Pázmány Péter Catholic University
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
Institute of International Relations
Saudi-Iranian regional competition after the
1979 Islamic revolution
Reasons, clashes and detente in the modern era
Consultant:
Made by:
N. Rózsa Erzsébet, Ph.D.
Research Director
Hungarian Institute of International Affairs
Deésy Veronika
International Relations
Budapest, 2014
Table of Contents
I.
Introduction ............................................................................................. 4
II. Historical introduction ............................................................................ 6
1.
Saudi-Iranian relations in retrospect ................................................... 6
2. The Iranian Islamic revolution and the concerns raised by the
changes ....................................................................................................... 7
3.
The immediate aftermath of 1979 in Saudi Arabia ............................. 9
III.
The main areas of disagreement (hostility) and competition ............ 12
1. Religion, ideology ................................................................................ 12
a)
Shiite and Sunni Islam ................................................................... 12
b) Comparison of the two religious establishments ........................... 15
c)
2.
The question of the hajj ................................................................. 18
Ethnicity - Persian-Arab mutual sense of superiority ....................... 20
3. Politics: state structures and the question of domestic political
stability ..................................................................................................... 23
4.
Economic concerns- with the focus on oil and natural gas ............... 25
5.
Foreign policy - distinct alliances and actual conflicts in the region 28
IV.
V.
Warming of relations from the 1990s and the impacts of 9/11 ......... 38
The case of Syria (current opposition) .................................................. 41
VI.
Conclusion......................................................................................... 44
VII.
Bibliography ...................................................................................... 46
3
I.
Introduction
As a student of International Studies, I chose a regional foreign policy
issue to write my thesis about, namely the Saudi-Iranian competition. As
these two Persian-Gulf powers are divided by long-standing structural
tensions, rivalry is not only a recent manifestation of their policies towards
each other. Each country sees itself as a regional superpower and a main
force in Middle Eastern politics.1 Since today they are indeed the most
influential states in the region, their competition can be felt in almost every
country to a greater or lesser extent.
The aim of this paper is, therefore, to present the arenas of competition
between the Saudi kingdom and the Islamic Republic through history ever
since the Iranian revolution took place in 1979, until the election of
President Hassan Rouhani in 2013. The Islamic revolution, as it completely
re-drew the political and strategic map of the region, indicated the beginning
of an immense change in the Saudi-Iranian relations, too: ideological
differences became the main drives towards opposing goals.2 The beginning
of Hassan Rouhani’s Presidency overlapped with the writing of this paper;
therefore, the end of chronological line was drawn up at his election.
For the space frame of the thesis, the Middle Eastern and Central Asian
region was set in a wider sphere. More locally, however, the paper
concentrates on the following countries: Saudi Arabia and Iran themselves,
Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Bahrain and Afghanistan.
As the major hypothesis is the very fact that there has been a
considerable competition between the Islamic Republic and Saudi Arabia
ever since 1979, the purpose of the thesis is to support this statement
through various examples and indicators. Consequently, the structure of the
paper is constructed along the following lines:
1. Historical introduction, where after a brief presentation of the two
states’ relations before 1979, the nature of the Islamic revolution will
be shown, with its immediate aftermath and the Saudi reactions to it.
1
2
Kamrava (2011): 6.
Sunayama (2007): 60.
4
2. After briefly presenting the pre-1979 times, the post-revolutionary
indicators of disagreement and rivalry will be elaborated on, namely
the religious, ethnic, political, and economic competitions, with their
roots as well as their actual manifestations.
3. In the second part of the thesis, the conflicting foreign policies get
the most attention, in relation to the Middle Eastern and Central
Asian countries - where the Iranian goals oppose the Saudi
aspirations the most. Syria, as the most recent manifestation of the
competition between the two countries, gets special attention.
4. As the two countries’ relations are dynamic and not in every case
hostile, the reasons and examples of detente will also be paid
attention to, to provide a comprehensive view through history.
Since the rivalry between Iran and the Saudi kingdom is highly
complex and multidimensional,3 the paper does not aim to elaborate on
every single arena of the two powers’ competition, but on those which
were found the most significant. Still, within the natural limits, the aim
of the thesis is to draw up the most nuanced picture possible.
3
Wehrey (2009): 5.
5
II.
Historical introduction
1. Saudi-Iranian relations in retrospect
The relationship of the two regional powers dates back roughly to
1928, the establisment of the Al-Saud dynasty, however, the first official
visits between the countries took place only in mid-1960s.4 During the rule
of the Iranian Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Saudi Arabia and Iran were
both under monarchical rule and, in their foreign policies both shared close
ties with the Western world.5 At that time, religious leadership, which later
became an important factor of concern, was not a contentious issue either.6
These factors coupled with some other policies established a quasifriendship between the two nations over the years. The monarchies
consulted frequently as result of their common interests, such as the
preservation of their regime types, as well as the shared goals and concerns
related to economy.7 With regards to foreign policy, both states feared that
anti-monarchist movements would have a spill-over effect on their
respective soil - they were especially concerned about President Nasser’s
radical Arab nationalism in Egypt.8
Despite having common interests and concerns, the Saudi-Iranian
relationship before the Islamic revolution could best be described as uneasy
and suspicious, as some disagreements were still maintained between the
two powers, especially related to oil policies, the attitude towards Israel, and
the Gulf security agreements, where they were competing for leadership.9
These, however, in the light of the new political developments that 1979
brought, may seem much less significant, as Iran’s ideological map had been
completely re-drawn. The overthrow of the shah’s regime resulted in a
drastic change of foreign policy as well, which was especially apparent in
4
Jahner (2012): 39.
Sunayama (2007): 61.
6
Wehrey (2009): 13.
7
Jahner (2012): 39.
8
.Wehrey (2009): 12.
9
Sunayama (2007): 61.
5
6
relation to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, since the Islamic Republic
suddenly became the Saudi regime’s harshest critic and challenger.10
2. The Iranian Islamic revolution and the concerns raised by the
changes
Even before the revolution of 1979, Shiism constituted a significant
power in Iran, as being the “other pole” of the authority structure, where the
main power lay in the hands of the Pahlavi dynasty.11 During the
monarchical rule of the 20th century, the trends of state building and
secularization had disadvantageous effects on Shiite clerical leverage, which
(with other factors as well) later resulted in the mobilization of militant
religious elements against the monarchy.12 Even though the shah managed
to weaken the power of the clergy to some extent, they still had a great
influence in Iran, and their unique position later allowed them to play a
significant oppositional role.13
Ayatollah Khomeini, as the shah’s and his program’s main outspoken
critic, first became involved in political matters in the beginning of the
1960s,
14
and later became the leader of the Islamic revolution. He and his
followers, coming mainly from the Shiite clergy, rallied themselves in
opposition to the shah’s policies. They set the establishment of an “Islamic
government”
15
as their ultimate objective. Initially though, they were not
pushing for the ‘rule of the jurist’ (velayet-e faqih), which yet materialized
eventually, with the leadership of Khomeini himself.16 He thus became the
“supreme jurist” with an extraordinary power, who is only responsible to
God, as it was enshrined in the new constitution. Following the 1980
referendum on the subject, the theory of velayet-e faqih has officially been
implemented. 17
10
Jahner (2012): 39.
Arjomand (2009): 16.
12
Arjomand (2009): 17.
13
Keddie (1995):115.
14
Arjomand (2009): 20.
15
theory elaborated by Khomeini in the late 1960’s
16
Arjomand (2009): 21.
17
Keddie (2006): 247-248.
11
7
The change of regime resulted in a great shift of the Iranian foreign
policy as well and raised numerous international and regional questions.
Within the Muslim world in general, the revolution was widely seen as a
victory of Islam against a US-supported autocrat and Western influences.18
Few countries were more shocked after the Islamic revolution than
Saudi Arabia.19 However, initially the Saudis adopted a careful, quasisupportive posture and praised the new government of Iran for its religious
credentials, in order to avoid direct confrontation in the early phases of the
revolution and let the situation off steam.20 Prince Abdallah even called for
cooperation between the two countries that are representing the two main
branches of Islam. 21
In the reality, the fall of the shah’s rule raised enormous concerns for the
country and it shook the Saudi leadership on various grounds. Most
importantly, the threat to the Saudi monarchy materialized at two levels:
external security and domestic stability.22
Externally, there was a significant concern about the Iranian revolution,
as Saudis feared it might have a spill-over effect in the Gulf region, where
opposition groups under dynastic rules would probably rise up against their
ruling regime, inspired by the current changes. Particular attention was paid
to the Shiites.23 Clearly, the most worrisome for the Saudi leadership was
not the Iranian shah’s personal fate, but the possibility of further massrevolutions in the region intending to overthrow the conservative
monarchies, especially in Saudi Arabia itself.24 Throughout the Muslim
world, the Islamic Republic of Iran was ready and eager to export the
revolution, which Ayatollah Khomeini set and promoted as a main political
goal.25 Such external threats were very much merged with the questions of
internal stability in the eyes of the Saudi leaders.
Saudi Arabia, a traditional type of long-standing monarchical rule, was
greatly threatened by the new Iranian regimes’ messages. According to
Khomeini, Islam and monarchy were incompatible. This statement came as
18
Keddie (1995):119.
Rosen (1985):53.
20
Rosen 1985: 54.
21
Sunayama (2007): 61.
22
Niblock (2006): 80.
23
Sunayama (2007): 61.
24
Rosen (1985): 53.
25
Sunayama (2007):61.
19
8
a serious shock for the Saudi monarchs, who feared that the propaganda of
the new Islamic Republic would also have an effect on Saudi citizens. The
Iranian pilgrims coming to the Kingdom was a worrisome concern as well
in the following years, as they might have carried revolutionary messages.
