Week 12: The International Development Agenda II: Democratisation and Development Dae-oup Chang Exam Questions/Key Questions: Questions: Is the current neoliberal development framework compatible with the idea of liberal democracy? Can real democracy be given or does it have to be seized? Does development lead to democracy or is it the other way around? Has the Good Governance Agenda promoted or undermined postcolonial democracy? Essay question: Does capitalist development promote or undermine democracy? 2010: (a) ‘Strengthening democratic institutions is a necessary, but insufficient, condition for the deepening of democracy’. Discuss. OR (b) ‘The chief problem with mainstream discussions on democratization is that they do not take into account the roles and effects of social movements.’ Discuss. 2008: How can democracy be strengthened in developing countries? 2007: Critically assess the claims that democratisation is a necessary and desirable component of development. 2006: (a) To what extent can democracy be strengthened through the creation of ‘new democratic spaces’ at local level? OR (b) Why has the ‘global’ emerged as an arena of social movement politics, and does this signal the declining importance of ‘national’ and ‘local’ politics? 2005: What is the relationship between democracy and economic development, if any? 2004: Discuss the relationship between democracy and human rights (political, civil, social and economic) in the development process. Lecture Blurb: At the ‘end of history’, we seemed to have two ultimate forms of development: (neoliberal) capitalism and (liberal) democracy. However, earlier enthusiasm for the so-called ‘third wave’ of democratisation gave way to more sober, if not pessimistic, views on the future of democracies in the developing world as new ‘neoliberal’ capitalism did not lead to much more democratic development. Discussions about the ‘quality of democracy’ and ‘democratic consolidation’ reflect mainstream attempts to try to find obstacles to liberal democracy in the developing world rather than to identify the contradictions between democracy and capitalist development. On the other hand, with the emergence of ‘good governance’, the issues of democratisation and human rights became incorporated into the mainstream development agenda. Democratisation and the upholding of human rights are today seen as important conditions for economic and human development, and as goals in themselves not only for mainstream development discourse but also for global justice movements pursuing ‘cosmopolitan democracy’ and ‘global civil society’. The meaning of democratisation and human rights is, however, heavily contested and contextualized. This session addresses this democracy-development relation that is one of the most contested areas in development studies. There are many questions regarding this relation. Does democratisation presuppose economic development? Does democracy hinder economic development? Does more democratic and participatory development mean smaller states and bigger societies? The lecture will outline the main positions and their trajectories, locating them in the context of development processes. Definitions: Democracy Definitions: Electoral/Polyarchal/Liberal Schumpeterian minimalist concept: defines democracy as the “institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” Schumpeter (1947;269). Ie electoral democracy. Dahl’s Polyarchal Democracy: Dahl identifies the political institutions of modern representative democratic government as involving: Elected officials Free, fair and frequent elections Freedom of expression Access to alternative sources of information to those disseminated by the state and associational autonomy (ie freedom of assembly – the media etc.) Associational autonomy for example, The right to run for office, form independent political parties/interest groups Inclusive citizenship for example, Inclusive suffrage Dahl terms this modern type of large-scale democratic governance, with the six democratic institutions listed above, as polyarchal democracy, meaning: “rule by the many”. He distinguishes this polyarchal democracy from representative democracy – for example that involving restricted suffrage in the 19th Century and older democracies and republics which lacked many of the other characteristics of polyarchal democracy (e.g. political parties and the right to form political organisations, oppose the existing government etc). Liberal democracy: linked to Dahl’s description of polyarchal democracy and the six features of democratic institutions. Diamond (1996) emphasises: Absence of “reserved domains” of power for the military or other social and political forces who are not directly accountable to the electorate “Horizontal Accountability” of office holders to one another, in addition to “Vertical Accountability” of the rulers to the ruled. Extensive provisions for political and civic pluralism as well as for individual and group freedoms. Key themes from the lecture: What is democracy? Depends on what democracy means (see the above definitions) – difficult to define as everyone uses it for his or her own means. Highly politicised and conceptualised. Defined as good against something bad. Changing definition of democracy: Ancient concept (Athens 5th – 4th century BC); rule by the demos, the ‘people’. Obligation to participate, no ‘politicians’ – point to avoid technocrats. Negative meaning of democracy in the early modern period – rule by the mob. 1830s/40s democracy became the slogan of the modern social movement – radical roots (Labour movement/Women’s movement/abolitionist movement (Denning 2001). 1848 revolutions (France, North America) and the Chartist movement – reemergence of democracy. Moments of democratisation: Workers not strong enough to make it its own, but only alliance with radical bourgeoisie and middle class. Inclusionary element of democracy only relatively recent: Women’s movement late 19th/early 20th century, USA African American Civil Rights Movement 60s/70s. Using democracy as an incentive for action – e.g. War. Democracy vs. Development – Democracy born out of a radical concept, development born as a violent and antidemocratic concept (see weeks 1 and 3, invention and imposition of development). “Economic development is antidemocratic in several ways” – Lummis (1996; 45) cf Leftwich 2005 – institutional incompatibility between the two. The institutions necessary for rapid economic development are very different to those required for the promotion of democracy. Questions: - Does democracy promote development? Does development promote democracy? Which comes first? Contrary to modernisation theorists of the 1960s who regarded democracy as a product of development rather than a pre-requisite, neoliberals view democracy as a “necessary prior or parallel condition of development, not an outcome of it” (Leftwich, 1993, p. 605). No single answer – it all depends, combination of which democracy with which development. Return of democracy to the discourse: Since the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War (‘the end of history’) two ultimate forms of development have prevailed: (neoliberal) capitalist development and (liberal) democracy. According to Fukuyama, as they are the best institutions human society can possible enjoy, we have reached “the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human governance” (Fukuyama (1989). As a result, ideas surrounding liberal democracy and free-market capitalism are “inextricably linked” (Leftwich 2005). Huntington describes the rise of democratisation since this period as a “third wave of democratisation” in which “between 1974 and 1990, at least 30 countries made transitions to democracy, just about doubling the number of democratic governments in the world” (Huntington, 1993; 3). Schumpeterian minimalist concept in which democracies are states where