PLANNING OF SECURITY
SECTOR CAPABILITIES
FOR PROTECTION OF
MARITIME SOVEREIGNTY
Capt. (Navy) Ass. Prof. PhD Boyan Mednikarov
Ass. Prof. PhD Todor Tagarev
NATO ARW
“SCIENTIFIC SUPPORT FOR THE DECISION MAKING IN
THE SECURITY SECTOR”
Velingrad, Bulgaria, 21-25 October 2006
The main reasons for our interest in the subject:
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the dynamic changes of the economic, political, and military-strategic
environment in the Black Sea region after the end of the bi-polar world;
► the membership of Bulgaria in NATO;
► the forthcoming accession to the EU,
which brought the need for radical rethinking of the views on maritime
sovereignty of our country.
Broader definition of maritime sovereignty - the state retains the right to
exercise control both on the territorial waters and the other parts of the
Black Sea where it has internationally recognized rights.
The main task of the research - the adequate justification of the planning
of security sector capabilities for protection of maritime sovereignty.
Sub-tasks:
► developing a model for planning the national capabilities for maritime
sovereignty protection;
► testing this model and putting it into practise within the maritime
institutions.
CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO DEFINING THE
CAPABILITIES OF THE SECURITY SECTOR
Analysis of the
security environment
Security sector missions,
Levels of ambition
Planning scenarios
Task lists
(generic)
Mission Essential
Task List
Security Sector
Capabilities
KEY FACTORS
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Objectives in the area of maritime sovereignty, including those
to be achieved through military means;
Strategy for achieving the objectives;
Roles of the institutions, engaged in protecting maritime
sovereignty;
Scenarios, describing plausible materialization risks and threats
to the national interests related to the maritime space;
Tasks to be performed in neutralizing the plausible risks and
threats (often structured in a Universal Task List, or UTL);
Capabilities required to perform tasks for protection of
maritime sovereignty;
Ways to provide these capabilities (coordination of the
development of the variety of capability components within a
selected capability model).
FRAMEWORK PROCESS FOR
CAPABILITIES DEVELOPMENT
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Formulate the policy for protection of maritime sovereignty;
Analyse the environment and assess threats to maritime sovereignty;
Analyse the status of the system for protecting maritime sovereignty;
Define and agree on planning scenarios; formulate hypotheses for the
simultaneous (or near simultaneous) occurrence of these planning situations
Create a structured list of tasks for protection of maritime sovereignty; define
the subset of tasks that are critical for performing plausible missions in the
protection of maritime sovereignty across scenarios;
Define the full set of capabilities required to protect maritime sovereignty;
Test the set against the hypotheses on simultaneous occurrence of two or more
planning scenarios;
Distribute the required capabilities among organisations;
Assess planning risks;
Program the development of capabilities.
PLANNING THE CAPABILITIES FOR PROTECTION OF MARITIME SOVEREIGNTY
Formulation of policy
for protecting
maritime sovereignty
Analysis of the
security environment;
threat assessment
Analysis of the status
of the system for
protection of
maritime sovereignty
Planning scenarios;
Hypotheses on
simultaneity
Ongoing analysis
and assessment
Task list
Capabilities to
perform tasks in
scenarios
Test for
simultaneity
Full set of required
capabilities
Long-term planning
Distribution among
organisations
Resource allocation
Capability gaps;
Risk assessment
Capability-oriented
programming
Programming
Monitoring
Implementation
Implementation of
capability
development
programs
TESTING THE MODEL IN PRACTICE
1. Formulating of the national policy for protection of
maritime sovereignty:
► The main problem was identified: the lack of
coordination among the different institutions
responsible for the protection of the national interests in
the Black sea region.
► the first step was to define the scope of the term
‘maritime sovereignty’
► the next step was to formulate the objectives of the
policy for maritime sovereignty protection, which
include the protection of all the aspects of the national
interests, the enforcement of the provisions of
international and national maritime law, the defence of
the Black Sea coast, etc.
LEVELS OF AMBITION
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To protect the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the country
from seaside aggression, including neutralisation of terrorist activities
in the territorial waters;
To protect the outer borders of the European Union in the Black Sea;
To prevent acts of violation of international and national law, related
to the use on the national maritime space;
To guarantee security and safety of shipping in the territorial sea and
the internal waterways;
To react adequately in emergencies in the national maritime spaces
with primary goal to prevent casualties and to minimise material
losses;
To preserve the ecological balance of the sea and safeguard its life
resources;
To conduct an active policy for upholding the peace and security in
the region and to enhance the international cooperation on key
humanitarian and law enforcement issues.