In conclusion, after the changes of 1979, a new, powerful and militant
Islamic rival to Saudi Arabia appeared on the scene, which raised significant
concerns externally and internally alike.26
3. The immediate aftermath of 1979 in Saudi Arabia
As mentioned earlier, it was the ideological attack from
Tehran directed at the kingdom’s regime that shook Saudi Arabia the most
after the Iranian revolution. The monarchy was not prepared for such a
challenge calling its legitimacy to lead the Islamic ummah in question. As
Khomeini declared Islam and hereditary kingship incompatible, he called
Arabs and all Muslims to rise up against such “illegitimate” regimes.27 For
the Kingdom, it was an important issue whether its own Shiite community
would be loyal to the regime or to an external source of imitation, who was
then Khomeini in the revolutionary Iran.28
Perhaps influenced by the Khomeini example, Juhayman al-Utaybi 29
began the public conviction of the Al-Saud by distributing pamphlets
claiming the regime’s inability to rule, as well as the need to overthrow the
current leadership and replacing it with a truly Islamic one. 30 Prior to the
Mecca incident in 1979 November, secret groups were already being formed
in the Kingdom in opposition to the royal leadership, at the same time when
Khomeini enjoyed the peak of his success in the Islamic Republic. These
groups, under their religious slogans, called for the return to the true Islamic
way.31
26
Niblock (2006): 80.
Rosen (1985):56.
28
Wehrey (2009):30.
29
a fundamentalist preacher and a former member of the Saudi National Guards, leader of a
militant group that seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca in November 1979
Tristam, Pierre: „1979 Seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca”
http://middleeast.about.com/od/terrorism/a/me081120b.htm,
Oxford Index Overview: „Juhayman al-Utaybi”
http://oxfordindex.oup.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803114951414
30
Commins (2006):164.
31
Bligh (1985):47.
27
9
Arguably the Mecca siege was the first significant Muslim religious
uprising after the Iranian revolution. One of its leaders, Mohammad
Abdullah al-Qahtani (the other being al-Utaybi) declared himself as the
Mahdi 32 33 and condemned the Saudi regime for widespread corruption and
demanded pervasive “moral cleansing” within the Kingdom and especially
within the royal family itself.34 On the 20th of November, he and his band of
extremists besieged the Grand Mosque of Mecca.35 At the same time, Iran
called for the overthrow of the Saudi dynasty, however, they were not (at
least not directly) connected to the mosque’s actual seizure, as many Saudis
initially believed so.36
The participants in the incident were both Shiite and Sunni, who
opposed the Al-Saud and rebelled against it. The occupation lasted several
weeks, and was staged to overthrow the current rule. In order to crush it, the
Al-Saud deployed a significant number of troops from the regular army and
the Saudi Special Forces.37
38
The rebels were eventually sentenced by
fatwas 39 and the whole uprising was repressed.40
The most important implication of the Mecca incident was not the
siege itself, but the ideological challenge directed to the Al-Saud: the
accusation that they betrayed their religious base.41 Although this action had
no connection outside the Kingdom;
42
the Islamic Revolution’s ideological
impact must have been influential, especially in the neighbouring countries
like Saudi Arabia.
The Iranian example of a successful popular uprising overthrowing a
monarch may have been motivating for opposition groups in the Kingdom,
especially for the Saudi Twelver Shiites, who were mostly settled in the
Eastern provinces of Saudi Arabia. Shortly after the Mecca incident, antiregime protests broke out in that part of the country too, receiving public
32
according to the Shiite doctrine: messianic deliverer to restore true religion before the
end of the world
33
Encyclopaedia Britannica: „Mahdi”
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/358096/mahdi
34
Ochsenwald (1981):276.
35
Niblock (2006):77.
36
Rosen (1985):56.
37
Jones (2006): 213.
38
as-Said (1980):17-18.
39
religious judgement
40
Commins (2006):164.
41
Niblock (2006):77.
42
as-Said (1980):17-18.
10
support from Iran.43 The unrest was not purely religious, but rather widely
politicized in nature.44 The new riots were fuelled with the public statements
of the new leaders, in which they claimed that the takeover of the mosque in
Mecca was a part of a greater wave of uprisings against the monarchy.45
Indeed, further riots and demonstrations took place and demanded
the Saudi government to provide a fair distribution of wealth, more
favorable position to the Shiites (with firstly putting an end to their negative
discrimination) and the re-consideration of the Kingdom’s close relationship
with the USA.46 Subsequently, a politico-religious group called the
Organization of the Islamic Revolution was established, which soon opened
an office in the capital of the Islamic Republic, Tehran. It aimed at
broadcasting to the Saudi Shiite population and served as a global
coordinating body.47 The support of the new Iranian government was very
much apparent at this time, although the Organization denied its patronage
and insisted that they were only a local opposition movement seeking to
achieve better conditions from the Saudi government.48
In the beginning of February 1980, another violent clash occurred in
Qatif. Shiite celebrations of the anniversary of the Ayatollah’s return to
Iran49 were followed by a series of strikes and large demonstrations. These
were eventually repressed by the authorities with force.50 In reaction, Iran,
unsurprisingly, denounced harshly both the repression of the Shiites in the
Kingdom and the “tyrannical” nature of the Saudi leadership.51
Whatever role the Islamic Republic of Iran played in the domestic
conflict in Saudi Arabia in the 1980s, it is clear that its propaganda helped to
intensify tensions.52 The Islamic revolution was such a monumental event in
the region that - by its very existence - brought other countries’
arrangements into question, especially those with significant Shiite
minorities, like Saudi Arabia. Therefore, it can be stated that the main
43
Sunayama (2007):62.
Niblock (2006):82
45
Lippman (2012): 206.
46
Niblock (2006):82.
47
Niblock (2006):83.
48
al-Rasheed (1998):122.
49
Niblock (2006):83.
50
al-Rasheed (1998):122.
51
Goodarzi (2007):27.
52
al-Rasheed (1998):122.
44
11
trigger for the rivalry between the two countries was the 1979 revolution
itself.
III.
The main areas of disagreement (hostility) and competition
1. Religion, ideology
a) Shiite and Sunni Islam
To be able to fully understand the nature of Saudi-Iranian
competition, its ideological roots should be examined, since religion is an
especially important factor in the emergence of tensions between the two
states. The consequences of the Shi’a-Sunni divide have been felt
throughout a long history and even infiltrate our modern times; therefore it
is inevitable to start with an overview of the main branches of belief within
the Muslim faith. 53
The Shi’a-Sunni argument dates back to the death of Prophet
Muhammad in 632.54 The divide originates from the question of succession
to the Prophet55 - a political, as well as a religious question by that time. The
majority, who later became known as the Sunnis, supported Abu Bakr, a
close friend of the Prophet, who was elected by consensus.
56
The minority,
who were backing Ali, emphasized the importance of lineage as a source of
legitimacy and believed that the function of imam should be inherited within
the Prophet’s family. Ali, as a cousin and a son-in-law of Muhammad
seemed perfect for this role.57 According to the party of Ali, the Prophet
chose Ali as his substitute; therefore Shiites believe that the Muslim
majority became apostates when they lined themselves up behind Abu Bakr.
The Sunni have never accepted this reasoning.58
53
Since the aim of the thesis is to present the major differences between the Sunni and the
Shi’a, the principal religions of Saudi Arabia and Iran, a deep analysis about other branches
and sects present within Islam will not be given.
54
The Economist Explains: „What is the difference between Sunni and Shia Muslims?”
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/05/economist-explains-19
55
Ze’evi (2007):4.
56
The Economist Explains: „What is the difference between Sunni and Shia Muslims?”
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/05/economist-explains-19
57
Waines (1995):155.
58
Jany (2006):47.
12
The major split within Islam was therefore a consequence of this
disagreement: those who backed Ali became known as the Shiiat Ali (the
fraction of Ali),59 those on the other side were called later the Sunnis,
meaning the followers of the Prophet’s sunna or traditions. Although Abu
Bakr’s party turned out to be the winner, Ali did rule as the fourth caliph
(title for the successors of Muhammad), but his caliphate was rather short
and characterized by continuous competition for power.60
What eventually cemented the split among the followers of the
Muslim faith was the battle of Karbala in 680, where the Sunni troops killed
Ali’s son Hussein.61 This event has come to be remembered by the Shiites
with Hussein as the hero martyr, who died to defend his faith in Allah.
Karbala thus became the symbol of God’s divine justice and mercy, through
which redemption may be achieved.62 Most importantly, the battle was a
significant turning point for the former followers of Ali, who then began to
organize themselves more as a religious movement.63 The Shiite community,
as a distinctive group within the Muslim ummah, was not, however,
formulated overnight, but rather through a period of about three centuries.
As time passed, the Shi’a went through some changes: it absorbed some
groups and eliminated others.64 Today they amount to 10-20% of the total
Muslim population.65
Although –from an external perspective- the Shiite and Sunni
branches may have relatively few theological or legal disagreements, the
way they interpret some historical events can be very much different.66 Back
in the old times of Islam, the question who constitutes the Prophet’s
immediate family was a contentious issue, and is still a source of
disagreement. According to the Sunnis, it includes only Ali, Fatimah and
Muhammad’s grandsons, but Shiites believe that all of the twelve imams being direct descendants of the Prophet and Ali - belong there.67
59
Waines (1995):156.
Jany (2006):29.
61
The Economist Explains: „What is the difference between Sunni and Shia Muslims?”
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/05/economist-explains-19
62
Waines (1995):161.
63
Waines (1995):163.
64
Waines (1995):165.
65
The World Factbook: „Religions”
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2122.html
66
Ze’evi (2007):1.
67
Waines (1995):166.
60
13
The development of the Shi’a doctrine of the imamate was a result of
a long historical process. In the beginning, it was claimed that the function
of the imam is inevitable and originates from God.68 The imams thus
became seen to be unerring in all of their decisions and acts
69
and to rule
with absolute authority.70 In Sunni Islam, the word imam has a different
meaning: he is the leader of the prayers.
