Winter
2012
Trusts
Christopher Scott
Outline for LAW 319 A01, as taught by Professor Mark Gillen
Editor’s Note: This outline is directed at the open-book portion of the examination, and may not be suitable for
students preparing for the closed-book portion of the exam. In addition, students in subsequent iterations of this
course should take note that we did not cover substantial portions of the syllabus in the year that this was written.
University of Victoria Faculty of Law
Trusts
Table of Contents
FORMATION
1
Capacity
1
The Three Certainties
Certainty of Intention
Certainty of Subject Matter
Certainty of Objects
1
1
2
2
Constitution of Express Trusts
Methods of Constituting a Trust
Forcing the Settlor to Constitute the Trust
3
3
4
Formalities
General Rule
Formalities under the Statute of Frauds (Especially Contracts with Respect to Lands)
Formalities under the Wills Act for Testamentary Trusts
4
4
4
5
Legality and Public Policy
Trusts for Illegal Purposes
Trusts with Conditions that are Contrary to Public Policy, Impossible or Uncertain
Trusts to Avoid Creditors
The Rules Against Perpetuities
Restraints on Alienation and Spendthrift Trusts
6
6
6
7
8
9
TERMINATION AND VARIATION
10
Termination
Termination Under the Terms of the Trust Instrument
Termination Under the Rule in Saunders v. Vautier
10
10
10
Variation
Variation Via Court Order Under Variation of Trust Legislation
Variation Via Cy Près or Administrative Scheme
10
10
10
PURPOSE TRUSTS
11
Non-Charitable Purpose Trusts
General Rule
Purpose Trusts with Individual Beneficiaries
Statutory Reform
The Problem of Unincorporated Associations
11
11
11
11
12
Charitable Purpose Trusts
The Legal Meaning of Charity
Generally
Public Benefit
Relief of Poverty
Advancement of Education
Advancement of Religion
Other Purposes Beneficial to the Community
Associated Doctrines
Exclusivity
Political Purposes
Discriminatory Conditions
Administrative Schemes and the Cy-Près Power
The Administrative Scheme-Making Power
12
12
12
13
13
13
14
14
15
15
16
16
16
16
i
Trusts
The Cy-Près Power
17
ADMINISTRATION OF EXPRESS TRUSTS
18
Appointment, Retirement and Removal of Trustees
Appointment
By Operation of the Trust Instrument
By the Trustees Under the Trustee Act
By the Court via Judicial Appointment
Retirement and Discharge
Removal
18
18
18
18
19
19
19
Powers and Duties of Trustees
Distinctions and Overlap Regarding Powers and Duties
Powers
Types of Trustee Powers
Investment Powers
Seeking Advice of the Court
Court Intervention in the Exercise of Powers
General Duties of Trustees
Duty of Care
Duty Not to Delegate
20
20
20
20
20
21
21
22
22
22
APPENDIX I
24
INDEX OF CASES
25
ii
Trusts
Formation
Capacity
•
•
Rule: Settlors, trustees and beneficiaries must have the legal capacity that their role demands
o Settlors: Must be legal “persons” and have capacity to dispose of the trust property interest
 Personhood: This includes individuals and corporations
(BC Interpretation Act s. 29)
 Capacity to Dispose: The settlor must be able to dispose of the trust property interest
o Trustees: Must be persons and have the capacity to hold title and manage the trust
 Personhood: This includes individuals and corporations
(BC Interpretation Act s. 29)
 Capacity to Hold Title: Capacity to hold legal or equitable title (depending on the type of
title that the settlor is disposing of. Just capacity to hold title; don’t need to hold property
 Capacity to Manage Trust Property: Capacity to hold (not use) powers needed to manage
o Beneficiaries: Must have capacity to hold title and (if not continent) exist at time of formation
 Personhood: This grants the ability to hold title. Don’t need ability to deal with property
 Existence: The beneficiary must be in existence at the time they acquire an interest
 Contingent: An interest can be contingent on the beneficiary coming into existence
Types of Legal Incapacity:
o Minors: Persons below the age of majority (18 or 19 in most provinces)
 Testamentary Trusts: Minors generally cannot make wills, so no testamentary trusts.
 Inter Vivos Trust: Contracts with minors are voidable, unless for necessities (and even
then, they’re voidable soon after the age of majority). Gifts of realty or personalty are often
voidable. Thus, hard to make a trust via contract or gift. Plus, minors often can’t deal in land
o Mental Incapacity: Incapable of understanding the nature and effect of the transaction?
 Inter vivos Trusts: Must be able to appreciate the extent of the property being disposed of
and who will benefit). Mental illness is not always legal incapacity.
 Testamentary Trusts: Use the test from wills law: Does the person understand (1) the
nature and effect of making a will, (2) the extent of the property being disposed of, and (3)
an appreciation of the needs of her or his dependents?
o Other forms of Incapacity:
 Entities without Legal Personhood: Unincorporated associations, partnerships and trusts
lack personhood and so cannot hold title (and thus can’t be trustee, settlor or beneficiary)
 Persons in Bankruptcy: Their property is held by a trustee in bankruptcy; power to hold
and dispose of property is severely constrained. (Prof: “Be cautious”)
The Three Certainties
•
The Rule: In order for a trust to be formed, the three certainties must be satisfied. (Knight v. Knight)
Certainty of Intention
•
•
•
Intention to Create a Trust: The settlor must have an intention to create the trust
o Explicit or Implicit: May be written, oral or inferred from conduct or circumstances.
o Beneficial Intent Sufficient: An intention by one person (settlor) that another person (trustee)
hold property for the benefit of persons (beneficiaries) or purposes is sufficient.
o Self-Declared: An intention expressed by a person that property they hold title to is to be
henceforth held on trust is sufficient to show intention. (nb: here, the settlor is also trustee)
No Formal Requirements: There are generally no requirements as to form of the expression of
intent, except for compliance with the Statute of Frauds or extra formalities for testamentary trusts
No Specific Words Required: No specific words (e.g. trust or trustee) are required to form a trust
o Not Sufficient: Using “trust” or "trustee" don't automatically create a trust either. However,
using terms like “in trust” or “as trustee for” are usually enough to satisfy certainty of intent.
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Trusts
•
•
o Precatory Trusts: Words such as “hope”, “wish”, “desire”, or “expect” are not normally
enough to satisfy certainty of intention (though they don’t preclude a trust)
(Johnson)
 Look at the whole will to determine whether this was an intention or suggestion
(Johnson)
Example: Testator leaves property to his wife, the remainder (“if any is left at her death”) to be
disposed to certain other beneficiaries. Court finds this is a gift to the wife (on the basis that she can
spend the whole of the property), so there is no trust – the gift predominates.
(Re Walker)
o Note: Zipf says this case holds that any words after the first gift can always be ignored as being
“repugnant to the gift”, but Prof says it’s possible for the “gift over” (i.e. to the remainder) to
predominate, and thus for the initial disposition to create a trust. Look at the facts.
Example: Testator leaves everything to wife until last child turns 21. If she remarries, splits share
with children; otherwise, keeps it all and distributes the remainder to children on death. Given a
power of encroachment. Court finds intention to create trust based on “circumstances” (Re Shamas)
o Policy: This was a testator-drafted will (court loosens interpretation), there were [minor]
children involved, and the sum of money was quite large (court wants to share the wealth?)
Certainty of Subject Matter
•
•
•
Elements: Need certainty of property and certainty of amounts (or shares) to the beneficiaries:
o Certainty of Property: Need an objective basis to identify the quantum of the property(Re Golay)
 Timing: Must be clear at the date the trust comes into effect.
(Re Beardmore)
 Prof: Specific pieces of property, specific funds, fixed amounts, and formulas are all certain
 Example: “A sufficient sum of money to provide a reasonable income” is certain (Re Golay)
 Example: Putting 3/5 of one’s estate into an inter vivos trust is uncertain; the size of the
estate isn’t known until after death when the estate is administered.
(Re Beardmore)
 Example: Will puts specific property and “other property” in trust, and provides for a
remainder. Court interprets “other property” in context of the whole will. Certain. Also puts
bank accounts in trust; will lists 3 bank accounts elsewhere, but testator had 4 (one opened
after will written). Court can’t determine which accounts intended. Uncertain. (Re Romaniuk)
o Certainty of Amounts or Shares to the Beneficiaries: Can be satisfied by setting out the
amount, providing a formula for determination, or giving trustees a discretion to determine
 Example: Testamentary trust with four houses. First child gets to pick a house, other child
gets the other three. The first child dies before the testator. Void for uncertainty; unclear
how the houses should be distributed between the beneficiaries.
(Boyce)
Example: Testator leaves £300 to her husband, with the part that he didn’t use getting split between
three other parties. Trust property is the amount remaining at his death; void for uncertainty (Sprange)
Policy: Trustee need to know what the trust property is to fulfill settlor’s wishes. Courts need to
know so that they can determine if there’s been a breach (and so they can act as trustee, if needed)
Certainty of Objects
•
•
Certainty of Persons:
o Discretionary Trust: Trustees must be able to determine whether any given person is in the
class of beneficiaries (“Individual Ascertainability Test”)
(McPhail)
 Fiduciary Duty: In exercising the discretion, the trustee must make a reasonable effort to
identify beneficiaries within the class and determine who should get distributions. (McPhail)
o Fixed Trusts: Trustees must also be able to build a complete list of all of the persons who are
in the class of beneficiaries (“class ascertainability” or “complete list” test) (Broadway Cottages)
Certainty of Purposes: The trustee must know what the purpose is or be able to determine whether
a particular act would be consistent with that purpose.
o Charitable Purposes: An intention that property be held for charitable purposes is sufficient.