NEXT STEPS
► Analysis
of the participation of the Republic of Bulgaria in
a variety of international initiatives in the Black sea region–
this analysis proved the fact that the increased number of
activities enhances the security within the region.
► Evaluation
of the ways and the level of providing resources
for the maritime institutions - this showed that the situation
was not very optimistic although it can be improved by
actively utilising the funds provided by the EU.
► Analysis
of the environment where the protection of
maritime sovereignty is realised. As a result, the main
threats for the sea-related national interests of the Republic
of Bulgaria were identified.
MAIN THREATS
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Armed aggression
Violation of the safety of shipping and other regulations
Trafficking in human beings and illegal emigration by sea
Trafficking in narcotics
Smuggling
Trafficking in weapons and military technology, including WMD
components
Illegal or indiscriminate use of the bio-resources of the sea
Maritime terrorism
Piracy
Maritime pollution
Information security threats
Incident on a vessel or aircraft endangering the life of the
crew/passengers
Geology-, hydro-geology-, or weather-induced contingency
ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT STATE OF THE
SYSTEM FOR PROTECTION OF MARITIME
SOVEREIGNTY
► Bulgarian
Navy and Air Force
► Border Police
► Maritime and Port Administration Executive
Agencies
► Other organisations
We can sum up that their capabilities leave a lot to
be desired.
DEFINITION OF THE PLANNING SCENARIOS,
RELATED TO THE PROTECTION OF MARITIME
SOVEREIGNTY
scenario
Scenario # 1
Scenario # 2
Scenario # 3
Scenario # 4
Scenario # 5
Scenario # 6
Scenario # 7
Scenario # 8
Scenario # 9
Scenario # 10
Content
Armed aggression against the country, related to the
national maritime spaces (NMS)
Intentional violation of the safety of shipping and other
legal requirements in the national maritime spaces
Terrorist or pirate attack on a vessel or harbour facility
Illegal trafficking in weapons, military and dual-use
technologies, including WMD components, of drugs, and
goods
Trafficking of people and illegal immigration through the
sea
Illegal use of the bio-resources of the national maritime
spaces
Pollution of the maritime environment (intentional or as a
result of natural disasters or industrial incidents)
Incident on a ship or aircraft within the national SAR
region, especially one endangering the life of passengers
and crew
Natural disaster – strong earthquake or hurricane
Information incursion, e.g. cyber attack
12 hypotheses for the simultaneous occurrence of the scenarios were formulated.
FORMULATION OF STRUCTURED LIST
OF THE TASKS OF THE INSTITUTIONS
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PROTECTION OF
MARITIME SOVEREIGNTY
Two existing approaches to this were analysed:
► developing a universal task list (the approach
used by the Armed Forces of the US, United
Kingdom and Canada)
► the approach used by the Department of
Homeland Security of the US
In result, we agreed on the following structure of
the tasks of the maritime institutions:
1. Management of the Maritime Security
Organisations as part of the security sector
1.1. Management of the Maritime Security Organisations (MSO)
1.1.1. Planning the development of the Maritime Security Organisations (MSO)
1.1.2. Resource Management
1.1.2.1. Human Resource Management: education, qualification, certification
1.1.2.2. Acquisition Management
1.1.2.3. Finance Management
1.1.2.4. Crisis Resource Management
1.1.3. Training and exercises of the Maritime Security Organisations (MSO)
1.1.4. Lessons Learned
1.2. Coordination, Command and Control of the Maritime Security Organisations
1.2.1. National and international planning for protection of the maritime security
1.2.2. Operations planning
1.2.3. Command and control of forces
1.2.4. Coordinate and integrate joint, multinational and interagency support and
interaction with public organisations
1.2.5. Conduct information operations
1.2.6. Deploy the command and control system
1.3. Support to the Maritime Security Organisations
1.3.1. Provide material means
1.3.2. Recover/maintain systems and equipment
1.3.3. Provide legal support
1.3.4. Provide medical support
1.3.5. Provide transportation and deployment support
2. Prevention
2.1. Identify threats
2.1.1. Manage intelligence activities
2.1.2. Collect intelligence information
2.1.3. Process intelligence information
2.1.4. Analyse intelligence information
2.1.5. Disseminate information on threats
2.1.6. Identify, inform, and report
2.2. Control access
2.2.1. Inspect vessels and cargo
2.2.2. Monitor zones and areas
2.2.3. Inspect people
2.3. Eliminate threats
2.3.1. Investigate and detain terrorist suspects
