Introduction to science studies: from
philosophy via history to sociology
Claus Emmeche
Center for the Philosophy of Nature and Science Studies
Faculty of Science
University of Copenhagen
http://www.nbi.dk/~natphil/
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Introduction to science studies: from
philosophy via history to sociology
Claus Emmeche
Center for the Philosophy of Nature and Science Studies
Faculty of Science
University of Copenhagen
http://www.nbi.dk/~natphil/
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Why philosophy of science ?
Why study philosophy of science ?
Simple answer: A human being = a thinking animal. To think is also to
ponder. To ponder is also to self-reflect: Why do I do what I do? Do
I do it the right way? Is it good for me and others? Could it be
better?
Why do I do research?
Possible answers: It’s fun. It make me understand the world better. I
can make a living of it - perhaps even a career? I can give
something back to society. It’s worth the efforts for its own sake.
And what is research, really??
- is science something special?
- just a tool to predict or manipulate nature?
- does it carve nature at its joints?
- Humankinds only hope for survival?
These questions (and suggestions) have all kinds of
implications, and philosophy - as well as history & sociology
of science - provide ressources to approach them
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A crash course tour in the history of
philosophy of science: 1. Plato and...
Plato (428-348 BC) and the Pythagorean view of nature
• ”the real” = the mathematical harmony present in nature
• ”Science” (i.e. physics, philosophy of nature) ≈ Knowledge
of this harmony ≈ insight into the fundamental structure of
the universe
confer Galileo (1564-1642): the book of nature stands open to
our gaze, yet we have to understand its language mathematics - to be able to read it!
•
•
Pythagoreans: Mathematical relations, which fit
phenomena count as explanations of why things are as
they are
Rival point of view (e.g. Geminus, 1st Cent. BC):
mathematical hypothesis ≠ physical theories about the
structure of the universe. Thus, distinguish between
•
•
to ”save the appearances” by superimposing mathematical
relations on the phenomena
to explain why phenomena are as they are
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A crash course tour in the history of
philosophy of science: 1. ... Ptolemy
Ptolemy (c.100-178 AD)
• More than one model can be
constructed to save the
appearances of planetary
motions: A moving-eccentric
model may be equivalent to an
epicycle-deferent system
—> This lead to a tradition saying
that the astronomer should
construct mathematical models
to save the appearances but
should not theorize about ”the
real motions” of the planets.
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A planet orbits point x in a circular path called the
epicycle. The deferent is the circular path that point x
takes around the centre of motion, C. This is not the
same point as the location of the Earth. The offset is
called the eccentric. Different planets would have
different eccentrics, deferents and epicycles. The
resultant path traced out by a planet could account for
retrograde motion and variations in brightness.
... to make a long history short
Philosophy of science before the 19th Century:
No clear distinction between scientists and philosophers of
science. Philosophical issues was discussed by scientists
having different ideals of science, e.g.:
•
•
realism (science aims at making true theories about the structure of
the workd) vs. instrumtalism (science aims at making models useful
to account for observations and making precictions)
inductivism (knowledge from observations) vs. hypotheticaldeductive view of science
Three compeeting traditions
•
•
•
the Platonic-pythagorean (e.g., astronomy)
the Aristotelian (e.g., natural history)
the Archimedian (e.g., mechanics)
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Next quick-step: Positivism
Here is Carnap.
He was a positivist.
However, ”positivism” means different things!
- at least 4 meanings:
•
•
Classical positivism (19th Century): Comte
Logical positivism/empiricism (20th C.): Carnap et al
NB: this is the mother of ”philosophy of science” sensu an
institutionalized field of academic research!