ruling elites compete for votes in the market place of the election. Demonstrates an expansion of the market into the political area. Electoral democracy therefore emerges in this picture as a fundamental step in the evolutionary process towards more ideal liberal democracy. However: a wave is defined as “a group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period” (ibid.). It must be noted therefore, that the process of democratisation is not a final one, and that reverse waves can occur at any point, as Diamond highlights, the process of consolidation of democracy is therefore an important one see below (Diamond 1996). Consolidation Debate: How do democracies become ‘proper’ liberal democracies? Many democracies did not become ‘liberal’ or real democracies – many returned to authoritarian regimes or remained as illiberal democracies. Ending point should guarantee a better standard of living after democracy but not happening as expected – inequality undermining social stability. The proto-science of Consolidology: Linked to Dhalian concept of polyarchy (Dahl 1989), which elaborated on the Schumpeterian minimalist definition; Consolidology investigates problems hindering the transition of electoral democracy to liberal democracy. There are many ways in which the degree of consolidation can be evaluated, for example: Moving beyond formal electoral democracy Removing the reserved domains of power for the military, or other social/political forces that are not either directly or indirectly accountable to the state. Ensuring horizontal accountability of office holders to one another and extensive provisions for political and civil pluralism. Idea that if you don’t have an established modern state, cannot have consolidated democratisation. For Rose and Shin (2001), the growing gap between electoral democracy and liberal democracy is largely due to the absence of a modern state, which is presupposed in both Schumpeterian and Dhalian concepts of democracy – a comparison between first and third wave democratisation is undertaken. (See further reading). State building is therefore a necessary element of consolidation – linked to bringing back the state PWC. WC (plus) Neoliberals – democracy not a prerequisite for development but a product of market-based development/synonym of market based development whose purpose is to fix politics. E.g. IFIs. However, criticisms of the neoliberal model leading to increased inequality have led to the rise of the GG agenda (see week 6). Equity promotes growth and even efficiency through better use of human resources and social and political sustainability. Equity Debate: The combination of electoral democracy and free market economics led to widening gap between classes and countries, undermining social stability and therefore hampering development. Transition from the WC to the PWC; focus on accountability, transparency and anticorruption. Failings of the markets to work equitably down to bad governance rather than market-based development (WDR 1997). Got to get institutions right before prices correct themselves - NIE. Electoral democracy the key once again – it can tackle the corruption that distorts the market by holding governments accountable. The market then brings development and development completes (liberal) democracy. Represents the reintroduction of democracy into the mainstream development discourse. The key is not a big state, but a clean, effective and efficient one. Role to address market failures (providing public goods like education and health) but promote equity and provide social nets. PWC: Democracy is a prerequisite for growth – democratic institutions lead to the rule of law and thus to physical security, because they bring stability and predictability, they are conducive to investment. E.g. UN agencies. Democracy is also a pre-requisite for poverty alleviation: - More responsive to citizens’ needs - More accountable to citizens, civil society, private sector - Increasing the ‘voices of the poor’ Key question: What kind of democracy is promoted by the WC ‘plus’? Socioeconomic decision-making must be insulated from political power (that is democratically formed) – to protect individual freedom – neoliberal democracy is very unlikely to democratise ‘development’. Hard to challenge core ideas. No question about the sort of ‘economic development’ – discussion stops at the emergence of free-market capitalism over communism. Democracy only there to fix the bad government – market good and therefore should be left to its own devices – neoliberal democracy limited. What kind of democracy is promoted by the consolidation debate and PWC? Both expand democracy beyond electoral democracy (by emphasising ‘liberal’ democracy and equity – soci0-economic democratisation). But at the same time, they contain democracy within the neoliberal framework and existing forms of polyarchy – making western polyarchy the model and single mode of democratic participation. Irony of the third wave (Denning 2001) – rise of (American/European style) ‘democracy’ accompanied by the decline of socio-economic democracy. Greater ‘electorate area’ - devaluation of the political ability of democracy and restriction of powers of the public through the widening of ‘citizenship’ (Denning 2001). Contradictory nature of modern democracy: Alternative critiques More mass participation with an increasingly narrow mode of participation. Questioning the democratic quality that has been brought in. More and more people able to participate in politics, but the representative system becomes the only way of participating – de-radicalising politics. Attempts to identify democracy exclusively with liberal representative democracy – an attempt to degrade direct democracy and direct actions by labeling it non-democratic (occupation, coups?). McNally (2006): Social movements of working people had to give up more subversive elements of democracy (rule of people) and accept ‘liberal representative democracy’ as the only framework for all democracies – “the liberal transformation in the meaning of democracy” (2006; 272). Concentration of political power within parliamentary state – “Sovereignty remained grounded in the state” rather than lay with people who inhabited the state (Berger 2001; 893). “Democracy has been emptied of its original content – which referred to the absolute sovereignty of the people – and refilled with liberal doctrines of individual (property-based) rights” (McNally 2006; 273). Transnational structures of power moved from the people to powerful external agents (Evans 2001). “The effect is to de-radicalize the movement by proposing merely to change the ideology that drives government policy, not the system as a whole” (McNally, 2002, p. 60). Third wave of democratisation occurred after this transition of the notion of democracy. New democracies – don’t get international support if they don’t democratise ‘legally’. The result of the dominance of the “Euro-centric” liberal democratic model is to eradicate and stifle the emergence of new visions of democracy (which may involve greater people/citizen involvement) by labelling them illiberal or undemocratic (Koelble & Lipuma 2008). Addressing the gap between ideal and existing liberal democracies: Aims to pursue a more participatory and socio-economic democracy (Huber, Rueschermeyer & Stephens 1997) Common theme in this discourse is to focus on ‘civil society’, forces of which are believed to actively pursue democratisation. However, dedicated to describing and anticipating the emergence of civil society institutions resembling those in developed polyarchies. Consists of the usual routes (ie those in western democracies) through which voices of civil society gain ‘political’ impact – a unilateral path once again? Democracy discourse resembles development discourse rather than original idea of democracy as a social movement. “The expression [economic development] is not universal, but particular. It does not mean the development of any of the various ways that people have maintained their livelihood throughout history. Rather, it means the elimination of most of those ways and their replacement by certain historically specific practices originating in Europe. “Economic Development” means the development of those practices” Lummis (1996; 45). Do we first need to “democratize democracy” before democratizing development? (Koelble & Lipuma 2008). Literature: Core Readings: 1. Evans, T. 2001, ‘If Democracy, Then Human Rights?’