Strategic Alliance v. Radstock Securities, GR No. 178158, December 4, 2009
COA – Section 2: GENERAL FUNCTIONS
FACTS:
The case is about a bidder of Government PNCC shares and securities, Strategic Alliance Development Corporation (STRADEC)
who has alleged its claim against PNCC (formerly Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP)), a GOCC that
has issued guarantee letters for a loan obtained from Radstock Securities Limited. The said loan was originally made against
Marubeni Corporation which was later assigned to Radstock.
ISSUE:
Whether or not GOCCs are included in the audit jurisdiction of COA.
HELD:
GOCCs are included in the audit jurisdiction of COA as its jurisdiction extends not only to government "agencies or
instrumentalities," but also to "government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters" as well as "other governmentowned or controlled corporations" without original charters.
Uy, et al v. COA, GR No. 130685, March 21, 2000
COA – Section 2: GENERAL FUNCTIONS
FACTS:
Former Governor Paredes dismissed from service more than sixty employees, allegedly to scale down the operations of the office.
The Merit Systems Protection Board (under CSC) rendered a decision that the reduction in work force was not done in accordance
with civil service rules and regulations, and ordered the reinstatement of the workers. The Commission on Audit (COA) rendered a
decision ruling that the back salaries of the workers have become the personal liability of the Governor because the illegal dismissal
was done in bad faith.
ISSUE:
Whether or not COA, in the exercise of its power to audit, can disallow the payment of back wages of illegally dismissed employees
by the Provincial Government of Agusan del Sur which has been decreed pursuant to a final decision of the CSC.
HELD:
NO. The audit authority of COA is intended to prevent irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable
expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties. Payment of backwages to illegally dismissed government
employees can hardly be described as irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable.
Further, Gov. Paredes was never made a party to nor served a notice of the proceedings before the COA and it would be unfair to
hold him personally liable for the claims of petitioners without giving him an opportunity to be heard and present evidence in his
defense.
Davao City Water District v. CSC and COA, GR No. 95237, September 13, 1991
COA – Section 2: GENERAL FUNCTIONS
FACTS:
The case at bar clarifies conflicting jurisprudence with regard to the whether PD 198 is a special law (with grant original charters) or
a general legislation and whether such corporations are under the jurisdiction of CSC and COA. Petitioners claim that in Metro Iloilo
Water District v. NLRC, et al.,PD 198 is a general legislation empowering government agencies and entities to create water districts
and that the PD cannot be considered a charter in itself creating the water district. Respondents however site Tanjay Water District
v. Gabaton, et al, which state the PD No. 198, as amended, is the original charter of … all water districts in the country and thus
come under the coverage of CSC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not water districts created under PD 198 are GOCC with original charters and are thus under the jurisdiction of CSC and
COA?
HELD:
Yes, water districts are considered GOCCs with original charters as they conform to such definition of corporations
created by a special law and not under the Corporation Code of the Philippines. PD198, which is applicable only to different
water districts created pursuant thereto, is a special law as it pertains to a special purpose which is intended to meet a particular set
of conditions and circumstances.
Thus, water districts are deemed "government-owned or controlled corporations with original charter" and fall under the jurisdiction
of the public respondents CSC and COA.
Parreno v. COA, GR No. 162224, June 7, 2007
COA – Section 2: GENERAL FUNCTIONS
Topic: Prospective and retrospective effect of laws.
Facts: a petition for certiorari assailing the January 9, 2003 decision and January 13, 2004 resolution of the COA filed by 2lt
Salvador Parreno (ret) represented by his daughter.
Salvador Parreno served in the AFP for 32 years and was retired on January 1982. He received payment of his lump sum pension
and started receiving his monthly pension in 1985. Petitioner migrated to Hawaii and became a naturalized American citizen. In
January 2001, the AFP stopped petitioner’s monthly pension in accordance with sec. 27 of P.D. 1638 which provides that a retiree
who loses his Filipino citizenship shall be removed from the retired list and his retirement benefits terminated upon loss of Filipino
citizenship. Petitioner requested for reconsideration but AFP JAGO denied his request.
Petitioner filed a claim before the COA for the continuance of his monthly pension but on January 9, 2003, COA denied his claim for
lack of jurisdiction. COA ruled that the issue at hand requires the courts as mandated by the constitution to determine the validity of
the law re: P.D. 1638 sec. 27.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but on January 13, 2004, in its resolution COA denied the motion further ruling that even
if assumed jurisdiction over the claim, petitioner’s entitlement to the retirement benefits he was previously receiving must necessarily
cease upon the loss of his Filipino citizenship in accordance with sec. 27 of P.D. 1638 as amended.
Petitioner argued that P.D. 1638, as amended applies prospectively and should apply only to those who joined the military service
after its effectivity.
ISSUE: Whether COA has jurisdiction on the case
HELD: No. The COA can decide money claims based on law. But if a money claim is denied by law, COA has no authority to pass
judgement on the constitutionality of the law.
Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. COA, 651 SCRA 146
COA – Section 2: GENERAL FUNCTIONS
Facts: The COA issued a resolution in 1999 defining its policy with respect to the audit of the Boy Scouts of the Philippine, which
was created as a public corporation, and that in BSP vs. NLRC, the SC ruled that the BSP, as constituted under its charter, was a
GOCC within the meaning of Art. IX (B) (2) (1) of the Constitution, and that the BSP is regarded as a government instrumentality
under the Administrative Code. For the purposes of audit supervision, the BSP shall be classified among the government
corporations to be audited by employing the team audit approach. The BSP sought reconsideration of the COA Resolution in a letter
signed by then BSP National President Jejomar C. Binay, saying that it is not subject to the COA’s jurisdiction.
Issue: Does the test of economic viability apply to public corporations dealing with governmental functions?
Held: Art. XII, Sec. 16 bans the creation of private corporations by special law, but the said constitutional provision should not be
construed so as to prohibit the creation of public corporations or a corporate agency or instrumentality of the government intended to
serve a public interest or purpose. This should not be measured on the basis of economic viability, but according to the public
interest or purpose it serves as envisioned by par. 2, Art. 44 of the Civil Code, and of the Administrative Code. The BSP is a public
corporation or a government agency or instrumentality with juridical personality, which does not fall within the constitutional
prohibition in Article XII, Section 16, notwithstanding the amendments to its charter. Not all corporations, which are not government
owned or controlled, are ipso facto to be considered private corporations as there exists another distinct class of corporations or
chartered institutions which are otherwise known as "public corporations." These corporations are treated by law as agencies or
instrumentalities of the government which are not subject to the tests of ownership or control and economic viability but to different
criteria relating to their public purposes/interests or constitutional policies and objectives and their administrative relationship to the
government or any of its Departments or Offices.
Cordillera Broad Coalition v. COA, GR No. 79956, January 26, 1990
ARTICLE X Section 1. Territorial and Political Subdivisions of the Philippines
Facts: EO 220 dated July 15, 1987 creates the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) creating a temporary administrative agency
pending the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region. EO 220, issued by the President in the exercise of her legislative powers
under Art. XVIII, sec. 6 of the Constitution, created the CAR. It was created to accelerate economic and social growth in the region
and to prepare for the establishment of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras. Its main function is to coordinate the planning and
implementation of programs and services in the region, particularly, to coordinate with the local government units as well as with the
executive departments of the National Government in the supervision of field offices and in identifying, planning, monitoring, and
accepting projects and activities in the region. It shall also monitor the implementation of all ongoing national and local government
projects in the region. The CAR shall have a Cordillera Regional Assembly as a policy-formulating body and a Cordillera Executive
Board as an implementing arm. The CAR and the Assembly and Executive Board shall exist until such time as the autonomous
regional government is established and organized.
In these cases, petitioners principally argue that by issuing E.O. No. 220 the President, in the exercise of her legislative powers prior
to the convening of the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution, has virtually pre-empted Congress from its mandated task of
enacting an organic act and created an autonomous region in the Cordilleras.
Issue: Whether EO 220 thereby create a territorial and political subdivision
Held: No. What is created is not a public corporation but an executive agency under the control of the national government. It is
more similar to the regional development councils which the president may create under Art. X Sec. 14
Limbona v. Conte Mangelin, et al, GR No. 80391, February 28, 1989
ARTICLE X Section 2: Local Autonomy
Facts: On March 12, 1987 petitioner Limbona was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of
Central Mindanao. On November 2, 1987, members of Regional Legislative Assembly sans the petitioner Limbona convened in
defiance to short recess called for by petitioner as the latter was to attend a congressional committee hearing for Muslim Affairs in
Congress. During the convention, having acquired quorum, members thereof move to declare the Speakership of the Regional
Legislative Assembly vacant, thereby expelling petitioner from office. Petitioner Limbona filed petition for injunction praying that a
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining respondents from proceeding with their session to be held on
November 5, 1987, and on any day thereafter and that judgment be rendered declaring the proceedings held by respondents of their
session on November 2, 1987 as null and void. In view thereof, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to hear and decide matters
over autonomous region was challenged by respondents.
Issue: Whether or not autonomous governments of Mindanao, as they are now constituted, subject to the jurisdiction of the national
courts?
Ruling: Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of
administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of
government power and in the process to make local governments ‘more responsive and accountable,’ ‘and ensure their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social
progress.’ At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate
on national concerns….
“Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units
declare to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with
minimum intervention from central government authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts
to ‘self-immolation,’ since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its
constituency.”
San Juan v. CSC, 196 SCRA 69 (1991)
ARTICLE X Section 2: Local Autonomy
Facts: The Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal (PBO) was left vacant; thereafter Rizal Governor San Juan, peititioner, nominated
Dalisay Santos for the position and the latter quickly assumed position. However, Director Abella of Region IV Department of Budget
and Management (DBM) did not endorse the nominee, and recommended private respondent Cecilia Almajose as PBO on the
ground that she was the most qualified. This appointment was subsequently approved by the DBM. Petitioner protested the
appointment of Almajose before the DBM and the Civil Service Commission who both dismissed his complaints. His arguments rest
on his contention that he has the sole right and privilege to recommend the nominees to the position of PBO and that the appointee
should come only from his nominees. The law says that the budget officer shall be appointed by the Department head upon the
recommendation of the head of local government subject to civil service rules and regulations. If none of those recommended by the
local government head meets the requirement of law.
Issue: Whether or not the Department head may appoint anyone he chooses?
Ruling: No. He must return the recommendations of the local government head explaining why the recommendees are not qualified
and ask for new recommendations. In other words, the recommendation of the local government head is a conditio sine qua non
(requirement) of the Department’s appointing authority. This is the only way local autonomy can be given the recognition the
Constitution wants it to have. When in doubt, favor autonomy.
Magtajas v. Pryce Properties, GR No. 111097, July 20, 1994
ARTICLE X Section 2: Local Autonomy
Facts: On December 7, 1992, Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City enacted ordinance 3353, prohibiting the issuance
of business permit and cancelling existing business permit to any establishment for the using and allowing to use its premises or
portion thereof for the operation of a casino. On January 4, 1993, it enacted Ordinance 3375-93, prohibiting the operation of casino
and providing penalty for violation therefore. Pryce assailed the ordinances before the CA, where it was joined by PAGCOR as
intervener. The Court found the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement. CDO City and its
mayor filed a petition for review under Rules of Court with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the Sangguniang Panlungsod can prohibit the establishment of casino operated by PAGCOR through an
ordinance?
Ruling: No. Local governments have certain powers given by the Constitution which may not be curtailed by the national
government, but that, outside of these, local governments may not pass ordinances contrary to statute.
The government of Cagayan de Oro City contended that, under its authority to prohibit gambling, the city could prevent the
Philippine Games and Amusement Board (PAGCOR) from operating a casino in the city. PAGCOR, however, had authority under
P.D. 1869 to centralize and regulate all games of chance under the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. In ruling that Cagayan de
Oro City could not curtail PAGCOR’s authority, the court in no uncertain terms said: “Municipal governments are only agents of the
national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national
lawmaking body.”
Leynes v. COA, GR No. 143596, Dec. 11, 2003
ARTICLE X Section 2: Local Autonomy
FACTS: This is a case regarding the constitutionality of the act of COA Provincial Auditor in disallowing the Sangguniang Bayan of
Naujan in granting RTC Judge Tomas C. Leynes an increase in monthly rice and transportation allowance through the latter’s
Resolution No. 057. COA disallowed the said act on the basis of Republic Act No. 7645 “General Appropriations Act of 1993”
Section 36 that states that one shall not be allowed to claim RATA from more than one source.
ISSUE: Whether or not COA’s application of RA 7645 Section 36 is unconstitutional.
HELD: YES. COA misconstrued RA 7645 Section 36. The said section is merely an administrative tool employed by the DBM to
prevent the much-abused practice of multiple allowance by standardizing the grant of RATA by national agencies; it does not apply
to local government funds. To unjustly widen the coverage of the questioned section to include local government policies will be in
grave violation of Section 2 Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution which guarantees the local autonomy of the State’s territorial and
political subdivisions. Genuine and meaningful autonomy of local government agencies shall be ensured only when, as in this case,
the power to grant allowances is provided to the local government with the discretion as to the amount of the said allowances
depending on the fund availability.
Batangas CATV v. CA and Batangas City, GR No. 138810, September 29, 2004
ARTICLE X Section 2: Local Autonomy
FACTS: This is a case regarding the constitutionality of Resolution No. 210 enacted by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Batangas
City. This Resolution gave the petitioner the permit to conduct, install and operate a CATV in Batangas, provided that, in accordance
with Section 8 of the said Resolution, increase of subscriber rates shall be subject to the approval of the Sanggunian. Petitioner later
increased its rates without seeking for approval; hence, respondent threatened petitioner to possible revocation of the permit; hence,
this case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the local government have the authority to regulate CATV subscriber rates.
HELD: No, LGUs does not have the authority to regulate CATV rates. The National Telecommunications Commission has the
regulatory power over technical matters of CATV, including the determination of “fair” subscriber rates. Although the LGU can
regulate CATVs under the general welfare clause governing local government units, this local autonomy has limits. These limits was
crossed by Resolution No. 210 which violated the mandate of existing laws and the State’s deregulation policy over the CATV
industry. In the case at bar, the Sanggunian illegally usurped the jurisdiction of the NTC.
Garcia v. COMELEC, 227 SCRA 100 (1993
ARTICLE X Section 3: Local Government Code
FACTS: This is a case on the question of constitutionality of Section 70 of the Local Government Code. In accord with Section 70 of
the local government code, some mayors, vice-mayors and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of twelve Bataan municipalities
formed a Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRAC) to initiate the recall election of petitioner Governor Garcia as governor of Bataan on
the ground of loss of confidence. COMELEC scheduled the said elections. Garcia contends the constitutionality of Section 70 of the
Local Government Code on the ground that a recall election through the PRAC is unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 70 of the Local Government Code is unconstitutional.
HELD: No, it is not unconstitutional. The Constitution did not provide for any means to be followed in conducting a recall election.
Section 3 Article X of the Constitution mandates that the Congress shall enact a local government code which will provide for a
more responsive and accountable local government structure through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of
recall, initiative, and referendum. It is clear from the aforementioned section that the Congress is given the power to choose the
means of recall it deems to be most effective to support the judgment of the electorate and not to mandate the Congress into
choosing a particular mechanism of initiating recall elections.
Malonzo v. COMELEC, 269 SCRA 380 (1997)
ARTICLE X Section 3: Local Government Code
1.)
Ganzon v. CA, 200 SCRA 271
ARTICLE X Section 4: Supervision of the President
Facts:
Ganzon was then the mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were filed against him on grounds of misconduct and misfeasance of office.
Secretary of Local Government issued a 600 day suspension against Ganzon based on the merits of the complaints filed against
him. Ganzon appealed the issue to the CA and suspension order by the Secretary was affirmed. Ganzon said that the Constitution
does not authorize the President nor any of his alter ego to suspend and remove local officials; because the Constitution supports
local autonomy and strengthens the same and what was given by it was mere supervisory power.
Issue:
Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the President’s alter ego, can suspend and or remove local officials.
Held:
Yes. Secretary of Local Government is exercising a valid power. He, however, overstepped by imposing a 600 day suspension.
Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes
the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. Legally, supervision is not
incompatible with disciplinary authority. SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by the
President over local government officials in contrast to the power of control given to him over executive officials of our gov’t, where it
was emphasized that control and supervision are two different things. From the pronouncement given, it cannot be inferred that the
power of supervision of the President over local gov’t officials does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion the
good of the public service so requires.
Joson v. Torres, 290 SCRA 279
ARTICLE X Section 4: Supervision of the President
Facts:
This case is about the validity of the suspension of petitioner Eduardo Joson as governor of Nueva Ecija. Private respondent filed a
letter of complaint to the office of the president charging Joson with grave misconduct and abuse of authority. According to
respondents, in one of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan meeting, Joson barged into the hall in order to harass them into approving
the loan 150m pesos from PNB. They did not approve the loan because there is still a pending obligation and they can’t afford to
enter into another. They were thus summoned by the DILG to a settlement but did not comply so they were asked to give answers
with regards to the non-settlement where, Joson failed to do so and so was declared of waiving his right. Joson filed motion to
dismiss alleging that the letter of complaint was not verified on the day it was filed and hat DILG had no jurisdiction over the case
and no authority to require him to answer. Executive Secretary Torres issued an order, by authority of President, placing petitioner
Joson on a 60 days suspension pending investigation on the charges against him.
Issue:
Whether or not the DILG has investigating authority over the case.
Held:
Yes. There are 2 authorities in jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions against elective local officials, the Disciplining
Authority (DA)– President and the Investigating Authority(IA) – The Secretary of Interior and Local Gov’t. The Sec of DILG is not an
exclusive IA. The power of the President over admin. disciplinary cases against elective officials is derived from his power of general
supervision over local gov’t. The power to discipline evidently includes investigation. However, delegates the power to investigate to
the DILG or a special investigating committee as may be constituted DA which is not undue delegation. The Pres. remains the DA
and what is delegated is the power to investigate. The power of DILG to investigate admin. complaints is based on the doctrine –
decision of executive officials is valid as if it is the decision of the Pres. The DILG was the one who asked Joson to file his answer.
However, what happened is not fatal. Pres found complaint sufficient in form and substance to warrant further investigation.
