Surveillance” must be systematic---one-shot, random recording isn’t topical
Stefanick 11 – Lorna Stefanick, Associate Professor in the Governance, Law, and
Management Program in the Centre for State and Legal Studies at Athabasca University,
Controlling Knowledge: Freedom of Information and Privacy Protection in a Networked World, p. 129-130
According to the report prepared for the Information Commissioner, surveillance can be thought of as a set of activities that share certain characteristics:
Where we find purposeful, routine, systematic and focused attention paid to personal details, for the sake of control, entitlement, management, influence or protection, we are looking at surveillance . To break this down:
■ The attention is first purposeful; the watching has a point that can be justified , in terms of control, entitlement, or some other publicly agreed goal.
■ Then it is routine ; it happens as we all go about our daily business, it's in the weave of life.
■ But surveillance is also systematic ; it is planned and carried out according to a schedule that is rational, not merely random .
■ Lastly, it is focused; surveillance gets down to details . While some surveillance depends on aggregate data, much refers to identifiable persons, whose data are collected, stored, transmitted, retrieved, compared, mined and traded." (Emphasis in the original.)
What this means is that walking through a tourist area videotaping your surroundings with your Handycam video recorder is not considered surveillance because it is a one-off event that records randomly selected things for your own pleasure. In contrast, a camera installed at a strategic spot along that same street to film the patrons who routinely come out of a local bar intoxicated and proceed to urinate on the street or vandalize local businesses is purposeful
(identifying wrongdoers), routine, systematic, and focused. Similarly, a proud parent videotaping his child playing with her nanny in a park on a sunny Sunday afternoon would not fit the definition of surveillance. Installing a camera at a daycare to enable parents to view the interaction of their children with their caregivers on demand would be considered surveillance . Many parents insert the so-called "nanny cams" surreptitiously in items like teddy bears to ensure that their children are taken care of in a manner that they find appropriate. Instances of abuse caught by this surveillance have been posted to the Internet, creating predictable rage among those viewing the videos — an example of how panopticon surveillance can become synopticon surveillance. While the latter brings with it its own set of problems, it gives hope to those who fear that surveillance will result in the top-down surveillance described by George Orwell.

Voting issue---
1. Limits---they explode the topic to include limited, single-event recording of specific events. Each has distinct advantages and significantly expands the research burden.
2. Ground---our interpretation forces the Aff to defend broad, system-wide changes that force a dramatic departure from the status quo---that’s key to unique links on a topic that’s contemporary and constantly changing

ICE worksite enforcement effectively preventing counterfeit semiconductors now. Reducing raid ability leads to poor enforcement.
C ommittee on H omeland S ecurity 20 11 , HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ONE HUNDRED
TWELFTH CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION, Peter T. King, New York, Chairman, Lamar Smith,
Texas, Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez,
California Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Michael T. McCaul, Texas Henry
Cuellar, Texas Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Yvette D. Clarke, New York Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Laura Richardson, California Candice S. Miller, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois Tim Walberg,
Michigan Brian Higgins, New York Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Jackie Speier, California Joe
Walsh, Illinois Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania Hansen Clarke,
Michigan Ben Quayle, Arizona William R. Keating, Massachusetts Scott Rigell, Virginia
Kathleen C. Hochul, New York Billy Long, Missouri Vacancy Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Tom
Marino, Pennsylvania Blake Farenthold, Texas Mo Brooks, Alabama, GPO, “HOMELAND
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS: EXAMINING DHS'S EFFORTS TO PROTECT AMERICAN
JOBS AND SECURE THE HOMELAND,” http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
112hhrg72254/html/CHRG-112hhrg72254.htm. SBL
American innovation is the envy of the world. It is a constant target for competitors , including rogue nations that prefer to steal and copy rather than create. In addition to overcoming a depressed business climate, our Nation's job creators must protect their intellectual property from sophisticated counterfeiters all over the world , make sure their exports do not end up in the wrong hands, and comply with immigration laws .
The consequences of failure are serious. When counterfeit prescription drugs enter the marketplace or cheap imitation parts breach a semiconductor manufacturing plant, it costs American businesses revenues and jobs. When sensitive equipment manufactured for the Department of Defense falls into the wrong hands of rogue nations, it poses a threat to our National security . And when businesses seek assistance from the Government , it is the responsibility of the Department of Homeland Security to protect intellectual property, safeguard against counterfeit goods, maintain the integrity of export supply chains, and to ensure that businesses are in compliance with immigration laws in order to maintain a high- level playing field . So today we ask these questions: Is the help they receive from DHS, in collaboration with other Government agencies, adequate? What improvements can be made? What more needs to be done? Indeed, several cases in recent years indicate that there is room for improvement in these measures that directly impact the bottom line of businesses and their ability to create jobs. A 2008 investigation by Business Week magazine uncovered a polluted supply chain in some of our Nation's military equipment . According to Business Week, counterfeit products have been linked to the crash of mission-control networks, and they contain hidden back doors enabling network security to be bypassed and sensitive data accessed by hackers, thieves, and spies . The same investigation found that as many as 15 percent of the spare parts and microchips the Pentagon buys are actually counterfeit . Recently, Wired magazine reported that the military purchased 59,000 counterfeit microchips from China in 2010 .
These chips were to be installed into an array of equipment, including U.S. missile-

defense systems . This problem has been highlighted in many Federal prosecutions, including one in Houston where the defendant was sentenced to prison for selling counterfeit network cards to the U.S. Marine Corps for use in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. Pharmaceutical companies are seeing more of their products counterfeited. These counterfeits are often ineffective and, in some cases, dangerous. A recent report by CBS News found that the counterfeit drug network is worth an estimated $75 billion per year. This market has produced pharmaceutical drugs that contain little, none, or too much of the drug's active ingredient, and in some cases they contain harmful substances. One recent case involved Mr. Ken Wang, the owner of a Houston-based company, who was convicted of conspiring with individuals in China to traffic in counterfeit and misbranded prescription drugs. ICE began its investigation after
CBP seized 6,500 Viagra tablets from a mail facility in San Francisco addressed to Mr. Wang.
Pfizer Pharmaceuticals, the manufacturer of Viagra, confirmed that these tablets were counterfeit and contained a substance used to manufacture sheetrock. I am sure some buyers were severely disappointed upon the receipt of these counterfeit Viagra. After being convicted,
Mr. Wang fled to China, where he is still in hiding. Such cases often involve a bizarre, multijurisdictional chain supply, making it difficult to prosecute and harder to track. In one instance the supply chain began with the medication being manufactured in mainland China, shipped to Hong Kong, then to the United Arab Emirates, and then, lastly, to the Bahamas. Once in the Bahamas, the individual prescriptions were filled, put into packets, addressed, and sent to the United Kingdom. From the United Kingdom, the drugs were then shipped to the consumers in the United States, who at the time believed--when they placed an order on-line believed they were purchasing them from a Canadian pharmacy. ICE is the only Federal law enforcement entity with full statutory authority to pursue violations of U.S. export laws related to military items and controlled dual-use commodities , which will be another focus of this hearing. These are products that may have a seemingly innocuous civilian use, but also can have a potent military use as well. A glaring example is the triggered spark gap. This device is used legally by doctors to break up kidney stones in patients; however, it can also be used to detonate a nuclear device. In one case, a Pakistani businessman with close ties to Pakistan military and linked to the militant ISBLamic groups attempted to use a third party in South Africa to purchase 200 triggered spark gaps. Under U.S. law, as a dual-use item, it is legal to export the devices to South Africa, but illegal to export them to Pakistan. The third-party buyer was arrested, but the Pakistani businessman has not yet been apprehended. Finally, this subcommittee will examine the issue of worksite enforcement. In 2009, ICE, citing finite resources, instituted a shift in strategy from targeting undocumented employees to the employers that hire them . The results have been striking . According to the Congressional
Research Service, since 2008, administrative arrests have declined 77 percent , criminal arrests have declined 59 percent , and criminal convictions have declined 66 percent.
These figures strongly suggest that the shift in strategy has led to a scaling back of worksite enforcement efforts that allow bad actors to get away with breaking the law with little or no penalty .
Counterfeit semiconductors install spyware that can shut down weapons systems – specifically anti-ICBM missiles.
John Reed 7-2213 , national security reporter for Foreign Policy, internally quoting David
Shedd, deputy director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Foreign Policy, “The U.S. Might Be

Buying Weapons With Enemy Access Built In,” http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/07/22/the-u-smight-be-buying-weapons-with-enemy-access-built-in/ SBL
It’s bad enough that U.S. intelligence officials are constantly discovering new plans to insert spyware and back doors into the Defense Department’s supply chain. But what may be worse is that American analysts are only discovering indirect evidence of this infiltration , according to a senior DOD intelligence official. The back doors themselves remain maddeningly hard to find . " Our adversaries are very active in trying to introduce material into the supply chain in ways that threaten our security from the standpoint of their abilities to collect [intelligence] and disrupt " U.S. military operations, said David
Shedd, deputy director of the Defense Intelligence Agency during a speech at the Aspen Security
Forum in Colorado on July 19. DIA is finding more and more plots to deliver these parts through front companies that are "the instrument of the hostile service that’s guiding and directing them," Shedd told Killer Apps during the forum. " My concern is that our adversaries — and they’re multiple in the supply chain context — have been very active for a very long time," David Shedd, deputy director of the Defense Intelligence Agency told Killer
Apps at the Aspen Security Forum in Colorado. " We’re finding things, not in the supply chain itself but plans and intentions through" front companies posing as legitimate DOD parts suppliers . This is hardly a new threat . (Yours truly has written about the epidemic of counterfeit parts poisoning DOD supply chains since 2008.) A 2011 Senate investigation discovered an unbelievable amount of fake semiconductors in brand new DOD weapons such as the Navy’s P-8 Poseidon sub-killing plane and anti-ICBM missiles used by the
Missile Defense Agency . Perhaps unsurprisingly, the vast majority of the parts were found to come from China . In addition to the obvious safety threat posed by say, fake aircraft bolts or wiring harnesses, one of the main dangers to the supply chain is that spyware or back doors can be built into critical electronic circuits . Spyware and backdoors could allow an enemy to easily monitor U.S. operations or even disable American weapons systems .
Israel is rumored to have used digital back doors planted in the software of Syrian air defenses to disable their radars during its 2007 air strike against the Dayr as-Zawr nuclear facility. Just as scary as the fact that this kind of espionage has been going on for years, is the fact that the massive advantage the U.S. military has in hardware and manpower doesn’t exist in the digital world . "As we learn more about our own cyber requirements and needs, we have a better understanding that the world is a flatter world in terms of what our adversaries can do in the supply chain ," Shedd told Killer Apps. While DOD has poured counterintelligence resources at the problem, "I sense a little bit that it’s insufficient" said Shedd during his speech. "I’m generally an optimist, [but] in the supply chain area, I’m very concerned" given the fact that he doesn’t truly know the full extent of adversary penetration into
DOD weapons systems, said Shedd. "You don’t know what you don’t know and the old agage of the weakest link is obviouSBLy what we need to be concerned about." Despite all this, there aren’t enough people looking at the problem, and sequestration may make this worse. "It’s an area where I have a significant number of analytic resources attached to it and [this] is still less than adequate, in my personal view," said Shedd during his speech. "I’m trying to think about that in a time of fiscal austerity and all the rest because I’m trading it off with other missions that are critical." You can bet this issue will see more and more attention as hardware becomes increasingly networked and therefore vulnerable to cyber attack . For all the

noise about outsiders hacking American systems, the best way for a foreign adversary to get inside U.S. networks might be to ship some counterfeit parts with the spyware already built in .
Semiconductor spyware installed in missile systems leads to Chinese military modernization
John Reed 7-2313 , national security reporter for Foreign Policy, internally quoting David
Shedd, deputy director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Foreign Policy, “Here’s How Foreign
Spies Are Now Getting U.S. Weapons Tech,” http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/07/23/heres-howforeign-spies-are-now-getting-u-s-weapons-tech/ SBL
That’s according to a new report by one of Pentagon branches responsible for preventing such spying. Not coincidentally, perhaps, half of all successful incidents in 2012 of espionage against American defense contractors originated in Asia, up from 43 percent the previous yea r. THis report higlights what plenty of us have come to grasp intuitively , cyber attacks are steadliy replacing — or at least complementing — attempts to flat-out purchase
U.S. defense technology or simply ask for more information about it as the top MO of industrial intelligence operators . This shift from overt attempts at collecting information on U.S. weapons to cyber theft means that it may become more difficult to detect when a rival is trying to gain access to America’s defense secrets . It also shows why the Obama administration has been in such a tizzy of China’s alleged industrial espionage. According to the report from the Defense Security Service, these spies were particularly interested in gathering information on U.S. electronics; worldwide collection attempts in this sector spiked 94 percent from the year before. A "substantial" number of those electronics were radiation-resistant electronics that can be used in nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, aerospace and space programs, according to the report. "Foreign entities, especially those linked to countries with mature missile programs, increasingly focuses collection efforts on U.S. missile technology, usually aimed at particular missile subsystems ," reads the report. Why are nations with mature missile programs trying to steal secrets about American missile parts? To make their missiles even more deadly, of course . "After a country masters the chemistry and physics required to launch a missiles, scientists and engineers can focus on accuracy and lethality, the desired characteristics of modern missiles ," the report notes. Getting their hands on U.S. missile parts will also help these countries defend against American weapons . " Reverse-engineering would probably give East Asia and the Pacific scientists and engineers a better understanding of the capabilities of the targeted and acquired technology to develop countermeasures to U.S. weapons systems ," reads the document. Overall, foreign spies’ top four American targets were "information systems; electronics; lasers, optics and sensors; and aeronautic systems technologies," according to the report. All of these are crucial parts of the weapons that have given the U.S. a clear advantage on battlefields for the last 20 years . Information systems are how the US military passes massive amounts of intelligence and communications data. Meanwhile optics, lasers and sensors are key technologies that help
American drones spy on enemies and that guide its smart weapons onto targets. Aeronautic systems technologies, as you know, are the parts that make up the Pentagon’s next-

generation rockets, stealth drones and fighters — exactly the types of weapons that nations like China are trying to replicate . The report doesn’t specifically call out China as the home of these spies. But let’s be honest, the vast majority of espionage attempts originating from Asia are likely coming from China . "DSS continues to take the politically correct route and hide China within the ‘East Asia and Pacific’ category, disappointing," Richard Bejtlich, chief security officer of the cybersecurity firm Mandiant, told Killer Apps after reading the report. The Defense Security Service document was published on July 17, two days before David
Shedd , deputy director of the Defense Intelligence Agenc y told Killer Apps that his agency is constantly finding new attempts by foreign government to install spyware on
U.S. weapon systems . (In 2011, a Senate investigation found that tons of counterfeit electronic parts made in China were making their way into U.S. weapons; these parts could hide spyware or ‘back doors’ allowing enemies to take over or disable the weapons .) Far East countries — who accounted for 54 percent of the interest in
American missile tech — targeted everything from the Standard Missiles and Ground
Based Interceptors used for missile defense to TOW antitank missiles, Trident
Submarine launched nuclear missiles, Tomahawk cruise missiles and Patriot antiaircraft missiles and Harpoon anti-ship missiles . Unlike overall trends in espionage, spies kept things old fashioned when going after missile tech, trying to either buy it outright or simply requesting information about such technology. Interestingly, DSS found that successful attempts to get information on missile technology via cyber means are "relatively low."
However, because digital espionage allows spies to be even sneakier than outright attempts to steal information, such efforts may go unnoticed. When cyber espionage "goes unrecognized or unreported by cleared contractors, industry does not generate a report, making such instances unavailable for analysis in this data set," reads the DSS report. The DSS report largely confirms what any casual news reader has seen over the last few years — the Far East, led by China, is pushing to build military technology rivaling the U.S.’s by any means necessary .
Chinese modernization causes nuclear war. Causes US draw in and escalation. Other studies don’t assume current Chinese military strategy.
Stephen J. Cimbala 20 15 , Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State
University Brandywine, Strategic Studies Quarterly, “Chinese Military Modernization
Implications for Strategic Nuclear Arms Control,” http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/digital/pdf/Summer_2015/cimbala.pdf. SBL
China’s military modernization is going to change the distribution of power in Asia, including the distribution of nuclear and missile forces . This modernization draws not only on indigenous military culture but also on careful analysis of Western and other experiences. As
David Lai has noted, “The Chinese way of war places a strong emphasis on the use of strategy, stratagems, and deception. However, the Chinese understand that their approach will not be effective without the backing of hard military power . China’s grand strategy is to take the next 30 years to complete China’s modernization mission, which is expected to turn China into a true great power by that time.” Chinese military modernization and defense guidance for the use of nuclear and other missile forces hold some important implications for US policy. First,
Chinese thinking is apparently quite nuanced about the deterrent and defense uses for nuclear weapons . Despite the accomplishments of modernization thus far, Chinese leaders

are aware that their forces are far from nuclear-strategic parity with the United States or
Russia . Conversely, China may not aspire to this model of nuclear strategic parity , such as between major nuclear powers, as the key to war avoidance by deterrence or other means . China may prefer to see nuclear weapons as one option among a spectrum of choices available in deterring or fighting wars under exigent conditions and as a means of supporting assertive diplomacy and conventional operations when necessar y.
Nuclear-strategic parity , as measured by quantitative indicators of relative strength, may be less important to China than the qualitative use of nuclear and other means as part of broader diplomatic-military strategies . Second, China is expanding its portfolio of military preparedness not only in platforms and weapons but also in the realms of command , control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) and information technology . Having observed the US success in
Operation Desert Storm against Iraq in 1991, Chinese military strategists concluded that the informatization of warfare under all conditions would be a predicate to future deterrence and defense operations.5 As Paul Bracken has noted, the composite effect of China’s developments is to make its military more agile—meaning, more rapidly adaptive and flexible .6 The emphasis on agility instead of brute force reinforces traditional Chinese military thinking. Since Sun Tzu, the acme of skill has been winning without fighting, but if war is unavoidable, delivering the first and decisive blows is essential . This thinking also stipulates that one should attack the enemy’s strategy and his alliances , making maximum use of deception and basing such attacks on superior intelligence and estimation . The combination of improved platforms and command-control and information warfare should provide options for the selective use of precision fire strikes and cyberattacks against priority targets while avoiding mass killing and fruitless attacks on enemy strongholds. Another characteristic of the Chinese military modernization that is important for nuclear deterrence and arms control in Asia is the problem of escalation control . Two examples or aspects of this problem might be cited here. First, improving
Chinese capabilities for nuclear deterrence and for conventional warfighting increases
Chinese leaders’ confidence in their ability to carry out an A2/AD strategy against the
United States or another power seeking to block Chinese expansion in Asi a. This confidence might be misplaced in the case of the United States. The United States is engaged in a “pivot” in its military-strategic planning and deployment to Asia and , toward that end , is developing US doctrine and supporting force structure for “AirSea
Battle” countermeasures against Chinese A2/AD strategy . Another problem of escalation control is the question of nuclear crisis management between a more muscular China and its Asian neighbors or others . During the Cold War era, Asia was a comparative nuclear weapons backwater, since the attention of US and allied North Atlantic Treaty Organization policy makers and military strategists was focused on the US-Soviet arms race. However, the world of the twenty-first century is very different. Europe , notwithstanding recent contretemps in Ukraine, is a relatively pacified security zone compared to the Middle East or to South and East Asia, and post–Cold War Asia is marked by five nuclear weapons states:
Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea . The possibility of a nuclear weapon use, growing out of a conventional war between India and Pakistan or China and India, is nontrivial, and North Korea poses a continuing uncertainty of two sorts . This latter

nation might start a conventional war on the Korean peninsula , or the Kim Jung-un regime might implode , leaving uncertain the command and control over the nation’s armed forces, including nuclear weapons and infrastructure.
9 The problem of keeping nuclear-armed states below the threshold of first use or containing escalation afterward was difficult enough to explain within the more simplified Cold War context. Uncertainties would be even more abundant with respect to escalation control in the aftermath of a regional Asian war . There is also the possibility of a US Chinese nuclear incident at sea or a clash over Taiwan escalating into conventional conflict , accompanied by political misunderstanding and the readying of nuclear forces as a measure of deterrence . The point is US and Chinese forces would not actually have to fire nuclear weapons to use them.
Nuclear weapons would be involved in the conflict from the outset , as offstage reminders that the two states could stumble into a mutually unintended process of escalation . An important correction or cautionary note must be introduced at this point. Policy makers and strategists have sometimes talked as if nuclear weapons always serve to dampen escalation instead of exacerbating it. This might be a valid theoretical perspective under normal peacetime conditions. However, once a crisis begins — and especially after shooting has started — the other face of nuclear danger will appear .
Thereafter, reassurance based on the assumption that nuclear first use is unthinkable may give way to such an attack becoming very thinkable . As Michael S. Chase has warned, miscalculation in the middle of a crisis is a “particularly troubling possibility,” heightened by uncertainty about messages the sides are sending to one another and/or leaders’ overconfidence in their ability to control escalation . Chinese decisions about nuclear force modernization will not take place in a political vacuum. One important issue for
US-Chinese strategic planning is whether China and the United States will allow their political relations to fall into the “Thucydides trap,” which refers to the relationship between a currently leading or hegemonic military power and a rising challenger—as in the competition between a dominant Athens and a rising Sparta preceding the Peloponnesian War. The Thucydides trap occurs when a leading and rising power sees their competition as a zero-sum game in which any gain for one side automatically results in a commensurate loss in power or prestige for the other side. It is neither necessary nor obvious that US-Chinese diplomatic-strategic behavior be driven to this end. However , China’s challenges in Asia against US or allied Pacific interests might provoke a regional dispute with the potential to escalate into a more dangerous
US-Chinese confrontation, including resort to nuclear deterrence or threats of nuclear first use . Even if both Washington and Beijing avoid the Thucydides trap, China has the option of using nuclear weapons for diplomatic or strategic objectives short of war or explicit nuclear threats . We miss important possibilities for the political exploitation of nuclear weapons if we confine our analysis of China’s options to threats or acts of nuclear first use or first strike. The following list includes some of the ways China might signal nuclear weapons use to support its foreign policy in possible confrontations with the United States or US
Asian allies: • Nuclear tests during a political crisis or confrontation • Military maneuvers with nuclear-capable missile submarines or naval surface forces • Generated alert for air defense forces to reinforce declaration of an expanded air defense identification zone closed to all foreign traffic • Open acknowledgment of hitherto unannounced—and undetected by foreign intelligence—long- and intermediate-range missiles based

underground in tunnels on moveable or mobile launchers • Adoption of a launch-onwarning policy in case of apparent enemy preparations for nuclear first use •
Cyberattacks against military and critical infrastructure targets in the United States or against a US ally, including important military and command-control networks in Asia, preceded or accompanied by movement of forces to improve first-strike survivability against conventional or nuclear attack • Relocation of People’s Liberation Army Second
Artillery command centers to more protected sites • Preparation for antisatellite launches against US or other satellites in low earth orbit • Mobilization of reserves for military units that are nuclear capable • Shake-up of the chain of command for political or military control of nuclear forces or force components None of the preceding activities would necessarily be accompanied by explicit threats of nuclear first use or retaliation. Chinese political and military leaders would expect US intelligence to notice the actions and hope for US forbearance . China’s expectation might include either a willingness to settle a disagreement based on the status quo or on some newly acceptable terms. Creative analysts or experienced military and intelligence professionals could expand the preceding list; it is neither exhaustive nor definitive of China’s options for nuclear-related signaling. Contrary to some expert opinion, the relationship between China’s ability to exploit its nuclear arsenal for political or military-deterrent purposes and China’s apparent expertise in cyberwar deserves closer scrutiny. It is true nuclear war and cyberwar inhabit separate universes in terms of organization, mission, and technology. Moreover, the consequences of a nuclear war would certainly be more destructive than any cyberwar fought between the same states or coalitions. In addition, deterrence seems easier to apply as a concept to nuclear war, compared to cyberwar. Among other reasons, the problem of attribution in the case of a nuclear attack is simple compared to the case of a cyberattack.12 Notwithstanding the preceding caveats, in the information age it is likely that cyber and nuclear worlds will have overlapping concerns and some mutually supporting technologies . For the foreseeable future, nuclear-strategic command and control, communications, reconnaissance and surveillance, and warning systems —unlike those of the Cold War— will be dependent upon the fault tolerance and fidelity of
information networks, hardware and software, and security firewalls and encryption .
Therefore, these systems and their supporting infrastructures are candidate targets in any enemy version of the US Nuclear Response Plan (formerly Single Integrated
Operational Plan). In thinking about this nuclear and cyber nexus, it becomes useful to distinguish between a state’s planning for a preventive versus a preemptive attack. During the
Cold War, most of the nuclear-deterrence literature was focused on the problem of nuclear preemption, in which a first-strike nuclear attack would be taken under the assumption that the opponent had already launched its nuclear forces or had made a decision to do so. On the other hand, preventive nuclear war was defined as a premeditated decision by one state to weaken a probable future enemy before that second state could pose an unacceptable threat of attack.
Most Cold War political leaders and their military advisors rightly regarded preventive nuclear war as an ethically unacceptable and strategically dysfunctional option.13 In a world in which the day-to-day functioning of military forces and civil society is now dependent upon the
Internet and connectivity , the option of a preventive war with two phases now presents itself to nuclear-armed states . In the first phase, selective cyberattacks might disable key parts of the opponent’s nuclear response program — especially nuclear-related C4ISR . In the second phase, a nuclear threat of first use or first strike might follow against an

enemy partially crippled in its ability to analyze its response options or to order those responses into prompt effect . If this scenario seems improbable in the context of large states like the United States, Russia, and China because of their force and command-control diversity and protection, consider how it might work in the context of confrontations between smaller nuclear armed states, including hypothetical future India-Pakistan or Israel-Iran showdowns.14
Even in the cases of US conflict with China or Russia (or between China and Russia), nuclear crisis management would certainly include preparation for possible cyber attacks preceding or accompanying nuclear first use or first strike .

ICE operations key to target counterfeit semiconductors – successful now.
DHS 20 14 , Department of Homeland Security, “Written testimony of ICE Homeland Security
Investigations, National Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center Director Lev Kubiak for a Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security hearing titled
‘Strengthening Trade Enforcement to Protect American Enterprise and Grow American Jobs,’”
7-21-14, http://www.dhs.gov/news/2014/07/16/written-testimony-ice-senate-committeeappropriations-subcommittee-homeland-security. SBL
Operation Chain Reaction (OCR) is an IPR Center initiative that combines the effort of
16 federal law enforcement agencies to target counterfeit items entering the supply chains of the Department of Defense and other U.S. Government agencies . By partnering together, the participants in OCR are coordinating their efforts to more productively protect the
U.S. Government supply chain . In a case investigated by ICE, DCIS, and NCIS, a
Massachusetts man pleaded guilty in June 2014 to importing thousands of counterfeit integrated circuits (ICs) from China and Hong Kong and then reselling them to U.S. customers , including contractors supplying them to the U.S. Navy for use in nuclear submarines . The subject told his customers, many of whom specified in their orders that they would not accept anything but new ICs which were not from China, that the ICs were brand new and manufactured in Europe. Testing by the Navy and one of their contractors revealed the ICs had been resurfaced to change the date code and to affix counterfeit marks, all in order to hide their true pedigree. In order to purchase these ICs, the subject wired nearly $2 million to his suppliers' bank accounts in China and Hong Kong, in violation of federal money laundering laws. This was the second conviction ever under trafficking in counterfeit military goods, a provision in the U.S. criminal code which was enacted as part of the National Defense
Authorization Act of 2011. In another case, the former Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of
Powerline, Inc., a battery distributor, was found guilty of five counts of wire fraud and one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States by selling more than $2.6 million in cheap, counterfeit batteries to the U.S. Department of Defense. In joint case by ICE and DCIS, with assistance from DLA and the Defense Contract Audit Agency, investigators discovered that Powerline sold more than 80,000 batteries and battery assemblies that the U.S.
Navy used for emergency back-up power on aircraft carriers, minesweepers and ballistic submarines . The company would affix counterfeit labels falsely identifying the batteries as originating from approved manufacturers and used chemicals to remove “Made in China” markings from the batteries. The CEO fled the United States, but was apprehended when undercover HSI special agents hired him to sail his yacht to the U.S. Virgin ISBLands after spending more than two years on the yacht near St. Martin. Once the CEO entered U.S.
Territory, he was arrested and his yacht was seized. OCR has resulted in 40 criminal arrests,
70 indictments, 42 convictions, and 1,078 seizures worth $21.2 million (MSRP) in counterfeit parts, currency, and vehicles. Counterfeit items seized through OCR include commercial-grade devices re-marked as military-grade and counterfeit semiconductors intended for use on nuclear submarines.

