Conditions CP
Venezuela
Condition On Iran
CP 1NC
The United States federal government should [insert plan text] under the
condition that Venezuela cuts all ties with Iran.
The CP Solves and avoids the net-benefit –
Conditioning engagement is critical to cut Venezuela-Iran ties that result in
proliferation. They’ll say ‘yes’ with leverage.
Fleischman 6/13 (by Luis Fleischman on June 13, 2013 Luis Fleischman is the author of the
book, “Latin America in the Post-Chavez Era: The Security Threat to the United States.” “U.S.—
VENEZUELAN RELATIONS REVISITED” http://www.theamericasreport.com/2013/06/13/u-svenezuelan-relations-revisited/)
A week ago, during the annual general assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS), Secretary of State John Kerry met
with his Venezuelan counterpart, Elias Jaua, to discuss improvement of relations between the two countries. Relations between the
two have been severely strained during the 14- year rule of Hugo Chavez. The meeting took place when the United States
government had not yet officially recognized the legitimacy of President Nicolas Maduro whose election on April 14th raised
suspicions of fraud. The Obama Administration also supported a recount. The recount was conducted but without checking paper
ballots which the opposition had specifically requested. Since this was not done the opposition refused to recognize Maduro‘s
victory. Yet, the meeting between the two diplomats took place in a “positive” atmosphere. Secretary Kerry declared that both
countries agreed to “find a new way” forward. Venezuela, as a gesture, released from jail an American documentary filmmaker who
had been accused of conspiring against the government. There is nothing wrong when two parties whose relations are tense seek to
make things better. However, good relations between the U.S. and Venezuela must require that the government of Venezuela
radically change a very dangerous behavior. Arbitrary arrests, abuse of state resources, intimidation of the opposition, subjugation
of the judiciary, and demand of loyalty to the revolutionary government and other violations of rights are common practice in
today’s Venezuela. Neither the international community, the OAS, nor other countries of the region including the United States have
ever held the Venezuelan government accountable for these gross breaches of human rights. But this is not all. According to a report
by the U.S. Government Accountability Office in 2009, Venezuela extended a lifeline to Colombian illegal and armed groups by
providing them with significant support and safe haven along the border. As a result, these groups remain viable threats to
Colombian security and U.S.-Colombian counternarcotic efforts. The report provided evidence of the activities and cooperation
between the Venezuelan government with drug cartels and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) . The report
revealed that the flow of cocaine shipped from Venezuelan ports and airports to the United States, West Africa, and Europe
increased more than four times from 2004 to 2007 and continues to increase. Likewise, cocaine destined for the United States from
Venezuela transits through Central America, Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and other Caribbean islands. Between January
and July, 2008, numerous vessels with Venezuelan flags that were carrying large amounts of cocaine were seized. Furthermore, a
Colombian army raid in Ecuador in March, 2008 seized FARC computers and discovered documents belonging to FARC leader Raúl
Reyes (known as the Reyes files). The files indicated that the Venezuelan government may have provided the Colombian guerillas
with about $300 million in Russian weapons supplies. The files also seem to indicate that Chavez sought political and military
cooperation with the FARC at the same time as the Colombian government was denouncing the presence of FARC training camps
inside Venezuela. The FARC is a dangerous subversive force that threatens Colombia’s security and is also involved in drug
trafficking. While the United States is putting efforts into fighting drug traffickers in Mexico and other parts of Latin America,
Venezuela is providing them with a lifeline. The danger of this development is not only that drug trafficking poisons our population
and in particular our youth but that the drug business corrupts governments, security forces and the legal system. In Central
American countries are now facing a state of anarchy that is gradually creating another “Afghanistan” in our own hemisphere with
all the dangers that this implies. Venezuelan
relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran are no less
worrisome. The government of Venezuela has strengthened relations with Iran and has helped
Iran and its proxies increase their presence throughout the continent. As more countries joined Chavez’s
sphere of influence they also developed relations with Iran and Iran increased its presence in those countries. This includes a
growing presence of the Iranian proxy and terrorist group, Hezbollah, and the Iranian Republican Guards. A
Lebanese-born Venezuelan diplomat posted in the Venezuelan embassy in Syria and Lebanon, Ghazi Nasr al-Din, helped Hezbollah
raise money and facilitated the travel of its operatives from and to Venezuela.
Iran’s penetration into Latin America is
likely to grow under the influence of the Venezuelan Bolivarian revolution. Venezuela, along with
Syria and Cuba, have been the main supporters of Iran’s right to develop a nuclear weapon.
Venezuela helped Iran launder money through its banking system as well as selling the Iranians
gasoline so they could avoid international sanctions. Venezuela’s actions have been in clear violation of
international sanctions. Only a few days ago President Barack Obama increased sanctions on companies doing
business with Iran. As part of the sanctions protocol the United States will not do business with
companies or governments that help Iran avoid sanctions. If the sanctions law were fully
operationalized, the U.S. would no longer be buying Venezuelan oil. This would be a severe blow
to Venezuela but would make little difference to the U.S. Instead, Venezuela and Venezuelan
companies such as the oil giant Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) have never paid a serious price for their
dealings with Iran. Some reports, including one by former Manhattan district attorney Robert Morgenthau, even indicated
that Iran is trying to extract uranium from countries such as Venezuela and Bolivia. A scenario that
should not be ruled out is that if Iran develops nuclear capabilities it could use Venezuelan soil
to make the United States more vulnerable to an attack. Trying to diminish tensions and develop peaceful
relations with countries is a good goal to pursue. However, in the case of Venezuela, before peaceful and productive
relations can be established the United States government must set conditions demanding
that Venezuela completely cease its human rights violations and fully dismantle all its ties to terrorist groups and drug
cartels as well as ceasing to assist Iran in their effort to avoid sanctions.
Proliferation causes nuclear war
Monroe ‘12 [Robert, vice admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.), “Nonproliferation requires enforcement,”
9/12/2012, http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/249049-nonproliferationrequires-enforcement]
Proliferation of nuclear weapons among nations is the gravest threat facing the US and the
world. For twenty years two irresponsible and belligerent rogue states have been working intensely to develop nuclear weapons
production capabilities. The world has protested and wrung its hands. North Korea has now tested primitive weapons, and Iran is
close to producing them. When North Korea succeeds in weaponizing its designs, it will sell them to anyone desiring to buy –
including terrorists. Neighboring states such as South Korea and Japan will be forced to go nuclear in self-protection. Iran’s
acquisition of nuclear weapons – and its likely willingness to give them to proxies such as
Hezbollah, Hamas, and Al Qaeda for use – will stimulate another regional surge of proliferation
as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and others follow suit. In no time the cascade will be global, as
states like Venezuela, Germany, Brazil, and Argentina, rush to protect themselves. With nuclear weapons
widespread, and nuclear material even more readily available, terrorist acquisition of nuclear
weapons will not be difficult. We’re moving toward a world of nuclear horror and chaos, a
return from which appears impossible.
Solvency
The CP Solves – Now is the time for Venezuela to sever ties with Iran.
Venezuela says yes if we use our leverage.
Kredo 3/6 (BY: Adam Kredo March 6, 2013 3:50 pm Adam Kredo is senior writer for the
Washington Free Beacon. Formerly an award-winning political reporter for the Washington
Jewish Week, where he frequently broke national news, Kredo’s work has been featured in
outlets such as the Jerusalem Post, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, and Politico, among others
“After Death of Chavez, Iran-Venezuela Alliance in Doubt” http://freebeacon.com/after-deathof-chavez-iran-venezuela-alliance-in-doubt/)
The death of Venezuelan dictator Hugo Chavez may spark an internal battle between socialist
leaders and terrorist groups such as Hezbollah that have long served as Chavez allies, according to a foreign policy
expert. Chavez, who died late Tuesday of cancer at age 58, was described as a unique leftist dictator during a conference call
Wednesday sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute. Chavez both espoused a strict socialist dogma and courted
Muslim extremists in Iran and elsewhere, providing them safe haven in Venezuela where groups such as Hezbollah
have even had sway in government. Anti-Semitism and anti-Israel fervor increased during Chavez’s reign. Venezuela’s small Jewish
community grew to live in fear of Chavez as he denounced Israel at the behest of the Iranians. One
expert now doubts
Chavez’s socialist successors will continue the alliance with Iran and Hezbollah, however. “I don’t
think Chavez’s successors would have any interest in continuing that” relationship, said Roger
Noriega, a former assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs. “But how do you extricate” a known terrorist
organization? Noriega asked. An already entrenched Hezbollah could fight hard to retain its place in Venezuela, Noriega said.
“There
are Hezbollah cells that not only operate in Venezuelan territory, but the Venezuelan
government and the Venezuelan economy has become an important tool for Iran to launder
money and evade sanctions,” he said. “They’re not going to give that up easily.” “Iranians will try to maintain a
presence” in the oil-rich South American province, he added. “Right now,” Noriega said, “they’re probably sort of hunkering
down and holding on for as long as they can.” U.S. leaders could entice Venezuela’s new power brokers to
break ties with Iran. “I think if the U.S. is serious in it’s diplomacy, we could put this on the table
as something that needs to be addressed—send Hezbollah packing and [end] the relationship
with Iran … as a precondition for normalizing relations.” Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad offered
condolences soon after Chavez died. “Hugo Chavez is a name known to all nations. His name is a reminder of cleanliness and
kindness, bravery … dedication and tireless efforts to serve the people, especially the poor and those scarred by colonialism and
imperialism,” Ahmadinejad said in a statement posted online. “I offer my condolences to all nations, the great nation of Venezuela,
and his respected family over this tragic event,” Ahmadinejad added. Noriega also said during the call that even Chavez confidants
are scrambling in response to his death. This could lead to infighting and government distress as leaders jockey to replace Chavez.