Drilon v. Lim, 235 SCRA 135 (1994)
ARTICLE X Section 4: Supervision of the President
Facts:
Pursuant to Sec 187 of the local gov’t code, Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to him, declared ordinance no. 7794, the manila
Revenue Code, null and void for non compliance and for being contrary to law and public policy. In a petition for certiorari filed by
the City of Manila, RTC of Manila revoked the Secretary’s resolution and sustained the ordinance. It declared sec 187 of the local
gov’t code as unconstitutional because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the power of control over local govt’s in violation
of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution and of the specific provision therein conferring on the President of the
Philippines only the power of supervision over local govt’s.
Issue:
Whether or not Secretary of Justice can exercise control, rather than supervision, over the local gov’t.
Held:
No. An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or
re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor
merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify
or replace them. In the opinion of the Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less than this, and so performed an
act not of control but of mere supervision.
Province of Negros v. COA, GR No. 182574, September 28, 2010
ARTICLE X Section 4: Supervision of the President
IMPORTANT POINT: LGUs are subject only to the power of general supervision of the President, the President’s authority is limited
to seeing to it that rules are followed and laws are faithfully executed.
FACTS: The Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Negro Occidental passed a resolution allocating 4-million of its retained earnings for
the healthcare of the employees of the province. The insurance coverage was awarded to Philam Care. The Provincial Auditor,
however, issued a Notice of Suspension for the agreement between Philam Care and the Province of Negros for lack of approval
from the President (see note 1 for AO 103). The President then ordered that the suspension be lifted up to the amount of 100,000,
however, the Commission on Audit ignore the presidential directive.
NOTE 1: What was in AO 103? No governm ent entity, includi ng a local governm ent unit, is exem pt from securing
prio r approval from the President granting additional benefits to its personnel. This is in conformity with the policy of
standardization of compensation laid down in RA 6758.
ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the COA of disallowance valid?
HELD: NO The grant of additional compensation like hospitalization and health care insurance does not require approval of the
President to be valid.
LTO v. City of Butuan, 322 SCRA 805
ARTICLE X Section 5: Power of Taxation

Lina v. Pano, 364 SCRA 76 (2001)
ARTICLE X Section 5: Power of Taxation
FACTS:On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent bythe Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
(PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for theoperation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna,for a
mayor’s permit to open lotto outlet. This was denied by Mayor Cataquiz on theground that an ordinance was passed by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Lagunaentitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T.1995 which reads: “ISANG KAPASIYAHAN TINUTUTULAN
ANG MGA ILLEGAL GAMBLING LALO NA ANG LOTTO SA LALAWIGANNG LAGUNA”As A Result of denial, respondent Calvento
filed a complaint for declaratoryrelief with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.Petitioners contend that :
(1)the assailed resolution is a valid policy declaration of the Provincial Government of Laguna of its vehement objection to the
operation of lotto and all forms of gambling;(2) It is likewise a valid exercise of the provincialgovernment’s police power under the
General Welfare Clause of R.A. 7160otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991;(3) they also maintain
thatrespondent’s lotto operation is illegal because no prior consultations and approvalby the local government were sought before it
was implemented contrary to theexpress provisions of Sections 2 (c) and 27 of R.A. 7160. For his part, respondentCalvento argues
that the resolution is, in effect, a curtailment of the power of thestate since in this case the national legislature itself had already
declared lotto aslegal. As for the allegation that no prior consultations and approval were soughtfrom the sangguninang
panlalawigan of Laguna, respondent stated as a declarationof policy and not a self-executing provision of LGC of 1991.The
respondent judge,Francisco Pano promulgated his decision enjoining the petitioners fromimplementing or enforcing resolution of
Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995. Motion forreconsideration was denied. Thus, petitioners filed petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE/S:1.W h et h e r K a p a s i yah a n B l g . 5 0 8 , T . 1995 of t he S angguni ang P anl al a wi gan of Laguna and the denial of a
mayor’s permit based thereon are valid2 .W h e t h e r pri or c ons ultat i ons and approval by t he c onc erned
S a n g g u n i a n are needed before a lotto system can be operated in a given localgovernment unit.
RULING: The Petition is denied. The Court ruled that the ordinance merely states the“objection” of the council to said game. It is but
a mere policy statement on the partof the local council, which is not self-executing. Nor could it serve as a valid groundto prohibit the
operation of the lotto system in the province of Laguna. As a policystatement expressing the local government’s objection to the
lotto, such resolutionis valid. This is part of the local government’s autonomy to air its views whichmaybe contrary to that of the
national govern
Petron v. Mayor, GR No. 158881, April 16, 2008
ARTICLE X Section 5: Power of Taxation
FACTS:
Court records showed that Petron, which maintains a depot or bulk plant atthe Novatas Fishport Complex in Navotas, received a
letter from respondentNavotas Mayor Tobias Tiangco, wherein the firm was assessed taxescovering its sale of diesel from 1997 to
2001.The Navotas city governmentdemanded payment of P10.2 million representing Petron’s “deficiency taxes.”Petron filed with
Navotas a letter-protest to the notice of assessmentpursuant to Section 195 of the Code. It argued that it was exempt from
localbusiness taxes in view of Article 232 of the Implementin Rules of the LGC aswell as the ruling of the Bureau of Local
Government Finance of theDepartment of Finance. Owing to the denial of its protest, Petron filed withthe RTC in Malabon a
complaint for cancellation of assessment for deficiencytaxes with prayer for the issuance of a temprorary restraining order
andpreliminary injunction.On May 5, 2003, the RTC in Malabon rendered its decision dismissingPetron’s complaint and ordering the
payment of the assessed amount.After 11 days, Petron received a closure order from Tiangco, directing it tocease and desist from
operating the bulk plant, prompting it to elevate thecase to the SC.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not local government unit is empowered under the Local Government Code (the LGC) to impose business
taxes on persons or entitiese ngaged in the sale of petroleum products.
HELD:
The power of a municipality to impose business taxes is provided for in Section 143 of the LGC. Under the provision, a municipality
is authorized toi mpose business taxes on a whole host of business activities. Suffice it to say, unless there is another provision of
law which states otherwise, Section 1 43, broad in scope as it is, would undoubtedly cover the business of selling diesel fuels, or
any other petroleum product for that matter.
MAIN POINT:
The power to tax by LGU is liberally interpreted in its favor against the state, but is strictly construed against the local government in
favor of the taxpayer.
Yamane v. BA Lepanto Condominium, GR No. 154993, October 25, 2005
ARTICLE X Section 5: Power of Taxation
Facts:
Petitioner City Treasurer of Makati holds respondent, in a Notice of Assessment, liable to pay the correct business taxes, fees and
charges totaling to P1.6M in which the respondents protested contending that condominium does not fall under the definition of a
business, thus, they are not liable for such taxes.
Issue:
Whether or not the City Treasurer of Makati may collect business taxes on condominium corporations
Held:
Petition denied. Accordingly, and with significant degree of comfort, we hold that condominium corporations are generally exempt
from local business taxation under the LGC, irrespective of any local ordinance that seeks to declare otherwise.The power of the
local government units to impose taxes within its territorial jurisdiction derives from the Constitution itself, which recognizes the
power of these units “to create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to such guidelines and
limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy.
MAIN POINT:
The power of LGU to impose taxes within its jurisdiction is recognized by constitution to create its own source of revenue and to levy
taxes, fees and charges subject guidelines and limitations provided by congress, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy.
Philippine Petroleum v. Municipality of Pililla, GR No. 90773, June 3, 1991
ARTICLE X Section 5: Power of Taxation
Facts:
Petitioner, Philippine Petroleum Corporation (PPC for short) is a business enterprise engaged in the manufacture of lubricated oil
base stocks which is a petroleum product, with its refinery plant situated at Malaya, Pililla, Rizal, conducting its business activities
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Pililla, Rizal.Under Section 142 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1939,
manufactured oils and other fuels are subject to specific tax.Later, Presidential Decree No. 231, otherwise known as the Local Tax
Code was issued by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos governing the exercise by provinces, cities, municipalities and barrios of
their taxing and other revenue-raising powers. Sections 19 and 19(a) thereof, provide among others, that the municipality may
impose taxes on business, except on those for which fixed taxes are provided on manufacturers, importers or producers of any
article of commerce of whatever kind or nature. The Secretary of Finance issued a Circular directed to all provincial, city and
municipal treasurers to refrain from collecting any local tax imposed in old or new tax ordinances in the business of manufacturing,
wholesaling, retailing, or dealing in petroleum products subject to the specific tax under the National Internal Revenue Code.
Likewise, another Circular was issued by the Secretary of Finance instructing all City Treasurers to refrain from collecting any local
tax imposed in tax ordinances enacted before or after the effectivity of the Local Tax Code as provided before.Meanwhile,
Respondent Municipality of Pililla enacted Municipal Tax Ordinance No. 1 otherwise known as "The Pililla Tax Code of 1974 ".