Counterfeit semiconductors are on the rise – ICE key to prevent intrusion into the supply chain.
RE 20 11 , Rochester Electronics, the world's most comprehensive solution for mature and endof-life semiconductors, he only manufacturer that is dedicated to ongoing support of critically needed semiconductors for the entire lifecycle, Rochester Electronics, “Counterfeit and
Substandard Semiconductors: The Solution to the Threats,” https://www.rocelec.com/media/uploads/documents/solution-to-threats.pdf.
It might be interesting to calculate how many semiconductors we rely on during a typical day … coffee maker, radio, TV, cell phone (and the satellite that sends the signal), automobile, traffic lights, airplane, computer, maybe a CT scanner or blood analysis machine. Virtually every industry today uses semiconductors: aerospace, industrial, medical, military, security, contract manufacturing, space, telecom, utilities, transportation, communications, and more . It is estimated that the annual sales of semiconductors increases at a substantial rate each year . It has already exceeded $US300 billion and will approach $US400 billion in the not-too-distant future . Unfortunately, the percentage of sales that involves counterfeit and substandard parts is also expected to increase – exponentially . The U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement ( ICE ) reports that , between November 2007 and
May 2010 , ICE and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) made over 1,300 seizures involving 5.6 million counterfeit semiconductors . The counterfeits were marked with the trademarks of nearly 100 North American, Asian, and European semiconductor companies and were destined for importers in the United States and fifteen other countries.
Despite the efforts of industry and international government officials, these seized components represent only a small percentage of the parts that actually make their way undetected into the international marketplace . It is difficult to gather exact figures; counterfeiters, of course, will not divulge their success stories. But their victims are also reluctant to admit being caught in the counterfeit trap for fear of degrading customer confidence, lowering stock price, and compromising brand strength . Counterfeit sales of all products (including pharmaceuticals, jewelry, electronics, and other goods) has been estimated to be 7% of total sales. Seven percent of the total projected semiconductor sales for 2010 is over $US20 billion. This represents a considerable number of dangerous parts .

ICE enforcement key to prevent counterfeiting and IPR violations.
JOHN MORTON 3-812 , DIRECTOR U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, American Immigration Lawyers Association,
“REGARDING A HEARING ON “U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT
FISCAL YEAR 2013 BUDGET REQUEST,” http://www.aila.org/File/Related/12031367a.pdf.
SBL
Last fiscal year, ICE’s criminal investigators in ICE’s HSI initiated nearly 45,700 new cases and made over 31,300 criminal arrests . Special agents seized $561 million in currency and negotiable instruments, 2.4 million pounds of narcotics and other dangerous drugs, and $209 million worth of counterfeit goods . ICE’s FY 2013 budget request will strengthen efforts to target transnational criminal enterprises seeking to exploit
America’s legitimate trade , travel, and financial systems, and enforce customs and immigration laws at and beyond our nation’s borders. The request includes an enhancement of
$17.6 million for the transfer of Visa Overstay Analysis functions from US-VISIT to ICE to consolidate this work under one agency. The request also increases resources dedicated to commercial trade fraud investigations ; funds to continue DHS’ focus on worksite enforcement (promoting compliance with worksite-related laws through criminal prosecutions of egregious employers, Form I-9 inspections, civil fines, and debarment, as well as education and compliance tools); and continued enforcement of laws against illegal immigration and customs violations and disruption and dismantlement of transnational criminal threats facing the United States . In addition, the Visa Security Program, as part of HSI, will use requested funds to continue to leverage IT solutions to increase ICE’s efficiency in screening, vetting, and recording visa applications. ICE aims to have the capability to screen all visa applications and identify patterns and potential national security threats in process through technology and by leveraging the capabilities of our law enforcement and intelligence community partners. National Security ICE leads efforts in national security investigations through five interconnected programs that prevent criminals and terrorists from using our nation’s immigration system to gain entry to the United States . Intellectual Property
Rights and Commercial Fraud Investigations Through the National Intellectual Property Rights
Coordination Center (IPR Center), ICE leads efforts to stop intellectual property rights
( IPR ) and commercial fraud violations that threaten our economic stability, impact the competitiveness of U.S. industry, and endanger public health and safety . In FY 2011, ICE initiated 1,998 IP and commercial fraud investigations, made 686 arrests, obtained 421 indictments and had 353 convictions. In addition, ICE seized illegal goods with a combined manufacturer’s suggested retail price of over $480 million. Commercial fraud investigations resulted in the seizure of illegal goods with a combined domestic value of over $26 million.
ICE enforcement key to prevent IP and counterfeiting violations
DHS 2-2714 , Department of Homeland Security, Written testimony of ICE Homeland Security
Investigation, National Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center Director Lev Kubiak

for a House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations hearing titled “Counterfeit Drugs: Fighting Illegal Supply Chains,” http://testimony163.rssing.com/browser.php?indx=4136680&item=28. SBL
ICE has a legacy of engagement in enforcement against intellectual property (IP) crime that spans from our past as U.S. Customs Service investigators to our present role as
Homeland Security investigators . ICE is the lead agency in the investigation of intellectual property violations involving the illegal importation and exportation of counterfeit merchandise and pirated works , as well as associated money laundering violations . In coordination with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), we target and investigate counterfeit merchandise and pirated works and we seize and forfeit goods associated with these investigations , such as those that infringe on trademarks, trade names, and copyrights . Investigating counterfeit pharmaceuticals falls within ICE’s broad IP mandate. ICE recognizes that no single U.S. law enforcement agency alone can succeed in the fight against IP crime. Rather it is essential that all relevant federal agencies work together and with IP industry partners to confront this challenge .
Furthermore, law enforcement efforts alone will not fully address this growing problem. Indeed, public education, demand reduction, and global collaboration are critical to the success of this effort. To focus government efforts and to enhance efficiency, the former U.S. Customs Service, now known as ICE , formed the National Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center
(IPR Center), which combats violations of intellectual property rights, with a focus on trademark and copyright infringemen t. Pursuant to the Prioritizing Resources and
Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008 (Pro-IP Act, Public Law 110-403), U.S. government-wide intellectual property enforcement is coordinated by the White House Office of the U.S. Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator (IPEC), which is responsible for strategic planning and coordinating Federal efforts to address IP infringement. The IPR Center collaborates regularly with IPEC on IP policy issues. The IPR Center The former U.S. Customs
Service established the IPR Center in 1999, but following the events of 9/11, priorities were necessarily shifted and the IPR Center could not be adequately staffed. ICE rejuvenated the IPR
Center in 2008, and it now stands at the forefront of the U.S. Government’s law enforcement response to global intellectual property theft. The mission of the IPR Center is to address the theft of innovation that threatens U.S. economic stability and national security, undermines the competitiveness of U.S. industry in world markets, and places the public’s health and safety at risk. The IPR Center brings together many of the key domestic and foreign investigative agencies to efficiently and effectively leverage resources, and promotes the skills and authorities to provide a comprehensive response to IP crime . The IPR Center, located in Arlington, Virginia, operates on a task force model and is comprised of 21 relevant federal and international partners. While I serve as the Director of the IPR Center, I work with Deputy Directors from both CBP and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI). The IPR Center includes embedded team members from: HSI, CBP, the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the FBI, the U.S. Postal Inspection Service (USPIS), the
Department of Commerce’s International Trade Administration and U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, the U.S. Consumer Product Safety
Commission (CPSC), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Naval
Criminal Investigative Service, the Army Criminal Investigative Command Major Procurement
Fraud Unit, the U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations, the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, the U.S. Department of State’s Office of International Intellectual Property
Enforcement, the Defense Logistics Agency, and the Inspector General’s Office from the General
Services Administration. In 2010, the Government of Mexico and INTERPOL joined the IPR
Center as our first international partners. Since then, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and
Europol have joined as partners as well. While the Department of Justice (DOJ) is not a formal partner at the IPR Center, trial attorneys from the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property
Section (CCIPS) regularly provide input on ongoing enforcement operations and policy.
Protecting Health and Safety The illegal importation, distribution and sale of counterfeit pharmaceuticals pose a significant and growing threat to public health and safety. Working collaboratively with our law enforcement partners, the IPR Center has developed numerous initiatives and interdiction efforts to combat the infiltration of counterfeit, unapproved, and/or adulterated drugs entering the United States through a variety of means, including ports of entry, international mail facilities and express courier hubs. Our strategy is to attack the entire international supply chain, from manufacturer to distribution point and identify, disrupt, and dismantle the international criminal networks responsible for distributing counterfeit pharmaceuticals, by seizing the counterfeit product, criminal proceeds, and assets facilitating the crime, and bringing the individuals responsible for the criminal activity to the justice system to hold them accountable for their actions. This strategy requires a robust collaboration through our Attaché network with foreign counterparts where the majority of counterfeit items are made or through which they are transshipped en route to the United States and all of our trading partners worldwide. Operation Guardian Operation Guardian (Guardian) is the IPR Center’s public health and safety initiative. Guardian was initiated in October 2007 in response to the
Interagency Working Group on Import Safety and several incidents in which hazardous imports into the United States caused serious public safety concerns. In developing Guardian, HSI, through the IPR Center, solicited the assistance of numerous law enforcement and regulatory agencies, including CBP, FDA , USPIS, DOJ CCIPS, CPSC, and the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA). These agencies formed a Headquarters Working Group to target high-risk commodities from foreign sources. The template we use today for surge group operations is based on the findings of this working group. Since the inception of Guardian in FY 2008, HSI has initiated 916 investigations resulting in 334 criminal arrests, obtained 419 indictments, secured 288 convictions, and worked with CBP to make more than 3,000 seizures valued at over
$195 million (based on the Manufacturers Suggested Retail Price (MSRP) for the items if genuine). Operation Apothecary Operation Apothecary (Apothecary), which falls under the auspices of Operation Guardian, works to combat the growing use of the Internet in illegal drug distribution. Criminals, posing as legitimate pharmaceutical providers, use the Internet to advertise purportedly FDA-approved prescription drugs, and/or less expensive unapproved foreign alternatives, all without requiring a valid prescription. The consumer purchases the pharmaceutical with the belief that the product advertised is a legitimate product, but in fact, is often purchasing a counterfeit or unapproved version of the drug manufactured under unknown conditions or not subjected to any safeguards or quality control regimes. Apothecary addresses, measures, and attacks potential vulnerabilities in the entry process to attack the smuggling of commercial quantities of counterfeit, unapproved, and/or adulterated drugs through the
Internet, international mail facilities, express courier hubs, and land borders. Through
Apothecary, participants detect, seize and forfeit commercial shipments of illegally sold, shipped, and/or imported pharmaceuticals and scheduled drugs. The ultimate goal of
Apothecary is to identify and dismantle domestic and foreign organizations that illegally sell, ship, import and/or distribute pharmaceuticals and scheduled drugs in the United States. In support of the Apothecary mission, IPR Center personnel coordinated and conducted periodic

enforcement surges in conjunction with ICE, CBP, FDA and USPIS at international mail facilities and express courier hubs throughout the United States. Since FY 2010, as part of
Apothecary, HSI has arrested 115 individuals and obtained 112 indictments resulting in 99 convictions. There also have been 1,048 seizures worth approximately $20 million (MSRP).
Operation Pangea Websites offering counterfeit pharmaceuticals are a growing global phenomenon in the area of IP crime. Patients and consumers around the world are suffering from the negative side effects of counterfeit medications, which often contain unapproved, dangerous, substandard products. In response, Operation Pangea was organized by INTERPOL, with participation by ICE, CBP, FDA, and USPIS, to target the advertisement, sale, and distribution of counterfeit drugs and medical devices that threaten worldwide public health and safety. Conducted on a yearly basis, the intent of each Pangea operation is to build upon global best practices identified from previous operations and collectively develop a collaborative worldwide approach to combat the illegal trade of counterfeit and illicit medical products, particularly products that represent a serious risk to public health. In addition to the individual countries participating in Pangea, other major international organizations have joined the effort as well, including the Universal Postal Union and the World Customs Organization (WCO). In
2013, nearly 100 countries participated in Pangea VI, which resulted in 213 arrests worldwide and the seizure of more than 10 million potentially dangerous medicines worth approximately
$36 million. More than 13,763 websites linked to illicit online pharmacies were identified and shut down, in addition to the suspension of payment facilities of illegitimate pharmacies.
Worldwide, approximately 534,562 packages were inspected by customs and regulatory authorities, of which 41,954 were seized. Among the fake medicines seized during Operation
Pangea were antibiotics, cancer medication, anti-depression pills, and erectile dysfunction medication, in addition to illegal products labeled as dietary supplements. Other Interagency
Efforts ICE shares its border security and trade mission responsibilities with its sister agency, CBP 1. Therefore, ICE and CBP work closely to target counterfeit pharmaceuticals and other illicit goods crossing the borders, including through the co-location of personnel at the first Trade Enforcement Coordination Center (TECC). In May 2012, ICE and CBP formed the first TECC in Los Angeles, which services the Ports of Long Beach and Los
Angeles. The TECC enhances communication and combines resources to identify and combat trade fraud and IP crime, including counterfeit pharmaceuticals . The TECC proactively identifies, interdicts, and investigates inbound cargo that may enter the U.S. commerce in violation of U.S. customs and trade laws . TECCs ensure joint CBP and ICE oversight and prioritization of the enforcement and interdiction process in the local area, and involve ICE early in the enforcement process . The TECC concept is under development to be expanded to other ports of entry, with the next in Port Elizabeth, New Jersey, which will service ICE and CBP in New York City and Newark. ICE also collaborates closely with personnel at CBP’s Centers of Excellence and Expertise (CEE), including their CEE focused on pharmaceuticals, the Commercial Targeting and Analysis Center, and through the creation of the HSI-led National Targeting Center – Investigations (NTC-I). CBP established the CEE as a central point of contact for inquiries and resolution of issues regarding pharmaceutical, health and chemical imports. By having a central point of contact for importer participants at the CEEs,
CBP is able to increase uniformity of practices across ports of entry, facilitate the timely resolution of trade compliance issues nationwide, and further strengthen critical agency knowledge on key industry practices. The CTAC is a CBP facility designed to streamline and enhance federal efforts to address import safety issues by improving communication and information-sharing and reducing redundant inspection activities. The NTC-I is a CBP and HSI

collaboration to enhance the current partnership with the existing CBP equities at the NTC-
Passenger and NTC-Cargo and ICE’s Trade Transparency Unit. The cornerstone of the NTC-I is enhance and support ongoing HSI investigations, provide quality investigative referrals and intelligence to HSI field offices, and expand current collaboration with CBP. ICE participates in several other interagency efforts to protect the health and safety of the public, including through initiatives led by the Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator
(IPEC ). For example, ICE played a significant role in helping develop the IPEC’s 2013
Joint Strategic Plan on Intellectual Property Enforcement and the Counterfeit
Pharmaceutical Inter-agency Working Group Report to the Vice President and
Congress, and is carrying out the pertinent recommendations in those report . Through the IPEC, the U.S. Government is pursuing an innovative and multi-pronged strategy to combat infringing foreign-based and foreign-controlled websites by encouraging cooperation by law enforcement, development of voluntary best practices, and international leadership . The IPR Center shares the investigative outcomes and trend information that we obtain with interagency partners and the IPEC to further inform their policy development, including strategic plans, the U.S. Trade Representative’s Special 301 Process and the
Administration’s legiSBLative recommendations.

ICE key to IP enforcement – interdependence means decline of one agency hampers other efforts.
GAO 20 08 , United States Government Accountability Office, Report to the Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the
District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, U.S. Senate,
GAO, “Intellectual Property: Federal Enforcement Has Generally Increased, but Assessing
Performance Could Strengthen Law Enforcement Efforts,” March 2008, http://www.gao.gov/assets/280/273601.html,
Based on our prior work and background research, we determined that CBP, ICE, FBI, and
DOJ are the four key law enforcement agencies that play an active role in IP enforcement , and that FDA also plays an important role. To examine the key federal agencies' roles and priorities for IP-related enforcement, we met with agency officials in their headquarters and in seven field locations [Footnote 6] and reviewed strategic plans and other agency documents . To examine agencies' resources for IP-related enforcement, we obtained information on staff resources, where available . To evaluate IP-related enforcement trends and achievements, we reviewed agency statistics for fiscal years
2001 through 2006 , including IP-related seizures, investigations, and prosecutions . We also reviewed agencies' internal strategic planning documents to determine their priorities, goals, and objectives for IP enforcement and compared them to the types of data agencies collected . To examine the status of the National Intellectual Property Rights
Coordination Center, we met with ICE, FBI, DOJ, and FDA officials to discuss its evolution, role, and staffing levels; reviewed agency documents that articulated the center's purpose; and analyzed congressional appropriators' conference reports that directed agencies to staff and fund the center. Some of the information we reviewed was considered sensitive for law enforcement purposes, and our report only discusses publicly available information. We obtained private sector views on federal IP enforcement efforts through interviews with representatives from 22 companies and eight industry associations across eight sectors, such as the entertainment, pharmaceutical, and manufacturing industries . We conducted this performance audit from December 2006 through March 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. See appendix I for a more detailed description of our scope and methodology. Results in Brief: For the five key federal agencies that play a role in enforcing IP laws, such enforcement is not a top priority, and determining the resources they have devoted to this function is challenging . IP law enforcement actions consist of three primary functions--seizing goods, investigating crimes, and prosecuting alleged criminals. CBP is responsible for seizing IPinfringing goods at the U.S. border, a function that also includes assessing penalties and excluding--or denying entry to--certain types of IP-infringing goods. ICE and FBI share responsibility for investigating those suspected of IP crimes , and FDA investigates counterfeit versions of the products it regulates. DOJ is responsible for prosecuting those

accused of committing IP crimes. IP enforcement activities are generally a small part of these agencies' much broader missions, and, according to agency officials and documents, IP enforcement is not the top priority for these agencies . However, within their IP enforcement activities, these agencies have given enforcement priority to IP crimes that pose risks to public health and safety, such as counterfeit pharmaceuticals, batteries, and car parts . Determining the federal resources allocated to IP enforcement is challenging because few agency staff are dedicated exclusively to IP enforcement, and only investigative agencies tracked the time spent by non-dedicated staff on IP criminal investigations. The information we obtained shows declining staff resources in some agencies and increases or little change in others.
Because agencies' IP enforcement roles are interdependent, the emphasis one agency places on IP enforcement can affect the actions of others . For example, officials from several investigative agencies' field offices said their decisions to open IP investigations were influenced in part by the willingness of the local U.S. Attorney's Office to prosecute certain types of IP enforcement cases . Federal IP enforcement activity generally increased from fiscal year 2001 through 2006, but agencies have not taken key steps to assess their IP enforcement achievements . Our review of agencies' enforcement statistics over the 6-year period found that IP enforcement activities generally increased, with fluctuations in activity across fiscal years and type of enforcement action. Specifically, the number of CBP's seizures have steadily increased, but the domestic value of goods seized varied by fiscal year. However, we found that CBP collected less than 1 percent of penalties assessed during 2001 through 2006.
We also found a lack of data on CBP's exclusion of imports subject to "exclusion orders" and certain procedural issues, such as delays in creating enforcement guidance and minimal electronic targeting in certain cases.[Footnote 7] The number of IP-related criminal investigations that ICE, FBI, and FDA opened each year fluctuated during 2001 through
2006, but the number of arrests, indictments, and convictions stemming from these investigations generally increased during that time period . The number of IP prosecutions by DOJ for fiscal years 2001 through 2005 hovered around 150 cases before increasing to about
200 cases in fiscal year 2006. Although agencies' enforcement activities show general increases, agencies have not taken key steps to evaluate their own enforcement trends in ways that would better inform management decisions and resource allocation. For example, agencies have generally not conducted systematic analyses of IP-related enforcement activities, such as by field offices or type of violation pursued. Our analysis of agency data shows that a small number of
CBP and DOJ field offices are responsible for the majority of these agencies' total IP enforcement activity. Further, all the agencies have given priority within their IP enforcement efforts to IP crimes that affect public health and safety, but most have not clearly identified which IP enforcement actions relate to public health and safety or lack data to track their achievements in this area. Finally, agencies have generally not established performance measures or targets to aid them in assessing their IP enforcement achievements and reporting their progress to Congress and interagency coordinating bodies.

Counterfeits with malicious insertion cause shutdown and illegal intell gathering.
RE 20 11 , Rochester Electronics, the world's most comprehensive solution for mature and endof-life semiconductors, he only manufacturer that is dedicated to ongoing support of critically needed semiconductors for the entire lifecycle, Rochester Electronics, “Counterfeit and
Substandard Semiconductors: The Solution to the Threats,” https://www.rocelec.com/media/uploads/documents/solution-to-threats.pdf.
An even more sinister sideline of the counterfeit industry is a technology known as malicious insertion . In this fairly sophisticated form of counterfeiting, which is usually effected for military and communications applications , components are outfitted with hidden capabilities intended to cause the shutdown or the malfunction of the equipment in which they are installed . Additional capabilities may allow the gathering of sensitive intellectual property or intelligence .

Counterfeit semiconductors cause catastrophic electronic failure – 6 reasons.
SIAACTF 20 13 , Semiconductors Industry Association Anti-Counterfeiting Task Force, a trade association and lobbying group at represents the United States semiconductor industry, SIA,
“WINNING THE BATTLE AGAINST COUNTERFEIT SEMICONDUCTOR PRODUCTS,” August
2013, http://www.semiconductors.org/clientuploads/Anti-Counterfeiting/SIA%20Anti-
Counterfeiting%20Whitepaper.pdf
Package cracking, package delamination, and/or die cracking may be induced by component removal from scrap Printed Circuit Boards (PCBs). Counterfeiters rarely take any precautions against package damage during board removal . Flexing of PCBs and removal of components from boards can cause subtle cracking , either on the outside or inside of the package, that is not visible with component inspection . A common form of damage caused by board removal is stress fracturing at the metal pins or metal solder balls on the outside of the package. Components having pins or solder balls with subtle stress fracturing may pass electrical testing after they are re-mounted on new PCBs . However, during customer application, particularly in harsh environments , the stress fracturing can progress to the point that the component fails intermittently or continuously .
Components removed from PCBs and re-marked to indicate they are new may fail at the worst possible time . For example, if the flight control system for a jet plane has a counterfeit component with a micron-scale crack in the silicon chip, the mechanical stress on the chip from flight turbulence could cause the crack to propagate, resulting in complete electrical failure of the compon ent. The resulting failure of the flight control system could result in loss of control of the plane, jeopardizing the lives of everyone onboard. 2. “Popcorning” of counterfeit components may occur during PCB assembly since counterfeiters rarely handle or store components properly . Many components , including components with mold compound (plastic) encapsulant, will absorb significant moisture . While OCMs always properly bake and dry-pack moisture-sensitive components , counterfeiters usually skip one or both of these manufacturing operations or take shortcuts to save time and cost .
Even if counterfeit components are dry-packed in sealed moisture barrier bags, they may not have been properly baked first. The net result is that during component mounting on PCBs using high-temperature reflow ovens, the moisture in the counterfeit components expands very rapidly (since steam forms above 100 °C = 212 °F ), causing the package to
“popcorn,” which can result in cracking or delamination inside the package . As in the previous case, this internal cracking or delamination can become worse during endcustomer use, resulting in total electrical failure of the component . 3. Counterfeit components are often marked to indicate they do not contain the element lead (Pb) or other restricted materials when they in fact do, and this can result in major component reliability risks . Components “harvested” from old scrap PCBs are often years or even decades old , and most of these components contain Pb and/or other materials covered by the Restriction of Hazardous Substances Directive (RoHS). Often, the Pb was incorporated in the solder used in component packages to reduce the melting point of the solder. For example,

tinlead (SnPb) solder was very common until RoHS and other environmental legislation went into effect over the past decade. Since component packages with SnPb solder were generally mounted on PCBs using relatively low peak solder reflow temperatures (typically between 220
°C = 428 °F and 235 °C = 455 °F), the materials in the package did not need to be reliable to particularly high temperatures. However, with the industry transition to Pb-free packages over the past decade, component packages are now usually mounted on PCBs using significantly higher peak reflow temperatures (typically between 240 °C = 464 °F and 260
°C = 500 °F). Semiconductor companies therefore re-engineered component package materials (such as mold compound and die attach) so that they would be reliable at these higher temperatures . Since most of the electronics industry has transitioned to Pb-free packages to meet RoHS requirements, the demand for Pb-bearing packages has dropped precipitously. Thus, counterfeiters usually re-mark old components to indicate they are
Pb-free (when they are not).
In addition to the use of such counterfeit components causing
RoHS compliance issues, PCB manufacturers that assume these components are Pb-free and mount them on PCBs at temperatures of up to 260 °C = 500 °F can unknowingly induce major reliability hazards since the package materials were not designed to handle these high temperatures . For example, counterfeit Pb-bearing packages that are mounted at such high temperatures may “popcorn,” resulting in cracking or delamination of the package . As previously detailed, internal package cracking or delamination can worsen during component field use, resulting in a sudden catastrophic failure . In addition to die cracks propagating in the field, delamination can spread to the point that internal bond wires snap, again causing the component to completely stop functioning . While marking
Pb-bearing packages as Pb-free is very common, counterfeiters sometimes do the inverse and mark Pb-free packages as Pb-bearing to meet remaining demand for legacy Pb-bearing packages. Due to the lack of controls in “manufacturing” and handling these counterfeits, this results in a different set of reliability risks, such as the potential for tin whisker formation that can result in shorting between electrical terminals on components. 4. Electrostatic discharge
(ESD) damage may occur to semiconductors during component removal from scrap
PCBs or during subsequent operations such as stripping of original package markings , adding new counterfeit markings, etc . All these “manufacturing” operations for counterfeit components can cause them to become electrically charged , especially since counterfeiters almost never take any precautions against ESD (such as using ESD ground straps and using ionizers to safely discharge components). When the charged components subsequently contact metal surfaces such as a metal storage bins, they will discharge via highcurrent transients that can slightly damage thin dielectric layers in the component circuitry , such as nanometer-scale gate and capacitor dielectrics. These dielectric layers , which are meant to be insulators, then conduct leakage currents . These leakage currents may be too low to result in electrical failures during initial use. However, after weeks or months of operation, the leakage currents can increase to the point that components suddenly fail catastrophically . 5. Chemicals used by counterfeiters to strip original markings and/or to clean component package connections can result in reliability failures due to corrosion . In their effort to make old or used components look new, counterfeiters often use harsh chemicals to “recondition” packages. These chemicals are sometimes incompatible with the package materials, and thus the integrity of the packages will be compromised by

these chemicals . Even if the chemicals are compatible with the packages, they may not be fully rinsed off by the counterfeiters. For example, acid used by counterfeiters to clean oxide layers and other contaminants from package pins, pads, and solder balls will initially penetrate only the surfaces of packages. However, weeks, months, or years later, the acid can work its way to active circuitry on the semiconductor chip, thus corroding away this circuitry and resulting in loss of functionality . This corrosion mechanism is accelerated by temperature and humidity; the time-to-failure of the counterfeit components will decrease as the temperature and/or humidity they are exposed to increases. Even if the PCB manufacturer washes circuit boards and/or applies conformal coatings to circuit boards, any acid that had partially penetrated packages during counterfeiting will be trapped in the packages and can eventually lead to catastrophic failure . Finally, counterfeiters can introduce reliability issues by incorrect laser marking of component packages . As the semiconductor industry has largely transitioned from ink-marked components to laser-marked components, counterfeiters have followed suit. Conducting laser marking on components in plastic packages has become increasingly challenging as these packages have become thinner. More specifically, the laser marking needs to be sufficiently deep into the package to make it legible without reaching bond wires or other critical internal package features . Due to their expertise at developing, characterizing, qualifying, and monitoring laser marking processes, semiconductor companies do not compromise package integrity during laser marking operations . However, counterfeiters usually do not know the depth of bond wires and other critical features on a given component . This is especially the case if counterfeiters have chemically or mechanically removed the original package markings and have thus reduced the thickness of the package. When bond wires or other interconnects inside packages are hit by lasers used by counterfeiters, the current-carrying capability of these interconnects is reduced . This can result in time-dependent failures when the damaged interconnect eventually fuses open during component use. Hermetic packages may likewise have poor reliability due to laser marking by counterfeiters. For example, in the case of ironbased lids that are plated with nickel and/or gold, if laser marking removes the plating, subsequent exposure of the package to moisture will cause the iron to corrode. Prolonged exposure to moisture will cause the iron to corrode away to the point that holes develop in the package lid, resulting in loss of package hermeticity and likely catastrophic failure due to moisture entering the package . The net result of the above issues is that counterfeit components that pass electrical testing after board mounting may still have significant field reliability problems . If even one counterfeit semiconductor component ends up in an electronic system with hundreds or thousands of components, the reliability of the entire system may be greatly compromised by this one bogus component . Classic system-level Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) reliability calculations , such as those detailed in MIL-HDBK-217, are completely meaningless if one or more components in the system are counterfeit.

