Support and Stability Operations
and Changing Rules Governing
the Use of Force
Lsn 26
Agenda
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Names, Definitions, and Themes
Beirut
Weinberger Doctrine
Changing World of the Post Cold War
Powell and Aspin Doctrines
Somalia
1996 National Security Strategy of Enlargement
and Engagement
• Bush’s Preemptive Strike Doctrine
Names
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Small Wars
Low Intensity Conflict
Operations other than War
Military Operations other than War
Support and Stability Operations
Support and Stability
Operations
• Stability Operations
– “Promote and protect US
national interests by
influencing the threat,
political and information
dimensions of the
operational environment
through a combination of
peacetime developmental,
cooperative activities and
coercive actions in
response to crisis”
• Support Operations
– “Support operations
employ Army forces to
assist civil authorities,
foreign or domestic, as
they prepare for or respond
to crisis and relieve
suffering”
FM 3-0, p. 1-15-16
SASO Patterns and Themes
• Nontraditional environments.
• The enemy.
• Noncombatants.
• The political-military dimension.
• Changing missions and mission creep.
• Operational constraints, including rules of
engagement (ROE).
• The role of combat troops.
• Cross-cultural interaction.
Yates, Military Support and Stability Operations, Military Review, Jul-Aug 97
Types of Stability Operations
• Peace Operations
– Multinational Force and
Observers (Sinai)
• Foreign Internal Defense
– El Salvador
• Security Assistance
– Partnership for Peace
(Europe)
• Humanitarian and Civic
Assistance
– Operation Provide Comfort
(Northern Iraq)
• Support to Insurgencies
– Contras (Nicaragua)
• Support to Counter Drug
Operations
– Operation Blast Furnace
(Bolivia)
• Combating Terrorism
– Operation Enduring
Freedom (Afghanistan)
• Non-Combatant Evacuation
Operations
– Operation Urgent Fury
(Grenada)
• Arms Control
– IFOR and SFOR (Bosnia)
• Show of Force
– Operation Vigilant Warrior
(Kuwait)
FM 3-0 p. 9-6
Forms of Support Operations
• Relief Operations
– Hurricane Andrew (1992) and Hurricane Katrina
(2005)
• Support to Domestic Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, Nuclear and High-Yield Explosive
(CBRNE) Consequence Management
• Support to Civil Law Enforcement
– Los Angeles Riots (1992)
• Community Assistance
– Youth Challenge Program
FM 3-0 p. 10-4
Beirut
• On Sept 29, 1982, US military forces were inserted
in Lebanon as part of a multinational peacekeeping
force
• Peacekeeping operations are designed to monitor
and facilitate cease fire, truce, and diplomatic efforts
• No cease fire materialized in Beirut
– Israelis and Syrians stayed in and around city
• In spite of this, the Marines were told to “establish
presence” between Syrians and Israelis without an
agreed upon withdrawal for either side
Beirut
• The Marines were first
welcomed but steadily
became perceived as
being pro-Israeli
• The Marines were highly
vulnerable in a nontactical billeting
arrangement with very
strict ROE
• Violence culminated on
October 23, 1983 with a
terrorist bombing that
claimed the lives of 241
service members
Time Reports the Terrorist Bombing
Lessons: Beirut
• “Without a clearly defined objective, determining
the proper size and armament and rules of
engagement for such a force is difficult at best.”
• “with no mission since there was no withdrawal
agreement” Marines are effectively sitting
targets.
• The military is but one instrument of national
power, and it is not the appropriate one to be
used in all situations or for all objectives.
• Results in the development of the Weinberger
Doctrine—strategic criteria to commit U.S. forces
overseas.
Conflicting Points of View
• “There had to be some way to
deal with violent threats that
lay between doing nothing and
launching an all-out
conventional war. Diplomacy
could work [to address]
problems most effectively
when force– or the threat of
force– was a credible part of
the equation.”
– Secretary of State George Shultz
Conflicting Points of View
• “My own feeling was that we
should not commit American
troops to any situation unless the
objectives were so important to
American interests that we had to
fight, and that those conditions we
met, and all diplomatic efforts
failed, then we had to commit, as a
last resort, not just token forces to
provide an American presence, but
enough forces to win and win
overwhelmingly.”
– Secretary of Defense Casper
Weinberger
Weinberger Doctrine
• The US should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the
particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national
interest or that of our allies
• If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given
situation,we should do so wholeheartedly and with the clear
intention of winning
• If we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should
have clearly defined political and military objectives
• The relationship between our objectives and the forces we have
committed– their size, composition, and disposition– must be
continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary
• Before the US commits combat forces abroad, there must be some
reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American
people and their elected representatives in Congress
• The commitment of US forces to combat should be a last resort
Changing World
• Desert Storm
– War can be won quickly with
low casualties
– Erases the “Vietnam
Syndrome”
• Dissolution of the Soviet
Empire
– No more threat of a
superpower clash
– US is the only superpower
– Real opportunity for
international cooperation and
United Nations leadership
• Weinberger Doctrine is not
as appropriate in the postCold War era
Powell Doctrine
• Force should be used only as a
last resort
• Military force should be used
only when there is a clear-cut
military objective
• Military force should be used
only when we can measure that
the military objective has been
achieved
• Military force should be used
only in an overwhelming fashion
Les Aspin and the Limited
Objective School
• “…this brand new world of
ours is a world of turmoil
and agitation. And that
agitation has provoked
calls for the use of military
force in a whole range of
circumstances that don’t fit
the mold.”
