegiate
debating. ‘In fact, if the¶ proponents of ethical debate are correct’, Cripe warned, ‘and it is immoral for¶ a
team to debate both sides, then many schools would have to discontinue¶ debate as we practice today’
(1957, p. 209).
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A2: Switch Sides = Tolerance
Looser method of accounting for other perspectives is a better model
Young, late Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, 94
(Iris Marion, “Comments on Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self Author(s)”, New German Critique, No. 62,
Spring - Summer, pp. 172)
The injunction to take the other person's standpoint is supposed to aid communication. It may in fact
impede it. If you think you already know how the other people feel and judge because you have
imaginatively represented their perspective to yourself, then you may not listen to their expressions of
their perspectives very openly. If you think you can look at things from their points of view, then you
may avoid the sometimes arduous and painful process in which they confront you with your
prejudices, fantasies, and misunderstandings about them, which you have because of your point of
view. If you enter a dialogue with all the best intentions of taking the other people's perspectives, and in
the course of the discussion they then express anger and frustration at you for misunderstanding their
position, you are likely to become defensive and shut down the dialogue. If, on the other hand, you
approach a moral dialogue with others with the attitude that you cannot see things from their
standpoint, that there are aspects of where they are coming from that you do not understand, then
you will likely be more open to listening to the specific expression of their experience, interests, and
claims.
Thus, I want to conclude with the suggestion that a communicative ethics needs to distinguish between
taking the standpoint of the other person, reversing perspectives with others on the one hand, and on
the other hand taking the perspectives of others into account in making moral and political
judgments. To take the perspectives of others into account is to acknowledge that they are specific
and not reversible with those of others, and thus that they require a specifically institutionalized
voice. Seyla Benhabib says this herself.
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A2: Debate =/= Social Change
Debate is critical to positive change – critical examination and freedom of
argumentation
Warner, director of the debate program at the University of Louisville, and Bruschke,
professor of Human Communication Studies 3 (Ede, John, “‘GONE ON DEBATING:’
COMPETITIVE ACADEMIC DEBATE AS A TOOL OF EMPOWERMENT FOR URBAN AMERICA”,
http://commfaculty.fullerton.edu/jbruschke/Papers/Debate%20as%20a%20Tool%20of%20empowerme
nt.htm, date accessed 7/10/13 igm)
These arguments are theoretical; they cannot speak as powerfully as the voices of those who have
experienced both the oppression of an education system failing from the “unique synergy between
lack of funding and anachronistic pedagogical practices.” Ed Lee, who now holds a Master’s degree
and works for an Urban Debate League in San Francisco, recounts his experience as an urban debater:
Educated in the public school system of inner-city Atlanta, my high school experience was tragically
similar to the one depicted above. My savior, like many others, was the Atlanta Urban Debate League.
It provided the opportunity to question the nefarious rites of passage (prison, drugs, and drinking) that
seem to be uniquely debilitating to individuals in the poor urban communities. In enclaves of poverty,
there is also an undercurrent of nihilism and negativity that eats away at the soul of the community.
Adults are hopeless. Children follow their lead and become hopeless. The solution is to offer people a
choice beyond minimum wage or prison. Urban Debate Leagues provide that. Debating delivers a
galaxy of alternatives and opportunity for those who are only offered hopelessness and were
unnecessary elements of our culture that existed becaused they (predominantly) go unquestioned.
Questioning the very nature of our existence is at the heart of the debate process. I am left wondering
what would occur if debate became as compulsory in inner-city educational culture as football and
basketball? Imagine graduating from high school each year millions of underprivileged teenagers with
the ability to articulate their needs, the needs of others, and the ability to offer solutions. I am
convinced that someone would be forced to listen. Urban debate Leagues offers a pedagogical tool that
simultaneously opens the mind to alternatives and empowers students to take control of their lives.
Half of the time, students are disseminating information and forming arguments about complex
philosophical and political issues. In the other half, they answer the arguments of others. Selfreflexivity is an inherent part of the activity. Debating gives students the ability to articulate the
partiality of all critical assessments. Contemporary educational techniques teach one side of the issue
and universalize it as the only “truth.” Debate forces students to evaluate both sides, and determine
their independent contextualized truth. Additionally, unlike the current pedagogy, debate allows
everything to be questioned…The ability to question subjectivities presented as the objective truth
makes debate uniquely empowering for individuals disenfranchised by the current system. It teaches
students to interrogate their own institutionalized neglect and the systemic unhindered oppression of
others. It is one of the few venues we are able to question authority. (pp. 95-6) Given the possibilities
an urban debate program presents, it is worth examining the practical possibilities for a revitalization of
urban debate. One thing is clear: Urban debate is under-utilized at present. Many urban debate
programs died in the late sixties and early seventies as the result of massive budget cuts. As tax
revenues diminished in educational coffers, debate programs, always treated as just one of the
“extracurricular” activities, got lost in efforts to stop the institutional bleeding by “doing more with
less.” While college debate is more vibrant, as early as 1975 major college debate organizations were
acknowledging the lack of diversity in intercollegiate forensics. Little has changed over the past twenty-
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five years; minority participation remains exceptionally low at the two major national policy debate
tournaments, the Cross Examination Debate Association championship and the National Debate
Tournament (Hill, 1997; Stepp, 1997)
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Critiques Good - Topic Specific
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Topic Education Pre-Requisite
Topic education: Criticism surrounding the topic is productive – Latin America is a site
for differing frameworks of knowledge that should be discussed – key to topic specific
education
Bialakowsky, Gino Germani Research Institute et al. 12 (Alberto L. Bialakowsky, Pablo Gentili,
Paulo Henrique Martins, Silvia Lago ¶ Martínez, Marcelo Langieri, Carolina Mera, María Victoria Mutti,
Alicia I. ¶ Palermo, Lucas Sablich, Federico Schuster, Beatriz Wehle “Latin American Critical Thought¶
Theory and Practice”
http://academia.edu/2635972/Latin_American_Critical_Thought._Theory_and_Practice, pg. 10 date
accessed 7/10/13 igm)
The resurgence of Latin American critical thought in the ¶ late 1990s and the early twenty-first century
has brought about some ¶ discoveries that distinguish it from the sociological production of the ¶
world. It is a scientific framework that has taken on the features of a new ¶ social scientific paradigm.