Counterfeit semiconductors cannot be identified by manufacturers and purchasers – lack of IP and high costs.
RE 20 11 , Rochester Electronics, the world's most comprehensive solution for mature and endof-life semiconductors, he only manufacturer that is dedicated to ongoing support of critically needed semiconductors for the entire lifecycle, Rochester Electronics, “Counterfeit and
Substandard Semiconductors: The Solution to the Threats,” https://www.rocelec.com/media/uploads/documents/solution-to-threats.pdf.
One of the treacherous aspects of counterfeit and substandard semiconductor devices is that they are not easy to identify, especially as components become smaller and more complex . The smaller the device , the more difficult it is to use sophisticated marking techniques . Inspection protocols can be applied to determine authenticity; however, because there are so many different counterfeiting methods and variations within those methods, definitive authenticity verification is not easy to achieve . Parts can be tested for quality and reliability; however, there are some caveats . The accuracy and usefulness of test results are dictated by the quality of the test. The only reliable tests are tests done with the exact same test protocols, equipment, and specifications used by the original component manufacturer. Unauthorized distributors and third-party test houses do not have access to this intellectual property (IP). Poorly conceived, inadequate test protocols do not result in accurate results . Only highly trained, experienced engineers have the skill and knowledge necessary to select and implement the proper test methodologies for each component. In addition, there is a difference between quality and reliability testing, though both are important in analyzing and projecting the life cycle performance of a semiconductor.
Quality is the ability of the device to perform its specified function under specified conditions when it is first used. Reliability is the ability of the device to perform its specified function under specified conditions for a stated period of time.
In most cases, testing adds additional cost to the purchase price of a component . The overall cost of testing must balance with the required quality and reliability level for the end-use of the component . Cost of testing by independent and third-party test labs are frequently dictated by competition and the demand for quick turnaround times; and cost-cutting shortcuts can negatively impact the quality of the test process .
Authenticity determinations are unreliable AND OCM’s only limit to their own products.
SIAACTF 20 13 , Semiconductors Industry Association Anti-Counterfeiting Task Force, a trade association and lobbying group at represents the United States semiconductor industry, SIA,
“WINNING THE BATTLE AGAINST COUNTERFEIT SEMICONDUCTOR PRODUCTS,” August
2013, http://www.semiconductors.org/clientuploads/Anti-Counterfeiting/SIA%20Anti-
Counterfeiting%20Whitepaper.pdf
As counterfeiters have refined their “manufacturing” processes, making authenticity determinations has become increasingly difficult for everyone except the Original
Component Manufacturer (OCM) . Years ago, many counterfeit semiconductors had irregular

solder on external package pins, poorly-marked logos, sloppy alphanumeric characters, and/or evidence of package surface sanding or “blacktopping.” These and other telltale signs of counterfeiting made it easy for anyone with a good, low-power microscope and some general training to identify the more blatant counterfeits. Some of these older, relatively crude counterfeits are still available through non-authorized purchase sources. More recently, however, counterfeiters have become far more sophisticated . For example, semiconductor package surfaces and external pins/solder balls as well as package markings (including logos) may be essentially identical to those on legitimate products. In addition, tubes, trays, reels, drypack bags, desiccants, humidity indicator cards, shipping boxes, shipping labels, certificates of conformance, and other packing materials and documents may be counterfeit or forged and may be indistinguishable from those used for legitimate shipments . Moreover, while very low retail prices were historically an indicator that components were likely bogus, counterfeits now often cost nearly as much as legitimate components, thus boosting the profits for counterfeiters and their supply chains while making retail prices a poor indicator of product authenticity . Many third-party laboratories and some Original
Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) and/or Contract Manufacturers (CMs) claim they can make authenticity determinations with a high degree of accuracy, but this often is not the case . Various standards, including SAE AS5553 and IDEA-STD-1010, provide detailed guidelines on identifying counterfeit components. [References 11-12.] These standards are sometimes helpful in identifying counterfeits where component packages have obviously been
“refurbished” and/or components have been re-marked. However, SIA member companies have numerous examples where third-party laboratories reportedly using these standards have made incorrect authenticity determinations . Moreover, these standards are generally ineffective for identifying the latest forms of counterfeiting . For example, counterfeits where used, low-grade, or second-source die are assembled in new packages and are marked as higher-grade components would likely escape detection. In addition, some of the test techniques used for counterfeit detection that are considered non-destructive can cause subtle damage to components . For example, x-ray inspection can result in shifts in key electrical parameters for components, particularly in the case of high-performance products.
Third-party laboratories and OEMs/CMs routinely conclude that components are legitimate based on their own electrical testing, which usually consists of curve tracer testing that measures the current vs. voltage characteristics of component pins. However, while curve tracer testing can identify the most obvious counterfeits, this and other simple bench-top electrical testing cannot begin to replicate OCMs’ thorough electrical testing of ICs using expensive Automatic
Test Equipment (ATE) running up to thousands of lines of test code as detailed in Section VII.
Curve tracing only checks a few transistors connected directly to each IC pin, while ATE testing by OCMs with proprietary test programs assesses the full functionality of even the most complex
ICs that can each have millions of transistors. Thus, unless ICs have been tested on OCMs’ ATE that is designed to ensure only high quality and reliability products are shipped , conclusions about product authenticity should never be based on ICs “passing” electrical testing . A common problem with authenticity testing is working on the false assumption that testing samples pulled from a population of suspect parts will allow conclusions to be drawn about all the parts . Due to the time and expense of conducting laboratory tests to try to identify counterfeits along with the destructive nature of some tests ( e.g., package decapsulation followed by die visual inspection ), usually only a small fraction of the parts in a shipment of suspect components is tested . However , counterfeiters are familiar with sampling

protocols, and thus they often “seed” legitimate units at the beginning and end of tubes and reels so that if these easily-sampled parts are tested they will pass . Even in cases where good parts are not “seeded” in an otherwise counterfeit reel, tray, or tube of parts, any assumption that a population of parts is homogenous is almost always incorrect in the case of counterfeits. More specifically, due to the variability in the processes used during the
“manufacturing” of counterfeits, only some of the parts may be damaged by mechanisms such as
ESD, corrosion, die or package cracking, etc. The bottom line on authenticity determinations made by anyone other than the OCM is that they are time-consuming, expensive, and often inaccurate . Moreover, even if testing correctly identifies that components are authentic, there is no way to prove that components outside the authorized supply chain have not been mishandled or improperly stored, thus jeopardizing their quality and reliability . Although counterfeiters have become very sophisticated, OCMs can readily make authenticity determinations on suspect products marked with their logos . OCMs incorporate overt and covert features into semiconductor packages as well as packing materials. In many cases, technical experts at OCMs can quickly make authenticity determinations when provided with high-resolution photos of the top-side and bottom-side of semiconductor packages as well as associated shipping labels and packing materials. OCMs’ methodologies for making authenticity determinations are only valuable when they are kept secret, so OCMs do not divulge any details on covert features and authenticity methodologies . In cases where authenticity determinations cannot be made from photos, OCMs can consistently make accurate determinations when provided with physical samples of suspect components marked with their logos. While OCMs are proficient at making authenticity determinations on “their” components, most O CMs limit their authenticity determination services to suspect products detained by Customs and to suspect products that are the subject of law enforcement investigation s. OCMs generally do not provide authenticity determinations as a free service for non-government agencies. This is because many billions of suspect components are available on the open market, and OCMs would need to staff large departments to try to respond to tens of thousands of authenticity requests from independent distributors and brokers as well as individuals or companies buying from these non-authorized sources. OCMs provide extensive post-sales support to customers that buy their products from authorized sources, but, as with other industries, there is no viable business model for OCMs to provide free support on suspect products that may not have been manufactured by the OCM . Again, as with other industries, OCMs support products they sell through authorized channels; OCMs are not in the business of supporting counterfeits and other suspect products available on the open market.
Authenticity tests can’t check – don’t account for upstream counterfeiting.
SIAACTF 20 13 , Semiconductors Industry Association Anti-Counterfeiting Task Force, a trade association and lobbying group at represents the United States semiconductor industry, SIA,
“WINNING THE BATTLE AGAINST COUNTERFEIT SEMICONDUCTOR PRODUCTS,” August
2013, http://www.semiconductors.org/clientuploads/Anti-Counterfeiting/SIA%20Anti-
Counterfeiting%20Whitepaper.pdf
A major misconception is that if an authenticity determination is made (by whatever means) and the associated semiconductor components are deemed legitimate, then they

will have high quality and reliability levels.
In many cases, nothing could be farther from the truth. Any components outside the authorized supply chain (whether authentic or not) may not have been handled, stored, and transported properly . Even if a customer buys components from a broker or an independent distributor that has always handled and stored components correctly, the broker/independent distributor may have obtained the components from an “upstream” source that did not do so . Unfortunately, unlike with some other products, semiconductor components can be mishandled or stored improperly yet show little or no physical evidence that they have been abused.
Examples of damage that can occur due to improper handling and storage when components are outside the authorized supply chain include : 1. Electrostatic Discharge ( ESD ) damage due to handling without adequate ESD controls; 2. Bent pins, scratched pads, and deformed solder balls due to rough handling ; 3. Solderability issues caused by exposure to excessive temperature and/or humidity; 4. Package contamination due to handling and storage in a dirty environment;
5. Package “ popcorning ” caused by incorrect or missing dry-packing. Unfortunately, as detailed in Section VIII, some of the above issues do not always result in immediate component failure . Both ESD damage and package contamination can result in time-dependent failures . Since the quality and reliability of components can be severely degraded by improper handling and storage, semiconductor companies do not offer warranties on components that are outside the authorized supply chain . Thus , if components bought on the open market have high fail rates in electronic systems, semiconductor companies have no liability.
Although the component purchaser may try to pass warranty costs and other large financial liabilities on to the company they bought the parts from, most open market sources are not in a financial position to pay out large liability claims.
For example, fly-by-night operators often “disappear” when faced with liability claims or lawsuits. The net result is that the Original Equipment Manufacturers ( OEMs ) and/or their Contract Manufacturers (CMs) are saddled with high financial liabilities and in many cases damaged reputations due to selling systems with poor reliability.
The OEMs/CMs can avoid all these problems by buying components directly from OCMs or directly from their Authorized Distributors/Resellers.

No assurance for non-authorized channels. The military has already purchased counterfeits from such channels.
SIAACTF 20 13 , Semiconductors Industry Association Anti-Counterfeiting Task Force, a trade association and lobbying group at represents the United States semiconductor industry, SIA,
“WINNING THE BATTLE AGAINST COUNTERFEIT SEMICONDUCTOR PRODUCTS,” August
2013, http://www.semiconductors.org/clientuploads/Anti-Counterfeiting/SIA%20Anti-
Counterfeiting%20Whitepaper.pdf
OCMs and their Authorized Distributors have proven systems for ensuring that components bought from them are legitimate and are handled, stored, and transported properly. However, once components are out of the authorized channel there are no assurances that the component is legitimate or functional . Components on the open market often pass through many different hands . For example, during his opening statement at the Senate
Armed Services Committee (SASC) Hearing on Counterfeit Electronic Parts in the Department of Defense’s Supply Chain, SASC Chairman Senator Carl Levin described how one set of suspect counterfeit parts went through six different brokers/independent distributors in three different countries before they were assembled into an electronic system .
[Reference 14.] Given the number of parties involved and the associated extensive shipping and handling operations , there are numerous opportunities for counterfeit components to enter nonauthorized supply chains. In many cases, the majority of parties in the supply chain are unaware that they are dealing with counterfeits.
It is not surprising these parties usually plead ignorance if an investigation takes place and civil or criminal charges are filed.
However, any individual or company that is knowingly or unknowingly involved in the distribution of counterfeit components can be charged with trafficking in counterfeit goods . While many brokers/independent distributors are diligent about avoiding counterfeits, some open market sources intentionally engage in the distribution and sale of counterfeit components . For example, the SIA Anti-Counterfeiting Task Force worked with US government agencies to analyze suspect components , many of which were determined to be counterfeit, sold by brokers MVP Micro, J.J. Electronics, VisionTech
Components, Epic International Electronics, and their affiliated companies. [References 15-18.]
The defendants in the MVP Micro case manufactured counterfeit semiconductors in the
US , thus illustrating that the manufacturing of counterfeit components is not just limited to countries with a history of providing minimal Intellectual Property (IP) protection . In the J.J. Electronics, MVP Micro, and VisionTech Components cases, the defendants knowingly sold counterfeit electronic components to the US military and other customers via their professional-looking websites . The defendants in these cases later served time in prison for trafficking in counterfeit components and other unlawful activities. The defendant in the Epic
International Electronics case was charged in July 2013 with importing counterfeit semiconductors for sale in the US. Some of these counterfeits were intended for use in nuclear submarines , thus underscoring the major risks that counterfeit semiconductors pose to health, safety, and security.

Counterfeit semiconductors ruin semiconductor industry competitiveness and electrical grids.
SIAACTF 20 13 , Semiconductors Industry Association Anti-Counterfeiting Task Force, a trade association and lobbying group at represents the United States semiconductor industry, SIA,
“WINNING THE BATTLE AGAINST COUNTERFEIT SEMICONDUCTOR PRODUCTS,” August
2013, http://www.semiconductors.org/clientuploads/Anti-Counterfeiting/SIA%20Anti-
Counterfeiting%20Whitepaper.pdf
In addition to jeopardizing health, safety, and security, counterfeit semiconductors cause significant harm to the economy . Semiconductor companies spend tens of billions of US dollars per year developing, manufacturing, and supporting products that will operate reliably for many years in customer applications . In contrast, counterfeiters spend minimal money developing and “manufacturing” products, and they provide no post-sales customer support. When an Original Component Manufacturers’ products are counterfeited, the low quality and poor reliability of the counterfeit components can cause damage to an
OCM’s reputation, especially if the parties that experience failing components do not realize that these components are counterfeit . This damage to an OCM’s reputation can result in loss of business even though the “manufacture” and sale of the counterfeits was completely outside the control of the OCM . Due to their low-cost operations based on theft of OCMs’ Intellectual Property (IP), counterfeiters can usually undercut the
Average Selling Prices (ASPs) of OCMs and their Authorized Distributors . While component purchasers may think they are getting a good deal in terms of pricing and/or availability by turning to the open market and ordering components based on quick Internet searches, there are no assurances that these components are consistently authentic and reliable.
Just one counterfeit semiconductor component in an electronic system can cause the entire system to completely fail unexpectedly during end-customer use . If this system is a video game console or an electronic toy, the economic consequences of failure are minimal.
However, if this system is a computer server for financial transactions or a control system for electric power grids, the economic damage from failures can be very substantial . Components bought through the open market carry no factory warranties, and most non-authorized sources are too small to be in a financial position to pay large liability claims stemming from high rates of OEM system failures caused by counterfeit components . Thus, component purchases from the open market that are initially viewed as inexpensive can turn into an extremely costly mistake, particularly if system failures result in millions of dollars in warranty expenses and/or liability claims against the
OEM or their CM . Moreover, the cost of high failure rates on electronic systems due to counterfeit components can be even greater if these failures result in major damage to the OEM’s/CM’s reputation and the loss of future business . The economic harm can be almost incalculable if counterfeit semiconductors result in critical infrastructure failure or if counterfeits in safety-critical electronic equipment cause loss of life . The
OEMs/CMs can avoid these major risks by always buying components directly from OCMs or directly from their Authorized Distributors/Resellers. By avoiding counterfeits and otherwise

inferior products by adopting procurement policies requiring purchases through authorized sources, the OEMs/CMs will protect the health, safety, and security of everyone that depends on reliable electronic products and systems on a daily basis. Individuals and companies involved in the sale of counterfeit components/electronic systems to the US Department of Defense (DoD) can face nearly unlimited financial liabilities along with severe criminal penalties. Section 818 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (NDAA) requires defense contractors to establish effective policies and procedures to detect and avoid counterfeit components. [Reference 3.] Even if defense contractors have implemented comprehensive safeguards against counterfeits, they may be financially liable for all costs associated with completely remediating any issues stemming from counterfeit components in electronic systems. As detailed in Section IX, authentication determinations on suspect components are difficult to make and are often erroneous.
Consequently, most counterfeit mitigation programs will not be effective unless they require that component purchases be exclusively through authorized sources . If counterfeit components are incorrectly deemed authentic and integrated into complex military systems deployed worldwide, the financial costs may be enormous to replace suspect or confirmed counterfeits . Thus, any savings that defense OEMs or their CMs may have realized by purchasing semiconductor components from the open market would be dwarfed by the costs of replacing previously-installed counterfeit components in fielded military systems .
Moreover, the reputations of defense contractors and their suppliers involved in counterfeit issues can be badly damaged . NDAA Section 818 and subsequent related legislation cover additional provisions including reporting requirements for suspect counterfeit components and criminal penalties for trafficking in counterfeit goods and services. For example, per Section 818, an individual who intentionally traffics in counterfeit goods to the
DoD can be fined up to $2 million and/or imprisoned for up to 10 years, double the penalties under previous laws.
Semiconductor industry key to the economy – its key to all major sectors and innovation.
Matti Parpala 20
14
, Research Fellow for the Semiconductor Industry Association, Master in
Public Policy '15 at Harvard Kennedy School, SIA, “The U.S. Semiconductor Industry: Growing
Our Economy through Innovation,” August 2014, http://www.semiconductors.org/clientuploads/Industry%20Statistics/141008%20Innovation%
20White%20Paper%20Final%20as%20posted.pdf
Semiconductor technology started conquering the world soon after the Second World War.
Jorgenson, Ho & Samuels (2011) have done extensive research into information technology’s impact on U.S. economic growth from 1960 to 2007 . 12 During that period, the U.S. semiconductor industry accounted for as much as 30.3 percent of total economic growth due to innovation (Figure 3). The U.S. semiconductor industry was third to wholesale and retail trade industries, which only had bigger innovation effects because of their massive size relative to the U.S. semiconductor industry . Jorgenson et al. (2011) also calculated the total contribution of different industries to aggregate value added (GDP) growth from 1960-2007, and the U.S. semiconductor industry’s share proved to be outsized . The industry accounted for as much as 2.9 percent of the total real GDP

growth (i.e. after adjusting for price changes) – seven times more than the industry’s share of nominal GDP from 1960 to 2007 . Figure 3 illustrates how outsized the U.S. semiconductor industry’s contribution to U.S. economic growth and innovation is compared to its share of GDP and to all other U.S. industries, categorized by IT-producing, IT-using, and non-IT-using industry groups Dividing U.S. industries into IT-using, IT-producing, and non-IT-using industry groups provides a striking illustration of the major indirect effect the U.S. semiconductor industry has on the U.S. economy. As Figure 3 shows , IT-producing or IT-using industries – which are all deeply reliant on semiconductor technology – had a 52.7 percent share of nominal GDP (left bar) and accounted for a 59.7 percent share of real GDP growth
(middle bar). Importantly, all growth due to innovation occurred due to IT-using and
IT-producing industries (right bar). 15 Even as a direct contributor to real U.S. GDP growth, the U.S. semiconductor industry beats many other major traditional U.S. industries . Table 1 shows the U.S. semiconductor industry’s contribution (0.10 percent units of total GDP) in comparison with other selected industries. Innovation and IT Continue to Play a Major Role in U.S. Economic Growth Between 1947-2010 , average annual U.S. economic growth was approximately 3.0 percent . Innovation played a major role in this growth, generating nearly a quarter of it, or 23 percent . Amazingly, from 2000-2005, innovation accounted for nearly a half of total economic growth . 17 Figure 4 illustrates, in yellow, the effect of innovation (TFP) as a share of total labor productivity growth from 1990- 2010, and projections for 2010-2020. The base case estimate expects GDP to grow by 1.93 percent annually during this decade, of which productivity growth is estimated to account for roughly 1.1 percentage points , as shown in the graph. According to the estimate, roughly a quarter of the labor productivity growth will be generated by innovation . Importantly, economists also estimate that all productivity growth during the current decade will likely be generated by IT-using and IT-producing industries . The non-IT-using industries are only expected to improve their productivity in the optimistic case, as described in Figure 5 .
Given all IT systems’ dependence on semiconductor technology, this information indicates that the U.S. semiconductor industry’s outsized direct and indirect impact on U.S. economic growth will continue .
Prefer our statistics—decline causes war
Royal ‘10
(Jedediah, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, Economic Integration, Economic
Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises, in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed.
Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215)
Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent stales. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level. Pollins (20081 advances Modclski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of
a pre-eminent power and the
often bloody transition from one
pre-eminent leader to the next
. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power
(see also Gilpin. 19SJ) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation
(Fcaron. 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power
(Werner. 1999). Separately. Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with

parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level. Copeland's (1996. 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states arc likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources.
Crises could
potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states
.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level.
Momberg and Hess
(2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn
. They write.
The linkage
, between internal and external conflict and prosperity is strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict lends to spawn internal conflict, which
in turn returns the favour
. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other (Hlomhen? & Hess. 2(102. p. X9>
Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism
(Blombcrg. Hess. &
Wee ra pan a, 2004). which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions
.
Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government.
"Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect
.
Wang (1996), DcRoucn (1995), and Blombcrg. Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force arc at least indirecti) correlated. Gelpi (1997). Miller (1999). and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that Ihe tendency towards diversionary tactics arc greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force
. In summary, rcccni economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict al systemic, dyadic and national levels.' This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

The plan is politically unpopular
Chen 12 --Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School [Ming Hsu, Where You
Stand Depends on Where You Sit: Bureaucratic Incorporation of Immigrants in Federal
Workplace Agencies (March 9, 2012). Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor Law, 2012; U of Colorado Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-03. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2019181 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2019181]RMT
Notwithstanding President Obama’s re-election in 2012
, immigration scholars in the legal academy have been exceedingly pessimistic about the federal government’s commitment to undocumented1 workers’ rights
over the last decade.
A majority of the criticisms focus on the need for comprehensive immigration reform in Congress
.2 A considerable number of these critiques focus on Hoffman as case law limiting the protective remedies of undocumented workers against employers who exploit the most vulnerable among their labor force
.3 The minority of legal scholars who seriously consider agency actions contend that such actions are insufficient and inadequate, even if well-intended.4
Immigration scholars have especially expressed dismay about the deleterious effects of White House policies relying on the Department of Homeland Security
(
DHS) worksite enforcement actions as a strategy for immigration control and the inability of workplace agencies to counter these actions
.5 The criticisms extend across Republican and Democratic administrations
.

Plan is tied to Obama
Immigration Impact 11 --Immigration Impact is a project of the American Immigration
Council (The American Immigration Council exists to promote the prosperity and cultural richness of our diverse nation by: Educating citizens about the enduring contributions of
America’s immigrants; Standing up for sensible and humane immigration policies that reflect
American values; Insisting that our immigration laws be enacted and implemented in a way that honors fundamental constitutional and human rights; Working tirelessly to achieve justice and fairness for immigrants under the law.) [““Obama Administration Seeks Balance Between Labor and Immigration Law Enforcement” 5/19/11, http://immigrationimpact.com/2015/04/15/icedirector-saldana-faces-critics-in-congress/]RMT
Last week
President Obama issued a blueprint for a twenty-first century immigration policy that highlighted
, among other things, the need to promote accountability for employers who deliberately hire and exploit undocumented workers
. The Administration’s recommendations for achieving this goal include a better employment verification system, more comprehensive anti-retaliation protections for workers, and a legalization program that requires the current undocumented population to get right with the law. Pending the success of these ambitious goals, the Administration has taken another important step to prevent unscrupulous employers
from retaliating against undocumented workers who seek to assert their labor rights—a revised Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Departments of Homeland
Security (DHS) and Labor (DOL)
.
The MOU obligates DHS’s enforcement arm (ICE) to refrain from civil immigration enforcement at any worksite that is the subject of an ongoing DOL investigation or any related proceeding.
The memorandum supersedes a 1998 agreement with the former
Immigration and Naturalization Service and contains detailed provisions for coordination of ICE and DOL enforcement activities.
It provides further that ICE will consider allowing witnesses to remain in the country if they are needed for DOL enforcement efforts.
The agreement also acknowledges that effective enforcement of labor and immigration law requires freedom from “inappropriate manipulation,” including false representations by ICE agents that they represent DOL. –
Republicans hate the plan – they want more enforcement
Brian Bennett 11 , Washington Bureau, January 27, 11, 1-27-2011, "Republicans want a return to workplace immigration raids," latimes, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/27/nation/lana-immigration-raids-20110127 ||RS
Reporting from Washington —
Deportations of illegal immigrants have reached new heights
for two years running under President Obama, statistics show, but Republicans say they'll use their new majority in the House to press for more aggressive enforcement without any path to legal status
.
Republican lawmakers called on the Obama administration to return to the era of workplace raids to arrest illegal employees
, an approach that contrasts sharply with the president's continued push to create a path to citizenship for "responsible young people" and deport only those illegal immigrants charged with serious crimes. Deportations under Obama have reached new heights for two years running, statistics show, but Republicans said they

would use their new majority in the House to press for more aggressive enforcement without any path to legal status.
Largescale workplace arrests of illegal workers were hallmarks of the George W. Bush administration's approach in its final years
. But two years ago Obama decided to shift enforcement efforts to focus on employers who knowingly hire illegal workers. Arrests from worksite raids for immigration-related offenses, such as using a forged driver's license or a fake Social Security number, have dropped by 70% since the end of the Bush administration, when a series of large raids of factories and meatpacking plants received national media attention.
Because Democrats hold a
Senate majority and Obama has veto power, the GOP cannot force a change in the enforcement policy. But with illegal immigration likely to be a
hotbutton issue in the
2012 campaign season
, House Republicans on the House Judiciary subcommittee on Immigration Policy and Enforcement plan to hold hearings to criticize an administration they claim allows illegal immigrants to take American jobs.
Loose enforcement measure spark political backlash
Stephen Dinan 15 , writer on Immigration issues, 4-14-2015, "Sarah Saldana, ICE chief, takes heat over agency’s record," Washingtion Times, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/apr/14/sarah-saldana-ice-chief-takes-heat-overagencys-re/?page=all |RS
The administration released dozens of
convicted illegal immigrant
murderers and rapists back onto the streets last year, even as it began to hold more women and children, according to
the latest statistics
that have
President Obama and his immigration team taking fire from all sides in the debate
.
Republicans said releasing
murderers and rapists, as well as thousands
of drunken-drivers, drug users, burglars and thieves is the latest step for an administration bent on ignoring enforcement , confronting Immigration and Customs Enforcement Director Sarah Saldana over her agency’s record
. The 30,558 criminal aliens released into the community by ICE in 2014 had amassed 250 homicide convictions, 186 kidnappings and 373 sexual assaults, according to agency statistics put into the official records of the House
Judiciary Committee.
“The nonsensical actions of this administration demonstrate its lack of desire to enforce the law even against unlawful aliens convicted of serious crimes
,” said
Rep. Robert W. Goodlatte
, Virginia Republican and chairman of the committee. Even as she was accused of releasing serious criminals,
Ms. Saldana faced charges from the political left that she was treating noncriminal refugees too harshly
. Illegal immigrant mothers who have fled Central America as part of the latest surge of border-jumpers said they and their children are being subject to poor treatment and deserve to be set free.