Sections 9 and 10 of the said ordinance imposed a tax on business, except for those for which fixed taxes are provided in the Local
Tax Code. P.D. 436 was promulgated increasing the specific tax all petroleum based products levied under Sections 142, 144 and
145 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and granting provinces, cities and municipalities certain shares in the
specific tax on such products in lieu of local taxes imposed on petroleum products. Provincial Circular No. 6-77 was also issued
directing all city and municipal treasurers to refrain from collecting the so-called storage fee onflammable or combustible materials
imposed under the local tax ordinance of their respective locality, said fee partaking of the nature of a strictlyrevenue measure or
service charge. P.D.1158 otherwise known as the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977 was enacted, Section 153 of which
specifically imposes specific tax on refined and manufactured mineral oils and motor fuels. Enforcing the provisions of the abovementioned ordinance, the respondent filed a complaint on April 4, 1986 docketed as Civil Case No. 057-T against PPC for the
collection of the business tax from 1979 to 1986; storage permit fees from 1975 to 1986; mayor's permit and sanitary inspection fees
from 1975 to 1984. PPC, however, have already paid the last-named fees starting 1985. The trial court rendered a decision against
the petitioner. Hence, the instant petition.
Issue:
Whether or not PPC whose oil products are subject to specific tax under the NIRC, is still liable to pay taxes on business and
storage fees, considering Provincial Circular No. 6-77, mayor's permit and sanitary inspection fee under Municipal Ordinance No.1.
Held:
Yes
PPC contends that: (a) Provincial Circular No. 2673 declared as contrary to national economic policy the imposition of local taxes on
the manufacture of petroleum products as they are already subject to specific tax under the National Internal Revenue Code; (b) the
above declaration covers not only old tax ordinances but new ones, as well as those which may be enacted in the future; (c) both
Provincial Circulars (PC) 26-73 and 26 A-73 are still effective, hence, unless and until revoked, any effort on the part of the
respondent to collect the suspended tax on business from the petitioner would be illegal and unauthorized; and (d)Section 2 of P.D.
436 prohibits the imposition of local taxeson petroleum products. PC No. 26-73 and PC No. 26 A-73 suspended the effectivity of
local tax ordinances imposing a tax on business under Section 19 (a) of the Local Tax Code, with regard to manufacturers, retailers,
wholesalers or dealers in petroleum products subject to the specific tax under the NIRC, in view of Section 22 (b) of the Code
regarding non-imposition by municipalities of taxes on articles, subject tospecific tax under the provisions of the NIRC. There is no
question that Pililla's Municipal Tax Ordinance No. 1, imposing the assailed taxes, fees and charges is valide specially. Section 9 (A)
which according to the trial court "was lifted in toto and/or is a literal reproduction of Section19 (a) of the Local Tax Code as
amended by P.D. No. 426." It conforms with the mandate of said law. But P.D. No. 426 amending the Local Tax Code is deemed to
have repealed Provincial Circular Nos. 26-73 and 26 A-73 issued by the Secretary of Finance when Sections 19 and 19(a) were
carried over into P.D. No. 426 and no exemptions were given to manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, ordealers in petroleum
products. Well-settled is the rule that administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. In case of
discrepancy between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, the former prevails. Furthermore, while Section 2 of P.D.
436 prohibits the imposition of local taxes on petroleum products, said decree did not amend Sections19 and 19 (a) of P.D. 231 as
amended by P.D. 426, wherein the municipality is granted the right to levy taxes onbusiness of manufacturers, importers, producers
of any article of commerce of whatever kind or nature. A tax on business is distinct from a tax on the article itself. Thus, if the
imposition of tax on business of manufacturers, thait is in petroleum products contravenes a declared national policy, it should have
been expressly stated in P.D. No. 436. The exercise by local governments of the power to tax is ordained by the present
Constitution. To allow the continuous effectivity of the prohibition set forth in PC No.26-73 (1) would be tantamount to restricting their
power totax by mere administrative issuances. Under Section 5,Article X of the 1987 Constitution, only guidelines and limitations
that may be established by Congress can define and limit such power of local governments. Provincial Circular No. 6-77 enjoining
all city and municipal treasurers to refrain from collecting the so-called storage fee on flammable or combustible materials imposed
in the loca ltax ordinance of their respective locality frees petitioner PPC from the payment of storage permit fee. The storage permit
fee being imposed by Pililla's tax ordinance is a fee for the installation and keeping in storage of any flammable, combustible or
explosive substances. In asmuch as said storage makes use of tanks owned not by the municipality of Pililla, but by petitioner PPC,
same is obviously not a charge for any service rendered by the municipality as what is envisioned in Section 37 of the same Code.
Section 10 (z) (13) of Pililla's Municipal Tax Ordinance No. 1 prescribing a permit fee is a permit fee allowed under Section 36 of the
amended Code. As to the authority of the mayor to waive payment of the mayor's permit and sanitary inspection fees, the trial court
did not err in holding that "since the power to tax includes the power to exempt thereof which is essentially a legislative prerogative,
it follows that a municipal mayor who is an executive officer may not unilaterally withdraw such an expression of a policy thru the
enactment of a tax." The waiver partakes of the nature of an exemption. It is anancient rule that exemptions from taxation are
construed instrictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. Tax exemptions are looked upon with
disfavor. Thus, in the absence of a clear and express exemption from the payment of said fees, the waiver cannot be recognized. As
already stated, it is the law-making body, and not an executive like the mayor, who can make anexemption. Under Section 36 of the
Code, a permit fee like the mayor's permit, shall be required before any individualor juridical entity shall engage in any business or
occupation under the provisions of the Code. However, since the Local Tax Code does not provide the prescriptive period for
collection of local taxes, Article 1143 of the Civil Code applies. Said law provides that an action upon an obligation created by law
prescribes within ten (10) years from the time the right of action accrues. The Municipality of Pililla can therefore enforce the
collection of the tax on business of petitioner PPC due from 1976 to 1986, and NOT the tax that had accrued prior to 1976.
John Hay People’s Alternative Coalition v. Lim, GR No. 119775, October 24, 2003
ARTICLE X Section 5: Power of Taxation
Facts:
The controversy stemmed from the issuance of Proclamation No. 420 by then President Ramos declaring a portionof
Camp John Hay as a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) and creating a regime of tax exemption within the John HaySpecial Economic Zone.
In the present petition, petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the proclamation. The Court also held that it is the legislature, unless limited by a provision of the
Constitution, that has the full powerto exempt any person or corporation or class of property from taxation, its power to exempt being as
broad as itspower to tax. The challenged grant of tax exemption would circumvent the Constitution's imposition that a lawgranting any
tax exemption must have the concurrence of a majority of all the members of Congress. Moreover, theclaimed statutory exemption of the John Hay SEZ
from taxation should be manifest and unmistakable from thelanguage of the law on which it is based. Thus, the Court declared that
the grant by Proclamation No. 420 of taxexemption and other privileges to the John Hay SEZ was void for being violative of the
Constitution. However, theentire assailed proclamation cannot be declared unconstitutional, the other parts thereof not being
repugnant tothe law or the Constitution. The delineation and declaration of a portion of the area covered by Camp John Hay as aSEZ was well within the
powers of the President to do so by means of a proclamation. Where part of a statute isvoid as contrary to the Constitution, while another part is
valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, as inthe case at bar, may stand and be enforced.
Issue:
WON the petitioners have legal standing to bring
Ruling:
YES.
Manila Electric v. Province of Laguna, GR No. 131359, May 5, 1999
ARTICLE X Section 5: Power of Taxation
Facts:
On various dates, certain municipalities of the Province of Laguna including, Biñan, Sta Rosa, San Pedro, Luisiana,
Calauan and Cabuyao, by virtue of existing laws then in effect, issued resolutions through their respective municipal councils
granting franchise in favor of petitioner Manila Electric Company (“MERALCO”) for the supply of electric light, heat and power within
their concerned areas. On 19 January 1983, MERALCO was likewise granted a franchise by the National Electrification
Administration to operate an electric light and power service in the Municipality of Calamba, Laguna.
On 12 September 1991, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the “Local Government Code of 1991,” was enacted to take
effect on 01 January 1992 enjoining local government units to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees and
charges, subject to the limitations expressed therein, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Pursuant to the provisions
of the Code, respondent province enacted Laguna Provincial Ordinance No. 01-92, effective 01 January 1993, providing, in part, as
follows:
“Sec. 2.09. Franchise Tax. – There is hereby imposed a tax on businesses enjoying a franchise, at a rate of fifty percent (50%) of
one percent (1%) of the gross annual receipts, which shall include both cash sales and sales on account realized during the
preceding calendar year within this province, including the territorial limits on any city located in the province”
Issue:
Whether the tax exemption privilege is to be withdrawn or not – rather than on whether the law can withdraw, without
violating the Constitution, the tax exemption or not.
Held:
While the Court has, not too infrequently, referred to tax exemptions contained in special franchises as being in the nature
of contracts and a part of the inducement for carrying on the franchise, these exemptions, nevertheless, are far from being strictly
contractual in nature. Contractual tax exemptions, in the real sense of the term and where the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution can rightly be invoked, are those agreed to by the taxing authority in contracts, such as those contained in government
bonds or debentures, lawfully entered into by them under enabling laws in which the government, acting in its private capacity,
sheds its cloak of authority and waives its governmental immunity.
Batangas Power v. Batangas City, GR No. 152675, April 28, 2004
ARTICLE X Section 5: Power of Taxation
Facts:
In the early 1990’s, power outages lasted 8-12 hours daily and power generation was badly needed. The government,
through the National Power Corporation (NPC), sought to attract investors in power plant operations by providing them with
incentives, oneof which was through the NPC’s assumption of payment of their taxes in the Build Operate and Transfer (BOT)
Agreement.On June 29, 1992, Enron Power Development Corporation (Enron) and petitioner NPC entered into a Fast Track BOT
Project. Enronagreed to supply a power station to NPC and transfer its plant to the latter after ten (10) years of operation.
