HSI Lessons Learned Status Report
FORCEnet HSI Working Group
George Edw. Seymour, Ph.D. *
LCDR Sally Van Horn * *
Naval Network Warfare Command
* Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center, San Diego
**
San Diego, California: April 7, 2004
1
Fn Human Systems Integration
Lessons Learned Update Agenda
The value of HSI….leader comments….at
the deck plates
Recent HSI timeline
HSI focus deficit in OIF LL
HSI Lessons Learned info design
HSI LL status report
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Preliminary findings and recommendations
Interview process findings
Value and next steps
2
The Value of HSI
“In short, only by embracing a
human-centered and HSIfocused philosophy that
transcends virtually every
element of the Navy will we be
able to win the "war for people"
and also ensure our future
warships and other platforms
can go in harm's way and
emerge victorious.” — CNO (2002)
Source: http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/policy/vision/vis02/vpp02-ch3a.html
3
HSI at the Deckplates
“It is not the critic who counts; not the man who
points out how the strong man stumbles, or
where the doer of deeds could have done them
better. The credit belongs to the man who is
actually in the arena, who's face is marred by
dust and sweat and blood; who strives valiantly;
who errs, who comes short again and again,
because there is no effort without error and shortcoming; but who
does actually strive to do the deeds; who knows great enthusiasms,
the great devotions; who spends himself in a worthy cause; who at
the best knows in the end the triumph of high achievement, and who
at the worst, if he fails, at least fails while daring greatly, so that his
place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who neither
know victory nor defeat.”
4
Traditional HSI
Human Systems Integration
Human
Factors
Engineering
Physical & Mental
Capabilities &
Limitations
Anthropometrics &
Biomedical Criteria
Man-Machine
Interface
Mission, Function
& Human
Rqmts Analyses
Skill, Knowledge
& Abilities
Manpower
Wartime Rqmts
Deployment
Considerations
Force Structure
Personnel
Training
Safety
And
Health
Personnel
Classification &
Selection
Training Concepts
& Strategy
System Safety / Health
Hazards Plan
Task Analysis
Methods
Human Error
Analyses
Demographics
Operating Strength
Accession & Attrition
Rates
Manning Concepts
Retention Rates
Rate / Rating
Career Progression
Officer and Enlisted
Workload
Training Flow
Media / Equipment
Simulation
OP Tempo
Training System
Evaluation
Training
Development Plan
System Reliability
Analysis
Habitability
Personnel
Survivability
Quality of Life
Anti-Fratricide
Quality of Work
Personnel Protection
Environment Limits
and Controls
Perform Effects of
Ensembles
Personnel Services
Damage Control
Lessons Learned
Environmental
Considerations
Protective Equipment
Performance
Assessments
5
Tactical Technology Comment
“Over the past decade, the
exponential growth of e-mail and
the Internet in command and
control of joint, combined, and
Fleet operations has made
network reliability and
redundancy perhaps our most
"mission critical" concern for the
warfighter.”
Admiral Natter, Commander, Fleet Forces Command, 2002
6
Information Overload Comment
“The Global Hawk was awesome and the
amount of data that it collects is incredible.
The thing that we've learned from our
lessons learned is that the Global Hawk
will collect all of this great data, dump it
down to the people and we got so much
data that we were overwhelmed. So we had
the Global Hawk go off into a holding
pattern and we told it, 'Don't send us any
more stuff.'”
Brig. Gen. Gregory H. Power, Vice Commander, Headquarters 8th
Air Force, February 2004
7
Information Deficit Comment
“Tactical intelligence was impeded by
our speed of movement," Conway said.
"We just didn't have enough time to get
the reconnaissance out and mature the
picture as to what was in front of the
division and the regiment on a day-today basis. I don't think we can say we
had too much" intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance.”
Marine Lt. Gen. James Conway, Commander, 1st Marine
Expeditionary Force, February 2004
8
Recent HSI Timeline
10/01: Task Force EXCEL: 13 Learning Centers
7/02: CNO Stands Up NETWARCOM
4/03: SPAWAR Stands Up HSI Department
5/03: FORCEnet Conference: NAB Little Creek
5/03: Paul Wolfowitz USD (AT&L) signs the
5000.1 Defense Acquisition Directive
6/03: CNO addresses HSI Symposium
7/03: NETWARCOM FORCEnet OAG
8/03: First HSI-focused OIF L.L. Initiative
9/03: Human Performance Center Established
9
HSI Focus Deficit in OIF LL
Example: Dienhart, Roos, & Howard (2003) collected USMC
Lessons Learned at two locations in Iraq. Despite their focus of
communication technology, a USMC Major who also holds a Ph.D.
and works in the human factors area examined the list of 115 items.
His analysis concluded that 18 items or 15.7 percent were definitely
HSI related, although not directly stated as such. Another 60 of
them definitely were not HSI items, and the remaining 37 could
have some component of HSI, but more information was required
to make that determination.
NETWARCOM initiated an HSI-focused lessons
learned research initiative
10
OIF Tech Lessons Learned:
Federal Computer Week, March 29, 2004
“What didn't work:
Bandwidth allocation. DOD officials admit they need a better way to get
bandwidth to the troops who need it.
Data analysis on the fly. Battlefield commanders said they often received
raw data and images that they were expected to interpret. Military and
civilian defense leaders have called for reducing reaction time by
providing more machine-to-machine information and data analysis.
Soldier intercom radios. Soldiers have no confidence in the intercom radios, according to
Army officials. Soldiers bought handsets and longer antennas to increase the radios' range.
Ruggedized laptop computers. According to Army officials, the systems had a 30 percent
failure rate in the desert. Apparently, they weren't rugged enough.
Communications interoperability. Communication among U.S. military
services was relatively reliable, but talking to allied or coalition troops
proved to be more difficult.”
Directly relates to FORCEnet and HSI
11
HSI LL Research Initiative
OIF Platforms: Two of each kind (CV to SS)
Inclusive vs. narrow HSI focus
“Deckplate” focus (O-5 – E-3) versus unit commanders
Tactical & Non-tactical network experience
Scientifically based: Sampling error goal  5 %
Two formats (pilot tested twice)

