Behavioural Safety at the Carrington Site
From a plateau to an iceberg, trying to avoid a few
crevasses
Peter Webb, HSEQ Manager, Basell Polyolefins
Carrington Site
Outline
• What is behavioural safety
• How we implemented a behavioural programme
• Some key learning points
Safety …. A potted history
INCIDENTS
Technological Improvements
Management
Systems
We are
here!
Human Factors
TIME
Why Behavioural Safety?
It’s just another tool in the human factors
tool box
What does a Behavioural Approach Comprise?
All behavioural safety programmes have a system of
OBSERVATION and FEEDBACK
The observations can be done by anybody on anybody
It’s all about people talking to each other about safety
The Observation Process
•
•
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Stop and observe
Put the person being observed at ease
Explain what you are doing and why
Discuss the job being carried out
Observe the work activity for a few minutes
• Praise safe behaviours
• Discuss any “at risk” behaviours
– What
– Why
– Discuss what the worst consequences could
have been
• Ask what corrective action is required
• Get commitment to act
• Finally record the observation - but no names!
Why do we behave the way we do?
Values
Attitudes
Behaviours
Our behaviour is driven by
our attitudes and values
What Are Behaviours?
Value: “I think safety’s important”
Attitude: “I’m going to use the
right tools for the job”
Behaviour: “*$%^&£!!! I’ve brought
the wrong tool out with me. But I’m
not going to use it, because that would
be unsafe. I’m going to walk back
to the workshop and get the right
one.”
Our behaviour is driven by
our attitudes and values
How can you modify “At Risk” Behaviours?
• At risk behaviours are driven by attitudes and values
• But you can’t modify people’s values and attitudes directly
……. They are too deep within us.
• So you use a system of observations which address the “at
risk” behaviours.
• If you work on modifying the “at risk” behaviours,
eventually the “at risk” attitudes and values change too.
We used to feel it was safe to ride in a car without a seat
belt.
Modify the behaviour and the value will follow
Value: “I feel safe in my car
without a seat belt”
Value: “I feel uncomfortable
and exposed in my car
without a seat belt”
Attitude: “Wearing seat belts
is unnecessary”
Attitude: “Wearing seat belts
is a responsible thing to do”
Behaviour: ”I don’t wear my
seat belt in my car”.
Behaviour: ”I wear my
seat belt in my car”.
Behaviour modification: You
must wear your seat belt, it’s the law!
Carrington Site
How did we come to BBS
1980’s
• “Systems” initiatives in HSE.
• Total recordable injury rate reduced from ~18 to ~10
injuries per million hours worked.
Mid 1990’s
• Safety performance had plateaued
• 1996 became aware of behavioural programmes
• Decision was taken to pilot it on one plant (Styrocell)
• Engaged BS provider to assist in implementation
• Started with observations in January 1997.
BBS Programme
Carrington implementation followed “classical” approach ...
Implementation
Observation and
Feedback Process
Assess cultural maturity or
readiness
Modify environment,
equipment or systems
Gain management & workforce
support & ownership
Behavioural safety training
Specify critical behaviours
Monitor
performance
Review &
goal setting
Review critical
behaviours
Provide
feedback
Establish baseline
Ref HSE CRR 430/2002
Conduct
observations
BBS Programme
Some specifics of our implementation:
List of critical behaviours
• Developed by reviewing near miss reports.
Follow up
• We don’t wait for trends to develop. We follow up on the
individual at risks - prioritised short list.
Facilities vs behaviour
• We don’t limit the at risks to behaviour related
• We allow at risks which are related to the facilities as well
• The most important thing is that people are doing the
observations face to face
BBS Programme
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•
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•
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Styrocell programme was a great success.
Great enthusiasm amongst (most/enough) technicians.
Programme was rolled out to rest of site in 1997/8.
Steering groups set up in each dept
Separate list of critical behaviours in each dept
Cross site facilitators group
Approx 10 - 15% of workforce were observers (now it’s
100% plus contractors)
• A lot of creativity and energy put into it
WHAT IS ZAP ?
ZERO ACCIDENT POTENTIAL
Total Recordable Injury Rate (per 106 hrs)
20
18
> 18 Before 1990
16
Total Recordable Rate
14
BBS introduced
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
Resuscitation
In 1999 it was clear there were problems
• Fall off in observations
• Technicians were saying:
“The same observations are being done on the same tasks”
“People can’t be bothered”
“It’s the same people being observed all the time”
“Observation process is too formal”
“Carrington is already safe, so why bother?”
“What’s coming out of it?”
“Data input to database is difficult”
Resuscitation
Managers were saying the same as the technicians, and
– “There’s not enough visible output.”
– “We need more performance metrics – contact rate,
observation quality”
– “Vision is that everybody needs to be an observer.”
– “Whole process needs to become part of the existing HSE
system.”
– “We need to move on from the original concept and make BBS
our own.”
Resuscitation
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•
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It was not delivering to its full potential
But we thought the approach was fundamentally sound
So we launched a “resuscitation”
Decision to work without the original BS provider
……………….. A representative team identified 4 issues
Resuscitiation Issue 1: Organisation
Issue
• Need to make line supervisors part of the process.
• Need to integrate BBS into the site HSE systems.
Resuscitiation Issue 1: Organisation
The BBS organisation we started with
Traditional HSE Structure
BBS Organisation
Site HSE
Council
Facilitators'
Committee
Department HSE
Committees
(x4)
Contractors' HSE
Committee
Made up of Managers and
technicians
Department Steering
Committees
(x4)
Only Technicians
Resuscitiation Issue 1: Organisation
And the organisation we changed to ….