A growing number of authors have aligned ¶ themselves with this perspective, with visions that include
critical readings geared to contributing to transformative social change, in a Latin ¶ American context.
Thus, we ask ourselves: What are the characteristics ¶ that distinguish Latin American critical thought
and give it its identity? ¶ What are its germinal features and what are its unresolved matters?
A distinguishing feature of this thought is its belonging to social ¶ sciences, particularly sociology and
its traditions of critical theory, ¶ whose roots, as Gramsci said, do not come from fundamentalist
opposition but rather from the acquisition of scientific certainty on the ¶ basis of critical analysis.
In scientific discussion […] To understand and to evaluate realistically ¶ one’s adversary’s position and his
reasons (and sometimes one’s adver-sary is the whole of past thought) means precisely to be liberated
from ¶ the prison of ideologies in the bad sense of the word — that of blind ¶ ideological fanaticism. It
means taking up a point of view that is ‘critical’, which for the purpose of scientific research is the only
fertile one.
Here, scientific convergence is not about repeating, reiterating or translating, but, above all, about resignifying and reversing the meaning of ¶ science on the basis of a new objectification agreed by
consensus.
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Critiques Good - General
Critiques on the topic are good – interrogating structures in Latin America is key to
breadth of education
Besse, CUNY City College Professor, 4
(Susan K., Professor in the City College division of the CUNY agency, 2004, Hispanic American Historical
Review 84.3 (2004) 411-422, “Placing Latin America in Modern World History Textbooks”,
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hispanic_american_historical_review/summary/v084/84.3besse.html,
Accessed 7/5/13, NC)
Studying the physical and cultural borderlands where Europeans, Native Americans, Africans, and
Asians met opens important discussions about the varying and continually changing ways humans
have defined the supernatural, physical space and nature, time, value and exchange, health and illness,
community and identity, gender, and the “other.” It points to the schisms between abstract, formal
scientific knowledge and local forms of knowledge; furthermore, by questioning the possibilities of
subaltern forms of knowledge, it challenges the notion of a universal reason. As nonwhite and nonChristian immigrants to the United States and Europe are changing (or upsetting, in the view of many)
the demographic and cultural landscape of the West, the history of Latin America can provide
illuminating examples of how heterogeneous cultural communities came into being through
interaction across boundaries of race, religion, language, and cultural differences. If we seek to tame
the violence that has characterized most of such encounters up until now, we would do well to
introduce our students to some of the literature on cultural encounters and ethno-racial hybridity .
Perhaps greater understanding of the complexities of such encounters can help reduce the cultural
myopia that breeds fear.
Latin American critical discussion is key to depth on the topic
Desmond, University of Iowa American studies, and Domínguez, director of the Iowa
Center for International and Comparative Studies 96 (Jane C., Virginia R., “Resituating
American Studies in a Critical Internationalism”
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/american_quarterly/v048/48.3desmond.html, American Quarterly 48.3
(1996) 475-490, date accessed 7/10/13 igm)
This call is not just for an internationalization of views, a way of giving voice to foreign scholars who
rarely get read or heard by U.S. humanities specialists, but for the activation of institutional and
intellectual grounds for the generation of a new kind of scholarship about the United States.
It is important to note the limits of current foreign humanities scholarship on the United States. Most of
it now falls into three categories: immigrant topics, U.S. influence, or comparative analogies. The first
body of work investigates immigration from the home community to the United States and the historical
influence or contemporary lives of such populations. This kind of work is especially popular in Europe. In
Spain, for example, scholarship often concerns Spanish colonial possessions in what is now the United
States, or the contemporary Spanish speaking population in the United States. 27 Scholars also
investigate the effects of U.S. foreign policy or U.S. commodities on their home country. For example,
the fall 1991 issue of the Tamkang Journal of American Studies in Taipei, Taiwan, featured articles on
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"China and the Far East in the Vision of William H. Seward" and "The U.S. Role in the Post-World War II
Struggle Between the Nationalists and the Communists."
Currently, a great deal of foreign scholarship on the U.S. focuses on drawing analogies between the
foreign scholar's country and that of the U.S., yielding papers such as "The Comparative Discourse
between the American West and the Argentine Pampas," presented by Hugo Gaggioti at the 1994 U.S.
