***Neg for Venezuela Practice Debate
US Politics
**see also the extensive link section on Venezuela in the Opening Packet
Ros-Lehtinen link module
( ) Our Ros-Lehtinen Link
First – she’s opposed to engaging Venezuela unless specific human rights conditions
are attached.
Congressional Documents and Publications ‘13
(June 4, 2013 – lexis)
U.S. Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), Chairman of the Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee, made
the following
statement after meeting with Venezuelan opposition leader Maria Corina Machado and writing a letter to Secretary of State John Kerry
asking for the immediate release of U.S. citizen Timothy Tracy, being held hostage in Venezuela.
Statement by Ros-Lehtinen:¶ "Today I had the honor of meeting with Venezuelan pro-democracy leader Maria Corina Machado, a stalwart
champion of democracy for Venezuela. I applaud her for her courage in continuing to boldly speak out against the Maduro regime, and join her
in urging the U.S. and responsible nations to be on the side of the people of Venezuela and support them in calling out the illegitimate elections
and robbing the Venezuelan people of true democracy.¶ "Under
the Maduro regime, democracy is made a pathetic
joke and Venezuelans continue to be deprived of their human rights. It is also appalling that this
regime has unjustly detained Tim Tracy, a U.S. citizen who was simply exercising his freedom of speech in making a documentary,
but now finds himself sharing a prison with some of the worst criminals of Venezuela. This situation is unacceptable and I urge
the State Department to do all it can to secure Tracy's release and safe return to the United States
unconditionally."
And – She hates Venezuela and brings in the Israel lobby
Madsen, 11
Wayne Madsen, Investigative journalist, author and syndicated columnist. Has some twenty years experience in security issues.
As a U.S. Naval Officer, he managed one of the first computer security programs for the U.S. Navy. He has been a frequent
political and national security commentator on ABC, NBC, CBS, PBS, CNN, BBC, Al Jazeera, and MS-NBC. He has been invited to
testify as a witness before the US House of Representatives, the UN Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and an terrorism
investigation panel of the French government. A member of the Society of Professional Journalists (SPJ) and the National Press
Club., 6/20/11, http://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2011/06/20/the-outsourcing-of-influence-peddling-to-the-israelilobby.html
The confluence of the Israel Lobby with pressure groups such as those that support the Saakashvili regime in Georgia is
not an isolated situation. Before the rise to power of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan in Turkey, Israel could rely on the support of successive Turkish governments. Turkey, in turn, established its own Washington-based
lobbying group, the American Turkish Council, which was modeled on the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). It was recently
learned from Turkish government officials in Washington that the secret network of Turkish military officers, politicians, intelligence officers,
professors, and journalists known as “Ergenekon,” which plotted a series of coups against independent-minded Turkish governments, was a
construct of the CIA and Mossad. An in-depth investigation of the Ergenekon network conducted by the Turkish intelligence service discovered
that many of the key players in Ergenekon were Dönme, the descendants of Turkish Jews who converted to Islam and, to varying degrees, now
practice a combination of Kabbalah Judaism and Islamic Sufism while remaining secular and Turkish nationalist in the mold of Turkish state
founder Kemal Ataturk. Similarly, the
Israel Lobby has made common cause with the right-wing Cuban exile community in
Florida, which has become as influential in the politics of south Florida as the many Jews and Israelis who live there. The
convergence of interests of pro-Israelis and Cuban Gusano exiles can best be seen in the current chair of the House Foreign Relations
Committee,
Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, who represents a congressional district in south Florida. Ros-Lehtinen, who is of
Cuban Jewish descent, is one of AIPAC’s and the ADL’s best friends in Congress . She is also a vociferous opponent
of the governments of Venezuela and Nicaragua, both of which have severed diplomatic relations with
Israel and have recognized the independence of Abkhazia, to the dismay of Israel, AIPAC, and the ADL. While Ros-Lehtinen rattles
sabers against Venezuela, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay, and other Latin American nations that have
recognized Palestine within its 1967 borders, she supports continued U.S. military assistance to Colombia, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Panama,
Israel’s last four remaining allies in Latin America. Ros-Lehtinen, while decrying alleged human rights “abuses” in Venezuela and Nicaragua, is
silent on actual abuses in Colombia, where Israelis routinely supply weapons and advisers to the government in its inhumane war with the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), peasants, and labor unionists. The trial in New York of Russian air cargo services owner Viktor
Bout for allegedly trying to sell weapons to the FARC is one outcome of the
strategic alliance between Israel, its U.S. Lobby,
and the right-wing Latin American exiles and intelligence operatives who call Miami their home. The conviction and
imprisonment of former Yukos owner Mikhail Khodorkovsky, considered a major agent-of-influence for Israel in Russia and a one-time
potential President of Russia, has placed Russia in the same category as Venezuela, Nicaragua, Abkhazia, Turkey, and other nations that
have incurred the ire of the Israel Lobby either directly or via outsourcing deals made with strategic allies such as the Georgians,
Cuban exiles, or, now, in the case of Turkey, the Armenians. In the past, AIPAC always ensured that “Armenian genocide” resolutions failed in
the U.S. Congress, a payback for Turkey’s support for Israel. With Turkey adopting an independent foreign policy, AIPAC and the ADL are now
strategically allied with the Armenian lobby to push for Armenian genocide resolutions in Washington and elsewhere.
Israel lobby key to agenda
Petras, 6
(James Petras is a Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University, 4/6, http://petras.lahaine.org/?p=7)
The problem of war and peace in the Middle East and the role of the Israel lobby is too serious to be marginalized as an after-thought. Even
more important the increasing censoring of free speech and erosion of our civil liberties, academic freedom by an aggressive lobby, with
powerful legislative and White House backers is a threat to our already limited democracy. It is incumbent therefore to examine the fourteen
erroneous theses of the highly respected Professor Chomsky in order to move ahead and confront the Lobby?s threats to peace abroad and
civil liberties at home. Fourteen Theses Chomsky claims that the Lobby is just another lobby in Washington. Yet he fails to observe that the
lobby has secured the biggest Congressional majorities in favor of allocating three times the annual foreign aid designated
to all of Africa, Asia and Latin America to Israel (over 100 billion dollars over the past 40 years). The Lobby has 150 full time
functionaries working for the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), accompanied by an army of lobbyists
from all the major Jewish organizations (Anti-Defamation League, B?nai Brith, American Jewish Committee, etc) and the
nation-wide, regional and local Jewish Federations which hew closely to the line of the ‘majors’ and are
active in policy and local opinion on Israel and promote and finance legislative candidates on the basis of
their adherence to the Lobby’s party line. No other lobby combines the wealth, grass roots networks,
media access, legislative muscle and single-minded purpose of the pro-Israel lobby. Chomsky fails to analyze
near unanimous congressional majorities which yearly support all the pro-Israel military, economic,
immigration privileges and aid promoted by the Lobby. He fails to examine the list of over 100 successful legislative
initiatives publicized yearly by AIPAC even in years of budgetary crisis, disintegrating domestic health services and war induced
the
military losses.
It’s unique – she’s currently on-board for immigration reform.
LeoGrande, 12
William M. LeoGrande School of Public Affairs American University, Professor of Government and a
specialist in Latin American politics and U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America, Professor LeoGrande
has been a frequent adviser to government and private sector agencies, 12/18/12,
http://www.american.edu/clals/upload/LeoGrande-Fresh-Start.pdf
But was Obama's success a harbinger of structural realignment in the Cuban-American community or merely a conjunctural product of
Romney's flawed candidacy? The Republican ticket had its shortcomings. In 2007, candidate Romney famously ended a speech to stunned
Cuban-Americans with Fidel Castro's signature closing, "Patria o muerte! Venceremos!" (Homeland or death! We shall overcome!). Vice
presidential candidate Paul Ryan had a record 8 of repeatedly voting in the House of Representatives to end the embargo against Cuba (on the
libertarian grounds that the government should not impede free trade). "That did their ticket a lot of harm with Cubans, and allowed us to at
least get a hearing with them about many other economic issues," an Obama campaign official said.9 Moreover, the Republican Party's antiimmigrant posture, which hurt it with Latino voters nationwide, hurt it with Cuban-American voters as well. The
state's most
prominent national Republican elected officials– Senator Marco Rubio, and Representatives Ileana Ros-Lehtinen
and Mario Diaz-Balart, all distanced themselves from their Party's hardline on immigration reform . In 1996,
when Bill Clinton won 35% of the Cuban-American vote against Bob Dole, 10 the Republican Party was also hurt by its anti-immigration policy.
That year, the Republican Platform supported making English the official language, advocated cutting off welfare for noncitizens, and deny
citizenship to the U.S.-born children of illegal aliens. Yet despite these 11 problems, there was growing evidence that Obama's gains might
represent more than just Romney's weakness. Polling by Florida International University since 1991 has chronicled gradual changes in the
Cuban-American community in south Florida, both demographically and attitudinally– changes that, as they begin to manifest themselves in
voting behavior, do not bode well for the Republican Party. The Cuban-American Electorate When FIU began polling Cuban-Americans south
Florida in 1991, 87% favored continuation of the U.S. embargo. By 2011, support had fallen to 56%. In 1993, 75% of respondents opposed the
sale of food to Cuba and 50% opposed the sale of medicine. By 2011, solid majorities (65% and 75% respectively) supported both. In 1991, 55%
opposed unrestricted travel to Cuba, whereas in 2011, 57% supported unrestricted travel for all Americans and 66% supported unrestricted
travel for Cuban-Americans (Table 2). These changes in Cuban-American opinion were clearly linked to demographic changes in the community.
Exiles who arrived in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s came as political refugees, motivated principally by their opposition to the
socialist course of the revolution. Those who arrived in the Mariel exodus in 1980 and afterwards were more likely to have left for economic
reasons. Recent arrivals, especially those who arrived in the post-cold war era, were far more likely to have maintained ties with family on the
island. A 2007 poll of Cuban-Americans in south Florida found that 58.3% were sending remittances to Cuba, but fewer than half of those who
arrived before 1985 were sending money, whereas three quarters of more recent arrivals were. The differences in age and experience among
different waves of 12 migrants produced sharply different opinions about relations with the island, with more recent arrivals being far more
likely to favor policies that reduce bilateral tensions and barriers to family linkages, especially the ability to travel and send remittances (Table
3).
---Appeasement
Engagement opponents control the debate on venezuela
Harper, 10 (liz, Senior Editor @ US Institute for Peace, adjunct fellow at the Council on Hemispheric
Affairs, americasquarterly.org contributing blogger based in Washington DC, 12/21,
http://americasquarterly.org/node/2058)
It's not clear whether some
sought to use the QFR to strong arm
the State Department to articulate or take
tougher
positions , and thereby bolster Palmer's confirmation prospects and support on the heels of his "weak" hearing
performance. Alternatively, perhaps the QFR was publicized to thwart his prospects entirely. Who knows; at this stage, it's irrelevant.
What's very relevant are the unfolding consequences of the QFR mishandling. First and foremost, Palmer got rolled. A dedicated Foreign Service
officer was not treated with due professionalism and respect. We will not know how great he would have been in Venezuela. Second, the State
Department on this matter appears naive, indecisive and disorganized. Third, critics
who never wanted ANY ambassador—and
succeeded. As did Chávez, for the short term. To take up the second point, the State
Department appears to have different and confused messages on Venezuela. The ostensible example of this is
the two messages of Larry Palmer's Senate testimony versus his answers to the QFR. What can be said publicly and on the
record regarding Venezuela? Beyond talking with a low voice on the safest matters, it is not clear. Is
certainly NOT Palmer—in Caracas,
such timidity to Chávez' bluster necessary? The next step will be to see whether the State Department will go bold and call Venezuelan
Ambassador to the U.S. Bernardo Alvarez a persona non grata, or take a softer approach and cancel his visa. Alvarez had been back home, and
over the weekend, it was said he was not planning to return to Washington DC—already one move ahead of the anticipated reciprocation to
Palmer's rejection. It was in Chávez’s best interests to welcome Palmer, as he wanted to work with Venezuelans, and help ease the growing
tensions between the two countries. But now, the State Department will have to rethink this, and find another person...most likely with a
stronger track record on human rights and democracy. Perhaps we should accept that playing nice and fair with an irrational actor like Chávez is
not likely to yield positive results. At the end of the day, we've
been backed into a corner to put forward a tougher
ambassador, and not Palmer, who was our first pick. Does this mean likewise that our policy of engagement must
be altered? Are we acting in response to Venezuela's moves? In this context, Chávez, and some conservative critics
here, are setting the terms of U.S. policy. This debacle also illustrates the express need for the State Department to complete
its review of Venezuela policy and clarify its positions. The QFR mishandling is a symptom of the bigger issue: uniting
our various agencies to craft a coherent message and policy on Venezuela. What are the "red lines" of what we'll
tolerate from Venezuela? When one of our career diplomats goes on record saying that Venezuela's National Guard is involved in
narcotrafficking, provides safe haven to terrorists like the FARC, imprisons judges for ruling against Chávez, why is the State Department not
publicizing those concerns? Until now, the State Department had been keeping its profile too low for anyone's good. Ostensibly that of
Ambassador Palmer. At this point, why is it a mistake to outline on record ways in which the Venezuelan government is breaking very basic
standards of human rights and hemispheric security? Just some open and disquieting questions. At the least, the State Department needs to
figure out what its basic message is, and then put it out there with a unified voice, loud and clear. This could go far to improve its public
outreach and image. But while silence continues, it
seems that the Venezuelans have settled the U.S. debate: this
kind of "engagement" will not get us where we want to be. Chávez is antithetical to our democratic values and security
concerns. He is moving full steam down the field, while we sit on the sidelines. Time to play.
Perceived as weak appeasement – crushes Obama PC and means plan can never be a
win
Mead, 10 (Walter Russell, Senior Fellow Council Foreign Relations, Prof Foreign affairs @ Bard, 3/31,
http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2010/03/31/kicked-by-the-great-white-north/
The policy of slapping friends seems not to be working very well; the policy of kissing up to the bad guys has been even less of a success. North
Korea, Cuba,
Venezuela and Iran have blown off the administration’s efforts to put bilateral relationships
on a friendlier basis. Not only is President Obama back to Bush’s old policy of trying to get the UN to adopt tougher sanctions on Iran,
he’s denouncing human rights crackdowns in Cuba. The biggest success to date, getting a new missile treaty with Russia, is at lot less impressive
than it looks. Russia needs to reduce the costs of its nuclear arsenal and wants the prestige that comes from arms talks with the US just like the
Soviet Union used to have. I support the treaty and hope it gets ratified, but on the whole it’s more a favor from us to Russia than the other way
round. In many cases, the administration has good reasons for specific choices that it makes. Russia, for example, is never going to be our best
friend, but there is no point in not trying to put relations on a more businesslike basis. Britain’s stand on the Falkland Islands, that there is
‘nothing to negotiate’ where sovereignty is concerned, is a tricky one to support. It always looks bad to be against talks. Given global skepticism
about US intentions after the poorly handled war in Iraq, it made sense for the Obama administration to bend over backwards to show it was
willing to reach a new relationship with Iran. Pressing Karzai to clean up the abysmal corruption that wastes American money and undermines
the strength of his government is certainly the right thing to do. And by twice announcing controversial housing decisions in Jerusalem during
critical talks with the United States, the Israeli government was showing enough arrogance or incompetence that the White House had to do
something. But while many of steps the administration is taking make sense on their own terms, when you look at them all together the picture
isn’t pretty. Beating up on your friends and kissing
up to your enemies looks terrible , especially when neither your friends nor
your enemies show any respect. Slamming Honduras and pampering Russia might have both been good decisions on their own; but when you
do them both you end up looking like a hypocrite who moralistically and didactically lectures the weak while fawning on the strong. Nobody
respects that kind of behavior, and nobody admires people who practice it. It tastes weak, like blood
in the water — and the sharks out there are paying attention . The emerging perception of weakness is one reason
the administration has had to fight Israel so hard over the Jerusalem issue. As Laura Rozen reports in a must read article at Politico.com,
administration sources say that the quarrel with Netanyahu is “bigger than Jerusalem” because “it’s
about the credibility of the
administration.” It’s precisely because so many people have kicked so much sand in the
administration’s face that it had to raise the stakes so high on this one. Forcing Netanyahu to back down in
Jerusalem may help the administration fight the perception of weakness abroad, but it is unlikely to help
President Obama much at home. And he may not get the win he seeks . Canada and Brazil have blown the administration
off with no ill effects, and even the preternaturally accommodating Japanese are still defying the administration over the unpopular American
military base on Okinawa. If Netanyahu sticks to his guns on an issue where he has strong domestic support, he might still force Washington to
compromise. Beating up on our few remaining friends isn’t going to fix things. What
the President really needs is a victory
over an adversary. He needs to get North Korea, Iran, Syria, Hamas, Venezuela or even Cuba to take a step back
— or he needs to charm one of them into behaving more nicely. Capturing bin Laden or otherwise achieving something decisive in Afghanistan
would also be a plus. Failing
that, foreign policy will be a continuing weak spot for the administration, and
sooner or later that will mean trouble.
anything short of big stick on Venezuela triggers intense congressional opponents and
high media profile
Harper, 10 (liz, Senior Editor @ US Institute for Peace, adjunct fellow at the Council on Hemispheric
Affairs, americasquarterly.org contributing blogger based in Washington DC, 12/21,
http://americasquarterly.org/node/2058)
I'm told that some
sought to torpedo Palmer's nomination from the get-go, either preferring another candidate
with more credentials on human rights, or not wanting an ambassador in Venezuela at all. Critics doubted that
Palmer—despite his experience as President of the Inter-American Foundation and as the Chargé d’Affaires in Ecuador during a time of
major internal crises—had the steel to tangle with Venezuela's strongman. To many, his soft tone and circumspect
statements at his confirmation hearing reinforced this view. Because Palmer did not come out swinging a
big stick at his Senate confirmation hearing, Senator Richard Lugar sent the ambassador a set of "questions for the
record" (QFRs), in attempt to strengthen support for his nomination. Palmer sat down with folks at the State Department and
answered them, discussing the low morale in Venezuela's military, the ties between members of Venezuela's government and Colombian
guerrillas and allowing them refuge in Venezuelan territory, its role in narcotrafficking, Chávez' increasing control over the judicial and
legislative branches, steady erosion of checks and balances, and violations of human rights and freedom of the press. Palmer's
responses—which he thought would be closely held, according to several sources at the State Department, including the ambassadordesignate himself—were newsworthy, especially at a time of heightened tensions between Colombia and Venezuela. The QFR
ripped around town and the world, media reports picked up Palmer's statements, thereby setting off the
wildfire. So much for the State Department trying to keep a "low profile" on Venezuela and the sensitive situation in the
Andean region.
Spun as appeasement, soft on terrorism and national security
Kouri, 11
Jim Kouri, Law Enforcement Examiner
Jim Kouri, CPP, the fifth Vice President and Public Information Officer of the National Association of Chiefs of Police, has served on the National
Drug Task Force and trained police and security officers throughout the country, Examiner.com, 6/26/11,
http://www.examiner.com/article/obama-urged-to-place-venezuela-on-terrorist-sponsor-list
Obama urged to place Venezuela on "Terrorist Sponsor List" Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez, who is believed to be in Cuba
following emergency surgery, is in ''critical'' but stable condition, Miami's El Nuevo Herald has reported. The government has treated the President's departure since
June 10 as a state secret. Chavez's government so far has made no comment about Iran Hezbollah activities in their country. During Friday's hearing of the
House Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, Chairman Connie Mack (R-14) again called on the Obama Administration
to cease their delaying of placing Venezuela on the "State Sponsor of Terrorism List." The hearing, "Venezuela's
Sanction able Activity," was held to provide oversight of sanctions available for the State Department and Treasury
Department to dissuade illicit activity in the Western Hemisphere. To date, the Obama Administration has underutilized these
tools allowing ruthless dictator Hugo Chavez to profit from the drug trade, sell fuel to the Iranians, and transport terrorists around the world. Congressman
Mack stated, "The State Department said they would name Venezuela a state sponsor of terrorism as
well as enforce consequential sanctions on their state run oil company if they received proof that Venezuela is
demonstrably sanctionable. That proof was again presented to officials of the State and Treasury Departments and
further delay by the Obama Administration is unacceptable and will only continue to coddle Hugo
Chavez." Chairman Mack reiterated Venezuela's repeated support for acts of international terrorism;
including the sale of refined fuel to Iran and the actions of Ghazi Nasr al Din, a Venezuelan Diplomat, who was sanctioned by the Treasury
Department for facilitating the transfer of funds to Hezbollah and escorted Hezbollah officials to and from Venezuela. Iran, and its proxy
group Hezbollah continue to expand their presence in Central and South American taking advantage of their already
close relationship with Venezuela's despot Presidente Hugo Chavez, according to Air Force General Douglas Fraser,
commanding officer of the U.S. Southern Command, Additionally, Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) drew sanctions
on several Venezuelan senior government officials, Hugo Carvajal Barrios, the Director of Military Intelligence, and Henry de Jesus Rangel Silva, General-in-Chief of
the Venezuelan Armed Services, for materially assisting and supporting drug trafficking and terrorism activities by the revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC). Mack added: "If the Obama Administration continues to coddle Hugo Chavez and the threat he poses to our security, freedom loving Americans will take
matters into their hands by not purchasing oil and gas from PDVSA, the Chavez run oil company which operates as CITGO in the U.S." In
addition, last
week Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said that no U.S. funds should be
provided to the newly-formed Hezbollah government in Lebanon, or to a Palestinian Authority that includes Hamas. The congresswoman and other
lawmakers are concerned that U.S. taxpayer money may end up in the hands of terrorist groups claiming
to be political organizations. “For years, members of Congress warned that it was unwise to fund a Lebanese government in which Hezbollah participated. It was
clear that Hezbollah’s influence was growing, and that the Executive Branch had no long-term strategy to deal with
that reality, and no contingency plan to stop U.S. aid from falling into the wrong hands ," she said.
Economic Engagement perceived by congressional critics as appeasement, soft on
national security, terrorism and iran
Goodenough, 12
Patrick Goodenough, Patrick covered government and politics in South Africa and the Middle East before joining CNSNews.com
in 1999. Since then he has launched foreign bureaus for CNSNews.com in Jerusalem, London and the Pacific Rim. From October
2006 to July 2007, Patrick served as Managing Editor at the organization's world headquarters in Alexandria, Va. Now back in
the Pacific Rim, as International Editor he reports on politics, international relations, security, terrorism, ethics and religion, and
oversees reporting by CNSNews.com's roster of international stringers, CNS News, 2/2/12,
http://cnsnews.com/news/article/iran-venezuela-links-examined-amid-fresh-calls-terror-sponsor-designation
Iran-Venezuela Links Examined Amid Fresh Calls for Terror-Sponsor Designation U.S. lawmakers will
turn a spotlight
Thursday on
the deepening links between Iran and leftist regimes in Latin America, at a meeting
that will likely hear fresh calls for the administration to designate Venezuela as a state sponsor of terrorism. Three weeks after
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua and Ecuador, the U.S. House Foreign
Affairs Committee will hold a hearing entitled “Ahmadinejad’s Tour of Tyrants and Iran’s Agenda in the
Western Hemisphere.” “Iran has been actively working for years to expand its ties and influence in the Western Hemisphere, and it has
found willing partners in the region’s anti-American despots,” committee chairman Rep. Ileana RosLehtinen (R-Fla.) said in an earlier statement. The panel aims to review steps the U.S. should take to advance
American interests and counter Iran’s activities in the region. Among experts scheduled to testify is Institute for Global Economic
Growth president Norman Bailey, who formerly served on the National Security Council and in the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, where he was appointed in November 2006 as “mission manager” for Cuba and Venezuela. In a briefing paper
published by the American Foreign Policy Council on Wednesday, Bailey explored
the Hugo Chavez regime’s “facilitation and
of the penetration of the Western Hemisphere by the Islamic Republic of Iran.” “Since 2005, with Venezuela’s
assistance, Iran has created an extensive regional network of economic, diplomatic, industrial and commercial activities,
with significant effect,” he wrote, noting that Iran’s interests have extended to other Latin American countries, especially the leftistgoverned Ecuador, Bolivia and Nicaragua. Bailey noted that although the Iran-Venezuela partnership had caught the
encouragement
attention of U.S. policymakers in recent years, “little by way of concrete responses has emerged to counter the extensive
web of illicit activity and strategic connections that Iran has made in Venezuela and throughout Latin America.” Among his
recommendations – designation of Venezuela as a state sponsor of terrorism, for its collusion both
with Iran and the Iranian-backed Lebanese terrorist group, Hezbollah. Bailey said designation would potentially result in a boycott of
Venezuelan oil to the U.S., but argued that the oil shipments “could easily be made up with equivalent amounts released from the U.S. Strategic
Petroleum Reserve.” “By contrast, such a move would have a much more pronounced impact on the Venezuelan economy.” Links to foreign
terrorist organizations The U.S. currently lists Cuba, Syria, Iran and Sudan as state sponsors of terrorism, a
sanctions including a ban on arms-related exports and sales, controls over exports of dual-use items,
assistance, and various financial restrictions.
designation that carries
prohibitions on economic
Designation requires a determination by the secretary of state that a country’s
government “has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism,” for example through support for and links to “foreign
terrorist organizations” (FTOs).
Congressional resolution passage proves congress perceives plan as appeasement –
triggers bipartisan opposition
Walser, 10
Ray Walser, Ph.D., is Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the
Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation, 1/20/10,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/01/state-sponsors-of-terrorism-time-to-add-venezuela-to-the-list
Since January 2009, the Obama Administration's attempts to improve relations with the stridently anti-America Chávez have yielded little more
than empty gestures. Although ambassadorial relations were restored in June 2009, Chávez has signaled renewed support for the
narcoterrorism of the FARC, begun threatening and punishing Colombia for its defense cooperation agreement with the U.S., helped destabilize
Honduras by backing former president Manuel Zelaya's illegal referendum, pushed ahead with major Russian arms acquisitions, and sealed ever
closer ties, including joint nuclear ventures, with Iran. Venezuela plays an increasingly prominent role as a primary transit country for cocaine
flowing from Colombia to the U.S., Europe, and West Africa. Nevertheless, the Obama Administration, according to the President's National
Security Council adviser on Latin America, Dan Restrepo, does
not consider Venezuela to be a challenge to U.S.
national security: President Obama "does not see Venezuela as a challenge to U.S. national security. There is no Cold War nor Hot War.
Those things belong to the past."[2] This view is not optimistic--it is dangerous. The Administration needs to, as
a recent bipartisan congressional resolution urges , adopt a genuinely tough-minded approach to
dealing with Chávez and Venezuela. The Administration needs to develop a public diplomacy strategy to counter Chavista
disinformation and a diplomatic strategy in the Americas that responds to growing threats of political destabilization. It also needs to
recognize that under Chávez, Venezuela has become terrorism's most prominent supporter in the Western
Hemisphere. The Obama Administration can begin to correct this policy of drift and inaction by placing Venezuela on the list
of state sponsors of terrorism along with Iran.[3]
Powerful congressional and committee backlash – spun as appeasement and soft on
terror
O’Brien, ‘9 (Michael, The Hill, 10/28, http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefingroom/news/65219-lawmakers-want-venezuela-named-a-state-sponsor-of-terrorism
Lawmakers want Venezuela named a state sponsor of terrorism A bipartisan pair of lawmakers
introduced a resolution on Wednesday to classify Venezuela as a state sponsor of terrorism. Rep. Ron Klein (DFla.), a member of the Foreign Affairs committee, and Rep. Connie Mack (R-Fla.), the ranking member of the
Western Hemisphere subcommittee, joined together to float a bill calling on Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to
add Venezuela to the list of states which sponsor terrorism. The resolution, H.Res.872, cites the
Venezuelan government's ties to Iran, Hezbollah, and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) as
examples of the South American nation's support for terrorism. "The evidence linking Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez to the FARC
and Hezbollah – two of the most dangerous terrorist organizations, responsible for many bombings, kidnappings, killings and drug
trafficking – is overwhelming, " Mack said in a statement announcing the resolution. "Naming Venezuela a state
sponsor of terrorism will strengthen the stability of the region," the Florida Republican, who has long
been a vocal critic of Chavez, added. "The Administration must not turn a blind eye to Chavez’s
dangerous aggression and must add Venezuela to the state sponsors of terrorism list without delay.”
"Venezuela’s assistance to the FARC in Colombia destabilizes the region and places the Chavez regime squarely outside the international
community," Klein said. "This legislation seeks to stop Venezuela’s
cannot and will not accept such actions taking place so close to home.”
facilitation of terrorism now . The United States
Especially because well documented terror ties – drives opposition
Goodenough, 12
Patrick Goodenough, Patrick covered government and politics in South Africa and the Middle East before joining CNSNews.com
in 1999. Since then he has launched foreign bureaus for CNSNews.com in Jerusalem, London and the Pacific Rim. From October
2006 to July 2007, Patrick served as Managing Editor at the organization's world headquarters in Alexandria, Va. Now back in
the Pacific Rim, as International Editor he reports on politics, international relations, security, terrorism, ethics and religion, and
oversees reporting by CNSNews.com's roster of international stringers, CNS News, 2/2/12,
http://cnsnews.com/news/article/iran-venezuela-links-examined-amid-fresh-calls-terror-sponsor-designation
In its most recent annual report on international terrorism, published last August, the State Department in its section on state sponsors cites
Cuba’s links with the Basque separatist group ETA and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) – both FTOs – as well as Iranian and
Syrian sponsorship of Hezbollah and Palestinian FTOs including Hamas. Yet Venezuela’s
links to Hezbollah are well-
documented (as early as June 2008, the U.S. Treasury Department charged that Chavez’ government was
“employing and providing safe harbor to Hezbollah facilitators and fundraisers”) and he has also been accused of
ties to FARC and to ETA. Caracas’ cozy relationship with state sponsors of terror Cuba and Iran – including new
concerns that Chavez could help Tehran to evade the latest Western sanctions against its banks and oil exports – provide
further reason, proponents say, for Venezuela itself to be designated. Rep. Connie Mack (R-Fla.), chairman of
the Foreign Affairs subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, has for several years sponsored legislation urging action .
