Economic Dimensions
Sudanese Poverty
1. Sudan is one of the 25 poorest countries on
the planet; 90% live below the poverty line.
2. A lethal combination of droughts and
flooding contributes to this situation.
3. Over 80% of the Sudanese population is
rural.
4. Since the famous famine of 1984, Sudan has
suffered severe droughts in 1989, 1990, 1997,
and 2000.
Source: Tessa Morrod, Practical Action Sudan Communication Team
The Darfurian Economy
1. Geography: Darfur is basically a vast
plain about 900 meters below sea level. Mainly
subsistence agriculture.
2. Rainfall and soils roughly divide the
province into 3 distinct areas:
– A. The northern dry belt: 300 mm of
rain/yr. Minimal agriculture; many nomads.
– B. Second is the Central Qoz. About 500 mm
of annual rainfall. Low-yield agriculture.
Crops include millet, maize, okra, tomatoes,
and onions. Inhabitated by settled
peasants.
– C. Third is the southern and southwestern.
Annual rainfall ranges between 800 and 900
mm.
Groundnuts = cash crop. Mango and
citrus trees common. Inhabited by the
Baggara and sedentary peasants.
– Source:
Gerard Prunier, Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide
Investment in Sudan
Ranked #2 – World’s Most Attractive Countries
for Investment.
New (2001) Economic policy which privatized
public corporations and ended the State’s
monopoly on business.
Major investors: Siemens, PetroChina, Chevron
China is the primary import/export partner
Sources:
Ministry Of Investment, Sudan;
UN Sudan IG
“The China Factor”
China’s goal is to secure inexpensive
resources in Africa.
Chinese National Petroleum Corporation
(CNPC) is the largest shareholder in the
GNPOC (Primary owner of the oil pipeline along the Nile).
China has invested over US 20 Billion in
Sudan. China does not follow international
lending guidelines which were designed to
stave off corruption. There have been
reports that China has been trading guns for
oil.
Source: The Institute for the Analysis of Global Security
Economic Power of
Military
The Central Government has used the influx
of money from oil (primarily Chinese money) to arm
local militias throughout the Sudan.
These local militias have now become de
facto political/economic power in the
villages they control.
Investment in Darfur
The Western Savanna Development Corp., Jebel
Marra Rural Development project, and the
USAID (Save the Children) had larger budgets,
more vehicles, and a greater capacity to
operate in rural areas than the (not funded)
Darfur Regional Gov’t).
The Sudanese
government is
soliciting outside
investment in hopes
of stabilization.
Government
Mr. Bashir an army general seized power in 1989
through a military coup.
Struggling to fix infrastructure.
70% of the government’s share of oil profits
are spent on defense. This is important because
the government is involved in a self arms
buildup in case it is cut off from its
suppliers. Military power is stressed in Sudan,
where the soldier is of higher class and
foreigners are forced to have register with the
police in order to enter the country. The
military is a stable job that pays and puts
food on the table, which is not to be
downplayed in a society that is so dependant on
food through imports.
Government Services
(or lack thereof)
Each of the 26 States has its own fiscal
autonomy. . . So, those States with the most
money are able to provide services. Khartoum
has the most stability and thus the best
services. The aim is to impress outside
investment.
Social services in rural areas are nonexistent.
In Darfur, the Sudanese Government does not
provide ANY services……… unless bombings count!!
Fighting for RESOURCES
Water is the most economically important
resource.
High variability in rainfall between the
north and the south. (25mm/yr north – 1600mm/yr south)
Drought in mid to northern regions can cause
great disparity in food supply between the
north and south.
North Darfur is one of the most at-risk
regions for drought because it is at the
fringes of available irrigation systems.
Source: UN Food and Agriculture Organization
Development Prospects/
Foreign Aid Projects
Sudanese-backed militias control most of the
movement of arms and money, and thus control what
can be done by humanitarian/aid organizations.
Development in the Darfur region, especially in
the embattled West, is at a standstill.
