40th Anniversary of the Fall of
South Viet Nam
Joseph Radzikowski, Lt. Col. USMC, Retired
Associate Professor, Historian of Military Studies and
Foreign Policy
San Diego City College
World Cultures Program Presentation
April 30, 2015
The 40th Anniversary of the
Fall of South Vietnam
 The lecture will cover the following three phases:
 The French Legacy 1945-1954
 The Advisory/Americanization of the War 1954-1972
 The Final Days of South Vietnam 1973-1975
French Indochina 1850-1954
First Indochina War 1946-1954
the prelude
 To understand U .S. involvement in Vietnam conflict it
‘s vital to start with the legacy of the French
involvement in Indochina.
 The French Indochina defines the contours, the events
and determines the outcome of the American war.
 Why? The First Indochina war does not settle the
principles it was fought for political unity/ unification
independence from foreigners.
 It does not solve and creates for the basis for the
Americanization of the war.
Historical Background
 Sept 1945 Japanese surrender and Ho Chi Minh proclaimed
the founding Provisional Government of Democratic Republic
of Vietnam.
 Lt. Col. Peter Dewey, a U.S. Army officer with the Office of
Strategic Services (OSS) in Vietnam, is shot and killed in
Saigon. Dewey was sent to Vietnam to search for missing
American pilots and to gather information on the situation in
the country after the surrender of the Japanese.
 The Vietminh waged an insurgency against France which
culminated in the siege of the French base in northern
Vietnam at Dien Bien Phu and the defeat of French forces in
1954.
Geneva Accord 1954
 A peace conference at Geneva, Switzerland, sought to
extricate France from Vietnam.
 Vietnam would be divided in half along the 17th Parallel.
 The Vietminh would control the northern section, the State
of Vietnam would control the south.
 General elections would occur in both north and south on
July 20, 1956, to decide which Vietnam would govern the
whole country.
 The agreement meant the Vietminh, who occupied
significant territory south of the 17th Parallel, would have
to withdraw to the north.
Consequences of the
Geneva Accord
 The U.S. and the State of Vietnam never signed the
agreement.
 The U.S. doubted that, without United Nations
supervision, any election in Vietnam would not be
democratic.
 The Geneva Accords got France out of Vietnam.
 It did nothing to prevent an escalation of discord
between free and communist spheres.
 It only hastened American involvement in the country.
Ho Chi Minh Vietnam’s
Enigma
The Nationalist
1919
The Revolutionary
1945
Ho Chi Minh’s Dream or
Illusion
 For thirty years 1910-1949 , he clung to the hope that
the United States was different.
 A new kind of power that had been born out of an
anti-colonial reaction.
 An advocate of self determination for all nations, large
and small.
 He believed that America could be the champion of
his cause.
The French Solution
Bao Dai ( 1950-54)
Create a puppet
government around Bao
Dai in order to both
consolidate support within
France for the war and to
gain American support for
the French effort.
The French believed that
he could create popular
support for French rule his
support came from
Parisian Vietnamese who
were more French than
the French.
They came from CochinChina, the southern most
state in Vietnam
The Truman Administration 19461952
In 1950, President Truman
Thesovereignty
Cold War Dean
Expands
recognized French
Acheson , to
self defender of
over Indochina
Southeast AsiaWestern civilization.
The “Domino Theory”
 On May 1, 1950, President Truman authorized the
first military assistance ( Military Assistance and
Advisory Group ) to Indochina.
 Indochina was a critical Cold War battlefield to
preserve the region against further Communist
aggression.
 The Domino Theory was central to the way
Americans viewed the threat in the 1950s.
 By 1954 the U.S . was paying 75 % of the French
war effort.
 May 7, 1954, Dien Bien Phu fell, exhausted , the
French stopped military operations in Indochina
and sought peace at Geneva.
The Eisenhower Administration
1952-1960
DullesAmericans
was not at all were
happy over the
Bernard Fall argued “that
French defeat in Indochina. For Dulles ‘
dreaming different dreams
than
thebase
French
butwithout
We have
a clear
there now
What happened to the Frenchthe taint of colonialism
walking
inhappen
the same
footsteps.”
would not
to us, they
were not a mighty power
An Experiment
in Nation
Building
Colonel Edward
Lansdale, chief of the
CIA's Saigon Military
Mission, meets with
President Diem after
the CIA entered
Vietnam in 1954 to
help the pro-Western
Vietnamese.
Without the assistance
of Lansdale and the
black operations of his
CIA team, Diem's
success in achieving
power and giving birth
to the Republic of
South Vietnam.
The American Solution
“The right man for the U.S. but the
wrong man for Vietnam”
South Vietnamese prime
minister Ngo Dinh Diem
and his brother/principal
aide Ngo Dinh Nhu
America Raises the Stakes 196163
We are going to win in Vietnam. We will
remain
here until we do win.