Increased Optempo
• After the end of the Cold War and the
tremendous success of Desert Storm,
there was an increased willingness to use
the military
• Previously reserved largely for “vital”
interests, the military became increasingly
used for lesser interests under a strategy
of “engagement and enlargement”
Increased Optempo
• The pace of deployments increased 16-fold since
the end of the Cold War.
– Between 1960 and 1991, the Army conducted
10 operations outside of normal training and
alliance commitments, but between 1992 and
1998, the Army conducted 26 such operations.
– The Marines conducted 15 contingency
operations between 1982 and 1989, and 62
since 1989.
– During the 1990s, U.S. forces of 20,000 or more
troops were engaged in non-warfighting
missions in Somalia (1993), Haiti (1994), Bosnia
(1996), and Iraq and Kuwait (1998).
The Heritage Foundation, The Facts About Military Readiness, Jack Spencer, Executive Summary #1394
1996 National Security Strategy of
Engagement and Enlargement
• “three basic categories of
national interests that can
merit the use of our armed
forces”
– Vital
– Important
– Humanitarian
Vital Interests
• “… interests that are of broad, overriding
importance to the survival, security and
vitality of our national entity -- the defense of
U.S. territory, citizens, allies and our
economic well-being.”
• “We will do whatever it takes to defend these
interests, including -- when necessary -- the
unilateral and decisive use of military power.”
– Desert Storm and Vigilant Warrior (when Iraq
threatened aggression against Kuwait in October
1994)
Important Interests
• “… interests at stake do not affect our national
survival, but they do affect importantly our national
well-being and the character of the world in which
we live.”
• “In such cases, military forces should only be used
if they advance U.S. interests, they are likely to be
able to accomplish their objectives, the costs and
risks of their employment are commensurate with
the interests at stake and other means have been
tried and have failed to achieve our objectives.
Such uses of force should also be selective and
limited, reflecting the relative saliency of the
interests we have at stake.”
– Haiti and Bosnia
Humanitarian Interests
• “Here, our decisions focus on the resources we
can bring to bear by using unique capabilities of
our military rather than on the combat power of
military force. Generally, the military is not the
best tool to address humanitarian concerns.”
• “But under certain conditions, the use of our
armed forces may be appropriate: when a
humanitarian catastrophe dwarfs the ability of
civilian relief agencies to respond; when the need
for relief is urgent and only the military has the
ability to jump-start the longer-term response to
the disaster; when the response requires
resources unique to the military; and when the
risk to American troops is minimal.”
– Rwanda
Somalia
Somalia
• Drought, famine, clan violence, corruption, and inefficient
government had created a humanitarian crisis in Somalia
in the 1990s.
• One of the main sources of power had been the control
of food supplies.
– Hijacked food was used to secure the loyalty of clan
leaders, and food was routinely exchanged with other
countries for weapons.
– In the early 1990’s up to 80% of internationally
provided food was stolen.
• Between 1991 and 1992 over 300,000 Somalis were
estimated to have died of starvation.
– UN relief efforts were unsuccessful, largely due to
looting.
• The U.N. asked its member nations for assistance.
Somalia
• In December 1992,
President George
Bush proposed to
the U.N. that United
States combat
troops lead the
intervention force.
– The U.N.
accepted this
offer and 25,000
U.S. troops were
deployed to
Somalia.
Operation Restore Hope
• The US-led coalition approved by
the Security Council in December
1992 had a mandate of protecting
humanitarian operations and
creating a secure environment for
eventual political reconciliation.
– At the same time, it had the
authority to use all necessary
means, including military force.
Operation Restore Hope was a
US-led, UN-sanctioned
operation that included
protection of humanitarian
assistance and other peaceenforcement operations.
This picture of a Somalian
women who weighed just 46
pounds was an example of
an image that drew US
attention to the situation
Somalia
(Role of Combat Troops)
• The Army force (ARFOR) area of operations included
over 21,000 square miles.
– Over these distances, units conducted air assault operations,
patrols, security operations, cordons and searches, and other
combat operations in support of humanitarian agencies.
– Other ARFOR operations included building or rebuilding over
1,100 kilometers of roads, constructing two Bailey Bridges,
escorting hundreds of convoys, confiscating thousands of
weapons, and providing theater communications.
