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Yoram Barzel
June 2012
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 Introduction
The assumption that commodity quality is uniform is entrenched
in economics. But in real life the quality of many commodities is
far from uniform. Moreover, buyers are seldom uniform either
sellers’ perspective.
Two questions arise:
1. How to incorporate the non-uniformity in the analysis? Indeed,
what does “price” mean in this context?
2. What are the consequences of the non-uniformity?
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Introduction, cont.
It might appear that to incorporate the non-uniformity in the D-S
model we can simply add a quality dimension to it. But quality is
multi-dimensional.
The heart of the problem is the positive cost of information about
non-uniform commodity specimens. This cost prevents the clear
delineation of rights. The competition to capture these rights is
dissipating.
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Introduction, cont.
• A number of major organizational forms have been adopted to
reduce these costs. These include guarantees, restrictions on
buyers’ opportunities to pick and choose, securitizing and
employment for wages.
• The rationale for the employment for wages underlies the
theory of the firm.
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Introduction, cont.
• I have been thinking and writing about variability for a long
time, especially in Barzel (1982).
• Akerlof (1970) is the first to introduce the variability
problem.
• I proceed by first discussing the underlying problem. The
rest of the time is given to two distinct issues. One is
analyzing how equilibrium is attained in the face of buyers
who pick and choose. The other regards arrangements to
reduce the effects of variability.
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 The role of information cost
• In the purely competitive Walrasian world
information cost is zero and commodities are
uniform and of known quality. There are no
disputes as to what is being exchanged, or at
what terms.
• When information is not free, resources are
required to produce it.
• We expect information to be produced by
whoever has comparative advantage in doing
so. The possessors of the information, which is
necessarily asymmetric, might exploit it at
others’ expense.
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The role of information cost, cont.
• Two questions arise:
1. How is the information actually produced?
2. What are the consequences of it being asymmetric?
Akerlof (1970) pioneered the analysis of asymmetric
information. His assumptions that sellers possess information
about their commodities that buyers do not have preempts the
analysis of the first and limits the range of its consequences.
I attempt to answer the two questions.
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The role of information cost, cont.
• Sellers may realize the value of their non-uniform commodities
by selling every specimen at a price commensurate with its
quality. But for most commodities this is too costly.
• Making commodities more uniform alleviates the problem, but
is costly too, so variability usually remains.
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 Who chooses?
• Sellers may retain the right to select specimens for
buyers, or let buyers pick and choose. To effect the former
requires buyers to trust them.
• Sellers sometimes effect the selection.
• In most cases, however, sellers allow buyers to pick and
choose, but prior to that they can sort their commodities or
make other arrangements.
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 Sorting
• Sorters who have comparative advantage in the activity,
must decide how many attributes to sort by, and which
attributes to leave unsorted.
• I assume that sorting takes place at a central location
where commodities are sorted into “grades” to meet the
specifications of customers such as supermarkets.
• Customers seek sorting levels such as to equate their
sorting costs to the increase in net revenues that the
better sorting generates.
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Sorting, cont.
• Buyers’ measurement skill is lower than sorters’;
otherwise they would have performed the sorting in the
first place. Moreover, sorters effect sorting when and
where it is most advantageous.
• In spite of their higher sorting cost, buyers may still sort
primarily because sorting is designated for the general
buyer but not for particular ones.
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Sorting, cont.
• Buyers with taste for particular attributes not sorted by will
find it worthwhile to pick and choose.
• Buyers make (implicit) measurements when choosing.
Others duplicate the measurements of the specimens
“rejected” by previous buyers.
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 Pick and choose
• Under pick and choose sellers cannot capture the
difference between the price they charge and the value of
specimens buyers select.
• To buyers the quality differential is a free attribute; they
select only units valued more than the price and continue
to choose until their marginal gain from the positively
valued quality is zero.
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Pick and choose, cont.
• What buyers gain is not a pure transfer to them. As with
catching fish in the ocean, part of it is dissipated because
they compete with each other for the better units by
rushing or waiting in line.
• I define dissipation as the difference between actual
outcomes and the (unattainable) Pareto outcomes.
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 The selection process
• The model.