ASA conference. At an institutional level, work done abroad often means retaining frameworks of U.S.
criticism. For example, in 1994 the American Studies Association of southern Africa issued a call for
symposium papers with "a comparative and interdisciplinary focus on a wide variety of American and
southern African [End Page 484] experiences," including "accommodating diversity," "multiculturalism,"
and "political correctness."
Latin American literature has been largely ignored – inclusion in the debate sphere
would allow for the paradigm of inclusion of Latin American studies
Moreiras, Texas A&M University Hispanic studies professor, 1
(Alberto, 2001, The Exhaustion of Difference, pg. 4-5, JZ)
Taylor’s notion could curiously constitute a basis for the rigorous metacritical defense both of the
literary-critical apparatus and of cultural studies, especially in reference to the theoretical analysis of the
symbolic production of peripheral and semiperipheral societies in the world-system.4 The Latin
American literary tradition is almost exhaustively definable as the quasi-systematic exploration of the
specificity of the Latin American alternative modernity from what today are outdated concepts of
identity and difference. Latin Americanist tradition never really subscribed other than marginally to
acultural theories of modernity. All the great figures of the tradition, from Francisco Javier Clavijero,
Andrés Bello, Domingo Sarmiento, and José Martí to Angel Rama, or Antonio Cornejo Polar through
Alfonso Reyes, Pedro Henríquez Ureña, Antonio Candido, Emir Rodríguez Monegal, and Roberto
Fernández Retamar, were culturalists in Taylor’s sense. But the master concepts of identity and
difference keep finding a new if precarious life in the new space of cultural studies. It could be said
that a large part of the work of Latin American cultural studies is nothing but an engaged reproduction
and transplantation of the old historiographic categories to new texts: the literary referent is often
rather mechanically substituted with alternative referents, but the questions remain—a bit farcically—
the same.
It is true—it has the truth of tautology—that something is gained when criteria for inclusion are
expanded and it becomes possible for a literary scholar to read the cinematographic text, or the text
of the new social movements, in a situation where it had not previously been allowed to move beyond
the essay, the novel, or the poem. In this cultural studies does return to the philological spring, since
philology wanted to explore cultural specificity through an ample repertoire of discursive traces. And it
is also tautologically true that something is lost when those who read such texts—the preservers— do
it on the limiting basis of a certain weakening of their technical capacity. Their reading capacity is in
principle weakened because readers educated in an exhaustive attention to the literary cannot simply
transfer their attention to the nonliterary and expect to produce results of a similar strength. But there
is no reason to think that the history of reading is ecstatic and that adequate tools for the kind of
reading that is pertinent to the widening of textual space will not be developed soon. It is, however,
truer, and more interesting, and not tautological, to conclude that if the simple considerations above
are more or less accurate, then cultural studies today, from a literary perspective, is still far from
having created a new paradigm for Latin Americanist reflection. Cultural studies, from the point of
view of its reading practices, its master concepts, and its geopolitical inscription, is, to a certain
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extent, more of the same. The old and the new thus share a similar anachronism—or a similar
novelty.5
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Critiques Good – Heg specific
Critiquing US influence is specifically key to education about the topic – ‘Latin
America’ was built on a system of imperial dominance that should be questioned
Bialakowsky, Gino Germani Research Institute et al. 12 (Alberto L. Bialakowsky, Pablo Gentili,
Paulo Henrique Martins, Silvia Lago ¶ Martínez, Marcelo Langieri, Carolina Mera, María Victoria Mutti,
Alicia I. ¶ Palermo, Lucas Sablich, Federico Schuster, Beatriz Wehle “Latin American Critical Thought¶
Theory and Practice”
http://academia.edu/2635972/Latin_American_Critical_Thought._Theory_and_Practice, pg. 10 date
accessed 7/10/13 igm)
This is also a debate on the consensus about social thought, a debate on the intellectual foundation of
hegemony. Latin American critical thought is resurfacing after the long period that followed the
impasse, or rather the decline, of the ‘Dependency Theory’ of the 1970s ¶ and the emergence of the
intellectual and ideological domination of ¶ neoliberalism, its political apparatuses and governmental
technologies that prevailed from the 1980s on. This new critical thought has ¶ called into question the
hegemonic forms of understanding the capitalist market, the colonization of power and eurocentric
assumptions. ¶ it has gained strength in line with the development of democratic political forms. When
critical Latin American authors refer to the previous decline in critical scholarship / literature, thought
point at the role ¶ of the genocidal dictatorships in the region. They also find parallels ¶ between their
own work and social movements, especially the peasant, the indigenous and the urban unemployed
movements of the late ¶ twentieth century, as well as the landless workers, the Zapatism and ¶ the
piqueteros, and class fractions that do not have a central place in ¶ classical theory. Beyond this
consensus, authors seem to differ on the ¶ magnitude of the democratic gains in / for the popular sector
and the ¶ restitution of rights as sources of expansion / in an expansive fashion ¶ (1990-2010). There are
also disagreements about the ‘populist’ character of these democratic gains when the fragility of the
processes of democratization and the close links between these electoral democratic ¶ systems and
the transnational capitalist market is considered.