The most recent bill, introduced in May 2011, calls for “Venezuela to be designated a state sponsor of
terrorism for its support of Iran, Hezbollah, and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).” Mack introduced
similar bills in October 2009 and in March 2008.
---Appeasement (Spillover)
Venezuela Engagement policies spun as appeasement – triggers intense fight and
derails Obama domestic agenda priorities
Dueck, 11
Colin Dueck,professor at the Department of Public and International Affairs, George Mason University, October 1, 2011
policy review » no. 169, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/94006
Look at how Obama’s strategy of accommodation has played out in relation to four categories of foreign
governments: 1) those essentially hostile to the United States, 2) those who pursue a mixture of strategic rivalry and cooperation, 3) genuine
American allies, and 4) Arab governments of varying allegiance. The first category, of regimes basically hostile
to the United States,
includes the governments of Iran, North Korea, Cuba, and Venezuela, to name only four of the most notable. Each of
these governments has literally defined itself at a fundamental level by violent opposition to America.
To think that a conciliatory tone, a preliminary concession, or a well-intentioned desire for better relations on the part of a U.S. president by
itself will transform that hostility is simply naïve. In the case of Cuba, for example, the Obama administration began by lifting certain economic
sanctions, in the hope of seeing some reciprocal concessions from the Castro brothers: political liberalization, an easing of anti-American
hostility, anything at all of significance. No such concessions have been made. The case of Iran has already been discussed — Obama reached
out to Tehran with great fanfare in 2009, and has received in effect a slap in the face. Both Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez and North Korea’s Kim
Jong Il are likewise just as hostile and provocative toward the United States today as they were when George W. Bush was America’s president.
This is because the fundamental barrier to friendly U.S. relations with those regimes was never George W. Bush. The fundamental barrier to
friendly relations with these regimes is the fact that they are bitterly hostile to the United States. The kinds of concessions that
Washington would have to offer to win their genuine accommodation
would be so sweeping, massive, and unacceptable,
from the point of view of any likely U.S. president that they will not be made — and certainly not by
Barack Obama. Any smaller concessions from Washington, therefore, are simply pocketed by a hostile regime, which continues along in its
basic antipathy toward the United States. So who is supposed to be the target audience here? The true audience and for that matter the
ultimate source of these various conciliatory policy initiatives is essentially a small, transnational, North Atlantic class of bien pensant opinion
who already share Obama’s core policy priorities in any case. They have rewarded him with their support, as well as with the Nobel Peace Prize.
Others internationally are less impressed. And in the meantime, we may have lost something, in terms of the ability to seriously prepare for
certain looming security challenges. A primary and continuing emphasis on diplomatic engagement after Iran has repeatedly rebuffed the
United States does not help us to prepare for the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran. A declared commitment to nuclear abolition does nothing
to convince other nuclear powers to abandon their own arsenals, and may even be counterproductive in the sense that it deludes important
segments of opinion into believing that such declarations actually help to keep the peace. Obama has said from the beginning that the purpose
of his more conciliatory foreign policy approach was to bolster American standing in the world, but the definition of international standing has
actually been highly self-referential in the direction of aforementioned transatlantic liberal opinion. In many cases overseas, from the
perspective of other governments, Obama’s well-intentioned conciliatory
gestures are read as a sign of weakness , and
consequently undermine rather than bolster American standing. In one way, however, Obama has already achieved much of what he
desired with his strategy of accommodation, and that is to re-orient American national resources and attention away
from national security concerns and toward the expansion of domestic progressive reforms. He appears to
sincerely believe that these liberal domestic initiatives in areas such as health care and finance will also bolster American economic power and
competiveness. Actually they will do no such thing, since heavy-handed and constantly changing federal regulations tend to undermine investor
confidence as well as long-term U.S. economic growth. But either way, Obama’s
vision of a more expansive government role in
American society is well on its way to being achieved, without from his point of view debilitating debates
over major national security concerns . In that sense, especially if he is reelected in 2012, several of his major
strategic priorities will have been accomplished. Any good strategy must incorporate the possibility of
pushback or resistance from unexpected quarters. As they say in the U.S. military, the enemy gets a vote. So, for that matter, do other
countries, whether friendly or not. When things do not go exactly according to plan, any decent strategy and any capable leader adapt. Indeed
any decent foreign policy strategy begins with the recognition for backup plans, since inevitably things will not go exactly according to plan.
Other countries rarely respond to our initial strategic moves in precisely the way we might wish. The question then becomes: What is plan B?
Obama is tactically very flexible, but at the level of grand strategy he seems to have no backup plan. There is simply no recognition
of the possibility that world politics might not operate on the post-Vietnam liberal assumptions he has imbibed and represented over the years.
Obama’s critics often describe him as providing no strong foreign policy leadership. They underestimate him. Actually he has a very definite
idea of where he wants to take the United States. His
guiding foreign policy idea is that of international
accommodation, sparked by American example. He pursues that overarching concept with great tactical pliability but without any sign of
ideological or basic revision since coming into office. Yet empirically, in one case after another, the strategy is not working. This is a kind of
leadership, to be sure, but leadership in the wrong direction. Obama
believes that liberal domestic initiatives will
bolster American economic power and competitiveness. How can the Obama administration adapt and adjust to the
failures of its strategy of accommodation? It can admit that the attempted diplomatic engagement of Iran has failed, and shift toward a strategy
of comprehensive pressure against that regime. It can make it abundantly clear to both the Taliban and al Qaeda that the United States will not
walk away from Afghanistan, despite the beginning drawdown. It can start treating Russia as a geopolitical rival, which it is, rather than simply
as a diplomatic partner. It can strengthen U.S. missile defenses as a form of insurance against nuclear proliferators. There is a long list of policy
recommendations that can be made on specific regional and functional matters, but the prior and most important point is the need for a
change in mentality. President Obama needs to stop working on the assumption that U.S. foreign policy concessions or gestures directed at the
gallery of elite transatlantic opinion — whether on nuclear arms control, counterterrorism, or climate change — will somehow be reciprocated
by specific foreign governments in the absence of some very hard bargaining. He needs to grasp that U.S. strategic disengagement from specific
regional theaters, whether promised or underway, is taken as a sign of weakness in those regions and not simply as a sign of benevolent
restraint. He needs to recognize that America’s international reputation consists not only of working toward his own definition of the moral
high ground, but also very much of a reputation for strength, and specifically of a reputation for the willingness to use force. He needs to stop
operating on the premise that past American foreign policy decisions are the ultimate source of much violent discord in the world today. He
needs to be willing to divide the international system conceptually and operationally into friends and enemies, as they actually exist, and to
support America’s friends while pressuring and opposing its enemies relentlessly. Finally, he needs to admit the limited effect of his own
personal charisma on the foreign policies of other governments. The president of the United States is not an international community
organizer. If the conceptual framework that underpins Obama’s foreign policy strategy is altered, then better policies will flow on a wide range
of specific issues. Obama needs to be willing to support America’s friends while pressuring and opposing its enemies relentlessly. Admittedly,
there is little chance that Obama will concede any of this. One of the things we know from historical example is that presidents tend to keep
operating on their own inbuilt foreign policy assumptions, even as contrary evidence piles up. It usually takes either a dramatic external shock,
or a new administration altogether, to bring about a major revaluation of existing assumptions. Curiously, this resistance to contrary evidence
in foreign policy appears to be even truer of highly educated, self-confident, and intelligent people with core ideological convictions — a
description that certainly fits President Obama. Obama
sensible calm, but in truth he
is malleable on tactics, and he takes great care to project an aura of
is a conviction president powered by certain core ideological beliefs and vaulting policy
ambitions. His characteristic response when these core beliefs and ambitions are truly tested by opponents or events is not to bend, but to
bristle. He is therefore particularly unlikely to admit or even perceive that a foreign policy strategy based upon faulty assumptions of
international accommodation is failing or has failed. Nor is it politically convenient for him to do so. More likely, he will continue along his
chosen path, offering nothing more than tactical adjustments, until some truly dramatic event occurs which brings his whole foreign policy
strategy into question — an Iranian nuclear test, for example.
---Appeasement/Congress
sparks fierce congressional fight - extremists control Venezuela debate and anything
short of confrontation gets viewed as appeasement
Harper, 10 (liz, Senior Editor @ US Institute for Peace, adjunct fellow at the Council on Hemispheric
Affairs, americasquarterly.org contributing blogger based in Washington DC, 12/21,
http://americasquarterly.org/node/2058)
Venezuela’s Formal Rejection of Ambassador-Designate Larry Palmer The long-running
debate over how to deal with the
irrational and impulsive strongman, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, has reached feverish pitch this winter. The latest
casualty in this war of words has become U.S. Ambassador Larry Palmer, the Obama administration's nomination as ambassador to Venezuela.
Worse yet, Chávez ultimately got what he wanted out of this latest battle: his choice of who will not be our next Ambassador in Venezuela. On
Monday, Venezuela formally told the U.S. to not bother sending Larry Palmer as the next ambassador since he would be asked to return the
moment he landed in Caracas. How did this all go down? Like
Cuba, any U.S. move regarding Venezuela involves egos,
politics and fortunately, some policy. Naturally, when Palmer went before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee over the
summer, the career diplomat—characterized by some at the U.S. Department of State as "not a Washington man"—he already faced an uphill
slog. Our domestic
debate over Venezuela generally falls into two camps: engagement and confrontation .
There are, of course, shades of gray and nuances between the two sides—though such voices are so often
overpowered by the more extreme views. On one side, you have those espousing "strategic
engagement," keeping in line with the Obama administration's stated foreign policy and national security objectives. In short
and broadly speaking, these proponents might argue, with an irrational state, you shouldn't turn your back. Look where that got us with North
Korea, Iran and Syria. Instead you want a seat at the table to start a dialogue based on mutual respect and to build on areas of mutual interest.
You raise concerns discretely and express disapproval quietly or through third parties. As one person said, engagement should be “subversive,"
because you
seek to assert positive influence by being present and through cooperation on areas such as business
development, financial opportunities, or culture and sports. Indeed, Palmer was the right guy to carry out this mission. But,
the engagement policy, as it is practiced with Venezuela, seems more like "appeasement ," say people
clamoring for a tougher approach. After all, for years now, we have witnessed a democracy's death by a
thousand cuts. This past week, Hugo Chávez got one of his Christmas wishes with the approval of new decree powers, thereby further
eroding the country's once well-established institutional checks and balances. Chávez threatens more than human rights and democratic
norms; the
U.S. has legitimate national security concerns, such as nuclear proliferation, terrorism and
narcotrafficking. Yet, as Chávez runs roughshod over international norms, is the U.S. working to halt the downward spiral? Those are
the broad brush strokes of the debate into which Palmer was tossed.
opposition to economic engagement in Venezuela is increasing – triggers fight in
congress and Israel lobby hates it
Farnsworth, 10
Eric, contributing blogger to americasquarterly.org. He is Vice President of the Council of the Americas in
Washington DC, 11/3/10, http://americasquarterly.org/node/1976
Now What? Elections and the Western Hemisphere Tuesday’s election results were not unexpected. The question now is what will they mean
for U.S. policy in the Western Hemisphere. The outlines are already clear: expect a sharper tone
across the board of Congressional oversight and initiative toward the Administration in trying to
impact policy. Here are a few predictions for regional policy based on the midterm election results. The new chair of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee will be Ileana Ros-Lehtinen; the chair of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee will be Connie Mack.
Together with newly-elected Senator Marco Rubio, this troika of Florida Republicans may well seek to reverse
the Obama Administration’s slow motion liberalization of Cuba policy. Expect also a harder line coming from
Congress toward Venezuela and the possible renewal of an effort to sanction Venezuela as a state
sponsor of terror. As well, Chairman-To-Be Ros-Lehtinen has earned strong pro-Israel credentials and is a strong
supporter of Iran sanctions; further moves of Brazil or Venezuela toward Tehran could well prove to be a point of
friction between the Administration and Congress if the Administration is perceived as downplaying
their significance.
spun as appeasement – triggers intense fight and derails Obama domestic agenda
priorities
Dueck, 11
Colin Dueck,professor at the Department of Public and International Affairs, George Mason University, October 1, 2011
policy review » no. 169, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/94006
Look at how Obama’s strategy of accommodation has played out in relation to four categories of foreign
governments: 1) those essentially hostile to the United States, 2) those who pursue a mixture of strategic rivalry and cooperation, 3) genuine
American allies, and 4) Arab governments of varying allegiance. The first category, of regimes basically hostile
to the United States,
includes the governments of Iran, North Korea, Cuba, and Venezuela, to name only four of the most notable. Each of
these governments has literally defined itself at a fundamental level by violent opposition to America.
To think that a conciliatory tone, a preliminary concession, or a well-intentioned desire for better relations on the part of a U.S. president by
itself will transform that hostility is simply naïve. In the case of Cuba, for example, the Obama administration began by lifting certain economic
sanctions, in the hope of seeing some reciprocal concessions from the Castro brothers: political liberalization, an easing of anti-American
hostility, anything at all of significance. No such concessions have been made. The case of Iran has already been discussed — Obama reached
out to Tehran with great fanfare in 2009, and has received in effect a slap in the face. Both Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez and North Korea’s Kim
Jong Il are likewise just as hostile and provocative toward the United States today as they were when George W. Bush was America’s president.
This is because the fundamental barrier to friendly U.S. relations with those regimes was never George W. Bush. The fundamental barrier to
friendly relations with these regimes is the fact that they are bitterly hostile to the United States. The kinds of concessions that
Washington would have to offer to win their genuine accommodation
would be so sweeping, massive, and unacceptable,
from the point of view of any likely U.S. president that they will not be made — and certainly not by
Barack Obama. Any smaller concessions from Washington, therefore, are simply pocketed by a hostile regime, which continues along in its
basic antipathy toward the United States. So who is supposed to be the target audience here? The true audience and for that matter the
ultimate source of these various conciliatory policy initiatives is essentially a small, transnational, North Atlantic class of bien pensant opinion
who already share Obama’s core policy priorities in any case. They have rewarded him with their support, as well as with the Nobel Peace Prize.
Others internationally are less impressed. And in the meantime, we may have lost something, in terms of the ability to seriously prepare for
certain looming security challenges. A primary and continuing emphasis on diplomatic engagement after Iran has repeatedly rebuffed the
United States does not help us to prepare for the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran. A declared commitment to nuclear abolition does nothing
to convince other nuclear powers to abandon their own arsenals, and may even be counterproductive in the sense that it deludes important
segments of opinion into believing that such declarations actually help to keep the peace. Obama has said from the beginning that the purpose
of his more conciliatory foreign policy approach was to bolster American standing in the world, but the definition of international standing has
actually been highly self-referential in the direction of aforementioned transatlantic liberal opinion. In many cases overseas, from the
perspective of other governments, Obama’s well-intentioned conciliatory
gestures are read as a sign of weakness , and
consequently undermine rather than bolster American standing. In one way, however, Obama has already achieved much of what he
desired with his strategy of accommodation, and that is to re-orient American national resources and attention away
from national security concerns and toward the expansion of domestic progressive reforms. He appears to
sincerely believe that these liberal domestic initiatives in areas such as health care and finance will also bolster American economic power and
competiveness. Actually they will do no such thing, since heavy-handed and constantly changing federal regulations tend to undermine investor
confidence as well as long-term U.S. economic growth. But either way, Obama’s
vision of a more expansive government role in
American society is well on its way to being achieved, without from his point of view debilitating debates
over major national security concerns . In that sense, especially if he is reelected in 2012, several of his major
strategic priorities will have been accomplished. Any good strategy must incorporate the possibility of
pushback or resistance from unexpected quarters. As they say in the U.S. military, the enemy gets a vote. So, for that matter, do other
countries, whether friendly or not. When things do not go exactly according to plan, any decent strategy and any capable leader adapt. Indeed
any decent foreign policy strategy begins with the recognition for backup plans, since inevitably things will not go exactly according to plan.
Other countries rarely respond to our initial strategic moves in precisely the way we might wish. The question then becomes: What is plan B?
Obama is tactically very flexible, but at the level of grand strategy he seems to have no backup plan. There is simply no recognition
of the possibility that world politics might not operate on the post-Vietnam liberal assumptions he has imbibed and represented over the years.
Obama’s critics often describe him as providing no strong foreign policy leadership. They underestimate him. Actually he has a very definite
idea of where he wants to take the United States. His
guiding foreign policy idea is that of international
accommodation, sparked by American example. He pursues that overarching concept with great tactical pliability but without any sign of
ideological or basic revision since coming into office. Yet empirically, in one case after another, the strategy is not working. This is a kind of
leadership, to be sure, but leadership in the wrong direction. Obama
believes that liberal domestic initiatives will
bolster American economic power and competitiveness. How can the Obama administration adapt and adjust to the
failures of its strategy of accommodation? It can admit that the attempted diplomatic engagement of Iran has failed, and shift toward a strategy
of comprehensive pressure against that regime. It can make it abundantly clear to both the Taliban and al Qaeda that the United States will not
walk away from Afghanistan, despite the beginning drawdown. It can start treating Russia as a geopolitical rival, which it is, rather than simply
as a diplomatic partner. It can strengthen U.S. missile defenses as a form of insurance against nuclear proliferators. There is a long list of policy
recommendations that can be made on specific regional and functional matters, but the prior and most important point is the need for a
change in mentality. President Obama needs to stop working on the assumption that U.S. foreign policy concessions or gestures directed at the
gallery of elite transatlantic opinion — whether on nuclear arms control, counterterrorism, or climate change — will somehow be reciprocated
by specific foreign governments in the absence of some very hard bargaining. He needs to grasp that U.S. strategic disengagement from specific
regional theaters, whether promised or underway, is taken as a sign of weakness in those regions and not simply as a sign of benevolent
restraint. He needs to recognize that America’s international reputation consists not only of working toward his own definition of the moral
high ground, but also very much of a reputation for strength, and specifically of a reputation for the willingness to use force. He needs to stop
operating on the premise that past American foreign policy decisions are the ultimate source of much violent discord in the world today. He
needs to be willing to divide the international system conceptually and operationally into friends and enemies, as they actually exist, and to
support America’s friends while pressuring and opposing its enemies relentlessly. Finally, he needs to admit the limited effect of his own
personal charisma on the foreign policies of other governments. The president of the United States is not an international community
organizer. If the conceptual framework that underpins Obama’s foreign policy strategy is altered, then better policies will flow on a wide range
of specific issues. Obama needs to be willing to support America’s friends while pressuring and opposing its enemies relentlessly. Admittedly,
there is little chance that Obama will concede any of this. One of the things we know from historical example is that presidents tend to keep
operating on their own inbuilt foreign policy assumptions, even as contrary evidence piles up. It usually takes either a dramatic external shock,
or a new administration altogether, to bring about a major revaluation of existing assumptions. Curiously, this resistance to contrary evidence
in foreign policy appears to be even truer of highly educated, self-confident, and intelligent people with core ideological convictions — a
description that certainly fits President Obama. Obama
is malleable on tactics, and he takes great care to project an aura of
sensible calm, but in truth he is a conviction president powered by certain core ideological beliefs and vaulting policy
ambitions. His characteristic response when these core beliefs and ambitions are truly tested by opponents or events is not to bend, but to
bristle. He is therefore particularly unlikely to admit or even perceive that a foreign policy strategy based upon faulty assumptions of
international accommodation is failing or has failed. Nor is it politically convenient for him to do so. More likely, he will continue along his
chosen path, offering nothing more than tactical adjustments, until some truly dramatic event occurs which brings his whole foreign policy
strategy into question — an Iranian nuclear test, for example.
---Appeasement---AT: No Assume Maduro
Chavez’s successor only magnifies the controversy
Washington Post 13 (03/06, “A misguided U.S. strategy for Venezuela,”
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-03-06/opinions/37497866_1_nicolas-maduro-apartmentsand-appliances-henrique-capriles)
ANTICIPATING THE death of Hugo Chavez, the Obama administration began reaching out months ago
to his designated successor, Nicolas Maduro, in the hope of bettering U.S.-Venezuelan relations. On
Tuesday, that strategy absorbed a body blow : Hours before revealing that Mr. Chavez had died of
cancer, Mr. Maduro tried to blame the United States for his illness, and he expelled two U.S. military
attaches on charges of “proposing destabilizing plans” to the armed forces. So much for the “reset”
with Caracas. The ludicrous and crude propaganda launched by Mr. Maduro was a sign that Mr.
Chavez’s successors will be more thuggish and less politically adept than he was — and, if anything,
more inclined to scapegoat the United States and Venezuela’s democratic opposition for the
horrendous problems the caudillo leaves behind.
Nothing Changed – Maduro pursuing “all out Chavismo”
Alic, 13
Jen Alic of Oilprice.com, 4/21/13, http://www.mining.com/web/foreign-oil-and-gas-companies-look-tostatus-quo-in-venezuela/
Now that Nicolas Maduro—the late Hugo Chavez’s choice for
successor—has narrowly won Sunday’s presidential elections in Venezuela, oil and gas investors can expect a
perpetuation of the status quo. In Sunday’s voVte, Maduro won with a very narrow 50.7% and a vow to continue
Foreign oil and gas companies look to status quo in Venezuela
with Chavez’s “revolution, ” which has seen the oil industry nationalized and the state-run PDVSA oil company
funding social programs and voraciously courting China and Russia. The narrow vote will not be without its challenges.
Opposition rival candidate Henrique Capriles has refused to recognize the results and is demanding a recount, though the electoral commission
is standing firm on Maduro’s victory. For foreign oil and gas companies,
we can expect more of the same . There are no
regulatory changes in the works, and an unattractive windfall tax system announced in January will likely be pushed forward
under Maduro. What Maduro is inheriting, though, is a nightmare situation that will see him stuck between using PDVSA to fund expensive
social programs that cost it $44 billion last year alone diverted from oil revenues, and cutting social spending or allowing a rise in the price of
fuel that could spark regime-threatening unrest. If Maduro feels compelled to reduce fuel subsidies, it could lead to riots as cheap fuel—which
cannot be sustained—is one of the most crucial social benefits for Venezuelans, who pay around 6 cents per gallon. Maduro has inherited a
does not appear to have the political capital to make any short-term changes in Venezuela’s
energy policy, experts at Southern Pulse told Oilprice.com. “The main energy issue for Venezuela is that oil production is struggling, down
“sinking ship” and
from a peak of about 3.2 million barrels per day in 1998 to less than 2.8 million bpd now. One would hope that fixing infrastructure, completing
refinery repairs and construction, and investing in exploration and new technology would be priorities but Maduro will not have funds to invest
unless he makes controversial cuts to social programs,” according to Southern Pulse, which does not believe that Maduro will attempt to cut
fuel subsidies any time soon. A top priority for Maduro will be boosting refining capacity, says Southern Pulse. Towards this end, Maduro may
be willing to negotiate if a partner steps forward to build a new refinery, which is a goal Chavez failed to realize. “If PDVSA fails to increase
production, PDVSA President Rafael Ramirez may be replaced this year. One way for Maduro to keep his presidency afloat is to bring new
proven wells online in the Orinoco Belt; but that will require major investment. PDVSA may need more than a minority-partner-with-a-servicecontract at those fields if they want to start pumping soon.” In the meantime, China’s foothold in Venezuela remains on solid ground. China is
already privy to 600,000 bpd from Venezuela in return for $42 billion in loans. Maduro is not likely to rock this boat with Beijing, and according
to the terms already in place, Venezuelan exports are set to increase to one million bpd by 2015, though most of the loan money has already
been spent. According to Southern Pulse, Maduro will likely seek new loans from China, but this will depend on the terms and stability in
Venezuela. If this doesn’t work, Maduro will have to look elsewhere—first to Russia and then perhaps to US Chevron or Spanish Repsol, the
latter two having only limited operations in the country. Overall,
we should consider that Maduro will pursue all-out
chavismo . “As president, Maduro will govern as he thinks Chavez himself would have ruled . However,
Maduro probably will not begin pandering to the most radical elements of his party, PSUV, because he has little to gain from that. Maduro is
not blind to the myriad problems facing the next president such as blackouts, food shortages and rampant criminal violence,” according to
Southern Pulse. While it’s status quo for now for the oil and gas industry, it’s clearly bad news for Maduro. “Despite Chavez’s immense
popularity, his memory will fade. And with time citizens who loved Chavez will blame Maduro for their struggles,” experts at Southern Pulse
say. “If Maduro survives that long, the next election in 2018 will involve a much deeper conversation about the direction of the country.” “In
fact, some think that one reason former military leader and current National Assembly Diosdado Cabello—a Chavez loyalist–did not dispute
Maduro’s succession is precisely because of the precarious financial and political situation he would have inherited.”
Chavez death changes nothing
Goodman, 13 (Josh, Bloomberg reporter responsible for economic and political
coverage in Latin America, 4/17,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-17/venezuelan-leader-s-taunts-won-t-provoke-u-sdiplomat-says-2-.html
The U.S. is unlikely to adopt a more confrontational stance toward Venezuela even as President- elect Nicolas Maduro ratchets up his
rhetoric in the wake of his narrow victory, the State Department’s top official for Latin America said. Echoing charges frequently levied by his
political mentor, the late President Hugo Chavez, Maduro yesterday accused the U.S. of trying to oust him by supporting opposition calls for a
recount of ballots in the April 14 election he won by about 270,000 votes. Today, he
likened President Barack Obama’s policy
towards Venezuela to U.S. support for the overthrow of Chile’s Salvador Allende in 1973. Roberta Jacobson,
assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs, said such rhetoric has become more commonplace since
Maduro took control of Venezuela’s troubled economy following Chavez’s death from cancer last month. While that
makes it harder for relations to improve, the U.S. is unlikely to respond in kind, she said. “I don’t think there’s going
to be a marked difference in the way we respond to Maduro versus the way we responded to
Chavez,” Jacobson, a career diplomat, said in an interview from the State Department in Washington. “It still doesn’t make sense to
get in, you’ll excuse me, a pissing match with Nicolas Maduro any more than it did with Chavez.” While relations between the U.S. and
Venezuela have long been strained -- the two countries have gone without ambassadors since 2010 -- former president George W. Bush in his
second term adopted a more conciliatory tone toward Chavez, which Obama continued. Other Cheek At the heart of what Jacobson called a
“turning of the cheek” approach are strong commercial ties -- Venezuela was the U.S.’s fourth-biggest supplier of oil last year -- and a sense of
political realism. That means that while the U.S. won’t back away from expressing its disappointment with the fairness of the election and the
lack of a recount, that shouldn’t lead relations to deteriorate further, she said. While Russia, China and most of Latin America has congratulated
Maduro for his win, the U.S. and European Union have held back support while seeking a recount to address opposition claims of irregularities.
“If Friday Maduro
is sworn in as president, I don’t think that’s going to change very much from one day to
the next our positions,” said Jacobson, who has served as the U.S.’s top diplomat to Latin America since
2011. ‘Rush to Judgment’ Jacobson said the U.S. will continue to believe that the way the election results were handled represent a “rush to
judgment” that won’t help Venezuela overcome deep political divisions. Still, Jacobson said she doesn’t
harbor much hope that
relations will improve either, even after what she described as Maduro’s favorable response to a U.S. outreach
a few months ago. In November, Jacobson said she called then-Foreign Minister Maduro to discuss how to get relations back on track in a likely
post-Chavez government. High-level meetings between the two governments were also held, though they lost momentum as Chavez’s
worsening health came to dominate the nation’s affairs, she said. Then, in the hours before Chavez’s death, Maduro
suggested the
U.S. may have poisoned the socialist leader. During the month-long campaign he continued to ramp up
“exponentially” his anti-American rhetoric, “making it much harder ” today to find any common ground,
Jacobson said. Long Harangue Jacobson’s first encounter with Maduro, at the April 2012 Summit of the Americas in Colombia, was
also marked by confrontation. In a private negotiating session attended by foreign ministers, she said she was subjected to a “long,
long harangue” by Maduro, in which he accused the U.S. of imperialism and starving communist Cuba with its half-century trade embargo.
“There were many around that table who were acutely uncomfortable with him yelling -- and he was yelling at this point -- at a woman across
the table,” she said. “Closing the doors didn’t seem to make a difference.” Then, less than two months later, at a meeting of the Organization of
American States in Bolivia, the two traded pleasantries while posing side-by-side for a group photo. Maduro said he held no grudges against her
or the U.S., according to Jacobson. “It’s very hard to read these signals,” she said. “Every
time we get to the point of actually
working on substantive stuff, we end up taking steps backward with accusations of everything from killing
Chavez with cancer to coups.”
---Appeasement---AT: Business Not Regime
Plan can’t avoid accusations of supporting the regime – business and investment is
coopted
Toro, 13
Fransisco Toro, Venezuelan journalist, political scientist, reported for the Washington Post, the New York Times and the Financial Times, and
was Editor of VenEconomy, Venezuela's leading bilingual business magazine. Since 2002, he has run Caracas Chronicles, the must-read Englishlanguage blog on all things Venezuelan He holds a BA from Reed College (1997), and MSc from the London School of Economics (1999) and is
currently a doctoral candidate in Political Science at the University of Maastricht, in The Netherlands. New Republic, 3/5/13,
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/112596/hugo-chavez-dead-cuba-defined-him-much-venezuela-did#
Chávez imported more than just personnel and advice; he imported the Cuban Revolution's eschatology virtually whole.