Site HSE
Council
It’s fully
Managers
supervisors and
technicians
Department HSE
Committees
(x4+ contractors)
integrated!
BBS Subgroup
1 per department
Cell
Cell
Cell
Cell
Site divided into cells of 6 - 8 people
Everybody is an observer, including
contractors
Subgroup made
up of
Improvement
Leader and cell
focal points
Key person
Resuscitiation Issue 2: Perceptions
Issue
• Overcome the complacency – “It’s already safe at
Carrington”
• People don’t see the value.
Response
• At the end of the observation, during the feedback, if
there are “at risks” to discuss, jointly agree what was the
worst consequence which could have happened.
• Jointly agree a ranking (L, M, H) for the potential outcome
on a defined scale ranging from slight injury (first aid),
through to fatality.
Gets people to visualise what could go wrong
Resuscitation Issue 3: Reporting
Issue
• Need to pull out learning points.
• Need to give feedback to observers.
• Integrate into the business – link with near miss reporting.
Response
Every month …..
• Overall KPI’s reviewed by site HSE Council (chaired by
Site Manager)
• Department HSE committees review performance against
KPI’s
• Cell members receive a report showing status of the at
risks
Resuscitation Issue 4: Observations
Issue
• People should want to carry out observations.
• Need to simplify the observation process.
• Need to make recording simpler.
Response
• Original programme design comprised a different list of
critical behaviours in each department
• Created a generic list to be used by everybody
• Allows any observer to carry out observations anywhere on
site
• The generic list is quite short, observation time can be as
short as 5 minutes
• Some people even do it without the checklist!
Other things we’ve learned!
Key Performance Indicators
• Currently have 3 KPI’s:
– Number of observations, 1 per person per month (all employees and
contractors)
– Quality, Percent of observations for which the “what” and the “why”
are filled out > 80%
– Close-out of “High” at risks, 100% in < 3 months
Number of observations forms part of bonus scheme
1800 observations in 2001, 2400 in 2002
…. We don’t have a KPI on % safe!
If you get 100% safe, does that mean you’ve finally made it? A safe
work place at last?
Or does it mean people aren’t looking hard enough?
With our generic list of critical behaviours, it’s hard to imagine we
could reach 100% safe.
Other things we’ve learned!
Management Commitment
Everybody knows its important, but what can they do to show
it
– By taking an active interest
– Management team must be active observers
– Use managers to coach in the observer training
Other things we’ve learned!
Hold an away day in a nice hotel!
• Organised by the BBS department focal points
• Attended by site management team, cell focal points, term
contractors
• Generated several action items for enhancing the
programme
• Demonstrates management commitment, generates good
ideas, gets buy in.
Other things we’ve learned!
Organisational readiness
• Implementing BBS is a big commitment - you don’t want it
to fail!
• Organisational readiness (climate/culture) is a key factor
which influences likelihood of success.
• HSE CRR 430/2002 - of 8 providers interviewed, 3 said
they would proceed regardless of readiness.
• To avoid a costly failure, discuss up front, or conduct
independent culture survey.
Other things we’ve learned!
Can be extended to other areas
e.g. We have now included environmentally critical behaviours
in the programme
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–
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–
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Is environmental protection equipment available
Is pollution prevention achieved
Releases controlled
Waste disposed of appropriately
Energy used efficiently
Other things we’ve learned!
Major Accident Hazards
• Behavioural safety has been driven by injury frequency
• Our inventory of critical behaviours was developed by
reviewing near miss/incident reports -> focus on
workplace safety
• It doesn’t follow that a reduction in the risks due to major
accident hazards will occur
• It depends on the list of critical behaviours
• Here’s an example of how BBS added to the major
accident hazard risk!
Major Accident Hazards
Handle
Bolts
• Manlid was not only used
for process reasons, but
was also a relief device
• Handle had been fitted
to solve a manual
handling “at risk” after a
BBS observation.
• Plant change procedure
was not followed
• Bolts interfered with
sealing surface
• Pentane vapour leakage
• Completely lost sight of
the MAH risks
Major Accident Hazards
• Incident investigations indicated “Procedures” were often
a root cause
• Procedures often relate to controlling major accident
hazards (plant change, safe operation, permit to work etc.)
• We’ve added “procedures” to our inventory of critical
behaviours”
Major Accident Hazards
Was there
a procedure for
the activity?
NO
At risk
Yes
Was the
procedure
appropriate?
NO
At risk
Procedures:
•permit to work
•safe operation
•plant change
•control of contractors
•etc
Yes
Was the
procedure
followed?
Yes
Safe
NO
At risk
You can substitute
the word Training
for Procedure
References
•Health & Safety Executive (2002). Strategies to promote safe
behaviour as part of a health and safety management system,
Contract Research Report 430/2002, www.hse.gov.uk
•PRISM (2002). Behavioural Safety Application Guide,
www.prism-network.org
Summary
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•
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The organisation must be ready for it
Management commitment is essential
It needs to be easy to carry out the observations
Needs to be integrated into the HSE MS
Need at least a few enthusiastic people to keep things
going in their departments
• People need to see some output
• Make sure the programme addresses all the issues which
are important for your organisation - Don’t forget about
major accident hazards
• We think BBS works, but it’s not easy
The End!