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Cross Culture Education Good
Cross cultural education is key to effective solve oppression
Nkurumeh, Middle Tennessee professor of the Arts, 12 (Bartholomew, “Teaching for crosscultural understanding: A critical study of the classroom efforts of three US arts educators”
http://udini.proquest.com/view/teaching-for-cross-cultural-goid:610189122/, date accessed 7/10/13
igm)
Misunderstandings continue to exist between cultures. Across space, continued social inequalities
involving unequal power relations create lack of understanding between cultures; this has led to
oppression, dominance, and even death. Education, especially arts education, may be one means of
helping build cultural bridges. Thus, this study examined three college teachers' efforts to use the arts
to promote cross-cultural understanding in the United States. The teachers were known for using nonWestern or multicultural arts in their teaching. The attempt of the researcher was to understand the
possibilities of promoting cross-cultural understanding through use of the arts in education. The inquiry
method involved critical qualitative research. The data were examined through the lens of Maxine
Greene's "The Dialectic of Freedom." From Greene's point of view, education itself is a dialectical
process that can be realized, in part, through a relational use of the arts. Collectively, the findings
suggest that these teachers promoted cross-cultural understanding by providing pedagogical spaces
conducive to recursive discussion of personal and collective experiences related to stereotypes and
the affirmation of diversity. Implications and applications were discussed for use of the arts in
education in general.
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Critiques Good – General
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Epistemology Focus - Prereq/Precede Policy
Questioning knowledge production is prerequisite to policy action – refusal to engage
in criticism leads to ineffective policies and education
Owen, Reader in Political Theory at the University of Southampton, 2 (David, Millennium:
Journal of International Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3, http://mil.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/31/3/653, pg. 659
date accessed 7/10/13 igm)
The first dimension concerns the relationship between positivist IR¶ theory and postmodernist IR
‘theory’ (and the examples illustrate the claims concerning pluralism and factionalism made in the
introduction to this¶ section). It is exhibited when we read Walt warning of the danger of
postmodernism as a kind of theoretical decadence since ‘issues of peace and war are too important for
the field [of IR] to be diverted into a prolix¶ and self-indulgent discourse that is divorced from the real
world’,12 or¶ find Keohane asserting sniffily that:
Neither neorealist nor neoliberal institutionalists are content with¶ interpreting texts: both sets of
theorists believe that there is an¶ international political reality that can be partly understood, even¶ if
it will always remain to some extent veiled.13
We should be wary of such denunciations precisely because the issue at stake for the practitioners of
this ‘prolix and self-indulgent discourse’ is¶ the picturing of international politics and the implications
of this picturing¶ for the epistemic and ethical framing of the discipline, namely, the¶ constitution of
what phenomena are appropriate objects of theoretical or other forms of enquiry. The kind of
accounts provided by practitioners of¶ this type are not competing theories (hence Keohane’s
complaint) but conceptual reproblematisations of the background that informs theory- construction,
namely, the distinctions, concepts, assumptions, inferences and assertability warrants that are taken
for granted in the course of the debate between, for example, neorealists and neoliberal
institutionalists¶ (hence the point-missing character of Keohane’s complaint).
Epistemic structures reinforce unethical policies – criticism is key to effective decisionmaking
Owen, Reader in Political Theory at the University of Southampton, 2 (David, Millennium:
Journal of International Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3, http://mil.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/31/3/653, pg. 660
date accessed 7/10/13 igm)
The point of these remarks is to call critically into question the background¶ picture (or, to use
another term of art, the horizon) against which the disciplinary discourse and practices of IR are
conducted in order to make¶ this background itself an object of reflection and evaluation. In a similar
vein, Rob Walker argues:
Under the present circumstances the question ‘What is to be done?’¶ invites a degree of arrogance that
is all too visible in the behaviour of the dominant political forces of our time. . . . The most pressing
questions of the age call not only for concrete policy options to be offered to existing elites and
institutions, but also, and more¶ crucially, for a serious rethinking of the ways in which it is possible¶
for human beings to live together.15
The aim of these comments is to draw to our attention the easily forgotten¶ fact that our existing
ways of picturing international politics emerge from, and in relation to, the very practices of
international politics with which¶ they are engaged and it is entirely plausible (on standard Humean
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grounds)¶ that, under changing conditions of political activity, these ways of guiding¶ reflection and
action may lose their epistemic and/or ethical value such¶ that a deeper interrogation of the terms of
international politics is required. Whether or not one agrees with Walker that this is currently required,
it is a perfectly reasonable issue to raise.
Epistemological debate is necessary to test policy
Owen, Reader in Political Theory at the University of Southampton, 2 (David, Millennium:
Journal of International Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3, http://mil.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/31/3/653, pg. 663
date accessed 7/10/13 igm)
The third dimension concerns the relationship between positivist IR¶ theory and critical IR theory, where
White’s distinction enables us to make¶ sense of a related confusion, namely, the confusion between
holding that¶ forms of positivist IR theory (e.g., neorealism and neoliberal¶ institutionalism) are
necessarily either value-free or evaluative. It does so because we can now see that, although forms of
positivist IR theory are not normative theories, they presuppose a background picture which¶ orients
our thinking through the framing of not only what can be intelligibly up for grabs as true-or-false (the
epistemic framing) but also what can be¶ intelligibly up for grabs as good-or-bad (the ethical framing).