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 623-642. This article analyses the link between democracy and human rights and whether it is actually a “symbiotic” relationship as often assumed. Evan’s conclusion suggests that “democracy promotion has more to do with global economic interests than with delivering human rights to the poor and excluded in less developed counties” (2001; 623”. Liberal Democracy: Four important assumptions from this view of democracy. The first assumption is that the territorial state is the appropriate environment for democratisation – it is the basic unit which defines the limits of democracy and differentiates from insiders/outsiders; however, it does not suggest that each person living in this state share the rights associated with citizenship equally. “the generally held assumption is that the concept of liberal democracy is tied to the idea a self-governing community, a community of citizens defined by national sovereignty, the territorial nation-state, self-determination and domestic jurisdiction” (2001; 624). The second assumption is that the principle of accountability should be at the centre of all forms of liberal democracy. “Accountability is further guaranteed by the practice of holding periodic multiparty elections to represent assembly, a practice that is widely understood as the single most important requirement for a government to claim democratic credentials” (ibid.). The third assumption is that democratic states have a high level of autonomy and the capability to pursue policies that further the interests of its citizens. “Citizens have an expectation that governments can, in fact, fulfil the aims and objectives of the community as expressed through the ballot box”. “There is an assumption that the autonomy of a democratic state is unconstrained by external factors beyond those that arise from its relative power positions within the international order” (Both 2001; 625). “The final assumption is that the democratic state acts in the interests of the whole of the people, not in the interests of particular national or global groups” (ibid.). This point highlights an obvious tension between the liberal and democratic elements of liberal democracy; public vs. private, political vs. economic, state vs. civil society and social demands and vs. the common good (Beetham 1992). Evans highlights that because of these dominant assumptions surrounding ideas of democracy, little attention has been paid to understanding new forms of democracy, especially in light of this changing age of globalisation – this ‘global interconnectedness’ raises questions surrounding the ‘relevant community’ for example in issues such as AIDS, acid rain, or the use of non-renewable resources (David Held 1992; 22). Evans adds universal human rights to this list, including economic, social, civil and political. The effects of globalisation: (pp 625-626) “The assumption that governments remain in control of state borders cannot be sustained under conditions of globalisation”. “The development of new technology enables the formation of new transnational relationships that challenge the territorial limits of democracy”. “Globalisation has seen state power decline as transnational decision making increasingly takes precedence over national decision making”. Rising power of international organisations such as the WTO, EU, WB etc. “Given the growing authority of these organisation, the assumption that national democratic communities ‘make and determine decisions and policies for themselves’ or that governments ‘determine what is right or appropriate exclusively for their own citizens’ seems doubtful” (Evans 2001; 626/Held 1992; 21). Growing economic power of the transnational corporations also challenges the dominant conception of democracy: “In the scramble to attract inward investment, the demands of TNC’s often take precedence over the needs of the community as a whole”, for example in areas of trade unions, environment, taxation, human rights regulation. “the state is losing its autonomy because of decisions made from above at the global level, raising questions that challenge the generally held assumptions about democratic representation and the accountability of government”. With respect to Human Rights, Evans highlights that “although international law presents the state as the main guarantor of human rights, the state may not possess the capabilities to fulfil its obligations”. Democracy and universal human rights: This section highlights the link between human rights and democracy, highlighting that the perceived symbiotic nature of the relationship between them should be treated with caution. “While all theories of democracy include a concern for rights, historically such rights were never extended to all the people sharing a common territory”. Evans highlights that under the conditions of globalisation, “governments are unable to exercise the necessary authority to secure democratic outcomes or offer protection for human rights” p.628. As a result, enhancing the institutions which uphold human rights and practices of liberal democracy on a national level will not be sufficient. UN therefore is perceived to play an important role in this respect, however, although it has played an important part in the global reach of the idea of human rights, the mandate of the UN (based upon non-intervention and sovereign equality) limits its ability to act. Democracy and global order: This section highlights the use of democracy as a legitimising tool, appeasing critics from within, and externally. Cf tactics during the Cold War: “the threat of social unrest, which would disrupt the supply of raw materials, restrict investment opportunities and severely damage prospects for exploiting low cost labour, cannot be avoided by using coercive policing and military suppression as it was during the cold war period… This left those with repressive regimes or those who want to maintain cordial relations for political reasons, with the dilemma of promoting a new rationale that justified continuing economic and political relations”. In these respects, Evans argues that the promotion of democracy is not necessarily concerned with Human Rights and social justice but instead, “with the need to create an appropriate global order that provides a stable environment for future economic planning and investment”. If a country can be perceived to be championing democracy and human rights, it is a legitimate partner to do business with. These types of democracy are important for maintaining the conditions of globalisation and, as such, are supported by aid and the IFIs. “In support of this aim, developed states have sought to promote democracy in its procedural guise: as a set of democratic institutions rather than as a means of achieving social and economic transformation that would have empowered the poor and the socially excluded” – Gills et al. term this type of democracy promotion as ‘low-intensity democracy’. The question is therefore, what kind of democracy, and for what purpose? The result of challenging the limitations set by ‘low-intensity democracy’ by the promotion of “popular democracy that includes social reform and justice” can however, result in the withdrawal of support for that country – for example Central