•
•
Commonsense positivism or positivism as an ethos
Positivism as a pejorative
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Rudolf Carnap
(1891-1970)
19th Century: Comte’s positivism
A. Comte
(1798-1857)
Comte was one of the big ”system builders” of the 19th C.;
his ”positive philosophy”, in Cours de Philosophie Positive (6
volumes, 1830-1842) witness the emergence of a selfconscious scientific (or scientist?) spirit
The positive is:
What is real (non-imagined)
no loose speculations, but the real and experience-based
What is useful
skepticism regarding ”armchair philosophy”
What is certain (beyond discussion)
What is precise
distancing the vague and opaque in contemporary phylosophy
What is edifying
Philosophy should helt build up, not break down
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19th Century: Comte’s positivism
•
•
•
A. Comte
(1798-1857)
”positive philosophy” - the idea of enlightenment and belief in progress
founder of sociology; one of the ”systems builders” of the 19th C.
a conception of the system of sciences: Unity and universalism, and a
historical tendency towards unification of all sciences
Comte’s progressionist philosophy of history:
The theological stage - belief in supernatural powers
•
•
•
Animism
Polytheism
Monotheisme
The metaphysical stage - belief in abstract powers
•
•
•
Isolated speculation
Branches of philosophy
Philosophical systems
The scientific stage belief in invariant patterns
•
•
Specific matters of fact
Fewer and fewer, more general facts (theories)
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complexity
generality
Sociology
Biology
Chemistry
Physics
Astronomy
20th Century: Logical positivism
A forerunner to logical positivism:
Ernst Mach (1838-1916)
”The goal which it
[physical science] has set
itself is the simplest and
most economical abstract
expression of facts” (from
the Essay ”The economical
nature of physical inquiry” ).
Mach held that scientific laws are summaries of experimental
events, constructed for the purpose of human comprehension of
complex data. Thus scientific laws have more to do with the mind
than with reality as it exists apart from the mind.
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Logical positivism,
the Vienna Circle,
1923 - 1936
Rudolf Carnap
(1891-1970)
Otto Neurath
(1882-1945)
Moritz Schlick
(1882-1936),
1932: Positivism
and Realism
Alfred J. Ayer
(1910-1989),
1936: Language,
Truth, and Logic
Herbert Feigl
(1902-1988)
Hans
Reichenbach
(1891-1953)
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Ludwig Wittgenstein
(1889-1951)
Carl G. Hempel
(1905-1997)
20th Century: Logical positivism
The Second
International
Congress for
the Unity of
Science,
København,
June 21.-26.,
1936
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Logical positivism
- some characteristics
The total
knowledge is
cumulative
Rationality, ”positive
knowledge”
Anti-metaphysical:
sharp distinction
between Science /
Non-science
Source of knowledge:
observations + logic (cf.
”logical empiricism”)
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(analytic and
synthetic)
’nonsense’
knowledge
( incl. Hegel and
Heidegger in philosophy
and nazism in politics)
Laws and theories
data
data
data
...
Logical positivism
- some characteristics
Language has a logical structure
What is meaningful = what is
verifiable
(by implication, metaphysics is
considered as meaningless)
A mirrowing relation between
language and reality (the ”FidoFido-theory”)
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logical positivism’s
favourite
philosophy of language
Fido’s
bread
Logical positivism
- some characteristics
Construction of general
knowledge through
induction and deduction:
”the hypotheticaldeductive method”
Unified science (methodological monism) ...
Mathematical physics becomes the ideal science
Theory-reduction and logical analysis are seen as tools
for unified science
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Logical positivism
- summary of its characteristics
1. Analytic/synthetic distinction


all math and logic are seen as analytic (makes possible to treat mathematical
knowledge within an empiricist frame)
Kant - Geometry - Discovery of Non-Euclidian geometries - Einstein - 2 kinds of
geometry: analytic and synthetic!
2. Verificationist theory of meaning
3. The language of Observation and the language of Theory are seen as
sharply separated

”the iron bar lights red” // ”Helium atoms have each 2 e– ”
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the language
of Theory
the language
of
Observation
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Logical positivism
- summary of its characteristics
1. Analytic/synthetic distinction


all math and logic are seen as analytic (makes possible to treat mathematical
knowledge within an empiricist frame)
Kant - Geometry - Discovery of Non-Euclidian geometries - Einstein - 2 kinds of
geometry: analytic and synthetic!