On September 23, 1992, the BOI issued a certificate of registration to BPC as a pioneer enterprise entitled to a tax holiday for
aperiod of six (6) years .On October 12, 1998, Batangas City sent a letter to BPC demanding payment of business taxes and
penalties,commencing from the year 1994, BPC refused to pay, citing its tax-exempt status as a pioneer enterprise for six (6) years
under Section 133 (g) of the Local Government Code (LGC). The city’s tax claim was modified and demanded payment of business
taxesfrom BPC only for the years 1998-1999. BPC still refused to pay the tax. It insisted that its 6-year tax holiday commenced from
thedate of its commercial operation on July 16, not from the date of its BOI registration in September 1992. In the alternative, BPC
asserted that the city should collect the tax from the NPC as the latter assumed responsibility for its payment under their BOT
Agreement. On August 26, 1999, the NPC intervened. While admitting assumptionof BPC’s tax obligations under their BOT
Agreement, NPC refused to pay.
Issue:
Whether or not NPC’s tax exemption privileges under its Charter were withdrawn by Section 193 of the Local Government
Code (LGC).
Held: Yes.
Smart Communications v. City of Davao, GR No. 155491, September 16, 2008
ARTICLE X Section 5: Power of Taxation
Facts
Smart filed a special civil action for declaratory relief for the ascertainment of its rights and obligations under the Tax Code of the
City of Davao, particularly Section 1, Article 10 thereof, the pertinent portion of which reads:
Respondents filed their Answer in which they contested the tax exemption claimed by Smart. They invoked the power granted by
the Constitution to local government units to create their own sources of revenue.
The RTC rendered its Decision denying the petition. The trial court noted that the ambiguity of the "in lieu of all taxes" provision in
R.A. No. 7294, on whether it covers both national and local taxes, must be resolved against the taxpayer. It added that while such
power may be subject to restrictions or conditions imposed by Congress, any such legislated limitation must be consistent with the
basic policy of local autonomy.
The Issue
WON Smart is liable to pay the franchise tax imposed by the City of Davao.
The Ruling of the Court
The "in lieu of all taxes" clause in Smart's franchise is put in issue before the Court. In order to ascertain its meaning, consistent with
fundamentals of statutory construction, all the words in the statute must be considered.
Smart is of the view that the only taxes it may be made to bear under its franchise are the national franchise tax (now VAT), income
tax, and real property tax. It claims exemption from the local franchise tax because the "in lieu of taxes" clause in its franchise does
not distinguish between national and local taxes.
Tax exemptions are never presumed and are strictly construed against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing
authority. They can only be given force when the grant is clear and categorical. The surrender of the power to tax, when claimed,
must be clearly shown by a language that will admit of no reasonable construction consistent with the reservation of the power. If the
intention of the legislature is open to doubt, then the intention of the legislature must be resolved in favor of the State.
In this case, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the City of Davao. The "in lieu of all taxes" clause applies only to national internal
revenue taxes and not to local taxes.
The "in lieu of all taxes" clause in Smart's franchise refers only to taxes, other than income tax, imposed under the National Internal
Revenue Code. The "in lieu of all taxes" clause does not apply to local taxes. The clear intent is for the "in lieu of all taxes" clause to
apply only to taxes under the National Internal Revenue Code and not to local taxes. Even with respect to national internal revenue
taxes, the "in lieu of all taxes" clause does not apply to income tax.
Moreover, Smart's franchise was granted with the express condition that it is subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal. In truth,
the Contract Clause has never been thought as a limitation on the exercise of the State's power of taxation save only where a tax
exemption has been granted for a valid consideration.
Pimentel v. Aguirre, 336 SCRA 201 (2000)
ARTICLE X Section 6: Share in National Taxes
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to annul Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 372, issued by the
President, insofar as it requires local government units to reduce their expenditures by 25% of their authorized regular
appropriations for non-personal services and to enjoin respondents from implementing Section 4 of the Order, which withholds a
portion of their internal revenue allotments.
ISSUE: WON Section 1 of AO No. 372 violates local fiscal autonomy.
HELD: Section 1 of the AO does not violate local fiscal autonomy. Local fiscal autonomy does not rule out any manner of national
government intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are
Province of Batangas v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 152774, May 27, 2004
ARTICLE X Section 6: Share in National Taxes
Alternative Center v. Zamora, GR No. 144256, June 8, 2005
ARTICLE X Section 6: Share in National Taxes
FACTS: On August 22, 2000, a number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), people’s organization, and three barangay
officials filed a petition for certiorari against respondents challenging the constitutionality of Special Provision 1 and 4,
particularly the,Unprogrammed Funds found in the GAA of 2000. Petitioners contend that such:
1.) violates the autonomy of local governments by reducing by P10 billion from the Internal Revenue Allotment
(IRA) due to local governments by placing such under unprogrammed funds;
2.) places the control of such funds to central authorities;
3.) constitutes undue delegation of legislative power to respondents
4.) constitutes an amendment of the Local Government Code of 1991
5.) undermines the foundation of our local governance system
6.) transgresses the constitution and the local government code’s prohibition on any invalid reduction and
withholding of the local government’s IRA.
ISSUE: Whether or not Special Provision 1 and 4 of GAA for the year 2000 is unconstitutional?
RULING: As the Constitution lays upon the executive the duty to automatically release the just share of local governments in the
national taxes, so it enjoins the legislature not to pass laws that might prevent the executive from performing this duty. To
hold that the executive branch may disregard constitutional provisions which define its duties, provided that it has the
backing of statute, is virtually to make the Constitution amendable by statute – a proposition which is patently absurd.
Moreover, if it were the intent of the framers to allow the enactment of statutes making the release of IRA conditional
instead of automatic, then Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution would have been worded to say “shall be [automatically]
released
to
them
as
provided
by
law.”
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
Important Point:
Congress is not authorized by the Constitution to hinder or impede the automatic release of the IRA.
League of Cities v. COMELEC August 24, 2010
ARTICLE X Section 6: Share in National Taxes
FACTS: On November 18, 2008, the Supreme Court En Banc struck down the subject of 16 Cityhood Laws for violating Section
10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and the equal protection clause. On March 31, 2009, the Supreme Court denied
respondent’s first motion for reconsideration. On April 28, 2009, the Supreme Court denied respondent’s second motion
for reconsideration. Accordingly, the November 18 decision became final and executory. However, the Court En Banc,
unprecedentedly reversed the November 18 decision by upholding the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws in its
December 21, 2009 decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the 16 Cityhood Laws is constitutional?
RULING: The Court held that the 16 Cityhood Laws is unconstitutional, stating that Section 10, Article X of the Constitution
expressly provides that “no xxx city shall be created xxx except in accordance with the criteria established in the
local government code.” This provision can only be interpreted in one way, that is, all the criteria for the creation of
cities must be embodied exclusively in the Local Government Code. If the criteria in creating LGUs are not uniform
and discriminatory, there can be no fair and just distribution of the national taxes to LGUs. The unconstitutionality of the
Cityhood Laws lies in the fact that Congress provided an exemption contrary to the express language of the Constitution.
In other words, Congress exceeded and abused its law-making power, rendering the challenged Cityhood Law void for
being violative of the Constitution.
Borja v. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157
ARTICLE X Section 8: Term of Local Officers
FACTS: Private respondent Jose Capcowas elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 1988 for a term ending June 1992.With the
death of the incumbent mayor, Capcobecame the mayor by operation of law.
In 1992, Capco ran and was elected mayor for a term of three years ending June 1995.
In 1995, Capco was reelected mayor for another term of three years ending June 1998.
In 1998,Capco filed his COC for mayor of Pateros but petitioner Benjamin Borja Jr.contested it on the ground that
Capcohad already served as mayor for three-consecutive terms by June 1998, and therefore is ineligible to serve for
another term after that.
ISSUE:
Whether or notCapco has already served three consecutive terms?
HELD:
The Court held that the three term limit for local officials must be taken to the “right to be elected”as well as “the right to
serve the same elective position.” Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in
an elective local office,he must also have been electedto the same position for the same number of times before the
disqualification can apply. In this case, the first term of Capco cannot be included in the computation because he was not elected
in that instance but rather only served the remaining term of the deceased mayor by virtue of operation of law.
Lozanida v. COMELEC, GR No. 135150, July 28, 1999
ARTICLE X Section 8: Term of Local Officers
Adormeo v. COMELEC, GR No. 147927, February 4, 2002
ARTICLE X Section 8: Term of Local Officers
Socrates v. COMELEC, 391 SCRA 457 (2002)
ARTICLE X Section 8: Term of Local Officers
Latasa v. COMELEC, GR No. 154829, Dec. 10, 2003
ARTICLE X Section 8: Term of Local Officers
Arsenio Latasa was the mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur for 3 Consecutive terms. In September 2000, a plebiscite
was conducted to convert the municipality to City of Digos. This marked the end of the term of Latasa as mayor of the municipality.
However, the charter of the new city provides that Latasa will stay in position in a hold-over capacity until the next election. In 2001
elections, Latasa again filed a COC to run as mayor. He argues that although he has already served three consecutive term in
municipal mayor, this is his first bid as a city mayor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Latasa can still run as mayor of Digos City after serving three terms as mayor of municipality of Digos.