He “kept even his followers in his inner circle in the dark about his terminal situation,” Noriega said. “So they haven’t discussed how
to hold power. … This will be complicated.” Liberal outlets such as the Huffington Post have mourned Chavez’s death and discussed
his vice president, Nicolas Maduro, as a likely successor. However, Noriega disputed that assumption. “You can’t take anything for
granted today,” said Noriega, noting that the only certainty in Venezuela is looming instability. “For example, most of the major
media are referring to Maduro as the natural successor and legal successor but that isn’t necessarily the case.” The
Venezuelan opposition has its best opportunity in years to make in-roads among the electorate, which
supported Chavez but has expressed less support for his government in general. Maduro does not possess the same
cult of personality that Chavez had, Noriega said. “Maduro has underwhelmed people in the last 90 days when he’s
emerged in Chavez’s absence,” he said. “He hasn’t grown into the role of the successor.” “Maduro has not projected the
kind of charisma and command that some thought he might be able to do,” he said. Given this, “anything
can happen” if elections actually take place in the coming weeks.
The removal of Iran should be a precondition to investment—Venezuela is too
unstable otherwise
Noriega 3/5 (Roger Noriega | March 5, 2013, 4:59 pm Roger Noriega, a former assistant
secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs (Canada, Latin America, and the Caribbean)
and a former U.S. ambassador to the Organization of American States. He coordinates AEI's
program on Latin America and writes for the Institute's Latin American Outlook series, A postChávez checklist for US policymakers “A post-Chávez checklist for US policymakers”
http://www.aei-ideas.org/2013/03/a-post-chavez-checklist-for-us-policymakers/)
With the impending demise of Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chávez, US policymakers should follow a rule that Chávez’s Cuban
medical team ignored: Primum non nocere — First,
do no harm. The State Department should set aside any
plans that would legitimize a successor regime in Caracas, at least until key demands are met:
The ouster of narco-kingpins who now hold senior posts in government; The respect for a constitutional
succession; The adoption of meaningful electoral reforms to ensure a fair campaign environment and a transparent vote count in
expected presidential elections; and The
dismantling of Iranian and Hezbollah networks in Venezuela.
Now is the time for US diplomats to begin a quiet dialogue with key regional powers to explain
the high cost of Chávez’s criminal regime, including the impact of chavista complicity with
narcotraffickers who sow mayhem in Colombia, Central America, and Mexico. Perhaps then we can convince regional leaders
to show solidarity with Venezuelan democrats who want to restore a commitment to the rule of law and to rebuild an economy that
can be an engine for growth in South America. As Venezuelan democrats wage that struggle against chavismo, regional leaders must
make clear that Syria-style repression will never be tolerated in the Americas. We should defend the right of Venezuelans to struggle
democratically to reclaim control of their country and its future. Only
Washington can make clear to Chinese, Russian,
Iranian, and Cuban leaders that, yes, the United States does mind if they try to sustain an
undemocratic and hostile regime in Venezuela. Any attempt to suppress their selfdetermination with Chinese cash, Russian arms, Iranian terrorists, or Cuban thuggery will be met with a
coordinated regional response. US law enforcement and prosecutors can do their part by putting criminal kingpins in jail
or, at the very least, on the defensive so they cannot threaten or undermine a reform agenda. US development agencies should
work with friends in the region to form a task force of private sector representatives, economists, and engineers to work with
Venezuelans to identify the economic reforms, infrastructure investments, security assistance, and humanitarian aid that will be
required to stabilize and rebuild that country. Of course, the expectation will be that all the costs of these activities will be borne by
an oil sector restored to productivity and profitability. Finally, we need to work with like-minded nations to reinvigorate regional
organizations committed to democracy, human rights, anti-drug cooperation, and hemispheric solidarity, which have been neutered
by Chávez’s destructive agenda.
Iran and Venezuela will strengthen ties absent the US—investments and
current rhetoric
Noriega 4/11 (BY ROGER F. NORIEGA | APRIL 11, 2012 Roger F. Noriega was ambassador to the
Organization of American States from 2001-2003 and assistant secretary of state from 20032005. He is a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and managing director of Vision
Americas LLC, which represents U.S. and foreign clients, and contributes to
www.interamericansecuritywatch.com. “After Chávez, the Narcostate”
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/11/after_chavez_the_narcostate?page=0,1)
Venezuelan leader Hugo Chávez has tried for 10 months to conceal the fact that he is losing his bout with cancer, determined to
appear in command of his revolutionary regime and the nation's future. This past Holy Week, however, television cameras captured
him pleading for his life before a crucifix in his hometown church, his mother looking on without the slightest glint of hope on her
face. Chávez's raw emotion startled his inner circle and led some to question his mental health. As a result, according to my sources
inside the presidential palace, Minister of Defense Gen. Henry Rangel Silva has developed a plan to impose martial law if Chávez's
deteriorating condition causes any hint of instability. Pretty dramatic stuff. So why isn't anyone outside Venezuela paying attention?
Some cynics in that country still believe Chávez is hyping his illness for political advantage, while his most fervent followers expect
him to make a miraculous recovery. The democratic opposition is cautiously preparing for a competitive presidential election set for
Oct. 7 -- against Chávez or a substitute. And policymakers in Washington and most regional capitals are slumbering on the sidelines.
In my estimation, the approaching death of the Venezuelan caudillo could put the country on the path toward a political and social
meltdown. The military cadre installed by Chávez in January already is behaving like a de facto regime determined to hold onto
power at all costs. And Havana, Tehran, Moscow, and Beijing are
moving to protect their interests. If U.S.
President Barack Obama were to show some energetic engagement as Chávez fades, he could
begin to put the brakes on Venezuela's slide, reverse Chávismo's destructive agenda, and
reclaim a role for the United States in its own neighborhood. But if he fails to act, there will be hell to pay.
Sources close to Chávez's medical team tell me that for months, his doctors have been doing little more than treating symptoms,
trying to stabilize their workaholic patient long enough to administer last-ditch chemo and radiation therapies. In that moment of
Chávez's very public prayer for a miracle, he set aside his obsession with routing his opposition or engineering a succession of power
to hardline loyalists. Perhaps he knows that his lieutenants and foreign allies are behaving as if he were already dead -- consolidating
power, fashioning a "revolutionary junta," and plotting repressive measures. One of them is longtime Chávista operator and military
man Diosdado Cabello, who was installed by Chávez to lead the ruling party as well as the National Assembly in January. Cabello's
appointment was meant to reassure a powerful cadre of narcomilitares -- Gen. Rangel Silva, Army Gen. Cliver Alcalá, retired
intelligence chief Gen. Hugo Carvajal, and half a dozen other senior officers who have been branded drug "kingpins" by the U.S.
government. These ruthless men will never surrender power and the impunity that goes with it -- and they have no illusions that
elections will confer "legitimacy" on a Venezuelan narco-state, relying instead on billions of
dollars in ill-gotten gain and tens of thousands of soldiers under their command. Chavismo's civilian
leadership -- including Foreign Minister Nicolás Maduro, Vice President Elías Jaua, and the president's brother, Adán Chávez, the
governor of the Chávez family's home state of Barinas -- are eager to vindicate their movement's ideological agenda at the polls this
fall. Maduro is extraordinarily loyal to the president, and is considered by Venezuelan political observers as the most viable
substitute on the ballot. Above all, these men crave political
power and will jockey to make themselves
indispensable to the military leaders who are calling the shots today. Cuba's Fidel and Raúl Castro are
desperate to preserve the life-blood of Venezuelan oil that sustains their bankrupt regime. According to a source who was briefed on
conversations in Cuba, Raúl has counseled Chávez to prepare to pass power to a "revolutionary junta"; Venezuelans who are
suspicious of the Castros expect them to pack the junta with men loyal to Havana. Cabello does not trust the Castros, but with
thousands of Cuban intelligence officers and triggermen on the ground in Venezuela, the Castro brothers are a force to be reckoned
with. The Chinese have provided more than $20 billion in quickie loans to Chávez in the last 18 months, which are to be repaid by oil
at well below the market price. Most of these funds were paid into Chávez's slush funds before the Chinese knew of his terminal
condition. Another $4 billion is being negotiated now, but my sources in the Venezuelan Foreign Ministry say the Chinese are
demanding new guarantees. Beijing also is angling to ensure that any post-Chávez government will honor its sweetheart deals.
Iran is
more dependent than ever on its banks and other ventures in Venezuela as a means to launder
billions in funds to evade tightening international financial sanctions. Companies associated with the
However, these predatory contracts are being scrutinized by leading opposition members of the National Assembly.
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Qods Force, and illicit nuclear and ballistic missile programs have invested millions in
infrastructure in shadowy facilities throughout Venezuela. Tehran will struggle to keep its beachhead near U.S. soil, which is vital to
its survival strategy in the critical months ahead. Russia is considering making $1-2 billion in payments in the weeks ahead to lock in
natural gas and oil deals signed with Chávez. Some in Moscow, however, are weary of the Venezuelan shakedown, particularly
because they know that Chávez's days are numbered. Russian firms are deciding now whether to double down on the Chávez
regime, which has been a reliable customer of more than $13 billion in Russian arms, or wait to see if a successor government will
honor its agreements in the oil and gas sector. The Soviet-style succession that corrupt Chavistas and their Cuban handlers are trying
to impose on the Venezuelan people is anything but a done deal. There is room and time for friends of democracy to play a
constructive role. Cabello and company, my sources tell me, are far more likely to resort to unconstitutional measures and
repression if they can count on support from Moscow and Beijing. The Chavistas intend to promise continued cheap oil and
sweetheart contracts to leverage this support. Discreet U.S. diplomacy -- working in concert with like-minded allies -- can help
scuttle these plans. The Chinese and Russians may not be eager to defend yet another violent pariah regime, and Washington should
rally Latin American leaders to draw the line against a Syria scenario in the Western Hemisphere. At the heart of the Chavista
strategy is a narco-state, led by men with well-documented ties to narco-trafficking. The White House should instruct U.S. law
enforcement agencies to smash the foundations of this regime. One Venezuelan general or corrupt judge in a witness box in a U.S.
federal courthouse will strike the regime at the very top and destroy any illusion of legitimacy or survivability. U.S.
intelligence
agencies have been virtually blind to the Iranian presence in Venezuela. If they were instructed to kick
over the rocks to see what is crawling underneath, I am convinced that they would discover a grave and growing
threat against the security of the United States and its allies in the region. Such evidence will help
motivate Venezuela's neighbors to take a stand against an even more unaccountable regime taking shape in Caracas. Venezuela's
military is not a monolith, and Chávez has undermined his own succession strategy by giving the narco-generals such visible and
operational roles. The fact that the narco-generals will be more willing to resort to unconstitutional measures and repression to
keep power and carry the "narco" label sets them apart from the rank-and-file soldiers and institutionalist generals. The
United
States military still carries a lot of weight with these men. A simple admonition to respect their constitution
and serve their people may split the bulk of the force away from the narcos and deny them the means to impose their will.