Fidel's vision of revolution as a kind of cosmic morality play pitting unalloyed socialist "good" in an unending death struggle against the ravages
of "evil" American imperialism became the guiding principle of Venezuela's revolution. The use and abuse of
anti-imperialist rhetoric as a mechanism for consolidating authoritarian control over society was the most valuable lesson Chávez learned from
Fidel. A superheated brand of unthinking anti-Americanism became the all-purpose excuse for any and every authoritarian excess, stigmatizing
any form of protests and casting a dark pall over any expression of discontent or dissent. The technique's infinite versatility proved its central
attraction: You could blame shadowy gringo infiltrator for neighborhood protests over chronic power shortages just as easily as you could
silence whistleblowers of government corruption by casting them as CIA fifth columns. In Cuba, considering the island's history as a target for
American imperialist meddling, anti-imperialism—however wantonly abused—rested on a bed of historic verisimilitude. But in Venezuela, a
country with no history of direct American imperial aggression, this borrowed bit of rhetorical posturing served only to underline chavismo's
derivative status, its ideology a kind of fidelista hand-me-down lacking even the self-awareness to realize it was decades out of date by the time
it was born. Where Chávez was able to transcend the Cuban model, it was largely due to the advantages of life at the receiving end of an
unprecedented petrodollar flood. By some estimates, Venezuela sold over $1 trillion worth of oil during his tenure, and so his was
substitute the checkbook for the gulag ;
marginalizing his opponents via popular spending programs rather than rounding them up and throwing them in jail. Rather than
declaring all out-war on business, he co-opted them. Rather than abolish civil society, he created a
parallel civil society, complete with pro-government unions, universities, radio stations and community councils. Such
enhancements were tried before by left-wing populists in Latin America, but always failed because they ran out of
money. Chávez avoided this pitfall thanks to the greatest of his innovations: He consciously avoided a
government by hyperconsumption, not rationing. The petroboom allowed Chávez to
complete break with the U.S. that Castro provoked in 1960. Instead, he railed against gringo imperialism all
morning, then spent all afternoon selling those same gringos oil. The irony is that this, his most important innovation,
will be the one least memorialized by his admirers. It was a gloriously incoherent posture, but one that fit the square peg of revolutionary zeal
into the round hole of an import-led petropopulism. Ironically, though, in its dependence on oil rents, the Chávez model quietly undermined its
own claim to represent a new alternative to dreaded Washington-sponsored neoliberalism. After all, if Venezuela
could afford to
botch the nationalization of its own steel industry, it was because there were always petrodollars around
to import the steel that local industry was no longer producing. And if nationalizations up and down the agro-food chain
resulted in food shortages, money could always be found to import the balance. As the Venezuelan
State-Owned Enterprise sector grew, it looked more and more like the USSR's—with a single profitgenerating industry cross-subsidizing a bewildering array of loss-making concerns. Chavenomics, as a development
model, boiled down to little beyond extracting oil, selling it at high prices, and using the proceeds to paper over the rest of
the system's cracks. How such a model is supposed to be relevant to countries that don't happen to float on top of hundreds of billions
of barrels in oil reserves is anybody's guess. Still and all, petropopulism's attractions were all too clear for Chávez. Those deep, oil-lined
pockets allowed Chávez a luxury Fidel could only dream of: being able to hold a long string of notovertly-rigged elections without ever seriously endangering his grip on power. It used to be that you could have
either unchecked personal power or electoral legitimacy, but the petrodollar flood allowed Chávez to have both. Elected
autocracy may sound like an oxymoron, but this is exactly what the Venezuelan synthesis of the Cuban experience yielded: a system that
washed away the sins of its own aggressive contempt for dissidence and dissent through continual recourse to the ballot box. What Hugo
Chávez built was, in other words, a flawless autocracy.
Even if its not targeted at government – congressional Critics perceive Economic
engagement and industry profits as appeasement that bolsters regime – not people
Goodenough, 12
Patrick Goodenough, Patrick covered government and politics in South Africa and the Middle East before joining CNSNews.com
in 1999. Since then he has launched foreign bureaus for CNSNews.com in Jerusalem, London and the Pacific Rim. From October
2006 to July 2007, Patrick served as Managing Editor at the organization's world headquarters in Alexandria, Va. Now back in
the Pacific Rim, as International Editor he reports on politics, international relations, security, terrorism, ethics and religion, and
oversees reporting by CNSNews.com's roster of international stringers, CNS News, 2/2/12,
http://cnsnews.com/news/article/iran-venezuela-links-examined-amid-fresh-calls-terror-sponsor-designation
Links to foreign terrorist organizations The U.S. currently lists Cuba, Syria, Iran and Sudan as state sponsors
of terrorism, a
designation that carries sanctions including a ban on arms-related exports and sales, controls over exports of dual-use items,
prohibitions on economic assistance, and various financial restrictions. Designation requires a determination by
the secretary of state that a country’s government “has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism,” for example through
support for and links to “foreign terrorist organizations” (FTOs). In its most recent annual report on international terrorism, published last
August, the State Department in its section on state sponsors cites Cuba’s links with the Basque separatist group ETA and the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) – both FTOs – as well as Iranian and Syrian sponsorship of Hezbollah and Palestinian FTOs including Hamas.
Yet Venezuela’s links to Hezbollah are well-documented (as early as June 2008, the U.S. Treasury Department charged that Chavez’ government
was “employing and providing safe harbor to Hezbollah facilitators and fundraisers”) and he has also been accused of ties to FARC and to ETA.
Caracas’ cozy relationship with state sponsors of terror Cuba and Iran – including new concerns that Chavez could help Tehran to evade the
latest Western sanctions against its banks and oil exports – provide further reason, proponents say, for Venezuela itself to be designated. Rep.
Connie Mack (R-Fla.), chairman of the Foreign Affairs subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, has for several years sponsored legislation
urging action. The
most recent bill, introduced in May 2011, calls for “Venezuela to be designated a state sponsor
of terrorism for its support of Iran, Hezbollah, and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).” Mack introduced similar bills in
October 2009 and in March 2008. In a white paper on the subject last summer, Mack argued that terror-sponsor designation was
not aimed at harming Venezuela’s people but to pressure Chavez’ government to end support for terrorism.
“Each SST [state sponsor of terrorism] is treated with a unique set of sanctions, and the designation does not
prevent travel to and from Venezuela, stop legal remittances to Venezuelan families, or impact services at the US embassy.” Mack said
designation could target Venezuela’s oil exports, affecting more than 33 percent of the government’s revenues. “Venezuelan oil
profits
have not benefited the Venezuelan people for years: crime is out of control, social infrastructure is destroyed, and health
and education are ruined,” the paper said. “Oil in Venezuela is used as a weapon against the people and against other,
friendly countries in the region.”
---Appeasement/Cuba Lobby
GOP and Cuba lobby HATE Venezuela and spin plan as appeasement
Boothroyd, 12
Rachel Boothroyd, journalist in Caracas, Venezuela. She contributes to Venezuelanalysis, Pulsamerica
and Correo del Orinoco International, and has had pieces published on other sites such as the Latin
American Bureau, Green Left Weekly, Znet and Global Research.9/25/12,
http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/7283
Republicans Vow to Halt “Policy of Appeasement” in Venezuela Caracas, September 23 2012 (Venezuelanalysis.com)
– Republican nominee for Vice-President of theU.S., Paul Ryan, has vowed that a Romney administration would get “tough on Castro, tough
on Chavez” and to end what he described as a “policy of appeasement” applied by the Obama administration towards
both Cuba and Venezuela. Ryan made the comments from the Versailles Restaurant in Miami, Florida last Saturday, where he
was accompanied by staunch members of the anti-Castro lobby , including Republican Representative,
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen. Ros-Lehtinen is a member of the Cuban-American Lobby and the Congressional Cuban Democracy Caucus;
organisations which claim to be aimed at speeding up Cuba’s “transition to democracy”. "In a Mitt Romney administration, we will not keep
practising this policy of appeasement, we will be tough on this brutal dictator (Castro). All it has done is reward more
despotism ... We will help those pro-democracy groups. We will be tough on Castro, tough on Chavez. And it's because we
know that's the right policy for our country,” said Ryan. The nominee had reportedly travelled to Florida in a bid to win over the
majority Latino vote two months ahead of the US elections. Florida is currently thought to be a “swing state” and could prove a determining
vote for the overall election results. Results of a recent voter intention poll in the state carried out by NBC news show that Obama currently has
a 5% lead over Romney, with a voting intention of 49% to 44%. ‘I learned from these friends, from Mario (Diaz-Balart), from Lincoln (DiazBalart), from Ileana (Ros-Lehtinen), just how brutal the Castro regime is, just how this president's policy of appeasement is not working. They've
given me a great education, lots of us in Congress, about how we need to clamp down on the Castro regime,” said Ryan. According
to
Ros-Lehtinen, Ryan is now a “loyal friend” to those who campaign on Cuba-related political issues.
Ryan's statements have caused some Democrats to accuse him of hypocrisy after he appears to have dramatically changed his stance on CubaUS relations. Prior to 2007, the Republican had called for “free trade” between all nations, which included voting to lift the trade embargo on
Cuba. "To paraphrase President Clinton, it takes real brass to vote three times against economic sanctions on the Cuban regime and then come
to Little Havana and ask Cuban-Americans for their vote," said Giancarlo Sopo, a Cuban-American supporter who told the US' Sun Sentinel that
he would vote for Obama. "It's one thing to have a genuine disagreement with someone on a policy. It's something else to change your position
from one day to the next just to pander in order to win votes,” added Sopo. Recently leaked footage of a meeting between Romney and party
donors also showed the presidential hopeful lambasting Obama for believing that “his magnetism and his charm, and his
persuasiveness is so compelling that he can sit down with people like Putin and Chávez and Ahmadinejad, and that they'll find that we're such
wonderful people that they'll go on with us, and they'll stop doing bad things”. The leaked recording also shows Romney referring
to Iranian President Ahmadinejad as a “crazed fanatic” and Iranian mullahs as “crazy people”. He also commented that, in his view, the
Palestinian people have “no interest whatsoever in establishing peace”. With the presidential elections now drawing near, the
Republican
party is beginning to increasingly outline its prospective domestic and foreign policy, which Romney has said would be principally based
on an attempt to implement a neo-liberal “Reagan economic zone” in Latin America and other regions, such as the Middle East. The Republican
presidential candidate has
been outspoken in his criticism of the “anti-American” views purported by the
governments of Venezuela, Cuba and Iran and has described them as one of the biggest threats to the
United States today. Earlier in July, Romney branded the Venezuelan government as a “threat to national
security” and accused the country's president, Hugo Chavez, of “spreading dictatorships and tyranny throughout
Latin America”. The Republican National Committee also circulated a video of Obama shaking hands with Chavez at
the OAS “Summit of the Americas” in Trinidad and Tobago 2009 at the same time. Romney has often claimed that the leader of
Venezuela's Bolivarian revolution has links to “terrorist” organisations such as Hezbollah and has access to
weapons that could “harm the US”. He has never presented any evidence in support of these accusations.
Powerful cuba lobby hates Venezuela economic engagement – even under maduro
Kozloff, 13 (Nikolas, doctorate in Latin American history from Oxford University, author
of Hugo Chavez: Oil, Politics and the Challenge to the U.S. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007),
Revolution! South America and the Rise of the New Left (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), No
Rain in the Amazon: How South America's Climate Change Affects the Entire Planet
(Palgrave Macmilan, 2010), Huffington Post, 4/14, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nikolaskozloff/maduro-elections-venezuela_b_3078387.html)
Déjà Vu? Washington's
War on Cuba and Venezuela: From the Kissinger Files to 'Cable Gate' If the polls are to be believed,
successor Nicolás Maduro will probably defeat the political opposition in Sunday's presidential election,
securing and solidifying Cuban-Venezuelan ties yet further . Such an outcome will come as a
Hugo Chávez's
thus
severe disappointment to Washington, which has spent the better part of 40 years trying to prevent
such a diplomatic alliance from developing in the first place. For evidence of U.S. paranoia over Cuba , one
need only consult the so-called "Kissinger files," sensitive State Department cables recently made accessible by whistleblowing outfit WikiLeaks. The correspondence, which dates between 1973 and 1976, underscores Henry Kissinger's singleminded obsession with quarantining Cuba lest Castro's influence be felt far afield. In late 1973, U.S.
diplomats expressed concern about Venezuelan moves to end Cuba's diplomatic isolation, and were
particularly worried that Caracas might "put together Organization of American States [OAS] majority in support resolution permitting
reestablishment relations with Cuba." Washington was also perturbed by reports that Venezuelan Navy vessels had departed for Cuba in order
to load up on large shipments of sugar, and diplomats contemplated
a possible cutoff of aid to Caracas in retaliation.
Not only had the State Department grown alarmed about such developments, but rightist anti-Castro exiles
were becoming restive as well. According to the U.S. Embassy in Caracas, the exiles were "appalled" at the prospect that
COPEI, the current party in power, might renew relations with Cuba. In an ominous move, the exiles planned to publish full page newspaper ads
against the COPEI administration. Hoping to punish COPEI at the polls, exiles threw their support to opposing party Acción Democrática (or AD)
in the 1973 presidential election. Ultimately, the Americans noted, such support proved critical and "highly
influential CubanVenezuelan entrepreneurs, backed by Cuban money from Miami" helped AD candidate Carlos Andrés Pérez
secure an electoral victory. The Rise of CAP If Kissinger or the Cuban exile community however hoped that Pérez, sometimes known
simply as "CAP," would prove amenable to their designs they would be sorely disappointed. History has not been kind to CAP, largely due to the
latter's second and disastrous presidency which lasted from 1989 to 1993, during which time the veteran politician followed the diktats of the
International Monetary Fund and nearly drove Venezuela to the point of social collapse. Nevertheless, during his first incarnation in the 1970s
CAP was regarded as a nationalist and something of a galvanizing figure on the Third World circuit. From 1974 to 1979, during his first
presidency, CAP nationalized U.S. oil companies and oversaw a program of massive social spending. Writing to Kissinger in Washington, the
U.S. ambassador in Caracas fretted that Venezuela now had "the economic strength and political
leadership in president Pérez to make her will felt beyond her borders." Indeed, the diplomat added, "the energy crisis and
president Carlos Andrés Pérez's electoral victory in December 1973 coincided and together have changed Venezuela's perception of herself and
her world role." Just like Chávez some 20 years later, CAP was "rapidly emerging as a hemisphere figure." Taking advantage of windfall oil
prices, CAP had turned Venezuela into a large international donor of development assistance. Personally, the ambassador feared that CAP had
grown too large for his britches as the youthful firebrand politician was fast becoming "a Latin American spokesman for the developing third
world countries vis-a-vis the developed nations, especially the Unites States." Reading through the Kissinger files, one
is possessed
with an incredible sense of déjà vu. Combing through paranoid U.S. telegrams, it's easy to imagine that diplomats might have
been referring not to CAP but to charismatic Hugo Chávez. Indeed, if anything the correspondence underscores just how
hostile Washington has been to any nationalist politician emerging in Venezuela , particularly if such
a figure threatened U.S. priorities in the Caribbean. Specifically, U.S. diplomats and anti-Castro exiles
worried that CAP might use his newfound diplomatic clout to edge closer to Fidel.
Congress and GOP backlash and media spin ensure perceived as appeasement, weak
on security and soft on Castro– also a flip flop Robertson, 12
Ewan Robertson, 4/11/12, Latin America Bureau analyst @ Venezuala Analysis, http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/6916
As both countries head toward important presidential elections this year, the United States has been intensifying its interventionist policy in
Venezuela. However, US attempts to influence Venezuela’s domestic politics while casting it a “rogue state” on an international
level, is leaving the Obama administration increasingly out-of-sync with Latin America’s new political reality. US Intervention in Venezuela Since the election of
President Hugo Chávez in 1998, US policy has aimed at removing the Venezuelan president from power and ending the Bolivarian Revolution which he leads. This
policy has included support by the Bush presidency for the short-lived April 2002 coup in Venezuela, which failed after mass protests returned Chávez to power.
Since then the US has focused on nurturing Venezuela’s conservative opposition, channelling over US$100 million to groups opposed to Chávez since 2002.
Meanwhile Washington
and US corporate mass media have attempted to de-legitimise his government
internationally in a propaganda campaign, portraying Venezuela as a threat to the US and its president as a “dangerous dictator” who
has trampled upon democracy and human rights. Any hopes that the Obama administration would usher a new era of respect for Venezuelan sovereignty have
long been dashed, with intervention intensifying as Venezuela’s October 7th presidential election draws closer and Chavez seeks his third term in office. In the last
twelve months the US government has imposed
sanctions on Venezuela’s state oil company PDVSA for trading with Iran, expelled
the Venezuelan consul in Miami based on a suspect documentary implicating the Venezuelan diplomat in plotting a
cyber-attack against the US, and publicly criticised the appointment of Venezuela’s new Defence
Minister Henry Rangel Silva. While direct US actions have maintained a constant rhythm of pressure against
Venezuela, Washington’s hopes of removing Chávez from power undoubtedly lie in the possibility of the conservative Democratic Unity Table (MUD)
opposition coalition defeating Chávez in this year’s presidential election. According to investigative journalist Eva Golinger, the US is providing the opposition in
Venezuela with political advice and financial support to the tune of US$20 million $20 million this year. This funding for anti-Chávez groups comes from the US
national budget, State Department-linked agencies, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and USAID, along with the US Embassy in Caracas. A curious
detail suggests that the US Embassy has become a key conduit for the distribution of this money. While the Embassy currently only maintains a Charge D’Affairs
responsible for diplomatic operations, and overall staff levels remain unchanged, the Embassy budget jumped from almost $16 million in 2011 to over $24 million
for 2012, an unexplained increase of over $8 million. Washington has long worked to see the development of a united Venezuelan opposition capable of defeating
Chávez. With the current MUD coalition displaying relative unity behind opposition presidential candidate Henrique Capriles Radonski, and the still popular Chávez
currently undergoing treatment for cancer, the US is likely hoping 2012 is the year to see an end to Chávez’s administration. Indeed, the make-up of Venezuela’s
opposition reads like a “who’s who” of figures who have received advice and financial support from US sources over the previous decade. Several of those who ran
in the opposition’s February primary elections to elect the MUD presidential candidate have ties with US financial aid, including the winner Radonski. His political
party Primero Justicia has been a key recipient of funding and political training since its founding in 1999, which has helped it to grow into a national force. US
funding has also followed fellow primaries candidate Leopoldo López throughout his political career, first in Primero Justicia, then in Un Nuevo Tiempo from 2002,
before receiving NED and USAID funding to support his own organisation Voluntad Popular. MUD National Assembly deputy and primaries candidate Maria
Machado Corina has also received heavy US financial support, as well as holding a private meeting with George W Bush in 2004. Machado has recently been
appointed as a coordinator for Radonski’s “Tricolour Command” presidential election campaign, while Leopoldo López is now a member of the Radonski campaign’s
select Political Strategic Command. The Political Strategic Command is headed by experienced opposition figure Professor Ramón Guillermo Aveledo, who with his
close political colleagues “assists US sponsors in pouring money into the MUD,” according to analyst Nil Nikandrov. The importance of US funding in helping to
shape the current Venezuelan opposition should not be underestimated. Indeed, according to US Embassy cables released by Wikileaks, in 2009 US Embassy chargé
d’affaires John Caulfield argued for increased US funding of opposition groups, as “without our continued assistance, it is possible that the organizations we helped
create ... could be forced to close...Our funding will provide those organizations a much-needed lifeline”. Another aspect of Washington’s
approach
to Venezuela moving into 2012 has been the increase of aggressive rhetoric designed to de-legitimise the
government and open the possibility of more direct intervention. At a special Organisation of American States (OAS) session held in Washington in March,
Democrat Congressman Eliot Engel said Venezuelan democracy was being “trampled” by the Chávez administration
and advocated a “robust” OAS mission be sent to the country to monitor the October presidential elections. Not to be outdone
by their Democratic counterparts, Republicans have continued to wind up the rhetorical dial on
Venezuela . In a presidential nomination debate in Florida this January, Mitt Romney made a commitment to “punish those who are
following” Hugo Chávez and his ally Fidel Castro, ex-president of Cuba. He claims that Obama has “failed to
respond with resolve” to Chávez’s growing international influence, arguing in his October 2011 foreign policy white paper foreign policy white
paper that he would “chart a different course” in US policy toward Venezuela and other leftist governments in
Latin America. Of course, US foreign policy has nothing to do with concern for democracy nor fabrications that Venezuela is involved in plotting an attack
against the US.
Nationalized industries and trade ties ensure economic engagement can’t avoid
backlash as soft on Venezuela regime, national security, Cuba and terrorism
Robertson, 12
Ewan Robertson, 4/11/12, Latin America Bureau analyst @ Venezuala Analysis, http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/6916
Venezuela is one of the region’s most vibrant democracies, witnessing a huge increase in political participation in the previous decade, both in internationallycertified free and fair elections and in new grassroots forms, such as the thousands of communal councils which have sprung up around the country. Figures
in
Washington routinely ignore the facts and the evidence regarding Venezuela, for example never mentioning the Chilean-based
Latinobarometro regional poll in which Venezuelan citizens regularly demonstrate they have one of the highest levels of support for democracy, and satisfaction
with how their democracy works in practice, in Latin America. Rather, the
issue for policy makers in Washington is that since the arrival of
Chávez Venezuela has refused to play its designated role within US imperial strategy. That is, to offer a reliable supply of cheap oil controlled
by US companies, to act as a market for US-based private foreign investment, and to conduct itself as a submissive ally in US diplomacy. It is the Chávez
administration’s policies
of national control over oil and using the resource to fund social programmes, nationalising
strategically important industries, and vocally opposing US foreign policy while pursuing regional integration on
principles contrary to “free trade” that have made Venezuela a “problem” for US foreign policy. The Regional Dynamic One of
the Chávez’s administration’s key regional integration initiatives is the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA),
established by Cuba and Venezuela in 2004 as an alternative to US free trade agreements by emphasising
mutual solidarity and joint development between member states. The group now contains eight members in Latin America and the
Caribbean. Venezuela has also reached out to the Caribbean with the Petrocaribe initiative, in which Venezuela sells oil at preferential rates to participating nations
to support their development, with 18 Caribbean states now participating. The
US has responded by trying to isolate Venezuela
and discredit the ALBA. Romney has described
it as a “ virulently anti-American ‘Bolivarian’ movement across Latin
America that seeks to undermine institutions of democratic governance and economic opportunity”. Meanwhile, Council of
Foreign Relations analyst Joe Hirst rather fancifully tried to paint the organisation’s inclusion of social movements as a
mechanism for promoting international terrorism , using information from the long-discredited Farc laptops . The US has also
applied diplomatic pressure to discourage other states from strengthening ties with Venezuela. These
have included using intimidation and diplomatic manoeuvres to try to prevent an alliance between Nicaragua and Venezuela after the 2006 election of leftist Daniel
Ortega to the Nicaraguan presidency, and using threats and pressure against Haiti in 2006-7 to scupper the Préval government’s plan to join Petrocaribe. This
strategy failed, with Nicaragua joining the ALBA at Ortega’s inauguration in early 2007 and the first Petrocaribe oil shipment reaching Haiti in March 2008.
Cuba fears drive US politics on Venezuela policy and opposition to the plan
Kozloff, 13 (Nikolas, doctorate in Latin American history from Oxford University, author of Hugo
Chavez: Oil, Politics and the Challenge to the U.S. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), Revolution! South
America and the Rise of the New Left (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), No Rain in the Amazon: How South
America's Climate Change Affects the Entire Planet (Palgrave Macmilan, 2010), Huffington Post, 4/14,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nikolas-kozloff/maduro-elections-venezuela_b_3078387.html)
Ratcheting up Pressure on Cuba In May, 1974 the U.S. ambassador in Caracas confronted the Venezuelan Foreign
Minister with reports claiming that Venezuela sought to import sugar from Cuba. The ambassador explained that
he would be "glad to explore ways and means of trying to find additional sugar for Venezuela from countries other than Cuba." Defiantly, CAP
shot back that "he intended to go ahead with trade exchanges, including the sale of Venezuelan rice for Cuban sugar." Sure enough, in early
1975 the U.S. Embassy noted that a Cuban vessel had loaded up on Venezuelan rice at a local port. Even
more seriously, the
Americans fretted that CAP might be tempted to ship oil to Cuba in the event that OAS sanctions were removed.
Already, the Soviets were interested in decreasing Cuban dependence on oil transported from the USSR, and indeed Pérez reportedly related in
private that Moscow had "been pressing him" to ship oil to the Communist island nation. In late 1976, CAP followed up by traveling to the
U.S.S.R. where he inked a deal to export oil to Cuba. On the diplomatic front meanwhile, CAP angered the Americans by resuming relations with
Cuba. In Caracas, the Cubans opened a new embassy and staff reportedly included five known intelligence officers. Cuban news agency Prensa
Latina meanwhile expanded its activities greatly in Venezuela. In Washington, Kissinger grew
alarmed that Venezuela and
other sympathetic nations might move to end the sanctions regime on Cuba, and the Secretary therefore instructed his staff
to delay any such vote at the OAS. Hardly deterred, CAP went ahead and organized an OAS conference in Quito in November, 1974. However,
when CAP failed to obtain the necessary votes, the Venezuelan took out his frustrations on the Americans, remarking indignantly that
Washington had bullied certain nations from either abstaining or voting against the OAS initiative. CAP Reacts to Posada Attack Naively
perhaps, CAP told U.S. diplomats that he was interested in becoming a kind of "bridge" between Washington and unfriendly Latin governments.
Privately, American officials wrote that Venezuela, a major oil supplier to the U.S., was "far too important to allow us to drift into an adversary
relationship." "If we choose openly to combat greater Latin American unity," the U.S. ambassador wrote, "the U.S. risks harming its highly
important interests in Venezuela and exacerbating its relations with the hemisphere." Whatever the feelings over at the State Department,
however, the CIA might have had other ideas in mind. Still
smarting from CAP's betrayal, anti-Castro Cubans plotted against
the island nation. One such figure was Cuban-born Luis Posada Carriles, a longtime CIA
asset. During the 1970s Posada moved to
Venezuela where he oversaw U.S. intelligence operations. He is thought to be responsible for the worst terrorist attack in the hemisphere
at the time, a hit on Cubana flight 455 which departed Caracas en route to Cuba in October, 1976. After a brief stopover in Barbados, the plane
exploded in midair, killing all 73 passengers aboard. Officially, Posada was no longer in the employ of the CIA at the time of the bombing, having
left the agency in July. There's no evidence that the CIA directly orchestrated the plot, though records show that Posada may have notified the
agency in advance that was a bomb was set to go off. In Caracas meanwhile, the government began to suspect that the U.S. was engaged in
foul play. Dismissing Cuban claims of U.S. destabilization as propaganda, American diplomats assured the Venezuelans, rather unconvincingly,
that there was "no conspiracy underway to destabilize anything." Ironic Coda Though his administration was dogged by allegations of
corruption, CAP still had enough credibility to run for a second term in office in 1988. Campaigning again with the AD on a nationalist platform,
CAP was elected to the presidency once more but promptly reversed course and adopted more pro-U.S. policies favorable to the International
Monetary Fund. In 1992, CAP faced down a military coup orchestrated by none other than Hugo Chávez and others. Though Chávez was
imprisoned, the paratrooper later ran successfully for president. In 1998, Chávez was democratically elected and split apart the corrupt two
party AD-COPEI system. Ironically, even though Chávez spent the better part of his career deploring CAP's excesses, the former military officer
carried out a very similar foreign policy predicated on opening up relations with Cuba and rhetorically challenging the U.S. If anything,
Washington made things worse at this point by seeking to unseat Chávez, and drove Venezuela to pursue even closer links with Cuba. That, at
least, is the impression one gets from reading yet another batch of sensitive U.S. correspondence released by WikiLeaks and known as "CableGate." From CAP to Chávez Carrying on from CAP's earlier opening in the 1970s, Chávez opened up regular commercial and military flights
between Cuba and Venezuela. In a further blow, Cuba extended its influence at Venezuelan ports. Perhaps even more seriously, Chávez was
apparently so taken with the Castro brothers that he consulted directly with Cuban intelligence officers without even bothering to vet the
reporting through his own intelligence services. Even as diplomatic relations improved with Cuba, daily dealings with the U.S. Embassy in
Caracas took a complete nosedive, as I explain in a recent al-Jazeera column. WikiLeaks cables also illuminate a scheme which led to the
exchange of discounted Venezuelan oil for Cuban assistance in the health sector. In an echo meanwhile of earlier press openings under CAP,
Venezuela and Cuba now provide joint support for a hemispheric-wide news channel, Telesur. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly in light of
Sunday's presidential election, the Americans suspected that Cuba provided key expertise to Chávez on how to expand Venezuela's national
electoral registry. It is a fitting irony that to this day, the Posada case continues to fester and, if anything, has only served to bring Cuba and
Venezuela closer together. Indeed, both countries have sought to extradite Posada, who currently resides openly in Miami. During the recent
presidential campaign, Chávez heir Maduro even claimed that Posada was linked to a group of mercenaries who are intent on assassinating
him. Assessing Kissinger Files and Cable-Gate Looking
back upon Washington's 40-year campaign to roll back an
incipient Cuban-Venezuelan alliance , one is struck by a sense of profound political and diplomatic waste,
not to mention the State Department's skewed moral compass. From the Kissinger files to Cable-Gate, America's counter-productive campaign
only served to inflame public opinion and, if anything, made Venezuela even more nationalistic by the time of Chávez's arrival on the scene in
the 1990s. If Maduro wins on Sunday, as expected, Chávez's heir apparent will
probably deepen Cuba ties even further,
thus demonstrating once again the complete and utter bankruptcy of U.S. foreign policy.