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Interview
Self-administered form
Minimize impact on both commands & platform personnel
Resource limited (i.e., researchers and funding)
Kick-off message: COMNAVNETWARCOM/081748ZAUG2003//
12
HSI LL Initiative: 16 Command Visits
As of 8 March 2004, visited 9 commands on east coast / 7 on the west coast
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Carrier Air Wing Three
Carrier Group Two
USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-75)
USS Kearsarge (LHD-3)
USS Donald Cook (DDG-75)
USS Montpelier (SSN 765)
USS Iwo Jima (LHD-7)
USS Mitscher (DDG-57)
USS Boise (SSN-764)
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USS Shiloh (CG-67)
VAW 116
USS Tarawa (LHA-1)
VFA-137
USS Nimitz (CVN-68)
USS Milius (DDG-69)
USS Pearl Harbor (LSD-52)
Conducted 60 OIF HSI-focused interviews which provided 484 comments

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Side 1 of survey form
Opportunity to choose from 19 categories for discussion
Collected nearly 1,400 HSI-focused forms (as of 1 April 2004)
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Side 1 – rate, paygrade, OIF and current tasks, SW/HW used
Side 2 – nine areas to provide comments, plus six-point satisfaction score
Note: Form data from commands listed in blue have been entered into analysis database
13
HSI Categories
Survey form
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Habitability
Health Hazards
Human Factors Engineering
Information & Knowledge
Management
Internet
Manpower, Personnel & Training
Medical Factors
Personnel Survivability
Safety Factors
Interview – All categories from survey
form plus:
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Education
Battlespace Awareness
Command & Control
Decision Speed & Superiority
Collaboration
Data and Information Distribution
(included Internet)
Knowledge and Wisdom
ISR
Joint, Coalition & NGO Operations
Focused Logistics
Miscellaneous
14
OIF HSI-focused Interviews
Table 1: Interviewee Rank
Enlisted
N
Officer
N
E-4
2
W-2
1
E-5
6
W-3
2
E-6
10
O-1
2
E-7
10
O-2
7
E-8
2
O-3
9
O-4
7
O-5
2
All 60 interviews were conducted
with OIF-experienced
personnel, having either tactical
or non-tactical (or both)
network experience. Interviews
lasted about 40 minutes each, and
provided a total of 484 anonymous
comments in 19 categories
15
Frequency
HSI Form Respondents
400
40
350
35
300
30
250
25
200
20
150
15
100
10
50
5
0
0
E-2
E-3
E-4
E-5
E-6
E-7
Enlisted Pay Grade
E-8
E-9
W-2
W-3
O-1
O-2
O-3
Officer Pay Grade
O-4
O-5
16
HSI Interview Responses
Education & Training
Collaboration
HFE
Data and Info Distro
Focused Logistics
C2
Battlespace Aw areness
Category
Personnel
Manpow er
Based on 60 Interviews
from 15 Commands
Know ledge & Wisdom
Habitability
Medical Factors
Joint, Coalition & NGO Ops
ISR
Personnel Survivability
Decision Speed & Superiority
Health Hazards
System Safety
Misc
Not HSI
0
20
40
60
Number of Comments
80
100
120
17
6
450
5.5
400
5
350
4.5
300
4
250
3.5
200
3
150
2.5
100
2
Number of Comments Received (Enlisted)
Number of Comments Received (Officers)
Average Rating (Scale 1 – 6)
Habitability
Internet
Manpower,
Personnel &
Training
Human
Factors
Engineering
Health
Hazards
Information &
Knowledge
Mgmt
Medical
0
1.5
Safety
50
1
HSI Category
18
Average Rating
500
Personnel
Survivability
Number of Comments
HSI Form Responses
Preliminary Interview Findings
OIF HSI LL Outcome Themes:
Training: The number one issue in the Fleet
 Collaboration: The modern (21st Century) issue
is second
 Other important themes