America (Chomsky, 1998). “In short, democracy often means little more than a ‘thin veneer of Western concepts’, including national sovereignty, statehood, parliamentary institutions and the ‘rule of law’, all of which are intended to subdue ethnic, cultural and religious tensions in the effort to secure an order fit for economic growth and development” pg. 631. Critics of this approach to democracy therefore look for something more than the introduction of formal institutions “which often do nothing to provide for social, economic and political reforms of the rights of people and peoples” to justify the claim of democratisaiton. “Although some commentators defend the introduction of ‘low-intensity democracy’, arguing that it is the first stage in a journey that ends in full democratic participation and social reform. Gills et al. (1993), argue that it is more accurate to understand it as an end in itself – as a way of maintaining an order that supports the interests of global and national capital” pg. 631. Links here are made to the idea that democracy is a human right; see e.g. Frank, (1988). However, Frank’s argument remains embedded in the idea of national democracy – limited now due to the rise of globalisation, which in turn systematically undermines the autonomy of the nation state. The key now, Evans emphasises, is to democratise the institutions of global governance and take a more inclusive view of the global political economy, including our understanding of democracy. Development, democracy and human rights: Evans therefore urges caution with respect to equating the language of democracy with that of human rights, “More particularly, it has attempted to demonstrate that the effort to promote the dominant version of democracy has more to do with maintaining an order that serves particular economic interests, rather than the interest of those whose human rights and security are threatened” pg. 633. He then undertakes an examination of the domestic and global context to argue that capitalist economic development and growth is ‘profoundly anti-democratic’”. Domestic: “Within the domestic context, the right to development is defined as the right of ‘every human person and all peoples to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized” (Declaration on the Right to Development 1986). The current understanding of development tends to ignore all but the goal of economic development at the expense of social, cultural and political development. Following this dominance of economic development over all others, “development becomes an end in itself rather than a means to an end”. This focus on the economic goals draws attention away from political goals such as the demand for human rights – and the importance on the economic has given many governments an opportunity to plead for tolerance of their human rights record. C.f. arguments that economic development comes before democracy vis-à-vis the western democracies. Are development and democracy compatible? There is also an assumption that full economic development is a realistic goal for all. “It is difficult to see just how the promotion of democracy can be achieved through a model of development that is demonstrably failing to achieve a reduction in inequalities”. Global: The argument that the majority are excluded form participating in the current drive to liberalise global markets focuses on the WTO; critics highlight that greater attention given to interests of transnational capital rather than to rights and human security. On an international level, democracy does not prevail. For example, “The [World] Bank often supports projects aimed at certain types of development that do not necessarily benefit the majority”. “Liberalisation is ‘imposed’ upon people who are excluded from full participation in the decision-making processes that directly affect their ability to claim human rights”. Cf critics of SA. “Although liberalisation often leads to a denial of economic and social rights a decline in the ability of the state to act autonomously in the interests of its people and a denial of democratic participation, developed economies continue to press for further deregulation” “In effect, this means that the interests of the majority of the world’s peoples are denied a voice in important negotiations and decision-making processes that shape their lives and provide the conditions for securing human rights”. Evans concludes that “the image of democracy is used to legitimate forms of behaviour supportive of particular economic interests associated with globalization”, and as a result, democracy and human rights cannot be seen to share a symbiotic relationship. The global scene suggests that democratic participation and representation are less achievable in the post-war/neoliberal world than many commentators argue, and that the creation of new global institutions and a global free market “favours the interest of capital above the interests of all others”. 2. Huber, E., Rueschemeyer, D. and Stephens, J. 1997, ‘The Paradoxes of Contemporary Democracy. Formal, Participatory, and Social Dimensions’, Comparative Politics, Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 323-342. In this article Huber, Rueschemeyer and Stephens divide democracy into three key types: formal, participatory and social democracy. They identify that democracy is a matter of power sharing, and therefore undertake an analysis of the promotion of each form of democracy in Latin America by the three types or ‘clusters of power’ which shape the conditions and maintenance of democracy: class power, state and civil society, and international/transnational structures of power. Previously, the authors have argued that the same historical conditions which promoted formal democracy – ie a shift in the balance of class power in civil society – would aid the advancement of social and economic equality; however, this has not happened – “the current historical conjuncture strides toward introducing and consolidating formal democracy in Latin America and eastern Europe appear to be combined with movements away from more fully participatory democracy and equality” p. 323. The purpose of this article is to analyse why this promotion of social and economic equality has not occurred alongside democratisation. Formal democracy: is defined as a political system which combines the four features of: “regular free and fair elections, universal suffrage, accountability of the states administrative organs to the elected representatives and effective guarantees for freedom of expression and association as well as protection against arbitrary state action” pg 323. However, they do highlight that the label of democracy is often used more loosely to represent “any country that has held an election roughly free of fraud”. The highlight that formal democracy does not mean equality – “even if all four requirements are met, a country may still be far from equality in the process of making collective decisions” – or an equal distribution of political power. Participatory democracy: therefore entails these first four criteria plus the addition of high levels of participation without systematic differences across social categories (e.g. class, ethnicity, gender). Social democracy: denotes a political system that incorporates the first five criteria as well as increasing equality in social and economic outcomes. The authors highlight that although “formal democracies fall far short of the ideals associated with this conception of social democracy”; the establishment of formal democracy is a useful starting point in the progression towards social democracy nevertheless. “Above all, however, formal democracy opens up the possibility of, and is a requisite for, advances toward participatory and social democracy”. Vs. Gills ‘low-intensity democracy’ (in Evans above). However, this is not a fixed progression – “formal