HELD:
The new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the municipality. This does not mean, however,
that for the purpose of applying the subject Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal mayor would now be construed as a
different local government post as that of the office of the city mayor. As stated earlier, the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos
is the same as that of the municipality
David v. COMELEC, 271 SCRA 90 (1997)
ARTICLE X Section 8: Term of Local Officers
Montebon v. COMELEC, 551 SCRA 50
ARTICLE X Section 8: Term of Local Officers
Facts: Sesinado Potencioso, Jr. was a candidate for municipal councilor of the Municipality of Tuburan, Cebu for the May 14, 2007
Elections. Petitioners and other candidates filed a petition for disqualification against respondent alleging that he had been elected
and served three consecutive terms as municipal councilor in 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. Thus, he is proscribed from
running for the same position in the 2007 elections as it would be his fourth consecutive term. Respondent admitted having been
elected, but claimed that the service of his second term in 2001-2004 was interrupted on January 12, 2004 when he succeeded as
vice mayor of Tuburan due to the retirement of Vice Mayor Petronilo L. Mendoza. Petitioners, on the other hand contended that
voluntary renunciation of the office shall not be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the
official concerned was elected.
Issue: WON respondent's assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 interrupted his 2001-2004 term as municipal
councilor.
Ruling:
The comelec denied the petition for disqualification. On appeal, the Comelec en banc affirmed and ruled that there was no voluntary
renunciation of office, but rather, an effective disruption in the full service of his second term as councilor.
Ong v. Alegre, GR No. 163295, January 23, 2006
ARTICLE X Section 8: Term of Local Officers
FACTS:
Alegre and Ong were candidates for mayor of Camarines Norte for the May 2004 elections. Ong was then the incumbent mayor.
In January 2004, Alegre filed with the COMELEC a petition to disqualify Ong for the reason of the three-consecutive term rule.
Alegre contends that Ong ran in the May 1995, May 1998, and May 2001 mayoralty elections and have assumed office as mayor
and discharged the duties thereof for three 3 consecutive full terms corresponding to those elections.
The First Division of COMELEC rendered a resolution dismissing the said petition of Alegre, rationalizing that Ong might have
indeed fully served the mayoral terms of 1995 to 1998;1998 to 2001 and 2001 to 2004 but the mayoral term however, from 1998 to
2001 cannot be considered his because he was not duly elected thereto. The RTC of Camarines Norte voided his election for the
1998 term when it held, in its decision that Alegre was the legally elected Mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election in San Vicente,
Camarines Norte.
ISSUE: WON Ong’s assumption of office for the 1998-2001 mayoralty term be considered as full service for the purpose of the
three-term limit rule.
RULING: Yes.
Ong is disqualified, even if the COMELEC had declared Alegre to be the legally elected mayor in the 1998 elections, it was without
effect as the declaration only took place after the expiration of the contested office.
Dizon v. COMELEC, GR No. 182088, January 30, 2009
ARTICLE X Section 8: Term of Local Officers
Alboin v. COMELEC, GR No. 184836, December 23, 2009
ARTICLE X Section 8: Term of Local Officers
FACTS:
The private respondent Asilo was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and
2004-2007 terms, respectively. In September 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively
suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then faced.
ISSUE: WON the preventive suspension of an elected public official is an interruption of his term of office for purposes of the threeterm limit rule (ART10SEC8)
RULING: No.
A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspended official continues to stay in office although he
is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within the suspension period
David v. COMELEC, GR No. 127116, April 8, 1997
ARTICLE X Section 8: Term of Local Officers
FACTS:
Barangay Chairman David raised the question of when the barangay elections should be held and questions the COMELEC’s
schedule of holding such elections on the 2nd Monday of May 1997. The COMELEC’s basis is R.A. 7160 which mandates barangay
elections every 3 years. David contends that an earlier law, R.A. 6679, should be the one followed. R.A. 6679 provides that
barangay elections should be held every 5 years. He also contends that there is a violation of Art. 10, Sec. 8 of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
W/N there was a violation of Art. 10, Sec. 8 of the Constitution.
HELD:
No. Art. 10, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides that, The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years. It is not to be construed as prohibiting a 3-year term of office for barangay officials.
Supangan Jr. v. Santos, GR No. 84662, August 24, 1990
ARTICLE X Section 9: Sectoral Representatives
FACTS:
Petitioner Supanganwas elected KB Chairman of Mabini, Pangasinan and was elected KB Provincial Federation President of the
province of Pangasinan. Petitioner was appointed by President Marcos as member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Pangasinan
representing the youth sector. Respondent Domantay presented a letter written by respondent Secretary Santos advising the body
that respondent Domantay has been named as member thereof to replace Supangan. Petitioner contends that Sec. Santos hand no
authority in appointing Domantay as the latter is not qualified.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the the appointment of Domantay by the Sec Santos, replacing Supangan is valid.
RULING:
Supangan, having all the qualifications, was appointed by the President to his position. Domantay, not having the qualifications, who
was appointed by Sec. Santos is not valid. President is the one who makes appointments for sectoral representatives. Sec. of Local
Government can only inform the sectoral representatives their appointments
Tan v. COMELEC, 142 SCRA 727 (1986)
ARTICLE X Section 10: Changes/Abolition
FACTS:
BP 885, an act creating a new province in the island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte was enacted.
Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite in January 3, 1986. Petitioners opposed, filing
a case for Prohibition and contending that the B.P. Blg. 885 is unconstitutional. because:1.The voters of the parent province of
Negros Occidental, other than those living within the territory of the new province of Negros del Norte, were not included in the
plebiscite.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the plebiscite conducted pursuant to BP 885 is constitutional.
RULING:
No, the court held that where a portion of an existing province was being lopped off to form a new province, both the mother
province and the proposed new province should participate in the plebiscite for the mother province will also be affected because its
boundaries is substantially altered.
League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC, GR 176951, Nov. 29, 2008
ARTICLE X Section 10: Changes/Abolition
Facts:
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law RA 9009 amending Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing
the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million to restrain the ³mad rush´
of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are
incapable of fiscal independence. Prior to its enactment, a total of 57 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in Congress.
Congress did not act on 24 cityhood bills during the 11th Congress. During the 12 th
Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29. This Resolution reached the Senate. However, the 12 th
Congress adjourned without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.During the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities
mentioned in the unapproved Joint Resolution No. 29 filed between November and December of 2006, through their respective
sponsors in Congress, individual cityhood bills containing a common provision, as follows:
Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009
. - The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.These cityhood bills
lapsed into law on various dates from March to July 2007 after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo failed to sign them. Petitioners
filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as
well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities
will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal
revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.
Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and the equal protection clause
Held:
Yes, the Cityhood Laws violate both the Constitution and the equal protection clause
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code
and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied)The
Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code
and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code. The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local
Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress
cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.
Section 450 of the Local Government Code provides: Section 450.
Requisites for Creation. ± (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has a locally
generated average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least One hundred million pesos
(P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices , and if it has either of the following
requisites:(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the Land Management Bureau;
or (ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office.
The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to
less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly
identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of
one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2)or more islands.(c) The average annual income
shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. Thus, RA
9009 increased the income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a cityfrom P20 million toP100 million. Section 450 of the
Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009,does not provide any exemption from the increased income requirement. The
equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification under the following conditions:1. The classification
must rest on substantial distinctions;2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;3. The classification must not
be limited to existing conditions only; and4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class. Limiting the
exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated.
Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent
municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of
the Local Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
Sema v. COMELEC, 558 SCRA 700
ARTICLE X Section 10: Changes/Abolition
FACTS:
The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of the province of Maguindanao but it is not part or ARMM
because Cotabato City voted against its inclusion in a plebiscite held in 1989. Maguindanao has two legislative districts. The
1stlegislative district comprises of Cotabato City and 8 other municipalities.
A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMM’s Organic Act and vesting it with power to create provinces, municipalities, cities and
barangays. Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional Assembly created Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201)
which comprised of the municipalities of the 1st district of Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato City.
For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the 1st district is now only made of Cotabato City (because
ofMMA 201). But it later amended this stating that status quo should be retained however just for the purposes of the elections, the
first district should be called Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City – this is also while awaiting a decisive declaration from Congress
as to Cotabato’s status as a legislative district (or part of any).
Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of S. Kabunsuan with Cotabato (1st district). Later, Sema was
contending that Cotabato City should be a separate legislative district and that votes therefrom should be excluded in the voting
(probably because her rival Dilangalen was from there and D was winning – in fact he won). She contended that
under theConstitution, upon creation of a province (S. Kabunsuan), that province automatically gains legislative representation and
since S. Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City – so in effect Cotabato is being deprived of a representative in the HOR.
COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there and that regardless of S. Kabunsuan being created, the
legislativedistrict is not affected and so is its representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or not ARMM can create validly LGUs.
HELD: RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution,
which provides:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially
altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or barangay must comply with
threeconditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second,
such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a population of at least 250k, and that a province, once created, should
have at least one representative in the HOR. Note further that in order to have a legislative district, there must at least be 250k
(population) in said district. Cotabato City did not meet the population requirement so Sema’s contention is untenable. On the other
hand, ARMM cannot validly create the province of S. Kabunsuan without first creating a legislative district. But this can never be
legally possible because the creation of legislative districts is vested solely in Congress. At most, what ARMM can create are
barangays not cities and provinces.