The majority of the Shiites became eventually known as Imamites
(the followers of imams) or as the Twelver Shi’a. The number twelve derives
from the belief in the occultation and the actual return of the twelfth and last
imam, who is associated with a quasi-messianic mission. He is the awaited
Mahdi, who will be appointed by God and will appear in the best time.
According to the belief, when he comes in the future, he would spread the
earth with equity and justice and his enemies would be destroyed.71 Shiites
believe that he will re-appear in Mecca, and the timing will overlap with the
commemoration of Hussein’s martyrdom.72 This is the reason why the
leader of the uprising in Mecca claimed himself to be the Mahdi.
Until the Mahdi re-appears, a constant chain of human mediators and
interpreters are needed according to the Shiite point of view. Therefore, the
“office of the jurist” is highly important in their eyes. For the Shi’a, the
aforementioned “jurist” stands in the centre of the theory about velayet-e
faqih, as he is put on the top of the clerical pyramid.73 This theory has been
a modern source of tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia, as the Sunnis in
the kingdom do not see the necessity of this “clerical governance”.74
Among the major differences between the Shi’a and the Sunni, the
organization of clerical institutions should also be mentioned. Within the
Shi’a theocracy, there is a clear hierarchy, whereas the Sunni have a rather
diffused clerical system.
Apart from the clerical differences between the two main branches of
Islam, there are also some ceremonial and ritual ones. To name a few, for the
Shiites, regular mourning and commemoration of the martyrs have a strong,
68
Jany (2006):46.
Jany (2006):47.
70
Waines (1995):167.
71
Waines (1995):164.
72
Waines (1995):166.
73
Jany (2006): 46.
74
Ze’evi (2007):2.
69
14
still existing tradition. They pray at imamzadehs,75 perform passion plays
and have a firm belief in the need of penitence. The battle of Karbala is still
commemorated during the period which is generally called Ashura.76
77
Sometimes, the rituals of the Shi’a coexist with self-flagellation, which
Sunni Muslims see as a practice of polytheism.78
b) Comparison of the two religious establishments
In the two ‘leading’ Islamic countries, Iran and Saudi Arabia, the
roles of the clergy are considerably different. These differences mostly
derive from the evolution of the Sunni and Shi’a Islam and other historical
processes.
In Iran - after the events of 1979- the constitution declared the
Twelver Shi’a Islam as the official faith of the country,79 which act played a
significant role in also determining the current leverage of the clergy. In the
Islamic Republic, every piece of legislation needs to be based on the
principles of Islam, thus religion infiltrates politics, too.80
The aforementioned doctrine of the imamate, which the new-born
Islamic Republic was based on, firmly believes that there are infallible
Imams, who are the repository of divine knowledge, but during the
occultation of the twelfth and last one, spiritual representatives are needed.81
Ayatollah Khomeini took a radical step stating that the right for governance
has also been devolved during the occultation.82 Therefore, he claimed
absolute authority in the Iranian matters and, as his duty, the restoration of
the rule of Islamic law in the country.83
The Supreme Leader may intervene and direct legislation when he
finds himself an expert on the matter or relevant to judge. Also, he has the
Imamzdehs are the shrines of descendents of Shi’a imams
Tehran Times: „Persian New Year festivities to be held at imamzades”
http://www.tehrantimes.com/society/114614-persian-new-year-festivities-to-be-held-atimamzadehs76
which is in fact only one day
77
Waines (1995):160.
78
Lippman (2012):20.
79
Rosen (1985): 23.
80
Constitution: Article 4.
81
Rosen (1985): 21.
82
Arjomand (2009): 25-26.
83
Rosen (1985):26.
75
15
right to arbitrate in any conflict occurring.84 He rules in the name of Allah
and has more extended power than any other constitutional ruler or elected
president in the world.85 The three branches of power in Iran thus all work
under the supervision of the Supreme Leader with an absolute mandate,
through the institutions of the velayet-e faqih.86 After the Supreme Leader,
among the bodies of the Iranian decision-making, the Guardian Council 87 is
the most influential (see later).88
The institutions of the theocratic Iran founded by Khomeini
established the constitutional policy that is valid even nowadays.89 Though
Iran has some features of a democracy, because of the significant clerical
dependence in the government structure, it can hardly be seen as an actual
one.90
Saudi Arabia, in contrast to Iran, represents Sunni Islam, more
precisely, its Wahhabi tradition.
91
This major difference results in several
others related to the state structure and leadership. Whereas in the Islamic
Republic, the ulama are often in position to rule; in Saudi Arabia they are
rather seen as the employers of the state, as the monarchical bodies are
vested with the most power.92
The Saudi kingdom, being a hereditary monarchy, is led by the royal
family, the Al-Saud. The regime’s legitimacy lies both in its tribal relations
in Najd and the tight alliance with the religious establishment.93 This latter,
deep-rooted connection between the royal family and the Wahhabis dates
back to the eighteen century. Still today, it is determinant in the domestic
affairs.94 One might see them as mutually dependent on each other, as the
Wahhabi clerics support the Saudi government’s policies
95
(as long as they
84
Zubaida (1988): 5.
Arjomand (2009): 40-41.
86
Constitution: Article 57.
87
a separate group of twelve jurisprudents
88
BBC News Special Reports:„Iran. Who holds the power?”
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/03/iran_power/html/guardian_council.st
m
89
Arjomand (2009): 25-26.
90
Hooglund (1992):21.
91
Bligh (1985):40.
92
Lippman (2012):186.
93
Ayoob (2008):49.
94
Ochsenwald (1981):273.
95
Commins (2006):156.
85
16
do not violate the rulings of the Islamic law96 ), and they are granted in
return with some legitimacy and protection by the ruling family.97 As long
as the Al-Saud continues to rule according to the Sharia and consult
regularly with the clerics, the ulama accept the regime’s leading position.98
As a result, the Wahhabi establishment stands more as a subservient to the
monarchy, in return for their primary position in the religious and moral
matters where they have a “free hand” from the Saudi government.99
Although by time some originally clerical functions were re-allocated, the
influence of religious authority has never been diminished from the Saudi
public sphere.100 For instance, if a regulation conflicts with the religious
rules, the ulama have the right to eliminate the latter at any time - similarly
to the Islamic Republic. 101
Even though there have been disagreements and tensions between
the state authorities and the religious establishment from time to time, the
relationship seems to have survived the testing. The Kingdom’s answer to
the problematic legitimacy issues was often the strengthening of its Islamic
credentials, as well as widening the ulama’s sphere of influence. Today, the
aforementioned mutual dependence and strong historical alliance are still
determining the cooperation.102
Having this comparison in mind one may see that Islam has been
playing completely different roles in the cases of Iran and the Saudi
kingdom. While religion is extremely important for both countries as the
source of their legitimacy, in Saudi Arabia it has been seen as a conservative
force, whereas in Iran as a source of revolutionary transformation.103 These
divergences may derive from the different natures of the religious branches
as well as the respective jurisprudential traditions and cultural practices. 104
96
Commins (2006):164.
Kechichian (1986):62.
98
Kechichian (1986):65.
99
Ayoob (2008):45.
100
Commins (2006):113.
101
Commins (2006):117.
102
Kechichian (1986):54
103
Rosen (1985):56.
104
Ayoob (2008): 48.
97
17
c) The question of the hajj
In Islam, there are two major pilgrimages for the believers to attend,
both performed in and around Mecca. The greater pilgrimage, called hajj, is
a religious duty for Muslims, since it lies within the five main pillars of
Islam: it should be performed at least once in a lifetime. 105 106
These holy “journeys” have a strong emotional impact upon
Muslims either they host and manage it, as the Saudis do, or participate in it
as pilgrims. For the Saudis, the hajj is a source of extraordinary pride, not
only because they organize the greatest Islamic religious event, but also
because they are perceived as the guardians of the holy places. 107 108 Besides
the feelings of pride, the pilgrimages also provide the Saudi state with an
immense income.
These religious journeys, being international Muslim “meeting points”,
apart from creating a sense of community, have often been venues for
sectarian rivalry, where Shi’a-Sunni clashes were apparent.
109
The
pilgrimages after the 1979 revolution also became sources of religiopolitical tensions, as many Iranians were among the pilgrims. They thus
were carefully examined and banned to carry out any political activities.110
Particular attention was paid to them, as they were mostly Shiites, and their
religious practices and beliefs did not conform to the official state ideology,
the Wahhabism.
The Saudi fears were mostly about seeing the Iranian pilgrims as
possible carriers of their regime’s revolutionary messages.111 These
concerns were well grounded as the Iranian regime used every opportunity
at its disposal to promote its vision of Islam, and the pilgrimage was an
event where the revolutionary messages might be transmitted by the
pilgrims.112 As a result of the sectarian disagreement and motivated by
Khomeini’s speeches, occasional clashes were taking place between the
105
Jahner (2012): 42.
the lesser one is called umrah
107
Ochsenwald (1981): 279.
108
This is reflected in the king’s titles, among which he is the Custodian of the Two Holy
Mosques (Mecca and Medina)
Lippman (2012):179.
109
Wehrey (2009):41.
110
Rosen (1985):56.
111
Niblock (2006): 80.
112
Niblock (2006): 81.
106
18
Saudi forces and the pro-Khomeini zealots in Mecca.113 At the same time,
the Saudi leadership was working hard to promote its own Islamic vision.
After the events in Saudi Arabia following the Iranian revolution, it was
crucial for the kingdom to re-assert its Sunni Islamic credentials and to
protect its Wahhabi doctrine against Shiite influences.