democracy may remain formal” – and in some cases, can spiral into vicious cycle or reverse wave of democratisation (see Huntington). This is particularly relevant for new and transitional democracies – links to the importance of strengthening the democratisation process (see Diamond). The authors highlight that changes in the balance of class power link democracy to development (although the outcomes differ between countries and are dependent upon the conditions in each individual country, e.g. politics of mobilisation and class alliance). However, contrary to other authors, they argue that this finding negates other explanations of the capitalist development/democracy link and subsequently reject the claim made by liberal and Marxist theory that democracy is a creation of the bourgeoisie. They do however highlight that the structure of state and state-society relations are critically important to the chances for democracy: Any policy-based advance towards social democracy requires significant instrumental state capacity The state needs to be strong and autonomous enough to ensure the rule of law/avoid capture by elites The power of the state needs to be counterbalances by the organisational strength of civil society ie civil society must not be overpowered by the state so that it can rule without accountability International power relations are also equally important as changes in world politics and the world economy can impact on the structure and capacity of the state, the constrainsts faced by state policy-makers, state-society relations and even the balance of power within society. Transnational structures of power also play an important role – although quite favourable for the promotion of formal democracy – especially regular elections – it can be vey unfavourable for participatory and social democracy. The authors give examples of the international market, and multilateral institutions dominated by core countries and bilateral relations as two features of transnational structures of power and highlight the small democracies of Europe as an example of the affected areas. “Thus, the political side of current transnational structures of power, while supporting the expansion of formal democracy, has worked against the promotion of participatory and social democracy because it has closed of consideration of alternative social democratic policy and, by closing off alternatives, has made popular mobilisation and participation less meaningful” pg 330. The authors highlight Latin America as a place where the consolidation of democracy has failed to occur. “The international community generally regards countries as democracies when they meet the test of regular free and apparently reasonably fair elections with universal suffrage”. However, many countries in LA fail to meet the other criteria of formal democracy defined at the start: Weak accountability (for example overpowering presidents and weak legislature and judiciaries) – continued fragmentation and weakness of state institutions made it hard to enforce accountability. Unevenly protected civil society and political rights across classes– lack of strong organisations of the subordinate classes; breaking up of the work force. Public/private interwoven rather than saying separate. However, some positives did emerge from SA rolling back of the state in LA – reduction in the opportunities for corruption etc. Nevertheless, continuing debt pressure due to the imposition of SA reinforced the tendency to concentrate power in the executive, insulate economic policy makers and rule by decree – cf Argentina President Menem. Determinants of the strengthening of participatory democracy: Importance of political parties for the representation of lower class demands. However, reduced mobilisation seen in LA with the threat of authoritarian rule removed. Political parties failed to establish/maintain ties to subordinate classes and articulate their demands effectively – previous links not upheld once power obtained e.g. Argentina’s Peronists under Menem. “Voter turnout among subordinate classes has been kept high in many cases, in a way that does little to effectively translate lower class interests into policy”. Little room for popular participation beyond the act of voting In many cases, political decentralisation implemented by the IFIs strengthened the position of local elites and their clientalistic networks. In contrast to the positive effects of the international system on the promotion of formal democracy, “the international system has had a depressing effect on citizen participation”. Criticism of neoliberal model – loss of income, job security, government supports and political voice (although the rise of the GG agenda and PRSPs has more recently helped in theory, the practical benefits are often still yet to be seen). “Economic problems rooted in the international system, most prominently continuing debt pressures but also growing internationalization of capital, have also weakened a critical part of the infrastructure of participation, political parties and party systems”. In contrast to Argentina, Peru and Brazil, Chile is the exception, having undertaken early macroeconomic reform, enabling greater progress in the area of social spending and real wages during this period. Determinants of Social democracy: Strong organisation of labour and electoral strength of pro-labour parties has been crucial to the effective implementation of redistributive policies in advanced industrial democracies. However, the shift of power away from labour and towards capital - partly due to neoliberal reforms, weakness of political parties in the new democracies and the effects of military and dictator rule – have resulted in a failure to address the issue of redistribution in a meaningful way. If anything, neoliberal adjustment policies have significantly aggravated socioeconomic inequality. For example, financial liberalisation, privatisation of state owned enterprises, internationalisation of production chains. “The beneficiaries of neoliberal reforms, then, have become very powerful constituencies and obstacles to the pursuit of social democratic policies”. Importance of state intervention to correct the inegalitarian consequences of the market, which originally declined during the period of neoliberalisation but has now re-entered the discourse with the PWC. Reduction in government room to manoeuvre with the rise of globalisation. E.g. Pressure to increase trade openness/liberalisation and the speed in which these types of reforms are implemented. Problem of increased power of capital therefore not only over labour but also over governments – cf Evans. “Increasing internationalization of financial operations and production chains has reduced government’s room to manoeuvre even more in developing than in advanced industrial countries” Pg 337. “In other words, the dominant mode of integration of the new Latin American democracies into the world economy deprives governments of some of the crucial traditional policy instruments to increase employment, raise real wages and finance redistributive social policies”. Conclusion: Huber, Rueschemeyer and Stephens highlight a contradiction between advances in formal democracy and the increasing obstacles appearing in the way of deepening democracy towards a more participatory and socially orientated democracy. They argue that the balance of class power is unfavourable to advancing participatory democracy, but mildly favourable to the survival of formal democracy as the organisational basis of the subordinate classes - crucial to mobilisation into political participation - has been undermined by the rising power of capital (caused by neoliberal reforms). Weak political parties representing the interests of the subordinate classes have resulted in weak accountability and deficiencies even in formal democracy. State Structure/society