WWII
British Rearmament & Anschluss
Britain Rearms…Sort Of…
 Abyssinia, Rhineland & Spain underscored weakness of LoN and
failure of collective security
 Becoming apparent that force will be needed to keep peace
 Important questions:
 What type of force to build up?
 How much would it cost & how much could Britain afford?
 A big concern was getting dragged into a continental war
 Some suggested refocusing upon naval power
 Others on building an air force that could project power and
potentially deter a future war
 Proposals for expanding the army were resisted
 Chancellor of Exchequer Neville Chamberlain claimed that it was
more important to strengthen economic power
 He claimed that the economy could not sustain & the public would
not support major rearmament
Chamberlain & the Army
 Becomes PM in May 1937
 Argued against a continental army
 If Hitler attacked eastward – no need for British army in West
 If westward – British force might arrive too late to help

Argument seems to say that Britain needed no field army at all
 Put faith in air power as deterrent
 With no commitment to expeditionary force, perhaps French
would extend Maginot Line to the Channel
 Chamberlain – France should not count on British help
 Military leaders argued that some continental commitment
was necessary – at least to protect Low Countries from
becoming bases for air attack against Britain
 Chamberlain determined to avoid mistakes of previous war
Chamberlain & Air Power
 Appeasement meant to avoid war & make continental force
unnecessary
 Belgium & France lost confidence in British support
 Hitler believed Britain might stay out of it if a quick decisive
attack was launched westward
 When attack did come, Germany did get bases in striking
distance of Britain – almost led to Britain’s demise
 Paradox – promise of air power convinced Chamberlain that the
British Army need not go to the Continent but the army was
needed to keep the Germans from getting in position to attack
 Fear of aerial bombardment exaggerated
 Germany never accomplished in war what alarmists feared
The RAF
 Embraced deterrent value of the bomber
 But never developed a comprehensive plan to use bombers
 As of 1938 – prospect of usable bomber force 2-3 years away
 Civilian leaders pushed for heavier reliance on fighters and
defense – mostly because it was the cheaper way to go
 But development of radar and well-designed fighters would
result in an effective air defense that would win the Battle of
Britain
 Except for the Fighter Wing of the RAF & radar, British
rearmament too little too late as a deterrent
Chamberlain’s Philosophy
 Must avoid the mistakes of the previous war
 Motivated by fear of new war and belief that conciliation &
generosity toward Germany – regardless of cost to potential
victims – would keep the peace
 Not coming to terms with Hitler would mean new war
 Little faith in LoN & collective security
 Britain must accept responsibility to maintain peaceful world
 Need to rearm to achieve strength and respect to permit an
active policy of appeasing discontented powers
 Supported increased spending for armaments but only a
“quick fix” to raise military power to position to permit his
brand of diplomacy
 Did not favor further funding
Chamberlain’s Philosophy
 Achieve stability & peace by discovering Hitler’s demands &
helping meet them without war
 Thought of Hitler & Mussolini as rational men with limited
goals
 Disregarded possibility that they might be unreasonable
 Also strategic dangers of Germany annexing Austria or the
Sudetenland, or danger to France & Britain
 Thinking of strategy was to consider possible war & plan for it

Unthinkable to Chamberlain
 He removed nay-sayers from his cabinet & surrounded
himself with those who agreed with him
 Would be free to conduct his policy without interference
Winning Good Will
 Chamberlain believed he could win positive behavior from
Germany through financial help in restoring Germany’s economy
 Fact – Germany already recovering while Britain was in financial
trouble
 Until outbreak of war – he tried to win German good will and
good behavior by offering incentives
 “Economic Appeasement”
 Greatest danger to British policy of Appeasement – France
 French looking for British commitment of support for
Czechoslovakia
 Chamberlain clearly not serious about helping
 By Britain writing off Czech. & making it clear there would be no help
in war – France reluctantly realized that they may not be able to help
either
 Appeasement desirable even if German neighbors absorbed
Hitler’s Plans
 Planning how he could take what he wanted while Western
powers planned how they might give it to him
 Emphasized Lebensraum from the East
 Had to contend with “hateful antagonists” England & France
 Need to deal with them before going East
 Need to gain Austria & Czech to prevent danger to German
flanks in attack to West
 Not sure that fighting would be needed to get Aust. or Czech
– felt sure that GB & FR already abandoned both
 Mostly true!
 Western weakness allowed & encouraged Hitler to speed up
timetable
 Italy’s assurances of abstention regarding Austria sealed deal
Anschluss
 Austrian Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg bullied by Hitler
into legalizing Austrian Nazi Party
 Also allowed pro-German Austrians in key govt. positions
 But Schuschnigg’s call for national vote to determine
independence angers Hitler
 After Mussolini is consulted to determine his attitude,
German forces moved into Austria on March 12, 1938
 Met by cheering crowds but mass arrests begin immediately
 Austria annexed on March 13, 1938
 France & Britain protest but do nothing
 Despite unlawful and somewhat violent annexation, in clear
violation of TofV, Chamberlain refused to give up on
appeasement