WATER CONFLICT, SECURITY
AND COOPERATION
Dr. Marwa Daoudy
IUHEI (Geneva), CERI (Paris)

« Water is not necessary for life, it is life »
Antoine de St-Exupéry, Terre des Hommes, 1939
WATER, AN INTERNATIONAL
ISSUE

PARTIAL PERSPECTIVE:


« Crisis » or « war» because of freshwater
scarcity – « geopolitics of water »
INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE OF
THE ENVIRONMENT:

Sanitary, environmental, political,
institutional and financial issues
MAP
Water,
an International Issue
The Debate: Water and IR
Benefit-Sharing
ELEMENTS OF A CRISIS
 INDICATORS:
Global data
 Resource use per person per year
 Rate of utilization
 Dependency rate on external sources

THE WATER CYCLE
WATER-RELATED DATA





263 internationally shared basins (A. Wolf,
Oregon State, Water Database)
70 in Africa, 55 in Europe, 40 in Asia, 33 in South
America, 6 in the Middle East
1400 million cubic kilometers (millions of billions
of m3), 70% of the earth, only 2.5% of freshwater
Renewable resources: 40 000 km3/year, i.e.
0,007% of the total water volume
Not an issue of global availability but geographic
distribution: 9 countries – 60% of world water
resources.
CRISIS - INDICATORS (I)
 Availability
per person per year:
> 1700 m3/h/an: relative water sufficiency
 Between 1700 and 1000 m3/p/year: water
stress
 Between 1000 and 500 m3/p/y: scarcity
line
 < 500 m3/p/y: absolute scarcity

CRISIS - INDICATORS (II)

Rate of dependence on external sources:

Upstream/downstream (main areas of
tension)

E.g: Turkmenistan (98%), Egypt
(97%), Syria (80%)
INDICATORS (III)
 Water
utilizations:
70% to agriculture (ME: 80-90%)
 Global food: need to find a balance
between agriculture/industry/domestic
use

ELEMENTS OF A CRISIS (I)
 Health-related
dilemmas:
Water quality (80% of diseases are
water-borne in poor countries - WHO)
 Pollution (pesticides and salinity of
water and soils)

ELEMENTS OF A CRISIS (II)
 Demographic growth:
 World population: x 3 in 100 years
 Pressures on water: x 6 in 100 years
 Mainly in developing countries
 Increased urbanization: + pressure on water
(90% of demographic growth is absorbed by
cities)
 Green Revolution: food security, intensive
irrigation practices (vs. Blue Revolution )
ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES

Increased water demand
(demographic growth)

Decreased water supply and water
quality

Main areas of conflict
INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE
 Decision-making
process?
 Execution of mandates?
 Accountability, responsibility?
THE DEBATE
 Institutional,
economic, ethical,
strategic and political issues at stake
 No
common vision or unified strategy
INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE
OF THE ENVIRONMENT
 Efficiency
of international agreements
 Legitimacy
 Equitable
of procedures
share of responsibilities
International Water Governance
Environmental, economic and social
issues
 Sustainable development:
 Promoting Integrated Water
Resources Management (IWRM)
 Global good vs. Economic good


Water ethics: International Water Law
MULTILATERALISM
 Promoting
International Water
Governance:
– Stockholm, Rio, Johannesburg
 1972, 1992, 2002
INTEGRATED WATER
MANAGEMENT (IWRM)
* Sustainable water management and sustainable
development
* Integrating sometimes opposed interests
(ecosystems/human needs, surface
water/underground resources,
upstream/downstream interests, different uses…).
* Chapter 18 of Agenda 21 (Rio): water is an
economic good
WATER AND ECONOMICS
 Symbolic
dimension: water = gift
from God= public good
 Water
costs?
WATER ECONOMICS: THE
DEBATE

Regional scarcity: need to calculate total
distribution costs

Global economic costs: distribution +
opportunity + external

Conclusion: need to enhance economic
efficiency and environmental, ecological
sustainability. Avoid « tragedy of common
goods ».
ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

Private investments in water sector
 Investments to increase water supplies
(supply management): desalination
 « Virtual water »: food imports = water
imports (1500 m3/ton of cereals)
 Water markets
ISSUES AT STAKE
 Privatization
of water sector: risks
 Water
access as human right
 Water
as global public good
 Third
way: between total privatization
and total State control
WATER ETHICS
 Need
to enhance cooperation among
States
 International
 Slow
legal standards
but steady construction of IL on
utilization of international
watercourses for non-navigational
purposes (United Nations Convention,
1997).
CONCLUSIONS
 Multidimensional
issue
 Water: human survival, economic
growth and political stability
 « Hydro-politics »: link between
hydraulic issues strategic, economic
and political levels (cooperation,
conflict, security).
WATER AND IR
The Theoretical Debate