• I construct a pick and choose model for a commodity and
illustrate it using numerical values.
• Suppose the quality of a commodity is uniformly
distributed with support $90-110.
• The seller initially charges a price p1.
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Chart 1
p
0.1
0
0
90
P
P
2 100 1
P
commodity value
110
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The selection process, Cont.
Buyers proceed in four steps.
• 1. Given their demand (specified in constant quality units
), the price charged, and their rough estimate of the
offering, until thy find one where thy wish to shop.
• 2. At a cost of $1 they estimate the distribution of quality.
• 3. Each randomly picks units one at a time and spends $1
for inspecting each of them.
• 4. Each buys when the first unit in his sample whose
value exceeds the amount he is willing to pay.
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The selection process, Cont.
• Whereas a buyer would pay, say, no more that $98 for a
unit of average quality of the commodity selling at $100,
he will nevertheless choose to shop at this particular
seller because the chance of getting a unit worth
sufficiently more than average is high enough.
• Individuals who demand n units will simply repeat the
selection process n times.
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The selection process, Cont.
• The composition of the seller’s offering deteriorates with each
purchase since the units purchased come form the upper end
of the distribution. As a result
• 1. Fewer individuals will proceed with the inspection process.
• 2. The net gain of those who choose to buy declines, and
• eventually nobody would be willing to buy from that seller’s
collection.
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The selection process, Cont.
• To simplify what comes I assume that the units selected
are always the best available.
• As support of the distribution shifts up (down), price will
increase (fall) but buyers’ decision will follow the same
pattern.
• As the support widens, picking and choosing becomes
more attractive.
• As it narrows, eventually it will cease to generate net
gains to buyers. Buyers will treat all the units as equal and
refrain from picking and choosing. Their net price will fall,
and dissipation form that activity will become zero.
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The selection process, Cont.
• Buyers differ in their cost of selection, say due to different time
costs. The main effect of this factor is that the low-cost buyers
deprive high-cost ones from the best units. Some of the latter
even may decide not to visit sellers serving diverse buyers.
• Similarly, low time-cost patrons take the best seats in a single
price movie theaters, making the events less attractive to high
time cost ones.
• Sellers may counter by offering time saving services such as
shorter lines at the cashiers, and raise prices correspondingly.
Such sellers become less attractive to low time cost individuals.
• The practice, then, results in separating equilibria.
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The selection process, Cont.
• I now turn to sellers’ behavior. As is obvious, a seller must
lower his price when buyers no longer find his commodity worth
buying.
• As the seller’s act of price change is costly, he will change his
price in price changes in discrete steps.
• Each step reflects different quality range, and each entails
some picking and choosing.
• Sellers whose high quality merchandise is depleted put the
remaining items on “sale” or sell what remains to “outlets” or to
others catering to individuals more willing to buy the low quality
units.
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• Dissipation and vertical relations. In
the numerical example for
simplicity I focus on buyers who are quality-variability neutral.
The value of the variable component of the seller’s offering is,
on average, $10 per unit. Of the $10, the seller retains about
$3, buyers capture about $2 and $5, which is about one half of
the value of the variable component of the commodity, is
dissipated. The dissipation consists of the seller’s cost of
changing price of about $1, of buyers’ selection cost of about
$2, and of $2 in buyers’ competition with each other.
• The numerical results give an idea of what one might expect in
reality, and why the parties are eager to reduce the effects of
variability.
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Dissipation and vertical relations, cont.
• A loss of $5 out of $100 may not appear large. But first these
costs are over and above the cost of sorting and the cost of
other preventive arrangements. More importantly, they are
incurred at every one of the vertical stages where the upstream
input suppliers and their downstream recipients carry out a
market exchange.
• For instance, had the Smithian upstream pin producers sold
their output to the downstream producers, the dissipation would
have occurred between each pair of the 18 successive, and
seemingly independent stages of the pin production.
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Methods of coping with variety
•
I now turn to methods of coping with variebilty. Besides more
thorough sorting or separating buyers, sellers may indirectly reduce
the impact of commodity variability or altogether finesse it in a
number of ways.