As Charles Taylor has argued, a condition of our intelligibility as agents is that we¶ inhabit a moral
framework which orients us in ethical space and our practices of epistemic theorising cannot be
intelligibly conceived as existing¶ independently of this orientation in thinking.21 The confusion in IR
theory¶ arises because, on the one hand, positivist IR theory typically suppresses acknowledgement of
its own ethical presuppositions under the influence of the scientific model (e.g., Waltz’s neorealism
and Keohane’s neoliberal¶ institutionalism), while, on the other hand, its (radical) critics typically view its
ethical characteristics as indicating that there is an evaluative or normative theory hidden, as it were,
within the folds of what presents¶ itself as a value-free account. Consequently, both regard the other
as, in¶ some sense, producing ideological forms of knowledge; the positivist’s claim is that critical IR
theory is ideological by virtue of its explicitly normative character, the critical theorist’s claim is that
positivist IR theory¶ is ideological by virtue of its failure to acknowledge and reflect on its own¶ implicit
normative commitments. But this mutual disdain is also a product of the confusion of pictures and
theories. Firstly, there is a confusion between pictures and theories combined with the scientistic
suppression¶ of the ethical presuppositions of IR theory. This finds expression in the¶ thought that we
need to get our epistemic account of the world sorted out before we can engage responsibly in ethical
judgement about what to do, where such epistemic adequacy requires the construction of a positive¶
theory that can explain the features of the world at issue. An example of¶ this position is provided by
Waltz’s neorealism.22 Against this first position, we may reasonably point out that epistemic adequacy
cannot be intelligibly¶ specified independently of background ethical commitments concerning what
matters to us and how it matters to us.
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Ontology Focus - Prereq/Precede Policy
Ontology precedes policymaking – questions of being and understanding define the
limits and conditions of politics
Dillon, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, 3
(Michael, pg. 1 “Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought” Taylor &
Francis e-Library, 2003, igm)
International Relations is a discipline concerned with observing how the political¶ project of living-out
the modern emerged, and how it continues to operate globally.¶ I am concerned with how we might
out-live the modern politically. I think of¶ outliving here as surpassing the modern political
imagination, not merely surviving¶ its dereliction.¶
In making its contribution to out-living the modern, politics must be an art¶ capable not only of
applying existing moral and economic codes, or of¶ administering the interests of existing subjectivities.
It must be capable, also, of¶ allowing new possibilities of political being to emerge out of the
unstable, unjust¶ and violently defended sediment of modern political existence. In the development¶
of such a project, International Relations becomes more rather than less important.¶ For the question of
whether or not human being does out-live the modern is one¶ posed in and through the interstitial
politics of (inter)national politics.¶
To conceive of politics as being concerned with making way for new¶ possibilities of being requires
reimagining politics itself. Specifically, it requires¶ that politics be thought as something which arises
from human being as a¶ possibility. To understand human being as a possibility, however, means
understanding that it consists in the improbable feat of always already containing¶ more than it is
possible to contain; understanding that there is always already in¶ human being an excess of being over
appearance and identity.¶
Thought as a possibility rather than a fixed and determinate actuality, human¶ being must necessarily
also be thought as free; free to take-up the difficult and¶ inescapable challenge it encounters in itself as a
possibility, and make that possibility¶ its own. For if the human were not free, in the condition of having
its being as a¶ possibility to be, there would be no action to take, no decisions to make, no dilemmas¶
to face, no relations to relate, no loves to love, no fears to fear, no laws to make and no laws to break.
There would, in short be no politics. Consequently, the very project of politics is made possible by
human being as a possibility. A possibility engendered by the freedom of human being as a possibility,
the project for politics must then be the making way for the taking place of human being’s as possibility.
Such an account of politics would also make International Relations more rather less important: albeit, it
would make International Relations something which its orthodox proponents would not recognize.
Ontology informs action – determining the implications of a policy start with
questions of ontology
Cambell, Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, and Shapiro,
Professor of Political Science at the University of Hawaiʻi, 99 (David, Michael J., pg. 96,
“Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics” University of Minnesota Press, igm)
As Heidegger-himself an especially revealing figure of the deep and mutual implication of the
philosophical and the political-never tired of pointing out, the relevance of ontology to all other kinds
of thinking is fundamental and inescapable. For one cannot say anything about that is, without
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always already having made assumptions about the is as such. Any mode of thought, in short, always
already carries an ontology sequestered within it. What this ontological turn does to other-regionalmodes of thought is to challenge the ontology within which they operate. The implications of that
review reverberate through the entire mode of thought, demanding a reappraisal as fundamental as the
reappraisal ontology has demanded of philosophy. With ontology at issue, the entire foundations or
underpinnings of any mode of thought are rendered problematic. This applies as much to any modern
discipline of thought as it does to the question of modernity as such, with the exception, it seems, of
science, which, having long ago given up the ontological questioning of when it called itself natural
philosophy, appears now, in its industrialized and corporatized form, to be invulnerable to ontological
perturbation. With its foundations at issue, the very authority of a mode of thought and the ways in