(Institutionalist generals may react in a similar way to news that Iran is conducting secret operations on Venezuelan territory that
are both unconstitutional and a dangerous provocation.) There is much the United States and the international community can do
without interfering in Venezuela's internal politics. Although the leaders of the democratic opposition are determined to keep their
distance from Washington, they
must at least show the flag in the United States and other key countries
to elicit the solidarity they deserve. Moreover, anyone who thinks the opposition can take on Cuba, China, Russia, Iran, drug
traffickers, and Hezbollah without international backing is just not thinking straight. Unfortunately, the career U.S.
diplomats in Washington responsible for Venezuela have spent the last two years downplaying
the mess there and the three years before that neglecting it altogether. So if there is any hope
for U.S. leadership, it will require the attention of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton or President Obama. Alas, in our own
neighborhood, "leading from behind" is not an option.
Iran-Venezuela Uniqueness
Iran and Venezuela will strengthen ties absent the US—investments and
current rhetoric
Noriega 4/11 (BY ROGER F. NORIEGA | APRIL 11, 2012 Roger F. Noriega was ambassador to the
Organization of American States from 2001-2003 and assistant secretary of state from 20032005. He is a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and managing director of Vision
Americas LLC, which represents U.S. and foreign clients, and contributes to
www.interamericansecuritywatch.com. “After Chávez, the Narcostate”
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/11/after_chavez_the_narcostate?page=0,1)
Venezuelan leader Hugo Chávez has tried for 10 months to conceal the fact that he is losing his bout with cancer, determined to
appear in command of his revolutionary regime and the nation's future. This past Holy Week, however, television cameras captured
him pleading for his life before a crucifix in his hometown church, his mother looking on without the slightest glint of hope on her
face. Chávez's raw emotion startled his inner circle and led some to question his mental health. As a result, according to my sources
inside the presidential palace, Minister of Defense Gen. Henry Rangel Silva has developed a plan to impose martial law if Chávez's
deteriorating condition causes any hint of instability. Pretty dramatic stuff. So why isn't anyone outside Venezuela paying attention?
Some cynics in that country still believe Chávez is hyping his illness for political advantage, while his most fervent followers expect
him to make a miraculous recovery. The democratic opposition is cautiously preparing for a competitive presidential election set for
Oct. 7 -- against Chávez or a substitute. And policymakers in Washington and most regional capitals are slumbering on the sidelines.
In my estimation, the approaching death of the Venezuelan caudillo could put the country on the path toward a political and social
meltdown. The military cadre installed by Chávez in January already is behaving like a de facto regime determined to hold onto
power at all costs. And Havana, Tehran, Moscow, and Beijing are
moving to protect their interests. If U.S.
President Barack Obama were to show some energetic engagement as Chávez fades, he could
begin to put the brakes on Venezuela's slide, reverse Chávismo's destructive agenda, and
reclaim a role for the United States in its own neighborhood. But if he fails to act, there will be hell to pay.
Sources close to Chávez's medical team tell me that for months, his doctors have been doing little more than treating symptoms,
trying to stabilize their workaholic patient long enough to administer last-ditch chemo and radiation therapies. In that moment of
Chávez's very public prayer for a miracle, he set aside his obsession with routing his opposition or engineering a succession of power
to hardline loyalists. Perhaps he knows that his lieutenants and foreign allies are behaving as if he were already dead -- consolidating
power, fashioning a "revolutionary junta," and plotting repressive measures. One of them is longtime Chávista operator and military
man Diosdado Cabello, who was installed by Chávez to lead the ruling party as well as the National Assembly in January. Cabello's
appointment was meant to reassure a powerful cadre of narcomilitares -- Gen. Rangel Silva, Army Gen. Cliver Alcalá, retired
intelligence chief Gen. Hugo Carvajal, and half a dozen other senior officers who have been branded drug "kingpins" by the U.S.
government. These ruthless men will never surrender power and the impunity that goes with it -- and they have no illusions that
elections will confer "legitimacy" on a Venezuelan narco-state, relying instead on billions of
dollars in ill-gotten gain and tens of thousands of soldiers under their command. Chavismo's civilian
leadership -- including Foreign Minister Nicolás Maduro, Vice President Elías Jaua, and the president's brother, Adán Chávez, the
governor of the Chávez family's home state of Barinas -- are eager to vindicate their movement's ideological agenda at the polls this
fall. Maduro is extraordinarily loyal to the president, and is considered by Venezuelan political observers as the most viable
substitute on the ballot. Above all, these men crave political
power and will jockey to make themselves
indispensable to the military leaders who are calling the shots today. Cuba's Fidel and Raúl Castro are
desperate to preserve the life-blood of Venezuelan oil that sustains their bankrupt regime. According to a source who was briefed on
conversations in Cuba, Raúl has counseled Chávez to prepare to pass power to a "revolutionary junta"; Venezuelans who are
suspicious of the Castros expect them to pack the junta with men loyal to Havana. Cabello does not trust the Castros, but with
thousands of Cuban intelligence officers and triggermen on the ground in Venezuela, the Castro brothers are a force to be reckoned
with. The Chinese have provided more than $20 billion in quickie loans to Chávez in the last 18 months, which are to be repaid by oil
at well below the market price. Most of these funds were paid into Chávez's slush funds before the Chinese knew of his terminal
condition. Another $4 billion is being negotiated now, but my sources in the Venezuelan Foreign Ministry say the Chinese are
demanding new guarantees. Beijing also is angling to ensure that any post-Chávez government will honor its sweetheart deals.
Iran is
more dependent than ever on its banks and other ventures in Venezuela as a means to launder
billions in funds to evade tightening international financial sanctions. Companies associated with the
However, these predatory contracts are being scrutinized by leading opposition members of the National Assembly.
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Qods Force, and illicit nuclear and ballistic missile programs have invested millions in
infrastructure in shadowy facilities throughout Venezuela. Tehran will struggle to keep its beachhead near U.S. soil, which is vital to
its survival strategy in the critical months ahead. Russia is considering making $1-2 billion in payments in the weeks ahead to lock in
natural gas and oil deals signed with Chávez. Some in Moscow, however, are weary of the Venezuelan shakedown, particularly
because they know that Chávez's days are numbered. Russian firms are deciding now whether to double down on the Chávez
regime, which has been a reliable customer of more than $13 billion in Russian arms, or wait to see if a successor government will
honor its agreements in the oil and gas sector. The Soviet-style succession that corrupt Chavistas and their Cuban handlers are trying
to impose on the Venezuelan people is anything but a done deal. There is room and time for friends of democracy to play a
constructive role. Cabello and company, my sources tell me, are far more likely to resort to unconstitutional measures and
repression if they can count on support from Moscow and Beijing. The Chavistas intend to promise continued cheap oil and
sweetheart contracts to leverage this support. Discreet U.S. diplomacy -- working in concert with like-minded allies -- can help
scuttle these plans. The Chinese and Russians may not be eager to defend yet another violent pariah regime, and Washington should
rally Latin American leaders to draw the line against a Syria scenario in the Western Hemisphere. At the heart of the Chavista
strategy is a narco-state, led by men with well-documented ties to narco-trafficking. The White House should instruct U.S. law
enforcement agencies to smash the foundations of this regime. One Venezuelan general or corrupt judge in a witness box in a U.S.
federal courthouse will strike the regime at the very top and destroy any illusion of legitimacy or survivability. U.S.
intelligence
agencies have been virtually blind to the Iranian presence in Venezuela. If they were instructed to kick
over the rocks to see what is crawling underneath, I am convinced that they would discover a grave and growing
threat against the security of the United States and its allies in the region. Such evidence will help
motivate Venezuela's neighbors to take a stand against an even more unaccountable regime taking shape in Caracas. Venezuela's
military is not a monolith, and Chávez has undermined his own succession strategy by giving the narco-generals such visible and
operational roles. The fact that the narco-generals will be more willing to resort to unconstitutional measures and repression to
keep power and carry the "narco" label sets them apart from the rank-and-file soldiers and institutionalist generals. The
United
States military still carries a lot of weight with these men. A simple admonition to respect their constitution
and serve their people may split the bulk of the force away from the narcos and deny them the means to impose their will.
(Institutionalist generals may react in a similar way to news that Iran is conducting secret operations on Venezuelan territory that
are both unconstitutional and a dangerous provocation.) There is much the United States and the international community can do
without interfering in Venezuela's internal politics. Although the leaders of the democratic opposition are determined to keep their
distance from Washington, they
must at least show the flag in the United States and other key countries
to elicit the solidarity they deserve. Moreover, anyone who thinks the opposition can take on Cuba, China, Russia, Iran, drug
traffickers, and Hezbollah without international backing is just not thinking straight. Unfortunately, the career U.S.
diplomats in Washington responsible for Venezuela have spent the last two years downplaying
the mess there and the three years before that neglecting it altogether. So if there is any hope
for U.S. leadership, it will require the attention of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton or President Obama. Alas, in our own
neighborhood, "leading from behind" is not an option.