( Kennedy
More assistance to SVN increase
The U.S sponsored “ secret war “
Military Assistance and Advisory
in Laos under the operational
1962)
Group (MAAG)
control of the CIA
A Limited Partnership with
South Vietnam
 Kennedy’s decision to violate the military provisions of
1954 Geneva agreements and to increase significantly
U.S. military support levels for the GVN were intended
to keep Diem in power.
 Keep U.S. commitment to South Vietnam limited
advisory and support roles.
 Maintain U.S . control of events in Vietnam.
 Kennedy was not trying to win the in Vietnam ; he was
doing enough not to lose.
The Advisor’s War
JFK solution to
winning the war
1962-1963
“ Project “ Beefup”
send helicopter,
transport and
reconnaissance
aircraft to add
firepower and mobility
to Diem’s army.
Kennedy had over
15,000 military advisors
including Green Berets
in South Vietnam to
help train and equip
the South Vietnamese
military forces.
JFK ‘ s solution
Green Berets and
counterinsurgency
/pacification 196263
For much of the
Vietnam War, the 5th
Special Forces Group
trained and led CIDG
mobile strike forces
and reconnaissance
companies that
comprised ethnic
minority tribes and
groups from the
mountain and border
regions. These strike
forces essentially
conducted
reconnaissance by
means of small-unit
patrols and
defended their home
bases.
OP PLAN 34 & the Gulf of
Tonkin Incident
The operation started in early 1960s under
the CIA.
President Kennedy’s the covert plan
expanded the use of PT boats in assisting
South Vietnamese clandestine naval
/commando operations against the North.
The operation involved U.S. destroyers
patrolling off the coast of North Vietnam
that assisted with relaying intelligence to
South Vietnamese forces regarding North
Shift from Advisor's
War to The
Americanization of
the War
Diem’s ouster and murder in
1963 ushered in a period of
political instability and a series of
military coups.
Based on unfolding events such
as, The Gulf of Tonkin incident , in
late 1964, Johnson decided to
escalate the war.
Operation Rolling Thunder( Air
Campaign in North Vietnam)
Marines land in South Vietnam
Search and Destroy Missions
Attritional warfare
Body Count culture
“The Light at the end of the
Tunnel mentality”
Americans go to war
On March 8, 1965 the
first U.S. Marines from
the 9th Marine
Expeditionary Brigade
from Okinawa landed
at Da Nang, Vietnam.
Johnson expected a
relatively quick and
cheap U.S. victory that
would save South
Vietnam and allow him
to implement his Great
Society and war on
poverty.
The Strategy of Attritional
warfare
 General Westmoreland devised the strategy of attritional
warfare from 1965-until President Nixon supplanted it with
Vietnamization in 1969.
 Attrition played to the American strengths ( firepower and
mobility) and minimized casualties.
 Attritional warfare promised to win the war more quickly
than protracted counterinsurgency operations.
 Attritional warfare would incorporate large tactical unit
sweeps into enemy basing areas “SEARCH AND DESTROY
MISSIONS.”
 Search and Destroy missions would find, fix, and finish the
enemy and provide security for an expanded
pacification program.
The TET Offensive 1968
 The massive NVA surprise attack during the 1968
Tet holiday was a crucial turning point in the war.
 The NVA tactical objective was to foment
rebellion among the South Vietnamese
population and encourage the United States to
scale back its support of the Saigon regime.
 Though U.S. and South Vietnamese forces
managed to hold off the Communist attacks,
news coverage of the offensive shocked /
dismayed the American public and further eroded
support for the war effort.
The Beginning of the End
1969-1973
 Johnson overwhelmed by Tet announced in March 1968
that he would not run for reelection.
 Richard M. Nixon won the 1968 election and has a plan to
take the nation out of the war while preserving national
honor. (A peace with honor)
 Nixon plan was called “Vietnamization “ but it also meant
changing the existing strategic and tactical rules of the
game.
 In March 1969, North Vietnamese bases in Cambodia were
bombed.
 May 1970 South Vietnamese troops moved in Cambodia
and Laos ( a privileged –sanctuary policy was finished)
Vietnamization 1970-73
 1970 the number of troops in Vietnam stood at 150,000 down
from 1968 of 565,000.
 In 1971 the policies of Vietnamization and renewed
pacification of the countryside continued with some success
but the public outcry in America against the war increased.
 April 1972 , the NVA launched their “Easter Offensive.”
 Despite the massive invasion across the DMZ into the Central
highlands the offensive was stopped by the South Vietnamese
with the aid of overwhelming American tactical air power.
 While, in Oct 1972, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was
carrying out negotiations, the NVA renewed their military
attacks.
Peace Accord 1973
 Nixon ordered the strategic bombing of North Vietnam
Operation Linebacker I & II which forced the North
Vietnamese back to the peace talks. North and South
Vietnam signed the peace accord , and the United States
agreed to withdraw.
 In Jan 1973 , South Vietnam was promised immediate
American military support in the face of any further
northern aggression, and substantial military aid.