which it characterizes the critical issues of freedom and judgment (of what kind of universe human
beings inhabit, how they inhabit it, and what counts as reliable knowledge for them in it) is also put in
question. The very ways in which Nietzsche, Heidegger, and other continental philosophers challenged
Western ontology, simultaneously, therefore reposed the fundamental and inescapable difficulty, or
aporia, for human being of decision and judgment. In other words, whatever ontology you subscribe to,
knowingly or unknowingly, as a human being you still have to act. Whether or not you know or
acknowledge it, the ontology you subscribe to will construe the problem of action for you in one way
rather than another. You may think ontology is some arcane question of philosophy, but Nietzsche
and Heidegger showed that it intimately shapes not only a way of thinking, but a way of being, a form
of life. Decision, a fortiori political decision, in short, is no mere technique. It is instead a way of being
that bears an understanding of Being, and of the fundaments of the human way of being within it. This
applies, indeed applies most, to those mock-innocent political slaves who claim only to be technocrats
of decision making. While Certain continental thinkers like Blumenberg and Lowith, for example, were
prompted to interrogate or challenge the modern’s claim to being distinctively “modern,” and others
such as Adorno questioned its enlightened credentials, philosophers like Derrida and Levinas pursued
the metaphysical implications (or rather the implications for metaphysics) of the thinking initiated by
Kierkegaard, as well as by Nietzsche and Heidegger. The violence of metaphysics, together with another
way of thinking about the question of the ethical, emerged as the defining theme of their work. Other,
notably Foucault, Deleuze, Lyotard, Baudrillard, and Bataille turned the thinking of Nietzsche and
Heidegger into a novel kind of social and political critique of both the regimes and the effects of power
that have come to distinguish late modern times; they concentrated, in detail, upon how the violence
identified by these other thinkers manifested itself not only in the mundane practices of modern life,
but also in those areas that claimed to be most free of it, especially the freedom and security of the
subject as well as its allied will to truth and knowledge. Questioning the appeal to the secure selfgrounding common to both its epistemic structures and its political imagination, and in the course of
reinterrogating both the political character of the modern and the modern character of the political, this
problematization of modernity has begun to prompt an ontopolitcally driven reappraisal of modern
political thought.
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State Focus Bad
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State Focus Bad – Agency
State focused debates preclude discussions of individual action – kills effectiveness
and agency
Bleiker, professor of International Relations, 2k (Roland, “Popular Dissent, Human Agency and
Global Politics” pg. 8, Cambridge University Press, igm)
To expand the scope of international theory and to bring transversal struggles into focus is not to
declare the state obsolete. States remain central actors in international politics and they have to be
recognised and theorised as such. In fact, my analysis will examine various ways in which states and the
boundaries between them have mediated the formation, functioning and impact of dissent. However,
my reading of dissent and agency makes the state neither its main focus nor its starting point. There
are compelling reasons for such a strategy, and they go beyond a mere recognition that a state-centric
approach to international theory engenders a form of representation that privileges the authority of
the state and thus precludes an adequate understand¬ing of the radical transformations that are
currently unfolding in global life. Michael Shapiro is among an increasing number of theor¬ists who
convincingly portray the state not only as an institution, but also, and primarily, as a set of 'stories' — of
which the state-centric approach to international theory is a perfect example. It is part of a
legitimisation process that highlights, promotes and naturalises cer¬tain political practices and the
territorial context within which they take place. Taken together, these stories provide the state with a
sense of identity, coherence and unity. They create boundaries between an inside and an outside,
between a people and its others. Shapiro stresses that such state-stories also exclude, for they seek 'to
repress or delegitimise other stories and the practices of identity and space they reflect.' And it is
these processes of exclusion that impose a cer¬tain political order and provide the state with a
legitimate rationale for violent encounters.22
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State Focus Bad – Education
State focus kills critical education – testing all parts of an action is key to international
scholarship. This is a portable impact
Biswas, Associate Professor of Politics, 7 (Shampa “Empire and Global Public Intellectuals:
Reading Edward Said as International Relations Theorist” Millennium - Journal of International Studies
http://mil.sagepub.com/content/36/1/117.short, pg. 125, date accessed 7/10/13 igm)
In making a case for the exilic orientation, it is the powerful hold of the nation-state upon intellectual
thinking that Said most bemoans. 31 The nation-state of course has a particular pride of place in the
study of global politics. The state-centricity of International Relations has not just circumscribed the
ability of scholars to understand a vast ensemble of globally oriented movements, exchanges and
practices not reducible to the state, but also inhibited a critical intellectual orientation to the world
outside the national borders within which scholarship is produced. Said acknowledges the fact that all
intellectual work occurs in a (national) context which imposes upon one’s intellect certain linguistic
boundaries, particular (nationally framed) issues and, most invidiously, certain domestic political
constraints and pressures, but he cautions against the dangers of such restrictions upon the intellectual
imagination. 32 Comparing the development of IR in two different national contexts – the French and
the German ones – Gerard Holden has argued that different intellectual influences, different historical
resonances of different issues, different domestic exigencies shape the discipline in different contexts.