2. Verificationist theory of meaning
3. The language of Observation and the language of Theory are seen as
sharply separated

”the iron bar lights red” // ”Helium atoms have each 2 e– ”
4. Logic as a main tool for philosophy

Deductive logic as a guaranty of truth, - but what about inductive logic !? It
became important to develop an inductive logic. Carnap did a great work, but
ultimately failed.
5. Context of Discovery
(opdagelsessammenhængen)
vs. Context of Justification
(begrundelsessammenhængen)


Philosophy takes care of C.o.Just. while History and Psychology studies the
C.o.Disc.
(implied): a teleological picture of the scientific method (as intrinsicly goaldirected towards objective knowledge) with an asymmetry between expanations
of ’good’ and ’bad’ science. Only bad science, pseudoscience, etc., needs
’external’ historical or psychological explanations.
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Logical positivism
- summary of its characteristics
6. Science should be value-free
7. Emphasis on ”facts” and the objectivity of science.

Objectivity conceived as methods to secure a mirrorlike relation between theories and observations
8. Methodological reductionism: theory-reduction
9. Ontological reductionism: physicalism (i.e., the belief
that the world is ultimately of a physical nature) or
eventually phenomenalism (as in Mach: sense
impressions are the ultimate stuff of all knowledge)
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Further senses of “positivism”
- as a pejorative / skældsord
In some contexts, ”positivist” is used as expressing criticism
or disapproval:
• ”Do you think that the social sciences should only
contribute knowledge to form a basis for ”a piecemal
social engineering” as Popper would have it?! - that’s
plein positivism!”
• ”Sociology reduced to quantitative statistics! What a
positivistic idea !”
Remember the ”Positivismusstreit” in German social science in
1950s and 1960s: What kind of social science should there
be, — should it be ”critical” or merely ”descriptive”,
”marxist” or ”positivist” ?
This controversy keeps reappearing.
E.g., the controversy over the ’right’ of scientists and scholars
to have special measures of quality in research in the
natural, the human and the social sciences.
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Further senses of “positivism”
- as an ethos
What is an ethos?
”the ethos of science” (R. Merton)
A practically-moral way to take a stance or act, an attitude, a set of
social norms and values
May be expressed at special occasions, in salutary speeches etc.; but
more often an ethos is expressed in actions and not in words.
(not a consistent philosophical position)
(not an ideology in the sense of ”false consciousness” or a ”political
agenda”)
An ideology in the sense of a non-scientific ”practical everyday stance”
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“The positivist ethos of science”
Science is the highest form of cultural human activity.
Science aims at positive, certain knowledge, by means of the scientific method
(hypothetical-deductive, theory-testing, falsification, etc.).
Science is (or should be) autonomous; only guided by curiosity and the inner
developmental logic of each speciality.
Knowledge is justified, true (or very probable) beliefs. Truth is an epistemic, not
an ontologic (about being) or axiologic (about values) concept.
Knowledge is neutral regarding use or misuse. There is no ”ethically wrong” or
”irresponsible” knowledge; only knowledge used wrongly in specific situations.
There is (or should be) a sharp division between science and non-science like
politics, religion, etc.
Use/misuse is a political question. If a researcher asserts anything about this, it is
in his/her role not as a researcher but as a citizen, a lay person, a politician.
Natural science is only committed to search for true knowledge, not ”good
knowledge”. Science forms the basis for technology that can be applied to
acceptable or intolerable purposes, but the ethics and politics involved in this is
foreign to science.
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“The positivist ethos of science”
The exaxt wording of the ethos in the slide above is mine (C.E.),
but it is seen in many contexts. Here is the so-called CUDOS
version, due to a founder of the sociology of science, Robert K.
Merton:
According to Merton, the ethos of science can be expressed in the
norms
• Communism (knowledge is a common good)
• Universality (science is for all disregarding social, political,
religious etc. background)
• Disinterestedness (objectivity)
• Organized Skepticism (the system of critical testing and
evaluation)
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“The positivist ethos
- in crisis ?
