How and why might organisations adopt a behavioural
safety approach
Peter Webb, HSEQ Manager, Basell Polyolefins UK Ltd., Carrington Site, Manchester, M31 4AJ,
England. October 2003.
Introduction
It is widely accepted that within the broader scope of human factors, specifically human behaviour at
all levels within an organisation influences the effectiveness with which risks are controlled.
Behavioural safety approaches aim to promote behaviours which are critical to health and safety. This
essay outlines why a behavioural safety approach might be adopted.
Behavioural safety programmes vary significantly in their success. Some fail altogether. An overview
is given of how to adopt such a programme. Some key barriers and enablers which have been shown to
affect the outcome are highlighted.
This essay will not go into detail about what behavioural safety is, except insofar as it is necessary to
explain the “why” and the “how”.
Why Organisations Might Adopt a Behavioural Safety Approach
Safety performance in many organisations has tended to reach a plateau. This follows significant
improvements which were achieved initially through technological approaches (better understanding of
physical hazards, inherently safe design etc.), and subsequently systems approaches (implementation of
HSE management systems, quality systems etc.).
The term organisation was defined by W. J. Duncan as “a collection of interacting and interdependent
individuals who work toward common goals and whose relationships are determined according to a
certain structure”. This definition suggests that fundamentally organisations are made up of people,
rather than buildings, equipment and machinery. In occupational organisations, people usually share a
number of common goals such as controlling the level of risk to their health and safety and working
towards financial objectives. In fact these goals are often synergistic. It follows that an understanding
of “what makes people tick” , or psychology, should lead to insights into how these common goals can
be achieved.
Within psychology there are several competing and quite different concepts of the person, of which the
behaviourist approach is one. In recent years, the principles behind this approach have been applied
with some success to behaviours which are critical to safety (Komaki et al. 2000).
Organisational factors which underlie a successful behavioural safety programme, can also be expected
to lead to successes in other areas of the business. For example, transformational leadership styles have
been shown (HSE 2002, p51) to have a strong positive impact on safety compliance of individuals who
were less committed to safety. Similarly it has been shown that a transformational leadership style
motivates employees to achieve organisational goals (Arnold et al. 1998, p 338).
How to Implement a Behavioural Safety Programme
Implementing a behavioural safety programme is not a trivial task, and success is not guaranteed. It is
important to get it right first time, since having tried once and failed, the organisation will be less
receptive to a second attempt. Figure 1 gives an overview of the essential elements of a behavioural
safety programme.
Implementation
Observation and
Feedback Process
Assess cultural maturity or
readiness
Modify environment,
equipment or systems
Gain management & workforce
support & ownership
Behavioural safety training
Specify critical behaviours
Monitor
performance
Review &
goal setting
Review critical
behaviours
Provide
feedback
Establish baseline
Conduct
observations
Figure 1; Overview of a behavioural safety programme
Assess Cultural Maturity or Readiness
It is necessary for an organisation to have a mature safety culture before it embarks on such a
programme. It can be assessed by questionnaires, interviews or observation. Key components of a
positive safety culture include management commitment, communication, productivity versus safety,
learning organisation, safety resources, participation, shared perceptions about safety, trust, industrial
relations and job satisfaction and training (see for example HSE 2000, and HSE 1998).
Management and Work Force Support
Getting the support of the people in the organisation is vital. This can be achieved by involving people
in the selection and design of the programme, usually through a steering group made up of volunteers.
Steering group members should be respected (but not high ranking) staff members, and should be
representative of the work group. Getting the support of first line supervisors is key, as they can either
facilitate or prevent observations from being carried out.
Behavioural Safety Training
This should initially target the steering group, who need to understand underlying psychological
principles, as well as the specific techniques associated with identifying critical behaviours, and
carrying out observations. Some programmes train all staff as observers, while others train only a
minority. If the resources can be committed, it would seem to make sense to have as many observers as
possible.
Specifying Critical Safety Behaviours
A critical behaviour checklist, to be completed by the observers during their observations, has to be
developed, normally by the steering committee. The list can be developed from incident reports, risk
assessments, audits, input from front line staff, and expert judgement.
Establishing a Baseline
The final element in the implementation phase is establishing a baseline, by carrying out observations
to establish the levels of safe behaviours, for the critical behaviours identified. A baseline is a useful
but not essential means of providing feedback on the success of the programme.
Observation and Feedback Process
Once the implementation phase is complete, the observation and feedback loop starts. Observations are
in general conducted by peers, but they can be conducted by superiors. The observer uses the check list
of critical behaviours to record whether the individual was safe, at risk, or that the behaviour was not
relevant. In order for useful data on the percent safe to be generated, the checklist must clearly describe
the behaviours. The name of the person being observed is not normally recorded, to avoid a blame
culture being established. Feedback is crucial to achieving improvements. In particular, positive or
“summative” feedback about a safe behaviour is important in providing motivation. “Formative”
feedback regarding any at risk behaviours is also important. Feedback tends to be most successful
when it is given immediately after the behaviour, but broader feedback to the organisation about
progress with trends is also important. Realistic and achievable goals must be set, and progress
communicated. Unsafe conditions or barriers to safe behaviour revealed in the environment
(antecedents) must be dealt with. Performance is monitored to track progress, and to prompt
investigation if expected improvements are not achieved. New behaviours can be added to the check
list, and existing ones removed if they have reached “habit strength”, i.e. consistently observed as safe.
Conclusions
There is strong evidence that behaviour modification is effective in changing a range of behaviours in
an organisation. This essay has described why such a programme could be effective in achieving
desired safety targets, and how it could be achieved. The focus of the implementation described has
been front line staff, where critical behaviours would be for example, wearing of correct PPE, or
following operational procedures. These are typically where the “active failures” in an organisation are
to be found (Reason 1997). Arguments have been made (HSE 2002) for promoting critical health and
safety procedures which support the HSE management system. This adjusted focus has the possibility
to use behavioural safety to make improvements in the “latent conditions” in an organisation;
weaknesses in the latent conditions in an organisation are in many cases currently only identified
reactively in incident investigations.
References
Arnold, J, Cooper, CL, Robertson, I.T., (1998) Work Psychology, Third Edition Understanding Human
Behaviour in the Work Place, Financial Times Management, London
Health & Safety Executive (2000). Safety culture maturity model Offshore Technology Report
2000/049. HSE Books, Sudbury.
Health & Safety Executive (1998). Health and safety climate survey tool. Available from
www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/misc097.pdf
Komaki, J et al (2000). A rich and rigorous examination of applied behaviour analysis research in the
world of work. International Review of Industrial and Organisational Psychology, 15, 265 – 367.
Reason, J. (1997) Managing the Risks of Organisational Accidents. Ashgate, Aldershot, UK
Bibliography
Health & Safety Executive (2002). Strategies to promote safe behaviour as part of a health and safety
management system, Contract Research Report 430/2002, HSE Books, Sudbury. Available from
www.hse.gov.uk