33 While this is to be expected to an extent, there is good reason to be cautious about how scholarly
sympathies are expressed and circumscribed when the reach of one’s work (issues covered, people
affected) so obviously extends beyond the national context. For scholars of the global, the (often
unconscious) hold of the nation-state can be especially pernicious in the ways that it limits the scope
and range of the intellectual imagination. Said argues that the hold of the nation is such that even
intellectuals progressive on domestic issues become collaborators of empire when it comes to state
actions abroad. 34 Specifically, he critiques nationalistically based systems of education and the
tendency in much of political commentary to frame analysis in terms of ‘we’, ‘us’ and ‘our’ particularly evident in coverage of the war on terrorism - which automatically sets up a series of
(often hostile) oppositions to ‘others’. He points in this context to the rather common intellectual
tendency to be alert to the abuses of others while remaining blind to those of one’s own. 35
Critical discussion is crowded out by state focus – kills education
Biswas, Associate Professor of Politics, 7 (Shampa “Empire and Global Public Intellectuals:
Reading Edward Said as International Relations Theorist” Millennium - Journal of International Studies
http://mil.sagepub.com/content/36/1/117.short, pg. 123, date accessed 7/10/13 igm)
The space for a critical appraisal of the motivations and conduct of this ¶ war has been considerably
diminished by the expertise-framed national ¶ debate wherein certain kinds of ethical questions
irreducible to formulaic ¶ ‘for or against’ and ‘costs and benefits’ analysis can simply not be raised. ¶ In
effect, what Said argues for, and IR scholars need to pay particular ¶ heed to, is an understanding of
‘intellectual relevance’ that is larger and ¶ more worthwhile, that is about the posing of critical,
historical, ethical and ¶ perhaps unanswerable questions rather than the offering of recipes and ¶
solutions, that is about politics (rather than techno-expertise) in the most ¶ fundamental and important
senses of the vocation.21
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It is not surprising that the ‘cult of expertise’ that is increasingly ¶ driving the study of global politics has
occurred in conjunction with a ¶ larger depoliticisation of many facets of global politics, which since the ¶
1980s has accompanied a more general prosperity-bred complacency ¶ about politics in the AngloEuropean world, particularly in the US. There ¶ are many examples of this. It is evident, for instance, in
the understanding ¶ of globalisation as TINA market-driven rationality – inevitable, inexorable ¶ and
ultimately, as Thomas Friedman’s many writings boldly proclaim, ¶ apolitical.22 If development was
always the ‘anti-politics machine’ that ¶ James Ferguson so brilliantly adumbrated more than a decade
ago, ¶ it is now seen almost entirely as technocratic aid and/or charitable ¶ humanitarianism delivered via
professionalised bureaucracies, whether ¶ they are IGOs or INGOs.23 From the more expansive
environmental and ¶ feminist-inspired understandings of ‘human security’, understandings of ¶ global
security are once again increasingly being reduced to (military) ¶ strategy and global democratisation to
technical recipes for ‘regime ¶ change’ and ‘good governance’. There should be little surprise in such ¶ a
context that the ‘war on terror’ has translated into a depoliticised ¶ response to a dehistoricised
understanding of the ‘roots of terror’. For IR ¶ scholars, reclaiming politics is a task that will involve
working against the ¶ grain of expertise-oriented professionalism in a world that increasingly ¶
understands its own workings in apolitical terms.
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A2: Roleplaying – Agency
Roleplaying bad – forcing state representation kills agency in debate
Mitchell, Associate Professor of Communication and 98 (Gordon R., Director of the William
Pitt Debating Union at the University of Pittsburgh, “Pedagogical possibilities for argumentative agency
in academic debate” Argumentation and Advocacy, Volume 35, Issue 2 Fall 1998
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb6699/is_2_35/ai_n28720712/)
In the process of explaining their teaching approach, argumentation scholars sometimes invoke a
bifurcation that separates academic study of argumentation from applied practice in public argument.
This explanation typically begins with an elucidation of the democratic and emancipatory potential of
debate as a process of decisionmaking, and then proceeds to an explanation of academic study as an
essential preparatory step on the way to achievement of such emancipatory potential. This route of
explanation is consistent with the American Forensic Association Credo, which declares that the
purpose of forensic education is to "prepare students through classrooms, forums, and competition
for participation in their world through the power of expression" (qtd. in Freeley 1996, p. 122). Writing
from this posture to defend the value of National Debate Tournament (NDT) policy competition, Edward
Panetta posits that NDT debate "will prepare students to be societal leaders ..." (1990, p. 76, emphasis
added). Similarly, Austin Freeley suggests that academic debate "provides preparation for effective
participation in a democratic society" and "offers preparation for leadership" (1997, p. 21, emphasis
added). What are the entailments of such a preparatory framework for argumentation pedagogy, and
how do such entailments manifest themselves in teaching practice? On the surface, the rhetoric of
preparation seems innocuous and consistent with other unremarkable idioms employed to describe
education (college prep courses and prep school spring to mind). However, by framing argumentation
pedagogy as preparation for student empowerment, educators may actually constrain the
emancipatory potential of the debate enterprise. In this vein, approaches that are purely oriented
toward preparation place students and teachers squarely in the proverbial pedagogical bullpen, a
peripheral space marked off from the field of social action. In what follows, I pursue this tentative
hypothesis by interrogating the framework of preparatory pedagogy on three levels, considering how it
can position sites of academic inquiry vis-a-vis broader public spheres of deliberation, how it can flatten
and defer consideration of complex issues of argumentative engagement and how it can invite
unwitting co-option of argumentative skills.
We’ll impact turn roleplaying - State focus denies agency – neorealist frameworks
eliminate the possibility of localized political changes
Bleiker, professor of International Relations, 2k (Roland, “Popular Dissent, Human Agency and
Global Politics” pg. 9, Cambridge University Press, igm)
Questions of agency have been discussed extensively in international theory, mostly in the context of
the so-called structure—agency debate. Although strongly wedded to a state-centric view, this debate
nevertheless evokes a number of important conceptual issues that are relevant as well to an
understanding of transversal dynamics. The roots of the structure—agency debate can be traced back
to a feeling of discontent about how traditional approaches to international theory have dealt with
issues of agency. Sketched in an overly broad manner, the point of departure looked as follows: At one
end of the spectrum were neorealists, who explain state identity and behaviour through a series of
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structural restraints that are said to emanate from the anarchical nature of the international system.