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 1. Guaranteeing output
• Guarantees, from buyers’ perspective, make commodities
essentially uniform. They dispenses with picking and choosing
as buyers are entitled to one good unit. To buyers guarantees
transform the variable commodity into a fixed one.
• By guaranteeing, sellers retain ownership over commodities’
variable components. They will lose when providing low quality
as they face a high level of guarantee claims and they are
induced to produce the optimal quality mix.
• Akerlof (1970) was the first to point out the use of guarantees
to avoid lemons. See also Barzel (1982).
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 2. Restricting buyers’ opportunity to pick and choose.
• 2a. Bundling.
Bundling sits half way between sellers’ selection and
buyers’ picking and choosing. I hypothesize that bundling
serves to discourage buyers from picking and choosing.
But then buyers must trust sellers not to load the bundles
with low quality specimens.
An implications of the bundling hypothesis is that in areas
with significant wage dispersion, and thus wide dispersion
in the cost of picking and choosing, the fraction of bundled
commodities is larger than in areas with more uniform
incomes.
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2. Restricting buyers’ opportunity to pick and choose.
cont.
•
• 2b. Restricting buyers. Barzel, Habib and Johnsen (2006) show that the
attempt to dissuade speculators from picking and choosing explains many of
the restrictions associated with IPO’s such as the number of shares one may
buy.
Two other cases where sellers restrict buyers’ ability to pick and choose are:
•
First in some wholesale used cars auctions.
•
Second is De Beers sightings where buyers’ picking and choosing is
severely restricted. In Barzel 1977 (preceding Kenny and Klein) I argue that
the purpose of the practice is to prevent dealers from picking and choosing.
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 3. Sorting individuals into homogeneous groups to finance
commodity purchases
•
The variability of the individuals engaged in exchange is
another source of exchange problems. Consider financing
assets posted as collateral. Securitizing the loans reduces
the financing cost, but variability in borrowers’ default rate
facilitates adverse selection. Lenders impose restrictions
both in terms of the assets and of the borrowers such that
borrowers become largely uniform, needing only modest
scrutiny.
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3. Sorting individuals into homogeneous groups to finance commodity
purchases
cont.
•
Consider new car buyers. New cars become less uniform as they age. The
down payment and a repayment schedule lenders require as well as minimal
borrowers’ income-level requirement makes the latter’s default rate more uniform,
reducing the need to thoroughly scrutinize them. The standardized lenders’ assets
is what accommodates the securitization of the loans.
•
Borrowers become the owners of the cars’ variable component, giving them a
strong incentive to protect the equity in their cars and avoid default.
•
To prevent lenders from using excessively lax selection criteria, we expect
securitizers to require lenders to hold the “toxic” tranches of the loans they initiate.
• Similarly, securitizers are expected to require the mortgages’ originators to hold
the equity, i. e., the most junior, (“toxic”) tranche.
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 4. Wage contracting and its rationale for the firm.
•
The wage contract radically alters the form of exchange as it
altogether eschews the commodity exchange problem. Two major
reasons for exchanging labor services for wages are:
 1. Bypassing the need to measure workers’ product.
 2. Have workers cooperate with capitalists who guaranteeing their
output in exchange for employing and controlling them.
These reasons for the use of wage-labor contribute to the theory of the
firm.
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 1. Bypassing the need to measure workers’ products.
• Owners of labor services may operate as independent contractors producing
and selling their output in the market, or sell their services for wages. In the
latter case upstream wageworkers transfer their output to downstream ones.
Employing workers for wages serves as a substitute for exchanging
commodities in the market.
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Employment for wages, including employment in vertically integrated firms,
requires less measurement of the commodities being transferred than where
workers sell their output in the market. Within firms employers instruct employees
what and how to produce and to whom to transfer their output, reducing
employees’ gain from picking and choosing, thus reducing the need to measure
the commodities (Barzel, 1982). The employment for wages, then, finesses the
problem of exchanging non-uniform commodities in the market.
Wage-employees’, however, have to be induced to produce, and this
requires costly supervision. Alchian and Demsetz (1972) explicitly point to
entrepreneurs’ need to employ workers for wages and supervise their effort when
measuring workers’ output is (prohibitively) expensive.
