Hannibal at the Gates The Second Romano-Carthaginian War and the Contest for Mediterranean Supremacy Carthaginian Spain and Barcid Expansion Hamilcar Barca and the New Carthaginian Spanish Empire: 237-229/8 BCE Mineral Resources and Manpower Gades and the Fortress at Alicante Roman Reconnaissance Mission (231 BCE?) Hamilcar: Meeting the War Indemnity Hasdrubal (Hamilcar’s son-in-law): 229-221 BCE Carthago Nova (New Carthage) The Ebro Treaty (226 BCE?) The Massalia Factor Hannibal Barca (son of Hamilcar) Assumes high Spanish command in 221 BCE Saguntum and the Roman Ultimatum Carthaginian Spain Causes of the Hannibalic War: The Polybian Analysis (3.9-12) The “Wrath of the Barcids” Roman Seizure of Sardinia in the Aftermath of the First Romano-Carthaginian War Carthaginian Success in Spain and Roman Suspicions “Hannibal’s Oath” Alpine Gorge--Hannibal’s Troops Ambushed Here by Gallic Tribesmen The Col de la Traversette Hannibal’s Passage of the Alps Synopsis of the Hannibalic War (218-202 BCE) Blitzkrieg Strategy--Hannibal arrives in Italy with 26,000 troops Plan: Disaffection of Roman Allies Early Victories in Northern Italy Cannae (Apulia): 216 BCE (Polyb. 3.107-18; Liv. 22.43-9) Ticinus and Trebia (218 BCE); Trasimene (217 BCE) 70,000 Roman casualties (Polyb. 3.117) “Double-Envelopment” Tactic Fabius Maximus Cunctator (“Delayer”; Fabian Tactics) Roman allies hold firm Hannibal bottled up in southern Italy Carthaginian reinforcements intercepted and destroyed at Metaurus River in 207 BCE Hannibal arrives in the Po River Valley (Polyb. 3.56) “The whole march from New Carthage had taken him five months, and the actual crossing of the Alps fifteen days, and now when he boldly descended into the plains of the Po valley and the territory of the Insubres, the army that was left to him consisted of 12,000 African and 8,000 Spanish infantry, and not more than 6,000 cavalry in all; he himself explicitly mentions these figures in the inscription on the column at Lacinium which records the strength of his forces.” The High Toll of the Alps (Polyb. 3.60) “The result was that while Hannibal started after the crossing of the Rhone with 38,000 infantry and more than 8,000 cavalry he lost nearly half his force as I have described above in making his way through the passes, while the survivors, because of the ceaseless privations they endured, came in their outward appearance and general condition to look more like beasts than men.” The Hannibalic War in Italy The Battle at Trasimene (217 BCE) The Battle at Cannae (216 BCE) Rome on the Offensive Hannibal returns to Africa (autumn, 203 BCE) Proconsul: P. Cornelius Scipio (204-202 BCE) The Battle at Zama (202 BCE) “Africanus” The Trial of the Scipios and the PoliticoCultural Stance of the elder Cato (“Catonians” and “Philhellenes”?) The Battle at Zama (202 BCE) Aftermath of the Hannibalic War Spain: Roman Province from 197 BCE (see Livy, 32.27.6) The Greek World: “[I]t is evident even to those of us who give scanty attention to affairs of state, that whether the Carthaginians beat the Romans or the Romans the Carthaginians in this war…they are sure to come here and extend their ambitions beyond the bounds of justice” speech of Greek ambassador in 217 BCE Polybius, Histories, 5.104 Readings for Next Meeting Polybius, The Rise of the Roman Empire, 178-276 Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, 9-53 Gruen, Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome, 1-53 Questions for Readings How does Polybius represent Roman motivations in the First Illyrian, Gallic, and Hannibalic Wars? In these wars, who is the aggressor in the Polybian account? Compare and contrast the views of Harris and Gruen on Roman imperial expansion In Gruen’s view, where and how did the Romans learn the diplomatic tools they employed in Greece? Assignments for Next Meeting Group Discussions of Polybius and the contrasting views on Roman imperialism of W.V. Harris and E.S. Gruen