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Trusts
•
Conceptual Certainty: Only the definition must be certain. Don’t need evidentiary certainty
(i.e. don't need to be able to prove membership. Just need to know what membership entails)(McPhail)
o Example: “Relatives” and “dependents" are sufficiently conceptually clear (McPhail, Re Baden)
o Example: “Needy or deserving members” of a 7000-member club is sufficiently certain(Re Bethel)
o Overlap: The courts don’t always keep conceptual and evidentiary certainty completely distinct
 Example: Will gives assets to testatrix’s “close friends”; court notes that she was from a
small town, so determining who her close friends are should not be infeasible
(Re Connor)
Constitution of Express Trusts
Methods of Constituting a Trust
•
Rule: A trust does not come into existence until it is constituted.
o Definition: When a trustee holds the interest in property (i.e. title) that is to be held in trust.
o Rationale: This ensures that the trustee can carry out the trust obligations. Also, equity will not
perfect an imperfect gift (i.e. court won’t order delivery of property).
• Three Methods: (1) transfer directly to the intended beneficiary (i.e. gift), (2) transfer to trustee
and (3) declaration that the settlor is the trustee. Note that both (1) and (2) require transfer. (Milroy)
o No Substitutions: If the intended method of constitution fails, the court will not substitute
another method of constitution (e.g. if transfer to trustee failed, won’t find that it’s a gift) (Milroy)
• Transfer: Settlor can transfer the intended trust property to be held be beneficiary or trustee
o Requirement: The settlor must do everything he can to complete the transfer
(Milroy)
 Events Beyond the Settlor’s Power that are required to complete the transfer do not need
to have been concluded at the time of constitution – only settlor’s acts
(Re Rose)
 Example: Settlor intends to make Lord a trustee. Property remains with settlor; Lord gets a
deed providing power of attorney, allowing settlor to order the transfer of shares at any
time. No such transfer ordered. Failed transfer; settlor could have ordered.
(Milroy)
 Example: Settlor leaves shares in trust for wife. Transfer of shares requires company’s
consent. There has been successful transfer of equitable title, and the last element of the
transfer of legal title was beyond settlor’s control, so trust is constituted
(Re Rose)
 Policy: The purpose of requiring delivery in transfer is to indicate deliberation and give
evidence of the transfer. These can be met in other ways (e.g. executed docs - Re Rose)
o How to Transfer Legal Interests: As opposed to equitable interests (see below)
 Land: We use a registry system (as opposed to a deed system). Need to register transfer
 Chattels: Can be transferred by delivery, a bill of lading, or deed (if it is non-gratuitous
and allows for specific performance to effect delivery)
 Choses in Action: Transferable by assignment in equity or law.
(Judicature Act s. 36)
 Negotiable Instruments: Transferable by endorsement in favour of another person.
 Note: Assignment preserves equities on title, whereas endorsement does not.
 Bonds and shares are types of negotiable instruments (this is to avoid equities)
 Securities are deemed by statute in Canada and USA to be negotiable instruments.
 In places where statute does not so deem, they are choses in action.
“CDS” = “Canadian
Depository for
 Rights are exercisable only by the registered (legal) owner, but the CDS follows the
Securities”
equitable owner’s instructions. Thus, transferring equitable title is often sufficient.
o How to Transfer Equitable Interests: Transfer can be effected in the following ways:
 Assignment of the equitable interest to a trustee on trust for the proposed trustee
 Declaration by person that s/he is a trustee of the equitable interest for proposed donee
 Instruction to existing trustees to hold an equitable interest in favour of new beneficiary
• Declaration: The settlor can declare himself to be a trustee with respect to property he owns.
o Requirement: Need clear evidence of intention to declare oneself a trustee.
(Paul)
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Trusts

Example: Settlor opens bank account in his name, gives π the right to draw on the account,
uses the account to deposit joint bingo winnings and withdraw for joint expenses. This is
“clear evidence” of intent to declare; trust for π constituted
(Paul)
 Example: ∆ and π build a boat together; ∆ gives π keys, leaves a note indicating that the
boat is to be jointly owned. Clear evidence of intention to declare a trust.
(Watt)
 Note: Transferring the key was not delivery and not an attempt at transfer.
(Watt)
o No Delivery: Unlike constitution by transfer, delivery of the trust property is not required.
o No Substitution: See above; if there was an attempt to transfer, there’s no declaration
(Milroy)
Forcing the Settlor to Constitute the Trust
•
Gratuitous Deeds: Settlors generally can’t be forced to constitute trusts based on gratuitous deeds.
o Specific Performance: Equity will not perfect an imperfect gift, so no specific performance.
o Damages: Broken covenants can give rise to damages in law, claimable by the trustee. Only
Here, “deed” nominal damages are usually available (to account for lost trustee’s fees), unless the trustee is
means “legal
also entitled to enforce the trust obligation in the deed.
covenant”,
not “act”
 Non-Monetary Trust Property: Damages are cash-only, and can’t grant the trust property
• Transfer for Value: If consideration was given for the transfer of trust property, there’s a contract
o Specific Performance: Only granted if damages are inadequate (i.e. where the trust property is
unique and not replaceable with money, such as with land).
o Damages: If the beneficiary provided the consideration, they can sue for damages in contract.
• Promise to Convey in the Future: Without consideration, gratuitous promises are not enforceable.
o Note: The most common form of this is a promise to be included in someone’s will.
o Not a Future Interest: This is an interest that doesn’t yet exist, not a future interest vested now
Formalities
General Rule
•
•
Generally: There are no formal requirements on the creation of trusts.
Exceptions: Law and Equity Act s. 59 (which partially re-enacts the 1677 UK Statute of Frauds)
and Wills Act impose formalities on trusts involving contracts for land and testamentary trusts.
Formalities under the Statute of Frauds (Especially Contracts with Respect to Lands)
•
•
•
•
Background: The Statute of Frauds was enacted to combat fraud based on oral evidence (mostly
by making them unenforceable). Problems: Clever fraudsters would defraud others by making oral
promises and using the Statute of Frauds to their benefit, and even non-fraudulent oral transactions
might result in violations of parties’ reliance and possible unjust enrichment.
Doctrine of Part Performance: If one party performs, and the other party refuses to perform on
the basis that the agreement was oral, the court may still enforce to protect reliance.
Doctrine of Fraud: A person claiming fraud may use parole evidence to demonstrate that the
Statute of Frauds is being used to defraud. If there is fraud, the statute does not apply (Rochefoucauld)
Contracts with Respect to Lands: No action regarding an interest in land can be brought unless
the agreement on which it is based (or a note or document evidencing it) is in writing and signed
by the person charged or his agent.
(Law and Equity Act s. 59, re-enacting Statute of Frauds s. 4)
o Applicable in BC: This has been re-enacted in BC, with the modification that the contract can
be proved in ways other than writings signed by the person charged.
(Law and Equity Act s. 59)
o Written Evidence: If relying on a note or document as evidence, it must include the terms of
the contract or make reference to such a document, but need not be the contract itself.
 Example: Signed letters indicating the state of the property might be enough (Rochefoucauld)
o Note: This is relevant to trusts if there is a promise to create a trust that is found in a contract
4
Trusts

•
•
Example: A pays B for B’s promise to hold lands (that B has legal title to) in trust for C. No
delivery or declaration, so this is a contractual promise to create a trust.
 Example: A has life interest, B has remainder interest. A and B agree that A will release the
life interest, B will sell the property, and then split the proceeds. If there is a contract, then it
creates a trust in the proceeds of sale. If the agreement is not in writing, there is no contract.
Trusts with Respect to Land: All declarations or creations of trusts of interests in land must be
“manifested and proved” by a written document (nb: not necessarily the trust instrument) signed
by the party declaring the trust (nb: no agent), or else they are unenforceable. (Statute of Frauds s. 7)
o Not Applicable in BC: This rule doesn’t apply to trusts in BC. (Law and Equity Act s. 59(1)(a))
o Signature: Don’t need a signed trust instrument (except in NS and NB), just signed evidence.
 Timing: The signature doesn’t need to occur at the time of creation or declaration of trust.
 Agency: An agent of the settlor cannot be the signatory, unlike with contractual promises.
o Unenforceability: The statute says “utterly void and of no effect”, but courts have interpreted
this to mean "unenforceable". (Prof: Making it void might open trustees up to liability)
 Effect: Oral instructions are valid, but no one can force the trustee to follow them.
Assignment of an Equitable Interest: All grants or assignments of equitable interests must be in
writing and signed by the party granting or assigning, otherwise unenforceable(Statute of Frauds s. 9)
o Not Applicable in BC: This was not re-enacted at all in BC.
o Note: If a beneficiary renounces his interest, that may be an assignment (to other beneficiaries)
Formalities under the Wills Act for Testamentary Trusts
•
•
•
•
Background: Parts of the Statute of Frauds dealing with fraudulent wills got moved to this Act.
Application: Applies to “testamentary dispositions” (i.e. dispositions that take effect on death)
Requirements for Wills: For a will to be valid (and therefore for any trusts it creates to be valid):
o The will must be in writing
(Wills Act s. 3)
o The will must be signed at its end by the testator or by some other person on behalf of the
testator, in the testator's presence and by the direction of the testator
(Wills Act s. 4(a))
 No effect will be given to any writing appearing after the signature
(Wills Act s. 6(3))
o The testator must make or acknowledge the signature in the presence of two or more witnesses
attesting to it
(Wills Act s. 4(b))
o The witnesses must also sign the will.
