Antonella Demartini
PA 740: Managing Public Organizations
Assignment #3
April 1, 2011
James Woolsey & the CIA
During James Woolsey’s tenure as chief of the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) from
1993 to 1995, he led an investigation of one of the agency’s most notorious scandals. Aldrich
Ames, a thirty-year employee of the CIA, pled guilty to “selling secrets to Russia for over nine
years [from 1985 to 1994] and accepting more than $2 million in payments.” (Tarr & Heyman,
1996, 1.) Under intense scrutiny from the U.S. Congress and public for a situation that happened
prior to his administration, Woolsey’s was in charge of conducting an investigation and
determining disciplinary measures for those involved in the scandal.
This paper uses the
Romzek-Dubnick framework of accountability to argue that Woolsey acted appropriately given
the circumstances and cross pressures he faced.
The Romzek-Dubnick framework of accountability views accountability through the
lense of principal-agent theory. This perspective proposes that “principals want to hold agents to
whom they delegate authority responsible for their actions.” (Hill & Lynn, 2009, 291.) The
model features four systems of accountability: legal accountability, imposed by authorities
external to an organization; bureaucratic, or hierarchical, accountability, involving rules and
expectations of an organization’s internal actors; political accountability, emphasizing
representativeness or responsiveness to an external constituency; and professional accountabilty,
characterized by subjective responsibility and reliance upon professional expertise and
discretion.
Woolsey provided competent leadership because he knew when to assert his managerial
role as a creator and when to accept his reality as a creaturei. By virture of Woolsey’s position,
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he was the agency’s leading spokesperson and the Director of Central Intelligence (“DCI”),
overseeing complex intelligence gathering operations among a network of entities in the
executive branch and military. His entrance into the agency occurred at a time when members of
U.S. Congress believed the agency’s purpose was outdated, since the Soviet Union dissolved and
the Cold War was over. At the time, U.S. Congress wished to slash the CIA’s funding and
transfer responsibilities to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”).
Woolsey sought
presidential support for the agency, and he went to brief President Clinton regarding the latest
developments within the CIA. Because he was rarely admitted, Woolsey stopped going. Unlike
previous CIA chiefs, he found himself without executive support.
Despite constraints like presidential indifference and potential budget cuts, Woolsey was
a managerial creator because he refocused the CIA’s mission. He proposed a new direction for
the agency which concentrated on combating terrorism, supporting national security, and drug
and weapons interdiction.
Woolsey successfully advocated for the CIA before the U.S.
Congress, legitmizing the necessity of the agency’s existence. His work avoided drastic budget
cuts which could have considerably down-sized the organizaiton. In addition, he took steps
necessary to modernizing the nation’s spy satellite system.
On the other hand, Woolsey was also a managerial creature. Although Woolsey became
aware of the Ames scandal in February 1993 shortly after becoming DCI, high government
officials and litigators did not allow him to do anything about the matter until April 1994, two
months after government officials arrested Ames and he pled guilty to charges. Only once the
legal case against Ames was secure, Woolsey was able to take charge of the situation, reverting
back to his role as creator. He assumed hierarchical accountability and launched a three part
investigation to cover damage assessment, an internal security review, and an inquiry into Ames’
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supervisors. He appointed the CIA Inspector General (“IG”), Frederick Hitz, to direct the
supervisor inquiry. Despite pressure from Congress to take immediate action, Woolsey awaited
the results of the investigation before taking disciplinary measures against individual CIA
employees.
The IG issued a four hundred page, classified document detailing Ames’ performance
blunders, supervisory responses, and a critique of the CIA’s organizational culture. Ames had an
alcohol problem, which substantially affected him on-duty, and he was known to ignore security
procedures.
His supervisors grew accustomed to his behavior and continued to give him
assignments where it was necessary that he handle sensitive information. Also, the report
recommendations suggested that cultural change was imperative. The report called the CIA a
fraternity of “elitist” white males whose “old-boy” network discouraged the acknowledgement of
inter-agency problems. Without it, the CIA could not address the systemic problems that created
the environment where Ames was able to profit off of trading secrets to the Russians for nine
years. It further indicated the need for the revival of the “molehunt” effort, or careful, consistent
review of CIA employees for indicators of treason, Ames being a case in point. The CIA did not
pick up on his extravagant domestic and international land purchases, which his civil servant
salary clearly could not fund, because the parts of the agency investigating Ames did not
communicate with one another.
According to his sense of political accountability, Woolsey believed in transparency and
ensured that parts of the report be declassified and shared with the public. The revelation of the
report, in combination with the scathing remarks Ames made about the CIA during his
sentencing, created overwhelmingly poor press for the agency. In addition, it increased the
public and Congressional perception that the agency was “[unwilling] to punish individuals for
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past failures and scandals.” (Tarr & Heyman, 1996, 12.) The public’s dissatisfaction with the
scandal questioned the agency’s legitemacy, and put further pressure on the U.S. Congress to
appear “tough” on scandal.
Woolsey was a creature of his work because he was under substantial pressure from U.S.
Congress and public to fire CIA employees. Further, he only had a matter of days to review the
findings of the IG report, deliberate them with his staff, determine and present disciplinary
measures. He met with his staff on a Saturday to discuss who was involved in the Ames scandal,
to what extent, and how that person should be disciplined. The following Wednesday, Woolsey
presented his disciplinary decisions. He named twenty-three individuals and issued reprimands
to eleven of them. Four of those reprimands were serious. However, three of those four officers
were retired and one was about to retire, so dismissing them would not be possible. Had
Woolsey acted ultimately to safeguard his own job, he would probably have made dismissals
among the remaining staff. Although he knew his choices would not be well received, he
deferred to his sense of professional accountability. For Woolsey, being fair to his staff was more
important than appeasing the U.S. Congress and public in exchange for political “points.”