I. Water Conflict & Cooperation: some IR
theories
 II. Debating water issues in the 1990s:
environmental security vs. virtual water
 III. Debating water issues today: benefit
sharing vs. water rights.
Water Specificity –
Some Theoretical implications

Global Common Good = need for collective
action

Avoid « tragedy of the commons »
(Hardin, 1968) or unilateral abuse by
developing common and organized
management of resources.
Water, Conflict and Security
Conflict over Water

Classification criteria (Zeitoun & Warner,
2006):
 Development disputes
 Control of water resources
 Water as political tool
 Water as military target
 Water as military tool

Inter-State

Intra-State
Water Conflict and Cooperation

Regime Theory: regional institutions to
manage cooperative regimes for natural
resources.

International Governance: agent-based
resolution of collective problems at local,
national and international level.
Water Conflict & Cooperation

Power Matrix: additional factors (other than
asymmetry) to explain link between water and
conflict (interests, riparian position, projected
power).

Inherent asymmetry as specific nature of
conflicts over water (Haftendorn, 2000).
– Conflict resolution should address
asymmetric structure of conflict
Water Conflict vs. Water Cooperation

Environmental security vs. virtual water
(Pessimists vs. Optimists)
Debate in 1990s: very high risks of violent
conflict because of increasing water scarcity
(e.g., Middle East)
 Vs. no conflict despite water scarcity and
tensions: additional supply through water
embedded in food imports

GEOPOLITICAL STUDIES
 Conventional
Geopolitics:
– Natural resource endowments and
geography are defining features of a
State’s status
 Geographical
determinism
and environmental
WATER - GEOPOLITICS

Neo-Malthusianism: « WATER WARS»
 Demographic growth, resource scarcity
and violent conflict

Cornucopian perspectives: cooperation vs.
conflict
 Available but mismanaged resources
 Need to evaluate resources
economically (price)
WATER WARS?
The Debate

The inevitability of water conflicts is
supported by quantitative and qualitative
analysis. The link between water and
violent conflict is thus confirmed.
 As a strategic security concern, water can
become a source of conflict but
interdependent riparian states are more
likely to cooperate over water.
Water & Security
A new debate on national security:
critical security studies (CSS)
 Enlargement of threats: from traditional
(military, economic) to non-traditional

(environment, resources, health)
Link between environmental problems
and emergence of conflicts
 « Environmental security »

Research Questions

What linkages are established between the
environment and security? How can they explain
the successful securitization of the environment as
a referent object since the 1990s.

Some would argue that resource scarcities have
been over-securitized in the last decades. How?
Why? What about current trends towards the
securitization of the environment in relation to
development?
Environmental Security (1)
 Transnational
environmental
problems
 Resource-based
conflicts
Environmental Security (2)
 Toronto
School (Homer-Dixon, 1993,
1994)
 Oslo School (Gledditsch, 1998, 2000)
 Woodrow Wilson Center for
International Scholars (ECSP),
Washington.
THE SECURITIZATION OF WATER
RESOURCES MANAGEMENT

Link between environmental problems
(water) and national security issues

Threat perception

Securitization of environmental
problems: maintain local biosphere as
an essential support on which will
depend all other human activities
(Buzan et al., 1998, p. 74)
UNDERLYING CONCEPTS
 Negotiation
 Power
(asymmetry)
 Conflict
(resolution)
 Water,
Conflict and Negotiation
NEGOTIATION ELEMENTS
 Actors
 Structure
 Process
 Strategies
 Results
ACTORS
•
Defining the Hegemon: State that temporarily gains
a preponderance of power in the international
and/or regional system
•
It can unilaterally dominate the rules
and procedures that guide political and economic
relations – and water dynamics
STRUCTURE
 Asymmetry
of power
(upstream/downstream, military,
economic resources)
 History of relations (politics,
culture, etc..)
 Structural power (1st dimension of
power)
PROCESS
 Cooperative,
integrative
– (win-win)
 Conflict-oriented,
distributive
– (win-lose)
 Mixed
(but predominantly…)
STRATEGIES
 Bargaining
Power (« 2nd face
of power »)
 Time
– Costs of no agreement
AGREEMENTS
 Bilateral
vs. basin-wide, temporary vs.
lasting, stable, unstable
 Structure of agreements =
power structure (Schelling, 1960)
 BATNA: Best Alternative to No
Agreement
How to reach agreements in situations
of Hydro-Hegemony?