Camid v. Office of the President, GR No. 161414, January 17, 2005
ARTICLE X Section 10: Changes/Abolition
Facts: This is a petition for Certiorari arguing the existence of Municipality of Andong in Lanao Del Sur. This decision have noted the
earlier decision of Pelaez where the Executive orders of Former President Macapagal creating 33 Municipalities of Lanao Del Sur
was considered null andvoid due to undue delegation of legislative powers. Among the annulled executive orders is EO107 creating
Andong. The petitioner herein represents himself as resident of Andong (as aprivate citizen andtaxpayer). Camid
contends/argues the following: (1) Municipality of Andong evolved into a fullblown municipality (since there is a complete set of
officials appointed to handle essential tasksand services, it has its own high school, Bureau of Post, DECS office, etc. (2) 17
barangays with chairman; (3) he noted agencies and private groups recognizing Andong and also the CENRO and DENR
Certification of land area and population of Andong. In the Certification of DILG, there is an enumeration of existing municipalities
including 18 0f the33 Municipalities invalidated in Pelaez Case. Camid finds this as an abuse of discretion and
unequal treatment for Andong. Likewise, Camid insists the continuing of EO 107, arguing that in Municipality of San Narciso v. Hon.
Mendez, the Court affirmed in making San Andres a de facto municipal corporation. San Andres was created through an executive
order. Thus, this petition.
Issue:
W hether or not the Municipality of Andong be recognized as a de facto municipal corporation
Held: Municipal corporations may exist by prescription where it is shown that the community has claimed and exercised corporate
functions, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the legislature, and without interruption or objection for period long
enough to afford title by prescription. The C e r t i f i c a t i o n h a s n o p o w e r o r i t d o e s n o t b e a r a n y
a u t h o r i t y t o c r e a t e o r r e v a l i d a t e a municipality. Should the case of Andong be treated same as the case of San Andres?
No, for the following reasons:(1) There are facts found in the San Andres case that are not present in the case at bar: (1) The
Executive Order creating San Andres was not invalidated in Pelaez Case, (2) The municipality existed for 30
years before it was questioned and (3) The municipality was classified as a fifth class municipality and was included in
the legislative district in the House of Representatives apportionment.( 2 ) A n d o n g d i d n o t m e e t t h e r e q u i s i t e s
s e t b y L G C o f 1 9 9 1 S e c . 4 4 2 ( d ) r e g a r d i n g municipalities created by executive orders. It says: Municipalities existing
as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized
pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding
office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.(3) The failure
to appropriate funds for Andong and the absence of elections in the municipality are eloquent indicia (indicators) that
the State does not recognize the existence of the municipality.(4) The Ordinance appended in the 1987 Constitution (which
apportioned seats for the House of Reps to the different legislative districts in the Philippines, enumerates the
various municipalities encompassed in the various districts) did not include Andong. The DILG Certification and
the Ordinance in the1987 Constitution validates them. The fact that there existing organic statutes passed by the legislation
recreating these municipalities is enough to accord a different treatment as that of the municipality of Andong.SC DISMISSED
petition for lack of Merit. Note the following Sections with regards to juridical personality of corporations in relation to the reasons
why San Andres have a different treatment with Andong: Batas Pambansa Blg. 8: Section 2. Corporation defined. A corporation is an artificial being created by operation of law, having the right of succession and the powers,
attributes and properties expressly authorized by law or incident to its existence; Section
4.Corporations created by special laws or charters. Corporations created by special laws or charters shall be
governed primarily by the provisions of the special law or charter creating that are applicable to them, supplem ented by
the provisions of this Code, insofar as they are applicable. Moreover, under Art.44 of the New Civil Code with relation to
Art. 45 of the New Civil Code, those considered as juridical person includes the State and its political subdivisions and Other
corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by law; their personality begins as soon as they
have been constituted according to law.
Navarro v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 180050, February 10, 2010
ARTICLE X Section 10: Changes/Abolition
FACTS:
1. This is petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9355, otherwise
known as An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands, for being unconstitutional.
2. When the Dinagat Islands was proclaimed a new province on December 3, 2006, it had an official population of only
106,951 based on the 2000 Census of Population conducted by the National Statistics Office (NSO).
3.
4.
5.
Clearly the population is short of the statutory requirement of 250,000 inhabitants.
Moreover, the land area of the province failed to comply with the statutory requirement of 2,000 square kilometers.
Petitioners allege that the creation of the Dinagat Islands as a new province, if uncorrected, perpetuates an illegal act of
Congress.
ISSUE: Whether or not REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9355, complied with the Constitution and statutory requirements of the local
government code of 1991.
RULING: The court ruled that RA 9355 is declared unconstitutional. The proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the
election of the officials thereof are declared NULL and VOID.
The provision in Article 9 (2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 stating, "The land
area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands," is declared NULL and
VOID.
RATIO:
It is undisputed that R.A. No. 9355 complied with the income requirement specified by the Local Government Code. What is
disputed is its compliance with the land area or population requirement.
MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association Assoc., GR No. 135962, March 27, 2000
ARTICLE X Section 11: Metropolitan Political Subdivisions
FACTS:
1. Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), petitioner herein, is a Government Agency tasked with the delivery
of basic services in Metro Manila.
2. Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA), respondent herein, received a letter of request from the petitioner to open Neptune
Street of Bel-Air Village for the use of the public.
3. MMDA also stated in the letter that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision and Kalayaan Avenue would be
demolished.
4. Respondent filed a case against petitioner enjoining them from opening the Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition
of the perimeter wall.
5. Petitioner MMDA appealed, and claimed that it has the authority to open such street since it is an agent of the State and
can practice police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila.
ISSUE: Whether or not the MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic and has police powers.
RULING:
The Court ruled that the MMDA does not have the capacity to exercise police power.
Police power is primarily lodged in the National Legislature. However, police power may be delegated to government units.
Petitioner herein is a development authority and not a political government unit. Therefore, the MMDA cannot exercise police power
because it cannot be delegated to them.
RATIO: Republic Act No. 7924 does not empower the MMDA to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for
the general welfare of the inhabitants of Manila. There is no syllable in the said act that grants MMDA police power.
MMDA v. Garin, GR No. 130230, April 15, 2005
ARTICLE X Section 11: Metropolitan Political Subdivisions
FACTS:
1. Respondent Garin was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his driver’s license was confiscated for parking illegally.
2.
Garin wrote to then MMDA Chairman requesting the return of his license and expressed his preference for his case to be
filed in Court.
3. Without an immediate reply from the chairman, Garin filed for a preliminary injunction assailing among others that Sec 5
(f) of RA 7924 violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing MMDA to fix
and impose unspecified and unlimited fines and penalties.
4. The RTC ruled in his favor, directing MMDA to return his license and for the authority to desist from confiscating driver’s
license without first giving the driver the opportunity to be heard in an appropriate proceeding.
ISSUE:
Whether or not MMDA can confiscate and suspend or revoke driver’s licenses without any need of any other legislative enactment?
RULING: The court ruled that Section 5(f) of R.A. 7924 did not grant the MMDA the power to confiscate and suspend or revoke
driver’s licenses without the need of any other legislative enactment. Such is an unauthorized exercise of police power.
RATIO:
It is only where there is a traffic law or regulation validly enacted by the legislature or those agencies to whom legislative powers
have been delegated, like the local government units, that MMDA is not precluded – and in fact duty bound – to confiscate and
suspend or revoke driver’s licenses in the exercise of its mandate of transport and traffic management, as well as the administration
and implementation of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs
Gancayco v. City Government of Quezon City, 658 SCRA 853
ARTICLE X Section 11: Metropolitan Political Subdivisions
Facts
The Quezon City Council issued Ordinance No. 2904 which requires property owners to relinquish a portion of their properties
located along EDSA for use as an arcade for pedestrians. The ordinance covered the property of Justice Gancayco.
Subsequently, the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) conducted operations to clear obstructions along the
sidewalk of EDSA pursuant to Metro Manila Council’s (MMC) Resolution No. 02-28. The resolution authorized the MMDA and local
government units to “clear the sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public places in Metro Manila of all
illegal structures and obstructions.”
The MMDA sent a notice of demolition to Justice Gancayco alleging that a portion of his building violated the National Building Code
of the Philippines in relation to Ordinance No. 2904. The MMDA gave Justice Gancayco fifteen days to clear the portion of the
building that was supposed to be an arcade along EDSA. Upon failure of Justice Gancayco to comply, the MMDA proceeded to
demolish the wing walls of the ground floor of the structure.
Issue
Whether or not the MMDA had the authority to demolish the wing walls of the ground floor of the property owned by Justice
Gancayco for alleged violation of the National Building Code and Ordinance No. 2904
Ruling
It did not.
The MMDA only exercises administrative powers. MMDA’s action in this case included determination of whether or not a thing is a
nuisance and imposition of penalties should it be declared so. The power to declare, prevent and abate a nuisance and to further
impose the penalty of removal or demolition of the building or structure by the owner or by the city at the expense of the owner
constitutes police power that is outside the scope of MMDA’s authority. Nor may this be delegated to the MMDA.