---Laundry List
Our GOP, Appeasement, Cuba Lobby, Committee and Rubio Links
Mazzei, 12
Patricia, and Erika Bolstad, Miami Herald, 7/11/12, http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/07/11/vfullstory/2891728/republicans-attack-obama-for-chavez.html
Mitt Romney, GOP
howl over President Barack Obama’s remark about Hugo Chávez Republicans criticize President
Obama for saying Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez has not threatened U.S. national security. The region’s
experts, however, side with Obama. Republicans, led by Mitt Romney and Florida Sen. Marco Rubio, pounced on
President Barack Obama on Wednesday after he told a Miami TV anchor that Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez does
not pose a “serious” national security threat to the United States. Republicans wasted no time in firing up a
key South Florida constituency coveted by both Romney and Obama: Cuban-American voters who hate
Chávez for his close ties to the Castro regime in Cuba. “President Obama hasn’t been paying attention if he
thinks that Hugo Chávez, with buddies like the regimes in Cuba, Iran, and Syria, drug cartels, arms
traffickers, and extremist groups, is not a threat to the United States,” said Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen of Miami,
chairwoman of the House Foreign Affairs committee and co-chair of Romney’s National Hispanic Steering Committee. “I am
deeply disappointed that this administration continues to bury its head in the sand about threats to
U.S. security, our interests, and our allies.” Rubio said Obama “has been living under a rock ” when it comes to Chávez,
and said the president “continues to display an alarmingly naïve understanding of the challenges and
opportunities we face in the western hemisphere.” Other Cuban-American lawmakers issued
statements in the same critical vein , and Senate candidate Connie Mack, a Republican congressman from Fort Myers,
tied his opponent Sen. Bill Nelson, D-Fla., to the president’s remarks. Experts in the region, though, called Obama’s
comments reasonable. Chávez is “certifiable,” with a tremendous ego fueled by the power that comes from sitting on vast oil reserves — but
he’s not as dangerous as the leaders of other less friendly regimes, said Riordan Roett, the director of Latin American Studies Program at the
School of Advanced International Studies at The Johns Hopkins University. The
Republican criticism is “just pure electoral
politics,” Roett said. “He poses no security threat to the United States or anyone else,” Roett said. “Hugo Chávez is not going to attack us,
he’s not going to occupy our embassy, he’s not going to bomb U.S. planes arriving in Caracas at Maiquetía Airport. He is a loudmouth who
enjoys listening to himself, and has built up on the basis of oil revenue, a very, very populist, dependent regime that can’t deliver on basic
services, on goods and commodities to his own people.” Here’s what Obama told Oscar Haza, a Spanish-language broadcast journalist and
anchor in an interview with Obama that aired Tuesday night on A Mano Limpia (which roughly translates to “The Gloves Are Off”), Haza’s
nightly show on WJAN-Channel 41: “We’re always concerned about Iran engaging in destabilizing activity around the globe,” Obama said. “But
overall my sense is that what Mr. Chávez has done over the last several years has not had a serious national security impact on us. We have to
be vigilant. My main concern when it comes to Venezuela is having the Venezuelan people have a voice in their affairs, and that you end up
ultimately having fair and free elections, which we don’t always see.” Romney
called Obama’s comment “stunning and
shocking” and said in statement it’s a sign of “a pattern of weakness” in the president’s foreign policy. “It
is disturbing to see him downplaying the threat posed to U.S. interests by a regime that openly wishes
us ill,” Romney said. “Hugo Chávez has provided safe haven to drug kingpins, encouraged regional terrorist organizations that threaten
our allies like Colombia, has strengthened military ties with Iran and helped it evade sanctions, and has allowed a Hezbollah presence within his
country’s borders.” White House press secretary Jay Carney declined to answer questions about the president’s remarks. The president’s
campaign spokesman, Ben LaBolt, said Romney is only “playing into the hands of Chávez” and his “outdated rhetoric” by giving him any
attention. “Because of President Obama’s leadership, our position in the Americas is much stronger today than before he took office,” LaBolt
said. “At the same time, Hugo Chávez has become increasingly marginalized and his influence has waned. It’s baffling that Mitt Romney is so
scared of a leader like Chávez whose power is fading, while Romney continues to remain silent about how to confront al-Qaeda or how to bring
our troops home from Afghanistan.” Michael Shifter,
president of the Washington D.C.-based think tank Inter-American
Dialogue, cautioned that it’s up to the president to judge in an election year whether it’s politically smart
to talk about Chávez in a way that draws such heated Republican response
considering how valuable the swing state’s votes are to Obama’s prospects.
in South Florida — especially
---Cuba Lobby (Assumes Maduro)
Venezuala and Cuba policies inherently tied – even after chavez
Toro, 13
Fransisco Toro, Venezuelan journalist, political scientist, reported for the Washington Post, the New York Times and the Financial Times, and
was Editor of VenEconomy, Venezuela's leading bilingual business magazine. Since 2002, he has run Caracas Chronicles, the must-read Englishlanguage blog on all things Venezuelan He holds a BA from Reed College (1997), and MSc from the London School of Economics (1999) and is
currently a doctoral candidate in Political Science at the University of Maastricht, in The Netherlands. New Republic, 3/5/13,
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/112596/hugo-chavez-dead-cuba-defined-him-much-venezuela-did#
What Fidel Taught Hugo Cuba defined Chávez's career as much as Venezuela did Hugo Chávez died today in Venezuela at the age of 58, but his
battle with a never-specified form of cancer was waged largely in a Cuban hospital—a telling detail, as Cuba loomed just as large in his political
imagination as his native country. It's a point that my gringo friends up north always struggle with. The Cuban Revolution's immense influence
on the region has been constantly underestimated and misunderstood from day one. It's only a slight exaggeration to suggest that everything
of note that's happened south of the Rio Grande since 1959 has been an attempt either to emulate, prevent, or transcend the Cuban
experience. Chávez will be remembered as the most successful of Fidel Castro's emulators, the man who breathed new life into the old
revolutionary dream. Starting in the 1960s, guerrilla movements throughout the hemisphere tried to replicate the Sierra Maestra rebels' road
to power, to no avail. In the '70s, Chile's Salvador Allende tried the electoral route, but he didn't have a clear majority. In the '80s, Nicaragua's
Sandinistas had the majority and rode it to power, but took over a state too bankrupt to implement the social reforms they'd always
championed. Chávez had all three—power, votes, and money—plus charisma to boot. His was the last, best shot at reinventing Caribbean
Communism for the 21st century. At the root of the
extraordinarily close alliance
Chávez built with
Cuba was a deep,
paternal bond between two men. A fiercely independent figure, the messianic Chávez was never seen to kowtow to anyone. But there
were special rules for Fidel. Chávez's extraordinary devotion sprung from Castro's status as the mythical Hero-Founder of Latin America's postwar hard left. Chávez loved to brag of his frequent, spur-of-the-moment trips to Havana to seek Castro counsel. When he was diagnosed with
the cancer that ultimately killed him, Chavez got invites from high-tech medical centers in Brazil and in Spain, but it was never in doubt where
he would seek treatment. Chávez trusted Fidel, literally, with his life. There's no comparable relationship between two leaders in contemporary
world politics, and it had its political consequences—especially for Chávez. In a Cold War throwback, his
government welcomed
tens of thousands of Cuban doctors, trainers, and "advisors"—including, por supuesto, an unknowable number of spies—to
Venezuela. And tens of billions of petrodollars flowed in the opposite direction, a resource stream that
propped up the last bastion of totalitarianism in the Western Hemisphere long past its sell-by date. For Fidel, who had
had his eyes on Venezuela's oil riches since the 1960s, Chávez's election was an unbelievable stroke of luck. Much has been written about the
way Venezuela stepped in to fill the fiscal and strategic void the collapse of the Soviet Union left in Cuba, but the reality is much stranger than
that. As the unquestionably senior member of their Cold War alliance, the Soviets treated Cuba as just another satellite state; Fidel's
subjugation to a cold war superpower was always something of an embarrassment to him. In
the Caracas-Havana axis, by contrast,
the paymaster doubled up as the vassal. Venezuela effectively wrote a fat petrocheck month after month
for the privilege of being tutelaged by a poorer, weaker foreign power. The extent of this reverse colonization was startling.
Cuban flags eventually came to flutter above Venezuelan military bases and Venezuelans witnessed the surreal
spectacle of a democratically elected president telling them that Venezuela and Cuba share "a single
government " and that Venezuela "has two presidents ." Cuban military advisors kept watch over
Venezuela's entire security apparatus, and had exclusive control over Chávez's personal security detail. Through most of his 20month battle with cancer, the Castros had better information about the president's condition than even his inner circle back home, and
they maneuvered successfully to ensure a pro-Havana diehard , Nicolás Maduro, won the tough battle
for succession.
Economic support for venezuala is key factor in Cuba policy – Maduro changes nothing
Ponce, 13
Dr. Carlos Ponce, general coordinator of the Latin American and Caribbean Network for Democracy, coeditor of the political magazine “Nueva Politica”, lecturer in several U.S. and Latin American Universities
and member of the Steering Committee of the World Movement for Democracy and the ISC of the
Community of Democracies, 1/12/13, http://www.capitolhillcubans.com/2013/01/venezuelas-coupmade-in-cuba.html
Hugo Chávez was aware of the potential complications of this new surgery and he clearly
said that in case he became unable to take
oath on January 10th, or in case of his death, his chosen one to run for president was Nicolás Maduro. And the Constitution in
Venezuela is clear: the mandate began on January 10th, 2007 and ends January 10th, 2013, and if the elected president can’t take the oath that
day the Assembly’s President assumes power temporarily and calls for new elections within a maximum of 30 days. But for Cuba, which
receives more than $10 billion a year plus other benefits from Venezuela, this is not acceptable. Fidel and
Raúl Castro have been close friends and supporters of Chávez's regime for economic reasons. Thanks
to Hugo Chávez and his fake revolution, the Cuban dictatorial regime has been able to survive this past decade.
For Castro’s regime, the future of Chávez will also mark Cuba’s future . The Castro brothers have
become the conciliators and advisors of the two most powerful acolytes of Chávez as well as of some
fractions from the military. Castro has been coordinating the meetings among Diosdado Cabello, the president of
Venezuelan National Assembly, Vice President Maduro, Chávez’s family and some sectors of the military.
---Israel/Cuba Lobby
Triggers intense opposition from both Israel and Cuba lobbies and their Congressional
allies
Madsen, 11
Wayne Madsen, Investigative journalist, author and syndicated columnist. Has some twenty years experience in security issues.
As a U.S. Naval Officer, he managed one of the first computer security programs for the U.S. Navy. He has been a frequent
political and national security commentator on ABC, NBC, CBS, PBS, CNN, BBC, Al Jazeera, and MS-NBC. He has been invited to
testify as a witness before the US House of Representatives, the UN Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and an terrorism
investigation panel of the French government. A member of the Society of Professional Journalists (SPJ) and the National Press
Club., 6/20/11, http://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2011/06/20/the-outsourcing-of-influence-peddling-to-the-israelilobby.html
The
confluence of the Israel Lobby with pressure groups such as those that support the Saakashvili regime in Georgia is not an
isolated situation. Before the rise to power of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey, Israel
could rely on the support of successive Turkish governments. Turkey, in turn, established its own Washington-based lobbying group, the American Turkish Council,
which was modeled on the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). It was recently learned from Turkish government officials in Washington that the
secret network of Turkish military officers, politicians, intelligence officers, professors, and journalists known as “Ergenekon,” which plotted a series of coups against
independent-minded Turkish governments, was a construct of the CIA and Mossad. An in-depth investigation of the Ergenekon network conducted by the Turkish
intelligence service discovered that many of the key players in Ergenekon were Dönme, the descendants of Turkish Jews who converted to Islam and, to varying
degrees, now practice a combination of Kabbalah Judaism and Islamic Sufism while remaining secular and Turkish nationalist in the mold of Turkish state founder
Kemal Ataturk. Similarly, the
Israel Lobby has made common cause with the right-wing Cuban exile community
in Florida, which has become as influential in the politics of south Florida as the many Jews and
Israelis who live there. The convergence of interests of pro-Israelis and Cuban Gusano exiles can best be
seen in the current chair of the House Foreign Relations Committee, Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen,
who represents a congressional district in south Florida. Ros-Lehtinen, who is of Cuban Jewish descent, is one of AIPAC’s and the
ADL’s best friends in Congress . She is also a vociferous opponent of the governments of Venezuela and
Nicaragua, both of which have severed diplomatic relations with Israel and have recognized the independence of Abkhazia, to the
dismay of Israel, AIPAC, and the ADL. While Ros-Lehtinen rattles sabers against Venezuela, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Brazil,
Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay, and other Latin American nations that have recognized Palestine within its 1967 borders, she supports continued
U.S. military assistance to Colombia, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Panama, Israel’s last four remaining allies in Latin America. Ros-Lehtinen, while decrying alleged
human rights “abuses” in Venezuela and Nicaragua, is silent on actual abuses in Colombia, where Israelis routinely supply weapons and
advisers to the government in its inhumane war with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), peasants, and labor unionists. The trial in New York of
Russian air cargo services owner Viktor Bout for allegedly trying to sell weapons to the FARC is one outcome of the strategic alliance between Israel, its U.S. Lobby,
and the right-wing Latin American exiles and intelligence operatives who call Miami their home. The conviction and imprisonment of former Yukos owner Mikhail
Khodorkovsky, considered a major agent-of-influence for Israel in Russia and a one-time potential President of Russia, has placed Russia in the same category as
Venezuela, Nicaragua, Abkhazia, Turkey, and other nations that have incurred the ire of the Israel Lobby either directly or
via outsourcing deals made with strategic allies
such as the Georgians,
Cuban exiles , or, now, in the case of Turkey, the
Armenians. In the past, AIPAC always ensured that “Armenian genocide” resolutions failed in the U.S. Congress, a payback for Turkey’s support for Israel. With
Turkey adopting an independent foreign policy, AIPAC and the ADL are now strategically allied with the Armenian lobby to push for Armenian genocide resolutions
in Washington and elsewhere.
---Israel Lobby (Extension)
Triggers Israel lobby and congressional backlash to economic involvement in
venezuela
Cole, 12
Juan, Richard P. Mitchell Professor of History and the director of the Center for South
Asian Studies at the University of Michigan, 1/11,
http://www.guernicamag.com/daily/juan_cole_ahmadinejad_in_latin/
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has begun a four-nation tour in Latin America that will include Nicaragua, Cuba,
Venezuela and Ecuador. In part, the trip is for propaganda purposes. With the European Union joining in an Israeli-inspired U.S. boycott of
Iran’s Central Bank, which in essence translates into a boycott of buying Iranian petroleum, Tehran is desperate to underline that it still has
friends in the world. Most of these are in Asia, but Latin
America still does have regimes that will defy the U.S. attempt to
isolate Iran. In one sense, these are not important countries geopolitically or economically. But an embargo strategy of the sort
that the U.S. is pursuing depends heavily on there being no significant leaks . Venezuela has $4 billion worth
of joint projects with Iran. (This article stresses a military dimension, with Revolutionary guards posted to the Iranian embassy in
Caracas and a comparison to Soviet policies in Latin America, which led to the Cuban missile crisis. I see these Iranian moves more as an aid to
espionage than being military in character.) Venezuela
is also significant because in 2009 it established a joint bank
with Iran, which allows Iranian financial institutions to interface with other banks via Caracas. Some in the
Israel lobbies in the U.S. Congress have urged financial sanctions on Venezuela in order to close this loophole.
But that step would make it difficult for the U.S. to pay for Venezuelan petroleum, a significant source of America’s oil imports. As it is, the U.S.
Government won’t accept contracts from the Venezuela state petroleum company because the latter helps Iran with gasoline production. I
doubt the U.S. government itself did much business with the company so it sounds to me like another symbolic sanction. I doubt Brasilia much
likes the idea of a U.S.-Europe financial and energy boycott of a country of the global South. The
U.S. just expelled the
Venezuelan consul in Miami over a Univision investigative report alleging a Cuban-Venezuelan-Iranian plot to hack U.S.
nuclear facilities. (Note to the Cuba and Israel lobbies: This story is not very plausible and you wouldn’t want one of its members to be in the
U.S.—hackers can be anywhere and like anonymity.)
Jew Hating is explicit Venezuela policy – sparks lobby demands for isolation
Samuels, 10
Shimon Samuels is Director for International Relations of the Simon Wiesenthal Centre, which holds
consultative status at the Organisation of American States and the Latin American Parliament, 3/25/10,
http://www.thejc.com/news/world-news/29926/analysis-in-venezuela-antisemitism-state-policy
A new report by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) has criticised the Venezuelan government for
encroaching on the civil and political rights of its people, and particularly those of its Jewish community. The
report expressed particular concern about the rising number of antisemitic incidents, and noted that the
government-controlled media "contributed to creating an atmosphere of intimidation and violence against
the Jewish community in Venezuela". This is cause for serious alarm. However, it is hardly surprising. Since
Hugo Chavez took power, antisemitic expression has grown exponentially: in government media; in the
dissemination of the Protocols of Zion; in the accusation that "Semitic banks" are sabotaging the economy; in the fact that the Caracas Jewish
school was raided twice by armed forces "searching for Mossad-supplied arms caches"; in the desecration of two synagogues; and in the closing
of the Israeli Embassy. The Venezuelan ambassador to Moscow even alleged that Jewish citizens implicated in a 2002 anti-Chavez coup were
"Mossad agents". The origins of Mr Chavez's attitude can be traced to the influence wielded over him by his Argentine, pro-Nazi, Holocaustdenying school companion, the late Norberto Ceresole, who - in his 1998 book on Mr Chavez's election victory - warned of the Venezuelan
"Jewish mafia". In a 2004 Christmas Eve message, Mr Chavez claimed that "the descendants of those who crucified Christ, the descendants of
those who expelled Bolivar and crucified him in their own way… took possession of the riches of the world. A minority appropriated the world's
gold, the silver, the minerals, the water, the good lands, the oil and has concentrated the riches in a few hands…" Here he was mixing the
motifs of the Jews as Christ-killers and of Marxism. The next year, Mr Chavez compared the Spanish conquest of the Indians to the situation of
the Palestinians and, a year after that, tolerated the appearance of "Hizbollah Venezuela", an indigenous Wayuu Indian tribe that has embraced
Shiah Islam and is essentially a jihadi transplant into the region. Much,
too, has been made of the burgeoning VenezuelaIran strategic alliance. This is primarily anti-American, but its antisemitic/anti-Zionist quotient is an
added binding factor. A weekly Caracas-Tehran flight was inaugurated in November 2004 by Mr Chavez, who arrived in Iran at the very
moment his Special Forces raided the Caracas Jewish School. Mr Chavez is undoubtedly obsessed with a world Jewish conspiracy represented
by the less than 12,000 Jews remaining in Venezuela. They are
becoming the scapegoat for his dysfunctional administration and
the economic crisis that is engulfing a country blessed with oil, coffee and sugar. One third of the Jewish community has fled,
fearing Soviet-style state antisemitism. Indeed, such a policy has all the appearances of having already
begun. A pro-Chavez television show named Venezuelan Jewish leaders as anti-Venezuelan conspirators, and called on other Jews "not
involved in the conspiracy" to publicly denounce their coreligionists. A Chavista newspaper editorial questioned whether "we will have to expel
them from our country… as other nations have done." The Wiesenthal Centre's 2009 appeal to the Organisation of American States to conduct
an enquiry into Venezuelan government–inspired antisemitism has resulted in its associated Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
Report. Within
this catalogue of Caracas's violations of fundamental rights, it unambiguously
documents the government's incitement to Jew-hatred as a policy of state . For as long as this autocratic
regime strategically endangers the Western hemisphere and targets the classic scapegoat, prodemocracy activists will surely lobby for its isolation from the international community.
Venezuelan Politics Disad – Neg
Maduro Politics – Shell
Democratic Transition coming, but at crossroads. Any US involvement fails and
empowers anti-US forces.
Spetalnick ‘13
Matt Spetalnick – White House correspondent who has covered news on four continents for Reuters, from Latin American coups and drug wars
– Reuter’s – March 6th, 2013 – “Despite new hopes, U.S. treads cautiously after death of Venezuela's Chavez” –
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/03/06/uk-venezuela-chavez-usa-idUKBRE92504920130306
Washington's challenge will be to figure out how far to go in seizing the opening to engage with
Venezuelan leaders as well as its political opposition without giving the impression of U.S. meddling following the
socialist president's death after a two-year battle with cancer. "We're not interested in having a confrontational relationship with Venezuela,"
a senior U.S. official told Reuters. "We're going to have to see how things evolve. It's a dynamic period." For Washington, a major test will be
whether Venezuela follows its own constitution - which has been widely interpreted to require a special election to pick Chavez's successor and if such a vote is conducted in a free and fair way in "accordance with hemispheric norms," the official said. Washington had accused
Chavez and his allies of electoral abuses, such as intimidating foes and misusing state media during his 14-year rule. Chavez had created
headaches for successive U.S. administrations with his strong anti-American rhetoric and his alliances with some of Washington's main foes,
including Cuba and Iran. The question now is whether his leftist "revolution" and incendiary foreign policy can live on without his dominant
personality at the helm. In a normally divided Washington, Chavez's death brought a rare moment of bipartisan agreement, with Republicans
and Democrats alike seeing it as a chance to turn a page after a long period of strained U.S.-Venezuelan ties. "Hugo Chavez was a destabilizing
force in Latin America, and an obstacle to progress in the region," said Mike Rogers, a Republican from Michigan and chairman of the U.S.
House of Representatives intelligence committee. "I hope his death provides an opportunity for a new chapter in U.S.-Venezuelan relations."
"Hopefully
there will be a peaceful transition of power in Venezuela with real, meaningful democratic
reforms," U.S. Senator Bill Nelson, a Democrat from Florida, said in a message on Twitter. OBAMA'S NOT-SO-SUBTLE MESSAGE Obama
called it a "challenging time" for Venezuela and - in a measured but not-so-subtle message to Vice President Nicolas Maduro, Chavez's
preferred successor - said the United States "remains committed to policies that promote democratic principles, the rule of law and respect for
human rights." Taking the chill off the relationship between Washington and Caracas will not be easy. Recent U.S. efforts to improve longdormant cooperation in areas like drug interdiction and regional security were favourably received at first in Caracas but ultimately failed to
yield any real progress, the senior administration official said. And Washington was quick to reject Maduro's accusations, made just hours
before his announcement of Chavez's death, that the United States had been engaged in a conspiracy against the president and Venezuela.
"Their statements and actions today call into question their interest in having a functional and productive relationship with the United States,"
the official said. Chavez, who took on Cuban leader Fidel Castro's role as Latin America's most vocal critic of Washington, accused the United
States of pursuing imperialist policies in the region as he used Venezuela's oil wealth to bolster leftist allies. As for whether Washington hoped
to see Venezuela move away from its alliance with communist-ruled Cuba, the U.S. official said: "That's up to them to determine who their
partners are." But the official added that Washington has not hesitated to make known its displeasure when "there were relationships with
actors of concern." U.S. officials had contended that Chavez' rule eroded democratic freedoms in Venezuela and he went too far in
concentrating power in his own hands. But any
overt U.S. effort to intervene in Venezuela's politics now would
almost certainly backfire, and possibly harm the anti-Chavez opposition. "It is a delicate time. I think
the United States needs to be very patient and not become a factor internally in a way that ... could
become negative," said Arturo Valenzuela, the U.S. State Department's top official for the Western Hemisphere from 2009 to 2011.
Maduro stands on crossroads – his perceived political success is key to check narcogenerals. That causes internal meltdown.
Noriega ‘13
Roger F. Noriega was ambassador to the Organization of American States from 2001-2003 and assistant secretary of state from 2003-2005. He
is a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute – “Venezuela elections may stir things up” ” – InterAmerica Security Watch – April 13th,
2013 – http://interamericansecuritywatch.com/venezuela-elections-may-stir-things-up/
As I noted after Chávez’s death last month, Venezuela is a country on the verge of a socioeconomic
meltdown. Street crime, power outages, and shortages of food and consumer goods trouble the lives of millions of citizens. The
government is running a dangerous fiscal deficit; mismanaged social programs are unsustainable. State revenues are down dramatically
because the state-run oil company – packed with political cronies and plundered by Chávez to fund pet projects – is producing far less oil than it
was 15 years ago. The regime has forfeited its legitimacy as senior officials are complicit with drug trafficking and terrorism. And the shameless
intervention of Havana to manage the chavista succession has stirred anger among nationalists in Venezuela’s once-proud military.
Confronting these challenges without Chávez at the top of the ticket, the regime has exploited every unfair
advantage to engineer a convincing victory. Although the chavista leadership has closed ranks around
Maduro, their confidence has to have been shaken by his buffoonish performance – claiming to chat with Chávez through a
little bird circling over his head, for instance, or clumsily mimicking the antics of his charismatic predecessor. Even if the chavistas
decide to steal an electoral victory for Maduro, after the election, the narcogenerals led by National
Assembly president and ruling party chief Diosdado Cabello will second-guess Maduro as he tries to run the country .
Cabello considers himself a much more able administrator, and he has a bitter distrust of the Cubans who appear to be micromanaging Maduro
and his campaign.
If Venezuela slips into a narco-state, it turns each case advantage.
Noriega ‘12
Roger F. Noriega was ambassador to the Organization of American States from 2001-2003 and assistant secretary of state from 2003-2005. He
is a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute – TESTIMONY¶ OF¶ AMBASSADOR ROGER F. NORIEGA¶ BEFORE THE¶ UNITED STATES¶
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES¶ COMMITTEE ON¶ FOREIGN AFFAIRS¶ SUBCOMMITTEE ON¶ TERRORISM, NON¶ -¶ PROLIFERATION AND TRADE¶ “¶
Hezbollah’s Strategic Shift: A Global Terrorist Threat¶ ”¶ 1:30 PM, Wednesday,¶ March 20¶ , 2012 – http://www.aei.org/files/2013/03/20/hezbollahs-strategic-shift-a-global-terrorist-threat_134945797264.pdf
Some may assess this¶ cooperation between¶ “¶ narco¶ s” and¶ terrorist¶ s¶ as a marriage¶ of
convenience between different criminal elements or¶ just¶ another¶ modus operandi¶ of¶ powerful international drug
syndicates¶ that can be tackled by l¶ aw enforcement¶ . Instead,¶ this criminal activity is the product¶ of a¶ conscious
strategy of¶ rogue regimes in¶ Iran and¶ Venezuela to wage¶ asymmetrical warfare¶ against¶ U.S.
security, interests and allies¶ close¶ to the homeland¶ .¶ As such, it requires a much more robust analysis
and coordinated¶ response¶ –¶ from exposing terrorist g¶ roups working within Venezuela, identifying¶ narcoterrorist activities in Central
America,¶ imposing¶ sanctions against state¶ -¶ ru¶ n entities¶ being used to conceal criminal transactions,¶ to dismantl¶ ing transnational
money¶ laundering schemes.¶ Under bipartisan legislation passed by Congress in December, the Department of¶ State was given six months to
provide you with an analysis of and strategy for dealing¶ with Iran’s activities in the Americas. Until now, the State Department has earned a¶
repu¶ tation within the U.S. government of minimizing this¶ threat¶ . This Subcommittee will¶ have to press the Department to conduct a
thorough and rigorous review of the Iranian¶ and Hezbollah activities in our region and to expose the¶ extraordinary¶ role¶ that is¶ p¶ layed¶ by
Venezue¶ la in this regard. U.S. diplomats will then have to inform our neighbors about¶ this problem and lay the groundwork for a coordinated
strategy for dealing with this¶ phenomenon in our Hemisphere.¶ Mr. Chairman,
I fear that these narco¶ terrorist activities will
exact an increasingly terrible price from our neighbors and our nation¶ until our national security
establishment recognizes the nature of the threat and fashions an effective response.
Link-Uniqueness backlines
( ) Maduro narrowly holding-off internal military challenges now –fidelity to Chavez’s
anti-US cause will be key.
Metzker ‘13
(Internally quoting Michael Shifter, Adjunct Prof @ Gtown, member of the Council on Foreign Relations,
and president of the Inter-American Dialogue. Jared Metzker – IPS Reporter, Washington DC - Inter
Press Service – June 17, 2013 – lexis)
The new president's waffling may be a reflection of his tenuous grip on power. By many accounts, Maduro
lacks the political prowess and rabble-rousing charm of Chavez, who enjoyed military backing as well as fervent
support from the lower classes.¶ In addition to a strong anti-Chavista opposition that openly challenges the legitimacy of his narrowly won
election, Maduro
has had to deal with a split within Chavez's own former political base. ¶ Shifter
pointed out that among the military, which was once a source of significant strength for Chavez, more support is given
to Diosdado Cabello, currently head of Venezuela's parliament and whose supporters believe he was the rightful heir to the presidency.¶
Maduro's legitimacy stems largely from his perceived ideological fidelity, the reason for his selection
by Chavez to lead in the first place. Shifter said this leads him to "emulate" his predecessor and makes
rapprochement with the United States less probable.
A-to Kerry meeting = non-unique
( ) Kerry meeting doesn’t non-unique the disad – it was a incredibly preliminary step.
Metzker ‘13
(Internally quoting Michael Shifter, Adjunct Prof @ Gtown, member of the Council on Foreign Relations,
and president of the Inter-American Dialogue. Jared Metzker – IPS Reporter, Washington DC - Inter
Press Service – June 17, 2013 – lexis)
Nonetheless, major actions remain to be taken if normalisation is to even begin , such as the exchange of
ambassadors and official U.S. recognition of the Maduro government. Shifter (who
regards the Kerry-Jaua meeting as "a
small step" ) was not optimistic that these larger requirements will be completed in the short term. ¶
"I
don't think Washington is going to push hard to send an ambassador to Caracas ," he said. "It will probably
take more time to observe the new government and see where it is going."