(Wills Act s. 4(c))
Secret and Semi-Secret Trusts:
o “Secret Trust”: Where a will disposes of property without indicating the creation of a trust, but
the intent to create a trust has been expressed outside of the will.
o “Semi-Secret Trust”: Where a will disposes of property with the indication that a trust is being
created, but without indicating the objects of the trust (in the will)
o Requirements: These apply to both secret and semi-secret trusts:
 Communication by the donor of the trust obligation and its terms to donee (i.e. trustee)
 Acceptance of the obligation by donee (may be by acquiescence or inducement) (McCormick)
 Example: Testator informs donee of trust. No inducement. Testator says “it shall be no
other way”; no acquiescence. Secret trust void for lack of acceptance.
(McCormick)
 Timing: The communication must be timely (this varies between secret/semi-secret trusts)
 Secret: Must be before the death of the testator (can be after making of will)
(Boyes)
 Example: Will leaves everything to testator’s lawyer, communicates intention by
letter. Letter not sent; found after death. Void for communication post-death. (Boyes)
 Semi-Secret: Must be at or before the time of the making of the will(Blackwell, Jankowski)
 Example: Leaving an amount in a codicil to one’s will “for the purposes I have
communicated to them” creates a valid semi-secret trust
(Blackwell)
5
Trusts
 Example: Testator leaves money “to my executor, to distribute as he sees fit”. Tells
trustee who beneficiaries are after signing. Court recognizes this would be invalid as
a semi-secret trust. Majority instead interprets it as a gift to the trustee (in the will)
with trust obligations communicated afterward (i.e. a fully-secret trust).
(Jankowski)
o Note: When faced with competing interpretations of wills, courts will prefer the
one that leaves all of the property distributed by will (and not intestacy) (Jankowski)
o Evidence: Need “clear evidence” of each element
(Ottaway)
o Transfer by Secret Trustee: Once the testamentary trust is created, there’s no restriction on
how the trustee may transfer property; it may be in the trustee’s will, or inter vivos
(Ottaway)
Legality and Public Policy
Trusts for Illegal Purposes
•
•
Examples: Trusts clearly contrary to statute (or clearly contrary to public policy found in statutes,
e.g. trusts for schools to train terrorists, a trust that gives money to whoever kills the most people),
trusts for fraudulent purposes, trusts for non-charitable purposes that aren’t recognized as valid.
Consequences:
o Unenforceability and Return of Trust Property: If an illegal trust is unenforceable, the
settlor loses the ability to get the property back. It may, however, be returnable in some cases:
 Rule: If the illegal intent has not been carried out, the property may be returned
(Krys)
 Example: House transferred to trustee to avoid creditors. Creditors are later paid. The
fraudulent purpose wasn’t executed, so assignor retains right to recover the property (Symes)
 Example: Company takes money on trust to improve its balance sheet in order to issue new
shares at an inflated price. Doesn’t issue shares. Court finds that the fraudulent purpose was
executed; the creditworthiness wasn’t used, but it was attained.
(Great Britain Steamboat)
 Prof: That’s odd. I think the court suspects that later creditors were defrauded.
o Forfeiture of Trust Property: Common approach in the UK, but only done in Canada under
certain statutes (e.g. Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act)
Trusts with Conditions that are Contrary to Public Policy, Impossible or Uncertain
•
•
Approach: Prof has provided a flowchart indicating how we should approach this. (See Appendix I)
Conditions Contrary to Public Policy: e.g. restraint of marriage, interference with marital
relationships, interference with discharge of parental duties, discriminatory conditions, restraints on
alienation or interference with enjoyment of property, and adherence to a particular religion.
• Conditions Precedent, Conditions Subsequent and Determinable Interests:
o Conditions Precedent: A condition that must occur before the gift occurs.
 Effect of Illegal Condition Precedent:
 Real Property: The condition is void and the gift fails
Here, “illegal”
 Personal Property:
means
“contrary to
 Malum in se (bad in itself): The condition is void and the gift fails
public policy”
 Malum prohibitum (prohibited by law): The condition is struck; the gift subsists
o Exception: If it is also uncertain, uncertainty takes precedence and the gift fails.
o Conditions Subsequent ("determinable interest"): The gift is effective, but may be taken
away if the condition occurs (e.g. To A, but if X happens, then to B)
 Words: “on condition that”, “but if”, “provided that” or “if it happens that” tend to indicate
a condition subsequent (as opposed to a determinable interest – see below)
 Effect of Illegal Condition Subsequent: The condition is struck; the gift subsists
o Words of Limitation ("determinable interest"): May look similar to conditions subsequent;
these impose restrictions on the term of the gift, but do not act to take away a permanent gift.
(e.g. "to A, as long as he is married to B" – could be read as providing a time period for the gift)
6
Trusts



•
•
Words: “while”, “during”, “so long as” and “until” tend to indicate a determinable interest
Effect of Illegal Determinable Interest: The interest is invalid; the gift fails.
Policy: Courts often choose between conditions subsequent and determinable interests
based on the outcome of that decision. Conditions subsequent are struck, so illegal purposes
are often construed as subsequent (so that the gift subsists)
Conditions Impossible of Performance: Was it impossible when the trust was constituted?
o Impossible at Time Gift is Made: The condition is struck and the gift continues to operate
o Impossible after Time Gift is Made: If the settlor clearly intended that the condition should
operate, and the impossibility is not attributable to the settlor, then the gift fails.
Uncertain Conditions: Uncertain conditions are void. Generally, this means that the gift fails.
o Exception: For void conditions subsequent, the condition is struck and the gift subsists.
Trusts to Avoid Creditors
•
•
“FCA” = “Fraudulent Conveyances Act”; “BIA” = “Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act”
Dispositions Defrauding Creditors:
o A disposition made to delay, hinder or defraud creditors is void against the creditors (or their
assignees) whose rights are delayed/etc. by collusion, malice or fraudulent devices.
(FCA s. 1)
 Interpretation: This is often interpreted as being merely “voidable”, not “void”
Dispositions On or Prior to Bankruptcy:
o Undervalue Transfers:
 Arm's Length Transfers are void against the trustee in bankruptcy if:
(BIA s. 96(1)(a))
 The transfer was at undervalue (i.e. conspicuously less than fair market price: BIA s. 2)
 The transfer was within a year of the date of the initial bankruptcy
 The debtor was insolvent at time of transfer or was made insolvent by the transfer, and
 The debtor intended to defraud, defeat or delay a creditor.
 Non-Arm's-Length Transfers are void against the trustee in bankruptcy if the transfer was
at undervalue and either one of the following apply:
(BIA s. 96(1)(b))
 The transfer occurred within one year of the date of the initial bankruptcy event, or
 The transfer occurred within 5 years of the date of the initial bankruptcy event, and…
 Debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer, or
 Debtor intended to (nb: or had the effect of) defraud, defeat or delay a creditor.
o Preferences Between Creditors:
 Disposition when insolvent (or when the person knows he’s on the eve of insolvency) is
void against injured creditors if the disposition is to (or for the benefit of) another creditor
with the intent to give that creditor preference over other creditors.
(FCA s. 3)
 Exception: Doesn’t apply if disposition is made for consideration in good faith(FCA s. 6)
 Arm's Length Transfers are void against trustee in bankruptcy if they:
(BIA s. 95(1)(a))
 Are in favour of a creditor, or in favour of another person in trust for that creditor,
 Are made with a view to giving that creditor a preference over another creditor, and
 Are made within three months of the initial bankruptcy event.
 Non-Arm's-Length Transfers are void against trustee in bankruptcy if they: (BIA s. 95(1)(b))
 Are made to a non-arms-length creditor, or to another person in trust for that creditor,
 Have the effect of giving that creditor a preference over another creditor, and
 Are made within one year of the initial bankruptcy event
o “Arm’s Length”, for the purposes of the BIA provisions above, is a question of fact. (BIA s. 4(4))
 Relatives are presumed not to be at arm’s length. See BIA for more presumptions (BIA s. 4(5))
7
Trusts
The Rules Against Perpetuities
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Rule Against Remoteness of Vesting: “An interest is valid if it must vest, if it is going to vest at
all, within a period calculated by taking the lives in being, at the time the instrument takes effect,
plus 21 years”
o “Interest”: This refers to a contingent interest (since non-contingent interests are vested)
o “Must Vest”: The rule is violated if it is possible for the interest to vest after the allowed period
 To vest, both the identities of the beneficiaries and the size of their interests must be known.
o “If At All”: If it is clear that the interest will not vest, that’s also acceptable.
o “Lives in Being”: Perpetuity period expires 21 years after the death of the last individual who is
connected with the grant and was in existence at the time the instrument took effect.
o Example: John makes a gift of land to the hospital. If the land ceases to be used for that
purpose, then it goes to Lydia. This violates the rule: must Lydia’s gift vest in time?
o Example: Funds left to trustee, to be given to charities that apply for funding. No time period
given within which charities must be selected. Void due to the rule against remoteness.