Iran needs Venezuela—previous investments means Khameini will always work
with Venezuela
Habibinia 4/29 (Omid Habibinia April 29, 2013 Omid Habibinia is an Iranian journalist and
media researcher, and the co-founder of the International Association of Independent Iranian
Journalists. “Iran-Venezuela ties: win-win game for reformists and conservatives”
http://www.yourmiddleeast.com/columns/article/iranvenezuela-ties-winwin-game-forreformists-and-conservatives_13490)
On Wednesday, Iranian president Ahmadinejad’s government announced a day of mourning in respect of Hugo Chavez death,
despite the fact that some clergies criticized the decision. Iranians quickly reacted to Chavez passing, and few were surprised when
Ahmadinejad said that he would travel to Venezuela to attend the funeral. What was strange though is his religious condolence
message, in which he wrote that Hugo Chavez will return along with Messiah and the 12th Imam at the apocalypse to establish
justice in the world. Iran
and Venezuela have enjoyed strong ties ever since Khatami’s term and both
Khatami and Chavez regularly visited their respective capitals. This relationship has deepened during
Ahmadinejad’s reign; Chavez visited Tehran 13 times after his rise to power in 1999, and Ahmadinejad has himself been to
Venezuela six times after he became president in 2005. ALSO READ Memories of Tehran International School Iran
got
increasingly involved in Venezuela’s economy with large-scale projects through companies run
by the Islamic Republican Guards or groups connected to them. Private companies started to
“win” major deals such as hospitals, road construction, and housing complexes in Venezuela. In a
2012 report from The American Foreign Policy Council, Norman Bailey wrote: ”Since 2005, with Venezuela’s assistance, Iran has
created an extensive regional network of economic, diplomatic, industrial and commercial
activities, with significant effect. The sum total of Iran’s declared investments in the region now stands at some $20
billion.” Kayson is one of the biggest private companies working in Venezuela, but it came under scrutiny by oppositional media
when it was clear that it had ties with the Iranian government. The company is owned by reformist technocrats, yet work closely
with the current conservative government in Iran. When it comes to money-making machines, there seems to be no war between
the political factions. Last year, leftist oppositional media accused reformist politicians to have shares or ownership in Kayson and
because of these benefits their relatives can easily go back and fourth to Iran without difficulty. One of those ending up in the
spotlight was Farrokh Negahdar, ex-leader of Fadaian Khalgh Organisation (Majority), who is now a main reformist figure abroad. He
was accused to reap huge economic benefits and of being a conformist. Negahdar recently denied the accusation and said he is not
the owner of the company but stated that one of his close relatives inside Iran owns it. Last month, another scandal for the company
emerged when Tahmaseb Mazaheri, Khatami’s economic minister and Iran’s former central bank chief, was interrogated at
Dusseldorf airport by German police for not indicating that he carried a 300 million Bolivar cheque (equivalent of nearly $70 million).
Kayson denied assumptions that any suspicious activities were behind the episode, saying Mazaheri merely transported the check as
a favor to the company. The incident brought more curiosity to the Kayson Company and its possible ties to the current Iranian
government. At the same time reformists abroad, who have always warned the alternative movement to not go too far in its
rhetoric and actions against the establishment, seems to believe the regime is capable of reform. They
write letters to
Khamenei and put forward demands to the head of the judiciary to show they believe in the
legitimacy of the Islamic Republic. Such political games, negotiations and lobbying make segments of the traditional
Iranian opposition angry and ultimately dissatisfied with anything less then the overthrow of the regime and the establishment of a
laïque democratic republic.
Ties increasing now—Maduro’s election only amplifies their reliance on each
other, recent meetings prove
PTV 4/20 (Press TV Sat Apr 20, 2013 5:41AM Press TV takes revolutionary steps as the first
Iranian international news network based in Tehran. “Iran to stand united with Venezuela to
achieve justice: Ahmadinejad” http://www.presstv.com/detail/2013/04/20/299226/iran-tostand-united-with-venezuela/)
Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has reaffirmed Iran’s resolve to stand united with the
Venezuelan nation for the achievement of justice and prosperity. Ahmadinejad arrived in the Venezuelan
capital, Caracas, on Friday to take part in the inauguration ceremony of the Latin American country’s new President Nicolas Maduro.
Speaking to reporters upon his arrival at the airport, Ahmadinejad
pointed to the pressures by the hegemonic
powers and the enemies of humanity against the world’s independent nations, adding, “The
Iranian nation stands by the Venezuelan nation in the path of progress and justice.”
Ahmadinejad congratulated the Venezuelan nation for holding a successful presidential election and hailed Maduro as
“a dear brother who has been trusted by the great Venezuelan nation.” Maduro was declared the winner
of Venezuela's presidential election on Sunday. He won 50.7 percent of the vote against 49.1 percent for opposition candidate
Henrique Capriles, a difference of 235,000 ballots. “The
great country of Venezuela is on the threshold of a
glorious path and it undertakes a great and historic mission,” the Iranian chief executive pointed out. On
March 8, Maduro became Venezuela’s acting president, following the death of late President Hugo Chavez, who lost a two-year-long
battle with cancer on March 5. Maduro has promised to continue the socialist policies of the former leader. “Firstly, the
Venezuelan nation must make rapid progress and build an advanced, prosperous and powerful
country, and, on the other hand, it should keep the flag of justice and freedom hoisted across
Latin America,” he said. Ahmadinejad expressed confidence that the Venezuelan nation can
fulfill that goal through unity. The Iranian president noted that the entire world is embroiled in acute problems
and called on all the independent states to join efforts in an attempt to solve the existing
problems and create a promising future.
Ties are strengthening—President elect of Iran and Maduro to meet
AP 6/18 (Associated Press June 18, 2013 08:37 PM “Venezuela's Maduro to meet Iran's Hassan
Rowhani” http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/International/2013/Jun-18/220814-venezuelasmaduro-to-meet-irans-hassan-rowhani.ashx#axzz2ZX0PdCi2)
CARACAS, Venezuela: Venezuela's President Nicolas Maduro says he'll meet soon with Iran's President-elect
Hassan Rowhani to further strengthen already close relations. Maduro announced plans for a meeting
through Twitter on Tuesday, saying that he recently spoke with Rowhani and they agreed to meet. He did not offer details.
Venezuela deepened trade with Iran under the leadership of the late president Hugo Chavez.
Iranian companies were enlisted to help build public housing in the South American country. Iran and Venezuela also launched joint
ventures including a tractor factory and dairy plants, and the
two countries have been united in their opposition
to what they say is Washington's hegemony in international affairs. Venezuela defends Iran's
nuclear energy program. The West suspects Iran intends to build nuclear weapons, a charge Iran denies.
Iran-Venezuelan relations will remain strong—trade and recent rhetoric
Davidovich 3/10 (By JOSHUA DAVIDOVICH March 10, 2013, 6:09 am, reporter for “The Time of
Israel,” “Ahmadinejad indicates West should not expect diplomatic opening after Chavez’s
death” http://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-vows-ties-with-venezuela-to-remain-firm/)
Iran and Venezuela will continue to have strong ties, Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
promised Saturday, after returning to Tehran from Caracas, where he attended Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez’s funeral.
Ahmadinejad’s remarks came a day after he drew flack for saying that Chavez, who died last week after a long battle with cancer,
would be resurrected and “return alongside Jesus Christ and Mehdi [the hidden imam] to establish peace and justice in the world.”
The death of the firebrand leftist leader had led some to believe the Latin American country might soften its stance toward the West
and distance itself from Iran, which has become a pariah over its illicit nuclear program. But Ahmadinejad, who is to step down later
this year, said Tehran
and Caracas would continue to support each other no matter who was in
charge. “The Iranian nation has strong bonds with revolutionary nations and we do help to the
strengthening of these ties so that no one can imagine that a vacuum will be created in our
relations due to the death of Chavez,” the Iranian president said, according to the semi-official Fars News agency.
Annual bilateral trade between the two countries is estimated to be in the hundreds of million
of US dollars, and Chavez and Ahmadinejad were frequent visitors to each other’s countries.
However, some Iranian pundits have said that the two countries, who share little in common other than an anti-Western attitude,
could not continue to be such strong allies. “Definitely
this will have an impact on Iran’s relations with
Venezuela,” Iranian political analyst Sadegh Zibakalam told The Wall Street Journal. After Chavez’s death on Tuesday, Israeli
diplomatic officials said Jerusalem was trying to assess whether Chavez’s departure could offer Israel an opportunity to mend ties.
The officials spoke to The Times of Israel on condition of anonymity due to the sensitive nature of the issue. While Chavez’s
handpicked successor Nicolas Maduro would likely maintain ties with Iran, his presumptive challenger in
elections next month, Henrique Capriles, who has Jewish roots and is the grandson of Holocaust survivors, might take a different
stance vis-a-vis the Islamic Republic. Ahmadinejad attended Chavez’s funeral in Caracas on Friday, joining
Maduro’s
accusation that the leader “had been killed by enemies.” However, he drew criticism at home after posting on
his personal website that Chavez would return along with Jesus and the Mahdi, a mystical “13th imam” who, in Shiite theology, is
thought will return to Earth to usher in a Utopian era.
Impacts
Iran ties with Venezuela are a threat—Venezuela is their gateway to America,
and they’re expanding now—intensified Iranian diplomatic and military and
commercial activity in the region
Rotella 7/11 (By Sebastian Rotella Thu, 07/11/2013 - 12:47pm—reporter for The Standard
Examiner, “The terror threat and Iran’s inroads in Latin America”
http://www.standard.net/stories/2013/07/11/terror-threat-and-iran-s-inroads-latin-america)
Last year, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited his ally President Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, where the firebrand leaders
unleashed defiant rhetoric at the United States. There was a quieter aspect to Ahmadinejad's visit in January 2012, according to
Western intelligence officials. A
senior officer in the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) traveled
secretly with the presidential delegation and met with Venezuelan military and security chiefs.