Information and Knowledge Management
 Personal and Personnel Readiness
 Technology Usability Issues
 Habitability and Morale
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19
HSI Capability Issue 1 - Chat
Findings:
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Chat has emerged as one of the primary means of operational
communication and tasking
Chat was used by all platforms tactically and non-tactically
Evidence:
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56 interview comments from 15 different units regarding chat
usage (all units interviewed)
19 form comments from 9 different units regarding monitoring
chat and maintaining connectivity for chat
“We lived and died via chat and e-mail.”
20
Capability Issue 1 (Continued)
Preliminary Analysis:

Chat has become an integral
element of both tactical and nontactical warfighting operations

Why?
 Facilitates coordination and
collaboration
 Facilitates timely information
exchange
 Wide availability
 User friendly
 Can be used as person to
person or to broadcast
messages
21
Capability Issue 1 (Continued)
Preliminary analysis (cont.)
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Current shortfalls of chat becoming increasingly
visible
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No standard for chat software applications
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Multiple applications results in potential interoperability problems
and increased costs due to multiple licenses and duplication of
training effort
Limited TTP, protocols and policy (varied between chat rooms and
theaters)
Notable limited central management of chat rooms
Requires constant connectivity to participate in chat rooms
No user-specific feedback that all recipients have received and
understand the communication
Unreliable “logging” capability due to lack of official timestamp
and backup capability
22
Capability Issue 1 (Continued)
Recommendations:

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Investigate establishing chat as an official method to
disseminate tasking (CFFC / NETWARCOM / NWDC)
Conduct chat requirements analysis (timestamp, security,
number of users, joint/allied interoperability, etc.) (NETWARCOM /
SSC-SD)
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Research available chat software applications and establish/field
the standard (JFCOM / SPAWAR)
Develop, and test via Trident Warrior and other appropriate
experimentation venues, chat TTP, protocols and policy for
usage of chat (including investigating the most efficient means
of monitoring chat on each platform) (C2F / C3F)
Develop contingencies for when chat is unavailable (C2F / C3F)
23
HSI Capability Issue 2 – Info Mgmt
Findings:

Double-edged sword: There is too much
information from too many different sources
AND required information is not easily found
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Problem will only get worse as the Navy moves
forward digitally
No consistent way to verify accuracy or
reliability of data once found
Evidence:
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56 interview comments from 15 different units
(all units interviewed)
81 form comments from 13 different units (all
units in database)
“Defending America, in
today's rapidly changing
world, is contingent upon
the ability to process data
and information quickly.
Now, more than ever,
knowledge superiority and
integrated IT capabilities
are essential to not only
winning the war against
terrorism, but defending our
Nation as well.”
“There’s too much information out there –
we need information management.”
24
Capability Issue 2 (Continued)
Preliminary analysis:
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Personnel are being flooded with too much information
Difficult to compile/reconcile data from multiple sources
Difficult to determine which sources are authoritative
Unsure of where to find needed data
Personnel don’t have ready access to the data needed to
perform their jobs because
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Access (bandwidth, internet, time)
Unsure of appropriate source
Moreover, “114.5 million or 39 percent of Americans
used a search engine during January 2004.” *
* 114.5 million unique users represent “76 percent of the active online U.S. population.”
25
Capability Issue 2 (Continued)
Recommendations:
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Develop / field intelligent agents for SIPRNET (“Ask Jeeves”
type of capability) (SPAWAR)
Develop and implement information management plans during
Trident Warrior and other appropriate experimentation venues
(NETWARCOM / SPAWAR / C2F / C3F)
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Identify Navy POC for developing IM / KM DOTMLPF (DoN
CIO)
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Buy / develop information management processes and tools
(SYSCOMs)
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Ensure HSI is integral in individual C4I system design/updates
and across systems (NAVSEA)
Install more computers / LAN drops throughout the ship to
improve access (OPNAV / SPAWAR)
26
HSI Capability Issue 3 - Skills
Findings:
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Skills acquisition and performance support
tools have become increasingly critical given
optimum manning and increased optempo
Junior personnel arrive at their command with
inadequate skills to perform required tasks
Senior personnel are seldom adequately trained
to address technology upgrades
Evidence:
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68 interview comments from 15 different units
(all units interviewed)
242 form comments from 13 different units (all
units in database)
“Proficiency level on ships does not match
requirements.”
27
Capability Issue 3 (Continued)
Preliminary analysis:
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Personnel arrive at their command
with inadequate skills to perform
required tasks
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Results in under-utilization of untrained
personnel
Results in over-tasking of the trained
ship’s crew, who have to provide the
needed training when they can
Tasks take longer when personnel
don’t receive adequate training
Sailors require more access to
computers to take advantage of
computer based training
“With each advance in technology, the
human has become the increasingly weak
link in systems," says Harold P. Van Cott,
author of the foreword. To be competitive
in today's economy, corporations spend
billions of dollars each year to train their
employees. Yet only a tiny portion of this
expense is invested in research and
development to make training more
effective.” (2000)
28
Capability Issue 3 (Continued)
Recommendations:
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Sailors should arrive at commands with more hands-on expertise and
troubleshooting skills (NETC)
Each rate should have a standardized skills continuum tailored to platform
(i.e., ship class) (Task Force Warrior)
Develop performance support tools (Human Performance Center)
Officers and enlisted need basic skills on computer applications and web
sites they routinely use (MS Office, Turboprep, NAVFIT, NKO, etc.)
(NETC)
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Ensure adequate connectivity for training systems at sea (NETWARCOM)
Install more computers / LAN drops throughout the ship to support
education and training (OPNAV / SPAWAR)
Incorporate innovative / web-enabled training events during Trident Warrior
events (NETWARCOM / SPAWAR / C2F / C3F)
29
Identified Technology Issue:
NALCOMIS
“We use both NALCOMIS and IETMS but they do not work
together. They are two stovepipes by two different
contractors, and we have to retype the information (it is
double work). They are used for downloading discrepancies
from jets, and then creating the work order. They should be
integrated to work together.”
“I use three computer systems and they do not work together
(NMCI, NALCOMIS and IETMS). The whole thing
frustrates me. None of them talk to each other. I can’t
download what I need, and NALCOMIS is a DOS (command
line) system. It has not changed in 10 years or so.”
30
Interview Process Findings
OIF HSI LL Process Themes:
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Categories (e.g. Personnel & Education) sometimes convey
different meanings to interviewees
Current focused-interview process is insufficient
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Interview format should focus on specific tools and work processes
Should require interviewees sit at their workstations
Ideal time for interviews is during transit from theater to CONUS
Need more efficient way of collecting / analyzing data
Recommendations:

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Phase 2 of HSI LL should include small warfighter teams
at pre-selected workstations
Data collection process needs to be more automated
31
Link Between HSI LL Initiative and TW04
TW04 Initiative
FORCEnet Systems
Issue examples identified from HSI
Research Initiative Addressed in TW04
Sea Warrior
Integrated Learning Env,
5-Vector Model, Threaded
Discussion, Distance Spt
Centralized web-enabled foundational
and system specific training for several
C2 and network systems
Web-Enabled
Warrior
Chat, Email, NMCP, NITES,
TMIP
Information Mgmt /
Knowledge Mgmt
IM Plan
Standardized policy for sharing / finding
information (info rules of the road)
Networks
ADNS, EHF TIP, INMARSAT,
VIASAT
Means of providing better situational
awareness of the network environment
(BW status, constraints)
ISR-Fires
SACC-A, NFCS, TBMCS,
GCCS-M
Improved situational awareness and C2
processes (information exchange and
collaboration)
Standardized chat policy
32
Connection between FORCEnet
and HSI LL Initiative
Preliminary (Incomplete) Alignment Analysis
Expeditionary,
multi-tiered
sensor and weapon
information
6.4%
Dynamic, multi-path
and survivable
networks
14.5%
Human -centric
Integration
FORCEnet
Information
Effects
36.3%
Distributed, collaborative
command & control
31.8%
0.6%
Adaptive / automated
decision aids
10.3%
33
Value and Next Steps
Value of HSI Lessons Learned Effort