The Supreme Court should rule on the grounds of the fourth amendment that no present statute authorizes workplace raids and investigations by the
Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency absent a tailored warrant.
Solves the case – 4 th amendment precedent restricts ICE raids - SCOTUS precedent AND ICE standards.
Katherine Evans 20 09 , Teaching Fellow at the Center for New Americans at the University of
Minnesota Law School, member of the American Immigration Lawyers Association and serves as the federal court liaison for the Minnesota-Dakotas Chapter, NYU School of Law, “THE ICE
STORM IN U.S. HOMES: AN URGENT CALL FOR POLICY CHANGE,” https://socialchangenyu.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/homes.pdf.
This section argues that the Fourth Amendment protects all individuals lawfully present in the
United States as well as many who are present unlawfully, and that the administrative nature of immigration law does not mitigate its protections in the context of
home raids
.
Additionally, this section argues that agency regulations, internal manuals, and official statements recognize the requirements of the Fourth Amendment in immigration enforcement and, therefore, that ICE agents' actions should conform to the Constitution
. Finally, this section discusses the limited application of the exclusionary rule in removal proceedings and the calls for the Supreme Court to revisit its decision on this issue.
The first question is to whom does the Fourth Amendment apply in the criminal context
. If the Fourth Amendment does not apply in the criminal context, it is unlikely to apply in the less demanding context of administrative law.
With respect to the application of the Fourth Amendment to noncitizens, the Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment protects a
Mexican citizen, lawfully present in the United States, in a criminal proceeding
.114 It was left uncertain, however, whether the exclusionary rule would be available in removal proceedings to remedy Fourth Amendment violations. 115 In deciding the reach of the exclusionary rule in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, the Court assumed that the Fourth
Amendment protected illegal aliens." 6 In United States v. VerdugoUrquidez, the Court explained that the assumption made by the
LopezMendoza Court was not binding and specifically declined to answer the question of whether the Fourth Amendment protects illegal aliens in criminal investigations." 7 In Verdugo-Urquidez, U.S. officials searched a Mexican national's home in Mexico, confiscated drugs, and brought the Mexican national to the United States to be arraigned on criminal charges.
The Court suggested that an individual would be one of "the people" protected by the Fourth
Amendment if she were present in the United States voluntarily and had "accepted some societal obligations" or "developed substantial connections with this country.""
8 The precedential value of this portion of the Court's opinion is complicated by the fact that Justice Kennedy concurred in the opinion but rejected the idea that the text "the people" provides any authority for restricting the category of persons protected by the Fourth
Amendment.119 Justice Kennedy went on to say that if the search had been conducted in the United States, he had "little doubt that the full protections of the Fourth Amendment would apply., 120 Therefore, despite the Court's holding, it does not appear that there were actually five votes for the proposition that some individuals living in the United States might not be protected by the Fourth
Amendment. 2 1 Additionally, the Court stated that the "illegal aliens in Lopez-Mendoza were in the United States voluntarily and presumably had accepted some societal obligations," thereby suggesting that the protections of the Fourth Amendment are not limited to noncitizens who are lawfully present in the United States
.122 But the Court did not describe what constitutes sufficient societal obligations.
Many of the families described in this article whose homes have been raided are of mixed immigration status, often including U.S. citizen children

and some lawful permanent resident members
.
As such, many occupants of these homes would enjoy the full protection of the Fourth Amendment under Verdugo-Urquidez in the criminal context
.
Those occupants who are not lawfully in the United States are still here voluntarily and may have accepted sufficient "societal obligations" to be protected by the Fourth Amendment. As a result, the immigration status of a home's occupants is unlikely to limit the application of the Fourth Amendment in home raids
. Also, the immigration status of a home's occupants or the extent of their "societal obligations" is not immediately apparent to ICE agents
. This information is only learned later in the encounter.
Agents should assume that the Fourth Amendment applies from the outset
.
Otherwise, agents would be justifying state action that does not conform to the Fourth Amendment with information gathered only after the action was taken
. Such ex-post findings cannot be the basis for unconstitutional behavior. In an analogous situation, the Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld reasoned that the Due Process Clause applies to a U.S. citizen challenging her status as an enemy combatant and, therefore, only after that status was confirmed could fewer constitutional protections attach.123 The nature of the law being enforced also affects the level of protection afforded by the Fourth
Amendment. Probable cause and a warrant, or circumstances that constitute an exception to the warrant requirement, are requirements of criminal law enforcement. However, in civil law enforcement, courts determine whether an administrative search was reasonable by balancing the state interest in the search against the degree of invasion the search entails.'24 In evaluating the level of intrusion, courts have considered the following factors: prior notice of the search,'25 the amount of discretion exercised by the officer in choosing whom to search,126 a diminished expectation of privacy,"7 the location of the search,2l8 the duration of a seizure required to effectuate a search,12 9 and the invasiveness of the search. 30 The government's interest in enforcing immigration laws is certainly legitimate and substantial. On the other hand, all of the factors indicating level of intrusion point toward a severe intrusion of privacy in home raids
. In particular, the invasion of privacy in one's own home implicates the core of the Fourth Amendment
.
The
Supreme Court described arbitrary searches of one's home as the "chief evil" against which the Fourth Amendment aims to protect' and has referred to "the Fourth
Amendment sanctity of the home."
'32 The Court in Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco addressed whether probable cause and a warrant were required for entry into a home to conduct an administrative safety inspection in the absence of consent.133 In balancing the competing interests, it determined that probable cause of a safety violation in a specific building was not required, but a warrant was.134 A modified warrant procedure was required because "administrative searches of the kind at issue here are significant intrusions upon the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment."13' 5
Given the significant privacy interests at stake and the Court's previous holding on administrative searches of homes, the administrative nature of immigration law should not reduce the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment in the context of home raids. ICE's own position has conformed to the doctrinal arguments suggesting that the Fourth Amendment applies in immigration home raid. ICE's regulations,"' internal guidelines,137 and policy statements138 all draw on the standards and requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
As a result, the actions of ICE agents when conducting home raids should be judged against the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.

The 4 th amendment applies to ICE raids – SCOTUS precedent AND ICE standards.
Katherine Evans 20 09 , Teaching Fellow at the Center for New Americans at the University of
Minnesota Law School, member of the American Immigration Lawyers Association and serves as the federal court liaison for the Minnesota-Dakotas Chapter, NYU School of Law, “THE ICE
STORM IN U.S. HOMES: AN URGENT CALL FOR POLICY CHANGE,” https://socialchangenyu.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/homes.pdf.
This section argues that the Fourth Amendment protects all individuals lawfully present in the
United States as well as many who are present unlawfully, and that the administrative nature of immigration law does not mitigate its protections in the context of
home raids
.
Additionally, this section argues that agency regulations, internal manuals, and official statements recognize the requirements of the Fourth Amendment in immigration enforcement and, therefore, that ICE agents' actions should conform to the Constitution
. Finally, this section discusses the limited application of the exclusionary rule in removal proceedings and the calls for the Supreme Court to revisit its decision on this issue.
The first question is to whom does the Fourth Amendment apply in the criminal context
. If the Fourth Amendment does not apply in the criminal context, it is unlikely to apply in the less demanding context of administrative law.
With respect to the application of the Fourth Amendment to noncitizens, the Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment protects a
Mexican citizen, lawfully present in the United States, in a criminal proceeding
.114 It was left uncertain, however, whether the exclusionary rule would be available in removal proceedings to remedy Fourth Amendment violations. 115 In deciding the reach of the exclusionary rule in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, the Court assumed that the Fourth
Amendment protected illegal aliens." 6 In United States v. VerdugoUrquidez, the Court explained that the assumption made by the
LopezMendoza Court was not binding and specifically declined to answer the question of whether the Fourth Amendment protects illegal aliens in criminal investigations." 7 In Verdugo-Urquidez, U.S. officials searched a Mexican national's home in Mexico, confiscated drugs, and brought the Mexican national to the United States to be arraigned on criminal charges.
The Court suggested that an individual would be one of "the people" protected by the Fourth
Amendment if she were present in the United States voluntarily and had "accepted some societal obligations" or "developed substantial connections with this country.""
8 The precedential value of this portion of the Court's opinion is complicated by the fact that Justice Kennedy concurred in the opinion but rejected the idea that the text "the people" provides any authority for restricting the category of persons protected by the Fourth
Amendment.119 Justice Kennedy went on to say that if the search had been conducted in the United States, he had "little doubt that the full protections of the Fourth Amendment would apply., 120 Therefore, despite the Court's holding, it does not appear that there were actually five votes for the proposition that some individuals living in the United States might not be protected by the Fourth
Amendment. 2 1 Additionally, the Court stated that the "illegal aliens in Lopez-Mendoza were in the United States voluntarily and presumably had accepted some societal obligations," thereby suggesting that the protections of the Fourth Amendment are not limited to noncitizens who are lawfully present in the United States
.122 But the Court did not describe what constitutes sufficient societal obligations.
Many of the families described in this article whose homes have been raided are of mixed immigration status, often including U.S. citizen children and some lawful permanent resident members
.
As such, many occupants of these homes would enjoy the full protection of the Fourth Amendment under Verdugo-Urquidez in the criminal context
.
Those occupants who are not lawfully in the United States are still here voluntarily and may have accepted sufficient "societal obligations" to be protected by the Fourth Amendment. As a result, the immigration status of a home's occupants is

unlikely to limit the application of the Fourth Amendment in home raids
. Also, the immigration status of a home's occupants or the extent of their "societal obligations" is not immediately apparent to ICE agents
. This information is only learned later in the encounter.
Agents should assume that the Fourth Amendment applies from the outset
.
Otherwise, agents would be justifying state action that does not conform to the Fourth Amendment with information gathered only after the action was taken
. Such ex-post findings cannot be the basis for unconstitutional behavior. In an analogous situation, the Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld reasoned that the Due Process Clause applies to a U.S. citizen challenging her status as an enemy combatant and, therefore, only after that status was confirmed could fewer constitutional protections attach.123 The nature of the law being enforced also affects the level of protection afforded by the Fourth
Amendment. Probable cause and a warrant, or circumstances that constitute an exception to the warrant requirement, are requirements of criminal law enforcement. However, in civil law enforcement, courts determine whether an administrative search was reasonable by balancing the state interest in the search against the degree of invasion the search entails.'24 In evaluating the level of intrusion, courts have considered the following factors: prior notice of the search,'25 the amount of discretion exercised by the officer in choosing whom to search,126 a diminished expectation of privacy,"7 the location of the search,2l8 the duration of a seizure required to effectuate a search,12 9 and the invasiveness of the search. 30 The government's interest in enforcing immigration laws is certainly legitimate and substantial. On the other hand, all of the factors indicating level of intrusion point toward a severe intrusion of privacy in home raids
. In particular, the invasion of privacy in one's own home implicates the core of the Fourth Amendment
.
The
Supreme Court described arbitrary searches of one's home as the "chief evil" against which the Fourth Amendment aims to protect' and has referred to "the Fourth
Amendment sanctity of the home."
'32 The Court in Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco addressed whether probable cause and a warrant were required for entry into a home to conduct an administrative safety inspection in the absence of consent.133 In balancing the competing interests, it determined that probable cause of a safety violation in a specific building was not required, but a warrant was.134 A modified warrant procedure was required because "administrative searches of the kind at issue here are significant intrusions upon the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment."13' 5
Given the significant privacy interests at stake and the Court's previous holding on administrative searches of homes, the administrative nature of immigration law should not reduce the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment in the context of home raids. ICE's own position has conformed to the doctrinal arguments suggesting that the Fourth Amendment applies in immigration home raid. ICE's regulations,"' internal guidelines,137 and policy statements138 all draw on the standards and requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
As a result, the actions of ICE agents when conducting home raids should be judged against the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
ICE uses unconstitutional entry – deception and coercion. Precedent proves.
Katherine Evans 20 09 , Teaching Fellow at the Center for New Americans at the University of
Minnesota Law School, member of the American Immigration Lawyers Association and serves as the federal court liaison for the Minnesota-Dakotas Chapter, NYU School of Law, “THE ICE
STORM IN U.S. HOMES: AN URGENT CALL FOR POLICY CHANGE,” https://socialchangenyu.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/homes.pdf.
The legal validity of "consent" for ICE agents to enter a home, if obtained at all, can be challenged on the basis that it is routinely coerced.
In a typical home raid, ICE agents violate the Constitution from the minute they enter the premises . The Supreme Court articulated the test for consent in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, stating that "the question whether a consent to search was in fact 'voluntary' or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances."' 83
Although the Court did not articulate all of the factors relevant to assessing the totality of the

circumstances in Schneckloth, it acknowledged that knowledge of one's right to refuse is one factor to be taken into account .184 In addition, the Court highlighted " subtly coercive police questions, as well as the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person who consents" as additional factors to consider .185 Consent cannot be "coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force.
"1'86 The Court has also stated that consent cannot be shown by "no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority ."'87 In developing the totality of the circumstances test, the Schneckloth Court relied heavily on the Court's cases analyzing the admissibility of a confession, because these cases balanced similar competing interests: the need for effective law enforcement and protection of individuals against overwhelming police power.
18s In order for a confession to be admissible, it must be voluntary. Otherwise "if [the defendant's] will was overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, the use of his confession offends due process." '89 In cases that assess whether the individual's will was overborne, the
Court has looked to (1) the circumstances of the confession, such as the number of interrogators and the length and time of day of the interrogation; (2) the conduct of the officers, such as the use of physical abuse or deceptive tactics; and (3) the characteristics of the individual interrogated, including her level of education and her nationality or experience with U.S. law.190 These factors are instructive in analyzing whether consent is voluntary in a typical home raid.' All of the factors looked to by the court in assessing voluntariness indicate that consent is coerced in a typical home raid . First, ICE engages in deceptive tactics . Agents often identify themselves as police, which is misleading at best and false at worst .' 9 2 Agents sometimes state that they have a "warrant," which, in fact, carries no authority to search the home and no authority to enter the premises to effectuate an administrative arrest . This confusing nomenclature affects policymakers as well. In response to criticism of local raids, the mayor of Passaic, New Jersey, stated:
"Immigration warrants are warrants. If they came and took them away, they must have had the right to take them."193 Alternatively, agents frequently say that they are looking for a
"criminal," either as a pretext or in a misleading manner wherein it refers to a "fugitive alien" who has already been apprehended and convicted of a crime as opposed to someone who is suspected of committing a crime and has not yet been captured. The person allowing ICE agents to enter her home generally believes that she has no choice because these are police officers with a warrant, or that she is allowing local police to come inside in order to further an ongoing criminal investigation in some way . ICE's deceptive tactics are combined with coercive circumstances . Home raids are generally conducted early in the morning when most residents are sleeping, capitalizing on the confusion and disorientation of the home's occupants when they are awoken .194 They involve at least five and as many as twenty-five ICE agents .195 Finally, the residents of the home are often foreign-born with varying levels of education, and many have no knowledge of their right to refuse entry . 96 Together, these factors indicate that consent is typically coerced in home raids . The use of Warrants of Deportation/Removal to gain entry is also problematic in its own right . In Bumper v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court found that consent is rendered involuntary if it is given in response to a false statement of possession of a valid warrant.
97 The "warrant" possessed by ICE agents is not akin to a judicial arrest warrant because it does not confer authority to enter the home in order

to effectuate an arrest or conduct a search .1 98 While it may be true that the piece of paper
ICE agents carry is nominally a warrant, this piece of paper is a far cry from a judicial warrant.
ICE agents know this .1 99 While their statements regarding possession of a "warrant" may not be literally false, they are false in substance, and consent given on this basis should be deemed involuntary under Bumper . The most common practice described in accounts of home raids is ICE agents pushing their way into a home after a resident opens the door to speak with the agents . In discussing a raid on a Nassau County home,
Christopher Shanahan, the Director of Deportation and Removal for ICE in the New
York region, stated : "Once Erica's grandmother let agents over the threshold, there was no turning back.' 2° Importantly, Mr. Shanahan specified that the agents must be permitted to cross the threshold. Simply opening the door is not the equivalent of consenting to ICE agents' entry .
ICE uses unconstitutional searches – no basis for protective sweeps.
Precedent proves.
Katherine Evans 20 09 , Teaching Fellow at the Center for New Americans at the University of
Minnesota Law School, member of the American Immigration Lawyers Association and serves as the federal court liaison for the Minnesota-Dakotas Chapter, NYU School of Law, “THE ICE
STORM IN U.S. HOMES: AN URGENT CALL FOR POLICY CHANGE,” https://socialchangenyu.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/homes.pdf.
Protective sweeps are exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's requirement of a warrant and probable cause in order for a search to be reasonable. The Buie Court held that , as a precautionary measure, officers may look in areas immediately adjacent to an arrest "from which an attack could be immediately launched" without reasonable suspicion or probable cause .222 To conduct a protective sweep beyond this area, the Court held that officers must have reasonable suspicion , based on specific and articulable facts, that other people are present and represent a risk of harm to the officers or other individuals in the home . 223 The Court was clear in limiting officers' incident search powers to spaces large enough to contain a person, of which they could perform only a cursory inspection lasting "no longer than is necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger ., 224 In the context of home raids , as illustrated above, a search often occurs before any arrest, if an arrest takes place at all . This practice conflicts with the facts and rationale in Buie, which was based on the Court's decisions in Terry v. Ohic25 and Michigan v. Long.
"26
These cases did not involve indiscriminate and dragnet-type searches. Instead, officers possessed probable cause and an arrest warrant for Buie,227 reasonable suspicion that Terry was armed and dangerous, 8 and reasonable suspicion that Long was dangerous and might have a weapon in his adjacent car. 229 The Court in these cases emphasized that the encounter itself might have been dangerous either because the officers had reasonable suspicion that the person could access a weapon or because of the general risk of ambush when arresting someone in her own home for a criminal offense."' This danger justified an incident search to protect officer safety. 3 In contrast, in home raids, ICE agents do not have probable cause to support a criminal arrest and may not even have probable cause that any particular person in the home committed an immigration violation, if they are relying on outdated or incomplete information . Nor do agents generally have a particularized ground to believe that other

residents represent a danger when they search all rooms of a home . The Court has been careful to cabin searches justified by officer safety, rather than probable cause and a warrant, in order to prevent fishing expeditions.232 Where agents search first, no formal law enforcement encounter recognized by the Fourth Amendment (e.g., a stop or arrest) has yet occurred. Therefore, at the time of the search in a typical home raid, there is no dangerous event that would justify a search to protect officer safety . ICE is mischaracterizing its searches . Searches conducted by ICE agents are not protective sweeps ; they are not part of the process of arresting a person for whom the agents possess probable cause and a warrant. Searches by ICE agents are typically roundups that generate the arrests in home raids. As such, the purpose of these searches is investigative, not protective -exactly what the Buie Court rejected in scope and rationale. 33
ICE uses unconstitutional seizures –precedent proves.
Katherine Evans 20 09 , Teaching Fellow at the Center for New Americans at the University of
Minnesota Law School, member of the American Immigration Lawyers Association and serves as the federal court liaison for the Minnesota-Dakotas Chapter, NYU School of Law, “THE ICE
STORM IN U.S. HOMES: AN URGENT CALL FOR POLICY CHANGE,” https://socialchangenyu.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/homes.pdf.
In Florida v. Bostick, the Supreme Court recognized that the Fourth Amendment encompasses seizures that fall short of a full arrest and articulated the test for a seizure, stating that "a court must consider all the circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whether the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter. 2
64 In an earlier decision, the Court noted circumstances that might indicate seizure, including "the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelle d., 265 In
California v. Hodari D., the Court required that in cases in which an officer has not physically touched an individual, the individual must actually submit to a show of authority for a seizure to occur . 266 And in INS v. Delgado, the Court made clear that a police officer's request for identification or questioning as to an individual's identity is unlikely , by itself, to constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment .267 In a typical home raid, ICE agents seize residents before requesting identification or questioning an individual about her immigration status . Numerous accounts of raids i nclude descriptions of individuals being physically touched by ICE agents and often handcuffed at the start of the encounter, which automatically constitutes a seizure under Hodari D.
268 In addition, residents typically report submitting to a show of force . Individuals subjected to raids report being woken by flashlights or shouting and banging, finding numerous ICE agents in their home, and being told either to produce identification at that point or to go to a common area where they are then told to produce identification .269 Individuals invariably report being yelled at by agents and seeing agents block the doors to the home . 27 ' Numerous individuals report being told they could not put on additional clothes or use the bathroom in private . This last element is

particularly indicative of a seizure, because if an agent does not allow an individual to decline the encounter in order to engage in an exceedingly private activity, an individual is reasonable in believing the agents would not permit her to decline a request for identification . If agents gather occupants in a common area before interrogating them, it is common practice for agents to block the exits from that room as well .272 As discussed, many accounts include reports of agents pulling out their guns or motioning at their guns and, because of such conduct, most residents follow the agents' orders. As a result, questioning by ICE officers generally takes place after residents have been seized . For a seizure to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment , officers must have reasonable suspicion that illegal activity is occurring ."3 While reasonable suspicion is a somewhat amorphous concept, the Court in United States v. Cortez articulated the baseline requirement that "[b]ased upon the whole picture the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.
"2'74 Additionally, the Court held in United States v. BrignoniPonce that race or ethnicity can be a factor that supports reasonable suspicion, but it cannot be the only factor .275 In other words, the fact a home's resident appears Latino is not enough on its own to support her seizure by ICE agents. ICE agents may have reasonable suspicion that an individual named in a Warrant of Deportation/Removal is violating immigration laws . However, it is difficult to imagine how agents would have the necessary reasonable suspicion for each and every person in a home sufficient to justify seizing them . ICE
Officer Belluardo's testimony regarding the agency's policy of corralling all residents and holding them for questioning276 lends further support to the conclusion that the seizure of most home raid victims is unconstitutional. The Court in Florida v. Royer held that any consent to being searched which is the product of an illegal seizure is not valid consent .277 While it is possible to give consent voluntarily while being seized ,278 that seizure must be lawful . In the context of home raids, residents' responses to ICE agents' demands for identification and immigration status are not voluntary if their seizure is unlawful , which it typically is . As a result, ICE agents are using unconstitutionally-obtained statements as the basis for their arrests.
Reject these policies as a means of protecting individual privacy. Lack of 4th amendment application should not justify invasive policies.
Katherine Evans 20 09 , Teaching Fellow at the Center for New Americans at the University of
Minnesota Law School, member of the American Immigration Lawyers Association and serves as the federal court liaison for the Minnesota-Dakotas Chapter, NYU School of Law, “THE ICE
STORM IN U.S. HOMES: AN URGENT CALL FOR POLICY CHANGE,” https://socialchangenyu.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/homes.pdf.
There are strong arguments that ICE's practices in home raids regularly violate the
Constitution in numerous ways, and many would agree that home raids involve extremely intrusive actions by the state . Yet, by parsing out each stage of a typical home raidentry into the home, searching all rooms for individuals, collecting and questioning all individualsit is also possible to see that what appear to be violations might be deemed constitutional . Nonetheless, the existence of possible obstacles to constitutional claims

does not justify ICE's current practice . Official policy should conform to the foundational principle of the Fourth Amendment: protecting individuals' privacy .
Consent based on deception is not typically considered voluntary.
The only reason for
ICE agents to call themselves police or say they have a warrant is to encourage residents to draw the wrong conclusions regarding the agents' authorit y, since few people would consent to immigration agents entering their homes. Similarly, justifying searches based on safety and then arresting most of the individuals found in the home uses an exception to the Fourth Amendment to swallow the rule itself . Finally, characterizing responses to agents' questions as "voluntary," after residents have been pulled out of bed and held in a room while agents block the exits, defies belief . When taken as a whole, ICE's current practice seems intuitively wrong . The fact that the practice might be upheld as constitutional reflects limitations in the doctrine, not a justification for public policy .
The final section of this article builds on the constitutional arguments to abandon the current policy and examines the broader social costs of home raids in their current form. It concludes with proposals for policymakers in the Obama Administration.
ICE court rulings can challenge the power of the state
Katherine Evans 20 09 , Teaching Fellow at the Center for New Americans at the University of
Minnesota Law School, member of the American Immigration Lawyers Association and serves as the federal court liaison for the Minnesota-Dakotas Chapter, NYU School of Law, “THE ICE
STORM IN U.S. HOMES: AN URGENT CALL FOR POLICY CHANGE,” https://socialchangenyu.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/homes.pdf.
More fundamentally, the raids erode the sense that the U.S. government abides by the rule of law and protects everyone equally . In an interview with the ABA Journal, Michael
Neifach, ICE's principal legal adviser, discussed the numerous legal challenges brought against
ICE related to raids.318 Pointing to the limitations on the exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings established in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, he stated that "even if agents didn't have the residents' approval [to enter their homes], such searches and any subsequent arrests may not be disqualified in immigration court s." He added: " Aliens and citizens are protected by the Constitution, but the protections are different ."3'19
Mr. Neifach's statement implies that ICE may be taking advantage of the fact that noncitizens have few remedies available for constitutional violations . This implication was made explicit by Professor Jan Ting from Temple University's Beasley School of Law: " It is well-established in immigration law that you can do a lot of stuff you couldn't if it were concerning American citizens . If the exclusionary rule does not apply, is there anything wrong about law enforcement going in and getting the people they're looking for?, 320 In other words, it is fine for the government to enter homes and arrest individuals in a way that is unconstitutional because there is no penalty for this behavior. This attitude is troubling to say the least . The government should not be testing the line of what is permissible by intruding into a private home and seizing of all of its occupants . An individual has an interest in pushing the bounds of the law in order to have more space to act free from government interference . 32' The state's interest is only the aggressive enforcement of administrative law, which is insufficient to justify the government's practice of pushing ,

if not crossing, the limits of the Constitution .322 Instead, the government should ensure that its actions conform to the law .323 The absence of effective constraints on ICE's practices in the form of the exclusionary rule does not change the analysis. ICE's current policy in home raids erodes the government's credibility because it disrespects constitutional rights the
Executive is charged to protect.
The editorial board of the New York Times discussed the question of why ICE's current practice is wrong, regardless of the legal consequences, in an editorial on the "war on illegal immigration." It wrote: "The true cost is to the national identity: the sense of who we are and what we value. It will hit us once the enforcement fever breaks, when we look at what has been done and no longer recognize the country that did it.' '324 A government policy requiring federal agents, without warrants, to force or manipulate their way into private homes, to search the premises, and to interrogate residents does not respect the country's founding principles of individual liberty and protection from the coercive power of the state .