Woolsey could not bring himself to terminate any one person in the agency simply
because assessing individual culpability was nearly impossible. Ames’ supervisors lacked
continous contact with him because his supervisors changed as did his assignments. Also, the
agency practiced compartmentation, a tactic that restricts the availability of information within
the agency “to protect sources [and] . . . preserve power.” (Tarr & Heyman, 1996, 13.) While
Ames’ direct supervisors may have made poor judgements, not one particular person could be
held accountable for Ames’ misdeeds. Terminating qualified, productive, and dedicated
supervisors who contributed greatly to the agency for years seemed unethical and therefore
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unacceptable. To Woolsey, poor management or judgement on the part of Ames’ supervisors did
not constitute breaking the law, and therefore did not warrant their dismissal. Woolsey’s
subjective responsibility did not support taking action arbitrarily, rather he relied upon his
professional discretion to protect the employees working under him from unfair treatment.
Evidence demonstrating how Woolsey was both a creature and a creator within his
position as chief of the CIA can be categorized into the Romzek-Dubnick accountability
framework. Regarding legal accountability, two points illustrate Woolsey’s commitment to his
post. He legitimized the existence of the CIA in the eyes of Congress which allowed him to
stave off proposed agency budget cuts. He validated the agency’s worth to U.S. Congress, its
legal overseer, although he lacked support from the executive branch of the government.
Regarding hierarchical accountability, Woolsey took responsibility for the scandal brewing
within his agency and worked to resolve it as effectively, efficiently, and equitably as possible.
He entrusted the investigation to the appropriate entities, took the results seriously, and before
making decisions about disciplinary measures, met for several days with his staff to discuss the
issues and understand the multiple perspectives of his staff members.
Woolsey’s orientation to embracing his role as a creator compelled him to take
responsibility for the Ames scandal. Regarding political accountability, Woolsey made public the
findings of IG report, although he knew doing so would put the CIA in a politically
disadvantageous position. His gesture of transparency implied the authenticity of his efforts to
redress the scandal. Regarding professional accountability, Woolsey refused to scapegoat any of
Ames’ supervisors by firing them. Instead, he made individual assessments of their performance
and issued individual reprimands. He did not give in to the pressure from the U.S. Congress or
public to be punitive. Although firing one or many of Ames’ supervisors might have helped
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Woolsey’s future employment prospects with the CIA, what mattered more to him was being fair
to his staff. The warrant of this argument is that an effective leader will not let cross pressures
impair his or her judgement.
An opposing argument may claim Woolsey acted inappropriately because his choice not
to terminate any of Ames’ supervisors contributed to the CIA status quo, or the perception of
CIA employees as immune to disciplinary action.
However, three of the four employees
receiving serious reprimands had already retired, and one was about to retire. Woolsey would
only have had the choice of dismissing the remaining employees named in the investigation. In
addition, another opposing argument may claim that Ames’ supervisors chose to take no
disciplinary action against him despite his poor performance. However, this was not necessarily
feasible given the CIA practice of compartmentation and re-assignment of task and supervisor.
If Woolsey were to make dismissals or if Ames’ supervisor were to take disciplinary
action against him, these actions would have been of limited usefulness because they do not
address the agency’s underlying problem, as detailed in the IG report: the agency culture.
To
even attempt to change culture, CIA leaderhip would have to change the spoken and unspoken
norms of acceptable and unacceptable behavior.
One could argue that because Woolsey
embraced transparency, equitable treatment of his staff, and refused to succumb to cross
pressures, his leadership could potentially initiate cultural change within the organization.
James Woolsey dealt with the investigation and discipline of Aldrich Ames, a long time
CIA employee who sold secrets to the Russians. Woolsey launched an investigation and shared
the non-classified results with the public. As he navigated this delicate task, Woolsey faced
multiple cross pressures from U.S. Congress and the public to terminate Ames’ supervisors,
which would create an appearance of accountability in the public and congressional perceptions.
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However, after considering individually the circumstances of Ames’ supervisors, Woolsey could
not in good conscience dismiss any of them because they had not broken the law. Woolsey’s
sense of professional accountabilty and subjective responsibility compelled him to trust his
managerial discretion.ii
References:
Tarr & Heyman, 1996. “James Woolsey and the CIA: The Aldrich Ames Spy Case,” Kennedy
School of Government Case Program, Harvard University. C115-96-1339, C-115-961339.1.
Hill & Lynn. 2009. Public Management: A Three-Dimensional Approach. CQ Press. 287-333.
i
Managers who view their work as essentially influenced by laws and rules are “creatures” while managers who see
themselves as active participants in and instigators of organizational direction are “creators.” (Hill & Lynn, 2009, 9.)
The creature/creator dichotomy acknowledges that managers are constrained by context, but that they apply their
craft, or unique skill set, to dealing with said constraints.
ii
Claim- Woolsey acted appropriately given the circumstances and cross pressures he faced.
Reason – Woolsey was a competent leader because he knew when to assert his role as a creator and when to accept
his reality as a creature.
Evidence – case references, forms of accountability
Warrant – An effective leader will not let cross pressures impair his or her judgement
Acknowledgement & response – An opposing argument may claim Woolsey acted inappropriately because his
choice not to terminate any of Ames’ supervisors contributed to the CIA status quo, or the perception of CIA
employees as immune to disciplinary action. However, three of the four employees receiving serious reprimands
had already retired, and one was about to retire. Woolsey would only have had the choice of dismissing the
remaining employees named in the investigation, which would have been arbritrary.. In addition, another opposing
argument may claim that Ames’ supervisors chose to take no disciplinary action against him despite his poor
performance. However, this was not necessarily feasible given the CIA practice of compartmentation and reassignment of task and supervisor.
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