114
As a result, the
Saudis started to build new mosques, and Islamic education became a highly
invested area. The kingdom could not allow its Wahhabi basis to be
shaken,115 and the pilgrimages were certainly sources of bilateral
competition. The most sensitive issue was the access itself, the quotas for
the Iranians and their mistreatment. From the Saudi side, the agitation
against the kingdom was a crucial area of concern.116
The most violent conflict during the hajj of 1987, after a
demonstration lead by the Iranian pilgrims, cost around 400 lives and
wounded many. The Saudi police’s brutal repression was naturally
denounced by the Iranian government and therefore it permitted public
demonstrations against the actions. The Kingdom’s embassy in Iran became
sacked by the demonstrators and one diplomat died. This event marked the
end of the diplomatic relations between the two states, as the Saudi
government broke the connection off with Tehran in 1988. 117 As a
consequence, Iran boycotted the hajj in the years that followed.118
The break-off, however, did not come as a long-standing solution to
the problems, but generated more difficulties. Economic concerns had to be
taken into account by both sides, as Iran began to see its relations with Saudi
Arabia more significant in terms of oil revenues, which would help to rebuild the country after the war with Iraq. Also, the Saudi national budget
was greatly affected by the loss of income flowing in from the pilgrimages.
By alienating the Iranians, the largest group of foreign pilgrims was
missing.119 Therefore, it was mutually desirable to restore the diplomatic
relations, although it did not take place until 1991.120
113
al-Rasheed (1998):124.
Niblock (2006): 83.
115
Niblock (2006): 84.
116
Wehrey (2009): 41.
117
Niblock (2006): 81.
118
Jahner (2012): 41.
119
Jahner (2012): 42.
120
Wehrey (2009): 41.
114
19
At times, the pilgrimages have also been an arena for smoothing the
differences between the two states. As an instance, during the Iranian
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency, there was a reasonable friendly
gesture in relation to hajj: he was invited by the king and stayed in the
country as his prominent guest.121
Even though the Saudis made some conciliatory gestures, they still
fear that the Shiite messages and influence might infiltrate to Saudi Arabia.
As a result, they are discouraging the long-term settlements of the visiting
pilgrims in the kingdom. It might raise some doubts though, whether some
Shiites would actually have a significant impact in Saudi Arabia.122 In any
way, the regime prefers to be careful related to the events of the pilgrimages.
2.
Ethnicity - Persian-Arab mutual sense of superiority
Even though the political and religious rivalries are known to be the
most important elements of the Saudi-Iranian competition; ethnic hostilities
between the two countries are also notable,123 as there is a considerable
sense of self-superiority on both sides. To be able to capture the essence of
ethnic hostilities between these two states, a few theoretical simplifications
are needed related to both the Iranian and the Saudi population. Therefore,
from the Saudi point of view, the Iranian state is going to be referred as the
land of the Persians. Even though only half of its people are actually
Persian,124 they are yet determinant as being the biggest ethnic group.
125
The Wahhabi state therefore, - as being mostly inhabited by people from
Arabian origin – from the Persian viewpoint, will be seen as the land of the
Arabs. Firstly then, the major differences between the two ethnic identities the Arab and the Persian - should be drawn up.
121
Wehrey (2009): 42.
Ochsenwald (1981): 280.
123
According an Iranian Professor at the University of Tehran, Sadek Zibakalam, the
majority of Iranians hate all Arabs, and they believe that this feeling is mutual.
Al-Zahed, Saud (2011):” Hatred of Arabs deeply rooted in Persians, says Iranian
intellectual”.
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/10/09/170927.html
124
other large ethnic groups are Azeris, Kurds, Arabs, Baluchis, and Lors
DaBell (2013): „Iran Minorities: Ethnic Diversity”
http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2013/sep/03/iran-minorities-2-ethnic-diversity
125
N. Rózsa (2005): 112.
122
20
As it would be a difficult task to draw a general picture of the Arabs,
talking about some 300 million people widely spread in the world with great
diversity,126 in this thesis the emphasis again would be put on the people of
the Arabian Peninsula, more precisely the followers of the conservative
Wahhabi tradition.
Since Islam is often identified with the Arabs on the basis of the
Quran having been revealed in Arabic and in Mecca and Medina, the people
of Saudi Arabia have been taking extreme pride of their country being the
motherland of God’s revelations.127 In historical terms, Iranians take pride
from their thousand year old civilization and statehood, their rich cultural
heritage and their talent in arts.128 They feel superior because of their
language culture as well as their achievements in the fields of science and
scholarship.129
In the former Persia, the new faith of Islam arrived in the seventh
century by the conquest performed by the Umayyad. The Bedouin Arab
dynasty successfully toppled the Sassanid Persian Empire, and managed to
impose their Islam on the inhabitants. However, it took a long time until full
conversion could be achieved in Persia: the majority of the Iranians had
become Muslims only by the ninth century.
130
Even though people were
unified under the umbrella of the new religion, ethnic differences could
result in opposition from time to time - the Arab-Persian divide is such an
example among many others.131 The Arabs remained long in control;
however, they adopted various administrational and other practices from the
Sassanid. Previously, they did not have a state structure either. 132
From the Iranian point of view, Arabs were just barbaric nomads
who destroyed the great Iranian empire.133 On the other side, many Arabs
think that Iranians were fire-worshipper pagans until they were
126
N. Rózsa (2005):28.
N. Rózsa (2005): 29.
128
Shanahan (2009): 2.
129
Halliday: „ Arabs and Persians beyond the Geopolitics of the Gulf”
http://cemoti.revues.org/143
130
Iran Chamber Society: „History of Iran”
http://www.iranchamber.com/history/islamic_conquest/islamic_conquest.php
131
N. Rózsa (2005): 30.
132
Iran Chamber Society: „History of Iran”
http://www.iranchamber.com/history/islamic_conquest/islamic_conquest.php
133
Halliday, Fred: „ Arabs and Persians beyond the Geopolitics of the Gulf”
http://cemoti.revues.org/143
127
21
‘enlightened’ with the Muslim message. According to the Salafi’s point of
view, Arabs had (have) the absolute primacy in Islam.134
In case of Iran, after the Islamic revolution, another element has been
added to the list of factors to be proud of: the divine nature of Iran’s destiny.
As a result, the pre-revolutionary ideals became mixed with a Shi’a sense of
superiority.135
Old historical grievances still determine the way the two populations
see each other. However, the trend of re-Islamization should also be
mentioned: according to its ideology, belonging to the religious community
(ummah) is the most important element in the hierarchy of identities, putting
the questions of ethnicity and statehood second place.136 However, in the
case of Iran and Saudi Arabia, as the long history of rivalry formed a notable
part in the psyche of both groups; deep prejudices have been created as well.
Ze’evi (2007): 4.
Shanahan (2009): 2.
136
N. Rózsa (2005): 45.
134
135
22
3. Politics: state structures and the question of domestic political
stability
The constitution of the Islamic Republic, which was accepted
through popular referendum, facilitated the birth of a complex system, as it
combined the democratic and the theocratic principles and institution in a
unique way.137
According to the new constitution, on the top of the power
’pyramid’, the Rahbar (spiritual leader) stands, who has the right to lead the
Muslim community.138 As it was mentioned in the sub-chapter about the
religious establishments, he owns extraordinary leverage on all of the three
power branches. Legislative power lays in the hands of the Majlis, however
its mandate is not absolute, as its provisions are supervised by the
Guardian’s Council.
139
Executive power is held the members of the
government, led by the directly elected President. Even though this
president is quasi-selected by popular will, before going on elections, all
candidates –either for presidency or for the Majlis- are screened by the
Guardian’s Council,140 which creates a considerable religious-political filter.
The aforementioned body is furthermore important to be
emphasized, since it is in charge of the constitutional review, as well as the
examination of all laws passed by the Majlis if they are in compliance with
the constitution, i.e. Shiite Islam.141
After the government (president) and the Majlis, the third power
branch separated from the former two is the judiciary,142 whose work is
based on the Islamic law, Sharia.143
If we take a deeper look into the system, we may find some quasidemocratic elements as well, even enshrined in the constitution. These are
the division of power branches, the presence of a legislative body, the
presidential office, regular elections, the presence of checks and balances.144
137
Csicsmann (2008): 200.
Jany (2006): 481.
139
Keddie (2006): 248.
140
BBC News:„Guide: How Iran is ruled”
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8051750.stm
141
Keddie (2006): 248.
142
Constitution: Article 57.
143
Jany (2006): 480.
144
Csicsmann 2008: 200.
138
23
On the other hand, though, the popular will is somehow “subordinated” to
the institutions of velayet-e-faqih.145 What the Western world sees as a
democracy had never materialized in the Islamic Republic. Compared to the
Saudi Arabian system, though, Iran’s governance seems to be more
representative.146
In Saudi Arabia, constitutionalism was not a matter on the political
agenda till the end of the twentieth century, since with the governing
according to the Quran and the prophetic traditions; they felt no need for a
man-made document.
147
Even today, the Saudis lack a constitution which
would define legislative processes. The Wahhabi doctrine, however, in its
political theory, requires Muslims to be obedient to the ruler in all cases as
long as his provisions are not in contrast with the Sharia. Therefore, as the
ruler has an almost free hand in most matters, he is entitled to organize
governance as well. However there has been one other important limit of his
power, deriving from the Sharia: the qadis’ provisions in matters within
their jurisdiction. Thereby, the ulama had managed to preserve some
autonomy.148
In 1992, a Basic Law for Government was announced by the Saudi
monarch and at the same time he set up a Consultative Council.
149
However, the pluralisation of the political system did not take place in the
kingdom.
150
The decision making process can, therefore, be best seen as
two concentric circles: one is the senior princes of Saudi Arabia and the
other is the cabinet. The first group does not contain the members of the
ulama, though they are represented in the Saudi cabinet. In each ministerial
council the members of the ulama can be found -within the government of
kingdom, they are responsible and subject to the prime minister.151 This
way, the power in decision making processes is concentrated in the hands of
a relatively small, interconnected group.
145
Mir-Hosseini - Tapper (2006): 17.
Hooglund (1992): 20.
147
Ayoob (2008):49.
148
Commings (2006): 115.
149
Ayoob (2008):49.