Rule Against Perpetual Duration: Where there are no lives in being against which to measure, the
period is 21 years. (nb: this is often the case for non-charitable purpose trusts)
Rule in Whitby v. Mitchell: An interest to an unborn person followed by an interest to one of their
unborn children is not valid. (nb: this is repealed in “wait and see” legislation; see below)
Legislative Modifications: The BC Perpetuity Act varies the above rules with the following
modifications, which are evaluated in the order given below:
(Perpetuity Act)
o Age at Which Persons Can Have Children: A female over 55 is deemed to be unable to have
children. No such presumption for males, but evidence of infertility may be provided.
o Wait and See: A mere possibility that a contingent interest will vest outside the perpetuity
period will not make the gift void. The gift remains valid until events demonstrate that the gift
cannot take effect within the perpetuity period.
 Jurisdictions: This style of legislation is active in BC, ON, AB and the territories.
 Limitation: In BC, this only applies to trusts that take effect in 1979 or later.
 Note: This preserves the common law rule; it merely changes the immediacy of the effect.
 Note: Repeals rule in Whitby v. Mitchell; gifts to children of unborn children can be valid
o Age Reduction: If the only obstacle to meeting the rule is that the gift requires the beneficiaries
reach a certain age, that requirement can be reduced in order to fit within the perpetuity period.
o Class Splitting: If a gift vests to at least one person within the perpetuity period, then the gift
succeeds, but those persons who would receive the gift outside of the period do not receive it.
o Cy Pres: The court has the power to vary the terms of the trust to meet the testator’s intention.
o Eighty-Year Rule: Trusts can last for at least 80 years, despite the rule against perpetuities.
Conflicts of Laws: The applicable law might not be that of BC. Jurisdiction is usually determined
based on the location of the property (for choses in action, this is the location of the debtor).
Charitable Purpose Trusts: Can last indefinitely; not subject to the rules against perpetuities.
Courts can deal with problems as they arise using cy près. However, if the charitable purpose is
preceded by another interest or condition subsequent, that prior interest is subject to the rules.
Accumulations: Under the perpetuity rules, trusts can allow income to accumulate during the
perpetuity period. If income accumulates beyond that period, it offends the rule.
o The UK Accumulations Act (copied in ON) allows much shorter periods for accumulations –
generally just 21 years. Directions to accumulate beyond that period are null and void. That
income is then given to whoever would receive it if there were no accumulation provision.
o Example: Will provides for trust fund, but doesn’t deal with accumulated income. The
accumulations are not part of the trust – they go to the estate (and thus to next of kin) (McIntyre)
o BC: The Accumulations Act is repealed; accumulations use the usual rule. (Perpetuities Act s. 25)
8
Trusts
Restraints on Alienation and Spendthrift Trusts
•
•
•
Restraints on Alienation Generally: Settlors can put restraints on how, when, and to whom
property may be alienated, but if a restraint is too significant then it may be void.
o Example: Not permitting assignment or mortgage of an interest is likely too broad a restraint on
alienation, but limiting the restraint to a period of 10 years might salvage it.
Spendthrift (or “Protective”) Trusts: A trust with income that is to be paid out to a specific
person (often with clauses that terminate the trust if the beneficiary transfers or assigns their
interest), with the intent to support an individual that is not good with handling money.
o US: Some states have legislative provisions that prevent these trusts from being struck down.
Canada: Such trusts are likely to be found void for restraining alienation, unless the restraints are
very mild (e.g. ending on bankruptcy or foreclosure of the beneficiary's home).
o Prof: To get around this, the trust can be made discretionary. The trustee can then just choose
not to pay out to any assignees of the original beneficiary.
9
Trusts
Termination and Variation
Termination
Termination Under the Terms of the Trust Instrument
•
•
Generally: The trust instrument can include terms regarding its termination, and they are valid.
Right of Revocation: Allows the settlor to revoke the trust and have the trust property returned.
o Not Automatic: This right must be expressly reserved in the trust instrument.
o Tax Consequences: A right of revocation results in income to the trust property being taxed in
the hands of the settlor. For this reason, this right is rare reserved.
(Income Tax Act s. 75(2))
Termination Under the Rule in Saunders v. Vautier
•
•
•
Rule: One or more beneficiaries, all of full legal capacity, and who is, or are collectively, entitled to
all the beneficial interest in the trust may apply to have the trust terminated and the assets
transferred even though the trust instrument calls for final payment to be delayed.
(Saunders)
o Note: This means that you need to get remainder and successive interests on board as well!
o Variations: AB, MB and some US states (not BC) give courts discretion to grant an application
if it is of “justifiable character”. Being contrary to settlor’s intent doesn’t make it unjustifiable.
Example: The sole beneficiary of a trust who was to receive the assets at age 25 applied for the
trust to be terminated so that he could use the assets to start a business. The court accepted (Saunders)
Avoiding Application of the Rule: Put in a contingent interest in a person who won’t consent (e.g.
the settlor), put a contingent interest in someone without legal capacity (e.g. a minor), or provide a
discretionary power to distribute among a large class of hard-to-ascertain (not impossible!) people.
Variation
Variation Via Court Order Under Variation of Trust Legislation
•
•
Court’s Power: A court can, if it thinks it fit, approve a proposal for revocation or variation of a
trust on behalf of persons listed in the legislation:
(Trusts and Settlement Variation Act s. 1)
o Minors or Persons Lacking Legal Capacity (with vested or contingent interests) (TSVA s. 1(a))
 Notice in writing of the application must be given to Public Guardian and Trustee so that
they can appear to represent such persons.
(TSVA s. 3)
o Persons of a Specified Description or Specified Class: Persons, ascertained or not, belong to
specified description or of a specified class who may become entitled at a future date or on the
happening of a future event. (e.g. “to A and his then wife”, “statutory next of kin”) (TSVA s. 1(b))
o Unborn Persons
(TSVA s. 1(c))
o Persons who may attain an interest as a result of an exercise of a discretionary power that is
only exercisable as a result of an failed interest or determination of an existing interest, and only
if that failure or determination has not yet occurred (e.g. “to A upon reaching 25, but if A dies
before reaching 25 then the trustee will determine who the interest goes to)
(TSVA s. 1(d))
Requirement: A court can only give consent on behalf of the persons listed in TSVA s. 1(a)-(c)
(nb: not s. 1(d)) if it “appears to be for the benefit of that person.”
(TSVA s. 2)
o Test: Would a rational person, offered a variation providing this benefit, consent to it? (Finnell)
 Note: This is considered for each individual, and not the group as a whole
(Finnell)
 Clarity: A potential benefit isn’t enough; the benefit should be somewhat clear.
(Finnell)
 Sufficiency: Not every person has to be better off; it just has to be a reasonable bargain that
an adult would be prepared to make (i.e. just can’t be worse off)
(Re Kovish)
 “Benefit”: Not confined to financial benefits; could be indirect benefit from parents(Re Kovish)
Variation Via Cy Près or Administrative Scheme
•
See Administrative Schemes and the Cy-Près , on page 16.
10
Trusts
Purpose Trusts
Non-Charitable Purpose Trusts
General Rule
•
Rule: Trusts for non-charitable purposes are not valid.
(Re Astor)
o Exceptions: Trusts for specified animals, maintenance of grave sites, and the erection of
monuments at grave sites are valid (but not charitable)
(Morice)
o Rationale: The rule has been justified on the following policy bases:
 Beneficiary Principle: A person must be owed performance, so that the court knows who
Primary
rationale
to find in favour of (nb: charitable purpose trusts are enforced by the Crown)
(Re Astor)
 Conceptual Uncertainty: "Purposes" are often vague (e.g. "freedom of the press") – how
does one determine whether a particular action furthers a certain purpose?
(Re Astor)
 Perpetual Duration: With no beneficiaries, there's a risk that such trusts might never vest.
 Excessive Delegation of Testamentary Power: These trustees often have broad discretion.
o Canada: This rule may be effectively dead. See Purpose Trusts with Individual Beneficiaries.
• Example: Trust for purposes: “freedom of the press”, “international goodwill”, etc. Operation of
the trust is limited to 20 years. Invalid as a non-charitable trust (without an applicable exception).
Court relies on the beneficiary principle and conceptual uncertainty.
(Re Astor)
Purpose Trusts with Individual Beneficiaries
•
•
Rule: Where a trust is "directly or indirectly" for the benefit of one or more individuals, it is not
invalid by reason of being a purpose trust (it doesn't offend the beneficiary principle)
(Re Denley)
o Example: Trust for providing recreational facilities for employees of a company. Valid as a
trust for persons – the employees. (nb: this is a UK case)
(Re Denley)
Application of Re Denley’s Trusts in Canada: A non-charitable purpose trust is valid in Canada
provided that someone (one or more persons) can be given standing to enforce it
(Peace Hills)
o Example: Trust for the purpose of providing housing to first nations high school students. Valid
as a trust for one or more persons; “any number of individuals” can have standing.
(Keewatin)
 Note: The court was also willing to give bands standing, although the bands aren't persons.
o Example: Trust for the purpose of buying lands that a first nations band had not received in its
settlement. Valid; beneficiaries are the members of the band (about 1000 persons) (Peace Hills)
Statutory Reform
•
BC’s Wait and See Legislation: “A trust for a specific non-charitable purpose that creates no
enforceable equitable interest in a specific person must be construed as a power to appoint the
income or the capital”
(BC Perpetuity Act s. 24(1))
o Validity: The gift is valid and can operate for 21 years.
(BC Perpetuity Act s. 24(2))
o Interpretation: This provision says “valid”, not “not invalid”. This raises some questions:
 Application: When does the provision apply? There are four possibilities:
 Only when there is a perpetuity problem (this is the Perpetuity Act, after all)
 Only if there is no enforcement mechanism (fills gap left by Keeewatin)
Agree with
Keewatin
 Only when there is no one with a clearly identifiable equitable interest.