Abella v. COMELEC, GR No. 100710, September 3, 1991
ARTICLE X Section 12: Highly Urbanized Cities
Facts
A petition was filed against Larrazabal for disqualification from running as governor of Leyte on the ground that she was a resident
of Ormoc City and not of Kananga, Leyte as stated in her certificate of candidacy.
Failing in her contention that she is a resident and registered voter of Kananga, Leyte, she posed an alternative position that her
being a registered voter in Ormoc City was no impediment to her candidacy for the position of governor of the province of Leyte.
Under Sec. 12, Art. X of the Constitution, Ormoc City is considered independent of the province of Leyte to which it is geographically
attached because its charter prohibits its voters from voting for the provincial elective officials. Larrazabal argued that such
prohibition does not extend to running for provincial offices.
Issue
Whether or not the prohibition against the City's registered voters electing the provincial officials necessarily mean a prohibition of
these registered voters to be elected as provincial officials
Ruling
It does.
This independence from the province stated in Sec. 12 of Art. X carries with it the prohibition or mandate directed to their registered
voters not to vote and be voted for the provincial elective offices.
Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, GR No. 196271, October 18, 2011
ARTICLE X Section 12: Autonomous Region
NOTE :
The issues in this case pertain to passage of bill after 3 readings and appointments by the President of OICs in ARMM.
These are relevant to our previous lessons under the Legislative and Executive Departments. The facts of the case are
presented below. For the issues and ruling, refer to previous digests.
However, the present lesson on Sec. 15, Art. X only talks about the creation of the ARMM. Thus the main point in the case
so far as it relates to such provision is the fact that laws creating the ARMM were enacted by Congress.
Facts
Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No.
6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No.
9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of
September 2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third time
the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun
preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. But
on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular
national and local elections of the country.
Abbas v. COMELEC, 179 SCRA 287 (1989)
ARTICLE X Section 18/19: Organic Acts
FACTS:
In 1987, the Constitution was ratified which, for the first time, provided for the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and the Cordilleras. Pursuant to that, Republic Act No6734, entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao” was enacted on 1 August 1989. The plebiscite involving thirteen (13) provinces and nine
(9) cities in Mindanao and Palawan is set for 19 November 1990.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the approval of the Organic Act automatically creates the autonomous region
2. Whether or not it is required that the total votes cast in all the units where the plebiscite is called must yield a majority of
affirmative votes for the effective creation of the autonomous region
RULING:
1. No. The creation of the autonomous region immediately takes effectonly if the Organic Act is approved by majority of the
votes cast by constituent units in the scheduled plebiscite.
2. No. What is required by the Constitution is a simple majority of votes approving the Organic Act in individual constituent
units. For if the intention of the framers of the Constitution was to get the majority of the totality of the votes cast, they
could have simply adopted the same phraseology as that used for the ratification of the Constitution.
Ordillos v. COMELEC, 192 SCRA 100 (1990)
ARTICLE X Section 18/19: Organic Acts
FACTS:
On January 30, 1990, a plebiscite washeld in the Cordilleraspursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 which provided for the
Organic Act for the Cordillera Administrative Region. Consequently, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2259stating that the Organic
Act for the Region has been approved and subsequently reiterated in a memorandum by the Secretary of Justice to the President
with only the province of Ifugao comprising the Region.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably for the creation of the Cordillera
Autonomous Region can, alone legally and validly constitute such Region.
RULING:
No. Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution connotes that a region, as in the case of the Cordillera Administrative
Region, shall consist of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas, that is, to be made up of more than one constituent
unit. Furthermore, the Abbas case is not applicable in the case at bar for it laid down the rule on the meaning of majority in the
phrase "by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units called for the purpose" found in the Constitution and never dealt on the
issue on whether an autonomous region could exist despite the fact that only one province or city is to constitute it.
Badua v. CBA, 194 SCRA 101 (1991)
ARTICLE X Section 18/19: Organic Acts
FACTS:
July 1989, the Petitioner Spouses were forcibly ejected from the land by virtue of a "decision" of the Maeng Tribal Court
under the Cordillera Bodong Administration in Case No. O, entitled "David Quema vs. Leonor Badua."The case stemmed from
David Quema, respondent, mortgaged two parcels of land to Dr.Erotida Valera whom he redeemed 22 years later through her heirs.
The petitioners, on the other hand, claimed that the said properties were sold to her by Dr. Valera but was unable to produce the
titles to prove the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a tribal court of the Cordillera Bodong Administration can render a valid executor decision in a land dispute
RULING:
No. In the plebiscite that was held on January 23, 1990 pursuant to Republic Act 6766, the creation of the Cordillera
Autonomous Region was rejected by all the provinces and city of the Cordillera region, except Ifugao province, hence, the
Cordillera Autonomous Region did not come to be.As a logical consequence of that judicial declaration, the Cordillera Bodong
Administration created under Section 13 of Executive Order No. 220, the indigenous and special courts for the indigenous cultural
communities of the Cordillera region do not exist.
Cordillera Broad Coalition v. COA, GR No. 82217, Jan. 29, 1990
ARTICLE X Section 18/19: Organic Acts
Pandi v. CA, GR No. 116850, April 11, 2002
ARTICLE X Section 18/19: Organic Acts
Sema v. COMELEC, GR No. 177597, July 16, 2008
ARTICLE X Section 18/19: Organic Acts

Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Philippines Peace Panel, 568 SCRA 492
ARTICLE X Section 20
FACTS:
On 8 August 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP), represented by the GRP Peace Panel and the
Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP), and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign the
Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the previous GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace
of 2 0 0 1 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The MOA-AD included, among others, a stipulation that creates the Bangsamoro Juridical
Entity (BJE), to which the GRP grants the authority and jurisdiction over the ancestral domain and ancestral lands of the
Bangsamoro—defined as the present geographic area of the ARMM constituted by Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, TawiTawi, Basilan, and Marawi City, as well as the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM in the
2001 plebiscite. The BJE is then granted the power to build, develop, and maintain its own institutions. The MOA-AD also
described the relationship of the GRP and the BJE as “associative,” characterized by shared authority and responsibility. It
further provides that its provisions requiring “amendments to the existing legal framework” shall take effect upon signing of a
Comprehensive Compact.
ISSUE: W/N the MOA-AD is constitutional.
DECISION: NO. It cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions, but the very
concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for
the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.
While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the present legal frame work will not
be effective until that framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD
establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum
of Instructions From The President addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually
guarantees that the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP
Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to
authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people
themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment
process is through an undue influence or interference with that process.
Bornasal, Jr. v. Montes, 280 SCRA 181 (1997)
ARTICLE XI: section 1
Facts:
Petitioner charged respondent deputy sheriff with certain unauthorized acts relative to a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of
real estate mortgage.
Respondent effected a notice of sheriff’s sale and its publication after withdrawal of the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure or
real estate mortgage was submitted by FFDC as petitioner/mortgagee.
Respondent deputy sheriff invoked good faith that his issuance of the Notice of Sheriff’s Sale and its subsequent publication
were prompted by the vehement request of Spouses Calderon.
ISSUE: W/N respondent is liable for his unauthorized acts.
DECISION:
Yes. Respondent deputy sheriff ought to have been guided by his superior’s advice regarding the withdrawal of the subject
foreclosure case. As the enforcement arm of the judiciary, deputy sheriffs must at all times be circumspect in the performance of
their duties. Respondent’s act of signing the Notice of Sheriff’s Sale apparently for and in behalf of his superior is a clear case of
insubordination and gross misconduct. His alleged partiality in favor of the mortgagors to help them settle their obligation
cannot be countenanced by this Court.
In re Gonzales, 160 SCRA 771 (1988)
ARTICLE XI: section 3
FACTS:
Raul Gonzales forwarded an anonymous letter by “Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court” to Justice Fernan. Theletter was
addressed to Gonzales referring to charges for disbarment brought by Miguel Cuenco against Justice Fernan andasking “to do
something about this.” The action against Fernan was filed in the Tanodbayan. Tanodbayan – special prosecutor like a fiscal;
ombudsman.
Administrative Case No. 3135Resolution dated February 1988 entitled “Miguel Cuenco v Honorable Marcelo B. Fernan” in which
Resolution, the Court resolved to dismiss the charges made by Cuenco against Fernan for utter lack of merit. The Court resolved
to require Cuenco to show cause why he should not be administratively dealt with for making unfounded serious accusations
against Fernan. Important principles of AC 3135Article 8, Section 7 (1987 Constitution). A public officer who under the
Constitution is required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be
removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer.
MAIN POINT: Impeachment first, before criminal and other actions. There is fundamental procedural requirement that must
be observed before such liability may be determined and enforced. The Court is not saying that a Member of the SC is
absolutely immune from disbarment and criminal actions against him. It is just that, this member must first be removed from
office via impeachment proceedings before other actions will prosper against him. Should the tenure of the SC Justice be thus
terminated by impeachment, he may then be held to answer either criminally or administratively (by disbarment proceedings)
for any misbehavior that may be proven against him. Reason for ruling. Without the rule, Members of the SC would be
vulnerable to all manner of charges which might be brought against them by unsuccessful litigants or their lawyers or by other
parties who, for any number of reasons might seek to affect the exercise of judicial authority by the Court. Can
judges be disbarred during their term? Yes. The only ones who could be disbarred are the impeachable officers
Romulo v. Yniguez, 141 SCRA 260 (1986)
ARTICLE XI: section 3