A-to “US engaging now”
( ) US moving cautiously now
Spetalnick ‘13
Matt Spetalnick – White House correspondent who has covered news on four continents for Reuters, from Latin American coups and drug wars
– Reuter’s – March 6th, 2013 – “Despite new hopes, U.S. treads cautiously after death of Venezuela's Chavez” –
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/03/06/uk-venezuela-chavez-usa-idUKBRE92504920130306
While the death of Venezuela's stridently anti-American President Hugo Chavez on Tuesday raised hopes in Washington for
better U.S.-Venezuela relations, the Obama administration reacted cautiously as it weighed the prospects
for a diplomatic thaw. President Barack Obama quickly reached out to Venezuelans, expressing an interest in a "constructive
relationship" in the post-Chavez era. But analysts said it would be hard to make tangible progress when deep political uncertainty risks
destabilizing the South American oil-producing nation. Washington's challenge will be to figure out how far to go in seizing the opening to
engage with Venezuelan leaders as well as its political opposition without giving the impression of U.S. meddling following the socialist
president's death after a two-year battle with cancer. "We're not interested in having a confrontational relationship with Venezuela," a senior
U.S. official told Reuters. "We're
going to have to see how things evolve. It's a dynamic period."
Advantage One answers
Advantage One frontline
( ) Venezuela doesn’t sponsor dangerous Hezbollah activity – that’s a myth.
Tegel ‘13
Simeon Tegel is a British journalist based in Peru and is GlobalPost's senior correspondent for South America. He writes about a broad range of
themes across Latin America – “American conservatives warn of militant Islam's spread in Latin America. But their claims are hard to prove” –
Salon.com – Jan 8, 2013 – http://www.salon.com/2013/01/08/is_venezuela_harboring_hezbollah/
American conservatives warn of militant Islam's spread in Latin America. But their claims are hard to
prove Is Venezuela providing operational support to Islamic terrorists? That deadly serious question is
increasingly troubling foreign policy and security experts as the South American country and Iran — which funds Hezbollah — move ever closer.
Despite deep cultural differences, a shared antagonism toward the US has drawn Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and his Iranian
counterpart, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, into an unlikely political friendship in recent years. “Iran is an example of struggle, resistance, dignity,
revolution, strong faith,” Chavez said during one early visit to Tehran. “We are two powerful countries. Iran is a power and Venezuela is
becoming one. We want to create a bipolar world. We don’t want a single power [i.e., the US].” Beyond the rhetoric lies a strategic alliance
that has seen Caracas, along with Damascus and Havana, vote against United Nations sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program, and increasing
Iranian investment in the Venezuelan economy, now worth more than $5 billion. All of that is very public. But,
according to critics such
as veteran US Republican Latin Americanist Roger Noriega, Venezuela is also providing operational support to Hezbollah,
the Lebanese-based organization classified as terrorist by the US, UK and other allies. It even came up in November’s US elections, with the
Republicans claiming in their official online party platform: “Venezuela has become a narco-terrorist state, turning it into an Iranian outpost in
the Western hemisphere.” “The current regime issues Venezuelan passports or visas to thousands of Middle Eastern terrorists offering safe
The GOP did not respond to GlobalPost’s requests for comment. But its
claim was questioned — and even ridiculed — by several security experts in Israel and South America contacted by
GlobalPost. “ That is exaggerated . Generally, this kind of activity [terrorism] is conducted by small units.
It is political rhetoric,” said Ely Karmon, one of Israel’s top independent counter-terrorism experts. Nicholas Watson, a senior
analyst at British firm Control Risks, who specializes in South America, agreed, describing it as “unhelpful.” He added: “That
kind of rhetoric, the blatant accusations, doesn’t help the US’ position in the region. It actually plays into Chavez’s hands
haven to Hezbollah trainers, operatives, recruiters and fundraisers.”
and strengthens him within Venezuela.” That Hezbollah has been active in Latin America is hardly news. Argentine investigators have linked
the group to two deadly bombings in Buenos Aires in the 1990s. Together, the attacks on the Israeli Embassy and a Jewish cultural center killed
114 people. One of five Iranians wanted by Interpol over the second bombing, Ahmad Vahidi, is now Iran’s defense minister. Last year, he had
to make a rapid departure during a state visit to Bolivia when Argentine prosecutors requested Bolivian police arrest him. Meanwhile,
according to the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, a Washington, DC, nonprofit research group, there’s growing evidence that Hezbollah is
infiltrating other parts of Latin America, taking advantage of widespread corruption and drug trafficking to raise funds for its activities in the
Middle East. The Buenos Aires attacks took place years before Chavez, now cancer-stricken but recently re-elected, came to power in
Venezuela. He was even in jail, awaiting trial for his role in a failed coup, at the time of the first bombing, on the Israeli embassy. Nevertheless,
a jigsaw of data, put together by everyone from Karmon to Manhattan District Attorney Robert Morgenthau, paints a disturbing picture of
apparent bilateral cooperation in areas such as Iran’s outlawed nuclear ambitions and the Venezuelan military’s adoption of Tehran’s defense
doctrine of “asymmetrical” warfare; in other words, guerrilla resistance to a potential US invasion. Now canceled, there was also a secretive
weekly flight from Caracas to Tehran, with a stopover in Damascus, operated jointly by Iran Air and Conviasa, the state airlines in Iran and
Venezuela respectively. Karmon and others say the passengers did not pass through customs. Meanwhile, Venezuela’s Lebanese-born Interior
Minister Tareck El Aissami — who was previously in charge of the country’s passport office, fueling the Republican claim of papers being given
to Islamic terrorists — makes no secret of his sympathies. “I’m also the son of Arabs, I’m Palestinian, I’m Iraqi, and today we are the resistance
force,” he said at a 2009 event in support of Palestinians in Gaza. “There are Hezbollah supporters in the Venezuelan government. They have
been neither investigated nor fired. They have been kept in their jobs,” said Roman D. Ortiz, director of Bogota-based security consultancy
Decisive Point. But does that translate into the Chavez government arming or providing training facilities or other logistical support to
Hezbollah? “The
existence of a Lebanese community [in Venezuela] plus a left-wing populist government
plus the anti-American rhetoric does not equal terrorism,” says Control Risks’ Watson. “ That is speculation .”
The status quo is no longer threatening — sponsoring terrorism was a Chávez-led
doctrine — that dies out with Maduro
Ghitis 13 — independent commentator on world affairs and a World Politics Review contributing
editor (Frida Ghitis, World Politics Review, 01-10-13, “World Citizen: Will Venezuela-Iran Links Survive
Chávez?”, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12615/world-citizen-will-venezuela-iran-linkssurvive-chavez, Accessed 06-30-2013 | AK)
Chávez made anti-Americanism the cornerstone of his foreign policy, working at every step
to antagonize U.S. goals and undermine Washington’s influence. Perhaps the greatest irritant of all was
the close relationship he forged with Iran, a country the U.S. and its allies believe is trying to develop nuclear weapons and sponsoring international terrorism. As
the U.S. spearheaded efforts to pass United Nations sanctions to stop Iran’s nuclear enrichment, Chávez traveled to Tehran and, along with Iranian President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, provocatively announced the creation of what they called an “Axis of Unity” against the
U.S. The two countries work together in a number of areas. Of particular interest to the U.S. is Venezuela’s help to Iran in circumventing international sanctions. The question
for Washington now is how to maximize the chances that once Chávez leaves the scene, the ties linking Caracas and
Tehran, more than 7,000 miles away, will fade. Just before the end of the year, President Barack Obama signed into law the Countering Iran
in the Western Hemisphere Act, which instructs the State Department to develop a strategy to
“address Iran’s growing hostile presence and activity” in Latin America, and directs the Department of Homeland Security to take
During almost 14 years in office,
measures to protect U.S. borders with Mexico and Canada to keep out “operatives from Iran . . . Hezbollah or any other terrorist organizations.” For Iran and its Lebanese ally Hezbollah,
Chávez’s worsening condition could not come at a worse time . Their closest and most crucial ally, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, is
engulfed in a brutal civil war, likely to put an end to his regime and possibly destroy Syria’s ties with Iran and Hezbollah. The headwinds they face in Latin America recently came up in a speech
by none other than Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. Speaking a couple of days after the start of the year, Nasrallah said 2013 would bring a “very dangerous phase” for his organization,
citing efforts to add the group to the European Union’s terrorist list and to restrict its movements in Latin America as specific challenges. Before traveling to Cuba for his most recent cancer
Chávez dramatically acknowledged he may not be able to remain in power and anointed Vice President
Maduro as his chosen successor
surgery,
Nicolas
. Washington has already taken tentative steps, seeking to reach out to Maduro -- as has Tehran. It is not exactly clear what
the American strategy is, but there is no indication that the first moves were effective or well-received. The U.S. said that a telephone conversation between Maduro and a top State
Department official, Roberta Jacobson, was aimed at improving relations, and there have been reports of other bilateral contacts. However, Maduro lashed out at reports that relations with
Washington would improve after Chávez dies, calling it a distortion and manipulation by Washington. At about the same time, Iranian media reported a telephone call between Maduro and
Ahmadinejad. The two are already friends. Maduro has strong connections with Tehran, having met in person with top officials on many occasions during visits to Iran and having served as
their host when they traveled to Venezuela. Maduro is a favorite to succeed Chávez in both Tehran and Havana, not to mention Caracas. The Venezuelan constitution says if the president dies
or cannot take office, the head of the National Assembly would take power temporarily. That position is held by another Chávez loyalist, Diosdado Cabello. After 30 days, a new election would
take place. Cabello and Maduro are just two of several Chávez supporters who would vie for power in the factional power struggles to succeed the iconic president. Chávez’s unqualified
blessing means that for now Maduro is the country’s most powerful man. He would benefit from an initial surge of support. And there is no question he and the Chavista forces have a firm grip
there is no denying that
Chavismo thrived because of Chávez . There is no guarantee it will survive without him in the long
term, especially in the face of daunting economic problems, beginning with a budget deficit that stands at an astonishing 20 percent of GDP. For Washington, this means that forging ties
on all the institutions of power. Chávez’s entrenched United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) will not crumble without its leader. And yet,
with Maduro risks strengthening him against his rivals, helping him quash internal rivals and legitimize his rule at a time when it is unclear just how closely he and other Chavistas plan to follow
the constitution. Infighting within the ruling party’s ranks, and the lack of a candidate with strong personal appeal, could open the way for the opposition. Opposition leader Henrique Capriles,
who mounted a strong campaign against Chávez in last October’s presidential election, is on record saying he would bring a dramatic change in foreign policy, ending arms purchases from
Russia, pulling away from China, reviewing oil deals that strengthen other authoritarian regimes in Latin America -- and rethinking controversial links with Iran. Washington would do well to
keep conversations at the lowest possible volume, whether with the opposition or other would-be Chávez successors, while openly urging Venezuela to abide by democratic norms. If, in the
event Chávez is unable to serve his term for whatever reason, a fair contest is allowed and enough time passes to loosen the emotional power of grief, the Venezuelan people may wake up to
A close relationship between
Iran and Venezuela has always been a geographic and diplomatic oddity, one made possible only
because of Chávez’s own worldview. Chávez’s immediate successor will seek to maintain it, but the
intensity and impact will be difficult to preserve for long in a post-Chávez Venezuela .
the dismal state of their economy, and discover there are better ways to decrease poverty and build lasting prosperity than Chavismo.
( ) Hezbollah not a threat to the US and Noriega is wrong.
Willans ‘13
Pierce Willans is currently pursuing a degree in political science at Seton Hall University – “Venezuela News: Hezbollah is in Venezuela, But
There's No Threat to U.S. Security” – Policymic – March – http://www.policymic.com/articles/29303/venezuela-news-hezbollah-is-invenezuela-but-there-s-no-threat-to-u-s-security
Is Hezbollah in Venezuela? Probably. A more interesting question is: Does it matter, and if so, how much? American
foreign policy hawks have been sounding the alarm on this for years, claiming Hezbollah’s activities in
South America, which they often refer to as "America’s backyard," are a threat to national security. The U.S. State Department labels
Hezbollah as a terrorist organization and Iranian proxy. The origins of Hezbollah are murky, but it first emerged as a force in the early 1980s, in
reaction to Israel’s occupation of Southern Lebanon. During this period, the group quickly gained infamy in the United States when it blew up
the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, killing over 200 Marines, only months after it had blown up the U.S. Embassy there. That being said,
attacks on American targets have been the exception, rather than the rule. Throughout its history, the
majority of Hezbollah’s energies have been directed towards Israel. In the decades since its creation, Hezbollah has
evolved and expanded its activities, operating as a political party in Lebanon while simultaneously maintaining its separate criminal and military
activities. Sometime in the 1980s they are believed to have established a foothold in South America, probably to raise funds from the large
Lebanese community there. It has been established that the group is engaged in narcotrafficking and money laundering, no doubt spurred in
part by Iran’s declining support due to the crushing international sanctions against it. Though their activities in Latin America appear to be
primarily aimed at raising money, fears of Hezbollah’s capacity for violence in the region are not without basis; Hezbollah is widely blamed for
The
fears of a Venezuelan-Hezbollah axis seem to be spurred in large part by the highly visible personal friendship between the
bombing the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires and then again that city’s Jewish Community Center in the early 90s, killing over 100 people.
late Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. This unlikely alliance between two men of such
different cultural backgrounds appears to be a product of their respective governments’ isolation and shared antagonism towards the United
States. In the UN, Venezuela has voted against international sanctions on Iran for its nuclear program. Iran has billions of dollars invested in
Venezuela. There is, however, nothing particularly treacherous about that. The claims of a more sinister relationship have
been most
prominently voiced by Roger Noriega. Mr. Noriega is currently a visiting fellow at conservative think
tank the American Enterprise Institute. Mr. Noriega is no stranger to murky Iran-Latin American
intrigue; while at the U.S. Agency for International Development, he was implicated in the Iran-Contra Scandal during the Reagan
administration. He subsequently served in high-level diplomatic posts under President George W. Bush, including as Ambassador to the
Organization of American States, where he supported the abortive coup against Hugo Chavez in 2002. More recently, he has publicly accused
Venezuela of having a secret nuclear program. In his July 2011 testimony before Congress, Mr. Noriega further stoked the fires by claiming that
Venezuela actually supports Hezbollah and allows it and drug cartel members to operate in its territory, though he offered no proof. He also
Noriega clearly knows how
to get attention in Washington, but that is not the same as offering well-informed advice . In this post-9/11
foreign policy environment, his efforts seem to be aimed at reinforcing conservatives’ penchant for conflating
a group’s stated anti-American sentiments with an unstated intention to actually do us harm. In many
hinted darkly that the federal government knows more than it is willing to say publicly on the subject.
ways, Hezbollah’s activities in Latin America are similar to those of other drug cartels, which are rightly viewed as a problem. But their activies
are a law enforcement problem, and needs to be confronted without the hysteria that seems to accompany any statement containing
"Hezbollah" and "America’s backyard" in the same breath.
( ) Noriega wrong and alarmist
Sigger ‘10
Jason Sigger – Jason Sigger is a defense policy analyst and the proprietor of the blog Armchair Generalist – “Neocon Invents Venezuela Nuke
Threat” – Crooks and Liars – October 6, 2010 – http://crooksandliars.com/node/40459/print
On the one hand, it's
admirable that the Foreign Policy website offers views from both the right and the left
would be nice if they added some kind of warning label. I
don't know, something like " actual reality may differ from author's perspective. " I have this in mind as
Roger Noriega (former Bush political appointee, current AEI fellow) warns us of Hugo Chavez's supposed plans to develop
on controversial public policy issues. On the other hand, it
nuclear weapons with Iran's help.¶ Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez admitted last week that his government is "carrying out the first studies"
of a nuclear program. He attempted to portray it as an innocuous program designed solely for peaceful purposes.¶ --------¶ Chávez's suggestion
that he is merely studying the idea of a nuclear energy program is misleading. In fact, in November 2008, Iranian and Venezuelan officials
signed a secret "science and technology" agreement formalizing cooperation "in the field of nuclear technology." (The text of the agreement,
available in Farsi and Spanish, is available here.) The week after the agreement was signed, Venezuela's Ministry of Energy and Petroleum
prepared a presentation for the International Atomic Energy Agency documenting the establishment of a "nuclear power programme" in
Venezuela. That presentation, obtained from sources within the Venezuelan government, reveals that an "Atomic Energy Committee" has been
managing the nuclear program since 2007.¶ All countries have the right to a peaceful nuclear energy program under the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty, of which Venezuela is a signatory. However, Chávez's decision to rely on one of the world's worst proliferators to help
develop his country's capabilities in this sensitive technology sets alarm bells ringing. And his recent public declarations understating the nature
of his nuclear program raise more questions than they answer.¶ Just for the sake of accuracy, I'd note that China, Pakistan, and North Korea are
far more busy in weapons proliferation than Iran, particularly with high-tech equipment and materials. But this
kind of language isn't
new for Noriega. He is a particular hard-liner against Cuba and Venezuela, with a long history of alarmist
speeches and attacks against those governments. So it's not surprising to see this language, and it's easier to
shoot holes into his argument.
( ) Iran prolif not inevitable – prefer expert reporters.
Hibbs ‘13
(Mark Hibbs is a former journalist who has been covering nuclear proliferation issues for more than 30 years. In 2006, The Atlantic's William
Langewiesche wrote that Hibbs "must rank as one of the greatest reporters at work in the world today." Hibbs is now a Bonn-based senior
associate with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace – This article is an interview of Hobbs by The Atlantic – “Is a Nuclear Iran
Inevitable ?” – The Atlantic – April 12th – http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/04/is-a-nuclear-iran-inevitable/274924/)
You mention that there are countries like Iran that don't necessarily pursue the path to the bomb in terms of months or years -- they pursue it
in terms of slow progress that reaches a kind of momentum where it's almost irreversible. Do
you think that we've reached the
point with Iran where they've slowly built their capability to the point that it's inevitable that they get the bomb, unless
there's something major like war, an attack or some sort of internal social breakdown that prevents them from getting there?¶ No, I don't
believe that. I think that most analysts would conclude that between the period of around the middle of the 1980s and today, there
have been forces in Iran that have led certain people in the decision-making structure to try to have a nuclear weapons
capability. There are probably others in the system who didn't want that. Iran is by no means a
monolithic country.¶ ...Iran right now has a decision to make. It has acquired considerable nuclear capability which have brought them very
far along down a path towards obtaining a nuclear weapons capability. There's no question about that in my mind. But right now it's up to
Iran to decide whether it's going to draw a red line there, or whether it's going to cross it. And I think there's no consensus
right now about which direction Iran's going to move in.
( ) Iran Prolif not dangerous and wouldn’t cascade.
Hobbs& Moran ‘12
Dr Christopher Hobbs is a Leverhulme Research Fellow at the Centre for Science and Security Studies within the Department of War Studies at
King's College London. Matthew Moran is a Research Associate at the Centre for Science and Security Studies within the Department of War
Studies at King's College London. He is currently working on a MacArthur-funded postdoctoral project that explores the relationship between
nuclear, nationalism and identity and how these issues impact on policy-making. Guardian: Julian Borger’s Security Blog – 12-19-12 –
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/julian-borger-global-security-blog/2012/dec/19/iran-nuclear-middle-east-arms-race
Inevitably, Iran's nuclear defiance has provided ammunition for the war-mongerers advocating a pre-emptive attack on Iran. Prominent
commentators such as Matthew Kroenig, claim that, at the very least, a nuclear-armed Iran would prompt a
'proliferation cascade' in the Middle East. If Iran acquires nuclear weapons – whatever form that scenario may take - its regional
rivals will follow suit. The argument here is seductive; it is easier to assume the worst than to hope for the best. The problem is, we find that
the counter-argument is more compelling.¶ The idea that 'proliferation begets proliferation' is not new. Dire forecasts on the
seemingly inevitable increase in the number of nuclear weapon states have been made since the dawn of the nuclear age. In 1963, for example,
US President JF Kennedy predicted that there might be up to twenty-five nuclear weapons powers within the next decade. However,
proliferation has proven to be historically rare, with the number of nuclear weapons states expanding only slightly from five in 1964 to nine in
2006 following North Korea's nuclear test.¶ The
flawed logic of 'proliferation begets proliferation' is clearly
demonstrated in North East Asia where North Korea's nuclear weapons have not provoked Japan or
South Korea, countries with advanced civil nuclear programmes, to follow suit despite a long history of regional conflict and volatile
relations. In this case, strong security alliances with the United States incorporating extended nuclear deterrence have played an important role
in dissuading these countries from going nuclear.¶ Ironically, the
Middle East itself offers further evidence that nuclear
proliferation is not inevitable. Noted for its policy of nuclear opacity (neither confirming nor denying its nuclear arsenal), Israel
acquired nuclear weapons in the late 1960s and over four decades later still remains the only nuclear power in the
region.¶ Now the threat posed by Iran to its neighbours is arguably greater given Tehran's aggressive posturing and regional ambitions.
However our research finds that those states deemed most likely to go nuclear due to their proximity to Iran and their suspected past interest
in acquiring nuclear weapons (namely Turkey, Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia), would have little to gain and much to lose by embarking down
such a route.¶ Take Saudi Arabia, for example. Iran has long been at political and ideological odds with the kingdom across the Gulf. And
at
first sight, it seems likely that Saudi Arabia would follow Iran down the nuclear path. In February, Saudi
officials were reported as claiming that Riyadh would launch a "twin-track nuclear weapons programme" in the event of a successful Iranian
nuclear test. An article published in the London Times in February [£] described a scenario whereby Saudi Arabia would attempt to purchase
warheads from abroad while also adding a military dimension to its planned civil nuclear programme at home.¶ Look
more closely,
however, and there is a much stronger case to be made against Saudi nuclearisation. Beyond the Kingdom's
primitive nuclear infrastructure – the country lacks sufficient experience and expertise in practically all areas of the nuclear fuel
cycle – Saudi Arabia's political and strategic context does not favour the acquisition of nuclear weapons.¶ From a security
perspective, the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States has held firm since the 1940s, despite a number of challenges – most
notably the participation of a number of Saudi nationals in the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The relationship barters Saudi oil for US conventional arms
and an implicit commitment to Saudi's defence.¶ In recent years, the role of Washington as the silent guarantor of Riyadh's security has grown
apace with the structural changes in the Middle East. The fall of the pro-Saudi Mubarak regime in Egypt; protests and instability in Bahrain and
Yemen; the collapse of the pro-Saudi government in Lebanon; and civil war in Syria have upended the established regional order and made
Riyadh's position less secure.¶ In this context, and given the determination of the United States to prevent nuclear proliferation in the region, a
move by Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons holds few positives for Riyadh's security calculus.¶ From and economic perspective, Saudi
Arabia's policy outlook exemplifies Etel Solingen's seminal theory on the relationship between economic liberalism and nuclear restraint.
Solingen argues that political coalitions favouring the reduction of state control over markets and increased privatisation and foreign
investment – are less likely to adopt a nuclear posture that would endanger their economic interests.¶ In this regard, Saudi Arabia's emphasis
on facilitating the growth of foreign investment is significant. Riyadh has cultivated extensive trade relations with most international powers,
keen to attract foreign investment as a means of reducing over-reliance on oil and gas, increasing employment opportunities for the local
population (population growth of almost two percent equates to a need for some 200,000 new jobs per year), and reinvigorating the Saudi
private sector.¶ The acquisition of nuclear weapons would have far-reaching consequences, stalling progress and bringing progressive economic
isolation, thus drastically changing the nature of the kingdom's international trade relations. Saudi's interests are best served by nuclear
restraint.¶ In an article published in the latest issue of The International Spectator, we argue that there are strong arguments for nuclear
restraint in the cases of other regional players as well. From security guarantees and the provision of advanced conventional weapons - in
December 2011, following the United States agreed a $1.7 billion deal to upgrade Saudi Arabia's Patriot missile defence system, for example –
to facilitating increased integration into the international economy, there are a range of measures that can persuade a state to forgo nuclear
weapons.¶ Ultimately, many
see a domino-effect as the logical response to Iranian nuclearisation. But when the
is substantial evidence to
suggest that regional proliferation is not a very likely outcome at all.
stakes are this high, it is important to look at all sides of the debate. From another perspective, there
( ) US won’t respond with nuclear lash-out.
Washington Post ‘7
(Thursday, August 2, 2007 – “Obama says no nuclear weapons to fight terror” – http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/08/02/AR2007080201375_pf.html)
Presidential hopeful Barack Obama
said Thursday he would not use nuclear weapons "in any circumstance" to fight
terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan, drawing criticism from Hillary Rodham Clinton and other Democratic rivals." I think it would be a
profound mistake for us to use nuclear weapons in any circumstance," Obama said, with a pause, "involving civilians."
Then he quickly added, "Let me scratch that. There's been no discussion of nuclear weapons. That's not on the table."
Extensions – Iran not have sinister activities in Venezuela
( ) Iran doesn’t have sinister activities in Venezuela
Goodman ‘13
Internally citing a report from the US State Department – Joshua Goodman is a Rio de Janeiro-based reporter covering Latin America for
Bloomberg News – “Iran’s Influence Waning in Latin America, State Department Says” – Bloomberg News – June 26th –
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-06-26/iran-s-influence-waning-in-latin-america-state-department-says
The U.S. stepped up its monitoring of Iran’s presence in Latin America in a bid to isolate the country over its nuclear
program and after President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad forged closer ties with anti-American allies of the late Venezuelan
President Hugo Chavez. While Iran’s outreach bears watching, claims about more sinister activities are
unproven, said Christopher Sabatini, senior policy director at the Council of the Americas.¶ “It’s a
shame that in such a dynamic hemisphere in which we have so many diplomatic initiatives that for some -- especially Congress -attention to the region has boiled down to mostly spurious charges about Iranian infiltration,” Sabatini
said via e-mail.¶ Ahmadinejad made repeated trips to Latin America after taking office in 2005, most recently to Caracas to attend Chavez’s
funeral in March and the inauguration of his successor, Nicolas Maduro, a month later.
( ) Iran’s activities in Venezuela aren’t profitable or dangerous.
Goodman ‘13
Internally citing a report from the US State Department – Joshua Goodman is a Rio de Janeiro-based reporter covering Latin America for
Bloomberg News – “Iran’s Influence Waning in Latin America, State Department Says” – Bloomberg News – June 26th –
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-06-26/iran-s-influence-waning-in-latin-america-state-department-says
Under Ahmadinejad’s watch, Iran added embassies in Latin America and more than doubled trade with Brazil, the
region’s biggest economy. With Chavez, Ahmadinejad signed more than 100 accords to support everything
from a campaign to build homes in Venezuela to a joint venture to manufacture bicycles, which Chavez jokingly referred to as “atomic” twowheelers.¶ The
two countries also established in Caracas the Banco Internacional de Desarrollo, which
accused by the U.S. of being a vehicle for the Ahmadinejad
government’s funding of the Middle Eastern terrorist group Hezbollah.¶ Yet with Iran’s economy crippled by
sanctions, many of the projects haven’t gotten off the ground. For example, pledges from 2007 and 2008 to help build
together with its main Iranian shareholder, Bank Saderat, is
a $350 million deep-water port off Nicaragua’s Atlantic coast and an oil refinery in Ecuador have yet to materialize. Nor has it built what former
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warned would be a “huge” embassy in Managua.¶ That hasn’t prevented the Obama administration from
trying to curb Iran’s influence. In 2011, it imposed sanctions on state-owned oil company Petroleos de Venezuela SA for defying sanctions on
Iran. It also implicated an Iranian man working out of Mexico in a plot to kill Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to Washington.
( ) Iran’s influence in Latin America decreasing and not supporting terror.
Goodman ‘13
Internally citing a report from the US State Department – Joshua Goodman is a Rio de Janeiro-based reporter covering Latin America for
Bloomberg News – “Iran’s Influence Waning in Latin America, State Department Says” – Bloomberg News – June 26th –
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-06-26/iran-s-influence-waning-in-latin-america-state-department-says
Iran isn’t actively supporting terrorist cells in Latin America and its influence is waning in the region
after almost a decade of promises to increase investment, according to a State Department report.¶ While Iran’s interest in Latin America is a
“concern,” sanctions
have undermined efforts by the Islamic republic to expand its economic and political
toehold in the region, according to the unclassified summary of yesterday’s report.¶ “As a result of diplomatic outreach,
strengthening of allies’ capacity, international nonproliferation efforts, a strong sanctions policy, and Iran’s
poor management of its foreign relations, Iranian influence in Latin America and the Caribbean is waning,”
according to the report.
Extension – Nuclear Iran won’t cause War or Domino
( ) Iran Prolif not dangerous – wouldn’t cause instability or domino effect.
Keck ‘12
(Zachary Keck is deputy editor of e-International Relations and an editorial assistant at The Diplomat. His commentary has appeared at Foreign
Affairs, Foreign Policy, World Politics Review and Small Wars Journal – “False Prophets of Nuclear Proliferation” – National Interest – April 5th –
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/false-prophets-nuclear-proliferation-6725)
Even as other issues surrounding Iran’s nuclear program are debated, there
is a wide-ranging consensus in the West that an
Iranian bomb would precipitate a regional nuclear-arms race, if not a global one. Senators Lindsay Graham (R-SC),
Robert Casey (D-PA) and Joseph Lieberman (I-CT) said as much in the pages of the Wall Street Journal in March. Similarly, British foreign
secretary William Hague worries that if Iran acquires a nuclear weapon, “the most serious round of nuclear proliferation” to date would
commence. And recently in the New York Times, Ari Shavit of Haaretz stated matter-of-factly that “an Iranian bomb will bring about universal
there is no evidence to support these apocalyptic prophecies .
history nor contemporary circumstances indicate that
an Iranian atomic weapon would be a nuclear catalyst.¶ Historical Precedents¶ To begin with, fears of an impending
nuclear proliferation.”¶ Fortunately for mankind’s sake,
Although some precautionary actions might be prudent, neither
nuclear tipping point have been a regular feature of the nuclear age. The CIA is a case in point. Whereas in 1957 the agency predicted ten
countries could go nuclear within a decade, by 1975 it concluded that “logically” nuclear proliferation would only subside when “all political
actors, state and non-state, are equipped with nuclear armaments.” A quarter century and one nuclear power later (both South Africa and
Pakistan acquired a nuclear-weapons capability during this time, but South Africa dismantled all its nuclear weapons by 1991), CIA director
George Tenet announced in 2003 that we had entered “a new world of proliferation” and warned “the ‘domino theory’ of the twenty-first
century may well be nuclear.Ӧ The 1960s were equally remarkable. As a presidential candidate in 1960, for example, John F. Kennedy foresaw
“ten, fifteen, or twenty nations” acquiring a nuclear capability by the 1964 election. The following year, the Kennedy administration was so
certain a Chinese nuclear test would trigger a global wave of nuclear proliferation that it considered simply giving Beijing’s neighbors “defensive
nuclear weapons.” Although not a single additional nuclear power emerged by 1963, President Kennedy remained “haunted by the feeling”
that there would be fifteen or twenty of them by 1975 and possibly twenty-five by the end of that decade.¶ And yet nearly half a century after
the Cuban missile crisis there are only nine nuclear-weapon states, five more than when Kennedy was elected and two of which already had
advanced nuclear weapon programs during his presidency. During the same time interval, four states have voluntarily given up their nuclear
arsenals and an estimated forty nations have not built them despite possessing the technical capability to do so. ¶ Still, just because nuclear
forbearance has been the norm thus far doesn’t necessarily mean this will continue into the future. In fact, according to Shavit, an Iranian bomb
would “force Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt to acquire their own.” Similarly, President Barack Obama is “almost certain” that if Iran gets
nuclear weapons, its neighbors will be “compelled” to do the same.¶ Once again, there’s not much evidence to support these assertions.