His mission: to set up a joint intelligence program between Iranian and Venezuelan spy agencies,
according to the Western officials. At the secret meeting, Venezuelan spymasters agreed to provide
systematic help to Iran with intelligence infrastructure such as arms, identification documents,
bank accounts and pipelines for moving operatives and equipment between Iran and Latin
America, according to Western intelligence officials. Although suffering from cancer, Chavez took interest in the secret talks as
part of his energetic embrace of Iran, an intelligence official told ProPublica. The senior IRGC officer's meeting in Caracas has not
been previously reported. "The aim is to enable the IRGC to be able to distance itself from the criminal activities it is conducting in
the region, removing the Iranian fingerprint," said the intelligence official, who requested anonymity because he is not authorized to
speak publicly. "Since Chavez's early days in power, Iran
and Venezuela have grown consistently closer, with
Venezuela serving as a gateway to South America for the Iranians." A year and a half later, Chavez has died
and Ahmadinejad is no longer president. But the alliance they built is part of an Iranian expansion in the Americas that worries U.S.,
Latin American, Israeli and European security officials. Experts
cite public evidence: intensified Iranian
diplomatic, military and commercial activity in the region; the sentencing this year of an Iranian-American
terrorist in a plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in Washington; U.S. investigations alleging that Hezbollah, Iran's staunch ally,
finances itself through cocaine trafficking; and a recent Argentine prosecutor's report describing Iran's South American spy web and
its links to a 2007 plot to bomb New York's JFK airport. There is considerable debate inside and outside the U.S. government about
the extent and nature of Iran's activities, however. That debate dominated a U.S. congressional hearing this week about a new State
Department report that assesses the Iranian threat in Latin America, a region made vulnerable by lawlessness and an increasingly
anti-U.S. bloc of nations. The report resulted from a bipartisan bill, the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act, signed into
law by President Obama in January. That measure called for a comprehensive U.S. response to Iranian incursions and a study based
on threat assessments by intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Most of the study is classified. A two-page unclassified section
says that "Iran
has increased its outreach to the region working to strengthen its political,
economic, cultural and military ties." Nonetheless, the State Department assessment concludes that "Iranian influence
in Latin America and the Caribbean is waning" as a result of Western sanctions, U.S. cooperation with allies and "Iran's poor
management of its foreign relations." In a recent interview about the issue, a senior U.S. government official gave a measured
assessment comparable to the new report. "The
countries of the region need to watch carefully for Iran as a
threat within a spectrum of issues of concern in the region," said the official, who was not authorized to speak
publicly. "I don't see it as a major threat now. This is worth watching. It is something there is legitimate attention to given Iran's
history." The law's sponsor, Rep. Jeff Duncan, R-S.C., criticized the State Department's findings Tuesday at a hearing of a House
homeland security subcommittee that he chairs. Duncan
does not think Iranian influence has declined so
soon after a series of events and trends — including recent public warnings by intelligence and Pentagon chiefs —
that brought about the passage of the Countering Iran Act. "This administration refuses to see Iran's presence — so near U.S.
borders —as a threat to U.S. security," Duncan said. "We
know that there is not consensus on this issue, but I
seriously question the administration's judgment to downplay the seriousness of Iran's presence
here at home." State Department officials contacted by ProPublica declined to respond because the report is classified. They
said they will discuss the issue with legislators in private. As a sign of growing Iranian influence in South America, Duncan cited the
absence of a key witness at the hearing: Alberto Nisman, an Argentine special prosecutor. In May, Nisman released a 502-page
report as part of a long investigation of a car-bombing that killed 85 people at the AMIA Jewish community center in Buenos Aires in
1994 — the deadliest terror attack in the Americas before 2001. The report describes the evolution of Iranian spy networks in the
region and shows their role in attacks in Argentina and the foiled New York airport plot. Although Nisman had initially accepted the
congressional invitation to discuss his investigation, last week his government abruptly barred him from traveling to Washington.
The Argentine attorney general said that the topic of the hearing "had no relation to the official mission of the [Attorney General's]
office," Nisman wrote in a July 1 letter to Rep. Michael McCaul, R-Texas, chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security.
"The government of Argentina has silenced this prosecutor," McCaul declared at the hearing Tuesday. "I consider this to be a slap in
the face of this committee and the U.S. Congress." Expressing disappointment in a letter to Argentine President Cristina Fernández
de Kirchner, McCaul and Duncan said the attorney general's decision "[calls] into question the authenticity of your intentions" to
"pursue justice and truth on Iranian involvement in the AMIA bombing." The context for the unusual move to block the testimony is
Argentina's pro-Iranian shift. Argentina has had tense relations with Iran since the AMIA attack. A previous bombing in 1992 — also
blamed on Iran — destroyed the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires and killed 29 people. In 2003, Nisman was appointed special
prosecutor with a mandate to revive a probe that had bogged down in dysfunction and corruption. He indicted seven Iranian
officials and a Hezbollah chief as the masterminds three years later, and Interpol issued arrest warrants for them. Iranian officials
denied any role and described Nisman, who is Jewish, as "a Zionist." But six months ago, the Fernández de Kirchner government
agreed with Iran to form an independent "truth commission" about the AMIA case. Argentina's about-face was blasted by Jewish
groups, the political opposition, the Israeli government and U.S. officials. Critics call it a political maneuver that makes justice even
less likely at this late date. Argentina's growing ties to Iran coincide with an increasingly confrontational attitude toward the United
States, Spain and other Western nations. "The Argentine president has already made her decision to curtail DEA activities, publicly
and repeatedly attack the United States as an imperialistic and warmongering nation, and reopen relations with Iran that make a
mockery of the rule of law," Douglas Farah, president of the IBI Consultants national security consulting firm, testified at the hearing.
Duncan said in an interview that he believes Argentina's policy change results partly from economics. Iran-Argentine trade has
increased by more than 500 percent to $1.2 billion annually in the past eight years, according to the testimony of Ilan Berman, vice
president of the American Foreign Policy Council, a think-tank in Washington. The attacks in Buenos Aires in the 1990s revealed the
existence of Iranian terror networks in the Americas. The Argentine investigation connected the plots to hubs of criminal activity and
Hezbollah operational and financing cells in lawless zones, such as the triple border of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay and the border
between Colombia and Venezuela. Indicted AMIA plotter Mohsen Rabbani, an alleged spymaster using the cover of Iranian cultural
attaché in Buenos Aires, oversaw the establishment of intelligence networks in embassies, front companies and religious and
cultural centers in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Guyana, Paraguay and Uruguay, according to the Argentine prosecutor's report.
The Iranian spies teamed with Hezbollah to carry out both bombings, according to Argentine, Israeli and U.S. investigators. Today,
the fugitive Rabbani is based in Iran and continues to play a key role in Latin American espionage, directing ideological and
operational training for recruits who travel from the region, according to U.S. law enforcement officials and witnesses at the hearing.
The election of Ahmadinejad in 2005 spurred an Iranian outreach campaign in Latin America intended to find new allies and markets
and counter Western pressure over Iran's nuclear ambitions, according to Berman. Iran increased the number of its embassies in the
region from five to 11, launched a Spanish-language television channel and doubled its regional trade to $3.67 billion today, though
many of its economic commitments have not materialized. The Iranian expansion dovetailed with the rise of the Bolivarian Alliance
for the Americas (known by the Spanish acronym as ALBA), a bloc of leftist, populist, anti-U.S. governments including Venezuela,
Cuba, Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua. In 2008, the U.S. Treasury Department designated a Venezuelan diplomat and a Venezuelan
businessman as terrorists for allegedly raising funds for Hezbollah, discussing terrorist operations with Hezbollah operatives, and
aiding travel of militants from Venezuela to training sessions in Iran. In 2011, Iranian Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi, who is wanted
by Interpol for the AMIA bombing, attended the inauguration of ALBA's regional defense school in Bolivia, according to testimony at
the hearing. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper told a U.S. Senate hearing last year that Iran's alliances could pose "an
immediate threat by giving Iran — directly through the IRGC, the Quds Force [an external unit of the IRGC] or its proxies like
Hezbollah — a platform in the region to carry out attacks against the United States, our interests, and allies." The aborted 2007 plot
to attack JFK was an attempt to use that platform, according to the Argentine special prosecutor. A Guyanese-American Muslim who
had once worked as a cargo handler conceived an idea to blow up jet fuel tanks at the airport. He formed a homegrown cell that first
sought aid from al Qaida, then coalesced around Abdul Kadir, a Guyanese politician and Shiite Muslim leader. The trial in New York
federal court revealed that Kadir was a longtime intelligence operative for Iran, reporting to the Iranian ambassador in Caracas and
communicating also with Rabbani, the accused AMIA plotter. "Kadir agreed to participate in the conspiracy, committing himself to
reach out to his contacts in Venezuela and the Islamic Republic of Iran," Nisman's report says. "The entry of Kadir into the conspiracy
brought the involvement and the support of the intelligence station established in Guyana by the Islamic regime." Police arrested
Kadir as he prepared to fly to Iran to discuss the New York plot with Iranian officials. He was convicted and sentenced to life in
prison. The Argentine investigation unearthed other signs of Iranian terrorist activity. It cites the testimony of the former director of
Colombia's intelligence agency, Fernando Tabares. He described a mission by an Iranian operative to Colombia via Venezuela in 2008
or 2009. Working with Iranian officials based at the embassy in Bogota, the operative "was looking at targets in order to carry out
possible attacks here in Colombia," Tabares testified. Witnesses at the House subcommittee hearing Tuesday described Venezuela
as a gateway through which Iranian operatives travel to and from the region unmolested and obtain authentic Venezuelan
documents to enhance their covers. Witness Joseph Humire, a security expert, cited a report last year in which the Canadian Border
Services Agency described Iran as the top source of illegal migrants to Canada, most of them coming through Latin America.
Between 2009 and 2011, the majority of those Iranian migrants passed through Caracas, where airport and airline personnel were
implicated in providing them with fraudulent documents, according to the Canadian border agency. The allegations are consistent
with interviews in recent years in which U.S., Latin American and Israeli security officials have told ProPublica about suspected
Middle Eastern operatives and Latin American drug lords obtaining Venezuelan documents through corruption or ideological
complicity. "There
seems to be an effort by the Venezuelan government to make sure that Iranians
have full sets of credentials," a U.S. law enforcement official said. Last year's secret talks between Iranian and Venezuelan
spies intensified such cooperation, according to Western intelligence officials who described the meetings to ProPublica. The senior
Iranian officer who traveled with the presidential entourage asked Venezuelan counterparts to ensure access to key officials in
airport police, customs and other agencies and "permits for transferring cargo through airports and swiftly arranging various
bureaucratic matters," the intelligence official said. Venezuelan leaders have denied that their alliance with Iran has hostile intent.
They have rejected concerns about flights that operated for years between Caracas and Tehran. The State Department and other
U.S. agencies criticized Venezuela for failing to make public passenger and cargo manifests and other information about the
secretive flights to Iran, raising the fear of a pipeline for clandestine movement of people and goods. The flights have been
discontinued, U.S. officials say. State Department officials say the Iran report reflected a consensus among U.S. government
agencies. In contrast, homeland security Chairman McCaul said the intelligence community is more concerned about the Iranian
threat than the State Department. The DEA and Treasury Department have been especially active on the issue. Recent indictments
and enforcement actions have revealed a complex global network of cocaine trafficking and money laundering networks that
allegedly poured millions of dollars into the coffers of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Those mafias, led by accused gangsters of Lebanese
origin operating in Colombia, Venezuela and Panama, allegedly have links to the Iranian government as well, according to U.S. court
documents. The State Department says a concerted effort by diplomats, intelligence officers and law enforcement investigators has
stymied Iran's advances. The end of the personal bond between Chavez and Ahmadinejad was another blow, officials say. "The
death of … Chavez and the election of a new president in Iran has changed the landscape of Iran's relationship in Venezuela and
further weakened Iranian ties in the West," said Rep. Bennie Thompson, D-Miss., the ranking member of the Homeland Security
Committee. The foreign policy of new Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro is a work in progress. But as Duncan and others pointed
out this week, Maduro
was a point man for the alliance with Iran when he led served as foreign
minister from 2006 to 2012.