At the other end we find neoliberals, who accept the existence of anarchy but seek to understand the
behaviour of states and other international actors in terms of their individual attributes and their ability
to engage in cooperative bargaining. If pushed to their logical end-point, the two positions amount,
respectively, to a structural determinism and an equally farfetched belief in the autonomy of rational
actors. 24 The structure—agency debate is located somewhere between these two poles. Neither
structure nor agency receive analytical priority. Instead, the idea is to understand the interdependent
and mutually constitutive relationship between them. The discussions that have evolved in the wake of
this assumption are highly complex and cannot possibly be summarised here. 25 Some of the key
premises, though, can be recognised by observing how the work of Anthony Giddens has shaped the
structure—agency debate in international relations. Giddens speaks of the 'duality of structure,' of
structural properties that are constraining as well as enabling. They are both 'the medium and outcome
of the contingently accomplished activities of situated actors'. 26 Expressed in other words, neither
agents nor structures have the final word. Human actions are always embedded in and constrained by
the structural context within which they form and evolve. But structures are not immutable either. A
human being, Giddens stresses, will 'know a great deal about the conditions of reproduction of the
society of which he or she is a member'. 27 The actions that emerge from this awareness then shape
the processes through which social systems are structurally maintained and reproduced.
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A2: Roleplaying – Justifies Violence
Roleplaying is bad – using the state as the starting point for discussion justifies bad
policies and violence
Smith, Professor and Pro-Vice Chancellor of the University of Wales, 97 (Steve, University
of Wales, Aberystwyth “Power and Truth, A Reply to William Wallace,” Review of International Studies,
Vol. 23, No. 4 (Oct., 1997), p. 513)
Those academics who do get involved in talking truth to power must accept that in so doing they must
adopt the agenda of those to whom they are talking. They will be involved in problem-solving, and
thereby must accept the 'givens' of the policy debate. Policy-makers see certain things as givens;
therefore if you write about them in order to influence the policy debate, you tend to have to write as
if they are given as well. For academics such 'givens' are rarely seen as such. This has extremely
important political and intellectual consequences since it questions the very notion of talking 'truth'
to power. It is more a case of accepting the policy agenda of those to whom one is talking and then
giving them a series of alternative ways of proceeding. I see no connection between this and speaking
'truth to power'. I can also admit the tendency to make what one says acceptable to those 'listening', so
as to ensure that one is indeed 'listened to'. But more importantly, why should academics take the
policy agenda of governments as the starting point? Why do we privilege that starting point rather
than the needs and wants of the have-nots in our society or in the global political system? Indeed,
maybe speaking 'truth to power' is itself a very political act, albeit in the name of academic neutrality,
an act that supports the existing division of resources in the world. This situation is made all the worse
once the possibility arises of getting funding from policy-making bodies, however much the individual
academic wants to maintain the independence of his or her research. In my view, academics need a
critical distance from which to look at the activities of governments. Perhaps the greatest form of
isolation and self-righteousness is to accept the policy-makers' view of the world as the starting point,
so that the academic sees the world as the policy-maker sees it. Where would questions of gender,
famine, and racism fit into that world-view? Yet aren't these every bit as 'political' and 'international' as
the traditional agenda? This seems to me to take us very far indeed from the idea of 'speaking truth to
power'; the danger must be of telling the powerful what they want to hear and of working within their
world-view. Of course, academics spend much time trying to avoid these dangers, and Wallace himself
cannot be accused of simply adopting the agenda of the powerful, but surely he would admit that these
dangers are profound and very difficult to avoid, especially if one wants to have influence and prestige
within the policy-making community. My objection is really to those who pretend that any of this has
anything to do with truth and academic objectivity.
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A2: Cede the Political
Non unique – the political has already been ceded to the elite
Amsden, Professor of Political Economy at MIT, DiCaprio World Institute for
Development Economics Research fellow, and Robinson, Professor of Government at
Harvard University 10 (Alice, Alisa, James,
http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/newsletter/articles/en_GB/05-08-2009/, date accessed
7/10/13 igm)
In addition, their control over resources also gives elites the ability to make decisions over production
and technology. The owners of the factors of production have influence over what is produced and how
it is produced. They can act as entrepreneurs and innovators and increase factor productivity and
diversification. Or they can overexploit existing resources without regard for sustainability into the
future.
Elites also impact development outcomes through their control over decision-making processes that
allocate political resources within a society. This introduces two additional channels through which
their activities impact growth in the long run. The first is that elites have the resources to design and
implement institutions that favour their interests. Such institutions may promote participation and
information flow. Or they may simply cement the position of a particular group within the governance
structure.
Another feature of elite control over institutions is that they are able to influence how both elites and
non-elites within a society perceive different issues. Elites control how issues are framed through their
ability to distribute or withhold information, and their influence over and within the media. Even
where there is a free media, it depends on elites for information, and can choose to present issues that
reflect a particular bias.