150
Ehteshami (2007):116.
151
Blingh (1985): 43.
146
24
The chief of the state, as well as the head of the government is the
monarch.152 He combines the legislative and executive functions and he is
the ultimate source of judicial power as well. Therefore, there are no general
parliamentary elections in the Kingdom. This lack of pluralisation, coupled
with the need for structural reforms, make the rulers especially volatile
regarding the basis of their legitimacy. If not chosen by the popular will, it is
very difficult to accept them as the rightful “guardians of the nation”.153
Although after the Islamic Revolution in Iran, fears of popular
uprising aiming to reform the system were especially high among the Saudi
regime, when opposition movements appeared in the Kingdom, the regime
has so far been able to crush them with the support of the ulama.154
However, even though they could keep their status any demand for
democratic reforms is seen as a threat in their eyes.155 It is important to note
about both the Iranian and the Saudi cases that regime survival is central and
extremely important. 156
4.
Economic concerns- with the focus on oil and natural gas
The Persian Gulf is considered to be the most important strategic
region in the world today; having the two-thirds of Earth’s proven oil
reserves under its ground and waters. While Saudi Arabia is the country
with the greatest crude oil production, the Islamic Republic is also
significant in this sense, as being the sixth one in the ranking.
157
Furthermore, it controls the Strait of Hormuz, a key opening to the Persian
Gulf.158 As a result, Iran has been seen in the Saudi eyes as the state which
challenges the supremacy of the kingdom’s interests not only on security
CIA The World Factbook: „Executive branch”
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2077.html
153
Ehteshami (2007):116.
154
Kechichian (1986):57.
155
Hooglund (1992):21.
156
Milani (2009): „Tehran’s Take. Understanding Iran’s U.S. Policy.”
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65123/mohsen-m-milani/tehrans-take
157
CIA The World Factbook data, 2012
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2241rank.html
158
Gheissari (2009): 349.
152
25
and religious grounds, but also related to economy and most importantly oil
policy.159
Saudi Arabia ranks as the largest exporter of petroleum, as it owns
25.99 per cent of the world’s oil resources160 (265.85 billion barrels), while
the natural gas reserves are also significant. The value of the petroleum
exports is 336.12 billion dollars.161 The country stands among the OPEC162
(Organisation for the Petroleum Exporting Countries) founding members,163
and is still considered to be the most powerful and influential country in the
group.
Iran was also among the states that founded the organization,164 as
the extraction end export of crude oil has been the leading source of revenue
for the country in most of the twentieth century. It has been an issue with
central importance; however, attracting large-scale investments for
expansion was not always so successful. 165 The Islamic Republic, compared
to Saudi Arabia, has the value of petroleum exports of 101.47 billion dollars
(about the third of the kingdom’s), and proven crude oil reserves of 157.30
billion barrels. However the ‘oil competition’ in this sense is won by the
Saudis, it is significant to mention Iran’s strength too: as the world’s leading
state in relation to natural gas production, it has 33,780 billion cubic meters
of proven reserves, about four times more than the Saudi kingdom does. 166
In addition to the various aforementioned challenges arising from the
Iranian revolution in the eyes of Saudi Arabia, the oil market was another
source of friction. As Iran re-entered the market (now as Islamic Republic),
the world demand of oil had experienced a rapid decline. Therefore, the
Iranians had to discount their oil substantially, which caused a severe
dispute with Saudi Arabia, whose aim was to maintain the OPEC price.
Faced with harsh criticism and pressure within the OPEC, the Saudis had
159
Lippman (2012): 238.
Amiri (2010): 51.
161
OPEC: Saudi Arabia facts and figures
http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/169.htm
162
permanent, intergovernmental organization created in 1960 by Iran, Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait and Venezuela
163
OPEC: Brief History
http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/24.htm
164
OPEC: Brief History
http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/24.htm
165
Mafinezam (2008): 90.
166
According to the datas of the Annual Statistical Bulletin 2013
http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/163.htm
160
26
eventually cut their production, to be able to leave room for the Iranian
expansion.167
As the above mentioned case shows, Iran and the Saudi kingdom had
different ideals on oil prices in the past. The Iranian aim was to have them
as high as possible, while Saudi Arabia wanted rather to have slightly lower
prices.168
Today, the competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran, related to oil
issues might intensify in case of the lack of agreement over production
quotas within the OPEC. Saudi Arabia, as it has an extraordinary capacity of
spare oil, could threaten to increase its output and therefore to start a price
war.169 Countries like the kingdom can rely on oil far more into the future
than the Islamic Republic can, partly because the Saudis do not have the
high energy consumption that Iran has to deal with. The Islamic Republic is
deeply vulnerable to the fluctuations of oil price. The other disadvantages of
the Iran in opposition to Saudi Arabia lay in its long disputes with the
world’s leading industrial powers, as well as in its inability to raise
production capacity to the levels required by the large population.170
Most recently, as a result of the introduction of new sanctions in
2011, Iran found itself unable neither to attract new customers, nor to keep
the existing buyers on the required level of purchase. As a consequence,
notable economic hardship has emerged in the country.171 At this point of
the Saudi-Iranian friction, one might say that the energy-related ‘battle’ was
won by the kingdom. However, the case would not be this simple if the
Islamic Republic and the West finally manage to reach a deal.
As the main sources of disagreement and areas of competition
between the two countries have been religion (ideology), ethnicity, politics
and economy (energy resources), these areas had been presented in the first
part of the thesis. Now, the major proxy (and actual) battlefields will be
discussed, the arenas where the Iranian aims opposed the Saudi goals the
most.
167
Rosen (1985): 60.
Boucek (2011): „Rivals- Iran vs. Saudi Arabia.”
http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/20/rivals-iran-vs.-saudi-arabia/68jg#rivals
169
Schaller (2014): „Iran, OPEC, and the future price of oil”
http://www.brandeis.edu/now/2014/january/habibi-iran.html
170
Mafinezam (2008): 90.
171
Schaller (2014): „Iran, OPEC, and the future price of oil”
http://www.brandeis.edu/now/2014/january/habibi-iran.html
168
27
5. Foreign policy - distinct alliances and actual conflicts in the
region
Among the main sources of Saudi-Iranian disagreement, opposing
foreign policies have long been a crucial area. From a political point of
view, both Iran and Saudi Arabia consider themselves as indispensable
regional players, with their spheres of influence spreading across the Middle
East and Central Asia. However, they both face significant challenges from
almost all directions as well.172 As a result of their competition, their
opposition can be felt in most countries of the region - what constitutes a
good potential for one, is rather seen as a challenge or threat for the other.
The United States of America
Although the United States stands out from the regional sphere, it is
still significant to mention in relation to the Saudi-Iranian competition, since
it has been the major deterrent for Iran, and the same time, an important ally
for the Saudi kingdom.
The Islamic Republic’s foreign policy now is just as much concerned
about the USA, as it was prior to the revolution, but it took a great turn from
being partners to harsh enmity.173 Iran’s assumption that the country could
be an actual target for the USA became clear after the “Axis of the Evil”
speech by George W. Bush, as well as the American neoconservatives’ push
for the Iranian regime change.174 Nowadays, the Iranian regime still sees the
USA as a danger to its very existence.
What has been seen as the major threat in the eyes of the Islamic
Republic, has historically been the main security guarantor for Saudi Arabia.
While from the Iranian perspective, the United States should not maintain
forces in the Gulf and must allow the states in the region to organize their
Milani (2009): „Tehran’s Take. Understanding Iran’s U.S. Policy.”
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65123/mohsen-m-milani/tehrans-take
173
Milani (2009): „Tehran’s Take. Understanding Iran’s U.S. Policy.”
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65123/mohsen-m-milani/tehrans-take
174
N.Rózsa (2010): 6.
172
28
own security system, Saudi Arabia prefers to see the US being involved in
the regional security arrangements.175
Both the Iranian revolution, which in 1979 posed a common concern
and threat to the US and the kingdom, and the following Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, where mobilizing Salafis could lead to American victory,
significantly strengthened the cooperation between the kingdom and the
US.176 Due to the events of history, the two states have developed a strong,
mutually beneficial relationship which works for more than 80 years now.
Even though there was a considerable setback as a result of 9/11 and the
following human rights abuses, the partnership still endures. Today, their
alliance is based on their common interests - these interests have mostly
been related to economic and commercial issues.177
The Saudi Kingdom’s approach evolved around the prevention of
any regional hegemony (but its own), and, therefore, its aim has been
finding key allies to maintain the balance of power in practice. 178 The
partnership with the US has thus been a great potential for the country. On
the other hand, the alliance is also significant source of friction with the
Islamic Republic.
Lebanon
On the “periphery”, the Saudi-Iranian competition can especially be
felt in Lebanon, as both states have significant, long standing interests in the
country. Though they have avoided an open conflict yet, the Lebanese
developments have been very stimulating for their opposition. 179
The Shiites in Lebanon have developed a special connection with
Iran from the 15-16th centuries, when Lebanese Shiite mollahs converted the
Iranian people to Shiism.180 The Revolutionary Guards Corps provided
Lebanon with military training, not to mention the significant financial and
spiritual support given to the local Shiites either.
181
Iran, as the founder,
175
Kamvara (2011): 6.
Gause (2009): „Saudi-American Relations”
http://www.mei.edu/content/saudi-american-relations
177
Smith (2013): „US-Saudi relations: Eighty years as partners”
http://www.arabnews.com/news/445436
178
Kamvara (2011): 171.
179
Wehrey (2009): 78.
180
N.Rózsa (2010): 12.
181
Fulton (2011): „Lebanon-Iran Foreign Relations.”