relations have not developed in a favourable direction for participatory and social democracy either. Weakened state autonomy due to the rise of external actors, weakened judiciary etc due to the shrinking of the state – parallel negative effects on accountability, incentives for citizen participation and social democratic reform. International power structures – in general, opposite effects on formal and participatory/social democracy. “They encourage formal democracy, while virtually blocking a deepening of democratic decision making and policies aimed at a reduction of social and economic inequality… Market orientated economic policies supported by international pressures and by local constituencies gaining from them tend not only to undercut social democratic reform policies, but also to threaten the foundations of even formal democracy” 3. UNDP 2002. ‘Deepening Democracy by Tackling Democratic Deficits’ in Deepening democracy in a Fragmented World, Ch.3, pp. 63-83. “In earlier ties there were lengthy discussions on whether one country or another was yet “fit for democracy”. That changed only recently with the recognition that the question was its wrong headed: a country does not have to be judged to be fit for democracy, rather it has to become fit through democracy. This is a truly momentous change.” - Amartya Sen This is the opening quote of the chapter and highlights changing ideas surrounding the stages of development and democracy. Part of the UNDP HDR, this chapter highlights the importance of deepening democracy and the ways in which this can be achieved. It signifies the acknowledgment that ‘democracy’ means more than just electoral representation in government, at that this is a fundamental stumbling block in the process of democratisation; links to Dahl and consolidology. The article then systematically analyses the things that effect democracy and areas in which greater democratisation can take place. In the opening section, the authors highlight that the process of democratisation in terms of “making it work for the people” has barely begun. Instances of limited political competition, abuse of political and civil rights and the spread of “illiberal democracies” (where elected governments act as their authoritarian predecessors did) are numerous. Assumption that ‘democracy’ would bring more effective development – as this has not happened, it has resulted in a lost confidence in government. The problem is therefore what type of democracy has been promoted – often, the capability of states has not improved. Links between democracy and human development are not automatic. “history also teaches that democracy, in itself, does not guarantee greater social justice, faster economic growth or increased social and political stability”. “Accountability is about power – about people having not just a say in official decisions but also the right to hold their rulers to account”. However the meaning of accountability also differs between people and contexts. Public accountability of democratic institutions: People in democracies can hold their governments to accountability in two ways: action by civil society and through structure of representation and delegation. However, many institutions in many developing countries are weak, overburdened and inadequate – link to GG rhetoric. Resource constraints are one weakness, but also in many cases, national institutions are ineffective because real powers lie elsewhere – transnational corporations, aid donors etc. Rising influence of globalisation cf Evans. Often even though mechanisms for accountability exist, they do not function well, the reasons given for this are 1) subversion of democratic institutions by elite capture and corruption and 2) inadequate reach of democratic institutions/gaps in democratic practice. For example the 1997 Cameroonian elections. Problems can be seen in Europe, not just late democracies – “Flick Affair” Germany 1980s. Strengthening the separation of powers and the independence of the legislature and judiciary. The authors highlight judicial systems as an important part of accountability, however these systems are often inaccessible and, in many cases, corrupt. Professionalising the bureaucracy and military are also key steps. The authors stress the importance of democratising local politics. And highlight that one solution given to the problem of corruption and marginalisation of minorities is decentralisation; however, this can also paradoxically lead to reinforcement of elite power. Decentralisation has to happen democratically – requires more than just decentralising and devolving power. For example the panchayati raj in India. In Bolivia, grass-roots organisation played a key role. One main element to the strengthening of formal democratic institutions is the need to restore public trust in them – cf OECD dropping voter turnout. For example, ensuring that there are open, competitive elections for political party leaders. One way to do this is through developing stronger vehicles for formal participation and representation. Cf GG agenda/PRSPs. Promoting participation of minorities and women, building electoral systems and limiting the distorting influence of money in politics. Developing free and independent media very important, it has a role as a civic forum, a mobilising agent and a watchdog. “Informed debate is the lifeblood of democracies. Without it, citizens and decision makers are disempowered, lacking the basic tools for informed participation and representation” – c.f. imperfect information arguments. “Widely available information is crucial to democratic governance because it helps challenge government authorities and provokes more balanced debate on problems and policies”. However, self-regulation is also an important element in this – ensuring standards of journalism, quality, training etc. Participation key element of democracy – c.f. GG agenda “An alert citizenry is what makes democratic institutions and processes work”. Influence of global actors: c.f. Evans – e.g. IMF/WB, WTO and TNCs. “These global institutions and their rules govern important aspects of national economic policies and have enormous impacts on people’s lives – creating a global-national gap in democratic participation and accountability”. In conclusion, the article stresses the importance of strengthening accountability to the process of embedding democratic values, practices and principles. It highlights that the gap between ideal and actual democracy exists in older democracies as well as newer ones. Key issues such as inequality of rights, a neglect of women and minorities, and transparency of the military and civil service still remain. However, is this to be expected from representative democracy? The authors highlight that its purpose is to exist as a system of political competition, not one intended to exclusively empower citizens, ensure participation in government or produce economic and social justice; “democratization does not guarantee social justice any more than it guarantees economic growth, social peace, administrative efficiency, political harmony, free markets or the end of ideology”. 