A recent problem (2006) for Darfur is that much
of the aid money is going to the southern states
of Eastern Equatoria, Jabel and Jonglei to aid
these areas affected by the LRA incursion.
Source: UN Sudan IG
Aid for Darfur
YEAR
CHAD
DARFUR
Total in US $
2003
8,117,232
38,509,459
46,626,691
2004
204,300,900
890,213,941
1,094,514,841
2005
50,000
195,217,714
195,267,714
TOTAL 212,468,131 1,123,941,115
1,336,409,246
Top Donor Countries are the United States with 41% of total registered Funding, EC/ECHO with
16% and United Kingdom with 12%. These donor countries are followed by Netherlands with 4%
and Germany and Canada with approx. 3% each. Arab countries accounts for 2.5% (US$ 33.5
million) of total contributions, mainly in the form of in kind bilateral humanitarian aid.
Distribution of contributions towards the Darfur Crisis on calendar year and region. All amounts
are in US Dollars
Source: UN Resource Tracking Service
Gezira Scheme Facts
Originally
started by
British in 1925
This network of
canals and
ditches is 2,700
miles (4,300
kilometers) long,
and the irrigated
area covers 8,800
km².
Cotton is the
main crop
Gezira Scheme
Covers 882,000 hectares,
water is irrigated through
gravity irrigation.
100,000 tenant households
farm the Gezira Scheme
Crop Rotation from tenant
farmers
Gezira Scheme
It is centered on the Sudanese Stat of Al
Jazirah, just southeast of the confluence of
the Blue and White Nile rivers at the city of
Khartoum.
One of the biggest irrigation systems in the
world, 1/3 the size of Belgium
World’s least efficient working at less that
50%
Uses 30% of Sudan’s allocation of Nile River.
By allocating this percentage of water to the
scheme you are taking a chance with a large
amount of water on an inefficient system in a
country where water is a high commodity.
Gezira Scheme
Covers 882,000 hectares(2.1 feddans), water is
irrigated through gravity irrigation.
100,000 tenant households farm the Gezira
Scheme
Crop Rotation from tenant farmers, these tenant
farmers are put on this rotation through a
specific rotation decided by the government.
The land given to the tenants is about 20
feddans per tenant which has proven to provide
tenants with an income marginally above the
poverty line if at all.
Problems with the Gezira Scheme
Silt leads to inefficient irrigation
Deteriorating because of silt deposits, the reason
for the increase of silt deposits is the amount of
water being routed into irrigation has increased from
past years.
Silt deposits between 5-10 million cubic meters, most
of the silt settles in the minor canals. This
decreases the amount of water that reaches the
tenants who use these minor canals, and silt is
responsible for putting some canals and tenants out
of production.
Expensive $2.1 Billion SD ($8.2 million AD) spent on the
removal of silt, however, over recent years the
process of removing the silt has slowed down which is
putting the Sudanese at a fight to catch up.
More ProblemsTransportation
There are 18,000 kilometers of roads along
canal system and 30,000 kilometers along farm
tracks.
Majority are dirt, and unpaved. With these
unpaved roads they are often impassable after
rain or during the rainy season.
Light Railway covers about 75% of Gezira
Scheme. Inadequate maintenance has led to
depletion of locomotives and wagons. The
Schemes tracks have been damaged due to floods
and vehicle traffic. In order to fix the
railways the private sector would have to
become involved, but it seems that it is an
unlikely appealing investment. It has been
recommended that the railways undergo
improvements.
International Monetary
Fund
In 1990 IMF declares Sudan noncooperative.
1992-93 IMF threatens to expel Sudan
Sudan already owes the fund the
equivalent of more than $467 million in
hard currency
Sudan recently allowed to borrow an
additional $225 million over the next
year. Is it possible that the continued
foreign investment and the increase in
oil production have lead to the
continued lending of the IMF?
Economic Divestment
The Sudanese government has shown
an historic responsiveness to
economic pressure
political pressure and diplomacy
have largely failed to stop
violence in Darfur.