176
29
also acts as the main supporter of the Hezbollah movements.182 Saudi
Arabia, on the other hand, has long been backing the Salafi groups within
the country.183
The two major events in the new millennium, which emerged as
central catalysts for increased intervention on both side, took place in 20052006. In 2005, when Lebanon had experienced a political crisis after the
assassination of its Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, Iran supported the March 8
alliance, which included Hezbollah as well. On the opposite side, Saudi
Arabia stood as the ally of the pro-Hariri coalition.184
Subsequently, in 2006, the war between Israel and Hezbollah was the
event that posed a top concern related to Lebanon, for both Iran and the
Saudi kingdom. The results, in the eyes of Saudi Arabia, represented a
significant shift in regional balance of power - in favour of the Islamic
Republic. Therefore, Riyadh made its commitment to the reconstruction of
Lebanon a top priority.185
Following the war, the Saudi kingdom has still been struggling to
counter the rise of Hezbollah with its growing financial support to the Salafi
groups, who have thus been spurred toward greater political activism.186 On
the other side of the conflict, Hezbollah has also been increasingly
supported by Iran. However, the Islamic republic’s financial commitment is
not as immense as Saudi Arabia’s.187
Nowadays, as the recent conflict in Syria has unfolded and sectarian
clashes became even more apparent in Lebanon too, both Iran and the Saudi
kingdom have a growing interest and significance in the region.
http://www.irantracker.org/foreign-relations/lebanon-iran-foreign-relations
182
Institute For The Study Of War: „Iranian Influence in the Levant, Egypt, Iraq, and
Afghanistan”
http://www.understandingwar.org/report/iranian-influence-levant-egypt-iraq-andafghanistan
183
.Wehrey (2009): 78.
184
Wehrey (2009): 79.
185
Wehrey (2009): 81.
186
Wehrey (2009): 83.
187
Wehrey (2009): 82.
30
Afghanistan
For the Islamic Republic, Afghanistan has an obvious importance not
only because of its proximity and shared history but also as a result of the
country’s significant Shiite minority in the Western areas, which constitute
15-20 per cent of the whole Afghan population.188
Although in the eyes of Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan itself would not
be especially significant, it is still highly important, as the kingdoms’
relations with Iran and Pakistan have been notably affected by the situation
in Afghanistan.189 When the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan started, another
field of competition had been created between Iran and Saudi Arabia. In the
long war, the Saudi kingdom supported the insurgents (mujahedeen) against
the Soviet Union, with young Saudis sent to Afghanistan to fight. 190 For the
kingdom, it was especially important to fight for the protection of the
religion, opposing the Soviet atheism. In spite of the fact that Iran also stood
on the side of the Afghan resistance, the pre-existing divisions between the
two countries became soon apparent.191
Besides the recruitment, travel and training of the jihadist volunteers
against the Soviet invaders, Saudi acts also had an-anti Shiite dimension,192
as the kingdom competed with Iran for influence with the support of
Pakistan.193 The Saudis, besides being generous in funding the more radical
parties, also did a significant campaigning of their ideology, Wahhabism, to
counterbalance the Shiite Iran’s influence.194 Therefore, they gave their
support to the Sunni resistance, while the Islamic Republic backed the Shiite
group of Wahdat (unity).195
After the Soviet withdrawal, although both countries’ agendas had
been modified to some extent, their involvement in Afghanistan did not
end.196 The civil war continued even without the Soviet threat, as the
country fell into the hands of several warlords.197 In the middle of the 1990s,
a new movement had appeared on the Afghan scene: the Taliban. As Saudi
188
Steinberg (2013): 6.
Steinberg (2013): 2.
190
Lippman (2012): 184.
191
Saikal (2004): 203.
192
Wehrey (2009): 14.
193
Steinberg (2013): 2.
194
Rasanayagam (2005): 169.
195
Saikal (2004): 204.
196
Steinberg (2013): 3.
197
Saikal (2004): 206.
189
31
Arabia accepted the Pakistani decision to support them, 198 it offered notable
financial help: with the resources of the kingdom, and the weapons supplied
by the US and Britain,199 the Taliban gradually gained enough power to
expand their influence across Afghanistan. It has become clear that the
collaboration of the US, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan were responsible for the
rise of this kind of Sunni extremism in Afghanistan – which later ironically
became a major threat in the region and farther away.200
As the rise of the Taliban became the new main concern for Iran in
relation to Afghanistan, the competition between her and Saudi Arabia for
influence continued throughout the 1990s. The Taliban’s religious
extremism especially targeted the Shi’a Muslim faith, which it considered
heretical. Their opposition peaked in 1998 when the Taliban attacked the
Iranian consulate and murdered some of its diplomats.201 Afterwards, as a
result, Iran’s high-profile and consistent support for the anti-Taliban groups
further continued.202 The Saudi-Iranian friction in Afghanistan seemed a
long-standing issue, which only after the American overthrow of the Taliban
from the agenda has been removed.203
After the events of 9/11, the United States seriously challenged both
Iran’s and Saudi Arabia’s profile as defenders of political Islam. Tehran was
quick to distinct herself from the Taliban-backed violence represented by the
al-Qaeda: without hesitation it cooperated in the removal of the violent
regime in Afghanistan.204 Saudi Arabia was also about to re-assert its
credibility and religious credentials after the terrorist attacks, but its main
aim has still been keeping Iran out of Kabul. As a result, since the NATO
decision about the withdrawal from Afghanistan, Riyadh has been
increasingly struggling to put together a government which would include
some Taliban as well, to be able to contain the Islamic Republic.205
Recent steps suggest that the competition of Iran and Saudi Arabia
did not end in Afghanistan: they are both aiming to build up immense
198
Steinberg (2013): 3.
Saikal (2004): 223.
200
Katouzian (2008): 124.
201
Mafinezam (2008): 70.
202
Saikal (2004): 222.
203
Mafinezam (2008): 70.
204
Gheissari (2009): 335.
205
Steinberg (2013): 2.
199
32
mosques and Islamic centres of the Muslim faith of their own, which is
clearly a sign of a still existing religious competition.206
Iraq
From both Iran’s and the Saudis’ point of view, Iraq, as a neighbour
country with significant Shi’a population 207 has long been an important area
of concern and/or opportunity. Its importance became especially apparent
during the Iraq-Iran war. Since the Islamic Revolution, the secular, Arab
nationalist Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Iran
208
had been the first major
‘battlefield’ where Saudi and Iranian interests notably conflicted.
Being a Shiite majority country with Sunni leadership, it raised
significant concerns for Iraq that the new government of Iran championed
the cause of the Shiites abroad too.209 However, in fact, the Iraqi Shiites did
not change sides in favour of the Islamic Republic during the conflict.
From the Saudi point of view also, Iran’s aspirations started to seem
threatening, as the kingdom was worried about its own stability and security.
It was initially not simple to decide how to interfere the conflict and to what
extent, however, the kingdom saw far more threat in Iran than in Iraq. The
Saudis therefore offered their support to Iraq during the war to be able to
keep their own stability,210 since there was a direct concern that the violence
would spread beyond the two states. Another important factor has made
Saudi Arabia to back Iraq: the championing of the “Arab cause”.
Initially, the kingdom tried to avoid a confrontational public position
towards Iran,
211
but as the war dragged on, the Saudis increasingly
committed themselves on the side of Iraq in the conflict. Their most tangible
assistance was financial.212 Three years in the war, the danger of the
escalation and the Iraqi collapse became the greatest concern for the
kingdom.213
Iran, after some victorious battles, had been encouraged enough to
say that in case of a decisive victory of its own, it intends to go further and
206
Steinberg (2013): 3.
the majority of the country represents Twelver Shiism
208
Lippman (2012): 206.
209
Hooglund (1987): 17.
210
Niblock (2006): 87.
211
Rosen (1985): 57.
212
Rosen (1985): 58.
213
Rosen (1985): 59.
207
33
not stop until it liberates Jerusalem, and the holy cities of Mecca and
Medina. Saudi Arabia, naturally, was deeply concerned about these
aspirations. The kingdom’s worries about Iran at the time were not
completely unfounded, as the incident during the Mecca seemed an
important indicator of the Islamic Republics’ aims.214
As the Iraq-Iran war progressed, the Saudis used also economic
policy measures to put more pressure on Iran: they flooded the international
markets with oil, causing a significant decrease in the prices. These
measures, as they resulted in decreasing revenues for Iran, notably
destroyed the country’s economy.215 An additional Saudi step against the
Islamic Republic was the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council,
216
which had a strong anti-Iranian political agenda.217
At the end of the longest inter-state military clash in the Middle East,
both countries became devastated – one might say that a lose-lose situation
had been achieved by the adversaries, as the war had extraordinary costs in
terms of human lives and property alike. Both economies had been
destroyed. As the war was a total one, as both Iran and Iraq fully committed
themselves and used all possible manpower, economic and monetary
resources at their disposal in order to win the conflict.218
In the eyes of Iran, ending the war
219
probably seemed a rational
decision since its economy reached a critical level. As a result of this
economic pressure, the Islamic Republic made some adaptations in its
foreign policy according to the new circumstances.220 Inter alia, Saudi
Arabia was also among the countries that were affected by the new Iranian
policies, as the Islamic Republic in 1988 was ready to improve relations
with the Gulf States, mostly because of strong economic considerations.221
After the Iraq-Iran war, the next important landmark event in Iraq
both in the eyes of the Saudis and the Iranians was the eventual fall of
Saddam Hussein in 2003, since it had caused sweeping changes in the
214
Sunayama (2007): 120.
Jahner (2012): 41.
216
Iraq is not a member state
217
Jahner (2012): 40.
218
Hooglund (1987): 13.
219
There has not been a peace-treaty after the war, but only a cease-fire agreement,
therefore the state of war has not legally ended.
220
Amiri (2010): 4.
221
Amiri (2010): 50.
215
34
Middle East in terms of the regional balance of power. 222 As a result, the
redistribution of power in the area created four competing poles: Israel,
Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia. As Iraq was ‘deleted’ from the scene in the
sense of regional influence, these countries became the main competitors for
relative power share.223
The post-Saddam Iraq has a strategic importance for Iran, since its
Shiite majority managed to acquire significant governmental positions in the
new Iraqi system.