• Due to these efforts, humanitarian agencies declared
an end to the food emergency, community elders
became empowered, and marketplaces were
revitalized and functioning.
Somalia
(Changing Missions and Mission
Creep)
• In March 1993 the U.N. officially took over the
operation, naming this mission UNOSOM II.
– The objective of this mission was to promote “nation
building” within Somalia.
– One main target was to disarm the Somali people.
• UNOSOM II stressed restoring law and order,
improving the infrastructure, and assisting the
people with setting up a representative
government.
Somalia
(The Enemy)
• This change of mission was a direct threat to the
power base of clan leader Mohammed Farah
Aidid
• On Oct 3, 1993 Task Force Ranger raided the
Olympic Hotel in Mogadishu to search for Aidid.
• This led to a 17 hour battle in which 18 U.S.
soldiers were killed and 84 were wounded.
• Conservative estimates say more than 500
Somalians were killed and over 1,000 injured, but
pictures of the body of a dead US soldier being
dragged through the streets and the capture of a
US helicopter pilot caused a public outcry against
the US policy in Somalia
Withdrawal
(Political-military dimension)
• On Oct 7, President Clinton
announced the beginning of the
US withdrawal.
• Marks the beginning of a period
in which the US becomes very
“casualty adverse”
– High optempo use of the Army in
SASO lessens
– US does not intervene in a timely
or meaningful way in Rwanda
– Army not used in Kosovo
Somalia Review
• Discuss in terms of
– The role of combat troops
– The enemy
– Changing missions and mission creep
– Cross-cultural interaction
– Political-military dimension
LA Riots
LA Riots
(Non-traditional environment)
• April 29, 1992: Police officers acquitted in
beating trial of Rodney King
• Most destructive civil disturbance in US
history, causing the deaths of at least 54
people and more than $800 million in
property damage throughout LA County.
• More than 10,000 troops from the California
National Guard (CANG), 2,000 active
component soldiers, and 1,500 Marines were
deployed to the area at the height of
operations.
Posse Comitatis and the LA Riots
(Operational constraints)
• “The CANG's procedure for approving law
enforcement requests had been rapid and gave
maximum discretion to subordinate commanders
to coordinate directly with the supported law
enforcement entities. Before the establishment of
JTF-LA and the federalization of the CANG,
virtually 100 percent of law enforcement support
requests had been approved. Following
federalization, only about 20 percent were
approved.”
• After-action briefing by the California National Guard Plans,
Operations, and Military Support Officer; June 8-11, Reno, Nevada.
Posse Comitatis and the LA Riots
(Operational constraints)
• “It [JTF-LA] required each request for assistance to
be subjected to a nebulous test to determine
whether the requested assignment constituted a
law enforcement or a military function. As a result,
after the federalization on May 1 . . . not only were
the federal troops rendered largely unavailable for
most assignments requested by the LAPD, but the
National Guard, under federal command, was
made subject to the same restrictions, and
therefore had to refuse many post-federalization
requests for help.”
• William Webster, former FBI Director
Training and LA Riots
(Cross- cultural interaction)
• “Police officers responded to a domestic dispute,
accompanied by Marines. They had just gone up to the
door when two shotgun birdshot rounds were fired
through the door, hitting the officers. One yelled ‘cover
me!’ to the Marines, who then laid down a heavy base of
fire. . . . The police officer had not meant ‘shoot’ when
he yelled ‘cover me’ to the Marines. [He] meant . . . point
your weapons and be prepared to respond if necessary.
However, the Marines responded instantly in the precise
way they had been trained, where ‘cover me’ means
provide me with cover using firepower. . . . over two
hundred bullets [were] fired into that house.”
– James D. Delk, Fires & Furies: The L.A. Riots
LA Riots Review
• Discuss in terms of
– Nontraditional environment
– Operational constraints
– Cross-cultural interaction
Bush’s 2002 National Security
Strategy
• September 11 attack creates new
conditions
• NSS includes concept of preemptive
actions
Bush’s 2002 National Security
Strategy
• “The United States has long maintained the
option of preemptive actions to counter a
sufficient threat to our national security. The
greater the threat, the greater is the risk of
inaction— and the more compelling the case for
taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves,
even if uncertainty remains as to the time and
place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or
prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries,
the United States will, if necessary, act
preemptively.”
Axis of Evil
• In his Jan 29, 2002 State of the Union
Address, Bush had labeled Iraq, Iran,
and North Korea as comprising an
“axis of evil” of “regimes that sponsor
terror”
• In Sept 2002, the Director of Central
Intelligence issued a report stating,
“Iraq has continued its weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) programs in
defiance of UN resolutions and
restrictions. Baghdad has chemical
and biological weapons as well as
missiles with ranges in excess of UN
restrictions; if left unchecked, it
probably will have a nuclear weapon
during this decade.”
• Bush felt reports such as this justified
him to take preemptive action against
Iraq
Next
• Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Global War on
Terror