The divestment movement has
already triggered behavioral
changes in a number of companies.
Reasons for Divestment
Genocide is an expensive venture.
The Sudanese government relies
heavily on foreign investment to
fund its military and the brutal
militias seeking to eliminate the
non-Arab population of Darfur.
it is estimated that 70-80% of oil
revenue in Sudan, fueled by
foreign direct investment, goes to
the country’s military.
The Jonglei Canal
1.
2.
3.
4.
Source: War and
Slavery in Sudan
5.
6.
Heavy water flow through Sudan from
East Africa flows through south; never
reaches north
1974: Egypt and Sudan resumed an old
plan and in 1974 proposed the digging
of the canal.
The Canal would supposedly improve
trans., agriculture for cash crops,
drinking water, and hygiene.
High hopes that Sudan would become the
“breadbasket” of the Middle East were
matched with Saudi Investment
1983: Canal construction halted due to
Sudanese Civil War.
Government was forced to focus on rainfed agriculture instead.
Implications of a failed Canal
Source: War and
Slavery in Sudan
1. The opening up of Sudanese
agriculture to the
international market made
subsistence crops cash crops.
2. The advent of mechanized
agriculture damaged Baggara
livelihoods because it
dispossessed them of land
rights.
3. Baggara kidnapped women,
children, sold them into
slavery.
4. The government was
complicit and in denial.
5. The Dinka slaves were
forced to do herding of
livestock in Kordofan and
Darfur.
Foreshadowing Genocide
1. 95,000 of a population of 3.1 million
Darfurians died
2. The drought shrunk the grazing resources
for the nomads, who encroached on the landed
peasantry.
3. Farmers carrying out the traditional
practice of burning unwanted wild grass were
attacked by the Baggara.
4. Khartoum successfully pitted two
imagined communities against each other:
– The nomadic Baggara and the “Africans.”
Source:
Gerard Prunier, War and Slavery in Sudan
Denial
is not a river in Egypt
1. 1983: Rainfall diminishes dramatically
2. President Nimeiry warned that famine was
imminent without foreign aid.
3. The FAO estimated the food deficit at
39,000 tons.
4. Khartoum denied this figure, estimating
the food deficit at 5400-7000 tons
5. Nimeiry could no longer deny the obvious
–
Proclaimed Darfur a disaster zone
–
Asked the world for 160,000 tons of aid
6. Large IDP camps developed; 60-80,000
starving people marched toward Khartoum.
7. Khartoum declared them Chadian refugees,
and deported them to Kordofan.
Source: Gerard Prunier: Darfur, the Ambiguous Genocide
Who Benefits From Foreign Aid?
1. In this case, the Baggara did.
2. By seizing the food aid, the Baggara forced the
Dinka to remain slaves.
3. This creates a double-bind situation:
– Scenario 1: The Dinka receive the food aid, or…
– Scenario 2: The Dinka do not receive the food aid.
If the Dinka did not receive food aid, they would
have no reason to work for the Baggara. If the
Dinka did receive food aid, they would have no
reason to work for the Baggara. This is the reason
for Baggara ambivalence toward international aid
intended for this Dinka. This is also the reason
the Baggara attempted to control the rationing of
such aid.
Source:
Gerard Prunier, War and Slavery in Sudan
Is global warming to
Blame?
YES!
British Home Secretary John Reid publicly fingered
global warming as the driving force behind the Darfur
genocide.
It is certainly true that desertification,
increasingly regular drought cycles, and a lack of
water and arable land are aggravating factors.
Not Quite…
This is an oversimplification according to Richard
Reeve, a leading advocate and professor of English
literature at Smith College.
Michael Klare, a global security specialist at
Hampshire College argued that Darfur is part of an
emerging pattern of resource conflict (because of
global warming).
Source: Josh Braun, Seed Magazine
Global Warming: Experts Weigh In
Michael Horne, British Home Secretary
“Environmental changes make the emergence of a violent conflict more rather than less likely.”