Text: The United Nations should use the UNSCR 1540 Framework to create an independent UN body for ad hoc verification of states' implementation of
UNSCR 1540's mandates
CP results in an international verification regime to prevent global bioterrorism
Eric
Merriam 14
, Lieutenant Colonel at the United States Air Force, June 2014, The International Legal Regime Affecting
Bioterrorism Prevention, National Security Law Journal, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2478444 ||RS
With a
routine reporting and verification mechanism politically untenable
, recommendations
for improvement are modest
. Some improvement can be made. The BWC is likely the wrong vehicle;
UNSCR 1540 may be the right one
.
Given the gaping holes
in verification under the BWC, and its non-application to nonstate actors, the BWC is clearly not the primary legal agreement for preventing bioterrorism. Even as applied to its original purpose -- preventing states from developing, acquiring, and possessing bioweapons -- it is largely considered a failure. In the words of one commentator,
"[T]he BWC has been relegated to the status of an infirm elderly relative worthy of affection and respect yet not really expected to provide meaningful answers to current challenges."97 Its primary role now should be, as the United States now advocates, as a mechanism for refining "cooperation, information exchange, and coordination," and as "the premier forum for discussion of the full range of biological threats – including bioterrorism – and mutually agreeable steps States can take for risk management."98 In other words, the BWC will be a forum for discussion, not an instrument of enforcement. Clearly, the BWC does not, and will not in the foreseeable future, contain a verification mechanism.
UNSCR 1540
, though not focused solely on biological weapons, has served as an important improvement in legal attention to biological weapons proliferation and preventing bioterrorism
. The recent developments in state implementation of UNSCR 1540 discussed above are very encouraging. However, as with the BWC before it,
UNSCR 1540's verification mechanism is weak, relying on state self-reporting to the 1540 Committee
.
The creation of the 1540 Committee can be viewed as a first step toward a compliance body. To improve verification, the Security Council should give the 1540 Committee additional authority
-- an idea that might be politically viable given the Security Council's recent decision to extend the 1540 Committee's existence for another 10 years -- or create a new body under the auspices of UNSCR 1540.
In either case, the primary source of "verification" of compliance with UNSCR 1540 would remain states reporting their implementation efforts, but the new compliance body would have broader capability to assess such reports and
, when called upon by the Security Council to do so, investigate suspected non-compliance.
Such investigations should be conducted by experienced and preexisting teams, rather than ad hoc teams whose experience investigating compliance with the BWC or UNSCR 1540 may be minimal.

CP solves – Multilateral verification system would prevent bioterrorism
Eric
Merriam 14
, Lieutenant Colonel at the United States Air Force, June 2014, The International Legal Regime Affecting
Bioterrorism Prevention, National Security Law Journal, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2478444 ||RS
Though the practical difficulties of inspecting biological weapons production facilities caused by dual use are imposing,
UNSCR
1540 could be improved by creating a body for the physical inspection and monitoring of biological weapons
development and enforcement in states where specific concerns are raised and the Security Council believes greater attention is required. Though the nuclear and chemical weapons enforcement bodies are created by treaty, there is no legal need to use a treaty to do so. As with UNSCR 1540 itself, Chapter VII of the UN Charter is sufficient authority for the Security Council clearly to create such a body, and imbue
it with rights to inspect and gather additional information from without and within states' borders. Additionally, given the lack of enthusiasm for instituting substantive changes to the BWC, and seeming positive contemporary efforts under UNSCR 1540, utilizing the
Security Council may be a politically more realistic option
.
Such a body
-- similar to the IAEA or
OPCW, though with far less authority -- would be able to provide to the Security Council what is sorely missing from the current regime: data regarding the presence of biological weapons development, production, and storage programs and facilities
in states from an experienced and independent inspection team. This proposed independent body would not have authority to inspect absent specific authorization from the Security Council
.
Dependence on the Security Council for situation-specific inspection authority
in specific instances of concern would allow permanent Security Council member states
like the United States to control perceived overreaching
. Once given authority, it could conduct physical inspections of biological research, development, and production facilities in a way no currently constituted international body can. Unlike the "challenge inspections" of the CWC, these inspections could not be triggered solely by another state's allegations. Further, no routine and reoccurring inspections would be conducted. A multilateral verification body's physical inspection and monitoring activities could themselves serve as a deterrent, both to states who may support or allow biological weapons development by non-state actors, or by the nonstate actors themselves.
Perhaps more importantly, such a body's reports would offer independent and therefore more credible information upon which the Security Council could take action. Evidence from an independent inspection agency, or even a state's unwillingness to permit such inspections, would surpass the weight of evidence offered only by a state considered a rival of the alleged offending state. At a minimum, if one state were to offer such evidence, an independent body could verify it prior to the
Security Council authorizing sanctions or military action against that state. If such a body were already in existence, rather than having to be constituted for the sake of a particular situation, the Security Council would have the information necessary to take or authorize action much more quickly and effectively than otherwise. Finally, such a body could actually investigate and provide additional data and analysis regarding the efficacy of states efforts to implement and enforce prohibitions on
biological weapons development by non-state actors
, rather than simply cataloging such efforts as is currently the case.

Commitment are not an issue – Malaysia proves
Chatam House 14, King’s College London, 11/5/14, UNSCR 1540 Ten Years On: Challenges and Opportunities, International Security Department Meeting Summary, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/UNSCR%2015
40-summary.pdf ||RS
Despite the challenges associated with the adoption of laws, it was noted that considerable progress has been made since UNSCR 1540’s adoption in 2004. Notable examples include Malaysia and the UAE, which previously served as key nodes of the
AQ Khan proliferation network, and both of which have adopted comprehensive export control laws in the last decade. The success of countries like Malaysia and the UAE can provide encouragement to and models for other states , although it is recognized that the laws should be adapted to the specific needs of individual countries.

Developing countries are becoming more stable now
Abiad et al 12 - Deputy Division Chief in the IMF's Research Department, Senior Economist
Advanced Economies [Abdul Abiad, John Bluedorn, Jaime Guajardo, and Petia Topalova “The
Rising Resilience of Emerging Market and Developing Economies” 2012 International Monetary
Fund, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12300.pdf]RMT
Economic performance in many emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs) improved substantially over the past twenty years. The past decade was particularly good — for the first time EMDEs spent more time in expansion and had smaller downturns than advanced economies . In this paper we document the history of EMDEs’ resilience over the past sixty years , and investigate what factors have been associated with it.
We find that their improved performance in recent years is accounted for by both good policies and a lower incidence of external and domestic shocks — better policies account for about three-fifths of their improved resilience , while less frequent shocks account for the remainder.
No poverty trap and human development is increasing globally
Kenny and Summer 11 --Charles Kenny is a research fellow at the Center for Global
Development and the author of Getting Better: Why Global Development Is Succeeding - And
How We Can Improve the World Even More. • Andy Sumner is a research fellow at the Institute of Development Studies and a visiting fellow at the Center for Global Development [Charles and
Andy, “How 28 poor countries escaped the poverty trap”, The Guardian, 7/12/11, http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/jul/12/world-bankreclassifies-28-poor-countries]RMT
Remember the poverty trap? Countries stuck in destitution because of weak institutions put in place by colonial overlords, or because of climates that foster disease, or geographies that limit access to global markets, or simply by the fact that poverty is overwhelmingly self-perpetuating. Apparently the trap can be escaped. The World Bank did its annual assessment of poor countries last week
. Low-income countries are those with average gross national incomes (GNIs) of less than $1,005 per person per year
. And there are only 35 of them remaining out of the countries and economies that the World Bank tracks. That's down from 63 in 2000.
New middle-income countries this year include Ghana and Zambia
.
Lower middle-income countries are those with per capita GNIs of between $1,006 and $3,975 per year
; while upper middle-income countries are those with per capita GNIs between $3,976 and
$12,275.
The remaining 35 low-income countries have a combined population of about
800 million
. Tanzania, Burma, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia and Bangladesh account for about half of that total, and there are about 350 million people living on under $1.25 a day in the remaining low-income countries.
So what's behind all of this sudden income growth
? Is it a story about aid? One prominent Zambian,
Dambisa Moyo, has written of her country that "a direct consequence of the aid-driven interventions has been a dramatic descent into poverty
. Whereas prior to the 1970s, most economic indicators had been on an upward trajectory
, a decade later Zambia lay in economic ruin". In the 1980s, aid to Zambia averaged about 14% of the country's GNI
. In the 2000s, a decade of strong growth, the same proportion was 17%. If Zambia's ruin in the 1980s was the result of aid, is Zambia's graduation to middle-income status in the new millennium a sign that aid now works really well? Of course both the ideas that previous stagnation was all the fault of aid, or current growth was all the result, are ridiculous. The price of copper (Zambia's major export) was depressed in the 1980s and saw its price rocket in the middle of the last decade as China and India's economies grew and demand for the metal soared. But growth among low-income countries in Africa and elsewhere isn't

just limited to big mineral exporters. And the continent is fast drawing in more investment
. Foreign direct investment to Africa is projected to rise to $150bn by 2015, reports the Africa Attractiveness Survey
(that's more than the total global aid budget) – and domestic resources are being mobilised at a faster rate, too, as the Commission for Africa 2010 report discussed. Even gold and diamond-producing Ghana, which declared itself
63% richer at the end of last year than previously thought, didn't suggest the newfound riches were the result of mineral exports.
Instead, the recalculation was driven by the fact the country's services sector was a lot bigger than previously calculated. Part of that will reflect the incredible success of the telecoms sector - 75% of the country's population are mobile subscribers. And, of course, the expansion of telecoms is a worldwide phenomenon. So a lot of the growth we are seeing in poor countries is broad-based, not just reliant on the current commodity boom – which is good news for the future. Of course there's much to do to translate this growth into better and faster poverty reduction.
Looking at the progress data for the millennium development goals
(MDGs) for Ghana and Zambia there's nowhere near the kind of progress you would hope to see on income poverty.
Twenty years of growth in Ghana has reduced the number of people living on $1.25 or less from just over 7 million to just under 7 million
– and inequality (as measured by the Gini coefficient) rose significantly.
However, in both Ghana and Zambia, the number of children in primary school has climbed along with literacy rates, and infant mortality has fallen
. Even if they're not on track to meet the MDGs, quality of life is getting much better
.
Increased remittances cause Dutch Disease – appreciation and higher non tradable prices.
Emmanuel K. K. Lartey , Federico S. Mandelman , and Pablo A. Acosta 2012 , Lartey is an
Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Mandelman is a research economist and associate policy adviser on the regional team in the research department of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Atlanta, Acosta has a PhD in Economics from the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, Senior Economist at The World Bank, Social Protection and Labor, Review of
International Economics, “Remittances, Exchange Rate Regimes and theDutch Disease: A Panel
Data Analysis,” http://business.fullerton.edu/economics/elartey/dutch_journal_final.pdf
This study has shown that rising levels of remittances in emerging economies potentially possess an important spending effect that culminates in an increase in the relative price of non tradables and real exchange rate appreciation
. The results also suggest that a resource movement effect that favors the non tradable sector at the expense of tradable goods follows an increase in remittances
. In particular, the evidence shows that the share of services in total output rises while the share of manufacturing declines
, these being characteristics of
the phenomenon known as the “
Dutch disease
”.
These results still hold after dealing with endogeneity
issues and controlling for economic growth, terms of trade, trade openness, monetary aggregates and fiscal polic y. There is also an indication that resource movement effects that favor the non tradable sector operate stronger under fixed exchange rate regimes. One plausible explanation is that countries with a nominal peg cannot adjust international relative prices after a negative shock to the tradable sector
. The inflow of remittances aimed at compensating the resulting decline in households’ income may help to sustain the over-appreciated long-run equilibrium for the real exchange rate. These results represent a novel approach in studying real exchange rate effects and resource reallocation of an increase in remittances in particular, and in capital inflows in general under different monetary regimes.

Remittances foster corruption – governments divert spending form welfare.
Faisal Z. Ahmed 20 10 , Post-doctoral fellow, Woodrow Wilson School, Professor of political economy and international development at Princeton University, NYU, “Remittances Foster
Government Corruption,” http://politics.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/18787/Ahmed.pdf.
The re-allocation of expenditures from welfare payments to increased government patronage in response to higher remittance inflows is not unique to Jordan, nor its high level of aggregate remittance inflows
.
Small increases in remittances can shift the allocation of government expenditures to patronage.3
4 For instance, in countries that receive remittances less than 2 percent of GDP, government’s on average allocate 27 and 38 percent of their budget to employee compensation and government transfers respectively
.
As remittance inflows rise
, governments tend to allocate a greater share of their budget to employee compensation
.
In countries that receive moderate inflows of remittances (between 2 to 4 percent of GDP), for instance, governments allocate 30 percent of their expenditures on employee compensation and 26 percent to government transfers. In countries that receive inflows of remittances exceeding 4 percent of GDP, around 33 percent of government expenditures are spent on patronage and 31 percent is transferred to the population
.
This re-allocation of government resources to patronage as remittance inflows rise is robust to the inclusion of variables that capture a country’s economic growth, average income, population, and underlying degree of autocratic governance
. In a
2SLS specification that ontrols for these effects, a one percentage point in remittances reduces the share of expenditures a government allocates to subsidies and transfers by 4.5 percentage point
(table 13, column 1). This is consistent with the earlier finding that remittances raise government expenditures on employee compensation
(patronage).
The ability of governments to reduce expenditures on public goods in response to remittances has tangible harmful effects on the population
. For example, remittances reduce childhood immunizations to measles in the population
(column 2).
This type of health service represents a welfare good a government or household provides on a regular basis
(and the class of substitutable welfare goods envisioned in the formal model in Appendix B). The IV coefficient suggests that a 1 percentage point increase in remittances
(% GDP) reduces the percentage of infants immunized to measles by 5.7 percentage points
.
Remittances also tend to shift expenditures on health care between households and the government
.
Remittance inflows exhibit a negative effect public health care expenditures
(column 3), but tend have a positive effect on private health care expenditures (column 4). While these estimated effect on remittances on public and private health care expenditures are not statistically significant at conventional levels, the direction of the effects are informative and provide additional evidence that remittances may re-orient a government’s willingness to spend funds on welfare goods
. Together, the results in table 13 suggest that governments may reduce the provision of welfare goods in response to remittance inflows
.
Corruption is an alt cause and causes poverty, conflict and underdevelopment.
Vincent 9 – Research Institute for Law, Politics and Justice Keele University [ Brian, “The
Relationship between Poverty, Conflict and Development” March 2009, Vol. 2 No. 1, Journal of
Sustainable Development]RMT

This paper establishes the relationship between poverty, conflict and development
(PCD) in analysing instability in the African continent. In its analysis, the paper examines several variable factors that can help in the explanations of the relationship between PCD in Africa. These variable factors includes: economic, political, population, climate and environment, ethnic composition, militarization, poor growth and political corruption. None of these varying factors can unilaterally explain the relationship between poverty, conflict and development as issues behind Africa’s instability.
However, the paper argues that political corruption stands out as the most persuasive, compelling and primary explanation for the (causal) relationship(s) between PCD , though, it is not an exclusive one. While, the paper recognises that there are both exogenous and endogenous trends that influence political corruption, the paper adopts the endogenous (domestic political corruption) perspective, because political governance is now more controlled at home. The paper employs the human needs theory for analysis.
Remittances set to rise
World Bank 4/13 [The World Bank, “Remittances growth to slow sharply in 2015, as Europe and Russia stay weak; pick up expected next year” April 13, 2015, http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2015/04/13/remittances-growth-to-slowsharply-in-2015-as-europe-and-russia-stay-weak-pick-up-expected-next-year]RMT
In line with the expected global economic recovery
next year, the global flows of remittances are expected to accelerate by 4.1 percent in 2016
, to reach an estimated $610 billion, rising to $636 billion in 2017.
Remittance flows to developing countries are expected to recover in 2016
to reach $459 billion, rising to $479 billion in 2017.
The top five migrant destination countries continue to be the United States, Saudi Arabia, Germany, Russia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The top five remittance recipient countries, in terms of value of remittances, continue to be India, China, Philippines, Mexico and Nigeria. The global average cost of sending $200 held steady at 8 percent of the value of the transaction, as of the last quarter of 2014. Despite its potential to lower costs, the use of mobile technology in cross-border transactions remains limited, due to the regulatory burden related to combating money laundering and terrorism financing, says the Brief. International remittances sent via mobile technology accounted for less than 2 percent of remittance flows in 2013, according to the latest available data. In addition to sending money to their families, international migrants hold significant savings in their destination countries
.
‘
Diaspora savings’ attributed to migrants from developing countries were estimated at
$497 billion in 2013, the latest data available
.

Mexico proves remittances rising
Telesur 6/4 – a pan-Latin American terrestrial and satellite television network headquartered in Caracas, Venezuela [TelesurTV, “Rising Remittances Surpass Foreign
Investment in Mexico” June 4 2015 http://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Rising-
Remittances-Surpass-Foreign-Investment-in-Mexico-20150604-0013.html]RMT
Remittances
have surpassed foreign direct investment as the leading source of foreign exchange in
Mexico, according to a report published Wednesday by the country's largest provider of financial services, BBVA Bancomer.
This year,
Mexico is expected to receive US$22 billion in foreign direct investment and
US$25 billion in remittances
, BBVA Bancomer's Chief Economist for Mexico Carlos Serrano estimated.
Economist forecasts project that rising remittances will hit levels of US$667 billion by
2017.

Pew polls prove, life in developing countries is improving
Pew 14 --nonpartisan fact tank that informs the public about the issues, attitudes and trends shaping America and the world. We conduct public opinion polling, demographic research, content analysis and other data-driven social science research. We do not take policy positions.
[Pew Research Center, “Emerging and Developing Economies Much More Optimistic than Rich
Countries about the Future” OCTOBER 9, 2014, http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/10/09/emerging-and-developing-economies-much-moreoptimistic-than-rich-countries-about-the-future/]RMT
Looking ahead, people in the emerging and developing world see better opportunities at home than abroad.
Majorities or pluralities in 30 of the 34 emerging and developing nations surveyed say they would tell young people in their country to stay at home in order to lead a good life, instead of moving to another country.

Remittances foster corruption – studies prove.
Faisal Z. Ahmed 20 10 , Post-doctoral fellow, Woodrow Wilson School, Professor of political economy and international development at Princeton University, NYU, “Remittances Foster
Government Corruption,” http://politics.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/18787/Ahmed.pdf.
Excessive patronage is frequently a tactic governments in many developing countries employ to remain in power.
In these countries, this “misuse of government office for private gain” often paves the way for rampant government corruption
(Bardhan 1997), lower economic performance
(e.g., Mauro 1995; World Bank 2004) and worse social and health conditions
(e.g., Gupta et al 2002).1 In light of this, existing studies frequently find that rising household income
(e.g., Treisman 2000, 2007), achieved in part through the tremendous growth of remittances, may serve as a conduit for mitigating government excess and improving the quality of governance
(e.g., G8 Center 2004; Obama 2009; Pfutze 2009).2
This sentiment is misguided
.
This paper harnesses a natural experiment to demonstrate that remittances foster government corruption in poor countries with weak democratic institutions
. The natural experiment uses plausibly exogenous variation in the price of oil interacted with a Muslim country’s distance to Mecca as an instrument for remittances received in poor Muslim countries. This instrument allays major worries about endogeneity bias arising from reverse causality and non-random measurement error. T he instrumental variables results demonstrate that a one standard deviation increase in remittances corresponds to a more than one standard deviation increase in government corruption
.
This is equivalent to a 1.5 point jump in the 6-point index of government corruption
(which amounts to a $600 decrease in per-capita
GDP). The mechanism through which remittances can foster mis-governance is not obvious. While scholars have long recognized that direct financial transfers to governments, such as foreign aid, can generate rent-seeking behavior and fund corruption (e.g.,
Friedman 1958; Bauer 1972; Alesina and Weder 2002), the relationship between financial transfers to households (e.g., remittances) and government corruption is not so direct. Governments do not directly “observe” these transfers since a large share of remittances are sent through backchannels and via technologies
(e.g., automated teller machines) that bypass their tracking by international development agencies and predominantly poor governments
.
Given these problems, remittances are largely untaxed by governments (de Luna Martinez 2005; Chami et al 2008) and thus cannot directly finance corruption. Instead, given their political incentives, governments in more autocratic polities may harness remittance inflows to substitute resources from the provision of welfare goods
(e.g., government transfers, public health care) to the supply of patronage
(e.g., corruption).3
This
“substitution effect” supports existing theories and empirical evidence that governments in autocracies divert expenditures to engage in corruption to reward key supporters and stay in power
(Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). Gauging the effects of remittances on governance (as well as economic outcomes), however, will suffer from endogeneity bias related to both reverse causality (i.e., countries with more corrupt governments and inferior socio-economic conditions tend to attract higher remittances) and measurement error (i.e., officially recorded flows of remittances tend to under-report actual flows). To combat these concerns, I harness a natural experiment of oil price driven remittance flows from the Persian Gulf to construct an innovative cross-country and time-varying instrument for remittances. < Figure 1 around here > For largely cultural and religious reasons, Gulf oil producers have tended to “import” a large share of their workforce from other Muslim countries (Choucri 1986). As figure 1 shows remittances to these poor, non-oil producing Muslim countries have tracked the price of oil. The price of oil provides plausibly exogenous variation in remittances that is uncorrelated with the internal economic and political conditions in poor, remittance receiving countries.
Moreover, Muslim countries closest to oil producers in the Persian Gulf tended to receive more remittances. The inclusion of distance is key in generating a statistically strong instrument, and differentiates this study from Werker et al’s (2009) examination of oil price driven foreign aid flows.4 These two facts underlie the instrument. Specifically, I use exogenous variation in the price of oil interacted with a Muslim country’s distance from Mecca as a time-varying instrument for remittances. The instrument, therefore,

identifies the average treatment effect for poor, non-oil producing Muslim, and predominantly non-democratic countries.5 For a sample of 57 poor, non-oil producing countries between 1984-2004, the instrumental variables (IV) results show that remittances raise government corruption.
The results imply that a one standard deviation increase in remittances is equivalent to moving from a low corruption country like Costa Rica
(with corruption on par with Germany and the United States) to a moderately corrupt nation, such as Niger or
Sri Lanka
. T hese findings are robust to outliers, alternate econometric specifications, differential trends and potential violations of the exclusion restriction
. There are three plausible channels through which oil prices could affect corruption independently of remittance inflows: foreign aid, prices (inflation, exchange rate), and trade flows. The findings are robust to specifications that take these other channels into account. Finally,
I provide “micro” evidence from Jordan and cross-national analysis that the link between remittances and corruption plausibly operates through the reduction of welfare goods, such as health care and social spending
.
This paper’s findings counter the prevailing view that remittances are a conduit for improved governance
. Many studies tend to focus on the potential democratization effect of remittances in home countries, particularly in Latin America. For instance, Mexican migrants in the United States have had a sizeable impact on the domestic Mexican political process, through home town associations that provide financial assistance to their home communities. Home town associations are often involved in financing public infrastructure activities, such as the construction of roads, schools, and health facilities (Orozco and Lapointe 2003) as well as in political mobilization (de-la Garza and Hazan 2003). Such mobilization may contribute to improved public policies, governance, and the ousting of an incumbent government (Pfutze 2009).6 This sentiment has surfaced at the upper echelons of public policy. Leaders of the G8 countries, for instance, have officially acknowledged that remittances promote development and committed resources to policy initiatives to attract remittance inflows (G8 Centre 2004). More recently, in a speech promoting human rights and democracy in Cuba, President Obama (2009) declared “measures that decrease dependency of the Cuban people on the Castro regime and that promote contacts between Cuban-Americans and their relatives in Cuba are means to encourage positive change in Cuba. The
United States can pursue these goals by facilitating greater contact between separated family members in the United States and
Cuba and increasing the flow of remittances and information to the Cuban people.” These studies and views of policymakers
, however, frequently ignore the political incentives faced by public officials in countries with weak democratic institutions to engage in patronage
(and out-right theft) that fosters corruption and unaccountable governance
.
The findings from this paper also introduce a new explanation for cross-national variation in corruption
.
These studies consistently find that that countries with
Protestant traditions, histories of British rule, more developed economies
, and (probably) higher imports are less corrupt
(for an overview see Treisman 2000, 2007).
Scholars have also associated cross-national differences in corruption to economic transactions involving firms engaged in international trade
(e.g., Ades and Di Tella 1999) and foreign direct investment
(e.g., Wei 2000) and governments receiving foreign aid
(e.g., Alesina and
Weder 2002). To my knowledge, there are no published works documenting whether international financial transfers to households, in the form of remittances, deteriorate the quality of governance. Thus, this is the first paper to do so.