 March 1973 the release of American POWs ( 591) the only
positive accomplishment of the Peace agreement.
 While giving the United States a way out of the war , the
Paris agreements ironically brought no peace to Vietnam
and left substantial Communist forces in place in the south.
Economic downward spiral
 South Vietnam was facing severe economic problems.
 Since the early 1960s the economy was driven by massive
American aid and spending power of US forces.
 Construction projects alone employed in excess of 100, 000 South
Vietnamese workers.
 The withdrawal of US forces /decline in American aid sent the
economy downward .
 Inflation hit 65% and unemployment hit 40 %.
 South Vietnamese government kept an army of 1.1 million
soldiers worsened the economic situation.
Political/Military Situation
1973
 The Soviet Union increased shipments of weapons and
financial assistance to North Vietnam by 400 percent.
 To counter Moscow’s aid to Hanoi, the United States
funneled 3.2 billion in military aid to South Vietnam.
 Congress passed the Wars Powers Resolution in
October 1973.
 The North Vietnamese were watching Washington
politics very closely and had no intention of
abandoning the dream of unification and
independence.
Continued decline in
funding for South Vietnam
 Pham Van Dong and Le Duc Tho were cautious about the next
offensive.
 They knew that the Nixon administration was weakening under
the pressures of Watergate, but they did not underestimate Nixon.
 Le Duc Tho was certain that if Nixon had the chance , he would
unleash the B- 52’s again and he did not want another Easter
offensive 1972.
 Mid 1974 Congress limits aid to South Vietnam to $1.1 billion
from $ 3.2 billion the year before, and funding in 1975 to 700
million.
Nixon, Watergate and the
Fall of South Vietnam
 Nixon’s cover-up of the Watergate would
eventual lead to his resignation and the fall of
South Vietnam.
 Nixon was unable to deliver on its promise to
rescue South Vietnam if Hanoi broke the 1973
agreement.
 Watergate scandal enveloped him and his
presidential authority to prevent the coming
South Vietnamese crisis declined.
 When the final North Vietnamese offensive came
in 1975 , he was in exile in San Clemente.
The Evacuation and
Departure
 On April 29 , 1975 , President Ford implemented Operation
Frequent Wind , the airlift evacuation of about 7000 American
and South Vietnamese civilian and military personnel from
Saigon.
 Additional U.S. naval ships ferried more than 70,000 South
Vietnamese to American ships in the South China Sea
 April 30 , 1975 , Ambassador , Graham Martin departed on the
last helicopter the U.S. Embassy in South Vietnam.
The Vietnam Era: Critique
 President Eisenhower , Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon all
expressed their fear of becoming the first president to lose a war ,
like Truman over the loss of China to the Reds in 1949.
 Inflation , opposition to the war, and the Oil Embargo affected the
American domestic politics against supporting the conflict.
 The increasing antiwar forces in the United States influenced by
the media.
 A genuinely idealistic venture to save the world from
Communism ended in 1970s as a face –saving game to get out of
a quagmire.
The Political Critique
 The war was fought with no clear policy goal established that
would satisfy the American public.
 American and civilian policy makers never realized they were
fighting a revolutionary protracted war not a conventional war.
 American military leaders allowed civilians to dominate military
strategy and even tactics to an that extent that efficient warmaking became impossible.
 The media, especially television , was allowed to dominate the
interpretation of the war after 1968.
 The United States fought a wrong kind of war against an enemy it
did not understand.
The Military Critique
 Both the French and Americans hoped to
draw the insurgent/regular forces into a
battle of attrition, where superior firepower
would be decisive.
 The United States military , especially the
Army approached the Vietnam War with a
conventional mindset.
 It organized, trained, and equipped the
South Vietnamese forces into the American
model.
 The U.S. approach to counterinsurgency
warfare was timely /costly.
The Military Critique
 Like the French the U.S. mobility and firepower
could take them anywhere in Vietnam, but
they could not stay and could show only
wasted resources and time for their efforts.
 Neither the French or Americans completely
embraced the idea of counterinsurgency
tactics.
 The solution to the insurgency was almost
purely a military approach which ignored the
political /social realities on the ground.
 In the end , the American defeat was a failure
to understand and imagination.
Peace with
dishonor
Nixon’s domestic political
troubles arising from
Watergate and his
resignation , together with
the passage of the War
Powers Resolution in 1974
sealed South Vietnam’s
fate and any hope of
survival in the face of
mounting northern military
activity.
A deterioration of South
Vietnamese society and
the continuing cuts in
American support for
Thieu’s failing regime by
the Ford administration
triggered the final NVA
OFFENSIVE Dec 1974 to
April 30, 1975.
The Final Chapter 31 years Later
“Time heals all wounds”
First Vietnamese
Brigadier General In
the United States
Army
Left South
Vietnam 30 April
1975 with family
at the age of 10
years old,
however, two
weeks ago a
success story
was in the
making of the
American
dream.