“The blunt truth is that the lack of water and agricultural land is a significant contributory
factor to the tragic conflict we see unfolding in Darfur”
Eric Reeves, Professor of English at Smith College
“The greater cause, by far, lies in the policies of the current National Islamic Front regime.”
Mark Lavergne, from the University of Khartoum:
“ The problem is not a water shortage as such, and water shortages don’t necessarily lead to
war. The real problem is the lack of agricultural and other development policies to make
the best use of available water resources since colonial times.”
Michael Klare, Global Securities Specialist, Hampshire College
“Climate Change, consumption, globalization…it’s one phenomenon. Conflicts occur among
ethnic or religious lines because that’s how communities are organized. In Darfur, they’re
fighting the inexorable reach of an expanding desertification.”
Source: Josh Braun, Seed Magazine
Darfur and Game Theory
Are “the rebels willing to
let genocide continue
against their own people
rather than compromise
their demand for power?”
Is “the optimal strategy
for the United States [and
others] to disengage from
the process?
What is the economic
payoff/incentive for the
Rebels to forgo the
opportunity to end the
genocide?
Does this make sense?
Source: Chris Makler: Aplia Econ Blog (Game Theory from
Alan Kuperman, a professor at the University of Texas
Game Theory Continued
According to Kuperman, the rebel leaders in the Darfur
region of Sudan share responsibility for the continued
atrocities befalling their own people. This means that…
Concerned westerners should stop interfering if they want
it to end. In June 2006, international mediators proposed
a peace deal. The Sudanese government agreed to it. But
the rebels rejected the deal because it did not give them
sufficient autonomy over their own lands. Mediators
returned and extracted further concessions from the
Sudanese government. One of the rebel groups agreed to the
new terms, but then various rebel groups began fighting
amongst themselves.
The game theory diagram on the previous slide is Kuperman’s
economic model because it deals with incentives. According
to Kuperman, the rebels have an incentive to “provoke
genocidal retaliation,” and that the rebels would have
pursued peace a long time ago. But because of the Save
Darfur movement, they wait for western pressure to hand
them control of the region instead, prolonging the
genocide.
Source:Chris Makler: Aplia Econ Blog (Game Theory from
Alan Kuperman, a professor at the University of Texas
Works Cited
Braun, Josh. “A Hostile Climate: Did Global Warming Cause a
Hostile Climate in Darfur?” Seed Magazine 2 August 2006. 4
December 2006.
<http://www.seedmagazine.com/news/2006/08/a_hostile_climate.php>
Damu, Jean. “Does God work for the CIA?: U.S. Policy toward
Darfur and Sudan.”
FinalCall.com News Nov 7, 2006. 4 December 2006. <
http://www.finalcall.com/>
de Waal, Alex. Famine that Kills: Darfur, Sudan: Revised Edition.
New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
Gailey Jr., Harry A. History of Africa: Volume III from 1945 to
present. Malabar, Florida: Robert E. Krieger Publishing Company,
1989.
Gettleman, Jeffrey. "War in Sudan? Not Where the Oil Wealth Flows."
The New York Times 10/24/2006:
Works Cited (Continued)
"Gezira Scheme." Wikipedia. 11/15/2006
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gezira_Scheme>.
Government of Sudan and the World Bank. "Sudan: Options for the
Sustainable Development of the Gezira Scheme (PDF)." Wikipedia.
2000. 11/13/2006 <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gezira_Scheme>.
Jok, Madut Jok. War and Slavery in Sudan. Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press, 2001.
Morrod, Tessa. “Too little: the vicious cycle of drought in North
Darfur.” Political Action: Technology changing poverty. 26
November 2006.
<http://practicalactionconsulting.org/?id=s4_too_little>
Prunier, Gérard. Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide. Ithaca, New
York: Cornell University Press, 2005.
Reeves, Eric. "The Economics of Genocide in Sudan." Sudan Tribune
Oct 11,2006 10/11/2006 <http://www.sudantribune.com/article>.