Although a few countries have built nuclear weapons because a rival acquired them, these are the
exceptions to the general rule. Of the quantitative studies done on reactive proliferation, none have
found a nuclear-armed rival makes a state more likely to even initiate a nuclear-weapons program,
much less succeed. Furthermore, as the political scientist Jacques Hymans documents in a forthcoming book, despite the diffusion of
technology, nuclear aspirants have become increasingly inefficient and unsuccessful over time.¶ It’s therefore not surprising that in-depth case
studies of Turkey’s, Egypt’s and Saudi Arabia's nuclear prospects have found no cause for concern. Turkey is the most capable of building
nuclear weapons but already has a nuclear deterrent in the form of an estimated ninety nuclear warheads hosted on its territory for the United
States. This is far more than what it is capable of producing indigenously. Additionally, it’s hard to square Turkey’s supposed nuclear ambitions
with the recent removal of its entire stockpile of highly enriched uranium.¶ Egypt is far less capable of building a bomb than Turkey. Indeed, it
already had a dysfunctional nuclear program during the 1960s that was abandoned despite Israel, its archenemy at the time, acquiring a
nuclear capability. Even before the onset of the Arab Spring, proliferation analyst Jim Walsh argued it was “not likely that Egypt will seek, let
alone acquire, nuclear weapons.” In the aftermath of Mubarak’s overthrow, any government in Cairo will be preoccupied with improving the lot
of its people, lest it too wind up on trial. Achieving economic growth will require sustained access to foreign capital, markets and financial
assistance, none of which would be forthcoming if Cairo initiated a nuclear-weapons program.¶ Given its long-standing rivalry with Tehran,
Saudi Arabia is certainly the most alarmed by the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran. Moreover, Saudi Prince Turki al-Faisal, former head of
intelligence and ambassador to the United States and the United Kingdom, has repeatedly warned that if Iran is allowed to get nuclear
weapons, the kingdom may well do the same. Of course, this might be what a nation would say if it wanted Washington to “cut off the head of
the snake” in Tehran.¶ In fact, as Nuclear Threat Initiative concludes, “no convincing evidence exists . . . that Saudi Arabia is attempting to
develop, or has the motivation to develop, a nuclear weapons program.” Similarly, in his comprehensive study that included fieldwork inside
the kingdom, Ibrahim Al-Marashi found “little evidence . . . that Saudi Arabia would seek to engage directly in a regional nuclear arms race.”¶ If
Saudi Arabia did pursue nuclear weapons, however, it would be almost certain to fail. Even those most concerned about a Saudi bomb don’t
claim it can build one itself. Rather, they contend Riyadh will buy a ready-made nuclear deterrent from Pakistan. Pakistan’s willingness to take
this unprecedented action is based on pure speculation, past Saudi aid to Pakistan and a host of unsubstantiated claims, most notably those
made by Mohammed al-Khilewi, a Saudi diplomat at the UN who defected in 1994. In seeking to gain asylum into the United States, al-Khilewi
told U.S. authorities that in exchange for financial aid, Pakistan had agreed to provide Riyadh with a nuclear deterrent should the need ever
arise.¶ Besides al-Khilewi’s obvious motives for fabricating this story, it’s doubtful Islamabad would uphold its end of the alleged bargain. After
all, in the wake of 9/11 Washington gave Islamabad $22 billion to fight terrorism and later found Osama bin Laden living amongst Pakistan’s
military cadets. Furthermore, Pakistani leaders are exceedingly paranoid their nuclear arsenal would not withstand an Indian or U.S. first strike.
It’s therefore difficult to imagine them willingly parting with any nuclear warheads.¶ Even if Islamabad did have some to spare, Riyadh would be
an unlikely recipient. Given the world’s dependence on Saudi crude, Pakistan would be the target of exceptionally harsh and unrelenting
international condemnation, including from its “all-weather friend” China, which has recently been getting 20 percent of its oil supplies from
Riyadh. Iran would also be outraged and almost certain to respond by aligning itself squarely with India. Pakistani leaders have gone to great
lengths to avoid this outcome, and they wouldn’t suddenly invite it just to keep a promise their predecessors might have made.¶ If Iran
does acquire nuclear weapons, there’s no reason to think a regional nuclear-arms race would follow.
Washington and its allies have avoided this outcome in the past, and nothing suggests this time would
be different.
No impact to Iranian proliferation — multiple warrants — their evidence reflects a
fundamental misunderstanding of IR
Waltz 12 — Senior Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies (Kenneth N.
Waltz, Council on Foreign Relations, July/August 2012, “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb”,
http://sistemas.mre.gov.br/kitweb/datafiles/IRBr/ptbr/file/CAD/LXII%20CAD/Pol%C3%ADtica/Why%20Iran%20Should%20Get%20the%20Bomb.pdf,
Accessed 07-04-2013 | AK)
The past several months have witnessed a heated debate over the best way for the United States and Israel to respond to Iran's nuclear activities. As the argument has raged, the United States
has tightened its already robust sanctions regime against the Islamic Republic, and the European Union announced in January that it will begin an embargo on Iranian oil on July 1. Although the
a palpable sense of crisis still looms. It should not. Most U.S.,
policymakers warn that a nuclear-armed Iran would be the worst possible
outcome of the current standoff. In fact, it would probably be the best possible result: the one most likely to restore
stability to the Middle East. POWER BEGS TO BE BALANCED The crisis over Iran's nuclear program could end in three different ways. First, diplomacy coupled with
United States, the EU, and Iran have recently returned to the negotiating table,
European, and Israeli commentators and
serious sanctions could convince Iran to abandon its pursuit of a nuclear weapon. But this outcome is unlikely: the historical record indicates that a country bent on acquiring nuclear weapons
can rarely be dissuaded from doing so. Punishing a state through economic sanctions does not inexorably derail its nuclear program. Take North Korea, which succeeded in building its
weapons despite countless rounds of sanctions and UN Security Council resolutions. If Tehran determines that its security depends on possessing nuclear weapons, sanctions are unlikely to
change its mind. In fact, adding still more sanctions now could make Iran feel even more vulnerable, giving it still more reason to seek the protection of the ultimate deterrent. The second
possible outcome is that Iran stops short of testing a nuclear weapon but develops a breakout capability, the capacity to build and test one quite quickly. Iran would not be the first country to
acquire a sophisticated nuclear program without building an actual bomb. Japan, for instance, maintains a vast civilian nuclear infrastructure. Experts believe that it could produce a nuclear
weapon on short notice. Such a breakout capability might satisfy the domestic political needs of Iran's rulers by assuring hardliners that they can enjoy all the benefits of having a bomb (such
as greater security) without the downsides (such as international isolation and condemnation). The problem is that a breakout capability might not work as intended. The United States and its
European allies are primarily concerned with weaponization, so they might accept a scenario in which Iran stops short of a nuclear weapon. Israel, however, has made it clear that it views a
significant Iranian enrichment capacity alone as an unacceptable threat. It is possible, then, that a verifiable commitment from Iran to stop short of a weapon could appease major Western
powers but leave the Israelis unsatisfied. Israel would be less intimidated by a virtual nuclear weapon than it would be by an actual one and therefore would likely continue its risky efforts at
subverting Iran's nuclear program through sabotage and assassination -- which could lead Iran to conclude that a breakout capability is an insufficient deterrent, after all, and that only
The third possible outcome of the standoff is that Iran continues its current
course and publicly goes nuclear by testing a weapon. U.S. and Israeli officials have declared that
outcome unacceptable, arguing that a nuclear Iran is a uniquely terrifying prospect, even an existential threat. Such
language is typical of major powers, which have historically gotten riled up whenever another country
has begun to develop a nuclear weapon of its own. Yet so far, every time another country has managed to
shoulder its way into the nuclear club, the other members have always changed tack and decided to live with
it. In fact, by reducing imbalances in military power, new nuclear states generally produce more regional
weaponization can provide it with the security it seeks.
and international stability, not less . Israel's regional nuclear monopoly, which has proved remarkably durable for the past four decades, has long fueled
instability in the Middle East. In no other region of the world does a lone, unchecked nuclear state exist. It is Israel's nuclear arsenal, not Iran's desire for one, that has contributed most to the
Power
begs to be balanced
current crisis.
, after all,
. What is surprising about the Israeli case is that it has taken so long for a potential balancer to emerge. Of course, it is
easy to understand why Israel wants to remain the sole nuclear power in the region and why it is willing to use force to secure that status. In 1981, Israel bombed Iraq to prevent a challenge to
its nuclear monopoly. It did the same to Syria in 2007 and is now considering similar action against Iran. But the very acts that have allowed Israel to maintain its nuclear edge in the short term
have prolonged an imbalance that is unsustainable in the long term. Israel's proven ability to strike potential nuclear rivals with impunity has inevitably made its enemies anxious to develop
current tensions are best viewed not as the early stages of a relatively recent Iranian nuclear crisis
as the final stages of a decades-long Middle East nuclear crisis that will end only when a balance of military power
is restored. UNFOUNDED FEARS One reason the danger of a nuclear Iran has been grossly exaggerated is that the
the means to prevent Israel from doing so again. In this way, the
but rather
debate surrounding it has been distorted by misplaced worries and fundamental misunderstandings
of how states generally behave in the international system . The first prominent concern, which undergirds many others,
is that the Iranian regime is innately irrational. Despite a widespread belief to the contrary, Iranian
policy is made not by "mad mullahs" but by perfectly sane ayatollahs who want to survive just like
any other leaders. Although Iran's leaders indulge in inflammatory and hateful rhetoric, they show no
propensity for self-destruction. It would be a grave error for policymakers in the United States and Israel to assume
otherwise. Yet that is precisely what many U.S. and Israeli officials and analysts have done. Portraying Iran as irrational has allowed them to
argue that the logic of nuclear deterrence does not apply to the Islamic Republic . If Iran acquired a
nuclear weapon, they warn, it would not hesitate to use it in a first strike against Israel, even though
doing so would invite massive retaliation and risk destroying everything the Iranian regime holds dear.
Although it is impossible to be certain of Iranian intentions, it is far more likely that if Iran desires nuclear weapons, it is for the
purpose of providing for its own security, not to improve its offensive capabilities (or destroy itself). Iran may be intransigent at
the negotiating table and defiant in the face of sanctions, but it still acts to secure its own preservation. Iran's leaders did not, for
example, attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz despite issuing blustery warnings that they might do so after the EU announced its planned oil embargo in January. The Iranian regime clearly
Nevertheless, even some
observers and policymakers who accept that the Iranian regime is rational still worry that a nuclear
weapon would embolden it, providing Tehran with a shield that would allow it to act more aggressively and increase its support for terrorism. Some analysts
even fear that Iran would directly provide terrorists with nuclear arms. The problem with these
concerns is that they contradict the record of every other nuclear weapons state going back to 1945 .
History shows that when countries acquire the bomb, they feel increasingly vulnerable and become acutely
aware that their nuclear weapons make them a potential target in the eyes of major powers. This awareness
discourages nuclear states from bold and aggressive action. Maoist China, for example, became much less bellicose after acquiring nuclear
weapons in 1964, and India and Pakistan have both become more cautious since going nuclear. There is little reason to believe Iran would break
this mold. As for the risk of a handoff to terrorists, no country could transfer nuclear weapons without running a high risk
of being found out. U.S. surveillance capabilities would pose a serious obstacle, as would the United States'
impressive and growing ability to identify the source of fissile material. Moreover, countries can never
entirely control or even predict the behavior of the terrorist groups they sponsor. Once a country such as Iran
acquires a nuclear capability, it will have every reason to maintain full control over its arsenal. After all, building a bomb is
costly and dangerous. It would make little sense to transfer the product of that investment to parties
that cannot be trusted or managed. Another oft-touted worry is that if Iran obtains the bomb, other
states in the region will follow suit, leading to a nuclear arms race in the Middle East . But the nuclear
age is now almost 70 years old, and so far, fears of proliferation have proved to be unfounded. Properly
defined, the term "proliferation" means a rapid and uncontrolled spread. Nothing like that has occurred; in fact, since 1970, there has been a marked
slowdown in the emergence of nuclear states. There is no reason to expect that this pattern will
concluded that it did not want to provoke what would surely have been a swift and devastating American response to such a move.
change now . Should Iran become the second Middle Eastern nuclear power since 1945, it would hardly
signal the start of a landslide. When Israel acquired the bomb in the 1960s, it was at war with many of its neighbors. Its nuclear arms were a much bigger threat to the
Arab world than Iran's program is today. If an atomic Israel did not trigger an arms race then, there is no reason a nuclear
Iran should now. REST ASSURED In 1991, the historical rivals India and Pakistan signed a treaty agreeing not to target each other's nuclear facilities. They realized that far more
worrisome than their adversary's nuclear deterrent was the instability produced by challenges to it. Since then, even in the face of high tensions and risky provocations, the two countries have
If Iran goes nuclear, Israel and Iran will deter each other, as
nuclear powers always have. There has never been a full-scale war between two nuclear-armed states.
Once Iran crosses the nuclear threshold, deterrence will apply, even if the Iranian arsenal is relatively small. No other
country in the region will have an incentive to acquire its own nuclear capability , and the current crisis will finally
kept the peace. Israel and Iran would do well to consider this precedent.
dissipate, leading to a Middle East that is more stable than it is today. For that reason, the United States and its allies need not take such pains to prevent the Iranians from developing a
nuclear weapon. Diplomacy between Iran and the major powers should continue, because open lines of communication will make the Western countries feel better able to live with a nuclear
Iran. But the current sanctions on Iran can be dropped: they primarily harm ordinary Iranians, with little purpose. Most important, policymakers and citizens in the Arab world, Europe, Israel,
the United States should take comfort from the fact that history has shown that where nuclear
capabilities emerge, so, too, does stability. When it comes to nuclear weapons, now as ever, more may be better.
and
Extensions – US won’t respond with nuclear lash-out
( ) Obama won’t retaliate with nuclear weapons
Crowley ‘10
(Michael Crowley, Senior Editor the New Republic, “Obama and Nuclear Deterrence”, Jan 10th – http://www.tnr.com/node/72263)
The Los Angeles Times ran an important story yesterday about the
Obama administration's Nuclear Posture Review,
which evaluates U.S. policy towards the use of nuclear weapons. Apparently there's a debate inside the
administration--one that is splitting the civilians from the generals--not just about the size of our nuclear stockpile but also how we conceive of
possible first-strike and retaliatory policies. A
core issue under debate, officials said, is whether the United States should
shed its long-standing ambiguity about whether it would use nuclear weapons in certain
circumstances, in hopes that greater specificity would give foreign governments more confidence to make their own decisions on nuclear
arms. Some in the U.S. argue that the administration should assure foreign governments that it won't use nuclear weapons in reaction to a
biological, chemical or conventional attack, but only in a nuclear exchange. Others argue that the United States should promise that it would
never use nuclear weapons first, but only in response to a nuclear attack. As the story notes, some experts
don't place much weight
on how our publicly-stated doctrine emerges because they don't expect foreign nations to take it
literally. And the reality is that any decisions about using nukes will certainly be case-by-case. But I'd still like to
see some wider discussion of the underlying questions, which are among the most consequential that policymakers can consider. The
questions are particularly vexing when it comes to terrorist groups and rogue states. Would we, for
instance, actually nuke Pyongyang if it sold a weapon to terrorists who used it in America? That implied
threat seems to exist, but I actually doubt that a President Obama--or any president, for that matter--would go
through with it.
( ) Nuclear retaliation won’t happen.
Bremmer ‘4
(Ian Bremmer is the president of Eurasia Group, the leading global political risk research and consulting firm. Bremmer has a PhD in political
science from Stanford University (1994), and was the youngest-ever national fellow at the Hoover Institution. He presently teaches at Columbia
University, and has held faculty positions at the EastWest Institute and the World Policy Institute, 9-13-2004, New Statesman, “Suppose a new
9/11 hit America”)
What would happen if there were a new terrorist attack inside the United States on 11 September 2004? How
would it affect the presidential election campaign? The conventional wisdom is that Americans - their patriotic defiance aroused - would rally to
President George W Bush and make him an all but certain winner in November. But consider the differences between the context of the
original 9/11 and that of any attack which might occur this autumn. In 2001, the public reaction was one of disbelief and incomprehension.
Many Americans realised for the first time that large-scale terrorist attacks on US soil were not only conceivable; they were, perhaps,
inevitable. A majority focused for the first time on the threat from al-Qaeda, on the Taliban and on the extent to which Saudis were involved in
terrorism. This time, the public response would move much more quickly from shock to anger; debate over how America should respond
would begin immediately. Yet it
is difficult to imagine how the Bush administration could focus its response on
an external enemy. Should the US send 50,000 troops to the Afghan-Pakistani border to intensify the hunt for Osama Bin Laden and
'step up' efforts to attack the heart of al-Qaeda? Many would wonder if that wasn't what the administration pledged to do after the attacks
three years ago. The
president would face intensified criticism from those who have argued all along that Iraq was a
And what if a significant number of the terrorists responsible for the pre-election attack were again
Saudis? The Bush administration could hardly take military action against the Saudi government at a time when
crude-oil prices are already more than $45 a barrel and global supply is stretched to the limit. While the Saudi royal family might
distraction from 'the real war on terror'.
support a co-ordinated attack against terrorist camps, real or imagined, near the Yemeni border - where recent searches for al-Qaeda have
concentrated - that would seem like a trivial, insufficient retaliation for an attack on the US mainland. Remember how the Republicans criticised
Bill Clinton's administration for ineffectually 'bouncing the rubble' in Afghanistan after the al-Qaeda attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania in the 1990s. So what kind of response might be credible? Washington's concerns about Iran are rising. The 9/11 commission report
noted evidence of co-operation between Iran and al-Qaeda operatives, if not direct Iranian advance knowledge of the 9/11 hijacking plot. Over
the past few weeks, US officials have been more explicit, too, in declaring Iran's nuclear programme 'unacceptable'. However, in the absence of
an official Iranian claim of responsibility for this hypothetical terrorist attack, the
domestic opposition to such a war and the
international outcry it would provoke would make quick action against Iran unthinkable. In short, a decisive
response from Bush could not be external. It would have to be domestic. Instead of Donald Rumsfeld, the defence
secretary, leading a war effort abroad, Tom Ridge, the homeland security secretary, and John Ashcroft, the attorney general, would pursue an
anti-terror campaign at home. Forced to use legal tools more controversial than those provided by the Patriot Act, Americans would experience
stepped-up domestic surveillance and border controls, much tighter security in public places and the detention of a large number of suspects.
Many Americans would undoubtedly support such moves. But concern for civil liberties and personal freedom would ensure that the
government would have nowhere near the public support it enjoyed for the invasion of Afghanistan.
( ) The U.S. won’t retaliate with nuclear weapons—it makes no sense
Spring ‘1
(Baker, Research Fellow at Heritage Foundation, Heritage Backgrounder 1477, Sept 20,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/MissileDefense/BG1477.cfm)
Nuclear retaliation is not appropriate for every kind of attack against America. Some opponents of missile
defense believe that the United States has an effective nuclear deterrent that, if necessary, could be used to respond to attacks on the
homeland. But no
responsible U.S. official is suggesting that the United States consider the use of nuclear
weapons in response to the horrific September 11 attacks. In most cases of attack on the United States,
the nuclear option would not be appropriate, but a defense response will almost always be appropriate. The United States
needs to be able to resort to defensive options.
A-to Nuclear Terrorism
Frontline
( ) No nuclear terrorism – tech barriers.
Chapman ‘12
(Stephen, editorial writer for Chicago Tribune, “CHAPMAN: Nuclear terrorism unlikely,” May 22, http://www.oaoa.com/articles/chapman87719-nuclear-terrorism.html)
A layperson may figure it’s only a matter of time before the unimaginable comes to pass. Harvard’s Graham Allison, in his book “Nuclear
Terrorism,” concludes, “On the current course, nuclear terrorism is inevitable.” But remember: After
Sept. 11, 2001, we all thought
more attacks were a certainty. Yet al-Qaida and its ideological kin have proved unable to mount a second
strike. Given their inability to do something simple — say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck
bomb — it’s reasonable to ask whether they have a chance at something much more ambitious. Far from
being plausible, argued Ohio State University professor John Mueller in a presentation at the University of Chicago, “the likelihood that
a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small.” The events
required to make that happen comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a
bomb or fissile material, perhaps from Russia’s inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would
have already gone missing. Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not
maintained quickly become what one expert calls “radioactive scrap metal.” If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani
bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized
use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally — for reasons even the Iranians can
grasp. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to
jeopardize their own lives. Then comes the task of building a bomb. It’s not something you can gin up with
spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced
equipment — plus people with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause.
Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. Sure,
drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time — but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion.
This, like every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of people who know
what’s going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up. That has heartening
implications. If al-Qaida embarks on the project, it has only a minuscule chance of seeing it bear fruit. Given the formidable odds, it
probably won’t bother. None of this means we should stop trying to minimize the risk by securing nuclear stockpiles, monitoring
terrorist communications and improving port screening. But it offers good reason to think that in this war, it appears, the worst
eventuality is one that will never happen.
( ) No nuclear terror – counter to the goals of terror groups.
Kapur ‘8
(S. Paul; Associate professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, The Long Shadow: Nuclear
Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia. pg. 32)
Before a terrorist group can attempt to use nuclear weapons, it must meet two basic requirements. First, the group must decide that it wishes
to engage in nuclear terrorism. Analysts and policy makers often assume that terrorist groups necessarily want to do so (Carter 2004; U.S.
Government 2002). However, it is
not clear that terrorist organizations would necessarily covet nuclear
devices. Although analysts often characterize terrorism as an irrational activity (Laqeuer I999: 4-5),
extensive empirical evidence indicates that terrorist groups in fact behave rationally, adopting strategies
designed to achieve particular ends (Crenshaw I995: 4; Pape 2003: 344). Thus whether terrorists would use nuclear weapons is contingent on
whether doing so is likely to further their goals. Under what circumstances could nuclear weapons fail to promote terrorists' goals? For
certain types of terrorist objectives, nuclear weapons could be too destructive. Large-scale
devastation could negatively influence audiences important to the terrorist groups. Terrorists often
rely on populations sympathetic to their cause for political, financial, and military support. The horrific
destruction of a nuclear explosion could alienate segments of this audience. People who otherwise
would sympathize with the terrorists may conclude that in using a nuclear device terrorists had gone
too far and were no longer deserving of support. The catastrophic effects of nuclear weapons could also damage or destroy
the very thing that the terrorist group most values. For example, if a terrorist organization were struggling with another
group for control of their common homeland, the use of nuclear weapons against the enemy group
would devastate the terrorists' own home territory. Using nuclear weapons would be extremely counterproductive for the
terrorists in this scenario.
( ) No nuclear terror – they’ll choose conventional weapons.
Mueller ‘8
John Mueller, political science professor at Ohio State University, “The Atomic Terrorist: Assessing the Likelihood” Jan. 1
http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF
Meanwhile, although
there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all (thus far, at least)
have relied on conventional destructive methods--there hasn't even been the occasional gas bomb. In effect the terrorists
seem to be heeding the advice found in a memo on an al-Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: "Make use of that which is available...rather
than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach" (Whitlock 2007). That is: Keep it simple, stupid. In
fact, it
seems to be a general historical regularity that terrorists tend to prefer weapons that they know
and understand, not new, exotic ones (Rapoport 1999, 51; Gilmore 1999, 37; Schneier 2003, 236). Indeed, the truly notable
innovation for terrorists over the last few decades has not been in qualitative improvements in
ordnance at all, but rather in a more effective method for delivering it: the suicide bomber (Pape 2005, Bloom
2005).
( ) US won’t use nuclear retaliation against non-state nuclear terror.
Washington Post ‘7
(Thursday, August 2, 2007 – “Obama says no nuclear weapons to fight terror” – http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/08/02/AR2007080201375_pf.html)
Presidential hopeful Barack Obama
said Thursday he would not use nuclear weapons "in any circumstance" to fight
terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan, drawing criticism from Hillary Rodham Clinton and other Democratic rivals."I think it would be a
profound mistake for us to use nuclear weapons in any circumstance," Obama said, with a pause, "involving civilians."
Then he quickly added, "Let me scratch that. There's been no discussion of nuclear weapons. That's not on the table."
( ) No miscalc impact – US-Russian safety systems check conflict.
Morrison ‘7
(James Morrison, formerly served as an assistant foreign editor for the Washington Times. Mr. Morrison returned to the Foreign Desk in 1993
to launch the Embassy Row column, a diplomatic news column primarily focusing on foreign ambassadors in the United States and U.S.
ambassadors abroad. The column is the only one of its kind in U.S. journalism. The Washington Times, September 25, 2007, Sentinels on Guard,
lexis)
Despite growing foreign-policy disputes, Moscow and Washington have prevented an accidental nuclear
disaster with extensive communication links through Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRCs), Russian
Ambassador Yuri Ushakov said in a review of 20 years of the program established under President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. "The NRRCs
have proved their efficiency as an instrument of transparency and confidence-building," he said in a speech last
week at the State Department. "Moreover, they
have become a reliable mechanism designed to diminish and eliminate
the very potential threat of an accidental nuclear disaster."
Extensions – Too many tech barriers
( ) No Nuclear terror – too many tech bariers
Schwartz & Falk ‘3
(Yaron Schwartz, US office director of the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, and Ophir Falk, Vice President of Advanced
Security Integration Ltd., 2003”Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Terrorism” 5-13-2003
http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=487)
For a terrorist group to obtain a nuclear weapon, two principal channels exist: build a device from scratch or somehow
procure or steal a ready-made one or its key components. Neither of these is likely. Of all the possibilities, constructing a bomb from
scratch, without state assistance, is the most unlikely. “So remote,” in the words of a senior nuclear
scientist at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, “ that it can be essentially ruled out.” The chief obstacle lies not only in
producing the nuclear fuel—either bomb-grade uranium or plutonium—but also the requirements for testing and securing safe havens for the
terrorists.[16] Unlike uranium, a much smaller quantity of plutonium is required to form a critical mass. Yet to make enough of it for a workable
bomb, a reactor is needed. Could terrorists buy one? Where would they build it? Could such a structure go undetected by satellites and other
intelligence tools? That is all very implausible indeed. If making nuclear-bomb fuel is out of the question, why not just steal it, or buy it on the
black market? Consider plutonium: if
terrorists did manage to procure some weapon-grade plutonium, would
their problems be over? Far from it: plutonium works only in an “implosion”-type bomb, which is
about ten times more difficult to build than the more simple uranium bomb used at Hiroshima. Among a
litany of specialized requirements is an experienced designer, a number of other specialists and a testing program. Hence, the terrorist’s
chances of getting an implosion bomb to work are very low. An alternative to stealing plutonium is bomb-grade uranium. The
problem
with buying bomb-grade uranium is that one would need a great deal of it—around 50kg for a guntype bomb—and nothing near that amount has turned up in the black market.[17] Even when
considering a country like Pakistan, the only possibility for terrorists to lay their hands on that
country’s uranium would be if its government fell under the control of sympathizers. Given that
Pakistan’s army is by far the most effective and stable organization in the country, there is not much
chance of that happening. Russia, again, is the terrorists’ best bet and therefore a potential target. It has tons of bomb-grade
uranium left over from the cold war and, in addition to bombs, has used this material to fuel nuclear submarines and research reactors. With
a reported history of smuggling attempts, there are definite prospects in Russia. If terrorists could
strike the main deposit and get enough uranium for a bomb, they would be on their way. But it would
still be a long journey: designing and building the bomb is anything but a trivial undertaking, as is
recruiting the suitably skilled technician/s for the task. The main risk for terrorists is getting caught. Finding an
isolated location for minimal risk of detection also would not be easy. Stealing or buying a complete
bomb would circumvent the aforementioned obstacles. But this option presents other pitfalls which
are even greater: all countries, including Russia and Pakistan (with US assistance), make ever greater efforts
to safeguard their warheads and materials, and even rogue states—if they should get the bomb (as North Korea appears to
staunchly pursue)—would be highly likely to do the same. Countries employ security measures specifically
designed to prevent theft. Warheads are typically stored in highly restricted bunkers. Terrorists would
have a very hard time trying to take over one of these and even if successful, it would be much harder
to leave with the contents in hand.[18]
( ) Nuclear terror risk exaggerated – tech barriers block the process.