Scientism?!
ofEthnochauvinism?
science”
Science is the highest form of cultural human activity.
Science aims at positive, certain knowledge, by means of the scientific method
(hypothetical-deductive, theory-testing, falsification, etc.).
Science is (or should be) autonomous; only guided by curiosity and the inner
developmental logic of each speciality.
Knowledge is justified, true (or very probable) beliefs. Truth is an epistemic, not
an ontologic (about being) or axiologic (about values) concept.
demand of
Knowledge is neutral regarding use or misuse. There is no ”ethically wrong”
or
just one
”irresponsible” knowledge; only
knowledge
situations.
emphasis
onused wrongly in specific
method
is
like ”art pour
certainty
is
There
is
(or
should
be)
a
sharp
division
between
science
and
non-science
like
wildly
l’art” - a naive
a dead end,
politics,
religion, etc.
restrictive
view
of science.
and
leads
Use/misuse
is a political question. If a researcher asserts anything about this, it is
Should society
philosophically
to
in indefinitely
his/her role not
but as a citizen,
a lay person, a politician.
pay
?! as a researcher
skepticism
A social
contract
Natural
science
is only committed to search for true knowledge, not ”good
(or
payback)Science
is
knowledge”.
forms the basis for technology that canabe
applied to
naive
needed or
! intolerable purposes, but the ethics andconception
acceptable
politics involved
in this is
of how
foreign to science.
science in fact
develops
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“The positivist ethos of
- in crisis ?
Knowledge cannot fully
science”be accounted for like that.
Values and knowledge
cannot be separated
Can science
justify
itself
Science
is the highest
form
of ?
cultural human activity.
Science aims at positive, certain knowledge, by means of the scientific method
(hypothetical-deductive, theory-testing, falsification, etc.).
Science is (or should be) autonomous; only guided by curiosity and the inner
developmental logic of each speciality.
Knowledge is justified, true (or very probable) beliefs. Truth is an epistemic, not
an ontologic (about being) or axiologic (about values) concept.
Knowledge is neutral regarding use or misuse. There is no ”ethically wrong” or
”irresponsible” knowledge; only knowledge used wrongly in specific situations.
There is (or should be) a sharp division between science and non-science like
Should
this free
politics,
religion,
etc.the
scientist
special
Use/misuse
is a of
political
question. If a researcher asserts anything about this, it is
responsibility?
in his/her role not as a researcher but as a citizen, a lay person, a politician.
Natural science is only committed to search for
true
knowledge,
not ”good
you
cannot
always
knowledge”. Science forms the basis for
technology
can be applied to
separate
usethat
of knowledge
acceptable or intolerable purposes, but the
ethics
and politics involved
in this is
from
achievement
of
foreign to science.
knowledge
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Can the
scientist always
“The positivist ethos of science”
distinguish
- in crisis ?
There are many
between his
forms of
role as a
Science is often political
expertise
- not
scientist and his
Science is the highest form of cultural human
activity.
althouth it pretends to
only scientists
active interests
Science aims
at positive,
by means of the scientific method
appear
neutral certain knowledge,
are experts!
in funding,
(hypothetical-deductive, theory-testing, falsification, etc.).
patents, or his
Science is (or should be) autonomous; only guided by curiosity and the
inner
role
as a
developmental logic of each speciality.
politically
Knowledge is justified, true (or very probable) beliefs. Truth is anengaged
epistemic,citizen
not
What we consider to be science today
an ontologic (about being) or axiologic (about values) concept.
?
May be considered ideology tomorrow or in 50 years
Knowledge is neutral regarding use or misuse. There is no ”ethically wrong” or
”irresponsible” knowledge; only knowledge used wrongly in specific situations.
There is (or should be) a sharp division between science and non-science like
politics, religion, etc.
Use/misuse is a political question. If a researcher asserts anything about this, it is
in his/her role not as a researcher but as a citizen, a lay person, a politician.