Increased remittances cause Dutch Disease – appreciation and higher non tradable prices.
Emmanuel K. K. Lartey , Federico S. Mandelman , and Pablo A. Acosta 2012 , Lartey is an
Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Mandelman is a research economist and associate policy adviser on the regional team in the research department of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Atlanta, Acosta has a PhD in Economics from the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, Senior Economist at The World Bank, Social Protection and Labor, Review of
International Economics, “Remittances, Exchange Rate Regimes and theDutch Disease: A Panel
Data Analysis,” http://business.fullerton.edu/economics/elartey/dutch_journal_final.pdf
This study has shown that rising levels of remittances in emerging economies potentially possess an important spending effect that culminates in an increase in the relative price of non tradables and real exchange rate appreciation . The results also suggest that a resource movement effect that favors the non tradable sector at the expense of tradable goods follows an increase in remittances . In particular, the evidence shows that the share of services in total output rises while the share of manufacturing declines , these being characteristics of the phenomenon known as the “ Dutch disease ”. These results still hold after dealing with endogeneity issues and controlling for economic growth, terms of trade, trade openness, monetary aggregates and fiscal polic y. There is also an indication that resource movement effects that favor the non tradable sector operate stronger under fixed exchange rate regimes. One plausible explanation is that countries with a nominal peg cannot adjust international relative prices after a negative shock to the tradable sector .
The inflow of remittances aimed at compensating the resulting decline in households’ income may help to sustain the over-appreciated long-run equilibrium for the real exchange rate. These results represent a novel approach in studying real exchange rate effects and resource reallocation of an increase in remittances in particular, and in capital inflows in general under different monetary regimes.
Increased remittances cause dutch disease - laundry list of effects.
Pablo Fajnzylber and J. Humberto López 20 08 , Pablo Fajnzylber is a Senior Economist in the
Office of the Chief Economist for the Latin America and the Caribbean Region, World Bank,
Washington, DC, J. Humberto López is a Senior Economist in the Office of the Chief Economist for the Latin America and the Caribbean Region, World Bank, Washington, DC, The World
Bank, “Remittances and Development: LESSONS FROM LATIN AMERICA,” http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAC/Resources/Remittances_and_Development_Repo rt.pdf
In the previous chapters, we have argued that remittances may have a number of beneficial effects for the welfare of the receiving countries. The evidence presented so far in this book suggests that at the country level, higher remittances inflows tend to be associated with lower poverty indicators and higher growth rates. Beyond these typical income dimensions of welfare, remittances seem to reduce output volatility (a measure of risk faced by countries1), and at least in some countries and for some socioeconomic groups, lead to improvements in social indicators. Yet the magnitude of these flows relative to the size of the receiving economies2

implies that remittances may also pose an important number of challenges. For while these inflows may ease external financing constraints and therefore hold the potential for higher investment by developing countries, in many circumstances remittances are so large that they can impact macroeconomic stability and more specifically carry the potential for a
Dutch disease type of phenomena (see the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic
Outlook 2005 [IMF 2005], and the Work Bank’s Global Economic Prospects 2006 [World Bank
2006]). Workers’ remittances can be viewed as a capital inflow, and therefore the theory of the Dutch disease phenomenon associated with a surge in inflows (perhaps because of the discovery of new natural resources) can also be applied in this context . In order to isolate the specific channels transmitting remittances shocks through the economy, consider first a small open economy model with no leisure-consumption trade-off. In this setup, an increase in remittances is equivalent to a (permanent) increase in incomes of the households .
Assuming that nontradables are normal goods, this positive income shock results in extra spending on both tradables and nontradable s. Because most Latin American countries are price takers in international markets, growing demand does not raise the prices of tradables . However, because the prices of nontradables are determined in the domestic economy , they increase due to additional demand, or the so-called spending effect .
There is also a “resource movement effect.” The relative price change between tradables and nontradables makes production of the latter more profitable . Output growth in the nontradable sectors will push up factor demands, especially for those factors used intensively in these sectors . Increased factor demand by the expanding sectors will be accommodated by factors released from other sectors (the resource movement effect) and , depending on the behavior of total supply of the factor, will normally result in higher factor returns in the final equilibrium . The price shift and resource reallocation in favor of nontradables erode the competitiveness of export-oriented sectors and hurt importcompeting sectors . The final result of this real exchange rate appreciation is normally increased import flows and lower export sales . When the above assumption of no consumption-leisure trade-off in the household utility function is removed, the above effects are exacerbated . Without this assumption, an increase in nonlabor income, as is the case with remittances, influences household decisions to supply labor —namely, individuals can now consume more of both goods and leisure (that is, the income effect dominates), and thus their labor supply is reduced. In turn, reduced labor supply implies rising wages, and this additional pressure on wages intensifies the effects of real exchange rate appreciation described earlier . Obviously, the pressure on the real exchange rate will be somewhat mitigated if (i) there are productivity gains, particularly in the nontradable sector, that offset the effects of the increasing demand; (ii) governments implement policies that aim at stimulating labor demand by reducing labor costs3; and (iii) a large share of the remittances are channeled to the external sector via additional imports so that the price effect on nontradable goods is limited. Yet, in principle it seems difficult to justify that these effects are enough to mitigate appreciating pressures. In turn , there are a number of connected macroeconomic effects that can result from a real exchange rate appreciation associated with remittances flow s. They include: • Adverse effects on the tradable sector of the economy . Although remittances flows are likely to lead to an expansion of the nontradable sector (as a result of the increase experienced in domestic demand), both export-

and import-competing industries (that is, the tradable sector of the economy) would be adversely affected by real exchange rate appreciation and the associated loss of international competitiveness. The negative impact of remittances on the tradable sector may be reinforced if they also fuel inflation and higher prices result in higher economywide wages .4 As mentioned above and as was documented in chapter 5, this effect would be further magnified if remittances also reduce the labor supply . In these circumstances, the nontradable sector may be in the position of passing some of the wage pressures on to prices, but this is likely to be much more difficult for a tradable sector facing international competition , which , as a result, will lose competitiveness . • Widening of the current account deficit. In principle , it is difficult to justify that an increase in domestic demand will be passed in full to the nontradable sector . So, to the extent that some of the remittancesinduced consumption is directed toward tradable goods, there will be an increase in the demand for imports . This, coupled with the loss of international competitiveness for domestic firms mentioned in the previous paragraph, would likely result in deteriorations of the external position . For example, according to the
World Bank (2003), the surge in remittances observed in El Salvador during the 1990s was the most likely factor behind the worsening of the country’s trade deficit, which over the 1990s deteriorated from less than 7 percent of GDP to almost 14 percent of GDP . •
Weaker monetary control, inflationary pressures, and the sectoral allocation of investment. If remittances flows do not leave the country (at least in full) through a widening of the current account, large flows will push up monetary aggregates, potentially derailing inflation targets . Experience also indicates that prices of financial assets, and particularly of real estate, can rise rapidly following a surge in remittances, something that in turn may introduce significant distortions in the economy and affect the sectoral allocation of investment and lead to overinvestment in some sectors (for example, real estate).
Remittances cause dutch disease – litany of studies.
Artatrana Ratha 20 13 , Professor of Economics at St. Cloud State University, Fulbright Fellow
2010 – 2011, Ph.D. University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, St. Cloud State University, theRository at St. Cloud State, “Remittances and the Dutch Disease: Evidence from Cointegration and Error-
Correction Modeling,” http://repository.stcloudstate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1025&context=econ_wps
Remittances are known to be larger than official aid flows. They are also found to be countercyclical and more stable than and for many countries, larger than FDI flows (World Bank, 2003;
Frankel, 2011). The migrants’ firsthand knowledge of the recipients also mitigates the problems of adverse selection and moral hazards, resulting in better utilization of the scarce foreign exchange in the developing world. Thus, remittances are gaining in importance as an effective tool promoting GDP growth and reducing poverty and inequality (Adams and Page, 2005).
However, remittances are essentially inflows of foreign exchange and any large inflow of foreign exchange can potentially cause currency appreciations in the receiving countries and hurt their exports.
Known as the Dutch-Disease phenomenon in the literature , this side effect of remittances has received relatively scant empirical attention, partly because remittances’ ascendance to the limelight is also relatively recent. This paper investigates the
Dutch disease effect for some of the largest destinations of remittances. The Dutch-disease

effect of remittances may be attributed to various channels.
Being purely income transfers, remittances can lead to a spending effect increasing the consumption of both tradable and non-tradable goods. With prices of tradable goods essentially determined in world markets, the relative prices of the domestic, non-tradable goods, rise and push up the overall price level in the economy . This translates into a higher real exchange rate , both fueling and fueled by a resource movement effec t: Rising non-tradable prices divert resources away from the tradable - and toward the non-tradable sector and exert upward pressure on wages and other production costs, prices, and real exchange rate of the domestic currency . Thus, an increase in remittance inflow would lead to the incidence of the Dutch Disease . The increased income of households , as a result of the increased remittances would also increase imports . This, coupled with the decline in the export competitiveness of the tradable sector, would hurt exports and contribute to current account deficits . 2 Remittances may also exert an income effect on the consumption-leisure tradeof f, reducing the overall supply of labor in the economy . At a time when demand is growing (because of increased remittance inflows), this reduction in labor supply will only exacerbate price increases, especially in the non-tradable sector , and cause the domestic currency to appreciate even further . Many of the top remittance destinations being in the developing world (e.g., China, India, Mexico, and Philippines), the applicability of the above channels may be qualified further . For example, if there is surplus labor in the economy (as is the case with most LDCs), at least part of the excess demand for labor in the non-traded sector would be met by the surplus labor and the resource movement effect may not be as pronounced. However, there would still be a spending effect leading to real exchange rate appreciation and hence, a decline in export competitiveness . Also, and more likely perhaps, labor mobility between LDCs’ tradable and non-tradable sectors is quite limited (either because of labor market imperfections and/or specific-skills required by these sectors), in which case the relative price of non-tradable goods can still rise and raise the real exchange rate further . As we mentioned earlier, empirical investigations of remittances’
Dutch disease effects are still quite few. Rajan and Subramaniam (2005) conducted a large cross-country study and found that foreign aid inflows lead to the Dutch disease, but not remittances. They attributed this finding to remittances drying up as receiving country’s currency appreciates (thus, remittances become endogenous). From a panel study of 13 Latin
American countries , Ameudo-Dorantes and Pozo (2004), however, find that remittances do lead to the Dutch Disease by lowering export competitiveness . Lopez, Molina, and
Bussolo (2008 ) reconfirmed this findings for a larger sample of countries, followed by
Lartey, Mandelman, and Acosta (2012) who also segregated the resource movement and the spending effects and found remittances to shrink the tradable sector (relative to the non-tradable sector) – a finding consistent with the foregoing discussion .

Status quo solves - DOD solves and mitigates the impact
Jennifer L. Robison 12 , LTC in the US Army, Building Civilian-Military Collaboration to
Enhance Response Following an Anthrax Release, 4/5/12, US Army College, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a592823.pdf ||RS
Protecting
the Homeland and Defense Support of
Civilian Authorities have been longstanding missions for the military and will remain a priority
.
DoD is uniquely capable of augmenting local and state entities in the case of a bioterror event
.
As local public health departments face the challenges of multiple competing missions and decreasing federal and state funding, they will have to turn to coalition building to augment services and resources
, especially in time of disaster.
Local DoD installation leadership and personnel are prepared to support the communities in which they are located.
Building partnerships and coalitions, forging joint councils, developing mutual aid agreements and MOAs, and providing realistic training exercises will prepare these civilian-military communities
to respond to disasters together to decrease the morbidity and mortality from a catastrophic event
.
The unique challenges of CBRN response, including the timely distribution of medical countermeasures in the event of a deliberate anthrax release, have been addressed by the federal CBRN Response Enterprise. These federal and National Guard units are prepared to rapidly deploy
as requested when local and state resources are overwhelmed.
Collaborative agreements and synchronizations must continue at local, state and federal level to optimize emergency response plans
with regards to CBRN incidents.
DoD capabilities can provide key manpower augmentation, logistical support, and subject matter expertise especially with bioterror preparedness planning and distribution of MCMs in the event
of a deliberate anthrax release.
Mitigation can result from early assistance from DoD partners at all levels
in a truly whole of nation effort.
DoD is committed to providing DSCA to save lives and decrease the pain and suffering of American citizens in the case of a catastrophic event.
DoD’s support to civilian authorities and the ongoing cooperation at the local, state, and federal levels will: improve disaster response plans, bolster homeland defense, support vital national
20 security interests, and increase the publics’ trust and confidence in our government
, military, and public health agencies.
Alt cause—police misconduct
Williams and Feshir 6/17 --Minnesota Public Radio ,General assignment reporter for MPR
News. [Bryant, Riyam, “Program aims to boost police-community ties but some doubt it will work”, Jun 17 2015, http://www.mprnews.org/story/2015/06/17/national-initiative-forbuilding-community-trust-justice]RMT
Leaders of a national initiative to promote dialogue after police killings of African-Americans stirred outrage stopped in Minneapolis this week. It was the last stop in a series of meetings across the country. In March,
Minneapolis was one of six cities chosen for the $4.75 million program, the National Initiative for Building Community
Trust and Justice
, in response to the Ferguson, Mo., shooting of Michael Brown by a white police officer.
Department of Justice officials are working with researchers from Yale University
, UCLA and John Jay College of Criminal Justice to study implicit bias, how law enforcement interactions affect crime rates

and racial reconciliation.
They held a public forum at the Minneapolis American Indian Center Tuesday night and plan to meet with the Minneapolis City Council Wednesday. Phillip Goff, a social psychology associate professor at
UCLA, said the project is not a police-led initiative.
"This is an initiative that is based in evidence, based in science with the goal of repairing and improving police-community relations," he said. "The goal is not to be doing something from just the policing side."
The three-year program aims to use social psychology research to explore the underlying issues that could lead to police misconduct
. Mark Kappelhoff, deputy assistant to the
U.S. attorney general, said police are joining in the conversation over conduct.
"There has really never been, that I have seen, a time in our country where policing, police reform and community trust has been at the forefront of this conversation that our nation now is havin g," Kappelhoff said. "
The community feels in many ways that the criminal justice system is biased."
Some in the diverse audience of about 35 people criticized the timing of the meeting and said it didn't give working families the opportunity to engage.
Attendees included the group Communities United Against Police
Brutality, who said they don't trust that the program will solve police and community relations. "
The problem is about police conduct," said CUAPB's President Michelle Gross, "I don't want to see that somebody gets beat up while the police smiles. That's not the right idea of procedural justice."
1AC Uniqueness author concludes NEG—squo levels of workplace raids are going down—lower arrests and better employee protections—MOU proves— we have a graph
Griffith 12 [Kati L., Proskauer Assistant Professor of Employment and Labor Law, Industrial and Labor Relations School, Cornell University, “UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS: CROSSING
THE BORDERS OF IMMIGRATION AND WORKPLACE LAW”, http://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=114069009009103113028023106081001106004
0490200880120910730711021110091180670081060240181100170630
620490971180071050281121200120080430880
260520701111210910940041231050270520071110741200050041130010800890
05069103077089121071109094029101112100029090029&EXT=pdf&TYPE=2] alla
In contrast to its heightened enforcement focus on employers
, the federal government has recently downplayed workplace-based immigration enforcement measures that target employees
.
Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano
, for instance, recently stated that workplace immigration raids “made no sense” as an immigration enforcement strategy.36 According to Napolitano, while
federal immigration authorities expended considerable time and resources to conduct large-scale workplace immigration raids during the Bush administration , too many lawbreaking employers were left unpunished and “criminal aliens were free to roam our streets
.”37
As a result of this reduction in workplace immigration raids
, the total number of arrests that result from the federal government’s workplace-based immigration efforts has decreased .
Table 4 illustrates this trend.

Federal agencies have acknowledged the interaction between workplace-based immigration enforcement and employees’ workplace protections to some extent.
The
Obama administration’s “Comprehensive Worksite Strategy,”
for instance, proclaims that it
“promotes national security, protects critical infrastructure and targets employers who violate employment laws or engage in abuse or exploitation of workers
.”38
Coordination between immigration authorities and the U.S
. Department of Labor (
DOL
) similarly illustrates a kind of immployment law enforcement strategy. Namely, the two agencies have stated that they would like to better coordinate their efforts in order to reduce immigration law’s negative effects on workplace protections
. For example, the
DOL has coordinated with federal immigration authorities to obtain “U” visas for undocumented workers who are victims of workplace crimes
.39 Moreover, the DOL
and the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency (
ICE
) recently co-signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
, which states that immigration authorities will not misrepresent themselves to workers as DOL agents and will refrain from worksite immigration enforcement when there is an ongoing DOL investigation at that worksite
.40 Among other things, the MOU states that immigration authorities will be cautious of “tips and leads” which
“are motivated by an improper desire to manipulate a pending labor dispute, retaliate against employees for exercising labor rights, or otherwise frustrate the enforcement of labor laws.”41 Similarly, the
MOU clarifies that the DOL will have a chance to interview undocumented workers who are detained as a result of workplacebased immigration enforcement measures but who may have suffered workplace law abuses
.42

I’m sorry but you don’t have an aff anymore—Latino populations don’t like law enforcement now, are not willing to share information regardless of raids, find local law more invasive, and CITIZENSHIP doesn’t matter
Theodore 13 [Nik, PhD, Professor at UIC Department of Urban Planning and Policy, BA
Macalester College (1986); MUPP, University of Illinois at Chicago (1989); PhD, University of
Illinois at Chicago (2000), Insecure Communities: Latino Perceptions of Police Involvement in
Immigration Enforcement, May 2013, http://www.policylink.org/sites/default/files/INSECURE_COMMUNITIES_REPORT_FINAL.
PDF] alla
This report presents findings from a survey of Latinos regarding their perceptions of law enforcement authorities in light of the greater involvement of police in immigration enforcement
. Lake Research Partners designed and administered a randomized telephone survey of 2,004 Latinos living in the counties of Cook (Chicago), Harris (Houston), Los Angeles, and Maricopa (Phoenix). The s urvey was designed to assess the impact of police involvement in immigration enforcement on Latinos’ perceptions of public safety and their willingness to contact the police when crimes have been committed.
The survey was conducted in English and Spanish by professional interviewers during the period
November 17 to December 10, 2012.
Survey results indicate that the increased involvement of police in immigration enforcement has significantly heightened the fears many
Latinos have of the police, contributing to their social isolation and exacerbating their mistrust of law enforcement authorities
. Key findings include: •
44 percent of Latinos surveyed reported they are less likely to contact police officers if they have been the victim of a crime because they fear that police officers will use this interaction as an opportunity to inquire into their immigration status or that of people they know
. •
45 percent of Latinos stated that they are less likely to voluntarily offer information about crimes, and 45 percent are less likely to report a crime because they are afraid the police will ask them or people they know about their immigration status
. • 70 percent of undocumented immigrants reported they are less likely to contact law enforcement authorities if they were victims of a crime. •
Fear of police contact is not confined to immigrants. For example, 28 percent of USborn Latinos said they are less likely to contact police officers if they have been the victim of a crime because they fear that police officers will use this interaction as an opportunity to inquire into their immigration status or that of people they know.
• 38 percent of Latinos reported they feel like they are under more suspicion now that local law enforcement authorities have become involved in immigration enforcement
. This figure includes
26 percent of US-born respondents, 40 percent of foreign-born respondents, and 58 percent of undocumented immigrant respondents.
• When asked how often police officers stop Latinos without good reason or cause, 62 percent said very
or somewhat often
, including 58 percent of US-born respondents, 64 percent of foreign-born respondents, and 78 percent of undocumented immigrant respondents.
Majority of terror suspects are US citizens – no reason why racially profiled communities are key to info. Their author.
International Association of Chiefs of Police, IACP, 14 , a dynamic organization that serves as the professional voice of law enforcement, 2014, Using Community Policing to Counter Violent

Extremism, http://www.theiacp.org/Portals/0/documents/pdfs/Final%20Key%20Principles%20Guide.pdf
Homegrown violent extremists, foreign fighters, and domestic extremists continue to evolve and contribute to the threat that faces law enforcement agencies of all sizes . Individuals and groups within each of these categories are extremely diverse, as are their justifications and targets .
Homegrown violent extremists are citizens or long-term residents of a Western country who have rejected Western cultural values , beliefs, and norms in favor of a violent ideology and intend to commit acts of terrorism in Western countries or against their interests overseas .18 Approximately 70 percent of individuals “arrested, indicted, or otherwise identified” as being involved in attempted terrorism plots between 9/11 and 2010 were United States citizens —either born or naturalized— and even more were legal permanent residents .19 Foreign fighters are individuals — especially individuals from
Western countries—who are recruited to travel abroad to train and fight with a particular extremist group based on the belief that the conflict is politically, ideologically, or religiously justified and that they have a divine obligation to engage in violence .20 Often, the training and extremist ideology are brought back to the United States to radicalize Americans with similar views and justify acts of violence here . Meanwhile, domestically-radicalized individuals are citizens or long-term residents of a country whose primary social influence has been the cultural values and beliefs of their country of current residence .21 These individuals include anti-federalists, fundamentalists, political extremists, and sovereign citizens .
Status quo solves bioterror - DOD solves and mitigates the impact
Jennifer L. Robison 12 , LTC in the US Army, Building Civilian-Military Collaboration to
Enhance Response Following an Anthrax Release, 4/5/12, US Army College, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a592823.pdf ||RS
Protecting
the Homeland and Defense Support of
Civilian Authorities have been longstanding missions for the military and will remain a priority
.
DoD is uniquely capable of augmenting local and state entities in the case of a bioterror event
.
As local public health departments face the challenges of multiple competing missions and decreasing federal and state funding, they will have to turn to coalition building to augment services and resources
, especially in time of disaster.
Local DoD installation leadership and personnel are prepared to support the communities in which they are located.
Building partnerships and coalitions, forging joint councils, developing mutual aid agreements and MOAs, and providing realistic training exercises will prepare these civilian-military communities
to respond to disasters together to decrease the morbidity and mortality from a catastrophic event
.
The unique challenges of CBRN response, including the timely distribution of medical countermeasures in the event of a deliberate anthrax release, have been addressed by the federal CBRN Response Enterprise. These federal and National Guard units are prepared to rapidly deploy
as requested when local and state resources are overwhelmed.
Collaborative agreements and synchronizations must continue at local, state and federal level to optimize emergency response plans
with regards to CBRN incidents.
DoD capabilities can provide key manpower augmentation, logistical support, and subject matter expertise especially with bioterror preparedness planning and distribution of MCMs in the event
of

a deliberate anthrax release.
Mitigation can result from early assistance from DoD partners at all levels
in a truly whole of nation effort.
DoD is committed to providing DSCA to save lives and decrease the pain and suffering of American citizens in the case of a catastrophic event.
DoD’s support to civilian authorities and the ongoing cooperation at the local, state, and federal levels will: improve disaster response plans, bolster homeland defense, support vital national
20 security interests, and increase the publics’ trust and confidence in our government
, military, and public health agencies.
Technology barriers and distribution fails
Keller 13
– (Rebecca, 7 March 2013, Analyst at Stratfor, “Bioterrorism and the Pandemic Potential,” Stratfor, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/bioterrorism-and-pandemic-potential)
The risk of an accidental release of H5N1 is similar to that of other infectious pathogens currently being studied. Proper safety standards are key
, of course, and experts in the field have had a year to determine the best way to proceed, balancing safety and research benefits
.
Previous work with the virus was conducted at biosafety level three out of four, which requires researchers wearing respirators and disposable gowns to work in pairs in a negative pressure environment. While many of these labs are part of universities, access is controlled either through keyed entry or even palm scanners. There are roughly 40 labs that submitted to the voluntary ban. Those wishing to resume work after the ban was lifted must comply with guidelines requiring strict national oversight and close communication and collaboration with national authorities.
The risk of release either through accident or theft cannot be completely eliminated, but given the established parameters the risk is minimal . The use of the pathogen as a biological weapon requires an assessment of whether a non-state actor would have the capabilities to isolate the virulent strain, then weaponize and distribute it
. Stratfor has long held the position that while terrorist organizations may have rudimentary capabilities regarding biological weapons, the likelihood of a successful attack is very low. Given that the laboratory version of H5N1 – or any
influenza virus, for that matter – is a contagious pathogen, there would be two possible modes that a non-state actor would have to instigate an attack. The virus could be refined and then aerosolized and released into a populated area, or an individual could be infected with the virus and sent to
freely circulate within a population. There are severe constraints that make success using either of these methods unlikely. The technology needed to refine and aerosolize a pathogen for a biological attack is beyond the capability of most non-state actors. Even if they were able to develop a weapon, other factors such as wind patterns and humidity can render an attack ineffective
. Using a human carrier is a less expensive method, but it requires that the biological agent be a contagion. Additionally, in order to infect the large number of people necessary to start an outbreak, the infected carrier must be mobile while contagious, something that is doubtful with a serious disease like small pox. The carrier also cannot be visibly ill because that would limit the necessary human contact.
There’s no motive for bioterror
Mauroni 12
– Al Mauroni, Air Force senior policy analyst, “Nuclear Terrorism: Are We Prepared?”, Homeland Security Affairs, http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=8.1.9
The popular assumption is that terrorists are actively working with “rogue nations” to exploit WMD materials and technology, or bidding for materials and technology on some nebulous global black market. They might be buying access to scientists and engineers who used to work on state WMD programs. The historical record doesn’t demonstrate that.
An examination of any of the past annual reports of the National Counterterrorism Center reveals that the basic modus operandi of terrorists and insurgents is to use conventional military weapons, easily acquired commercial (or improvised) explosives, and knives and machetes
.8 It is relatively easy to

train laypersons to use military firearms
, such as the AK-47 automatic rifle and the RPG-7 rocket launcher.
These groups have technical experts who develop improvised explosive devices using available and accessible materials from the local economy. Conventional weapons have known weapon effects and minimal challenges in handling and storing. Terrorists get their material and technology where they can. They don’t have the time, funds, or interests to get exotic
. It’s what we see, over and over again.

Police misconduct is causing broad anti-police coalitions—destroy cooperation or trust
Obeidallah, ’14, (Dean, “Michael Brown, Gaza, and Muslim Americans,” The Daily Beast,
08.20.14, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/08/20/michael-brown-gaza-andmuslim-americans.html)//erg
The Muslim-American community of which I’m part hasn’t been great in standing up with and for African Americans. A lack of empathy and racism are the main culprits. What makes this especially astonishing is that 30 percent of the Muslim-American population is African-American. You would think that there would be natural alliances, but that hasn’t been the case. At least not up until now.
The shooting of Michael Brown and the heavy-handed response by the police that followed has struck a nerve among Muslims. It has motivated American-Muslim leaders to speak out publicly in ways we hadn’t seen before on police misconduct
directed against African Americans. Why? A few reasons. But one that can’t be discounted is Gaza. More specifically, young Palestinians who commented on Twitter about the shooting of Michael Brown drew direct connections between the two. For example, Inas Safadi, a
Palestinian living in Gaza, tweeted: “Revolution of #Ferguson, can’t be prouder of these people who won’t let their son’s blood go for nothing #MikeBrown.” Another tweeted a photo of himself holding a sign that read, “The Palestinian people know what means to be shot while unarmed for your ethnicity” #Ferguson #justice.” Other Palestinians, including a doctor, even offered advice via Twitter to the protesters in Ferguson on how to deal with the tear gas being fired at them based on their own experiences with Israeli security forces. Comments included, “Don’t keep much distance from the police, if you’re close to them they can’t tear gas. To
#Ferguson from #Palestine.” Another tweeted: “Always make sure to run against the wind/to keep calm when you’re teargased, the pain will pass, don’t rub your eyes! #Ferguson Solidarity.”
The support by Palestinians for Brown and the protesters is not surprising. Oppressed people often stand together in solidarity.
That’s why it has amazed me and so many other Muslim Americans that we don’t see broad support in our community for the broader struggles of African Americans. Instead, I have personally heard, from Muslim friends who are black, tales of racism directed toward them by other Muslims, such as being made to feel unwelcome when visiting a new mosque or not having more leadership positions in national Muslim organizations. A growing number of
Muslim Americans are pushing back
against this type of racism. One is Margari Aziza Hill, an African-American Muslim who serves as programming director of the Muslim Anti-Racism
Collaborative. Hill told me that after Trayvon Martin was shot in 2012, she called on her fellow Muslims to take a stand demanding justice but was met with silence.
Alt cause to Muslim American/immigrant cooperation—police misconduct and racism
Akbar, ’10, (Farah, Teaching Fellow (TESOL). Education, Teaching and Leadership (ETL)
University of Edinburgh, “City's Muslims Report Harassment by Police,” Gotham Gazette, Jan
04, 2010, http://www.gothamgazette.com/index.php/civil-rights/4276-citys-muslims-reportharassment-by-police)//erg
Coming from a family with members who work in law enforcement, Yasmin Nasser used to look at police officers as honest, upstanding and there to protect all members of society. Today, though, Nasser said, she feels uneasy when she walks by cops and, for a brief period, tried staying away from them altogether. The 20-year-old American citizen who resides in Saudi Arabia had come to
New York City to visit family. Her trust in New York City's finest eroded the day she claims a police officer pulled her by the arm, told her to leave Rockefeller Center, where she had gone to see the
Christmas tree, and called her a "terrorist
."
She was asked to provide identification to the officer, was subsequently accused of having phony identification and allegedly told,
"Leave you terrorist, you shouldn't be here."
"
It's so hard for me to believe that a cop