 Applies to all non-charitable purpose trusts, even if already recognized exceptions.
 Meaning: A “specific purpose trust” must be similarly specific to the recognized anomalous
exceptions that are permitted to operate as powers. (nb: supports 4th view, above) (Re Russell)
 Test: Similar to McPhail test for beneficiaries (see Certainty of Objects, p. 2); can one
determine whether a given use of the trust property fits within the purpose?
(Re Russell)
• Manitoba Proposal: The settlor can appoint an enforcer for non-charitable purposes.
• BC Proposal: Provide for a supervisory power that allows the trustee (and others) to enforce.
11
Trusts
The Problem of Unincorporated Associations
•
•
•
Problem: An unincorporated association is not a person. Accordingly, it cannot receive gifts (and
thus cannot be a trustee or beneficiary). Attempted gifts to such associations are invalid.
Possible Solutions: These interpretations might save gift to unincorporated associations: (Re Lipinski)
o Gift to the members allowing members to take their share: This is a trust for persons, but is
often not what the settlor intended; usually intend it to be used for association’s purposes.
o Gift to the members for the purposes of the association:
 If members can wind up the association and distribute the property among themselves:
This is a gift to the members, subject to the contract between them. They can take their
share at any time by winding up, so the gift has properly vested in the members.
 Example: An association required that, on dissolution, assets must go to creating a new,
similar organization. It also allowed members to change its constitution. Court found
that this was a vested gift to the members; they could take it if they wanted. (Re Lipinski)
 If members can’t distribute the property among themselves on winding up the association:
Vesting is subject to a condition precedent (winding up). Perpetuity rules may apply.
o Gift to an unincorporated association for a specific purpose: This is a gift to the members in
trust for that purpose. If it’s not charitable and not for the benefit of the members, it may be
invalid (subject to the case law and statutory reforms discussed above).
Note on Re Lipinski: No one knows what this case stands for; just say that the case adopted the
above classifications of possible solutions from “Tudor on Charity”.
Charitable Purpose Trusts
The Legal Meaning of Charity
Generally
• Definition: The legal definition of “charitable purpose” requires …
o … exclusive dedication of property (see Exclusivity on p. 15) …
o … to a charitable purpose (must be listed in one of the categories given below) …
(Pemsel)
 Relief of Poverty (see p. 13)
 Advancement of Education (see p. 13)
 Advancement of Religion (see p. 14)
 Other Purposes Beneficial to the Community (see p. 14)
o … in a way that provides a public benefit (see Public Benefit on p. 13).
o Note: Some people add “and not for a political purpose” as a fourth purpose. It’s usually
implicitly included in the above three requirements (see Political Purposes on p. 16).
o Policy: These purposes are limited because charitable purpose trusts have an associated cost to
the public; the Crown enforces them (through the Public Trustee or A.G.), which costs money.
• Modifications to Ordinary Rules for Express Trusts:
o Beneficiary Principle: This doesn't apply, because the Crown (the A.G. or, in some places, a
designated public official called "Public Trustee") will enforce these trusts.
o Certainty of Objects: Not a requirement in charitable purpose trusts.
o Relief from Perpetuity Rules: Common-law perpetuity rules don’t apply to charitable purpose
trusts. They can theoretically last forever, and never vest. The court can apply cy près if needed.
• Tax and Charities:
o “Charity” and “Charitable purpose trust” are not the same; a charity can be any organization.
o Non-Profit Organizations vs. Charitable Organizations under the Income Tax Act:
 Non-profit organizations are not necessarily charitable. They just aren’t for profit.
 Non-profit organizations and “charitable organizations” are not taxed.
12
Trusts
 “Charitable organizations” are orgs. that are registered as charitable under the ITA.
To quality, their activities must be “charitable”. The ITA doesn’t define this term, so the
CRA relies on the trust law definition of charitable in its assessments.
Public Benefit
• “Benefit” means “of practical utility”. There is a rebuttable presumption in favour of this (Re Pinion)
o Also defined as a “material or tangible benefit”
(Gilmour)
• “Public” means a “section of the community” with these two requirements:
(Oppenheim)
o Size: The number of potential beneficiaries is not numerically negligible
 The actual beneficiaries might be small in number, so long as many people are eligible.
o Not Dependent on Relationship: The quality that distinguishes the beneficiaries from other
members of the community must not depend on their relationship to a particular individual.
 Example: A trust that benefits only children of [former] employees of a corporation is not
charitable, because it is based on their relationship to a person (the corporation) (Oppenheim)
• Presumption of Public Benefit: For the first three categories of charitable purposes (poverty,
education, religion), a public benefit is presumed. For the fourth, it must be proved that the
purpose is “beneficial to the community”, so public benefit is not presumed.
o Rebuttable: Evidence can be lead to rebut this presumption (e.g. expert testimony)
(Re Pinion)
• Poverty: Persons who benefit from a charitable trust do not need to be poor.
Relief of Poverty
• Relative Concept: The meaning of “poverty” varies over time, and is relative to current social
conditions and the particular persons involved.
(Trustees of Mary Clark House)
• More than Basic Necessities: This provides for more than mere basic necessities of life.
o Example: Trust to provide luxuries to a poorhouse. Accepted as charitable.
(Re Brown)
o Example: Trust to provide for outings for poor parents/children in summer. Charitable. (Re Hart)
• “Public Benefit” Modified: For relief-of-poverty trusts, the beneficiaries may be limited to the
relatives of the settlor, despite the Oppenheim prohibition against dependence on relation.
(Jones)
o Example: Trust for relatives who fall into “needy circumstances”. Charitable.
(Re Scarsbrook)
o Example: Trust for care of “needy or deserving” members of employee club. Charitable. (Jones)
 Note: The club was an unincorporated association, but court adopted McPhail v. Doulton.
Advancement of Education
• Broad Meaning: This is about acquisition of knowledge, and includes education outside of formal
education settings (e.g. children’s camp where kids play, but also learn Italian)
(Societa Unita)
• Generally Acceptable: These purposes are accepted as being for the advancement of education:
o Schools, Students, Libraries and Research: Monies for educational institutions, scholarships,
prizes, libraries, learned societies, adult learning institutions, research at universities, private
research if the results are published, private schools (if non-profit)
o Museums: Museums and gifts to museums are presumed to advance education
(Re Pinion)
o Training Professionals: Purposes aimed at advancing in life or vocation persons such as
gardeners, engineers, artists, lawyers, etc, are charitable
(Law Reporting)
 Previously: Test used to require students, physical facilities, instructors, and/or curriculm
(Seafarer’s Training), but that part of the test has since been overturned
(Law Reporting)
 Example: Trust for the production of law reports found to be charitable on the basis that the
legal profession is learned and law reports the raw material for legal study
(Law Reporting)
o Games: A trust to teach people about educational games that further the intellect and include no
element of chance (e.g. chess) may be charitable. (nb: court worries about gambling) (Re Dupree)
 Note: This is a limited exception to the rule that trusts for games are not charitable.
o Aesthetic Appreciation: Trusts for advancing appreciation of music or art (e.g. appreciation of
the music of Bach or promoting performances of Shakespeare) are charitable.
13
Trusts
•
•
Provision of Information: Trusts for mere provision of information do not qualify (Law Reporting)
General Test: A trust is for the purpose of education if it is:
(Vancouver Society)
o Geared at the training of the mind (includes training in life skills, not just academics)
o Provided in a structured manner (includes workshops, seminars, or self-study)
 Merely making materials available so persons can educate themselves is not enough
o For a genuinely educational purpose (i.e. to advance the knowledge of recipients), and
o Not just for the promotion of a particular point of view or political orientation (i.e. in the
manner of persuasion or indoctrination; moral/practical/scientific/speculative education is OK)
• Example: Charitable society provides training to immigrant and minority women and accepts job
listings from local companies and passes them on to members. Not educational. (Vancouver Society)
• Example: Trust to create a museum with testator’s paintings and furniture. Not educational: just
advancing the testator’s name and the repute of his family. Also, no public benefit: expert
evidence lead that everything in the collection was worthless, “atrociously bad”.
(Re Pinion)
Advancement of Religion
• Generally Acceptable: This purpose generally includes trusts for publishing, teaching and
propagation of religious belief; the building and maintenance of churches and burial grounds;
and the work of churches and ministers of religion.
• Tolerance: The court makes no distinctions between religions; a broad range are acceptable (Thorton)
o Example: A trust for the propagation of the works of Joanna Southcote (who believed the Holy
Ghost impregnated her) was acceptable, even though she was foolish and delusional.
(Thorton)
o Example: Trust for advancing a Hindu sect was unquestionably acceptable
(Versani)
• Requirement of a God: “Religion” requires (1) faith in and (2) worship of a God
(South Place)
o Example: A trust for the study and dissemination of “ethical principles” based on intellect
rather than belief in a God is not acceptable. Cultivation of ethics is not religion.
(South Place)
o Charter Issues: This requirement may not be acceptable under s. 2 (freedom of religion)
o Australian Modification: A religion involves a belief in a “supernatural Being, Thing or
Principle” (not necessarily a God), and/or involves accepted canons of conduct that includes
moral and ethical behavior as well as ritual observance.
(Church of the New Faith [Aus])
• Public Benefit: Recall that public benefit is presumed for religious trusts.
o Private Activities: If the benefit only accrues to a small number of people engaging in religious
activities in private, there may be no “public” benefit.