4. Koelble, T. A. and Lipuma, E. 2008, ‘Democratizing Democracy: A Postcolonial Critique of Conventional Approaches to the Measurement of Democracy’, Democratization, Vol.15, No. 1, pp. 128. Summary: Koelble and Lipuma provide a critique of conventional measures of ‘democracy’. They argue that current debates represent the dominant ‘Euro-American’ view of ‘democracy’ and ‘governance’, which, due to their differing experiences and histories, are not necessarily the same as in the postcolony. Their solution is that the process should be democratised itself to incorporate visions and values of democracy held by those who are governed by it. Main arguments: Criticise the idea of a linear development path, and therefore the assumption of a singular goal of western democracy and modernity. Current ways of measuring democracy are ahistorical and acultural. It is argued that the colonial state has had a lasting legacy on the way that democracy develops in the postcolony therefore ‘democracy’ here cannot and will not be the same thing as western democracy. Idea of ‘path dependence’. Domestic capacities of postcolonial states limit what they are able to achieve and provide e.g. provision of public goods. The current global framework undermines the ability of postcolonial governments to represent their electorates. e.g. constraints of financial architecture, freedom of economic policies, undermining of national sovereignty. Western views built upon assumptions associated with the rationally behaving individual. Relationship between the community and the individual very important in many postcolonial countries but not represented in western views of democracy. Differences in institutional forms are not linked to undemocratic weaknesses as assumed by the west. Strengths: Highlights the fact that there is not only one model of ‘democracy’ historical and cultural aspects can shape the democracy just as they shape the development process. Those being governed are in the best place to say whether what they are experiencing can be called ‘democracy’. Critique of the dominance of Neoliberalism, the impact that this has on emerging market nations and therefore the impact on ‘democracy’. Weaknesses: Assumes there is one ‘Euro-American’ democracy. If a new analytical measure of progress, dependent upon electorate understanding of democracy, were to be implemented, would a different interpretation of the fundamental aspects of democracy arise? Is it more a problem of implementation and capability? Additional literature: Cornwall, A., & Nyamu-Musembi, C. (2004). "Putting the 'Rights-Based Approach' to Development into Perspective". Third World Quarterly, 1415-1437. Dahl, R. A. (1998). On Democracy. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. After giving the history of democracy and characterising the differences of ideal and actual democracy, Dahl identifies the reasons why market-capitalism does and does not favour democracy. Why Market-Capitalism Favours Democracy: (pages 166-72) 1) “Polyarchal democracy has endured only in countries with a predominantly market-capitalist economy; and it has never endured in a country with a predominantly nonmarket economy”. 2) “certain basic features of market-capitalism make it favourable for democratic institutions” – such as private property rights, information exchange, a decentralised economy – a centralised economy has more opportunities for resource capture – and a reduction in political and social conflict. “in the long run, market-capitalism has typically led to economic growth; and economic growth is favourable to democracy”. Why Market-Capitalism Harms Democracy: (pages 173-179) 1) “Democracy and market-capitalism are locked in a persistent conflict in which each modifies and limits the other” – the inequality of market capitalism or its “two-faces”. Markets are not self-regulating, therefore the role of the state is key in the management of the markets – even in the US there are huge social protection mechanisms. 2) “Because market capitalism inevitably creates inequalities, it limits the democratic potential of polyarchal democracy by generating inequalities in the distribution of political resources’ – citizens are not all political equals. 3) “Market capitalism greatly favours the development of democracy up to the level of polyarchal democracy. But because of its adverse consequences for political equality, it is unfavourable to the development of democracy beyond the level of polyarchy” KEY POINT – only certain types of democracy promoted by market-capitalism. Dahl, R. A. (1989). Democracy and its Critics. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Dahl identifies in his books, the difference between ‘ideal’ and ‘actual’ democracy. He describes the polyarchal democracy as a polity that entails certain democratic institutions and principles such as: Free and fair elections Elected officials Inclusive suffrage The right to run for office Freedom of expression Alternative sources of information to those disseminated by the state and associational autonomy (ie freedom of assembly – the media etc.) Diamond, L. (1996). "Is the Third Wave Over?" Journal of Democracy, 7 (3), 2037. Diamond addresses conceptualisation questions surrounding the meaning of democracy in this article. He then examines how liberal democracy moves beyond the minimalist definitions provided by Schumpeter, identifying nine key features of liberal democracy in line with Dahl’s vision of polyarchal democracy. For those democracies that lie in between “electoral” and “liberal” democracy, he adopts the term semi- or “pseudo-democracy”. Diamond then undertakes an analysis of democratisation during the third wave, and makes the observation that the number of new democracies is stalled and the quality of many third wave democracies is deteriorating. He argues that the main problem is therefore now one of consolidation of democracy “the overriding imperative in the coming years is to consolidate those democracies that have come into being during the third wave” (1996; 33). He concludes that “The overriding imperative for the long-term global advance of democracy is to prevent its near-term recession into a new reverse wave” (1996; 35), and that there are three main challenges: 1) Consolidation 2) Deepening of democracy – “merely electoral democracies must be deepened and liberalised politically so that their institutions wil become more broadly and intrinsically valued by their populations” (1996; 35). 3) Continuing levels of democracy in the established democracies of the world – “the established, industrialized democracies must show their own continued capacity for democratic vitality, reform and good governance” (1996; 35). Faundez, J. (2005). "On the State of Democracy: Introduction". Democratization, 615-624. “the quality of governance in many regimes currently classified as electoral democracies is poor” (2005; 615). Huntington, S. P. (1993). "Democracy's Third Wave". In L. Diamond, & M. F. Plattner (eds), The Global Resurgence of Democracy (pp. 3-25). Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press. Huntington, S. P. (1993). The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press: Norman. Both of the above articles highlight the observation made by Huntington that democratisation occurs in waves. Democratisation is not a fixed process, and backwards democratisation can occur at any stage, however, a wave is characterised by the transition of more countries in the forwards direction of democratisation than the backwards. The ‘third wave of democratisation’ can be characterised by the end of the cold war, and rapid democratisation of developing countries since the 1980s; notably, this transition has also occurred alongside the rise of neoliberalism. “between 1974 and 1990, at least 30 countries made transitions to democracy, just about doubling the number of democratic governments in the world” (Huntington, 1993;3). Leftwich, A. (2005). "Democracy and Development: Is There Institutional Incompatibility?" Democratization, 12 (5), 686-703. Leftwich highlights in this article that “Democratic polities on the liberal model are inextricably linked with capitalist or mixed economies” (2005; 687) however, “there are also very complicated and potentially compromising structural tensions between the institutions required for stable and consolidated democracy and those required for rapid, effective and sustained growth and development” (2005; 686). The article takes an institutional perspective to analyse both development and democracy to further this argument. “In short, the institutions and systems of power which democratic politics both require and represent seldom promote the politics of radical change in the control, accumulation, distribution or use of wealth which is normally vital, early on, for establishing developmental momentum, especially in late developing societies, where the problems are most acute” (2005; 699). Leftwich, A. (1993). "Governance, Democracy and Development in the Third World". Third World Quarterly, 14 (3), 605-624. A key question addressed in this article is whether democracy is a necessary prior or parallel condition of development, or whether democracy is an outcome of development. Lefwich highlights four main influences on the promotion of good governance and democratic politics: 1) The experience of SA lending Highly political nature of these reforms however, the WB could say little about the politics of adjustment – argues that this explains the focus on the apolitical technicist notion of governance. Effective adjustment in practice therefore required both a strong and relatively autonomous state, whether democratic or not. Nevertheless, this did not stop western governments insisting on the need for democratisation. 