could do this
," said the Muslim woman who covers her head with the traditional headscarf (hijab) worn by some women who follow the Islamic faith. "I couldn't get over it. I was in shock," she said. Nasser has reported the matter to the Council of American
Islamic Relations and plans on filing a report with the city Civilian Complaint Review Board once she returns to Saudi Arabia.
She fears that making a complaint prior to her departure could disrupt her travel plans.
Advocates say that Nasser's story is not an isolated incident. Monami Maulik, executive director of Desis Rising Up And Moving
(DRUM), an immigrants' rights organization in Jackson Heights, said that she has heard many similar stories.
Several other organizations say police harassment of Muslims is a genuine problem.
Encounters with Police
The Council of American Islamic Relations analyzed civil rights cases
in 2008 by circumstances of occurrence. The group found encounters with police ranked sixth, following schools and prison
.
"Underreporting of hate crimes and police misconduct cases remains a real issue with American Muslims," said the council's New
York civil rights director Aliya Latif. Since the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks, law enforcement officials have worked on building a cooperative relationship with the American Muslim community in an effort to obtain valuable information related to terrorism and safety issues.
Muslim groups worry that allegations of misconduct by law enforcement damage the fragile ties between the two groups.
"We are concerned that incidents like these further alienate community members and contribute to an atmosphere of mistrust with law enforcement authorities
," Latif said. Edina Lekovic, communications director for the Muslim Public
Affairs Council, agrees. "The evidence of any problem with law enforcement undermines any cooperation they may seek from Muslims
," she said. "Even if there is a perception of harassment
, it very naturally leads individuals to be cautious and reluctant to seek help from law enforcement, let alone report any suspicious activity
." A police officer, though, may see the situation differently. "
Police officers may not always realize how they have come across to a civilian," said Graham Daw, a spokesperson for the Civilian Complaint Review Board, the all-civilian board that investigates civil complaints about alleged misconduct on the part of the New York City Police Department. "Civilians are not always aware of the pressures under which police officers work or the powers with which they are vested in order to do their job." The New York City Police
Department was contacted numerous times to comment on this issue but did not respond. According to DRUM, many
Muslims have complained about being randomly approached by members of law enforcement in their own neighborhoods and apartment buildings and being asked about their whereabouts and about what they did for a living.
Maulik said that her organization has received hundreds of accounts of cases regarding police misconduct since Sept. 11, many from blue-collar workers such as street vendors and taxi drivers. She also hears stories from youth.
Immigrant harassment tanks cooperation
Akbar, ’10, (Farah, Teaching Fellow (TESOL). Education, Teaching and Leadership (ETL)
University of Edinburgh, “City's Muslims Report Harassment by Police,” Gotham Gazette, Jan
04, 2010, http://www.gothamgazette.com/index.php/civil-rights/4276-citys-muslims-reportharassment-by-police)//erg
Slurs and Questions In 2006, DRUM and the Urban Justice Center Community Development Project surveyed 662 South Asian youths living in Queens, most of them Bangladeshi and Pakistani Muslims, about the impact of school safety policies on them. The report revealed that nearly a third of the youths reported having seen harassment by police officers or experienced harassment
. The study defined harassment to include "verbal abuse or harassment such as racial slurs and names, yelling and cursing; physical abuse or harassment, including physical harm, grabbing, pushing, forcing to do something the person does not want to do; and intimidation, including asking for identification or calling over for no reason, threatening to report person or their family to immigration and bullying."
"Since 9/11, there are a lot more security agents and police," said one young person. "
They treat us differently."
"There is more hatred against South Asians [post 9/11]. The police pay more attention to you; they think you are suspicious.
They wait for you to screw up,"
said another. DRUM received a report on one incident in which a teenage

girl who wore a hijab on the streets of Times Square was allegedly asked by a police officer if she was a terrorist. Ayesha Mahmooda, who works with DRUM, spoke to at least 100 South Asian families in Flushing during an outreach effort and found many reported experiencing harassment by law enforcement. She said that many South Asians described feeling scared while being questioned by officers. She mentioned the case of a
Muslim man who was questioned by law enforcement officials inside his own apartment. They asked him numerous personal questions, such as where he was born, what his immigration status was and if he smelled anything funny in his building, an apparent reference to possible bomb-making activities.
An alarmed South Asian woman asking Mahmooda why her husband was stopped and questioned by law enforcement on his way home from working the late shift. "I told her that it was because of the color of his skin, he is not white. He is a person of color," Mahmooda said. A Reluctance to
Protest
Those questioned are often afraid to protest
, according to DRUM. Latif of CAIR, though, urges
Muslims to exercise their right to have a lawyer present if questioned by the FBI or police. "Refusing to answer questions without an attorney present cannot be held against you and does not imply that you have something to hide," she said. Few Muslims take their cases to the Civilian Complaint Review Board. Of the 14 allegations of offensive language based on religion reported to the board in
2008, only two involved Muslims or Islam, and the board was unable to conduct a full investigation in either case. One complaint was withdrawn by the complainant, and the complainant in the other case did not respond to requests to be interviewed by board.
"100 percent of the cases that we've ever gotten, no one has ever called the CCRB," says Maulik. "We really don't have faith in the
CCRB. It is not a mechanism that has worked for many years in New York, so for the most part, Muslim immigrants don't call the
CCRB and file complaints.
People do not think the board will hold police accountable for harassment or profiling
, she said adding that
Muslims who are undocumented immigrants are particularly hesitant to report any instances of misconduct to the complaint board
.
Instead, she said, they live their lives in fear.
Daw said the board would be glad to make a presentation to the Muslim community to educate them about its work, but Monami has no plans of reaching out to them. She has been working on a project to create a formal complaint process with CUNY School of Law. Lekovic of the Muslim Public Affairs Council encourages Muslims to report all instances of misconduct to whomever they feel comfortable with, whether it be to Muslim organizations or city agencies .
"Without individuals sharing their experiences, we do not have leverage to make change," she said. Meanwhile, Yasmin Nasser thinks about what happened to her on her most recent visit to New York. "People in Saudi Arabia ask if people discriminate in New
York City, and I always say 'people are nice,'" said Yasmin Nasser. When she lands in Saudi Arabia this time, though, she may offer a different answer.
Relations/trust is horrible—especially in the context of ICE
TORRENS, ’15, (CLAUDIA, “Immigration officials see danger as local cooperation wanes,”
Washington Times, Associated Press, March 10, 2015, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/mar/10/immigration-officials-laws-limitingdetainers-risk/?page=all)//erg
NEW YORK (AP) -
Diminished local cooperation is putting federal immigration officers in dangerous situations as they track down foreign-born criminals
, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement officials say. They say that more of their officers are out on the streets, eating up resources, because cities and states have passed legislation that limits many of the detention requests issued by immigration authorities.
For years
, ICE has issued the detainers to local and state law enforcement agencies, asking them to hold immigrants for up to 48 hours after they were scheduled for release from jail. Most detainees are then either taken into federal custody to face an immigration judge or be deported.
But more than 300 counties and cities, plus California, Connecticut, Illinois, Rhode Island and the District of Columbia, have chosen to release immigrants, claiming too many people who have committed low-level offenses or no crime at all were being deported and unnecessarily separated from their families. Courts have said that honoring detainers without probable cause could result in a civil rights offense. ICE insists that its priorities have changed and it is only focused on foreign-born criminals who are a threat to society.
It deported nearly 316,000 people in fiscal year 2014. In the first eight months of 2014, immigration officers filed roughly 105,000 requests for local enforcement agencies to hold immigrants, but local agencies declined 8,800 of the requests, according to data provided by immigration authorities.
Officers now face more danger because they can’t just pick up foreign-born criminals in a safe environment like the Rikers Island jail, said Christopher Shanahan, field office director for Enforcement and Removal Operations in New York. “We

are in a situation in which we have to provide more men, more workers, more manpower in the streets, where it is more dangerous to take custody of somebody,” said Shanahan. “On the street, when you go into a house, a place of employment, when you are arresting somebody, you don’t know if they have weapons, you don’t know the surroundings.” Last week, an Associated Press reporter and photographer accompanied officers as they conducted a series of early-morning arrests in the Bronx and Manhattan, part of a nationally-coordinated operation that netted 2,059 people. A half-dozen ICE officers met at 5:30 a.m. in the parking lot of a
Bronx coffee shop, put on black bulletproof vests and reviewed the three people they would try to arrest that morning. After driving quickly to each location in unmarked cars with sirens blaring, they made two arrests: a Mexican man and a Dominican man accused of illegally re-entering into the country, which is considered a high priority for ICE. The Mexican man had been arrested 10 times by local police for driving without a license and then deported. The man, who was not identified per Department of Homeland Security policy, re-entered the U.S. illegally and then was accused of menacing a neighbor with a machete.
ICE said it had issued a detainer for the man that was not honored by the city.
Aff can’t solve police brutality and racial profiling—alt causes to community trust
Nittle, ’12, (Nadra Kareem, “Latinos on the Receiving End of Racial Profiling and Police
Brutality,” Race Relations: The Legal System, 2012, http://racerelations.about.com/od/thelegalsystem/a/Latinos-On-The-Receiving-End-Of-
Racial-Profiling-And-Police-Brutality.htm)//erg
In the early 21st century, there have not only been a growing number of hate crimes against
Latinos but also a growing number of police misconduct cases involving Latinos.
Racism, xenophobia and rising concerns about undocumented immigration have collectively led to greater incidences of law enforcement agents racially profiling, harassing and brutalizing
Hispanics. Across the nation, police departments have made headlines for their mistreatment
of Latinos. Discrimination Border Patrol Officer Police Latinos Police Illegal Search Car
These cases have not only involved undocumented immigrants but also
Hispanic Americans and permanent legal residents
. In states as diverse as Connecticut, California and Arizona, Latinos have suffered at the hands of police in egregious manners. Latinos Targeted in Maricopa County
Racial profiling. Unlawful detainment. Stalking.
These are some of the inappropriate and illegal behaviors
that officers in Arizona have allegedly engaged in, according to a 2012 complaint the U.S. Justice Department filed against the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office. MCSO officers stopped Latino drivers anywhere from four to nine times more than other drivers, in some cases only to detain them for long periods
. In one instance, MCSCO officers pulled over a car with four Latino men inside. The driver hadn’t violated any traffic laws, but the officers proceeded to force him and his passengers out of the car and make them wait on the curb, zip-tied, for an hour. The
Justice Department also detailed incidents where the authorities followed Hispanic women to their homes and roughed them up
. The federal government also alleges that Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio routinely failed to investigate cases of sexual assault against Hispanic women.
The aforementioned cases refer to police interaction with Latinos on the streets of Maricopa
County, but inmates in the county jail have also suffered at the hands of law enforcement.
Female prisoners have been denied feminine hygiene products and called derogatory names. Hispanic male inmates have been on the receiving end of racial slurs and put downs such as “wetbacks” and “stupid Mexicans.”

Withdrawal alt cause—also proves that their “law enforcement” spillover claim is non-unique
Theodore 13 [Nik, PhD, Professor at UIC Department of Urban Planning and Policy, BA
Macalester College (1986); MUPP, University of Illinois at Chicago (1989); PhD, University of
Illinois at Chicago (2000), Insecure Communities: Latino Perceptions of Police Involvement in
Immigration Enforcement, May 2013, http://www.policylink.org/sites/default/files/INSECURE_COMMUNITIES_REPORT_FINAL.
PDF] alla
2.
Withdrawal: Many Latinos feel isolated and admit to withdrawing from their community
. A large share feels under suspicion
and is afraid to leave their homes. This sense of withdrawal by a substantial portion of Latinos in the counties surveyed has short- and long-term negative consequences for public safety and community life
.
In the short term, crimes become more difficult to solve as the social distance between police and residents increases.
Over the long term, a significant segment of the population may withdraw and develop a fear of law enforcement authorities.
Alt causes – local enforcement, 287(g) program, and SAFE act.
Matthew Kolodziej 9-13-20 13 , author for Immigration Impact, Immigration Impact, “Local
Immigration Enforcement Harms Community Policing and Public Safety,” http://immigrationimpact.com/2013/09/13/local-immigration-enforcement-harmscommunity-policing-and-public-safety/
The Prince William County study cited by CIS does not conclude that the implementation of the
287(g) program had no chilling effect on crime reporting by immigrants. To the contrary, it concludes that 287(g) “created fear and a sense of being unwelcome among immigrants in general, and it seems to have caused some legal immigrants, or Hispanics generally, to leave or avoid the County ”. The program created “a serious ethnic gap in perception of the police, ratings of the County as a place to live, and trust in the local government;
Hispanic opinions on these matters plunged to unprecedented lows .” The study states
“police officers express concern that crimes against illegal immigrants are less likely to be reported, and the department knows of specific crimes in the Hispanic community that were not reported to police.” Officers thought that crime reporting was inhibited by the policy and community informants were unanimous in saying that crime victims or witnesses who were not citizens and did not speak English well would not report crimes . (See this documentary for information on the Prince William County experience.) The other studies CIS cites also contradict their own claims, or don’t address how fear of police affects crime reporting.
The 2001 survey by Davis, Erez and Avitabile (the title is not given but the citation is probably meant to refer to Access to Justice for Immigrants Who are Victimized: The Perspectives of
Police and Prosecutors) concludes that fear of deportation does in fact deter immigrants from reporting crimes, but does not claim to measure the effect of enforcement policies. The 2008
Bureau of Justice Statistics data simply provides statistics on crime reporting by different racial groups, and says nothing about how reporting might be affected by fear of police or of immigration enforcement. Academic studies and major police associations agree that that local immigration enforcement programs create fear and distrust between immigrant communities and local police and threaten public safety.
Most recently, a 2013 report

from the University of Illinois found that more than four in ten Latinos say that they are less likely to volunteer information about crimes because local police have become more involved in immigration enforcement , and they are afraid of immigration consequences for themselves or for family or friends. According to a 2009 report by the Police Foundation, the majority of police executives did not see the benefit of local police participating in immigration enforcement because public safety would suffer due to damage to trust and communication with immigrant communities and would undermine community policing efforts and lead to racial profiling. The Major City Chiefs Association also opposes local immigration enforcement because it undermines the trust and cooperation with immigrant communities which are essential elements of community oriented policing .
The enforcement of immigration laws is also very expensive for local communities, contrary to the anecdotal claims by CIS. A report by the Brookings Institute found that Prince William
County, Va., had to raise property taxes and take from its “rainy day” fund to implement its
287(g) program. The report found the program cost $6.4 million in its first year and would cost
$26 million over five years. A report by the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and The
Latino Migration Project found the total cost for the first year of operating the 287(g) program in Mecklenburg County, N.C., to be $5.5 million. Meanwhile, costs for the first full year of operation in Alamance County, N.C., were found to be $4.8 million. Increasingly local law enforcement authorities , like those in Chicago, New York, New Jersey and New Orleans, are declining to participate in aspects of immigration enforcement in the interest of strengthening relations with immigrant populations and creating safer communities.
They recognize that local immigration enforcement is not just expensive, it encourages racial profiling , undermines community safety, and ultimately contributes little to apprehending violent criminals . Enforcement programs like 287(g) and extreme legislative proposals such as the SAFE act that impose immigration enforcement on local governments divide the communities they claim to protect and work against the law enforcement objectives they claim to pursue.

No internal link to bioterror – their author is in the context of small attacks.
International Association of Chiefs of Police, IACP, 14 , a dynamic organization that serves as the professional voice of law enforcement, 2014, Using Community Policing to Counter Violent
Extremism, http://www.theiacp.org/Portals/0/documents/pdfs/Final%20Key%20Principles%20Guide.pdf
The targets of violent extremist attacks are just as diverse as the ideologies and are not limited to
“spectacular,” high-casualty attacks . Instead, plotters identify “soft targets” in open areas that offer the ability to get in and out easily . S oft targets are generally fixed locations or structures that hold a large number of unprotected civilians or symbolize economic prosperity, religious freedom, and business .These targets include shopping malls and movie theaters, bars and restaurants, schools, places of worship, office buildings and business districts, stadiums and other large venues, and hotels . From 2001 to 2011 , the most common targets of terrorists in the United States were businesses and private citizens and property .24 An increasing number of attacks have also targeted military recruitment centers because they tend to be less secure than military bases . Personnel at these centers and other offduty military personnel have also become popular targets because they tend to be unarmed and may be less expectant .They also have a symbolic meaning for those groups with anti-American sentiments . By expanding their interests to include smaller-scale attacks against political, economic, symbolic, and infrastructure targets, these individuals and groups have adopted the mentality that staging a successful attack doesn’t depend on size .25
This increase in potential targets requires that communities and law enforcement agencies remain vigilant .
The Aff cant solve—too many other things go into prevention AND the aff doesn’t focus on how to respond (could be a cp card)
Hamburg 02 [Margaret A. Hamburg, Commissioner of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration,
“Preparing for and Preventing Bioterrorism”, http://issues.org/18-2/p_hamburg/] JMOV
Developing a response
¶
Although there are enormous challenges before us, many of the elements of a comprehensive approach are relatively straightforward. Some of the necessary activities are already under way, though they may need to be expanded or reconfigured; other programs and policies still need to be developed and implemented.
¶
Perhaps most fundamental to an effective response is the understanding that public health is an important pillar in the national security framework and that public health professionals must be full partners on the
U.S. security team
. In fact, the president should appoint a public health expert to the National
Security Council
, and Governor Ridge must include public health experts among his key staff in his new Office of Homeland
Security.
¶
Today, e xperts agree that there is an urgent need to increase the core capacities of the public health system to detect, track, and contain infectious disease.
State and local public health departments represent the backbone of our ability to respond effectively to a major outbreak of disease, including a bioterrorist attack
. Yet these public health agencies have never been adequately supported or equipped to fulfill this mission.
In fact, many hesitate to call the array of health structures at the state, county, and local level a public health “system,” because years of relative neglect and underfunding have left them undercapitalized, fragmented, and uncoordinated.
¶
Upgrading current public health capacities will require

significantly increased and sustained new investments. First and foremost, this means providing resources to strengthen and extend effective surveillance systems that can rapidly detect and investigate unusual clusters of symptoms or disease. This will entail expanding and strengthening local epidemiologic capabilities, including trained personnel and increasing laboratory capacity to rapidly analyze and identify biological agents. In addition, communication systems, including computer links, must be improved to facilitate collection, analysis, and sharing of information among public health and other officials at local, state, and federal levels. Beyond these critical domestic needs, successful strategies must also include a renewed commitment to improving
global public health.
¶
To improve detection, i t is essential that physicians and other health care workers be trained to recognize unusual disease or clusters of symptoms that may be manifestations of a bioterroist attack. This must also include strengthening the relationship between medicine and public health so that physicians understand their responsibility to report disease or unusual symptoms to the public health department
. Physicians must know whom to call and be confident that their call will contribute to the overall goal of providing information, guidance, and support to the medical community. Health care professional organizations, academic medical institutions, and public health officials must come together to develop appropriate training curricula, informational guidelines, and most important, the working partnerships that are critical to success.
¶
Those same partnerships will be very important in addressing another critical concern: the urgent need to develop emergency plans for a surge of patients in the nation’s hospitals.
We must enhance systems to support mass medical care and develop innovative strategies to deliver both protective and treatment measures under mass casualty and/or exposure conditions
, especially when there may be an additional set of very difficult infection-control requirements as well. This will require careful advance planning since most hospitals are operating at or near capacity right now. Systematic examination of local capabilities and how they can be rapidly augmented by state and federal assets must be part of this effort.
¶
Federal health leadership will be important in this effort to define needs and provide model guidelines and standards; federal resources may also be essential to support planning efforts and to create the incentives necessary to bring the voluntary and private health care sector fully on board. However, the final planning process must be undertaken on the local or regional level
, engaging all the essential community partners and capabilities. It is critical to remember that the front line of response
, even in a national crisis, is always local
. Thus, across all these domains of activity, we must make sure that we have adequate capacity locally and regionally, which can then be supplemented as needed.¶ Another important example of this involves access to essential drugs and vaccines. A large-scale release of a biological weapon may require rapid access to quantities of antibiotics, vaccines, or antidotes that would not be routinely available in the locations affected. Given that such an attack is a low probability and unpredictable event in any given place, it would hardly be sensible or cost effective to stockpile supplies at the local level.¶ The first step in blocking the proliferation and use of biological weapons is to significantly bolster our intelligence.¶ As we ramp up our public health and medical capacity to respond to bioterrorism, we should continue to strengthen our national pharmaceutical stockpile so that vital drugs and equipment can be rapidly mobilized as needed. The federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has the responsibility to maintain and oversee use of this stockpile, which currently represents a cache of supplies located in strategic locations across the country that can be delivered within 12 hours to any place in the nation. Current concerns make it clear that the nature and quantities of materials maintained in the stockpile must be enhanced, and the stockpile contents should be periodically reviewed and adjusted in response to intelligence about credible threats. New investments in the stockpile should also include contractual agreements with pharmaceutical manufacturer’s to ensure extra production capability for drugs and vaccines in a crisis as well as heightened security at the various storage and dispersal sites.¶ Beyond simply having the drugs and vaccines available, we must develop plans for how those critical supplies will be distributed to those who need them. CDC needs to provide strong leadership and support for state and local health departments to undertake contingency planning for distribution. We must also think about the broader mobilization of essential drugs, vaccines, or other materials in the event that they are needed outside the United States. Although this may raise complex diplomatic issues, especially when the necessary pharmaceutical is in short supply, addressing potential global need is essential for political and disease-control reasons.¶ To make sure that the United States can remain strategically poised, further investments must be made in biomedical research to develop new drugs, vaccines, rapid diagnostic tests, and other medical weapons to add to the arsenal against bioterrorism.
We must learn more about the fundamental questions of how these organisms cause disease and how the human immune system responds so that we can develop better treatments and disease-containment strategies
. It is also essential that we improve technologies to rapidly detect biological agents from environmental samples and develop new strategies and technologies to protect the health of the public.
¶
Scientists will need the full support and encouragement of the public and the government confront this threat. Success will entail research endeavors and collaboration involving numerous government agencies, universities, and private companies. Looking to the future, an effective, well-funded research agenda may give us the tools to render the threat of biological weapons obsolete.
¶
An ounce of prevention
¶
Stopping a biological attack before it happens is obviously the most desirable way to avoid a crisis.
The first step in blocking the proliferation and use of biological weapons is to significantly bolster our intelligence.
The intelligence community could use additional scientific and medical expertise to help enhance the quality of data collection and analysis.
This will require greater partnership and trust between the intelligence community, law enforcement, and public health and biomedical science.
These disciplines do not routinely work together, and their professional cultures and practices are not easily merged. Nonetheless
, greater coordination of effort is very important to our national defense and must be an element of our nation’s developing homeland security strategy.
¶
Sadly, we must recognize that the possibility of bioweapons threats emerging from legitimate biological research is certainly real and embedded in the very science and technology that we herald in laboratories around the world. Vigilance is needed to ensure that the tools of modern genomic biology are not used to create new and more dangerous organisms. This is a complex challenge, for no one would want to impede the progress of

legitimate and important science. However, we also have a responsibility to face up to a very real set of concerns.
With leadership from the scientific community, we must begin to examine what opportunities may exist to constructively reduce this threat.
¶ Related to this, we must continue to reduce access to dangerous pathogens by helping the scientific community improve security and ensure the safe storage and handling of these materials.
Over the past five years, new regulations and requirements have tightened access to biological materials from culture collections in the United States and strengthened the government’s ability to monitor the shipping and receipt of dangerous pathogens through a registration process, which also requires disclosure of the intended use for the agents. These are important steps, but more can and should be done to assure that our nation’s laboratories have adequate oversight of the use and storage of these materials
.
¶
International cooperation will be essential to achieving these goals. The safety and control methods developed for domestic must be extended across the globe if they are to make a real and enduring difference.
Coupled with this, we should enhance efforts to provide socially useful research opportunities to scientists who had been employed in the Soviet Union’s bioweapons program.
Many of these scientists are under- or unemployed, and it is in our interest to see that economic need does not drive them to peddle their knowledge to potential terrorists.
We must also support efforts to help them secure or destroy potentially dangerous materials. The U.S. government has supported such efforts through the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, but these programs desperately need to be strengthened and expanded. Opportunities to extend the reach of the program to include university and industry R & D collaborations will also be essential to long-term success.
¶
In the final analysis, it may prove impossible to prevent future bioweapons attacks from occurring, but planning and preparation could greatly mitigate the death and suffering that would result. As a nation, we need comprehensive, integrated planning for how we will address the threat of bioterrorism, focusing both on prevention and response.
We need to define the relative roles and responsibilities of the different agencies involved, and identify the mechanisms by which the various levels of government will interact and work together. The new Office of Homeland Security is well situated to take on this task. Congress and the president must give this office the resources and authority necessary to develop and implement protective measures. Likewise, federal officials must vigorously pursue interantional cooperation in this effort.
¶
The United States has always been willing to meet the requirements and pay the bills when it came to our defense systems and security needs. We must now be willing to do the same when it comes to funding critical public health needs. Public health has too often received short shrift in our planning and public funding. This must change. Congress and the public need to understand that strengthening disease surveillance, improving medical consequence management, and supporting fundamental and applied research will be essential in responding to a biological weapons attack in this nation or anywhere in the world. These investments will also enhance our efforts to protect the health and safety of the public from naturally occurring disease.
We have a chance to defend the nation against its adversaries and improve the public health system with the same steps.
We cannot afford not to do this.
¶