(Gilmour)
 Example: Trust for a cloistered community of 20 women who pray privately and do not act
outside the convent. No public benefit; not charitable (despite advancing religion) (Gilmour)
o Public Access: Religious rites performed in public confer a public benefit
(Hetherington)
 Example: Trust for funeral masses for the testator and her family. Masses are public; court
accepts the trust as providing a public benefit
(Hetherington)
 Example: Trust for a faith-healing group that holds services in a member’s basement.
Services are open to the public (not advertised). Accepted as providing public benefit (Fennell)
o Debate: Some say we should drop the public benefit portion of the test entirely (like Ireland)
Other Purposes Beneficial to the Community
• Accepted Purposes: These purposes have previously been accepted in the case law:
o Social Welfare Purposes: helping the old, the young or the disabled;
caring for the sick;
the
provision of hospitals;
providing for health care or advanced medicine; providing for disaster
relief; caring for veterans; providing aid to prisoners
o Community Purposes: providing for public works or amenities such as parks, cemeteries and
cremation societies
• Rejected Purposes: Trusts for amateur sports are not charitable per se, unless there’s some other
connection with charitable purposes to render them charitable.
(Soccer Association)
14
Trusts
•
o Ontario: As a result of legislative amendments, sports may fall under the “other purposes” head
in Ontario. This is still not likely to be the case elsewhere.
(Re Laidlaw)
Traditional Approach: Look at the preamble of the 1601 Statute of Charitable Uses. See if it's
there. If not, see if there’s an analogy to something in the preamble. If not, look to the case law to
find an accepted analogy from which you can build an analogy to your purpose.
(Pemsel)
o Benefit Not Sufficient: It is not enough for the purpose to be beneficial to the community; it
must also be a purpose permitted by the law of charitable purposes.
(Vancouver Society)
o Movement Towards Broader “Spirit and Intendment”: FCA briefly adopted a new test for
the “other purposes” head. A purpose is charitable if it benefits the community generally and
society has changed in such a way as to consider that purpose charitable (Native Communications)
 Example: A non-profit has the purpose of transmitting radio media of interest to Native
people and training Native persons in radio communication. Not charitable under any
existing head, but this benefits the community by instilling appreciation in Native language
and culture, and Native special status in Canada indicates a societal change. This is
charitable under the “spirit and intendment” test.
(Native Communications)
o Traditional Approach Retained: SCC has rejected the Native Communications test, saying it
is too restrictive on courts. Recognized charitable purposes should change with societal norms,
but says this can be done by analogy. Continues to use traditional test.
(Vancouver Society)
 Example: Trust for maintaining public Internet kiosks providing municipal information is
analogous to the preamble’s “maintenance of bridges and highways”. Charitable.
(Freenet)
 Example: Organization trains, finds employment for immigrant/minority women. Previous
cases recognize care for veterans and aid for poor immigrants. No analogy (Vancouver Society)
Associated Doctrines
Exclusivity
• Rule: A charitable trust must be devoted exclusively to charitable purposes. If not, it is void.
• Rationale: Otherwise it would be impossible to control the discretion of the trustees; the Public
Trustee wouldn't be able to say that the trustee is spending too much on non-charitable purposes.
• Avoiding Invalidity:
o Reinterpret the Intention of the Settlor: Argue that the settlor really intended for it to be
directed entirely to charitable purposes
 Example: Trust for “needy or deserving members” of company's employee club. “Needy”
fits in “relief of poverty” head, but “deserving” (as in “hard-working”) doesn’t appear to.
“Deserving” interpreted as “deserving of the funds” (i.e. needy). Exclusively charitable (Jones)
o Read the Offending Part as Charitable Based on Who the Donee is:
 Example: Priest leaves money to a bishop for “charitable purposes, religious and
otherwise”. Court determines that trust is directed exclusively to religious purposes (since
it's a priest leaving money to a bishop).
(Blais)
o Sever the Non-Charitable Portion: Courts are often reluctant to do this (on basis of defeating
settlor’s intention); more likely to accept with minor or incidental portions of the trust, or where
there is a clear division in the trust property between charitable and non-charitable purposes.
 If the settlor would have said “It’s fine if you take that out, I’ll just leave it all to charitable
purposes”, then the court will be much more willing to sever.
o Find the Non-Charitable Purpose to be Merely Ancillary to the Charitable Purposes: The
offending purpose is just a means to achieve the charitable purposes, and not a distinct purpose.
 Example: Trust for making loans to female medical students and promoting “the science
and art of medicine”. Also for paying for teas and lunches, good fellowship in the faculty,
etc. The latter purposes are merely ancillary to advancing education.
(Guaranty Trust)
o Apply a Statutory Provision to Sever the Non-Charitable Portion (in certain circumstances)
15
Trusts

BC: Allows for severing of the non-charitable portion of the trust if (1) a person gives,
devises or bequeaths property, (2) in trust, (3) for a charitable purpose, (4) that is linked
conjunctively or disjunctively (i.e. “and” or “or”) in the trust instrument with a noncharitable purpose, and (5) the gift, devise or bequest would be void for uncertainty or
remoteness.
(Law and Equity Act s. 47)
 Example: “For such worthy objects as my trustees select” isn't conjunctively or
disjunctively linked; charitable and non-charitable purposes are all mixed together.
 Prof: How does this work with BC's Perpetuity Act? Do we have to wait-and-see to
determine whether it's void for remoteness?
Political Purposes
• General Rule: Trusts for political purposes are invalid even if they might otherwise be valid as
being for charitable purposes.
(Human Life)
• Application: This rule applies to trusts for the promotion of a political party, particular candidate,
or political ideas; attempts to influence government policy or the legislative or executive process;
and trusts to improve international relations or foreign governments or politics.
(McGovern)
o Not Exhaustive: The McGovern list is adopted in Canada, but isn’t exhaustive.
(Human Life)
• Rationale: Court’s can’t determine whether a change to the law would be beneficial; they are
bound to assume that the current law is correct, so the public benefit test must fail.
(Bowman)
o Counterarguments: Courts are often willing to make uncertain declarations regarding public
benefit; promoting pluralism and debate is beneficial; some political organizations’ trusts have
been upheld (e.g. Native Communication Society); some religious organizations try to influence
politics (but their trusts are valid); and maybe some political purposes should be allowed!
• Example: A registered charitable organization (under health/education heads) promotes pro-life
values. Sends photos of aborted fetuses to MPs. Non-charitable.
(Human Life)
Discriminatory Conditions
• Historically: Discriminatory terms in a trust were not contrary to public policy (the focus was on
the settlor’s freedom to dispose as he wished.
• Today: Blatantly discriminatory (non-affirmative-action) terms in an otherwise-charitable purpose
may cause the trust to be void for being contrary to public policy.
(Leonard Foundation)
o Example: Scholarship trust for Christians of the “White Race” (that also only allowed women
to get 25% of its monies) is definitely discriminatory. No question about it. (Leonard Foundation)
Administrative Schemes and the Cy-Près Power
•
Note: In the Waters typology, there is a general scheme-making power which decomposes into an
administrative scheme-making power and the cy-près doctrine. We follow that in this course.
The Administrative Scheme-Making Power
• Power: Courts may dictate how the trust is to be administered and how the property is to be used.
o Trust Not Changed: The scope of the trust is not changed; the court is merely dictating the
manner in which it may operate within the scope that it has been given.
• Situations Where Applicable:
• Vague Scheme: The court can provide direction if the administration of the scheme is vague.
o Example: A trust “to be used for charitable purposes”. Court can provide purposes.
• Unworkable Scheme: There is a sufficiently-detailed scheme provided by the testator, but the
scheme as provided doesn't work in a particular circumstance. Court can fill gaps.
o Example: A trust is making more money than expected – what to do with it? Or what if the
trustee needs to be replaced due to neglect of office or breach of trust?
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The Cy-Près Power
• Power: Courts can vary the terms of a trust if operation has become impossible or impracticable
• Impossibility: Circumstances where cy près might be applied due to impossibility include:
o No one can benefit (e.g. no one needs to learn the slide rule)
o Surplus from a fund raising campaign for a charitable purpose:
 Where the fundraising fails to raise enough money for the intended purpose
 Where more than enough money was raised from another source.
o The charitable purpose is found to violate public policy (e.g. Leonard Foundation)
o The organization to which the funds were to be given no longer exists (or never existed)
• Impracticability: Circumstances where cy près might be applied due to impracticability include:
o Example: Trust for the construction of a German Catholic Church in a particular town. There's
a nearby German Catholic Church; not enough German Catholics to justify a second church,
and there’s no indication that there ever will be. Court uses cy près power.
(Schneckenburger)
o Better Uses for Funds: It isn’t sufficient that there merely be a better use for the funds; the
original use itself now needs to be impracticable.
(Rector, Wardens and Vestry)
 Example: Trust reserves half its funds for maintenance of a church and the other half for
building a new one. Current wardens have no intent to build a new church, but more money
is needed for maintenance. Court rejects application for cy près; the church might need to be
rebuilt, or future wardens might choose to build a new one
(Rector, Wardens and Vestry)
• Initial vs. Subsequent Failure and General Charitable Intent:
(Hospital for Sick Children)
o Initial Failure: If there was an initial failure (failure at time of trust creation) then the trust
must be able to demonstrate general charitable intent for the court to apply cy près.
 Example: Will leaves funds to “crippled children’s hospitals” in Vancouver and Toronto.