224
In the eyes of the Saudi Arabia, in contrast (or as a
result), Iraq is seen as a potential threat. Since the fall of Saddam in 2003,
the Iranian and the Iraqi threats have been even more interrelated from the
Saudi point of view. Proximity of both Iraq and Iran to Saudi Arabia gives
these fears a strategic dimension.225
Bahrain
With the elimination of Iraq as a significant Gulf power, regional
competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia for the dominance over the
Persian Gulf has became even more obvious.226 Bahrain, being especially
important for both countries, has long been a source of tension between the
Islamic Republic and the Saudi kingdom, both for historical and religious
(sectarian) reasons.227
Bahrain, with a 70-75 per cent Shiite majority, has significant ties to
the Islamic Republic. In contrast, the ruling power is in the hands of the
Sunni Al-Khalifa; therefore, the sectarian source of tension is naturally
given within the country. The royal family came into power in the
eighteenth century, overthrowing the Persian rulers. The small monarchy
was therefore an example of disagreement between the two states even well
before the Islamic revolution took place.
As the British withdrew their troops from the Persian Gulf, Iran used
the opportunity to assert its dominance in the region: it revived its historical
222
Wehrey (2009): 1.
Katouzian (2008): 145.
224
N. Rózsa (2010): 9.
225
Cordesman (2014) : „ Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the Clash within a Civilization.”
https://csis.org/publication/saudi-arabia-iran-and-clash-within-civilization
226
Mabon (2012): „The Battle for Bahrain: Iranian-Saudi Rivalry.”
http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/battle-bahrain-iranian-saudirivalry
227
Wehrey (2009): 53.
223
35
claim to the sovereignty over Bahrain. Naturally, Saudi Arabia strongly
opposed the idea that conflicted significantly with the kingdom’s
aspirations. Saudi Arabia also has deep roots within Bahrain, stemming
partly from the tribal relations to the Al-Khalifa, as well as (more recently)
from economic ties. Besides, Bahrain also plays a crucial role for Saudi
Arabia as a potential target country for the implementation of the Wahhabi
doctrine. Therefore, the kingdom provides ideological guidance to its
neighbour, in an attempt to limit and decrease Shi’a power in the country.
Iran, on the other hand, has been involved in Bahrain by also spreading the
ideological views of the Islamic Revolution, and at the same time by
challenging the Al-Saud’s legitimacy, too.228
After the Iranian regime change in 1979, the Islamic Republic’s
expansionist aspirations became the most tangible in Bahrain, when in 1981;
the authorities arrested Arab conspirators who received their training near
Isfahan in Iran. A coup might have been envisaged, but as it was revealed
early, it did not cause fundamental changes. However, a strong concern has
been raised by this event throughout the Gulf, and especially in Saudi
Arabia. In a matter of weeks, as a result, the kingdom and Bahrain
announced that they had signed a security pact.229
Even though the extent of Iranian influence in Bahrain following the
Islamic revolution is uncertain, its existence is beyond doubt. Most
probably, as the Shiites in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province, the Bahraini
Shi’a may also have been encouraged and inspired by the revolution, rather
than being directly motivated by the events. The Shiites of Bahrain have
long been viewed as a potential base of Iranian influence thus the Islamic
Republic always kept an eye on the small Gulf kingdom.230
A landmark event took place in 2007, which seriously shook IranianBahraini relations: historical Iranian claims over the kingdom have been
again revived. In a Persian newspaper it was argued that Bahrain was an
Mabon (2012): „The Battle for Bahrain: Iranian-Saudi Rivalry.”
http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/battle-bahrain-iranian-saudirivalry
229
Rosen (1985): 57.
230
Mabon (2012): „The Battle for Bahrain: Iranian-Saudi Rivalry.”
http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/battle-bahrain-iranian-saudirivalry
228
36
inseparable part of the Islamic Republic –an act terrifying not only from
kingdom’s, but also from the Saudi point of view.231
The Shiite-Sunni division in Bahrain is still an important issue, as
the members of the Shi’a community are not able to acquire significant
positions of power. However, the protracted tension between the
government and the opposition should not be described as a purely sectarian
friction as Sunnis are also present among those who are unsatisfied with the
governmental system. While the tensions within the kingdom have been
long present, oil prosperity has helped to smooth them to some extent.
However, as revenues decreased, frictions have gradually grown within the
society.
With the so-called Arab spring spreading cross the North African
region and the Middle East, Bahraini conditions have also experienced
changes in terms of anti-regime protests. The country has become an area of
significant damage, which was mostly a result of its sectarian schism, along
with the involvement of Iran and Saudi Arabia in the conflict. Initially, the
protestors (mostly Shiites) were demanding political and democratic
reforms in a peaceful manner. Later on, however, the response from the
monarchical forces was disproportionately harsh, which led to the evolution
of the unrest. Saudi Arabia played a significant role in helping the brutal
repression of the opposition, in order to keep the Al-Khalifa in ruling
position- they deployed troops to the country.232 Though the Iranian
involvement on the side of the protestors was less apparent, the ties between
the Shiite clerics in Bahrain and Tehran have been obvious.233
231
Wehrey (2009): 54.
Jahner (2012): 46.
233
Mabon (2012): „The Battle for Bahrain: Iranian-Saudi Rivalry.”
http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/battle-bahrain-iranian-saudirivalry
232
37
IV.
Warming of relations from the 1990s and the impacts of 9/11
Even though a certain extent of Saudi-Iranian competition could be felt
ever since the Islamic revolution until the very recent days, there had been
years of conciliation and signs of warming as well between the two
countries.
The impetus for the detente that first happened in the 1990s was
stemming from a number of domestic and regional factors on both sides.
The invasion of Kuwait made Iraq a threat for both states, and the fact that
Tehran did not support the Shi’a intifada in Iraq in 1991 indicated that Iran
might have given up its expansive revolutionary goals. 234 The warming of
relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia might have been also a
consequence of the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, which
considerably helped the Islamic Republic in re-engaging with certain
countries.
235
By the end of 1991, diplomatic relations had been restored
with Saudi Arabia, too.236
For Iran, all the damages caused by the Iraq-Iran war were highly
motivating to change priorities in foreign policy, based more on economic
considerations. Since oil revenues were extremely important for Iran,
cooperation with the GCC countries and especially with the Saudi kingdom
became the new top priority in the Iranian foreign policy. 237
First under the Presidency of Ali Akbar Rafsanjani the Islamic Republic
sought better relations with its neighbours. Rafsanjani’s visit to Saudi Arabia
in 1996 was an important indicator for these warming relations. A year later,
Crown Prince Abdullah also paid a visit to Tehran in order to take part in a
meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. The trip
significantly strengthened Iranian-Saudi ties by Abdullah’s friendly words to
the Muslim people of Iran, where he recognized their “immortal
achievements”. 238
234
Wehrey (2009): 17.
Gheissari (2009): 357.
236
Wehrey (20099: 17.
237
Amiri (2010): 50.
238
Mafinezam (2008): 69.
235
38
Later, Muhammad Khatami’s presidency brought further considerable
developments in Saudi-Iranian relations, as he strongly reinforced the nonideological aspects of the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy. He travelled to
Saudi Arabia too and the two countries defence ministers also met on
several occasions.239 Direct telephone lines were established between the
senior leaders of the two states, and a number of bilateral economic and
security agreements were also signed during that period. 240
Despite the achievements of better relations in the 1990s, religious
competition between the two countries lingered further, which was probably
the most apparent in the Saudi backing of the Taliban in Afghanistan.241
Therefore, the fundamental tensions between Iran and Saudi kingdom
continued to exist.242
The 2001 9/11 events posed serious challenges for both Iran and
Saudi Arabia, as the defenders of political Islam.243 Thus, the rescue of
Muslims from disrepute after the al-Qaeda attacks resulted in a campaign
which also helped the two countries to reach out towards each other. As an
important example, King Abdullah initiated an Interfaith Dialogue with
other religions. Furthermore, during the International Islamic Conference in
2007, he signed a declaration and thereby recognized all groupings and
schools of Islamic law, even the Shiite ones.244 The declaration said that
“...all who accept the basic tenets of the faith are Muslims and it is not
permissible to brand them apostates...” This was in contrast with the long
Saudi practice.245 Following the declaration’s signal, Abdullah has made
some other conciliatory gestures to the Saudi Shiites, for example, he
invited a Shiite imam to participate in the Interfaith Dialogue, as well as he
let a Shiite sportsman carry the Saudi flag in the 2008 Olympic Games.246
These were not only gestures towards the Saudi Shiites, but they can be seen
as a friendly step towards the Islamic Republic as well.
Another important era of rapprochement was, therefore, from
the middle to the end of the 2000s. This was also the time when Iranian
239
Gheissari (2009): 334.
.Gheissari (2009): 357.
241
Mafinezam (2008): 70.
242
Wehrey (2009): 17.
243
Gheissari (2009): 335.
244
Lippman (2012):189.
245
Lippman (2012): 190.
246
Lippman (2012): 207.
240
39
President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad accepted King Abdullah’s invitation to
Riyadh.247 The meeting has become an important signal of a working
relationship between the two countries. Even though the Saudis maintained
their position on the Arab politics as well as on the containment of the
Iranian influence in the Arab countries, the invitation was a clear sign of
cooperative relations. 248 During the trip, the Saudi press referred to the two
states as “brotherly nations”. This first significant rapprochement since the
1990s has probably been a result of the diminishing of the Iranian
revolutionary zeal, as well as different policies. The leaders of the Islamic
Republic no longer publicly questioned the legitimacy of the Saudi
kingdom. Saudi Arabia, on the other side, attempted to lessen its
dependence on the United States not least because of the US public
reactions to 9/11, and promoted the deepening of relations with China.249
Even though the two countries had still been regarding each other as
ideological rivals, Saudi Arabia remained keen to develop its friendship with
the pragmatic elements of the Iranian leadership.250
247
Mafinezam (2008): 70.