States and local law enforcement can just raid places—MOU doesn’t check— plan can’t solve
Theodore 13 [Nik, PhD, Professor at UIC Department of Urban Planning and Policy, BA
Macalester College (1986); MUPP, University of Illinois at Chicago (1989); PhD, University of
Illinois at Chicago (2000), Insecure Communities: Latino Perceptions of Police Involvement in
Immigration Enforcement, May 2013, http://www.policylink.org/sites/default/files/INSECURE_COMMUNITIES_REPORT_FINAL.
PDF] alla
IIRIRA also revised Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act to authorize the U.S. Attorney General to enter into written memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with state and local law enforcement authorities to formally involve them in immigration enforcement .3 The IIRIRA states that “ the Attorney General may enter into a written agreement with a State, or any political subdivision of a State, pursuant to which an officer or employee of the State or subdivision, who is determined by the Attorney
General to be qualified to perform a function of an immigration officer in relation to the investigation, apprehension or detention of aliens in the United States …, may carry out such function at the expense of the State or political subdivision and to extent consistent with State and local law .”4 Should a state or local law enforcement agency consent to entering into an MOU , officers must receive training in federal immigration law, the agency must provide written certification that officers are trained in immigration law, and any officer who engages in immigration enforcement is subject to the direction and supervision of the US Department of Homeland Security. According to US Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), as of December 31, 2012, more than 1,300 state and local law enforcement officers in 19 states have been trained and certified to enforce immigration law, and the budget devoted to 287(g) agreements has increased from $5 million in fiscal year 2006 to $68 million in fiscal year 2012 (ICE, 2013a,b).
DOL won’t protect unauthorized workers – empirics
Lee 11 --Acting Professor of Law University of California, Irvine School of La [Stephen,
“Monitoring Immigration Enforcement”, (December 19, 2011). Arizona Law Review, Vol. 53,
2011; UC Irvine School of Law Research Paper No. 2012-01. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1974624 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1974624] RS
A question embedded within the interagency monitoring
framework is whether an agency like the DOL can be trusted to protect the interests of unauthorized workers
. Although the
DOL’s primary mission is to protect workers against work-related exploitation, historically, the DOL has privileged the interests of citizen workers over noncitizen workers
. This suggests that
DOL officials might be tempted to shirk their monitoring duties to the extent that a particular

workplace inspection implicates unauthorized workers and only unauthorized workers
. Despite the status-neutral nature of U.S. labor laws, the immigration enforcement origins of the
DOL do give some traction to the concern that it maintains a citizen- centric orientation
.160 At least three reasons help assure that such a distortion, to the extent it exists, will not be overly pronounced.
DOL fails – changes in political administration
Jayesh M. Rathod 11 , Assistant Professor of Law at American University Washington College of Law, Arizona Law Review, Protecting Immigrant Workers Through Interagency Cooperation,
2011, http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/arz53&div=45&g_sent=1&collection=j ournals ||RS
T he proposed interagency monitoring agreement must
also consider
the political winds that might dampen the DOL's enthusiasm to embrace an ex ante oversight role
.
Unlike some agencies
, where bureaucratization has solidified certain core operations, the posture of the DOL has varied dramatically depending on the administration in power. For example
, during the George W.
Bush
administration, the federal government was largely silent about the 1998
Memorandum of Understanding ("
MOU
") between the DOL and the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS"), with advocates questioning its ongoing applicability.14 During the Bush administration, the DOL scaled back its 15 enforcement activities
. Within some DOL subagencies, voluntary compliance 16
Ideally , any interagency monitoring agreement would be insulated from the political whims of appointees who might choose to let their oversight authority languish. This could be accomplished through the creation of an external advisory committee or by requiring periodic reportsfrom the DOL and DHS-that assess the effectiveness of the agreement
Interagency monitoring fails – vague language
Jayesh M. Rathod 11 , Assistant Professor of Law at American University Washington College of Law, Arizona Law Review, Protecting Immigrant Workers Through Interagency Cooperation,
2011, http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/arz53&div=45&g_sent=1&collection=j ournals ||RS
Lee's article effectively describes the purpose and broad contours of
an interagency monitoring agreement between the DOL and ICE relating to worksite enforcement
.
One type of arrangement
that Lee describes involves "requir[ing] ICE to obtain permission from the DOL before investigating
a particular workplace."35 Lee's intriguing proposal invites additional thinking about exactly how such an arrangement would be structured. Below,
I share a few initial queries and offer further content to
Lee's proposa l. Let me begin with a few threshold questions. First, when exercised, what exactly would the DOL
"pre-clearance power" look like? Would the DOL be able to prevent ICE enforcement actions
from taking place? Or would the DOL's interests simply mean that ICE enforcement actions will be delayed
for a fixed period of time? Second, what type of circumstance flagged by the
DOL would be sufficient
to chill action by ICE? Would a single complaint brought by an individual worker suffice?
Would the complaint have to be brought by a worker or workers who are being targeted

by ICE in the enforcement action? (
And would such information be knowable in most cases?)
Or, would the
DOL speak with more authority vis-d-vis ICE if the employer had already been found to have violated certain workplace laws?
Plan is ineffective and gets circumvented - the MOU isn’t legally binding
Freeman and Rossi 12 - Archibald Cox Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. Professor
Freeman worked on a number of policy initiatives described in this Article when she served as
Counselor for Energy and Climate Change in the White House in 2009–2010. The discussion of these examples is based exclusively on documents available to the public. ∗ ∗ Harry M.
Walborsky Professor and Associate Dean for Research, Florida State University College of Law
[Jody and Jim, “AGENCY COORDINATION IN SHARED REGULATORY SPACE” VOLUME 125
MARCH 2012 NUMBER 5 http://harvardlawreview.org/wpcontent/uploads/pdfs/vol125_freeman_rossi.pdf]RMT
The fourth category of MOU listed above describes agreements that typically involve multiple agencies. A good example is a
2009 MOU among nine federal agencies regarding the siting of electric transmission lines on federal lands
.152 The example merits detailed discussion because it suggests how
Congress sometimes recognizes coordination problems
and how challenging they can be to address. In
2005, frustrated with long delays in siting large transmission projects
,
Congress instructed
DOE to coordinate the federal permitting process.153 DOE and eight other federal agencies signed an MOU in 2006 to clarify their respective roles
, with DOE retaining lead authority.154 Yet the collective action problem persisted.
The initial MOU had little effect, and permit applicants continued to proceed sequentially, agency by agency, resulting in considerable delays
. The Obama Administration revisited this state of affairs out of concern that transmission projects on federal lands were still proceeding too slowly. After months of negotiation, the nine key agencies signed a new agreement in which they established a process for integrated rather than sequential review. The new MOU does not retain DOE as the lead coordinator but rather specifies that the major land managers — the Department of the Interior (DOI) and USDA — will be the lead agencies for projects on federal lands.155 For all other applications, the MOU provides that the lead agency will be the primary regulator, FERC.
The agreement also establishes clear timelines for agency review and coordination and provides for a single administrative record.156This example illustrates both the benefits and challenges presented by MOUs. By simplifying a multiagency approval process and eliminating needless duplication, interagency agreements can reduce transaction costs for both applicants and agencies.157 And by converting a sequential decisionmaking process into an integrated one with a single record, the agencies can improve the expertise on which their decisions are based. Still,
the fact that a new agreement was necessary at all shows that even when Congress recognizes a collective action problem and instructs agencies to coordinate, agencies sometimes fail to do so
.
Agencies may negotiate MOUs but then let them languish, sometimes for years
.158 Moreover, despite their often being quite detailed and substantive
, these agreements are generally not legally enforceable
.159 And they may prove unstable across administrations, or even throughout the life of a single administration, s ince disgruntled agencies can block implementation simply by refusing to cooperate
. Thus, while MOUs may be promising instruments, their successful implementation may require a central coordinator, especially where agencies are reluctant to agree.

Agency incompetence is an alt cause OR Obama focus means squo solves
Hylton 11 [Wil S. Hylton, New York Times, October 30, 2011, “How Ready Are We for
Bioterrorism?”, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/30/magazine/how-ready-are-we-forbioterrorism.html] JMOV
Even if the leadership and financing for biodefense were to shift toward a national-security framework, the task would still require complex coordination among agencies with expertise in disparate spheres. This challenge is not made easier by the personal
hostility that has emerged among many current program heads — some of whom have close ties to the competing companies they oversee.
In the course of several months of reporting, I heard senior officials from each of the major countermeasure agencies question the motives and professional credentials of the others, sometimes in a manner involving spittle.
At times it seemed that the most virulent pathogen in biodefense was mutual hostility
, and everybody had it.
¶
Senior officials in the Obama administration say that the president is committed to improving coordination on biodefense
and is entering a fourth major overhaul of the countermeasure enterprise. Last year, officials from the countermeasure agencies met weekly with the
White House staff to discuss the merits and drawbacks of the current approach. Officials who attended those meetings say the administration hopes to develop a more “nimble, flexible” program, in which a single drug can treat multiple diseases and a single manufacturing plant can produce multiple drugs. If that plan, after 10 years and hundreds of millions of dollars trying to create a new anthrax vaccine that is still not ready, sounds optimistic, it is. Whether it is also realistic, only time will tell. Critics are quick to note that, three years after taking office, the administration is still holding meetings and announcing bold new plans.
¶
A number of former and current officials also point out that no one in the Obama White House is focused exclusively on biodefense. In both the
Clinton and Bush administrations, there was a biodefense director whose primary job was to coordinate the agencies. Today, there are four senior White House officials with partial responsibility for biodefense, but each of them is also responsible for a raft of other issues, like natural disasters, terrorism and large-scale accidents like the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Whatever you think U.S. biodefense policy should be, it is difficult to imagine that it would not benefit from clear, central leadership. Kenneth Bernard, the biodefense czar in both the Clinton and Bush administrations, told me,
“The only way that you can get all of those people in the room is to call them into the White House, and to have a coordinating group under a single person.”
Robert Kadlec, who was the senior official for biodefense in the second Bush term, said, “Unless someone makes this a priority, it’s a priority for no one.”
¶
Randall Larsen, who first smuggled a tube of weaponized powder into the meeting with Dick Cheney 10 years ago — and went on to become the executive director of the Congressional Commission on Weapons of
Mass Destruction — said:
“Today, there are more than two dozen Senate-confirmed individuals with some responsibility for biodefense. Not one person has it for a full-time job, and no one is in charge.”

The aff’s only internal link is about Latino Populations—they cannot overcome local law enforcement policies and negative perceptions
Theodore 13 [Nik, PhD, Professor at UIC Department of Urban Planning and Policy, BA
Macalester College (1986); MUPP, University of Illinois at Chicago (1989); PhD, University of
Illinois at Chicago (2000), Insecure Communities: Latino Perceptions of Police Involvement in
Immigration Enforcement, May 2013, http://www.policylink.org/sites/default/files/INSECURE_COMMUNITIES_REPORT_FINAL.
PDF] alla
These findings reveal one of the unintended consequences of the involvement of state and local police in immigration enforcement
– a reduction in public safety as Latinos’ mistrust of the police increases as a result of the involvement of police in immigration enforcement.
The following conclusions can be drawn from the survey findings
:
1.
Isolation and disconnectedness from police
: Many
Latinos feel isolated from the law enforcement officers who are sworn to protect them
. More than four in ten say that because police are more involved in enforcing immigration laws they have become less likely to volunteer information about crimes because they fear getting caught in the web of immigration enforcement
themselves or bringing unwanted attention to their family or friends.
Tons of alt causes - their 1ac card.
International Association of Chiefs of Police, IACP, 14 , a dynamic organization that serves as the professional voice of law enforcement, 2014, Using Community Policing to Counter Violent
Extremism, http://www.theiacp.org/Portals/0/documents/pdfs/Final%20Key%20Principles%20Guide.pdf
Engaging Immigrant Communities through Community Policing Law enforcement agencies nationwide have used community policing principles to build bridges with immigrant communities that may be wary of law enforcement because of past experiences in their home country .13 Law enforcement agencies have also used these principles, and continue to use them today, to demonstrate their commitment to balancing the needs of protecting their communities while also protecting individuals from hate crimes and civil rights and liberties violations . However, groups that share, or have been perceived to share, the national background or religions of the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks may still be hesitant to share tips and may be cautious about partnering with law enforcement .
This hesitancy can only be overcome by building trusting relationships, being transparent, and communicating with community members, regardless of their citizenship or immigration status . The principles of community policing extend beyond the residents of a specific community and encompass working in partnership with other government agencies, public and private stakeholders, and faith- and community-based organizations . For example, e nhanced information exchange between local, state, tribal, and federal law enforcement and homeland security partners ; improved partnerships between federal, state, and local officials ; information sharing between law enforcement and private

entities ; and, advances in communications technology and interoperable databases , can all be used to address terrorism and violent extremism .14 Using interoperable databases and sharing information with nonprofits and the private sector provides law enforcement with additional opportunities to prevent violent attacks by extremist individuals and groups .

MOU ineffective – raises costs for agencies
Freeman and Rossi 12 - Archibald Cox Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. Professor
Freeman worked on a number of policy initiatives described in this Article when she served as
Counselor for Energy and Climate Change in the White House in 2009–2010. The discussion of these examples is based exclusively on documents available to the public. ∗ ∗ Harry M.
Walborsky Professor and Associate Dean for Research, Florida State University College of Law
[Jody and Jim, “AGENCY COORDINATION IN SHARED REGULATORY SPACE” VOLUME 125
MARCH 2012 NUMBER 5 http://harvardlawreview.org/wpcontent/uploads/pdfs/vol125_freeman_rossi.pdf]RMT
— At first glance, coordination appears to raise agency decision costs. This observation is certainly true compared to a baseline of agencies deciding policy matters independently. But where agencies share regulatory space, the appropriate baseline should include the cost, or at least the risk, of inconsistency, waste, confusion, and systemic failure to deliver on the putative statutory goals. The actual question is whether coordination reduces these cumulative costs, even if it requires a greater up-front investment of resources. These up-front investments in fact might be substantial.
For example, even the relatively mild procedural consultation requirements described in Part II require the agency to expend time and staff to process comments — resources that might otherwise be deployed elsewhere. And these costs tend to rise with the burdensomeness of the consultation provisions. At the extreme end, giving one agency veto power over another’s decision has the potential to elevate costs considerably by sometimes requiring extensive negotiations . Thus, for example, the joint DOJ-FTC horizontal merger guidelines likely consumed significant staff time and resources .
The Plan just revises the MOU AGAIN—it failed before—that’s a 1AC
Uniqueness claim—ICE will just raid regardless of the MOU--here’s the Text of the REVISED MOU for contextual proof
Morton and Smith 11 [John Morton: Director U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, M. Patricia Smith: Solicitor of labor at the Department of Labor, “Revised
Memorandum of Understanding between the Departments of Homeland Security and Labor
Concerning Enforcement Activities at Worksites”, December 7, 2011, http://www.dol.gov/asp/media/reports/DHS-DOL-MOU.pdf] alla
D. This MOU is an agreement between DHS and DOL , and does not create or confer any right or benefit on any other person or party, public or private.
Nothing in this MOU or its implementation is intended to restrict the legal authority of ICE or the relevant
DOL components in any way.

Police-community relationships are high now – new law enforcement efforts. Their author.
International Association of Chiefs of Police, IACP, 14 , a dynamic organization that serves as the professional voice of law enforcement, 2014, Using Community Policing to Counter Violent
Extremism, http://www.theiacp.org/Portals/0/documents/pdfs/Final%20Key%20Principles%20Guide.pdf
In the years since 9/11, the law enforcement community has been faced with credible threats of violent extremism from an ever-evolving collection of determined enemies from overseas and within the United States .While terrorism remains a real and persistent problem—and the changing nature of the threat has made the chances of a successful attack more likely— law enforcement agencies have continually risen to the challeng e .Whether the threats have come from international terrorist organizations, domestic extremist groups, or homegrown violent extremists, law enforcement has made considerable progress in developing methods and strategies for proactively detecting and thwarting new plots . One of the most important strategies has been the repurposing and refining of community oriented policing practices . Law enforcement agencies have used these practices for decades to address other criminal and quality-of-life issues , such as gang violence and vandalism, and are now using them to address CVE . State, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies are focusing on fostering and enhancing partnerships with the community, building trust , using a whole-of-community approach , engaging the community , assisting with the creation of counter-narratives , helping build resilient communities , balancing engagement and information gathering , and tra ining officers with special focus on preventing extremist attacks and reducing the number of individuals who radicalize to violence . The marriage of community policing and countering violent extremism leverages the most valuable resource of each: local communities and their members . Law enforcement is empowering communities to impress upon individuals that everyone has an important role to play in the community .While radicalization to violence is occurring in homes across the country, thanks in large part to the Internet, community policing is being used to reach out to disenfranchised individuals and redirect them from the path of radicalization to violence . Community members are being invited to teach law enforcement about their religion, culture, and beliefs , so that officers are able to identify specific legal or constitutionally protected behaviors and not mistake those practices for criminal behavior .
Community members are being encouraged to report suspicious activities, and communities are being empowered to demonstrate that they are stronger than the virtual community and that freedom, justice, and dignity can coexist with religion, culture, and citizenship .
Crack-down on ICE already happening within the government—it’s very unpopular
TORRENS, ’15, (CLAUDIA, “Immigration officials see danger as local cooperation wanes,”
Washington Times, Associated Press, March 10, 2015,

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/mar/10/immigration-officials-laws-limitingdetainers-risk/?page=all)//erg
Mayor Bill de Blasio signed the legislation that limited cooperation with ICE
in November.
The law bars cooperation with detainers unless there’s a federal warrant and the person is on the terrorist watch list or committed a serious crime in the past five years.
From
October 2013 through September 2014, the New York City Police Department received 2,635 immigration detainers. Of those, it held
196 individuals. The city says no ICE detainers have been honored this year. New York City Council Speaker Melissa Mark-Viverito, who proposed the limitations, said
ICE officials for years “cast a dragnet at Rikers Island” that resulted in unnecessary deportations.
“In addition to being unfair, ICE’s policies were an offense to the rule of law and yet another symptom of our broken immigration system,” Mark-Viverito said in a statement. In California, only immigrants illegally in the United States who have been convicted of a serious offense are eligible for the 48-hour hold. David Marin, deputy field office director for Enforcement and Removal Operations in Los Angeles, said that of the seven counties that form the Los
Angeles area of operation only two honor detainers that meet those standards.
More than one-fourth of the people arrested by ICE in the Los Angeles area last week had recently been released onto the street by local authorities despite ICE detainer requests
. Fifty-nine of the 218 individuals detained by
ICE during the enforcement action had been the subject of immigration detainers, said ICE spokeswoman Virginia Kice. The issue is not black-and-white, says Muzaffar Chishti, New York director of the Migration Policy Institute. “My feeling is that, at some level, both (sides) are right”, said Chishti. “This is a classic case of where you stand on issues depends on where you sit. The concerns and the priorities of the city and police are very different from the concerns and priorities of the federal government.”
Immigrant communities hate law enforcement—no trust
Nittle, ’12, (Nadra Kareem, “Latinos on the Receiving End of Racial Profiling and Police
Brutality,” Race Relations: The Legal System, 2012, http://racerelations.about.com/od/thelegalsystem/a/Latinos-On-The-Receiving-End-Of-
Racial-Profiling-And-Police-Brutality.htm)//erg
Border Patrol Killings
It’s not just local law enforcement agencies that have been accused of racially profiling Latinos and committing acts of police brutality against them, it’s also the U.S. Border Patrol.
In April 2012, Latino advocacy group Presente.org launched a petition to raise awareness about the Border Patrol’s fatal beating of Anastasio Hernández-Rojas, which took place two years earlier. The group launched the petition after a video of the beating surfaced in hopes of pressuring the Justice Department to take action against the officers involved. “
If justice isn’t served for Anastasio, even when video clearly shows injustice
, Border Patrol agents will continue their pattern of abuse and lethal force,” the Presente team said in statement. Between 2010 to 2012, Border Patrol agents were involved in seven killings, according to Presente. LAPD Officer Found Guilty of Profiling Hispanics In an unprecedented move in March 2012, the
Los Angeles Police Department determined that one of its officers had engaged in racial profiling
. Which group did the officer in question target? Latinos, according to the LAPD. Patrick
Smith, a white officer on the job for 15 years, pulled over a disproportionate amount of Latinos during traffic stops
, the Los Angeles Times reported. He allegedly tried to conceal the fact that he’d so often targeted
Hispanic drivers by misidentifying them as white on paperwork.
Smith may be the first LAPD officer found guilty of racial profiling, but he’s unlikely the only one engaging in the practice. “A 2008 study of LAPD data by a Yale researcher found blacks and Latinos were subjected to stops, frisks, searches and arrests at significantly higher rates than whites, regardless of whether they lived in high-crime neighborhoods
,” the Times noted. Moreover, 250 allegations of racial profiling are made against officers annually. East
Haven Police Under Fire News broke in January 2012 that federal investigators had charged police
in East Haven,
Conn., with obstruction of justice, excessive force, conspiracy and other crimes concerning their treatment of Latinos in the city
. According to the New York Times, East Haven police officers, “ stopped

and detained people, particularly immigrants, without reason...sometimes slapping, hitting or kicking them when they were handcuffed, and once smashing a man's head into a wall.
”
They tried to cover up their behavior by targeting bystanders
who witnessed and tried to document their illegal acts. They also allegedly tried to recover surveillance tapes from area businesses that captured their abuses on video.
New DHS policy solves the aff—less raids, more focus on workers’ rights, investigations before arrests all prove
Fialkowski 10 [Elise, a partner at the Philadelphia office of Klasko, Rulon, Stock & Seltzer,
LLP. In addition to employment-based immigration work, she has particular experience in advising employers with regard to compliance with the Immigration Reform and Control Act, including I-9 Employment Eligibility Verification and work site enforcement issues, “The administration's new work site enforcement initiatives”, Business Law Today: Volume 19,
Number 3 January/February 2010, https://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/blt/2010-01-
02/fialkowski.shtml] alla
The Obama administration has pledged to continue—and in fact increase—vigorous criminal enforcement against employers that employ unauthorized workers. The
Bush administration conducted a series of high-profile raids that resulted in criminal charges against employers as well as the apprehension of large numbers of undocumented workers
. For example, in 2008
under the Bush administration, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (
ICE
) made 5,184 administrative arrests of unauthorized alien workers and 1,103 criminal arrests tied to work site enforcement.
Of the individuals criminally arrested, however, only 135 were owners, managers, supervisors, or human resource employees. The majority of the remainder were workers charged under identity theft statutes
.
Janet Napolitano
, Obama's secretary of homeland security, has indicated a shift away from apprehension of the undocumented workers in large-scale raids to a clear focus on employers including detailed up-front investigation on employer compliance prior to enforcement
activity. The large-scale raids under the Bush administration enraged the
Latino community
and religious leaders, immigrant advocates, and civil liberties groups
important to the Democratic base and they stepped up pressure on Obama to stop them
. In response, Janet
Napolitano has charted a middle course, ordering a review of which immigrants will be targeted for arrest and emphasizing that she intends to focus even more on prosecuting criminal cases of wrongdoing by companies
. Such action is consistent with her testimony during her confirmation hearing in which she stated that she expects "to increase the focus on ensuring that employers of unlawful workers are prosecuted for their violations
." Moreover, she pledged to subject employer violators to "appropriate criminal punishment" and to encourage employers to work with federal immigration agents
"to establish sound compliance programs that prevent unlawful hiring." On April 30 of this year, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and ICE, the enforcement branch of DHS, issued a new
Worksite Enforcement Overview and Worksite Enforcement Strategy Fact Sheet.
Consistent with prior statements, both these documents announced that Napolitano has issued a directive "outlining that ICE will focus its resources in the work site enforcement program on the criminal prosecution of employers who knowingly hire

illegal workers in order to target the root cause of illegal immigration
." The Strategy Fact Sheet emphasizes that ICE will aggressively investigate using an array of sources including "tips from the public, reports from a company's current or former employees, even referrals from other law enforcement agencies" as well as a variety of techniques commonly used in criminal prosecutions. The fact sheet emphasizes that, through these methods, ICE will aggressively investigate and pursue trafficking, smuggling, harboring, visa fraud, document fraud, money laundering, and other criminal conduct by employers. It is clear that the Obama administration is focusing on significant up-front investigation rather than large-scale raids.
Obama administration solves—Plan also cannot overcome ICE I-9 Audits and Social Security letters—these are different from raids
GARDELLA 11 [ADRIANA , Adriana Gardella is a journalist, writer, and editor. She contributes to publications including The New York Times, Forbes, and Real Simple; and writes marketing materials for an AmLaw 200 law firm, “As Immigration Audits Increase, Some
Employers Pay a High Price”, New York Times, JULY 13, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/14/business/smallbusiness/how-a-small-business-cansurvive-an-immigration-audit.html?_r=0] alla
David Cox was at his desk in September 2009, when his receptionist announced an unexpected visitor, a special agent from
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, also known as ICE. Mr. Cox is chief executive of L. E. Cooke Company, a fourth-generation, family-owned nursery in Visalia, Calif., that grows deciduous trees and shrubs. The agent handed Mr. Cox a letter and informed him he had three days to produce I-9 employment-eligibility forms for all current employees. Mr. Cox said the agent was “pleasant and nonthreatening,” but he noticed she carried a gun. L. E. Cook was one of 1,444 businesses to receive an introduction to ICE’s stepped-up worksite enforcement program in 2009 — almost three times the number audited in 2008. Last year, 2,196 businesses were audited. An ICE representative said the agency did not categorize audits by business type and that the law applied across industries. “Any company is at risk at any given time,” said Leon Versfeld, an immigration lawyer in Kansas City, Mo. In one prominent case, American Apparel, the clothing manufacturer, was forced to terminate 1,800 undocumented workers after a 2009 audit. Chipotle Mexican Grill, the restaurant chain, has let go hundreds of workers since its audit began last year.
While the administration of George W. Bush focused on headline-making raids that resulted in arrests of immigrant workers, the Obama administration has gone after employers with ICE’s I-9 audits on the theory that employers who hire unauthorized workers create the demand that drives most illegal immigration
. In addition, the Social Security
Administration has resumed sending “no-match” letters after a three-year hiatus
. The letters, which alert employers that information on an employee’s W-2 form does not match information on file with the Social Security Administration, had been halted in
2007
. The main purpose is ostensibly to ensure that employee Social Security accounts are credited properly
, but the letters can also be used by ICE to show that an employer had reason to believe an employee might not have documentation
. “The master narrative of immigration reform is being crafted around the notion of unscrupulous employers seeking cheap labor
,” said Craig Regelbrugge, a lawyer and lobbyist with the American Nursery and Landscape
Association.
Unscrupulous employers exist, Mr. Regelbrugge said, but more often he sees business owners who are just trying to follow the law
.
When a new hire produces seemingly legitimate forms of documentation required by the I-9 form, the employer must accept them
. (To refuse could expose the owner to charges of employment discrimination.) “The employer is not required to be a forensics expert,” said Monte Lake, an immigration lawyer in Washington. The upshot of the more aggressive enforcement is that even employers who have followed the rules can be devastated by an audit that compels them to fire valuable, long-time employees. The
I-9 audit of Mr. Cox’s nursery revealed that 26 of his 99 employees were not authorized to work in the United States
. Because
ICE determined he had acted reasonably in hiring them, Mr. Cox was not fined or held criminally liable. But after confirming that the 26 employees could not produce authentic documents, he was

forced to fire them
. All had been with him for five to 10 years, and he lost half of his budding crew, a highly specialized team that grafts trees. “Telling them was probably the worst day of my life,” he said. “I don’t just sit at a desk here, I’m actually out in the field harvesting with them.” Mr. Cox said he was lucky the audit hit midrecession, after he had already reduced his work force and inventory. Still, he estimates that his 2009 expenses climbed 10 percent as a result of the terminations. And, despite California’s high unemployment rate, finding replacement employees has proved challenging. “I’ve gone through more workers this year than I have in the past 10 years combined,” Mr. Cox said. While most such workers earn the $8-an-hour minimum wage in California, Mr.
Cox said he generally paid $8.90 an hour for a 50-hour week. The terminated budding crew workers made $10 an hour.
Compensation includes state-mandated overtime of time and a half, health insurance and two weeks’ paid vacation. “If I raised the wage,” he said, “I’d have to shut my doors.” Meanwhile, after an audit, ICE does not round up the affected workers for deportation
. That meant Mr. Cox’s former workers were free to seek employment elsewhere — including with his competitors. Mr. Cox said that he knew through his remaining workers that the terminated employees were all working in the area.
After the audit, Mr. Cox started using E-Verify, a federal program that lets employers confirm the authenticity of a job applicant’s Social Security and green card numbers electronically
. Although the program’s use is mandatory in some states, its reliability has been debated, and it remains voluntary in California. A bill in Congress that would require all American employers to use the program could go to a vote this month. The owner of another agricultural business, this one on the East Coast, requested anonymity because he was currently undergoing an I-9 audit that had resulted in the loss of half of his work force. He said the employees he was forced to terminate were
25 to 40 years old and had been in the United States for five to 10 years. Many were raising children born here. “They’re all staying here and working for someone else,” he said. After the terminations, the East Coast owner said he was struggling to get replacement workers up to speed. He has endured a substantial increase in customer complaints — to 30 a week from about three — and has reduced his 2011 sales goals by 15 percent. The terminated employees included members of his management team who earned $12 to
$15 an hour. He paid them all their vacation pay, and said he was bothered by the perception that employers like him were unscrupulous and treated undocumented workers unfairly. “We did everything by the book,” he said. “There were a lot of tears here.”
While the human side of the issue is compelling, employers must comply with the law, said Mr. Lake, the immigration lawyer. There is no way to avoid an ICE audit , but establishing and maintaining the right procedures can help you survive one
. Mr. Lake recommends that employers review their practices and seek professional assistance if they are not knowledgeable about legal requirements
. Sloppy record-keeping can lead to fines for technical violations.
If a review reveals incomplete I-9 forms, employers should fill in the missing information and initial it with the date and time it was added. Mr. Lake advises random checks to ensure that employees are completing the forms. Be sure to retain I-9 forms for the legally required period of time — the longer of three years or one year after the employee leaves the company. Business owners should understand their obligations upon receiving a no-match letter. Mr. Lake advises employers who receive these letters to meet one-on-one with the designated worker to ensure that a clerical error did not cause the confusion, confirming that names are spelled correctly and no numbers have been transposed. Assuming there is no mistake, Mr. Lake said the owner must instruct the worker to pursue the issue with the Social Security Administration and report back within a “reasonable time.” Document your actions and treat all workers the same, Mr. Lake said. If an employee reports that everything is fine, and you get another no-match letter the next year, you know it is not fine. After that, Mr. Lake said, there is no good answer if ICE conducts an audit and asks, “Why didn’t you take action the second time?”