Iran-Venezuela ties cause training of guerilla cells and terrorists
Bailey 12 Norman A. Bailey is President of the Institute for Global Economic Growth and Vice
Chairman of The Americas Forum, February 2012, The American Foreign Policy Council, “Iran’s
Venezuelan Gateway”, pgs 2-3, www.afpc.org/files/getContentPostAttachment/213
This economic activism serves several clear strategic purposes for the Iranian regime. First, it allows
Tehran to circumvent financial sanctions imposed by the United States, the European Union and the
United Nations through the use of the Venezuelan financial system. In doing so, Iran is exploiting an
existing loophole in the application of U.S. economic penalties. To date, the U.S. Treasury Department has
Singed
sanctioned several Iranian banks and various individuals. So far, however, it has not imposed similar restrictions on any Venezuelan
banks. As a result, Iran’s
partnership with Venezuela effectively provides it with an ancillary avenue
through which it can access the international financial system despite Western pressure.¶ The
second purpose is to facilitate the funding of radical organizations and guerrilla movements in the
Hemisphere. This includes, first and foremost, Hezbollah, the radical Lebanese militia that serves as Iran’s principal terrorist
proxy. Over the past three decades, the Iranian regime has facilitated the establishment by Hezbollah of a
major regional presence throughout the Americas, and aided and abetted the organization’s involvement in a
range of illicit activities, from drug trafficking to money laundering.4 (In 2008, for example, the Bush Administration accused
Venezuelan diplomat Ghazi Nasr al Din and Venezuelan-Arab businessman Fawzi Kanan of laundering money as well as facilitating
the travel of Hezbollah members from Iran to Venezuela.5) In the last few years, scholarly analysis has also revealed the use of
radical mosques in Caracas and elsewhere in Venezuela as a hub for Hezbollah fundraising activities, and more notably the existence
of Hezbollah “support cells” on Margarita Island.6 Hezbollah likewise is
known to have opened numerous
military camps inside Venezuela, as well as in South Lebanon, with the express purpose of training young Venezuelans to
attack American targets.7¶ Iranian sponsorship is not limited to Hezbollah, however; Hamas and even alQaeda have also benefited from Iranian/Venezuelan sponsorship, especially in fundraising from
the Islamic communities in various regional states.8 Locally, Iran has also aided the Colombian
FARC guerillas through the provision of arms and training in both Iran and Syria, conducted by
the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and its elite paramilitary unit, the Quds Force.9
Continued Iran and Venezuelan ties are a threat—searching for Uranium and
potential launching ground
Fleischman 6/13 (by Luis Fleischman on June 13, 2013 Luis Fleischman is the author of the
book, “Latin America in the Post-Chavez Era: The Security Threat to the United States.” “U.S.—
VENEZUELAN RELATIONS REVISITED” http://www.theamericasreport.com/2013/06/13/u-svenezuelan-relations-revisited/)
A week ago, during the annual general assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS), Secretary of State John Kerry met
with his Venezuelan counterpart, Elias Jaua, to discuss improvement of relations between the two countries. Relations between the
two have been severely strained during the 14- year rule of Hugo Chavez. The meeting took place when the United States
government had not yet officially recognized the legitimacy of President Nicolas Maduro whose election on April 14th raised
suspicions of fraud. The Obama Administration also supported a recount. The recount was conducted but without checking paper
ballots which the opposition had specifically requested. Since this was not done the opposition refused to recognize Maduro‘s
victory. Yet, the meeting between the two diplomats took place in a “positive” atmosphere. Secretary Kerry declared that both
countries agreed to “find a new way” forward. Venezuela, as a gesture, released from jail an American documentary filmmaker who
had been accused of conspiring against the government. There is nothing wrong when two parties whose relations are tense seek to
make things better. However, good relations between the U.S. and Venezuela must require that the government of Venezuela
radically change a very dangerous behavior. Arbitrary arrests, abuse of state resources, intimidation of the opposition, subjugation
of the judiciary, and demand of loyalty to the revolutionary government and other violations of rights are common practice in
today’s Venezuela. Neither the international community, the OAS, nor other countries of the region including the United States have
ever held the Venezuelan government accountable for these gross breaches of human rights. But this is not all. According to a report
by the U.S. Government Accountability Office in 2009, Venezuela extended a lifeline to Colombian illegal and armed groups by
providing them with significant support and safe haven along the border. As a result, these groups remain viable threats to
Colombian security and U.S.-Colombian counternarcotic efforts. The report provided evidence of the activities and cooperation
between the Venezuelan government with drug cartels and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) . The report
revealed that the flow of cocaine shipped from Venezuelan ports and airports to the United States, West Africa, and Europe
increased more than four times from 2004 to 2007 and continues to increase. Likewise, cocaine destined for the United States from
Venezuela transits through Central America, Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and other Caribbean islands. Between January
and July, 2008, numerous vessels with Venezuelan flags that were carrying large amounts of cocaine were seized. Furthermore, a
Colombian army raid in Ecuador in March, 2008 seized FARC computers and discovered documents belonging to FARC leader Raúl
Reyes (known as the Reyes files). The files indicated that the Venezuelan government may have provided the Colombian guerillas
with about $300 million in Russian weapons supplies. The files also seem to indicate that Chavez sought political and military
cooperation with the FARC at the same time as the Colombian government was denouncing the presence of FARC training camps
inside Venezuela. The FARC is a dangerous subversive force that threatens Colombia’s security and is also involved in drug
trafficking. While the United States is putting efforts into fighting drug traffickers in Mexico and other parts of Latin America,
Venezuela is providing them with a lifeline. The danger of this development is not only that drug trafficking poisons our population
and in particular our youth but that the drug business corrupts governments, security forces and the legal system. In Central
American countries are now facing a state of anarchy that is gradually creating another “Afghanistan” in our own hemisphere with
all the dangers that this implies. Venezuelan
relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran are no less
worrisome. The government of Venezuela has strengthened relations with Iran and has helped
Iran and its proxies increase their presence throughout the continent. As more countries joined Chavez’s
sphere of influence they also developed relations with Iran and Iran increased its presence in those countries. This includes a
growing presence of the Iranian proxy and terrorist group, Hezbollah, and the Iranian Republican Guards. A
Lebanese-born Venezuelan diplomat posted in the Venezuelan embassy in Syria and Lebanon, Ghazi Nasr al-Din, helped Hezbollah
raise money and facilitated the travel of its operatives from and to Venezuela.
Iran’s penetration into Latin America is
likely to grow under the influence of the Venezuelan Bolivarian revolution. Venezuela, along with
Syria and Cuba, have been the main supporters of Iran’s right to develop a nuclear weapon.
Venezuela helped Iran launder money through its banking system as well as selling the Iranians
gasoline so they could avoid international sanctions. Venezuela’s actions have been in clear violation of
international sanctions. Only a few days ago President Barack Obama increased sanctions on companies doing
business with Iran. As part of the sanctions protocol the United States will not do business with
companies or governments that help Iran avoid sanctions. If the sanctions law were fully
operationalized, the U.S. would no longer be buying Venezuelan oil. This would be a severe blow
to Venezuela but would make little difference to the U.S. Instead, Venezuela and Venezuelan
companies such as the oil giant Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) have never paid a serious price for their
dealings with Iran. Some reports, including one by former Manhattan district attorney Robert Morgenthau, even indicated
that Iran is trying to extract uranium from countries such as Venezuela and Bolivia. A scenario that
should not be ruled out is that if Iran develops nuclear capabilities it could use Venezuelan soil
to make the United States more vulnerable to an attack. Trying to diminish tensions and develop peaceful
relations with countries is a good goal to pursue. However, in the case of Venezuela, before peaceful and productive relations can be
established the United States government must set conditions demanding that Venezuela
completely cease its human rights violations and fully dismantle all its ties to terrorist groups and drug cartels as well as
ceasing to assist Iran in their effort to avoid sanctions.
The relation of Iran and Venezuela is one of strategy against the US
Darenblum 11 Jaime Darenblum Ph.D., Senior Fellow and Director
Center for Latin American Studies, Hudson Institute, Washington DC, January 2011, Hudson
Institute, “Iran and Latin America”,pgs 7-9,
http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/Iran_Latin_America_Daremblum_Jan2011.pdf
Singed
The danger here is that the ties to the Ayatollahs entail much more than what the countries in the¶ region may be expecting. We
must remember that Iran
is considered “the most active state¶ sponsor of terrorism.” Thanks to Chavez’s ties
Hamas has opened offices in Caracas, as¶ has the terrorist group Hezbollah, which Tehran
finances with over 120 million dollars a year.¶ As the Los Angeles Times has reported, Western government officials
fear that Hezbollah “may¶ be using Venezuela as a base for its operations.” An official involved in the fight
against¶ terrorism told the Times that the relation between Venezuela and Iran “is becoming a strategic¶
association.” How to explain otherwise the regular flights between Caracas and Tehran, for¶ which no tickets are sold and no
immigration or customs inspections are required?¶ We must not forget that Hezbollah has carried out not one, but
two horrible terrorist attacks in¶ the region, both in Buenos Aires. The first one, in 1992, against the
Embassy of Israel, killed 42¶ people and wounded 242. The second one, two years later, against
the headquarters of the¶ largest Jewish Community Center in the city, left 82 people dead and
300 wounded. The official¶ report from the Argentine authorities confirmed the direct responsibility of
Iran and Hezbollah in¶ both attacks. The report pointed out that Hezbollah had “followed orders issued directly by¶
to Iran,
Tehran’s regime.” The Argentine Justice issued arrest warrants against former Iranian President¶ Hashemi Rafsanjani, former Foreign
Minister Ali Ar Velayati, former Intelligence Chief Ali¶ Fallahijan and four other Iranian nationals, as well as against Imad Mugniyah,
head of Hezbollah´s external security apparatus. It is worth noting that, in spite of Iran’s strong protests¶ Interpol confirmed
Argentina’s report and issued international warrants for the arrest of six¶ Iranian suspects.¶ Besides this bloody record, police
authorities know that Hezbollah, Hamas, and Al Qaeda have¶ sought refuge and raise funds in
the Triple Frontier area, shared by Brazil, Argentina, and¶ Paraguay, as well as in Venezuela’s Margarita
Island and the Caribbean. Hundreds of millions¶ of dollars have been channeled to parent
organizations in the Middle East through their¶ operatives in those areas, extending thus the worldwide
network of support for terrorism in the¶ region.¶ Although it is well known that al Qaeda and Hezbollah come from
different, and inimical,¶ branches of Islam, this is not an obstacle for the two organizations to
form alliances of¶ convenience seeking to reach common goals against a “common” enemy, the
United States. The¶ infamous “tri-border” region has a trait that makes it particularly inviting to Tehran. Most¶ Muslims in the
Americas are Sunnis, in line with their proportion in the world’s population. But¶ the Shiites constitute almost half of all the Muslim
residents of Foz do Iguaçu, the Brazilian city¶ with the largest Islamic community in the Triple Frontier, just one bridge away from
Ciudad del¶ Este, which has the largest Islamic community in Paraguay with an equal high proportion of¶ Shiites.