Security dilemma
 Unilateral upstream development =
dependence and insecurity for
downstream riparians
  Bargaining power: reverse of
asymmetrical dynamics
Some Counter-Hegemony
Strategies

Issue-Linkage: linkage, securitization process


Change the other riparian’s utilities & alternatives
Impact on strategic, economic, security interests
– Immediate interests: food and water security
– General interests: regional, border security

International Law: source of bargaining and structural
power for dependent and/or downstream riparians
Power Asymmetry: The Debate

Power asymmetry between strong and weaker
riparians constitutes a major source of water conflict.
The will of the stronger states prevails and
determines the course of action.
 Power asymmetry between strong and weaker
riparians constitutes a major source of water
cooperation A difference in power symmetries
presents an opportunity for weaker riparians to find
solutions and strategies to impact the process and
final outcome, thus enhancing the “power of the
weak”.
Water Conflict Resolution
 Asymmetry
of power: specific to
water conflicts vs. political or some
other environmental conflicts
 Resolve the conflict by addressing
the structure of conflict, not causes
 “Desecuritization” process: focus
on interests, power and rights
POWER ASYMMETRY AND
HYDRO-HEGEMONY

Research findings: more efficient outcomes
if asymmetry of power (power strategies)
– limits to Hydro-Hegemony

Only bilateral agreements – limits to issue
linkage and downstream power

Water Cooperation & Economics
«Cornucopian » perspectives
 Political
Economy
 Cooperative solutions through water
markets and pricing of water:
 Virtual water
 Demand management
 Benefit-sharing
The Debate

Cooperation through joint water
management, information-sharing,
monitoring, etc. can provide the incentive
for broader cooperation between coriparians that is needed for effective desecuritization, thus allowing for conflict
prevention/transformation, mutual benefitsharing and development of all the
concerned riparian states.
Policy & Research Findings

“Transboundary Water Cooperation as a
Tool for Conflict Prevention and Broader
Benefit-Sharing”, Expert Group on
Development Issues of the Swedish
Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Co-authored with Phillips, Mc Caffrey,
Öjendal, & Turton, 2006.
The framework for the approach

Specific research and policy-oriented
questions:
– What role does the sharing of benefits play in
the conflict/cooperation debate?
– Can cooperation on the sharing of international
watercourses be utilized as a broader conflict
prevention tool?
– What are the key areas for development
partners in integrating trans-boundary water
management more closely into their overall
development agendas?
From ‘Water Wars’
to the Sharing of Benefits

Options for cooperation and the
amicable sharing of benefits resulting
from professionally managed
watersheds.

The ‘desecuritization of water resource
management’
Benefit-Sharing

Sadoff and Grey (2002)

Simplest and most useful general
framework to date

Benefits from cooperation over a shared
river basin may be divided into four
different categories: ‘environmental’,
‘economic’, ‘political’, and ‘catalytic’.
The Inter-SEDE Model

Phillips et al., 2006: assumption that a well-managed
watershed will provide enhanced benefits in terms of
Security, Economic Development, and the Environment

Comparative analysis for the Jordan, the Kagera and the
Mekong basins

Establishment of relevant categories of indicators for 21
riparians of the three basins
Categories of Benefits

Security: promotion of peaceful relations, reduction
of military expenditure, prevention of human and
societal insecurity.

Economic development: enhancement of trade,
food production, local household consumption,
livelihoods.

Both of the above elements are nested in the
environment: contribution to biodiversity, promotion
of sustainable management of trans-boundary resources,
access to sufficient w. resources.
Identify Key Drivers

Use indicators to identify key drivers

All riparians have been ranked for all the
indicators and resulting ranks placed in five
bands: 1-5

Conclusions: relative importance of
different categories of drivers
CONCLUSIONS

Clear need for further development of the
concept as a whole: “one size does not fit all”
 Over-riding importance of security-related
dynamics: securitization/de-securitization
dynamics
 Any successful benefit-sharing scheme will
require the generation of a ‘broad basket’ of
possible benefits to act as an inducement to
each co-riparian to be involved.
 Benefit-sharing will need to be established
based on concrete inducements which can be
quantified
 Equitable allocation vs. benefits: two sides of
same coin
From Theory to Reality?
 Testing
the frameworks in the Jordan
and Mekong Basins.