Mueller ‘10
John Mueller is Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University and the author of "The Remnants of War. Foreign Policy –
JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010 – http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/04/think_again_nuclear_weapons?page=0,2
"Fabricating a Bomb Is 'Child's Play.'" Hardly. An editorialist in Nature, the esteemed scientific journal, did apply that
characterization to the manufacture of uranium bombs, as opposed to plutonium bombs, last January, but even that seems an absurd
exaggeration. Younger,
the former Los Alamos research director, has expressed his amazement at how
"self-declared 'nuclear weapons experts,' many of whom have never seen a real nuclear weapon,"
continue to "hold forth on how easy it is to make a functioning nuclear explosive." Uranium is
"exceptionally difficult to machine," he points out, and "plutonium is one of the most complex metals
ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed."
Special technology is required, and even the simplest weapons require precise tolerances.
Information on the general idea for building a bomb is available online, but none of it, Younger says, is
detailed enough to "enable the confident assembly of a real nuclear explosive." A failure to
appreciate the costs and difficulties of a nuclear program has led to massive overestimations of the
ability to fabricate nuclear weapons. As the 2005 Silberman-Robb commission, set up to investigate the intelligence failures that
led to the Iraq war, pointed out, it is "a fundamental analytical error" to equate "procurement activity with
weapons system capability." That is, "simply because a state can buy the parts does not mean it can put
them together and make them work." For example, after three decades of labor and well over $100
million in expenditures, Libya was unable to make any progress whatsoever toward an atomic bomb.
Indeed, much of the country's nuclear material, surrendered after it abandoned its program, was still
in the original boxes.
( ) non-State actors can’t pull it off.
Mueller ‘8
(John, political science professor at Ohio State University, “The Atomic Terrorist: Assessing the Likelihood” Jan. 1
http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF)
More than a decade ago Allison boldly insisted that it would be "easy" for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile
material (Allison et al. 1996, 12).13 Atomic scientists, perhaps laboring under the concern, in Langewiesche's words, that "a declaration of
safety can at any time be proved spectacularly wrong" (2007, 49), have been comparatively restrained in cataloguing the difficulties terrorists
would face in constructing a bomb. But physicists Wirz and Egger have published a paper that does so, and it concludes that the
task
"could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group" (2005, 501). They point out that precise blueprints are
required, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint they "would most
certainly be forced to redesign" (2005, 499-500). The process could take months or even a year or more (Pluta and Zimmerman
2006, 62), and in distinct contrast with Allison, they stress that the work, far from being "easy," is difficult, dangerous, and
extremely exacting, and that the technical requirements "in several fields verge on the unfeasible."
They conclude that "it takes much more than knowledge of the workings of nuclear weapons and access to
fissile material to successfully manufacture a usable weapon" (2005, 501-2).
Extensions – Will use Conventional Weapons
( ) Terrorist will use Conventional Weapons instead.
Hashmi ‘12
(Muhammad, author of “Nuclear Terrorism in Pakistan: Myth of Reality,” and expert in defense and strategic studies, “Difficulties For Terrorists
To Fabricate Nuclear RDD/IND Weapons – Analysis,” Jan 30, http://www.eurasiareview.com/30012012-difficulties-for-terrorists-to-fabricatenuclear-rddind-weapons-analysis/)
Many believe that these threats of nuclear terrorism are inflated and have been overstated because
technical hurdles still prevent terrorists from acquiring or building a nuclear device. Brain McNair argues that
the threats of nuclear terrorism have been exaggerated by the world. As the matter stands today, the possibility of nuclear terrorism remains
more a fantasy than fact. Furthermore, Shireen Mazari argues that Nuclear
weapons would not be a weapon of choice for
terrorists. Instead, she claims that “terrorists already have access to enough destructive capabilities with in
conventional means, so their need for nuclear weapons is simply not there.” Analysts have endorsed
the assessment that the threat of nuclear action by terrorists appears to be exaggerated. Similarly, religious
cults and left-wing terrorists with their beliefs of certain prohibitions against mass murder are less likely by
many estimates to use WMDs in a terrorist activity, even though there is not any guarantee that terrorists will use WMDs.
It has also been witnessed that no terrorist group is known to have developed or deployed a nuclear explosive device, and the severity of the
threat of nuclear terrorism remains disputed amongst international scholars. So it becomes too early to conclude that how grave the threats of
nuclear terrorism are. James kitfield concludes in an interview from security expert that: Seven years after the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks, experts and presidential candidates continue to put nuclear terrorism atop their lists of the gravest threats to the United States. Yet
Brian Michael Jenkins, a longtime terrorism expert with the Rand Corp., says that the
threat lies more in the realms of
Hollywood dramas and terrorist dreams than in reality. There has never been an act of nuclear
terrorism, he notes, yet the threat is so potentially catastrophic that it incites fear — and that fear fulfills a terrorist’s primary goal. In
nutshell, we can say that it takes much more than knowledge of the workings of nuclear weapons and
access to fissile material to successfully manufacture a usable weapon. Current safety and security
systems help ensure that the successful use of a stolen weapon would be very unlikely. Meaning, it remains,
thankfully, an incredibly challenging task for terrorists to practice their idea in a successful way to meet their objectives.
Extensions – No Nuclear Retaliation
( ) Obama won’t retaliate with nuclear weapons
Crowley ‘10
(Michael Crowley, Senior Editor the New Republic, “Obama and Nuclear Deterrence”, Jan 10th – http://www.tnr.com/node/72263)
The Los Angeles Times ran an important story yesterday about the
Obama administration's Nuclear Posture Review,
which evaluates U.S. policy towards the use of nuclear weapons. Apparently there's a debate inside the
administration--one that is splitting the civilians from the generals--not just about the size of our nuclear stockpile but also how we conceive of
possible first-strike and retaliatory policies. A
core issue under debate, officials said, is whether the United States should
shed its long-standing ambiguity about whether it would use nuclear weapons in certain
circumstances, in hopes that greater specificity would give foreign governments more confidence to make their own decisions on nuclear
arms. Some in the U.S. argue that the administration should assure foreign governments that it won't use nuclear weapons in reaction to a
biological, chemical or conventional attack, but only in a nuclear exchange. Others argue that the United States should promise that it would
never use nuclear weapons first, but only in response to a nuclear attack. As the story notes, some experts
don't place much weight
on how our publicly-stated doctrine emerges because they don't expect foreign nations to take it
literally. And the reality is that any decisions about using nukes will certainly be case-by-case. But I'd still like to
see some wider discussion of the underlying questions, which are among the most consequential that policymakers can consider. The
questions are particularly vexing when it comes to terrorist groups and rogue states. Would we, for
instance, actually nuke Pyongyang if it sold a weapon to terrorists who used it in America? That implied
threat seems to exist, but I actually doubt that a President Obama--or any president, for that matter--would go
through with it.
( ) Nuclear retaliation won’t happen.
Bremmer ‘4
(Ian Bremmer is the president of Eurasia Group, the leading global political risk research and consulting firm. Bremmer has a PhD in political
science from Stanford University (1994), and was the youngest-ever national fellow at the Hoover Institution. He presently teaches at Columbia
University, and has held faculty positions at the EastWest Institute and the World Policy Institute, 9-13-2004, New Statesman, “Suppose a new
9/11 hit America”)
What would happen if there were a new terrorist attack inside the United States on 11 September 2004? How
would it affect the presidential election campaign? The conventional wisdom is that Americans - their patriotic defiance aroused - would rally to
President George W Bush and make him an all but certain winner in November. But consider the differences between the context of the
original 9/11 and that of any attack which might occur this autumn. In 2001, the public reaction was one of disbelief and incomprehension.
Many Americans realised for the first time that large-scale terrorist attacks on US soil were not only conceivable; they were, perhaps,
inevitable. A majority focused for the first time on the threat from al-Qaeda, on the Taliban and on the extent to which Saudis were involved in
terrorism. This time, the public response would move much more quickly from shock to anger; debate over how America should respond
would begin immediately. Yet it
is difficult to imagine how the Bush administration could focus its response on
an external enemy. Should the US send 50,000 troops to the Afghan-Pakistani border to intensify the hunt for Osama Bin Laden and
'step up' efforts to attack the heart of al-Qaeda? Many would wonder if that wasn't what the administration pledged to do after the attacks
three years ago. The
president would face intensified criticism from those who have argued all along that Iraq was a
And what if a significant number of the terrorists responsible for the pre-election attack were again
Saudis? The Bush administration could hardly take military action against the Saudi government at a time when
crude-oil prices are already more than $45 a barrel and global supply is stretched to the limit. While the Saudi royal family might
distraction from 'the real war on terror'.
support a co-ordinated attack against terrorist camps, real or imagined, near the Yemeni border - where recent searches for al-Qaeda have
concentrated - that would seem like a trivial, insufficient retaliation for an attack on the US mainland. Remember how the Republicans criticised
Bill Clinton's administration for ineffectually 'bouncing the rubble' in Afghanistan after the al-Qaeda attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania in the 1990s. So what kind of response might be credible? Washington's concerns about Iran are rising. The 9/11 commission report
noted evidence of co-operation between Iran and al-Qaeda operatives, if not direct Iranian advance knowledge of the 9/11 hijacking plot. Over
the past few weeks, US officials have been more explicit, too, in declaring Iran's nuclear programme 'unacceptable'. However, in the absence of
an official Iranian claim of responsibility for this hypothetical terrorist attack, the
domestic opposition to such a war and the
international outcry it would provoke would make quick action against Iran unthinkable. In short, a decisive
response from Bush could not be external. It would have to be domestic. Instead of Donald Rumsfeld, the defence
secretary, leading a war effort abroad, Tom Ridge, the homeland security secretary, and John Ashcroft, the attorney general, would pursue an
anti-terror campaign at home. Forced to use legal tools more controversial than those provided by the Patriot Act, Americans would experience
stepped-up domestic surveillance and border controls, much tighter security in public places and the detention of a large number of suspects.
Many Americans would undoubtedly support such moves. But concern for civil liberties and personal freedom would ensure that the
government would have nowhere near the public support it enjoyed for the invasion of Afghanistan.
( ) The U.S. won’t retaliate with nuclear weapons—it makes no sense
Spring ‘1
(Baker, Research Fellow at Heritage Foundation, Heritage Backgrounder 1477, Sept 20,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/MissileDefense/BG1477.cfm)
Nuclear retaliation is not appropriate for every kind of attack against America. Some opponents of missile
defense believe that the United States has an effective nuclear deterrent that, if necessary, could be used to respond to attacks on the
homeland. But no
responsible U.S. official is suggesting that the United States consider the use of nuclear
weapons in response to the horrific September 11 attacks. In most cases of attack on the United States,
the nuclear option would not be appropriate, but a defense response will almost always be appropriate. The United States
needs to be able to resort to defensive options.
Advantage Two Answers
Frontline
( ) Econ resilient
E.I.U. ‘11
(Economist Intelligence Unit – Global Forecasting Service, 11/16/’11
(http://gfs.eiu.com/Article.aspx?articleType=gef&articleId=668596451&secID=7)
The US economy, by any standard, remains weak, and consumer and business sentiment are close to 2009 lows. That said, the
economy has been surprisingly resilient in the face of so many shocks. US real GDP expanded by a relatively
robust 2.5% in the third quarter of 2011, twice the rate of the previous quarter. Consumer spending rose by 2.4%, which is
impressive given that real incomes dropped during the quarter (the savings rate fell, which helps to explain the anomaly.)
Historically, US consumers have been willing to spend even in difficult times. Before the 2008-09 slump,
personal spending rose in every quarter between 1992 and 2007. That resilience is again in evidence: retail sales in September
were at a seven-month high, and sales at chain stores have been strong. Business investment has been even more
buoyant: it expanded in the third quarter by an impressive 16.3% at an annual rate, and spending by companies in September on
conventional capital goods (that is, excluding defence and aircraft) grew by the most since March. This has been
made possible, in part, by strong corporate profits. According to data compiled by Bloomberg, earnings for US companies in
the S&P 500 rose by 24% year on year in the third quarter. All of this has occurred despite a debilitating fiscal debate in
Washington, a sovereign debt downgrade by a major ratings agency and exceptional volatility in capital
markets. This reinforces our view that the US economy, although weak, is not in danger of falling into a recession
(absent a shock from the euro zone). US growth will, however, continue to be held back by a weak labour market—the unemployment rate has
been at or above 9% for 28 of the last 30 months—and by a moribund housing market.
( ) No diversionary theory – it’ll be small scale if it happens
Harrison ‘11
(Mark, Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham, Hoover
Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University, “Capitalism at War” Oct 19
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/academic/harrison/papers/capitalism.pdf)
Diversionary wars In
the concept of diversionary wars, political leaders seek and exploit conflict with external
adversaries in order to rally domestic support. The idea is well established in the literature, perhaps because the theoretical case is quite
intuitive, and narrative support is not hard to find. In fact, it may be too easy; as Jack Levy (1989) pointed out, few wars have not been attributed to political leaders’
desire to improve domestic standing. The
idea of diversionary wars is directly relevant to a discussion of capitalism
only if it can be shown that capitalist polities are more likely to exploit foreign adventures. One reason might be
advanced from a Marxist perspective: perhaps capitalist societies, being class-divided, are more likely to give rise to wars
intended to divert the workers from the cause of socialism. A longstanding interpretation of the origins of World War I in domestic
German politics conveys exactly this message (Berghahn 1973). This view does not sit well with the equally traditional idea that
a class-divided society is less able to go to war. The official Soviet histories of World War II used to
claim that, under capitalism, divided class interests made the working people reluctant to fight for the nation.
Because of this, the workers could be motivated to take part only by “demagogy, deception, bribery, and
force” (Grechko et al., eds 1982, vol. 12, p. 38; Pospelov et al., eds 1965, vol. 6, pp. 80-82). Quantitative empirical work has lent little support to the idea (Levy
1989). Exceptions include studies of the use of force by U.S. and British postwar governments by Morgan and Bickers (1992) and Morgan and Anderson (1999). They
of force is more likely when government approval is high but the government’s
supporting coalition is suffering erosion. They also suggest that force is unlikely to be used at high intensities
under such circumstances (because likely costs are high, eroding political support) or when domestic
conflict is high (because conflict would then be polarizing rather than consolidate support). Another line of
conclude that the use
research suggests that new or incompletely established democracies are particularly vulnerable to risky adventures in nation-building (Mansfield and Snyder 2005).
One inspiration for this view was the record of the new democracies born out of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. More recently, Georgia seems to have
provided out-of-sample confirmation. Suppose
diversionary wars exist. Is capitalism somehow more internally
conflicted than other societies, and so disproportionately likely to externalize conflict? As a comparator, the case
of fascism seems straightforward. Fascism did not produce diversionary wars because, for fascists, war
was not a diversion; it was the Schwerpunkt. The more interesting case is that of communism. Communists do not
seem to have pursued diversionary wars. But the domestic legitimacy of Soviet rule visibly relied on the
image of an external enemy, and thrived on tension short of military conflict. Soviet leaders used external
tension to justify internal controls on movement, culture, and expression, and the associated apparatus of secrecy, censorship, and surveillance.
When they tolerated trends towards détente in the 1970s, they subverted their own controls. An East German Stasi
officer told his boss, repeating it later to Garton Ash (1997, p. 159): “How can you expect me to prevent [defections and revelations], when we’ve signed all these
international agreements for improved relations with the West, working conditions for journalists, freedom of movement, respect for human rights?” If Soviet
foreign policy was sometimes expansionist, it sought expansion only up to the point where the desired level of tension was assured. Bolsheviks of the 1917
generation knew well that too much too much conflict abroad encouraged defeatist and counter-revolutionary sentiments at home. Oleg Khlevniuk (1995, p. 174)
noted: “The complex relationship between war and revolution, which had almost seen the tsarist regime toppled in 1905 and which finally brought its demise in
1917, was a relationship of which Stalin was acutely aware. The lessons of history had to be learnt lest history repeat itself.” Stalin did all he could to avoid war with
Germany in 1941 (Gorodetsky 1999). Postwar Soviet leaders risked war by proxy, but avoided direct conflict with the “main adversary.” Faced with unfavourable
odds, they tended to withdraw (from Cuba) or do nothing (in Poland) or accepted them with great reluctance (in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan).
Diversionary tension must fall short of diversionary war. From this follows an acceptance that capitalism,
because of its tendency to give rise to democratic structures and political competition, has been more
open to diversionary wars than other systems. But the empirical research and analysis that underpin this
conclusion also imply that such wars would generally be small scale and short lived, and the
circumstances that give rise to them would be exceptional or transient. We should place this in the wider
context of the “democratic peace.” As Levy (1988) wrote: “Liberal or democratic states do not fight each other …
This absence of war between democracies comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in
international relations.” Since all liberal democracies have also been capitalist on any definition, it is a
finding of deep relevance.
( ) Decline doesn’t cause war
Barnett ‘ 9
(Thomas P.M Barnett, senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC, contributing editor/online columnist for Esquire, 8/25/’9 – “The New
Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis,” Aprodex, Asset Protection Index, http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--securityremains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx)
When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary
predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to
world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging
markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first
truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape.¶ None
of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the
global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates
the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity
conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last
August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the
most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost twodecade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions.¶ Looking over the various databases, then, we see
a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist
movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea,
Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global
economic trends.¶ And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and
Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up
to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises
with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere
else we find serious instability we pretty
much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command,
for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces.
Extensions – Econ resilient
( ) US econ resilient
Johnson ‘13
(Robert , CFA, director of economic analysis with Morningstar, Morningstar.com, “U.S. Economy Not So Fragile After All” – 1/19 –
http://news.morningstar.com/articlenet/article.aspx?id=581616)
No, the U.S. Economy Has Not Been Fragile After All¶ Although most economists got at least some things right about the
U.S. economy over the past two years, the one nearly universal error was the expectation that the economy was
fragile. The U.S. economy has proven to be anything but fragile.¶ I believe this to be the single biggest error that
economists have made over the last two years. During that time, the U.S. has survived the fallout from a major debt
crisis in Europe, a divisive election, temporarily going over the fiscal cliff, gasoline prices that have been on
a yo-yo, a tsunami in Japan, and Hurricane Sandy, which shut down New York and even the stock
exchanges for a couple of days. These are not signs of a fragile economy.
( ) Econ resilient – fundamentals growing
Stewart ‘13
(Hale Stewart spent 5 years as a bond broker in the late 1990s before returning to law school in the early 2000s. He is currently a tax lawyer in
Houston, Texas. He has an LLM from the Thomas Jefferson School of Law in domestic and international taxation where he graduated Magna
Cum Laude, seeking alpha, “Is The U.S. Economy Moving Into A Higher Growth Phase? Part 1 - The Positive” – Feb 5th –
http://seekingalpha.com/article/1158011-is-the-u-s-economy-moving-into-a-higher-growth-phase-part-1-the-positive?source=google_news)
All three of the above sectors -- housing,
autos and manufacturing -- are bedrock components of the economy. If all
three are doing fairly well, the worst that can happen is slow growth. There is simply too much of a
multiplier effect of the combined total for a recession to occur with the above three expanding.
However, this is before we get to the latest and upcoming fiscal follies from the people in Washington. We'll touch on that in Part 2.
( ) Recovery from 2008 proves economy resilient
Drezner ‘12
(Daniel, Professor International Politics Tufts University, October, “The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked” Council on
Foreign Relations International Institutions and Global Governance)
In looking at outcomes, the
obvious question is how well the global economy has recovered from the 2008
crisis. The current literature on economic downturns suggests two factors that impose significant barriers to a strong recovery from the Great
Recession: it was triggered by a financial crisis and it was global in scope. Whether measuring output, per capita
income, or employment, financial crashes trigger downturns that last longer and have far weaker recoveries than standard
business cycle downturns.10 Furthermore, the global nature of the crisis makes it extremely difficult for countries
to export their way out of the problem. Countries that have experienced severe banking crises since World War II have usually
done so when the global economy was largely unaffected. That was not the case for the Great Recession. The global economy has
rebounded much better than during the Great Depression. Economists Barry Eichengreen and Kevin O’Rourke have
compiled data to compare global economic performance from the start of the crises (see Figures 1 and 2).11 Two facts stand out in their
comparisons. First, the
percentage drop in global industrial output and world trade levels at the start of the
2008 financial crisis was more precipitous than the falloffs following the October 1929 stock market
crash. The drop in industrial output was greater in 2008 nine months into the crisis than it was eighty years earlier after the same amount of
time. The drop in trade flows was more than twice as large. Second, the post-2008 rebound has been far more robust. Four years after the
onset of the Great Recession, global
industrial output is 10 percent higher than when the recession began. In
years after the 1929 stock market crash, industrial output was at only two-thirds of
precrisis levels. A similar story can be told with aggregate economic growth. According to World Bank figures, global economic
output rebounded in 2010 with 2.3 percent growth, followed up in 2011 with 4.2 percent growth. The global growth rate in
contrast, four
2011 was 44 percent higher than the average of the previous decade. Even more intriguing, the growth continued to be poverty reducing.12
The World Bank’s latest figures suggest that despite the 2008 financial crisis, extreme poverty continued to decline across all the major regions
of the globe. And the developing world achieved its first Millennium Development Goal of halving the 1990 levels of extreme poverty.13 An
important reason for the quick return to positive economic growth is that cross-border
flows did not dry up after the 2008
crisis. Again, compared to the Great Depression, trade flows have rebounded extremely well.14 Four years after the 1929
stock market crash, trade flows were off by 25 percent compared to precrisis levels. Current trade flows, in contrast, are more than 5 percent
higher than in 2008. Even compared to other postwar recessions, the current period has seen robust crossborder exchange. Indeed, as a report
from CFR’s Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies concluded in May 2012, “The
growth in world trade since the
start of the [current] recovery exceeds even the best of the prior postwar experiences.”15 Other crossborder flows have also rebounded from 2008–2009 lows. Global foreign direct investment (FDI) has returned to robust levels. FDI inflows rose
by 17 percent in 2011 alone. This put annual FDI levels at $1.5 trillion, surpassing the three-year precrisis average, though still approximately 25
percent below the 2007 peak. More generally, global foreign investment assets reached $96 trillion, a 5 percent increase from precrisis highs.
Remittances from migrant workers have become an increasingly important revenue stream to the developing world—and the 2008 financial
crisis did not dampen that income stream. Cross-border remittances to developing countries quickly rebounded to precrisis levels and then rose
to an estimated all-time high of $372 billion in 2011, with growth rates in 2011 that exceeded those in 2010. Total cross-border remittances
were more than $501 billion last year, and are estimated to reach $615 billion by 2014.16 Another salient outcome is mass public attitudes
about the global economy. A
general assumption in public opinion research is that during a downturn, demand for
greater economic closure should spike, as individuals scapegoat foreigners for domestic woes . The
global nature of the 2008 crisis, combined with anxiety about the shifting distribution of power,
should have triggered a fall in support for an open global economy. Somewhat surprisingly, however, the
reverse is true. Pew’s Global Attitudes Project has surveyed a wide spectrum of countries since 2002, asking people about their opinions
on both international trade and the free market more generally.17 The results show resilient support for expanding trade
and business ties with other countries. Twenty-four countries were surveyed both in 2007 and at least one year after 2008,
including a majority of the G20 economies. Overall, eighteen of those twenty-four countries showed equal or greater support for trade in 2009
than two years earlier. By 2011, twenty of twenty-four countries showed greater or equal support for trade compared to 2007. Indeed,
between 2007 and 2012, the unweighted average support for more trade in these countries increased from 78.5 percent to 83.6 percent.
Contrary to expectation, there has been no mass public rejection of the open global economy. Indeed, public support for the open trading
system has strengthened, despite softening public support for free-market economics more generally.18 The
final outcome
addresses a dog that hasn’t barked: the effect of the Great Recession on crossborder conflict and violence.
During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to
increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.19 Whether through greater internal
repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict, there were
genuine concerns that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict. Violence in the
Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fuel impressions of surge in global
The aggregate data suggests otherwise , however. A fundamental conclusion from a recent report by the
Institute for Economics and Peace is that “the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as
it was in 2007.”20 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis —as
have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any
public disorder.
increase in violent conflict ; the secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed.21
Extensions – US not key to global econ
( ) US not key—global economies decoupling
Caryl ‘10
[Christian Caryl is a Editor at Foreign Policy and Newsweek and a Senior Fellow of the CSIS at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “Crisis?
What Crisis?” 4/5/10 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/04/05/crisis_what_crisis?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full]
We went through a terrifying moment back in the fall of 2008. The financial system in the United States was imploding. It
was impossible to predict how the effects would ripple through the rest of the world, but one outcome seemed inevitable: Developing
economies were going to take a terrible hit. There was just no way they could escape the maelstrom without seeing millions of their citizens
impoverished. Many emerging-market countries did experience sharp drops in GDP. Their capital markets tanked. Dominique Strauss-
Kahn, managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), sounded downright apocalyptic: "All this will affect
dramatically unemployment, and beyond unemployment for many countries it will be at the roots of social unrest, some threat to
democracy, and maybe for some cases it can also end in war." The Economist recently noted, "The Institute of International
Finance (IIF), a think-tank in Washington, DC, forecast that net private capital flows into poor countries in 2009 would be 72% lower than at
their peak in 2007, an unprecedented shrinkage." Virtually everyone expected to see the countries that had benefited so dramatically from
growth in the years leading up to the crisis to suffer disproportionately in its wake. An entirely rational assumption -- except it
hasn't
turned out that way at all. To be sure, there were far too many poor people in the world before the crisis,
and that still remains the case. Some 3 billion people still live on less than $2.50 a day. But the global economic crisis
hasn't added appreciably to their ranks. Just take China, India, and Indonesia, Asia's three biggest
emerging markets. Although growth in all three slowed, it never went into reverse. China's robust growth
through the crisis has been much publicized -- but Indonesia's, much less conspicuously. Those countries, as well as Brazil and
Russia, have rebounded dramatically. The Institute of International Finance -- the same people who gave that dramatically
skepticism-inducing estimate earlier -- now says that net private capital flows to developing countries could reach $672 billion this year (double
the 2009 amount). That's less than the high point of 2007, to be sure. But it
still seems remarkable in light of the dire
predictions. In short, the countries that have worked the hardest to join the global marketplace are
showing remarkable resilience. It wasn't always this way. Recall what happened back in 1997 and 1998, when the Thai
government's devaluation of its currency triggered the Asian financial crisis. Rioting across Indonesia brought down the Suharto government.
The administration of Filipino President Joseph Estrada collapsed. The turbulence echoed throughout the region and into the wider world,
culminating in the Russian government default and August 1998 ruble devaluation. Brazil and Argentina trembled. The IMF was everywhere,
dispensing advice and dictating conditions. It was the emerging markets that bore the brunt of that crisis. So
what's different this
time around? The answers differ from place to place, but there are some common denominators. Many of the BRICs (Brazil, Russia,
India, China) learned vital lessons from the trauma of the late 1990s, hence the IMF's relatively low-key
profile this time around. (The fund has been most active in Africa, where they still need the help -- unless you count Greece, of course.)
Many emerging economies entered the 2008-2009 crisis with healthy balance sheets. In most cases
governments reacted quickly and flexibly, rolling out stimulus programs or even expanding povertyreduction programs. Increasingly, the same countries that have embraced globalization and markets are
starting to build social safety nets . And there's another factor: Trade is becoming more evenly distributed
throughout the world. China is now a bigger market for Asian exporters than the United States. Some
economists are talking about "emerging market decoupling." Jonathan Anderson, an emerging-markets economist at the
Swiss bank UBS, showed in one recent report how car sales in emerging markets have actually been rising during this latest
bout of turmoil -- powerful evidence that emerging economies no longer have to sneeze when America
catches a cold . Aphitchaya Nguanbanchong, a consultant for the British-based aid organization Oxfam, has studied the crisis's effects on
Southeast Asian economies. "The research so far shows that the result of the crisis isn't as bad as we were expecting," she says. Indonesia is a
case in point: "People
in this region and at the policy level learned a lot from the past crisis." Healthy
domestic demand cushioned the shock when the crisis hit export-oriented industries; the government weighed
in immediately with hefty stimulus measures. Nguanbanchong says that she has been surprised by the extent to which families throughout the
region have kept spending money on education even as incomes have declined for some. And
that, she says, reinforces a major
lesson that emerging-market governments can take away from the crisis: "Governments should focus
more on social policy, on health, education, and services. They shouldn't be intervening so much directly in the economy itself."
This ought to be a big story. But you won't have much luck finding it in the newspapers -- perhaps because it runs so contrary to our habitual
thinking about the world economy. The U.N. Development Programme and the Asian Development Bank recently published a report that
attempts to assess what effect the crisis will have on the world's progress toward the U.N. Millennium Development Goals, benchmarks that
are supposed to be achieved by 2015. At first glance the report's predictions are daunting: It states that 21 million people in the developing
world are "at risk" of slipping into extreme poverty and warns that the goals are unlikely to be met. Many experts wonder, of course, whether
the V-shaped crisis we've witnessed so far is going to turn into a W, with another sharp downturn still to come. Some argue that the Great
Recession's real damage has yet to be felt. Yet the report also contains some interesting indications that this might not be the case. "The global
economic crisis has been widely predicted to affect international migration and remittances adversely," it notes. "But as the crisis unfolds, it is
becoming clear that the patterns of migration and remittances may be more complex than was previously imagined." In other words, these
interconnections are proving to be much more resilient than anyone might have predicted earlier. As the
report notes, receipts of remittances have so far actually increased in Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, and
Sri Lanka. Perhaps migrant workers -- those global experts in entrepreneurship and risk-taking -- know something that a lot of the rest of us
don't. So why should we care? Anirudh Krishna, a Duke University political scientist who studies poverty reduction, says that there's a moral to
the story: "Certainly cutting countries and people off from markets is no longer a sensible thing to do. Expanding
those connections, bringing in a larger part of a talent pool into the high-growth sector -- that is what would make most countries grow faster
and more individuals climb out of poverty." Echoing Nguanbanchong, he argues that governments are well-advised to concentrate on providing
their citizens with education and health care -- the great enablers in the fight for social betterment. Microfinance and income subsidy programs
can fill important gaps -- as long as they aim to empower future entrepreneurs, not create cultures of entitlement. This is not to say the outlook
is bright on every front, of course. As the Economist noted, the number of people facing hunger recently topped 1 billion, the highest since
1970. The reason for that has more to do with the 2007-2008 spike in food prices than with the financial crisis. (Remember how the price of rice
shot up?) We are still a long way from conquering poverty. There is still a huge -- and in some cases growing -- gap between the world's rich and
poor. Yet
how remarkable it would be if we could one day look back on the 2008-2009 crisis as the
beginning of a more equitable global economy.