These considerations apply to every vertical production stage except when
commodities are sold to final consumers
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 2. Guaranteeing output
• The expected value of workers’ output may be positive yet in
some cases the specimens they produce or their activities may
have a large negative value (exploding products; damaging
fellow workers). Buyers or fellow workers require guarantees to
protect themselves from abuse. But when losses are large,
workers are unlikely to possess the means to cover them.
• Capitalists may provide the guarantees accompanied with the
wage contract along with the supervision that goes with it.
• Thus solutions to the problem that product variability create
lead to the wage contract.
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 3. The firm.
• Employer-employee relationships are conducted within firms.
The explanations given here for these relationships contribute
two major ingredients to the theory of the firm. One contribution
regards the scope of vertically integrated firms that emerge in
response to measuring variable-quality products (Barzel,1982).
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) is a special case here,
• The other contribution regards firms guaranteeing workers’
output; a force that is enhanced by scale economies to
assembling guaranteeing capital. This force may lead to large,
integrated firms with clear boundaries (Barzel 1997).
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 5. Exchanging services
•
Like
commodities,
services
may
be
exchanged directly under explicit or implicit
guarantee or via the wage contract. Whereas
some services are sold by output, selling others
indirectly
via
the
wage-employment
is
a
substitute for the more costly exchange by
output.
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 5a. Services produced by wage workers.
• There must always be some connection between
input and output. But then service-workers’ output is
measurable, even if imperfectly. One may rather
conclude then that services differ from commodities
in that their output is more costly to measure directly
than that of commodities so they are often measured
indirectly via the input intensity. (Services can’t be
returned.)
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 5b. Guaranteed services.
• Some services are readily measurable and given the variability in
their output, they are often guaranteed. One such services is advice.
• One type of advice is how to minimize the net losses from fire, this
service has measurable financial effects. Advice seekers are
obviously ignorant of the quality of the advice they seek. The
exchange of advice implies asymmetric information, and the advisor
could overcharge for the quality he or she provides. To reduce that we
expect the advisor to become the residual claimant to the effect of the
advice, which . implies here guaranteeing it (Barzel 1997).
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Guaranteeing advice
cont.
•
Here too guarantors means may be insufficient for
guaranteeing. The advisers may abet clients’ fear of not
receiving the benefits they are entitled to by joining fire
insurance firms that back the advice of these specialized
employees.
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 Summary
• This paper explores the effects of commodity (and service) quality-
•
•
•
•
•
variability. The costliness of measuring commodities results in not
well-delineated rights, and dissipation occurs in the competition for
them.
Pricing each of the specimens and selling them individually is too
expensive for most commodities
Sellers then must sell most of their commodities at uniform prices.
They may select specimens for their buyers, but the cost of creating
the trust needed for that purpose is usually too high.
So sellers usually let buyers pick and choose from uniformly priced
but non-uniform commodities.
Sellers, however, first sort commodities and adopt arrangements to
reduce their losses from buyers’ picking and choosing.
How the market equilibrates in the face of picking and choosing is
analyzed, and Chart 2 summarizes the results.
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• In Chart 2 D1 is the conventional demand curve and D2 is
the demand curve net of buyers cost of picking and
choosing and of competing with each other. S1 is the
conventional supply curve and S2 reflects the added costs
of sorting and changing prices. The actual market quantity
is Q2 and Price is P2.
• While not shown, it is easy to see the associated
dissipation consisting of the triangle between Q1 and Q2
and the areas between the two pairs of curves to quantity
Q2.
Chart 2
Price
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S2
S1
Quantity
Q1
Q2
D1
D2
--------------------------------------------
P1
P
2
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• Several methods are used to lower the cost of dealing with
variability, each presumably chosen when it reduces the dissipation
more than any of the others.
Of these methods one is making borrowers more uniform
from sellers’ perspective, thus reducing lenders’ cost of selecting
them when their loans are securitized, and one is measuring wage
employees’ effort which is a substitute for measuring goods and
services. Organizing the exchange via the use of the wage contracts
means that workers are placed in firms.
The factors that explain the use of wage-workers also explain vertical
as well as horizontal integration, and thus contribute to the theory of
the firm.
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