Natural science is only committed to search for true knowledge, not ”good
knowledge”. Science forms the basis for technology that can be applied to
acceptable or intolerable purposes, but the ethics and politics involved in this is
foreign to science.
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“The positivist ethos of science”
- in crisis ?
Science is the highest form of cultural human activity.
A dangerous
illusioncertain
to
Science
aims at positive,
knowledge, by means of the scientific method
think
you
can
free
science
(hypothetical-deductive, theory-testing, falsification, etc.).
of ethical involvement
Today,
science
Science is (or should be) autonomous; only guided
by curiosity
andand
the inner
and responsability
technology
are
tightly
developmental logic of each speciality.
interwoven activities
Knowledge is justified, true (or very probable) beliefs.
Truth is an epistemic, not
(”technoscience”)
an ontologic (about being) or axiologic (about values) concept.
Knowledge is neutral regarding use or misuse. There is no ”ethically wrong” or
”irresponsible” knowledge; only knowledge used wrongly in specific situations.
There is (or should be) a sharp division between science and non-science like
politics, religion, etc.
Use/misuse is a political question. If a researcher asserts anything about this, it is
in his/her role not as a researcher but as a citizen, a lay person, a politician.
Natural science is only committed to search for true knowledge, not ”good
knowledge”. Science forms the basis for technology that can be applied to
acceptable or intolerable purposes, but the ethics and politics involved in this is
foreign to science.
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And now on to history …
Cf. the title of presentation: Introduction to science
studies: from philosophy via history to sociology
Positivism: focus on science as a product (context of
justification of knowledge)
Kuhn, briefly:
• focus on science as a micro-social historical process
• View of theories as conceptual structures embedded in
historically situated social framework (paradigms)
• Questioning the continuity and cumulative nature of
knowledge (revolutions)
• Context of discovery and context of justification is not so
neatly separated: The paradigm frames beforehand how
to ask questions and how to interpret a discovery - thus,
he sets out to understand the context of normal-science
practice on a deeper level.
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Thomas S. Kuhn
(1922-1996)
HPS: History and Philosophy of Science
Contrast to positivism and Popper:
The development of science is not trivially
cumulative, but discontinous
Anomalies (not ”falsification”) is a part of
normal science
Scientific development is a question of not
only ”theory”, but also social factors
and values. Science is not foreign to
values. Even ”data” are ”theoryladden” and thus connected to the
wider conceptual scheme that a
paradigm constitutes.
No definitional demarcation criterium:
”Science” as a concept is a cluster of
family likenesses (as concepts like
”game”).
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Kuhns scheme of
scientific development:
Pre-paradigmatic science
Normal Science
(puzzle solving)
Crisis (if some
anomalies
too serious)
become
Revolution
New Normal Science
etc.
HPS: History and Philosophy of Science
Characteristics of Kuhn as a founder of the HPS tradition:
•
Kuhn is an internalist: ”the social” as a set of factors influencing science is
mainly of an intellectual character and mainly manifest within the development of
a paradigm, and especially in between paradigms
•
Kuhn is an externalist regarding the phases of crisis & extraordinary science
between two rival paradigms: Here, social factors external to science may play a
role in the process of science.
•
Kuhn a relativist? Yes, but not an irrationalist: The process of theory-choise is
not irrational, yet it is not following any special algorithm or predefined set of
methodological norms independent of any paradigm
•
Kuhn’s critique of positivism: He contested some elements of the ”positivist
ethos” of science ... (e.g., ”Science aims at positive, certain knowledge, by means
of the scientific method (hypothetical-deductive, theory-testing, falsification”), but
was more critical to positivism as a philosophy than as an ethos (or that ethos’
implications for science policy).
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HPS: History and Philosophy of Science
What is ”the HPS tradition” ?
•
Study science in context
•
Science is a human activity, and not a purely
logical or theoretical process
•
To know about scientific change, one must look at
how science was actually conducted. Philosophy is
not enough. History of science provides important
sources for analysing philosophical issues like
confirmation, justification, theory choise,
discoveries, controversies, etc.