2) The resurgence of neoliberalism “Neoliberalism is not only an economic theory. It also has strong political dimensions which involve both normative and functionalist theories of politics and the state” (1993; 608). Leftwich argues that neoliberalism also has a functional theory of politics in which concern with markets and economic growth links to concern with democracy, “it assumes that democratic politics is also necessary for a thriving free market economy and vice versa, for the two are inextricably implicated with each other” (1993; 609). Neoliberals therefore believe that a large “obese” state is in practice “incompatible with an independent and pluralistic civil society and hence with effective democracy” (ibid.). Neoliberal political theory therefore holds that democratisation in the context of a free economy would ensure that governments were help accountable and were less corrupt/more efficient – idea that GG promotes the ideas of democracy without being explicitly political. 3) The collapse of communism Leftwich argues that the fall of communism changed the world dynamics so that democracy and market-capitalism prevailed – as a result, western governments were more forthright in their shaping of world politics: “the collapse of communist regimes and the consequential shirt in the structure of the world politics enabled Western governments to exercise not only economic conditionality, but also direct political leverage without fear of giving advantage to the Soviet Unions and its allies” (1993; 609). 4) The rise of pro-democracy movements in the developing world Legitimisation of the West’s actions, by the rise of pro-democracy movements: “The West has drawn legitimacy for pro-democracy policies from these movements around the world and can thus claim to be supporting genuinely popular and intellectual demands in those societies”. Leftwich concludes by arguing that development is highly political and to argue otherwise is naïve. In many developing countries, “democracy is unlikely to be the political form which can generate such a state or system of governance” (1993; 620) – history shows that successful transformations have almost always involved a strong and active state and, as a result, such as transformation is dependent less on regime type or policy orientation, but more on the capacity of the state whether democratic or not – cf Fritz and Menocal (2007) week 6. He therefore highlights that what is needed for economic development is therefore not necessarily a democratic state, but a developmental one. It is a matter or politics and state, than governance and democracy. Lummis, D. C. (1996). Radical Democracy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. McNally, D. (2002). Another World is Possible: Globalisation and Anti-Capitalism. Winnipeg: Arbeiter Ring Publishing. Critique of the capitalist system – argues that the capitalist system adds to the dilution of democracy via analysis of the history of democracy. Importantly, McNally argues that there is a “fundamental contradiction between (real) democracy and capitalism” (2002; 196). “The effect is to de-radicalize the movement by proposing merely to change the ideology that drives government policy, not the system as a whole” (McNally, 2002; 60). He goes on to analyse the alternatives to capitalism – for example in Bolivia and Ecuador. Porta, D. D. (2005). "Globalizations and Democracy”. Democratization, 668-685. “challenges to democracy arise from the necessity to adapt conceptions and practices developed at the national level to a reality in which transnational actors and global events have an increasingly larger influence” (2005; 669). “The turbulence of financial markets and irrational exploitation of natural resources are also viewed as free-market globalization effects that weaken and destabilize democracy” (2005; 671). “Therefore, economic globalization, in this neo-liberal version, challenges a conception of democracy as development of social rights that is deeply rooted in sociological theory” (2005; 671). “In summary, the term ‘globalization’ has been used to indicate various and heterogeneous types of phenomena, all of them producing challenges for the traditional, nation-state-based models of democracy. Economic globalization as free trade, with a devolution of power from the state to the market, challenges the welfare state model of tempered capitalism that has been dominant, especially in the European democracies, and, with it, the social dimension of democracy as a political regimes which aims to reduce economic inequalities” (2005; 679). Qadir, S., Clapham, C., & Gills, B. (1993). "Sustainable Democracy: Formalism vs Substance". Third World Quarterly, Vol 14, No 3, 415-422. Rose, R., & Shin, D. C. (2001). "Democratization Backwards: The problem of Third-Wave Democracies". British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 31, pp 331354. This article discusses the problem of third wave democracies by comparing their development to that of the first wave of democratisation. Examples include establishing democratic elections before the establishment of basic institutions of a ‘modern state’ such as the rule of law, accountability of government, institutions of civil society ie ‘Good Governance’. They argue that having “democratized backwards”, most third wave democracies are currently incomplete democracies. The authors detail three alternative paths, which incomplete democracies can follow: 1) Completing democratisation 2) Repudiating free elections and turning into an undemocratic alternative or 3) Falling into a low-level equilibrium trap in which “the inadequacies of elites are matched by low popular demands and expectations”. The authors then conclude with discussing the implications of democratisation, incomplete “A regime that is an incomplete democracy, with free elections but lacking essential elements of the modern state, may survive indefinitely but only at a price. Major derogations from the rule of law and untrustworthy institutions of civil society limit the effectiveness of a broken-back democracy” (2001; 351). Schumpeter, J. (1947). Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York: Harper. This book highlights Schumpeter’s minimal definition of democracy: Schumpeter defines democracy as the “institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (Schumpeter (1947;269). World Bank. (1997). World Development Report: The State in a Changing World. Washington, D.C: World Bank. Linked to transitions from WC to PWC, this report highlights mainstream changes in attitude towards the state. The focus is still very much on market led development, but with the state playing an important role in facilitating the working of the markets.