No such places exist. This is an initial failure, but there is clearly a general charitable
intent. Court varies the trust to benefit sick children’s hospitals
(Hospital for Sick Children)
 Example: Testamentary trust for scholarships for Protestant students. University is intended
trustee, but can’t administer the trust due to PEI legislation. This is a failure in constitution
(University can’t accept funds), so it’s an initial failure. General charitable intent found, so
court varies the gift; orders that a different trustee be found
(Ramsden Estate)
 Prof: But this isn’t even cy près; it’s modifying an administrative scheme. General
charitable intent shouldn’t even be necessary!
o Subsequent Failure: If the failure is subsequent (i.e. not at formation), then the court will not
look for general charitable intent as a condition of applying cy près.
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Administration of Express Trusts
Appointment, Retirement and Removal of Trustees
Appointment
By Operation of the Trust Instrument
• Generally: Trustees are appointed in the trust instrument (or orally at time of the trust's creation)
o If trust instrument doesn’t say how to appoint future trustees, the court can appoint them.
• Settlor as Trustee: The settlor may make him/herself a trustee
• No Obligation to Accept: No person is obliged to be a trustee, even if they had previously agreed.
• Acceptance: Acceptance of the appointment can be express or implied.
o Note: Carrying out even minor tasks of a trustee can imply acceptance.
• Disclaiming: A person who does not accept may disclaim (i.e. reject) the appointment.
• Power to Appoint: May be conferred on existing trustees or anyone else (settlor, beneficiaries, etc)
• Lack of Trustee: A trust does not fail merely because it lacks a trustee (e.g. when disclaimed):
o Inter vivos trusts: The trust is not yet constituted; the settlor can just select a different trustee
o Testamentary trust: The trust comes into existence when the will is administered (even if the
named trustee disclaims); the court will find a replacement trustee or administer the trust itself.
By the Trustees Under the Trustee Act
• Replacing Trustees: Statute creates a scheme that lets trustees be replaced without a court order:
o Replacement Power: An appointing person can, in writing, replace an unavailable trustee with
a new trustee. No court order is required.
(Trustee Act s. 27(1))
 Unavailable Trustee: A trustee who is dead, remains out of BC for more than 12 months,
wishes to be discharged from all or any of the trusts or powers reposed in or conferred on
him or her, refuses to act is unfit to act, or is incapable of acting.
 Appointing Person: The person nominated in the trust instrument. If such person, then the
surviving or continuing trustees or the personal representatives of the last such trustee.
o Additional Rules: The Trustee Act sets out a number of rules for convenience:
 Partition of Assets: On appointment of a new trustee, the trust assets may be partitioned
into distinct trusts.
(Trustee Act s. 27(2)(b))
 Number of Trustees: If the trust originally appointed…
(Trustee Act s. 27(2)(c))
 Only One Trustee: No need to appoint more than one trustee
 More than Two Trustees: No requirement to maintain the original number of trustees,
as long as there are at least two after appointment.
 Two or More Trustees: Trustee can’t be discharged unless at least two trustees remain
 Vesting: Must take steps to vest trust property jointly in new trustees (Trustee Act s. 27(2)(d))
 Note: this can be done by deed (Trustee Act s. 29; below), and appointment must be in
writing, so it’s often convenient to appoint and vest in one deed.
 Same Powers: New trustee has all powers as if originally appointed
(Trustee Act s. 27(3))
 Named Trustee Dead Before Testator: The s. 27(1) power of appointment can be used
where the person nominated in the will as trustee died before the testator (Trustee Act s. 27(4))
 Default Provision: s. 27 is a default provision, and can be overridden
(Trustee Act s. 27(5))
• Vesting of Trust Property in Trustees: Can be effected by deed
(Trustee Act s. 29)
o On Appointment: Deed appointing new trustee can contain declaration vesting trust property
in new and remaining trustees (works for land, title, choses in action)
(Trustee Act s. 29(1))
o On Retirement: Person(s) with power of appointment together with retiring and continuing
trustees can declare in deed of discharge that remaining trustees have joint title(Trustee Act s. 29(2))
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Trusts
o Statutory and Corporate Requirements: Some assets require extra steps – e.g. registration
under Land Titles Act or entry of transfer in books of a company
(Trustee Act s. 29(3),(4))
By the Court via Judicial Appointment
• Inherent Power: As successors to Court of Chancery, courts have inherent power of appointment.
• Statutory Power: A court can make an order for appointment of new trustees, if it is expedient to
do so and would be inexpedient, difficult or impracticable without the court’s help (Trustee Act s. 31)
o Vesting: Similarly, the court can order that the property vest in the trustee
(Trustee Act s. 33)
o Land: If order involves land, order has same effect as executing conveyance docs(Trustee Act s. 33)
o Share Transfer: The court may elect to give the new trustee the power to transfer shares (i.e.
the court can basically force a company to register the transfer in their books) (Trustee Act s. 34)
o Rights Against Third Parties: Order can give new trustees rights via chose in action (i.e. if the
outgoing trustee has debtors, court can give new trustees rights against them) (Trustee Act s. 34)
o Criminal Trustees: The court can order for a criminal trustee's replacement
(Trustee Act s. 35)
o Standing: Any beneficiary can apply for a judicial appointment under the Act (Trustee Act s. 36)
o Continuing Liability: An order by the court does not discharge former or continuing trustees
from their existing liabilities
(Trustee Act s. 37)
• Principles Applied by Courts in Appointing Trustees: The court should (1) consider the wishes
of the settlor, (2) avoid conflicts of interest, and (3) ask whether appointment of the particular
person would promote or impede execution of the trust.
(Re Tempest)
o Conflicts of interest are not necessarily fatal, but the court will try to avoid them.
o Settlor’s Wishes: In particular, the court should avoid appointing someone the settlor said
should not be appointed or who appears to be a person the settlor would not want appointed.
Retirement and Discharge
•
•
Non-Judicial Retirement and Discharge: If there are two or more trustees then one can be
discharged by deed with consent of (1) co-trustees and (2) any persons with power to appoint new
trustees. No court order is required.
(Trustee Act s. 28(1))
o Vesting: Must take steps to vest trust property jointly in remaining trustee(s) (Trustee Act s. 28(2))
o Default Provision: Can be overridden by the trust instrument
(Trustee Act s. 28(3))
Judicial Retirement and Discharge: Courts have inherent jurisdiction to elect to permit a trustee
to retire and to grant a discharge for that purpose.
Removal
•
•
•
Non-Judicial Removal: By operation of the trust instrument (e.g. trust grants power of removal)
Judicial Removal: Courts may remove trustees by order.
o Inherent Jurisdiction: This is the most common method of removal.
o Statutory Jurisdiction: Only applies where the trustee is appointed by the court, and even then
only where there is consent from a majority of the beneficiaries.
(Trustee Act s. 30)
Principles that Courts have Applied in Deciding Whether to Remove Trustees:
o Main Consideration: Overall one looks to the welfare of the beneficiaries.
(Conroy)
o Impossibility or Improbability: A trustee can be removed where the continued administration
of the trust in the interests of the beneficiaries has become impossible or improbable (Consiglio)
 Misconduct by the trustees is not necessary for removal of trustees
(Re Consiglio)
o Where There is Misconduct: Not every instance of misconduct will result in removal.
Misconduct, in act or omission, must:
(Conroy)
 Endanger the trust property;
 Show a lack of capacity to execute the duties required of the trustee;
 Show a lack of honesty (i.e., not fair / lack of truthfulness); or
 Show a lack of fidelity (e.g., bad faith dealing – sale of property in conflict of interest).
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Trusts
Powers and Duties of Trustees
Distinctions and Overlap Regarding Powers and Duties
•
•
•
Meaning of Duty: A duty is an obligation to act or not to act.
Meaning of Power: A power is an authority or permission to act or not to act.
o “Mere Power”: A power that comes with no duty to exercise it.
o “Trust Power”: A power that comes with a duty to exercise it.
Overlap Between Powers and Duties: A trustee can have a duty to use a power, and the exercise
of powers may be subject to the fulfillment of an underlying duty.
o Example: Duty to invest with power to choose investments
o Example: Duty to select or determine amounts of distributions (along with the power to do so).
o Example: Power to Accumulate: This is a power to select and determine the amounts of
distributions without an associated duty to exercise that power.
o Example: Duty to Accumulate: Trustee may be required not to distribute some trust income.
o Even Mere Powers Can Overlap with Duties: Trustee have a fiduciary duty to at least
consider using the power (see Court Intervention in the Exercise of Powers on p. 21) (Re Blow)
Powers
Types of Trustee Powers
• Administrative and Dispositive Powers:
o Administrative: Powers that allow the trustee to manage the trust property (e.g. power to sell
trust property, lease real property, repair or improve trust property, insure trust property, etc.)
o Dispositive: Powers that deal with the distribution of income or capital to trust beneficiaries
 Not all trusts have dispositive powers – there's sometimes a duty to distribute, but there
might be no associated power if there is no discretion (e.g. as in a fixed trust)
• Express and Implied Powers: As is usual, express trumps implied.
o Implied: These are default terms that have arisen as a result of the court’s gap-filling function
o Express: Powers defined in the trust instrument.
• Statutory Default Powers: Codifications of common law implied powers, plus additional powers
that are likely to be used in many trusts (goal: to reduce court applications). Default powers.
• Approach to Identifying Powers of Trustees: Consider the following sources of trustee powers,
in this order: (1) Trust Instrument, (2) Trustee Act (and other legislation), (3) Case Law.
• Presumption of Unanimity in the Exercise of Powers: Unless overridden by the trust
instrument, the trustees must be unanimous in order to exercise a power (see, e.g., Gibb v. McMahon)
Investment Powers
• Implied Power: Even if not explicit, the court is likely to infer an investment power.