( ) The U.S is not key – Asia fill-in and decoupling
Xinbo ‘10
(Wu, a professor and deputy director of the Center for American Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai, and a member of TWQ’s editorial
board“Understanding the Geopolitical Implications of the Global Financial Crisis” The Washington Quarterly – 33:4 pp. –
155163http://www.twq.com/10october/docs/10oct_Xinbo.pdf)
While China suffered moderately from
the crisis economically, it has gained remarkably in politico-economic terms.
For one thing, the Chinese model of development_ featured by a strong role of the state in economic development, stress on the
real rather than the virtual economy, a high savings rate, measured financial market liberalization, etc._has empowered China to
better resist the financial storm and minimize the losses associated with it. As a developing country, China’s
experience appears more applicable to the developing world. For instance, as Alex Perry of Time magazine observed,
‘‘African governments look at Western economic instability over the past two years and find a better model in Asia’s extraordinary growth.’’8 In
the post—ColdWar era, the U.S. model used to be hailed as the only way to economic prosperity. Now, the Chinese model seems to provide an
alternative. To be sure, the Chinese model is not perfect and is actually confronted with many challenges such as a widening income gap,
serious environment pollution, and rampant corruption. Yet, the record of tiding over two financial crises (the 1998—1999 Asian financial crisis
and the 2008—2009 global financial crisis) and securing three decades of a high economic growth rate testifies to its strength. Unlike
Washington, Beijing
does not like to boast of its model and impose it on others, but the increased appeal
of the Chinese experience will certainly enhance Beijing’s international status and augment its influence among developing
countries. Even before the recent crisis, there was already discussion of decoupling Asian economies from the United
States, given growing intra-Asian economic activities.9 The reality that China has already become the largest
trading partner to some major regional economies, such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, provided an additional
incentive to further East Asian regional economic cooperation. Even in Japan, where the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)
rose to power during the crisis in August 2009, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama noted that: [T]he recent financial crisis has suggested to many
people that the era of American unilateralism may come to an end. It has also made people harbor doubts about the permanence of the dollar
as the key global currency. I also feel that as a result of the failure of the Iraq war and the financial crisis, the era of US-led globalism is coming
to an end and that we are moving away from a unipolar world toward an era of multipolarity.10 Hatoyama continued that, ‘‘Current
developments show clearly that China, which has by far the world’s largest population, will become one of the world’s
leading economic nations, while also continuing to expand its military power.’’11 He pledged to strengthen relations with Asian
countries, particularly China, and work to build an East Asian Community. Behind this lies a recognition of China’s growing importance to
Japan’s economic future. South Korea also expressed enthusiasm for forging a free trade agreement with China as early as possible. Taiwan
signed the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) with mainland China in June 2009, marking a major step forward in relations
across the Taiwan Strait. The agreement, focusing on tariff concession and easier market access, will remove tariffs within two years on 539
Taiwan export items to the mainland worth $13.84 billion, as well as 267 mainland export items to Taiwan valued at $2.86 billion. The pact will
also give Taiwan firms access to 11 service sectors on the mainland including banking, accounting, insurance, and hospitals.12 The
financial crisis also prompted Beijing to boost its domestic consumption. As the great potential of its internal
market is further released, it will serve both to thicken China’s economic ties with regional partners and to strengthen its role as an East Asian
economic hub. In a nutshell,
the financial and economic turmoil underscored China’s position as the engine of
the Asian regional economy and even the global economy as well . In international politics, political and economic
relations always follow each other. AfterWorldWar II, many regional members developed close economic ties with the United States, following
tight political and security arrangements with Washington. By the same token, today and in the future, China’s
deepening economic
connections with its regional partners promise to expand its political clout in East Asia. Given China’s
growing economic size and its excellent performance during the crisis, it is no surprise that the financial turmoil served to raise China’s status in
global economic governance. The
G-20 emerged from the crisis as the premier forum for international economic
cooperation, shadowing the traditional role of the G-8 in world economy. China, as the world’s third largest economy and the largest
foreign reserve holder, ascended to center stage within the G-20. The idea of a G-2, consisting of Beijing and Washington
governing the world economy or managing international geopolitics, was tossed around among U.S. scholars and former government officials
(although not endorsed by either Beijing or Washington), reflecting
a recognition of China’s newly-accrued economic
and geopolitical weight. In April 2010, the World Bank decided to increase China’s voting rights, making it the third largest voter in the
institution. The IMF is also expected to raise China’s representation in its current round of reconstruction endeavors. All in all, the financial
crisis benefited China by quickening the pace of the global economic and financial power transition,
turning China from a peripheral member into a key player. Last but not least, the crisis gave credit to China’s currency Renminbi
(RMB) for its strength and stability. Even before the crisis, the RMB was already used in some of China’s
neighboring countries for settling accounts in border trade. The financial storm revealed the volatility of the U.S. dollar
and highlighted the strength of the Chinese yuan. Although the RMB is not yet freely convertible, some of China’s major
trading partners saw the desirability of increasing its holding as the U.S. dollar has been getting
weaker, arousing concerns that an unstable dollar would lead to increased costs and risks for traders. Since the onset of the crisis, China has
signed bilateral currency swap agreements with Argentina, Belarus, Iceland, Indonesia, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Singapore, and South Korea, with
a total amount of 803.5 billion yuan (about $118.1 billion). Some
countries also moved to take the RMB as one of its
reserve currencies. It was the crisis that caused Beijing to think seriously about the regionalization of
the RMB. To enhance that goal, the Chinese government undertook to push the RMB settlement pilots in the trade between China’s two
most important exporting regions, Guangdong and the Yangtze River Delta, with Hong Kong and Macao, and between two Chinese provinces
bordering Southeast Asia, Gaungxi and Yunnan, with the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In early 2009, Beijing
also approved Shanghai’s ambitious goal of turning itself into an international financial center by 2020, matching China’s economic influence
and the yuan’s international position. It will be a long journey for theRMBto become a major international reserve currency, but it seems that
the global financial crisis has turned out to be its starting point.
Extensions “Diversionary theory wrong”
( ) Diversionary war theory is false
Boehmer ‘7
(Charles, political science professor at the University of Texas, Politics & Policy, 35:4, “The Effects of Economic Crisis, Domestic Discord, and
State Efficacy on the Decision to Initiate Interstate Conflict”)
This article examines the contemporaneous effect of low economic growth and domestic instability on the threat of regime change and/ or
involvement in external militarized conflicts. Many studies
of diversionary conflict argue that lower rates of economic
growth should heighten the risk of international conflict. Yet we know that militarized interstate conflicts, and especially
wars, are generally rare events whereas lower rates of growth are not. Additionally, a growing body of literature shows that regime changes are
also associated with lower rates of economic growth. The question then becomes which event, militarized interstate conflict or regime change,
is the most likely to occur with domestic discord and lower rates of economic growth? Diversionary
theory claims that leaders
seek to divert attention away from domestic problems such as a bad economy or political scandals, or to garner
increased support prior to elections. Leaders then supposedly externalize discontented domestic sentiments onto other nations, sometimes as
scapegoats based on the similar in-group/out-group dynamic found in the research of Coser (1956) and Simmel (1955), where foreign countries
are blamed for domestic problems. This process is said to involve a “rally-round-the-flag” effect, where a leader can expect a short-term boost
in popularity with the threat or use of force (Blechman, Kaplan, and Hall 1978; Mueller 1973). Scholarship on diversionary conflict has focused
most often on the American case1 but recent studies have sought to identify this possible behavior in other countries.2 The Falklands War is
often a popular example of diversionary conflict (Levy and Vakili 1992). Argentina was reeling from hyperinflation and rampant unemployment
associated with the Latin American debt crisis. It is plausible that a success in the Falklands War may have helped to rally support for the
governing Galtieri regime, although Argentina lost the war and the ruling regime lost power. How many other attempts to use diversionary
tactics, if they indeed occur, can be seen to generate a similar outcome? The goal of this article is to provide an assessment of the extent to
which diversionary strategy is a threat to peace. Is
this a colorful theory kept alive by academics that has little
bearing upon real events, or is this a real problem that policy makers should be concerned with? If it is a strategy readily available to
leaders, then it is important to know what domestic factors trigger this gambit. Moreover, to know that requires an understanding of the
context in external conflict, which occurs relative to regime changes. Theories
of diversionary conflict usually emphasize
the potential benefits of diversionary tactics, although few pay equal attention to the prospective
costs associated with such behavior. It is not contentious to claim that leaders typically seek to remain in office. However, whether they
can successfully manipulate public opinion regularly during periods of domestic unpopularity through their states’
participation in foreign militarized conflicts—especially outside of the American case—is a question open for debate. Furthermore,
there appears to be a logical disconnect between diversionary theories and extant studies of domestic conflict and regime change. Lower rates
of economic growth are purported to increase the risk of both militarized interstate conflicts (and internal conflicts) as well as regime changes
(Bloomberg and Hess 2002). This implies that if
leaders do, in fact, undertake diversionary conflicts, many may still be
thrown from the seat of power—especially if the outcome is defeat to a foreign enemy. Diversionary conflict would thus
seem to be a risky gambit (Smith 1996). Scholars such as MacFie (1938) and Blainey (1988) have nevertheless questioned the validity of the
diversionary thesis. As noted by Levy (1989), this perspective is rarely formulated as a cohesive and comprehensive
theory, and there has been little or no knowledge cumulation. Later analyses do not necessarily build on past studies and the discrepancies
between inquiries are often difficult to unravel. “Studies have used a variety of research designs, different dependent
variables (uses of force, major uses of force, militarized disputes), different estimation techniques, and different data sets covering
different time periods and different states” (Bennett and Nordstrom 2000, 39). To these problems, we should add a lack of theoretical precision
and incomplete model specification. By a lack of theoretical precision, I am referring to the linkages between economic conditions and domestic
strife that remain unclear in some studies (Miller 1995; Russett 1990). Consequently, extant studies are to a degree incommensurate; they offer
a step in the right direction but do not provide robust cross-national explanations and tests of economic growth and interstate conflict. Yet a
few studies have attempted to provide deductive explanations about when and how diversionary tactics might be employed. Using a Bayesian
updating game, Richards and others (1993) theorize that while the use of force would appear to offer leaders a means to boost their popularity,
a poorly performing economy acts as a signal to a leader’s constituents about his or her competence. Hence, attempts
to use
diversion are likely to fail either because incompetent leaders will likewise fail in foreign policy or
people will recognize the gambit for what it is. Instead, these two models conclude that diversion is likely to be undertaken
particularly by risk-acceptant leaders. This stress on a heightened risk of removal from office is also apparent in the work of Bueno de Mesquita
and others (1999), and Downs and Rocke (1994), where leaders may “gamble for resurrection,” although the diversionary scenario in the
former study is only a partial extension of their theory on selectorates, winning coalitions, and leader survival. Again, how often do leaders fail
in the process or are removed from positions of power before they can even initiate diversionary tactics? A few studies focusing on leader
tenure have examined the removal of leaders following war, although almost no study in the diversionary literature has looked at the effects of
domestic problems on the relative risks of regime change, interstate conflict, or both events occurring in the same year.3
( ) Low growth makes politicians cautious—they don’t want to risk war because it
makes them vulnerable
Boehmer ‘7
(Charles, political science professor at the University of Texas, Politics & Policy, 35:4, “The Effects of Economic Crisis, Domestic Discord, and
State Efficacy on the Decision to Initiate Interstate Conflict”)
Economic Growth and Fatal MIDs The theory presented earlier predicts that lower
rates of growth suppress participation in
foreign conflicts, particularly concerning conflict initiation and escalation to combat. To sustain
combat, states need to be militarily prepared and not open up a second front when they are already
fighting, or may fear, domestic opposition. A good example would be when the various Afghani resistance fighters expelled the Soviet Union
from their territory, but the Taliban crumbled when it had to face the combined forces of the United States and Northern Alliance insurrection.
Yet the coefficient for GDP growth and MID initiations was negative but insignificant. However, considering
that there are many
reasons why states fight, the logic presented earlier should hold especially in regard to the risk of
participating in more severe conflicts. Threats to use military force may be safe to make and may be
made with both external and internal actors in mind, but in the end may remain mere cheap talk that
does not risk escalation if there is a chance to back down. Chiozza and Goemans (2004b) found that secure leaders were more likely
to become involved in war than insecure leaders, supporting the theory and evidence presented here. We should find that leaders
who face domestic opposition and a poorly performing economy shy away from situations that could
escalate to combat if doing so would compromise their ability to retain power.
Extensions – Econ decline not cause war
( ) Economic decline doesn’t cause war
Jervis,’11
(Robert, Professor PolSci Columbia, December, “Force in Our Times” Survival, Vol 25 No 4, p 403-425)
Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful
world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be
one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening
of the current economic difficulties,
back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor
economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to
lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic
which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring
interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything
seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even
if the more extreme versions of free trade and
economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high
level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could
prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that
people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as
outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the
very fact that we have seen
such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows
that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.
( ) Multipolarity makes your arguments untrue—economic decline doesn’t cause war
Thirlwell ‘10
—MPhil in economics from Oxford U, postgraduate qualifications in applied finance from Macquarie U, program director in International Economy for the Lowy Institute for International Policy
(Mark, September 2010, “The Return of Geo-economics: Globalisation and National Security”, Lowy Institute for International Policy, google scholar,)
Summing up the evidence, then, I would judge that while empirical support for the Pax Mercatoria is not conclusive, nevertheless it’s still
strongly supportive of the general idea that international integration is good for peace, all else equal. Since there is also even stronger evidence
that peace is good for trade, this raises
the possibility of a nice virtuous circle: globalisation (trade) promotes peace,
which in turn promotes more globalisation. In this kind of world, we should not worry too much about the big
power shifts described in the previous section, since they are taking place against a backdrop of greater economic integration which
should help smooth the whole process. ¶ Instead of ending this section on that optimistic note, however, it’s worth thinking about some
reasons why the
Pax Mercatoria might nevertheless turn out to be a poor, or at least overly optimistic, guide to our
future.¶ The first is captured by that all important get-out-of-gaol-free card, ‘all else equal’. It’s quite possible that the peace-promoting
effects of international commerce will end up being swamped by other factors, just as they were in 1914.¶ Second, perhaps the theory itself is
wrong. Certainly, a realist like John Mearsheimer would seem to have little time for the optimistic consequences of the rise of new powers
implied by the theory. Here’s Mearsheimer on how the US should view China’s economic progress, for example:¶ ‘ . . . the United States has a
profound interest in seeing Chinese economic growth slow considerably in the years ahead . . . A wealthy China would not be a status quo
power but an aggressive state determined to achieve regional hegemony.’ 62¶ Such pessimistic (or are they tragic?) views of the world would
also seem to run the risk of being self-fulfilling prophecies if they end up guiding actual policy. ¶ Finally, there is the risk that the
shift to a
multipolar world might indirectly undermine some of the supports needed to deliver globalisation. Here I am
thinking about some simple variant on the idea of hegemonic stability theory (HST) – the proposition that the global economy needs
a leader (or ‘hegemon’) that is both able and willing to provide the sorts of international public goods that are required
for its smooth functioning: open markets (liberal or ‘free’ trade), a smoothly functioning monetary regime, liberal
capital flows, and a lender of last resort function. 63 Charles Kindleberger argued that ‘the 1929 depression was so wide,
so deep, and so long because the international economic system was rendered unstable by British inability and
US unwillingness to assume responsibility for stabilizing it’, drawing on the failures of the Great Depression to make the original case
for HST:¶ ‘ . . . the international economic and monetary system needs leadership, a country that is prepared . .
. to set standards of conduct for other countries and to seek to get others to follow them, to take on an undue share of
the burdens of the system, and in particular to take on its support in adversity...’ 64¶ Kindleberger’s assessment appears to capture a rough
empirical regularity: As Findlay and O’Rourke remind us, ‘periods
of sustained expansion in world trade have tended to
coincided with the infrastructure of law and order necessary to keep trade routes open being provided by a dominant “hegemon”
or imperial power’. 65 Thus periods of globalisation have typically been associated with periods of hegemonic or
imperial power, such as the Pax Mongolica, the Pax Britannica and, most recently, the Pax Americana (Figure 9).¶ The risk, then, is that by
reducing the economic clout of the United States, it is possible that the shift to a multipolar world economy
might undermine either the willingness or the ability (or both) of Washington to continue to supply the
international public goods needed to sustain a (relatively) smoothly functioning world economy. 66 That in turn
could undermine the potential virtuous circle identified above.
Neg solvency
1NC Frontline
( ) Maduro must say “no”. The upside of plan gets outweighed by domestic politics. If
he accepts, he’ll get destroyed politically.
Shifter ‘13
Michael is an Adjunct Professor of Latin American Studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. He is a member of the Council
on Foreign Relations and writes for the Council's journal Foreign Affairs. He serves as the President of Inter-American Dialogue. “A Bolivarian
Dream Deferred” – Foreign Policy, June 24, 2013 – http://thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3338
It makes sense for Venezuela to reach out to the United States, but at least in the short term, Maduro
will have a tough time holding back on his strident, anti-American rhetoric . For political survival, he
needs to prove his Chavista bona fides to the base that brought him to the presidency . Whatever
happens abroad, Maduro will be increasingly consumed by Venezuela's staggering problems at home. Chávez left a
Maduro who has so far been able to fend off criticism
from his neighbors but is hardly in a position to lead the kind of broad ideological movement that Chávez was
able to cobble together in his glory days.
country devoid of institutions. Instead, he bequeathed cronies like
( ) Snowden affair confirms US has no leverage over Venezuela.
Sanchez ‘13
W. Alex Sanchez, Research Fellow, Council on Hemispheric Affairs – “Asylum for Snowden? Why are Venezuela, Nicaragua, others in Latin
America doing this?” – Matisak Blog – July 7th – http://matisak.wordpress.com/2013/07/07/asylum-for-snowden-why-are-venezuelanicaragua-others-in-latin-america-doing-this/
It wouldn’t be outrageous to assume that if Venezuela or Nicaragua accept Snowden, Washington may
want to apply soft power/soft pressure as some kind of “punishment,” this may mean calling back ambassadors and
diplomatic staff (though at this point I’m amazed there are any U.S. diplomats in Venezuela after the Chavez era), expelling diplomatic staff
from these nations from the U.S., or maybe Washington could
cancel some trade deals or impose some kind of trade
embargo. For example Ecuador withdrew from the ATPDEA treaty at the same time that it was considering to accept Snowden. But that
treaty was going to expire soon anyways and it seemed unlikely that the U.S. would want to renew it (especially if the Quito had accepted
Snowden).
trade
When it comes to Venezuela, it seems clear that Maduro has little interest in strengthening
or diplomatic
relations with the U.S. , so any kind of “punishment” from Washington. With that said, I am slightly surprised
about Nicaragua. Certainly, Ortega was no friend of the U.S. during the Cold War, but modern-day Nicaragua-U.S. relations are not particularly
bad, or as bad as U.S.-Venezuela relations at least. Recently, SOUTHCOM donated parachutes and some other military equipment to
Nicaragua’s special forces (this happened in late June), so some military cooperation between the two governments does exist. I
think
Nicaragua potentially stands to lose a lot if Snowden does touch Nicaraguan soil, as compared if the
American ends up in Venezuela.
( ) QPQ Negotiations can’t work. Too much tension, too little mutual respect
O’Reilly ‘13
Andrew O'Reilly – Writer/Producer for @FoxNewsLatino. “U.S.-Venezuelan Relations Remain Tense Under Maduro, Experts Claim” – Fox
News Latino – April 17 – http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2013/04/17/us-venezuelan-relations-remain-tense-under-maduro-expertsclaim/#ixzz2YYYnvrAl
While the ultimate impact of the Venezuelan presidential election remains to be seen, what's for sure is that relations between the
United States and the administration of President-elect Nicolás Maduro will continue to be as tense as under the
late Hugo Chávez, experts said. After voting on Sunday in a Caracas slum, Maduro said that while he would like to reestablish relations
with the U.S. “in terms of equality and respect,” Washington will always try to undermine his rule. These words followed a steady rhetoric on
the campaign trail of Maduro accusing the U.S. of conspiring against him and causing disruptions in Venezuela to unseat his rule, including
Experts argue that given Maduro’s anti-American
sentiments leading up to the election, as well as the controversy surrounding his victory and the polarization
in Venezuela, there is little hope for a change in relations between the countries. “It’s hard to see
[Maduro] backing off his rhetoric in the aftermath of the election,” Eric Hershberg, the director of American
University’s Center for Latin American and Latino Studies, told Fox News Latino. “ Americans will insist on a level of respect
working with opposition labor unions and causing electric power blackouts.
that he is not going to give them .”
Extensions off “Say no”
( ) Maduro will say “no” – domestic politics dictates that he must.
Forero ‘13
Juan Forero is The Washington Post's correspondent for Colombia and Venezuela, having previously been The New York Times' Bogotá bureau
chief. He joined the Post in September 2006. “With Snowden offer, Venezuela’s Maduro is on world stage” – Washington Post – July 8th –
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/with-snowden-offer-venezuelas-maduro-is-on-world-stage/2013/07/08/35d83f42-e812-11e2-818eaa29e855f3ab_story.html
The Snowden saga — a young American revealing secrets the U.S. government wants to contain — provided the perfect
opportunity for Maduro to take on the Obama administration, said Eduardo Semtei, a former Venezuelan
government official. “To figure internationally, to show that he is a player among big powers, he offered asylum to
Snowden,” said Semtei, who had been close to Chávez’s brother, Adán, a leading ideologue in the late president’s radical movement. “This
grabs headlines, and it shows that he’s a strong president, one with character, and that he’s capable of challenging the
United States.” Maduro and Venezuela came late to the Snowden saga, as tiny Ecuador, an ally also committed to opposing American
initiatives, heaped praise on Snowden and expressed a willingness to help him after he had flown from Hong Kong to Moscow on June 23 to
avoid American justice. When Ecuador backed away from its initial enthusiasm over Snowden, Venezuela stepped in last week as Maduro
arrived in Moscow for an energy summit. The 50-year-old Maduro, who found his political calling as a socialist activist with close ties to
Cuba, took
a sharply anti- imperialist stand in embracing Snowden. He said the United States had
“created an evil system, half Orwellian, that intends to control the communications of the world,” and characterized
Snowden as an antiwar activist and hero who had unmasked the dastardly plans of America’s ruling elite. Political analysts say the
opportunity to take sides against Washington was simply irresistible for a government that has for years
characterized itself as a moral force speaking out for the weak against “the empire,” as the United States is known in
Caracas. And the fact that the secrets Snowden divulged were embarrassing to the Obama administration only gave more fuel to Venezuela,
former Venezuelan diplomats and political analysts in Caracas said. “Edward Snowden
became the symbol for the antiimperialist rhetoric, for progressivism, for international radicalism,” said Carlos Romero, an analyst and author who closely tracks
Venezuela’s international diplomacy. Venezuela helped channel the fury of Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Uruguay and Suriname after Bolivian
President Evo Morales’s plane was apparently refused entry into the airspace of as many as four European countries last Tuesday because of
the belief that Snowden was hiding aboard. And on Monday, Venezuela’s state media apparatus seemed to take more offense than the
Brazilian government over revelations that the NSA had collected data on countless telephone and e-mail conversations in Brazil. But former
diplomats familiar with Venezuela say that there are other aspects to consider in deciphering
Maduro’s support for Snowden. Ignacio Arcaya, a diplomat who served the Chávez government in the United States in the early
part of his presidency, said Maduro has had the challenge of trying to ease the concerns of radicalized sectors
in his movement that have been worried about a resumption of relations with Washington now that
Chávez is gone. Indeed, until recently, Maduro was spearheading an effort at rapprochement, as shown by a meeting in Guatemala on
June 5 between Secretary of State John F. Kerry and his Venezuelan counterpart, Elías Jaua. “What Maduro is doing is aimed at
quieting the radical sectors of his party who think he is negotiating with the United States and think that he’s
talking to private industry,” Arcaya said. Maduro also has to consider his own unstable political position after the
April 14 election, which is being contested by his challenger, Henrique Capriles, who says the vote was stolen from him. At the same time,
Maduro faces millions of Venezuelans tired of the country’s sky-high inflation, rampant homicide rate and serious shortages of everything from
chicken to toilet paper. Myles R.R. Frechette, a retired American diplomat who served in Venezuela and other Latin American countries, said
Maduro is using a tried-and-true strategy: loudly oppose the United States to distract from domestic
problems. “It plays very well,” said Frechette. “It’s the card to play. It’s what you’ve always got in your drawer. You open
your drawer and play to your most radical elements.”
( ) Maduro won’t engage with the US
Shinkman ‘13
Paul – National Security Reporter at U.S. News & World Report – internally quoting Doug Farah, a former Washington Post investigative
reporter who is now a senior fellow at the Virginia-based International Assessment and Strategy Center. “Iranian-Sponsored Narco-Terrorism in
Venezuela: How Will Maduro Respond?” – US News and World Report – April 24th –
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/04/24/iranian-sponsored-narco-terrorism-in-venezuela-how-will-maduro-respond?page=2
[Maduro] has been and will continue to be forced to take all the unpopular macroeconomic steps and corrections that are painful, but Chavez
never took," Farah says. "There is going to be, I would guess, a great temptation to turn to [the elites] for money."¶ "Most
criminalized
elements of the Boliavarian structure will gain more power because he needs them," he says, adding "it won't
be as chummy a relationship" as they enjoyed with the ever-charismatic Chavez.¶ U.S. officials might try to engage the new
Venezuelan president first in the hopes of improving the strained ties between the two countries.¶
But Maduro has never been close with the senior military class in his home country, and will likely
adopt a more confrontational approach to the United States to prove his credentials to these Bolivarian
elites.¶ "Maybe if he were operating in different circumstances, he could be a pragmatist," Farah says. "I
don't think he can be a pragmatist right now."
Extensions off of “QPQ Negotiations can’t work”
( ) Snowden affair means the US-side will breakdown Venezuelan negotiations.
Negroponte ‘13
Diana Villiers Negroponte is a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, specializing in Latin America. She previously worked at the
U.S. Institute of Peace. She travels frequently to Latin America. “Consequences for Venezuela if Maduro Offers Asylum to Edward Snowden” –
Brookings Blogs – July 2nd – http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/07/02-snowden-venezuela-asylum-negroponte
Within these relations, Secretary of State Kerry met with Foreign Minister Elías Jaua on the margins of the recent OAS meeting in Guatemala.
The report of the meeting indicated that Kerry was firm and insisted that improvements had to be made in specific areas before diplomatic
relations at the Ambassadorial level could resume. Among those areas of collaboration was Venezuelan permission for Drug Enforcement
Agents to carry out counter-narcotics investigations and improvement of airport security. Without serious progress in these areas, relations
with Washington would not improve. More recently, the State Department has sent the message to Jaua through his Charge d’Affaire in
Washington, Calixto Ortega, that the grant of asylum to Snowden would jeopardize all bilateral projects. In appointing Ortega to Washington,
bilateral relations had begun to improve. “Ortega has a lot of knowledge of U.S. society, and we know that he will contribute a lot towards
increasing dialogue…We want to have the best ties with all the world’s governments, and the U.S. government, but on the basis of respect.
There can be no threats,” said Maduro in his April 24th statement reported by www.venezuelanalysis.com. “I have decided to name Calixto
Ortega so that dialogue with U.S. society can increase, with the universities, the academic world, the social and union world, the Afro-American
community, the Latino community, Congress, senators, representatives, the economic, trade and energy sectors.” Ortega, the
former
Venezuelan minister to the Latin American parliament was well received at the State Department and hope
exists in Washington that bilateral relations can improve on a steady and pragmatic basis. However,
flying Snowden to Venezuela and granting him asylum will blow apart the prospects for improved
relations . The recently formed Continental Coalition of Social Movements in support of the Bolivarian Alliance (ALBA) may rejoice that
Snowden can operate and speak freely in Venezuela, but the prospects of dialogue with U.S. economic, trade and
energy sectors will fizzle out. Without U.S. support, few nations will step in to help meet Venezuela’s rising debt repayments and
falling foreign reserves. In deciding whether to give Snowden a way out of Moscow, Maduro must balance the economic wellbeing of
Venezuela against the short term notoriety of saving Snowden.
Extensions off of “No US leverage”
( ) US has no influence – their QPQ’s teases improved relations, but that doesn’t play
in Caracas.
Navia ‘13
Patricio Navia, Adjunct Assistant Professor, Center for Latin American and Caribbean Studies, New York University, “Asylum for Snowden? Why
are Venezuela, Nicaragua, others in Latin America doing this?” – Matisak Blog – July 7th – http://matisak.wordpress.com/2013/07/07/asylumfor-snowden-why-are-venezuela-nicaragua-others-in-latin-america-doing-this/
Venezuela and Nicaragua want to embarrass the US. They are not doing this out of a commitment to press freedom or
because of an interest in promoting freedom of information or defense of personal privacy. Neither of those two countries has a good track
The two
countries have tense relations with the US. This will probably add additional tensions. But those governments want
record on freedom of the press. In fact, both governments have been criticized by freedom of the press advocacy organizations.
to increase tensions because they will use it to deviate attention from their own problems and to
rally domestic support. Because their governments are not doing well, presidents Maduro and Ortega
want to create tensions to use the nationalist card to deviate attention from their own mistakes and
mismanagement.