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Seldom, if ever, has the HSI perspective been given this empirical
visibility and this depth of analysis
HSI Lessons Learned effort needs to be continued during these times
of rapid technology and system changes
Recommended Next Steps

Phase 1 Platform Visits Completed
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Enter the remaining survey form data. Requires support!
Analysis and report generation
Derive requirements from findings and forward as appropriate
Design and Initiate Phase 2

Develop plan and methodology

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Expand to USMC
Develop website
Conduct onsite briefs / train crew prior to data collection
34
HSI Lessons Learned Summary
Although the Navy moves smartly into the
21st Century, there are substantial HSI issues
in the Fleet.
Heretofore, there has been no mechanism
for addressing the wide scope of traditional
and newer IT HSI topics collectively.
Important Fleet HSI LL and HSI process
methodology LL have been identified in this
preliminary report. The final report is
expected before the end of FY04.
35
Resources
Carl, C. (2003). "Bloggers and Their Blogs: A Depiction of the Users and Usage of
Weblogs on the World Wide Web." M.A. thesis in Communication, Culture and
Technology at Georgetown University: <link>
Clark, V. (2003). CNO’s Talk at HSI Symposium, June: <link> <Covenant leadership>
Dienhart, P., Roos, S. & Howard, M. (2003). Field Report Marine Corps Systems
Command Liaison Team Central Iraq 20 April to 25 April.
FORCEnet HSI webpage (2003) (I.E. only): <link>
FORCEnet: Turning Information into Power: <link>
Greenspan, R. (2003). "Blogging By The Numbers," CyberAtlas <link>
Human Systems Integration: <link>
Lyman, P. & Varian, H. (2003). How Much Information? Regents of the University of
California, October 27: <link>
Naval Network Warfare Command: <link>
NETWARCOM Stands Up: <link>
President Roosevelt: <link>
Sea Power 21: <link>
SC-OAG Seeks Deckplate's Input to Shape Future Navy: <link>
POC: George Edw. Seymour (DSN or 619) 553-8008
36
Contact Information
Points of Contacts:

George Edw. Seymour, Ph.D., Space and Naval Warfare
Systems Center, San Diego, CA DSN or (619) 553-8008
E-mail: seymour@spawar.navy.mil
http://www.2-SIR.com/TwinFalls/

LCDR Sally Van Horn, NETWARCOM FORCEnet
Architecture Team, Norfolk, VA (757) 417-6752 x6
DSN: 537-6752 x6,
E-mail: sally.vanhorn@navy.mil
37
Addenda: Backup Slides
Identified Technology Issues:
 SPINS
 TAMPS
 SAMS
Capability Issues Quotes:
 CHAT
 Information / Knowledge Management
 Training / Skills Management
38
HSI Technology Issue:
SPINS
“Had one guy on the ship creating SPINS. He
was very talented. It was on 8.5 x 11" paper.
Should be pictures in the cockpit. These are
mission critical and go along with the ATOs.
They are Joint, but standardization is a big
issue. All military aircraft use them. There
needs to be a better way - automated.”
Recommend: This issue be investigated.
39
Identified Technology Issue:
TAMPS
“TAMPS machine constantly down---the rep on board
was working it constantly. It is a mission computer, a
single point of failure. We have to put a brick in JRT.
MIDS uses it and HARM uses it.”
“WEPS 1.1 is terrible.During OIF used ATACS and it was
just as bad. Now we are expecting WASP (why did it take
so long) and use TAMPS (but it is UNIX based; that is not
good). We have a $60 million jet that is useless without
the proper tools.”
40
Identified Technology Issue:
Medical SAMS
“We are using legacy systems in Medical SAMS (SNAP
Automated Medical System), but it was designed for
smaller ships (about 500 people), and then expanded for
CVs. But it is archaic. Tried to make it fit Windows, but
did not work. It’s terrible. Need user-friendly system that
communicates with database (e.g., personnel) because
people have to maintain. At NPGS they had a web-based
system where all sailors logged on to check their medical
readiness. Tracking immunizations and health protection
topics are important.”
41
Capability Issue 1 – Chat Quotes
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Representative Quotes from the Fleet concerning chat’s effectiveness:
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“Tomahawk lived and died by chat…”
“Often got advance notification of launch involvement via chat.”
“Decision making information came via chat and e-mail.”
Representative Quotes from the Fleet regarding their concerns:

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“We need chat and NetMeeting on the same system. As of today, half the ships
say they do not have the bandwidth, tools or the space that the CVs have.”
“Daily Intentions Message – received via official message traffic, but by the time
the message was received, it was outdated, since it had been revised continually
via chat.”
“Used chat continuously. Two problems with chat – no timestamp associated
with entries (so it was difficult to get a sense of the timing involved); if unit
submerges or if connectivity is lost, there is no record of what transpired on the
chat when you re-establish contact.”
“Do we need a chat phone talker? Some ships did. Had 1 guy who did only type
and read. Another only on GCCS and back-up chat. The Launch Area
Coordinator needs to think….Sound power phones a good analogy because
Fireman Tim was not paid to think but to relay information.”
42
Capability Issue 1 – Chat Quotes
Chat and e-mail are tips of the digital iceberg, and
the Navy must explore other IP technologies:




“America Online’s AOL Instant Messenging Service (AIM) "estimates 1.6
billion AOL and AIM IMs are sent every day" (Edwards, 2003). Similarly,
the Kaiser Family Foundation found that 74 percent of online teens use
instant messaging (Henry J. Kaiser Foundation, 2002).”
“84 percent of Internet users say they have contacted or joined online groups
(Pew Internet and Family Life, 2001).”
“Blogcount (http://dijest.com/bc), a Web site dedicated to finding how many
blogs and bloggers are out there, suggest there are 2.4–2.9 million active
weblogs ("active" means they have been updated in the last eight weeks) as
of June 2003 (Greenspan, 2003).”
The Navy should take the initiative to create a Naval Semantic Web.
43
Capability Issue 1 – Chat Quotes
“So here's my prediction: Blogs will soon become a
staple in the information diet of every serious
businessperson, not because it's cool to read them, but
because those who don't read them will fail. In short,
blogs offer an accelerated and efficient approach to
acquiring and understanding the kind of information
all of us need to make business decisions...
Until recently, blogs have proven to be an incredibly
lousy source of information for most businesspeople.
Finding and keeping up with the relevant ones is far
too time-consuming. But I've recently started using a
newsreader, and after spending hours setting the damn
thing up, my business life has changed forever.” —
John Battelle, 2004
Visiting
Professor, UC
Berkeley and
one of the cofounders of
Wired
magazine.
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Capability Issue 2 – Info Mgmt Quotes

Representative Quotes from the Fleet:




“How do we determine the wheat from the chaff? Need a better
way of searching. Google is good. When we search on
SIPRNet, we get garbage.”
“Search Engine on SIPR doesn’t work.”
“Lessons learned are distributed on ships. Using message
traffic. Need a database or a website.”
“Too many sources – message traffic, GCCS-M, GBS,
SIPRNET, CNN, e-mail – need to get things from a single
source.”
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Capability Issue 3 - Skills Quotes
Representative Quotes from the Fleet:









“Need to train sailors better before coming to the Fleet (they are booksmart, but have difficulty troubleshooting equipment).”
“Proficiency level on ships does not match requirements.”
“Too much work is being dumped on the Fleet, especially in the area of
providing training.”
“Training for many of new systems that are being fielded isn’t adequate.”
“Command only uses experienced personnel at sea.”
“Lack of manpower leading up to cruise. Two check-ins needed training,
rapidly. Training did not always result in necessary skills acquisition.”
“Gained four new personnel just prior to cruise, useless, until end of
cruise. They created more work.”
“Need to standardize training and have set people give it.”
“Need single source for OJT.”
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Tactical Training Comment
“I feel very strongly that we have lost our
bearings when it comes to transformation
because most of the talk is not backed up
by solid intellectual analysis.”
Konetzni also blasted technology development and experimentation across the Navy,
singling out four programs for criticism:
the Joint Fires Network, Navy-Marine
Corps Intranet, mine warfare efforts and
the Battle Force Tactical Training (BFTT)
system.”
Vice Adm. Albert Konetzni, deputy commander and chief of staff
Atlantic Fleet, May, 2003
47