We should all
be concerned that Iran may aim at infiltrating these communities in order to manipulate them.¶ All
this has moved the U.S. Treasury Department to freeze assets belonging to Hezbollah¶ members in the tri-border area as well as
prompted Canadian intelligence to point out that its¶ “reports indicate that resources are regularly sent to Middle East groups,
including Hamas, by¶ support groups [in the Triple Frontier].” The threat of Islamic terrorism in the Triple Frontier is¶ serious enough
to have brought the three countries involved to create, with the support of the¶ United States authorities, a tripartite command
center (the 3 + 1 Group) in order to consolidate¶ their police efforts in the area.¶ There is also evidence that Islamic terrorists
have active links with drug traffic and money¶ laundering in several countries in the region, as
was revealed in Colombia by the dismantling of a group composed of Hezbollah operatives and a
Colombian drug cartel that had generated¶ hundreds of millions of dollars to finance Hezbollah’s
terrorist activities.¶ The drug cartels are expanding their reach in our countries, as has been shown by
diverse police¶ operations. The proven links between the Islamic terrorists and the drug cartels significantly ¶ increase the security
risks in the region. In this respect, several
Central American countries¶ suffer the assaults of “maras”
(gangs). These “maras” are tightly linked to drug trafficking and¶ all kinds of highly violent
criminal acts as well as to gangs in the United States; they are also¶ instrumental in the illegal infiltration of this
country. Security experts worry that these gangs’¶ expertise could be put at the service of terrorists who want to enter the United
States without¶ being detected.
Iran is using Venezuela to proliferate—uranium searches and agreements
NTI 7/2 (NTI Jul 2, 2013, “Venezuela” http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/venezuela/)
Nuclear-As the world's fifth largest oil exporter and with abundant hydroelectric resources, it is unlikely that Venezuela will require
nuclear power to meet its energy needs. Additionally, until recently, open source evidence had not suggested that Venezuela might
be considering pursuing nuclear weapons. The country has only one nuclear facility, very minimal nuclear expertise, and is a member
of the major nuclear nonproliferation agreements and regimes. [2] Caracas became a member of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) in August 1957, after purchasing a 3 MW research reactor from the U.S. General Electric Company in 1956. The
reactor, which went critical in July 1960, was operated by the Instituto Venezolano de Investigaciones (IVIC) under IAEA safeguards,
and was officially shut down in January 1994. [3] Reportedly, the reactor site "is now used for food processing irradiation, medical
sterilization and research." [4] In February 1967, Venezuela signed the Tlatelolco Treaty, ratifying it three years later in March 1970.
That treaty, which finally entered into force in October 2002, prohibits the acquisition, production, use, testing or possession of
nuclear weapons in the region. [5] Venezuela joined the NPT in 1975 as a non-nuclear weapon state, and negotiated an IAEA
Safeguards Agreement covering its nuclear activities that entered into force in March 1982. [6] In November 1983, Venezuela and
Brazil signed an agreement that provided for cooperation in the research, design, development, and use of experimental and
operational reactors; research on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and prospecting "for minerals with nuclear uses." [7] There is
little public information, however, on any activity carried out under this agreement. In May 2002, Venezuela was the 92nd country
to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). In 1998, Hugo Chávez, a former military officer, was elected president
on a populist platform dubbed the "Bolivarian Revolution," which called for the country to use its oil revenue to support social
welfare programs at home, and to counter U.S. influence in the region and around the world. [8] Chávez's announcements since
2005 about building a nuclear power program and the nuclear cooperation alliances that he has sought may have more to do with
his foreign policy goals and anti-U.S. stance than with any actual need or plan to develop either nuclear power or nuclear weapons.
For example, during an October 2005 summit meeting, Chávez announced unexpectedly that Venezuela might acquire as many as a
dozen nuclear power reactors from Brazil and/or Argentina. [9] The announcement took Brazilian and Argentine nuclear officials by
surprise, and was viewed by many nuclear proliferation analysts as another way of challenging the U.S. administration, though
Chávez may also have perceived obtaining nuclear reactors as a way to gain international prestige. [10] Both Brazilian and Argentine
officials reacted warily to possible nuclear cooperation with Venezuela, and despite the existence of nuclear cooperation
agreements with both countries, there is no public information indicating that Venezuela has received any nuclear technology or
know-how from either country. [11] However,
Venezuela's ever-strengthening ties with Iran pose some
proliferation concerns. Venezuela, the world's fifth largest oil exporter, and Iran, the second
largest, began to build stronger ties after Venezuela hosted the 2000 OPEC meeting in Caracas.
[12] The relationship between the two countries intensified as Chávez became an outspoken
supporter of Iran's nuclear program, and a critic of Western countries that have sought UN
Security Council resolutions requiring Iran to halt uranium enrichment and to disclose the full
extent of its nuclear program and any nuclear weapons-related activities. In February 2006, when the
IAEA Board of Governors voted to refer Iran to the UN Security Council for sanctions, only Venezuela, Cuba, and Syria opposed the
decision. [13] In return for Venezuela's support at the IAEA and the UN Security Council,
Iran has entered into more than
270 energy, development, commercial, and financial agreements with Venezuela, and allegedly has
invested billions of dollars in joint projects. [14] Chávez's successor, Nicolás Maduro, has indicated continued
support for the alliance, and reportedly plans to visit Iran to demonstrate his commitment to
close bilateral relations. [15] The United States government has expressed great concern about
Venezuela's cooperation with Iran, particularly in the nuclear area. In March 2008, Congressman Connie
Mack (R-FL) reintroduced a bill (H. Res. 1049) calling for Venezuela to be designated as a state sponsor of terrorism. [16] The draft
bill pointed to President Chávez's "strong relationship" with Iran as demonstrated by Venezuela's "200 bilateral agreements with
Iran," Iran's
reported offer to help Venezuela with a nuclear program, and Chávez's strong support
for Iran's controversial nuclear program. The Venezuelan Embassy in the United States posted a point-by-point denial
of the resolution's charges, and stated: "Venezuela and Iran also have discussed cooperation on nuclear
energy, but we are not aware of any significant developments as a result of these discussions."
[17] Congress did not pass a resolution designating Venezuela as a state sponsor of terrorism; however, in 2008, the U.S.
government imposed sanctions on Venezuelan companies for transferring items and funds to Iran that could contribute to WMD
proliferation and help Iran circumvent UN and U.S. sanctions. [18] In
September 2009, Chávez announced that
Venezuela had signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with Iran, under which Iran would help
Venezuela construct a nuclear program for peaceful purposes. [19] While Chávez emphasized that Iran and
Venezuela have the right to develop nuclear energy, Western countries pointed out that any transfer of nuclear
technology from Iran to Venezuela would violate UN Security Council sanctions on Iran, and in
particular UN Security Council Resolution 1737. [20] At the same time, Chávez and other government officials
admitted that Iran had been helping Venezuela to explore remote areas of the country for
uranium deposits. [21] The announcements heightened concerns that Venezuela could be aiding
Iran in exchange for nuclear technology transfers, however geologists have questioned whether Venezuela even
has exploitable uranium; estimates of the country's potential deposits are based on unverified projections and might be difficult to
extract. [22] Chávez has also cultivated ties with Russia that resulted in a nuclear cooperation agreement in November 2008.
Following an aborted coup attempt in 2002, which Chávez blamed on the United States, and deteriorating relations with the United
States, Chávez turned to Russia for military equipment as well as energy cooperation. [23] Between 2005 and 2007, Chávez spent
roughly $4 billion on Russian arms, including 100,000 Kalashnikov AK-103 assault rifles (and a factory to build more in Venezuela), 24
Sukhoi fighter jets, and 53 combat helicopters. [24] In 2010 Caracas received a $2.2 billion loan to buy Russian tanks and missile
systems, and the following year the country became the top importer of Russian arms for ground forces. [25] In late November 2008
during then President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev's visit to Caracas, Venezuelan Minister of Energy and Petroleum Rafael Dario
Ramirez Carreno and Rosatom head Sergei Kiriyenko signed a long-anticipated general agreement on nuclear cooperation. The
agreement established a framework for: joint research into controlled nuclear fusion; design, development, manufacture, and use of
research reactors and nuclear power plants; production of radioisotopes for use in industry, medicine, and agriculture; help for
Venezuela in the development of the infrastructure and legislative framework for peaceful use of nuclear energy; and possible
exploration and development of Venezuela's uranium and thorium deposits. [26] The agreement reportedly specifies that any
nuclear equipment and know-how supplied by Russia will not be used by Venezuela "to produce nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices, nor to achieve any military objectives, and will be under the guarantees of the IAEA." According to a Rosatom
press release, the agreement will not involve the transfer of "any know-how or systems for chemical reprocessing of irradiated fuel,
isotope enrichment of uranium or production of heavy water, its main components or any objects produced from them, nor uranium
enriched to 20 per cent or above." [27] Following the signing, Rosatom head Kiriyenko stated that the deal should not raise
proliferation concerns because Venezuela is an IAEA member and has signed nuclear nonproliferation agreements. [28] While
Venezuela is an NPT member and has signed an IAEA Safeguards Agreement, it has not yet joined the Additional Protocol, which
would give the Agency broader inspection powers. In October 2010, Chávez visited Medvedev in Moscow to oversee the signing of
several oil and economic deals; the two leaders also signed an agreement spelling out their countries' nuclear cooperation.