2.3.2. Seize dangerous materials
2.3.3. Explosive ordnance disposal
2.3.4. Detect and eliminate information incursion
3. Protection
3.1. Assess critical infrastructure and key resources and sites
3.1.1. Identify key resources and sites
3.1.2. Assess vulnerability
3.1.3. Coordinate and exchange information among institutions, nongovernmental organisations, and businesses on key resources and sites
3.1.4. Assess the situation
3.2. Protect forces and sites
3.2.1. Adopt measures to lower/mitigate threats against sites
3.2.2. Prepare/ develop the types of defence and protection of mobile
and stationary assets
3.2.3. Disseminate key resources and objects
3.2.4. Detect and destroy mines
3.2.5. Detect and seize illegal fishing devices
3.3. Lower the risks to society
3.3.1. Safeguard public health
3.3.2. Provide public safety
3.3.3. Prepare the public
4. Response
4.1. Assess incidents
4.1.1. Investigate incidents
4.1.2. Assess threats and consequences
4.1.3. Maintain internal communication and disseminate information
on incidents
4.2. Limit incident consequences
4.2.1. Manage incidents
4.2.2. Respond to threats
4.2.3. Target hardening
4.2.4. Search and rescue
4.2.5. Fire fighting
4.3. Impact by opponents
4.3.1. Track detected ships and submarines
4.3.2. Destroy ships and submarines
4.3.3. Establish defensive mine barrages
4.3.4. Detain ships
4.3.5. Antiterrorist activities
5. Recovery
5.1. Assist the public
5.1.1. Provide pre-hospital care/ support and evacuation
5.1.2. Provide humanitarian assistance
5.1.3. Provide social services
5.2. Restore environment
5.2.1. Clean up contaminated sites and areas
5.2.2. Dispose of materials
5.2.3. Conduct site remediation
5.2.4. Restore natural resources
5.3. Restore infrastructure
5.3.1. Restore Civil Services
5.3.2 Rebuild property
5.3.3 Restore lifelines
5.3.4. Restore economic institutions
REQUIRED CAPABILITIES FOR PROTECTION
OF MARITIME SOVEREIGNTY
► General
(for each mission):
 Management of the maritime sovereignty forces –
managing force development
 Coordination, Command and Control of the
Maritime Sovereignty Forces
 C2 – communications and information support
 Logistics support
 Force deployment
REQUIRED CAPABILITIES FOR PROTECTION
OF MARITIME SOVEREIGNTY
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Prevent:
 Surveillance and detection of surface, sub-surface and aerial
targets
 Fusion and analysis of intelligence information
 Exchange of information and cooperation
 Target identification, dissemination and reporting
 Inspection of vessels and their cargo
 Control the traffic of vessels, cargo, passengers and personnel
in harbour areas
 Investigate and detain intruders, including terrorists, in
national maritime spaces
 Detect chemical, biological, radiation, nuclear, and ecological
threats and effects
 Detect information incursion
REQUIRED CAPABILITIES FOR PROTECTION
OF MARITIME SOVEREIGNTY
► Protect:
 Defend and protect forces and areas
 Protect sites and critical infrastructure in the coastal
area
 Detect and destroy mines
 Detect and seize illegal fishing gear
 Protect databases and computer networks
REQUIRED CAPABILITIES FOR PROTECTION
OF MARITIME SOVEREIGNTY
► Respond:
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Track detected surface and subsurface vessels and aircraft
Destroy surface and subsurface vessels and aircraft
Set defensive mine barrages
React to a terrorist attack against a vessel and a harbour
facility
Rescue hostages
Search and rescue at sea
Fight fires at sea
Evacuate and provide pre-hospital care
REQUIRED CAPABILITIES FOR PROTECTION
OF MARITIME SOVEREIGNTY
► Recover:
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Limit a pollution source/spill
Decontamination of sea areas
Assist a ship/aircraft in emergency
Provide humanitarian assistance
NEXT STEPS
► to
suggest distribution of the capabilities among
security sector organizations taking into account
their traditions, experience, and current roles, with a
focus on cost effectiveness.
► to
assess the risk.
CONCLUSIONS
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The problem with the lack of interagency cooperation
is very serious and it must be made central for the
maritime policy of the country.
The wide array of tasks related to the protection of
maritime sovereignty requires that that the activities
should be systematized and specified.
The defining of the maritime sovereignty protection
capabilities must be based on the particular tasks
carried out within the particular scenarios.
The suggested distribution of the capabilities reflects
their current state in the maritime institutions.
The main purpose of risk assessment is to evaluate the
extent to which the planned capabilities will be
adequate to the possible future requirements for the
maritime institutions.