Kamrava( 2011): 105.
249
Mafinezam (2008): 70.
250
Gheissari (2009): 334.
248
40
V.
The case of Syria (current opposition)
The most prominent area where Saudi and Iranian interests are
clashing today and where the two states’ competition is the most visible is
the current Syrian civil war. For the Islamic Republic, the Syrian regime
constitutes a long-standing important ally, as their good relation dates back
to the birth of the new system in Iran. Syria was the first Arab country to
recognize the Islamic Republic. 251 Since then, the two states collaborated in
various ways, even on military and political matters.252 The partnership is
still strong, because they have the ability to compromise on key issues.253
Besides the mutual “hatred” towards Iraq (based on another historic
competition between Iraq and Syria), Syria had various other reasons to
have strong ties with the new Iranian leadership. As its relation with Saudi
Arabia and Morocco significantly deteriorated in the 1980s, the President of
Syria saw the Syrian-Iranian axis as a regional strengthening.254 In the
1990s, in spite of the ideological differences, Arab nationalist Syria and the
Islamic Republic continued to cooperate with each other on various
grounds, especially militarily and in politics.255 Despite the fact that Syria is
a secular state, the leadership belongs to the Shiite Alawite sect,
256
therefore, it has been a strong interest for the Shiite Iran to help President
Bashar al-Assad stay in power.257 Since Syria’s future is extremely
important for Iran, the two regimes’ alliance is likely to remain strong
through the current situation.258
The recent conflict in Syria which has escalated into a bloody civil
war by the time, started as a peaceful demonstration of Assad’s opposition,
to be able to acquire more rights.
259 260
Besides the regime’s harsh
251
Goodarzi (2007): 18.
Goodarzi (2007):291.
253
Goodarzi (2007): 286.
254
Goodarzi (2007):31.
255
Goodarzi (2007):291.
256
Sunayama (2007):61.
257
Keddie (1995): 120.
258
Institute For The Study Of War: „Iranian Influence in the Levant, Egypt, Iraq, and
Afghanistan”
http://www.understandingwar.org/report/iranian-influence-levant-egypt-iraq-andafghanistan
259
International Affairs 88: 1 (2012) 95–113
260
Mourtada (2013): “No Country for Anyone”
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/10/09/no_country_for_anyone_syria
252
41
oppression, the influence and interference of regional powers also
contributed to the maintenance of the conflict and the current stalemate.
Apart from Iran, the Lebanese Hezbollah and Russia intervened by
supporting the government, while Saudi Arabia and Qatar stepped into the
picture on the side of the Syrian rebels.261
To have a comprehensive view on the current civil war, it is
important to examine the rebels’ background as well. Initially most of them
have been Sunni Muslims, who – besides the regional events - were
motivated by the support of Saudi Arabia and the Muslim Brotherhood in
their opposition.
262
Later on, the anti-Assad coalition was expanded by
Turkey, and the US in the background.263
Besides Saudi Arabia’s initiative for the isolation of Syria within the
Arab League, its other contributions to the revolution are not negligible
either. The significant financial support to the rebels coming from mostly
private funds helped to cause the protraction of the conflict, as well as its
radicalization, since the support often came from the jihadists. 264 Besides
the financial backing, the technical training organized by the Saudis is also
worth mentioning.265
Notwithstanding the efforts of the rebels and their supporters, what
they really aimed at, a split within the regime, has not taken place yet.
Ironically, it was rather the armed opposition that was split into various
smaller groups.266
267
Even though there are significant cross-country
alliances as well, many groups are operating on the local level, with various
agendas.268
Hubbard (2013): „Private Donors’ Funds Add Wild Card to War in Syria.”
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/13/world/middleeast/private-donors-funds-add-wildcard-to-war-in-syria.html?src=recg
262
International Affairs 88: 1 (2012) 107.
263
International Affairs 88: 1 (2012) 111.
264
Hubbard (2013): „Private Donors’ Funds Add Wild Card to War in Syria.”
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/13/world/middleeast/private-donors-funds-add-wildcard-to-war-in-syria.html?src=recg
265
Kenner, Davis (2013): „Why Saudi Arabia Hates the Iran Deal?”
http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/11/14/why_saudi_arabia_hates_the_iran_deal_0
266
they are now believed to be around 100 in Syria
BBC News Middle East: „Guide to armed and political opposition”
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24403003
267
International Affairs 88: 1 (2012) 110.
268
BBC News Middle East: „Guide to armed and political opposition”
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24403003
261
42
The rebels’ foreign supporters do not share completely unified goals
either, nor use the same methods to overthrow the current regime. Saudi
Arabia, for instance, is campaigning for a more radical, active involvement,
whereas the US would be more ready to compromise. The Saudi kingdom,
as the conflict escalates, has a harsh criticism towards the international
community that they could not do anything worthwhile in order to
overthrow Assad’s rule, nor to protect the civilians.269 For Saudi Arabia, a
diplomatic solution and the keeping of the current president in power are
unacceptable.270
Over the three years of the war, more than 100.000 Syrians lost their
lives and more than nine million people had to leave their homes. For the
conflict, to reach these lows, the regional powers’ oppositions worked as a
catalyst - especially the Saudi-Iranian competition.271
Gordon. (2013): „Kerry Reassures Saudis U.S. Shares Their Goals”
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/05/world/middleeast/kerry-meets-saudi-king-to-smoothrelations.html?ref=syria
270
Gladstone (2013): “Kerry to Visit Saudi Arabia to Smooth Relations”
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/01/world/middleeast/kerry-to-visit-saudi-arabia-tosmooth-relations.html?ref=syria
271
BBC News Middle East (2014): „Syria: the story of the conflict”
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868
269
43
VI.
Conclusion
This paper sought to present the competition between the Islamic
Republic of Iran and Saudi Arabia through various factors. The countries are
long considered to be a challenge to each other’s supremacy in all aspects
that matter to them the most: religion, security (politics), and economy272 these areas, therefore, gave the backbone of the thesis.
In relation to ideology and religion, it was concluded that Islam played
very different roles both in the construction and the maintenance of the two
states.273 These differences may derive from the very nature of Sunni and
Shiite Islam as well as the diverse cultural practices of each country. Both
believe that “their” Islam is superior to the other’s, which has been causing
much tension. Iran - just as much as Saudi Arabia - seeks to present itself as
the “leader” of the Muslim nations, therefore, religious competition
constitutes to exist and still has an impact on foreign policies.
Apart from this competition, the two powers are considered to be rivals
in respect to culture and ethnicity as well. They both take pride in their
respective heritage and feel superior vis-á-vis each other.274 On political
grounds, the considerably different regime types constitute a notable
obstacle to warm relations.
In relation to foreign policy, there have been several proxy “battlefields”
where Saudi and Iranian interests notably conflicted or still conflict. Either
we examine Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan of Bahrain, the rivalry is
apparent.275 To the competition, both powers bring all tools at their disposal:
they promote ideologically friendly regional groups in order to advance
their interests,276 as well as they seek out international allies to be able to
dominate in the area.277 Both Iran and Saudi Arabia have advocated a
particular group of political Islam and supported a type of Islamic
272
Lippman (2012):238.
Ayoob (2008): 47.
274
Boucek (2011): „Rivals- Iran vs. Saudi Arabia.”
http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/20/rivals-iran-vs.-saudi-arabia/68jg#rivals
275
Boucek (2011): „Rivals- Iran vs. Saudi Arabia.”
http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/20/rivals-iran-vs.-saudi-arabia/68jg#rivals
276
Kamrava (2011): 179.
277
Kamrava (2011): 176.
273
44
fundamentalism.278 The tools of advancing their interests have mostly been
financial, technical, or based on ideology. The Islamic Republic and Saudi
Arabia bring different strengths to their rivalry: Iran, for example is more
successful in supporting non-state actors like Hezbollah, whereas the Saudi
kingdom have far more financial resources and the notable alliance of the
Unites States.279
From warm relations before the Islamic revolution to the cessation of
diplomatic ties in the late 1980s and then to gradual detente, the relationship
of the two powers changed significantly over time and again seems to be
uncertain.280 Today, in the light of the sweeping regional changes (also
known as the “Arab Spring”) both countries face enormous challenges and
neither of them is able to come out as the “ultimate winner” of the
competition.281 Important to note as well that they seem unwilling to
confront each other directly, even though they both still yearn for regional
dominance. In the near future, the Iranian economic reliance on Saudi
Arabia and the Saudi fear from the Iranian nuclear weapon potential is
likely to keep them reluctant to confront directly. At any possible future
scenario, their relation will surely have an enormous impact on the region’s
stability.282
278
Ehteshami (2007): 104.
Lippman (2012): 242.
280
Jahner (2012). 38.
281
Boucek (2011): „Rivals- Iran vs. Saudi Arabia.”
http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/20/rivals-iran-vs.-saudi-arabia/68jg#rivals
282
Jahner (2012): 46.
279
45
VII.
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Clause
I the undersigned, Veronika Deésy, (ID number: 982870IA) candidate for
the MSc degree in international studies declare herewith that the present
thesis is exclusively my own work, based on my research and only such
external information as properly credited in notes and bibliography. I
declare that no unidentified and illegitimate use was made of the work of
others, and no part of the thesis infringes on any person’s or institute’s
copyright. I also declare that no part of the thesis has been submitted in this
form to any other institution of higher education for an academic degree.
Budapest, April 2014
Veronika Deésy
Alulírott Deésy Veronika (sz.ig.:982870IA) nyilatkozom arról, hogy a
szakdolgozat saját szellemi termékem, azt más szakon szakdolgozatként
nem nyújtottam be, és csak a megjelölt segédeszközöket használtam.
Budapest, 2014. április
Deésy Veronika
53