•
Thus, Kuhn’s impact is the turn or transformation
of classical (logicist) philosophy of science into an
integrated study of the history and philosophy of
scientific development: the HPS tradition.
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”history of science
without philosophy of
science is blind, and
philosophy of science
without history of
science is empty”
Norwood Russell Hanson
HOPOS, The
International
Society for the
History of
Philosophy of
Science,
scistud.umkc.edu/hopos/
HPS: History and Philosophy of Science
Kuhn’s legacy is contested:
• Kuhn the revolutionary: A relativist
himself, questioning the ’objectivity’ of
science and the inevitable nature of
scientific progress. His own theory seemed
like a revolution in (positivist) philosophy of
science.
•
Kuhn the conservative: He distanced
himself from the more philosophically’radical’ interpretations of his work, and can
be seen as a conservative regarding the
implications for science policy: Society
should not interfere with the everyday
workings of science, and a certain amount
of indoctrination in the normal-science
(ph.d. student) education of scientists
seems necessary.
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What’s next? In the Wikipedia entry
for History_and_philosophy_of_science
you find that
” More recently the sociology of
science and technology studies have
become popular topics and a few HPS
departments have become Science
Studies departments, e.g., the School
of History and Philosophy of Science at
the University of New South Wales was
known as the School of Science and
Technology Studies (STS) from the
mid-1980s until 2001. For this reason it
can be argued that the fields are
identical and that the difference is only
one of emphasis. While it may seem
that STS is a broader concept, leaving
room for other approaches to science
such as sociology of science, HPS
departments are not usually as
exclusive as a literal interpretation of
the name might imply.”
STS: Science and Technology Studies
Barry Barnes & Davis Bloor
SSK, Sociology of
Scientific Knowledge:
• Barry Barnes & Davis
Bloor (Edingburgh
school): A Strong
Programme for a SSK:
you must give sociological
explanations for
erroneous as well as true
beliefs - they should be
treated symmetrically.
• Harry Collins (Bath
school): The sociology of
scientific experiments and
of forms of expertise
• General sociology of
knowledge (Berger &
Luckmann)
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STS, Science and Technology Studies
• the study of how social, political,
and cultural values affect scientific
research and technological
innovation, and how these in turn
affect society, politics, and culture
• an interest in viewing science and
technology as socially embedded
enterprises.
• an interest in studying
SSK Practitioners
relationships between
include Gaston
technoscientific innovations and
Bachelard, David
society, from new perspectives
Bloor, Paul
(e.g., and anthropology, but also
Feyerabend, Elihu
literature, art history, cultural studies,
M. Gerson, Thomas
gender studies, history of
Kuhn, Susan Leigh
consciousness, medicine, law and
Star, Anselm
computer science).
Strauss, Lucy
• Concern over the direction and the
Suchman, Harry
risks of science and technology.
Collins, and others.
STS: Science and Technology Studies
Science and Technology Studies
Thus, STS includes STS,
• the study of how social, political,
and cultural values affect scientific
studies of the
research and technological
pathway from
innovation, and how these in turn
affect society, politics, and culture
research to
• an interest in viewing science and
technology as socially embedded
technology
enterprises.
(and invoices),
• an interest in studying
relationships between
and the
technoscientific innovations and
accompanying
society, from new perspectives
and anthropology, but also
instrumentalization of (e.g.,
literature, art history, cultural studies,
science, and the risks gender studies, history of
consciousness, medicine, law and
and uncertainties
computer science).
• Concern over the direction and the
involved.
risks of science and technology.
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Questions for discussion
1 Why is it problematic (or wrong) to claim that
”natural science is an exemple of positivist science”
?
2 Discuss what became of the idea that all sciences
had certain (unifying) characteristics in common - is
it all gone?
•
•
Still, there must be a difference between art and
science, or religion and science - but which ones?
Isn’t true that the method of the natural sciences is
the experimental method?
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