• Historical Scope: In the 19th century there was a duty to invest prudently. Later statutes creates
lists of investments that were deemed prudent; that “legal list” approach had flaws (listed items
weren’t necessarily prudent, were inconsistent with modern investment theory). It was abolished in
BC in 2003; today, BC uses a “prudent investor” approach with modern default provisions.
• Permitted Types of Investments: Nearly any investment is permitted
(Trustee Act ss. 15.1-17.1)
o Default Term: Allowable investments can be limited by trust instrument. (Trustee Act s. 15.1(2))
o Restriction: Corporate trustee cannot invest trust funds into its own securities (Trustee Act s. 17.1)
• Standard of Care: The trustee must exercise “care, skill, diligence and judgment” in making
investments (“prudent investor” standard)
(Trustee Act s. 15.2)
• Obligation to Diversify: Some jurisdictions (not BC) require trustees to diversity investments.
o Note: Diversifying (to lower overall risk) is consistent with modern theories of prudent
investment. Failing to diversity might, in some cases, breach the standard of care (even in BC)
20
Trusts
•
Liability of Trustee for Loss on an Investment: A trustee is not liable for losses on a particular
investment, but is liable for losses on imprudently invested portfolios as a whole. (Trustee Act s. 15.3)
o Historically: Each investment was considered individually. Trustees could be liable for losses
on a single risky investment. That isn’t consistent with modern investment theory.
• Delegation of Investment Functions: Delegation of investment decisions is OK (Trustee Act s. 15.5)
o Trustee Responsibilities: The trustee is responsible for selecting the agent, establishing the
scope of their authority, and monitoring their performance (std. of care applies)(Trustee Act s. 15.2)
o Note: Trustees have a duty not to delegate, so these provisions are important!
• Mutual Fund Investments: Investments in mutual funds are expressly permitted (Trustee Act s. 15.1)
o The purchase of a mutual fund is not a delegation of investment powers (Trustee Act s. 15.5(7))
o Rationale: Mutual funds are a prudent, diversified, cheap investment.
• Common Trust Fund Managed by a Trust Company: A trust company can pool its trusts’
investment funds into a “common trust fund” (a kind of internal mutual fund). (Trustee Act s. 15.1(3))
• Duties and Powers in Relation to Investment: There’s the duty of care (held to the standad of a
prudent investor), the duty not to delegate (this is varied by the Act), and the underlying duties of
loyalty and impartiality.
Seeking Advice of the Court
• Trustees can apply to court for an opinion or directions(Trustee Act s. 86; Supreme Court Rules R. 10)
o Historically: Courts thought they lacked inherent jurisdiction to perform this function.
• No Court Exercises of Power: A court will not exercise a power for the trustee.
(Re Wright)
Court Intervention in the Exercise of Powers
• No Court Exercises of Power: A court can order trustees to exercise their power in a certain way,
but the court will not put itself in the position of the trustee and exercise the power itself. (Re Wright)
• Discretionary Powers: Courts will not intervene to force the exercise of a power where the
trustees have been given a pure discretion to exercise the power or not.
(Tempest)
o Example: Trustees given power to sell trust property and buy other property. Only explicit duty
is to buy the other property in a reasonable time. Beneficiaries want a particular property
purchased; trustees refuse. Court refuses to intervene.
(Tempest)
o Mala Fides: The court will intervene if there are mala fides (i.e. bad faith)
(Gisbourne)
 Note: This is based on the trustee’s underlying duty to act in the best interests of the
beneficiaries; having bad faith with regard to their interests will trigger intervention(Gisbourne)
 Example: Trust left to testator’s brother as trustee; beneficiary is testator’s wife. Power to
use “part or the whole” of the trust income for the wife; brother chooses not to disburse any
on the grounds that she doesn’t need any. Broad discretion, no mala fides.
(Gisbourne)
o Failure to Exercise: The court might intervene if the trustee did not at least consider the
exercise of the power; duty arises from trustees’ duty to act in beneficiaries best interests(Re Blow)
o Relevant Considerations: The trustees have a duty to consider all relevant facts in choosing
how to exercise a power. If the trustees breach this, and if they would have acted differently if
they hadn’t, the court may intervene.
(Fox)
 Irrelevant Considerations: A minority of the court in Fox (Galigan J.) said that the trustees
must also consider no irrelevant facts (Re Blow arguably support this; see Letter of Wishes)(Fox)
 Letters of Wishes: A settlor’s letter of wishes is not a binding part of the trust instrument. It
is an irrelevant consideration. Trustees can’t fetter an unfettered discretion like that (Re Blow)
 Note: This rule is based on a UK case (Hastings-Bass) that was recently revisited by the
HL. They adopted the “relevant” part, but didn’t say anything about the “irrelevant” part
 Example: Beneficiary marries a Gentile; Mom (trustee) uses her discretion to cut him out of
the remainder. This was an irrelevant consideration – court intervenes
(Fox)
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Trusts
•
•
•
Improper Exercise of a Power: The court will intervene with an exercise that is inconsistent with
the terms of the power (i.e. goes beyond constraints) or is in breach of an underlying duty (Tempest)
Duty to Exercise Power: If trustees have a duty to exercise a power, courts will order the trustees
to exercise the power in a proper manner and in a reasonable time
(Tempest)
Deadlock: Courts might intervene in a deadlock (between trustees) if the failure to exercise the
discretion is inconsistent with the settlor’s intentions. Make an order that is consistent. (Kordyban)
o Example: π’s brother is a co-trustee over voting shares for π’s benefit. Brother refuses to
consent (as trustee) to vote the trust shares in π’s favour in shareholder mtgs. π being a director
is not necessary to carry out the trust; no evidence of settlor’s intent. No intervention. (Kordyban)
General Duties of Trustees
Duty of Care
• Absolute Duties and Duties Subject to a Standard of Reasonable Care:
o Absolute Duties: There is no defence for a trustee to say that he acted with reasonable care.
 Example: The duty of loyalty is an absolute duty (National Trustees Company of Australia)
o Non-Absolute Duties: There is a defence (and thus a standard) of reasonable care
 Examples: This includes the duty to invest, duty to sell, and duty to retain and manage.
• Standard of Care: “that of a person of ordinary prudence in managing his or her own affairs” (Fales)
o Example: Trustee sells private-company shares to a publicly traded company in exchange for
stocks and bonds in it. Trustees don’t sell them; company fails. Court finds lack of prudence; no
evidence of careful consideration of the options.
(Fales)
 Note: Only the corporate trustee was found liable; an individual trustee (the beneficiaries’
mom) acted reasonably given her level of expertise, and so was relieved under s. 96. (Fales)
o Paid or Professional Trustees: The usual standard of care is also applied against paid and
professional trustees (i.e. they are not held to a higher standard)
(Fales)
 But note Trustee Act s. 96’s treatment of paid and professional trustees, below.
• Relief of Liability: A court can relieve a trustee of liability even if it did breach the duty of care.
Considerations to take into account include:
(Trustee Act s. 96)
o Paid Trustees: Whether the trustee was paid
o Small Mistakes: Whether the breach was merely technical or a minor error in judgment
o Recession: Whether lost value of securities was due to general economic conditions
o Professional Trustees: Whether the trustee is someone who accepted a single trust to oblige a
friend or is a company organized for the purpose of administering estates and presumably
chosen in the expectation that it will have specialized departments and experienced officials
o Reasonableness: Above all, whether the conduct of the trustee was reasonable.
Duty Not to Delegate
• General Rule: Trustees may not delegate
o Exceptions: Where the power to delegate was explicitly or implicitly granted.
 Implicit Power: Trustees may delegate a task where persons acting with reasonable care for
their own purposes would, in the particular circumstances, delegate the task
(Speight)
 Example: Trustees can delegate to agents and have agents handle funds where it is
normal in such transactions to engage agents for that purpose (e.g. stock brokers)(Speight)
• Legislatively Permitted Delegation: BC’s Trustee Act gives some very specific cases:
o Solicitors and Bankers: These parties can receive and discharge money (bankers: insurance
money only), but can’t leave it in their hands for longer than is necessary.
(Trustee Act s. 7)
o War Service: Trustees away on war service can delegate any power to anyone (Trustee Act s. 14)
• Delegation by Corporate Trustee: The board of directors has a duty to at least turn their minds to
dispositions of trust property (i.e. they can’t completely delegate significant powers)
(Re Wilson)
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Trusts
•
o BCCA: Obiter says that Re Wilson was wrongly decided and that it is not the law of BC (Fales)
o Prof: Delegating to officers/employees is usually implicit if you make a corporation a trustee.
o Example: decision to dispose of property was made by an officer (general manager) and not by
the board of directors. Court found this to be a breach of the duty not to delegate.
(Re Wilson)
Liability for Agents' Fault or Negligence: The trustee is not liable unless they demonstrated
“willful default”
(Trustee Act s. 95)
o “Willful default” means a consciousness of negligence (i.e. awareness of negligence) or
recklessness on the trustee's part with respect to the agent's breach of duty.
(Re Vickry)
o Note: Some other cases say that "willful default" means a breach of the standard of prudence.
o Prof: This basically imposes a duty to select an agent with appropriate expertise and a duty to
monitor the agent's activity to ensure the due level of care is maintained.
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Notes on Trusts – Chapter 7 – Public Policy Constraints
©Mark Gillen
Appendix I
24
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Index of Cases
Short Name
Ct./Year
Keywords
25
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