According to press reports, under the agreement Rosatom would build a power plant in Venezuela with two 1,200 megawatt
pressurized water reactors and a research reactor to produce medical isotopes and nuclear materials for other peaceful purposes.
[29] Rosatom's chief executive Kiriyenko was vague about when Russia might start building the nuclear power plant, and he
indicated that the research reactor would be the priority. [30] While Chávez has touted the agreements with Russia and Venezuela's
peaceful nuclear goals, Venezuela's nuclear projects have not progressed beyond the planning stages. In March 2011, Venezuela's
nuclear power plans were put on hold. In the wake of the nuclear accident in Japan, Chávez announced the cancellation of the
Russian plan to build a power plant in Venezuela, stating "[nuclear power] is something extremely risky and dangerous for the whole
world." [31] Nevertheless, recent statements by the Russian government make it unclear whether the project was cancelled or
simply put on hold. In May 2012, the Russian government voted to approve the plan to build a nuclear power plant and research
reactor in Venezuela. [32] The following year, in a speech highlighting the potential for investment between the two countries,
President Vladimir Putin noted that the Russian company Inter RAO UES had been supplying Venezuela with gas turbines "for
nuclear power plants under construction there." [33] Since Chávez's death in March 2013, both his successor Nicolás Maduro and
President Putin of Russia have reaffirmed their commitment to the strategic partnership between the two countries. [34] Biological
There are no indications that Venezuela has developed or is developing biological weapons. Venezuela ratified the Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) on 18 October 1978. According to its United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540
reports, it has adopted legislation prohibiting the acquisition, manufacture, and development of chemical and biological weapons.
[35] While
Venezuela denies any interest in acquiring biological weapons, it does have close ties
with two countries, Iran and Cuba, which have extensive biotechnology capabilities, and have in
the past been suspected of pursuing biological warfare programs. Venezuela has signed numerous
technology development agreements with Iran, and a Memorandum of Understanding "pledging full military support and
cooperation." [36] Venezuela also has a technology trade agreement with Cuba, and in the past has received pharmaceutical
products from Cuba as debt payments. In an October 2009 UN General Assembly meeting, a representative for Venezuela, Liseth
Ancidey, indicated that global biological weapons elimination is a priority for the country. Ancidey noted that Venezuela supported a
program for the "full implementation" of the BTWC, and further, that "it was holding consultations to establish a national body for
its implementation and had drafted a code of bio-security to govern the conduct of scientists and researchers working in that field."
[37] Chemical Venezuela ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on 3 December 1997. In its second Note to the United
Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 Committee, Venezuela declared it had established a National Authority "for the
prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons." [38] In two other submissions to the Security
Council, the Venezuelan government enumerated the various laws it had enacted to prohibit chemical weapons. [39] In an October
2009 UN General Assembly meeting, Venezuela's representative Ancidey, "reaffirmed" the importance of eliminating chemical
weapons. In reference to the CWC, she said that Venezuela "supported full transparency in the implementation of the Convention,
as well as its universality." She also noted the concern of her country that states possessing such weapons might not eliminate them
by the agreed upon 2012 deadline. [40] Missile Venezuela does not have a long-range missile program, and subscribes to the Hague
Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC), which calls for limits on the production, testing, and export of ballistic
missiles. However, Caracas is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and has been accused of aiding Iran's
missile program, and plans to import Russian missile defense systems.
The United States has sanctioned
Venezuelan companies for providing aid to Iran that could benefit that country's missile
program. In August 2008, and again in February 2013, the U.S. Department of State under the Iran, North Korea, and Syria
Nonproliferation Act imposed sanctions on the Venezuelan Military Industries Companies (CAVIM) for the transfer of items either
barred by multilateral export control lists or otherwise "having the potential to make a material contribution to the development of
weapons of mass destruction of cruise or ballistic missile systems." [41] Two months later, the U.S. Treasury Department designated
the Export Development Bank of Iran (EDBI) as providing financial services to Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics
that allow this entity to develop Tehran's alleged WMD programs. The Treasury Department also designated Banco Internacional de
Desarollo, C.A., a financial institution in Venezuela, asserting it to be a business controlled by or acting on behalf of the EDBI. [42]
Iran has reciprocated Venezuela's economic support with various forms of military assistance. Most notably, Iran has provided
Venezuela with six different models of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which were allegedly shipped to the country in 70
mislabeled containers, each carrying 24,000 pounds of cargo from Iran. [43] Additionally, a former ballistic missile engineer from
Iran's Defense Industry Organization headed development of a domestic UAV production program in Venezuela. [44] With Iranian
help, Venezuela claims to have produced three of its own UAVs, called the Arpia-001 (aka Harpy-001), which is a localized version of
the Iranian Mohajer-2. [45] The state defense company claims the Arpia has a range of 100 km; however, since only still photos of
the UAV have been released, these claims are unverifiable. [46] In announcing the program, former president Hugo Chávez
maintained that the UAVs would only be used for defensive purposes. U.S. General Douglas Fraser has said the UAVs are likely
intended for "internal defense." [47] The
United States is concerned that Venezuela is helping Iran
circumvent UN and U.S. sanctions designed to prevent Iran and Syria from developing WMD and
ballistic missile programs. In December 2008 media reports stated that an Iranian firm, Shahid Bagheri, under UN sanctions
for furthering Iran's ballistic missile program, had "used the Venezuelan airline Conviasa to ship computers and missile engines" to
Syria in exchange for elite Iranian military forces providing law enforcement and intelligence training to Venezuelan troops. [48]
Based on Venezuelan export statistics, the same airline was reportedly also used in 2010 to ship 4,556kg of explosives (worth
$376,527) to Iran via the Caracas-Damascus-Tehran flight. [49] These incidents gained the attention of the U.S. State Department,
which expressed concerns about Conviasa as a possible terrorism risk. [50] In September 2009, Chávez stated that Venezuela would
use a $2.2 billion loan from Russia to buy Russian military technology, including a variety of air defense systems. The multi-layered
air defense system could "include short-range S-125 Neva/Pechora (NATO: SA-3 Goa), medium-range Buk-M2, and possibly the longrange S-300 (NATO: SA-10 Grumble) surface-to-air missile system." [51] Chávez claimed that defenses were necessary because of an
increased U.S. presence in neighboring Columbia. Components for the S-300VM (Antey 2500) system arrived in Venezuela in April
2013, in spite of initial Russian fears that Chávez's death the previous month might jeopardize arms deals between the two
countries. [52]
Iranian sponsored narco-terror risk increasing—Maduro election
Shinkman 4/24 (By PAUL D. SHINKMAN April 24, 2013 Paul D. Shinkman is a national security
reporter for U.S. News & World Report. “Iranian-Sponsored Narco-Terrorism in Venezuela: How
Will Maduro Respond?” http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/04/24/iranian-sponsorednarco-terrorism-in-venezuela-how-will-maduro-respond?page=2)
At a conference earlier this month, top U.S. military officers identified what they thought would be the top
threats to the U.S. as it draws down from protracted wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Gen. James Amos, commandant of the
Marine Corps, was unequivocal about a largely unreported danger: [PHOTOS: Nicolas Maduro Captures Venezuela Presidential Vote]
"Narco-terrorism just on our south border: [it is] yet to be seen just how that is going to play out in our own nation,
but it is an issue and it is something that our nation is going to have to deal with." "Colombia is doing particularly well, but there is
an insurgency growing," Amos continued. "They have been fighting it, probably the greatest success story in this part of the world."
The commandant's remarks came a week before the April 14 election where Venezuelans chose a successor to the wildly popular
and charismatic Hugo Chavez, who died March 5. Amos indicated the outcome of this election would define much of future relations
between the U.S. and Venezuela, located on a continent that has rarely appeared on America's foreign policy radar in the last
decade. Experts, analysts and pundits could not have predicted the election outcome: The establishment's Nicolas Maduro beat
reformer Henrique Capriles by a margin of roughly 1 percent. Chavez's hand-picked successor inherited the presidency, but he would
not enjoy a broad public mandate to get a teetering Venezuela back on track. The
situation in the South American
nation remains dire amid skyrocketing inflation, largely due to Chavez's efforts to nationalize
private industry and increase social benefits. Maduro's immediate attention after claiming victory was drawn to
remedying widespread blackouts and food shortages. One expert on the region says the new leader may need
to tap into a shadow world of transnational crime to maintain the stability his countrymen
expect. "Venezuela is a really nice bar, and anybody can go in there and pick up anybody else," says Doug Farah, an expert on
narco-terrorism and Latin American crime. He compares the country to the kind of establishment where nefarious actors can find
solutions to a problem. Anti-American
groups can find freelance cyber terrorists, for example, or
potential drug runners can make connections with the FARC, the Colombian guerilla organization, he says.
"Sometimes it creates a long-term relationship, and sometimes it creates a one-night stand," says Farah, a former Washington Post
investigative reporter who is now a senior fellow at the Virginia-based International Assessment and Strategy Center. Each of the
Bolivarian states has lifted visa requirements for Iranian citizens, thereby erasing any public record of the Iranian citizens that come
and go to these countries," wrote Farah of countries such as Venezuela, Ecuador, Colombia and Panama. [READ: Venezuelan NarcoTerrorism Among Top U.S. Threats] He also cited Venezuelan Foreign Minister David Velasquez who said, while speaking at a press
conference in Tehran in 2010, "We
are confident that Iran can give a crushing response to the threats
and sanctions imposed by the West and imperialism." These relationships are controlled by a
group of military elites within Venezuela, Farah tells U.S. News. He wonders whether the 50.8 percent of the vote
Maduro won in the April 14 election gives him enough support to keep the country – and its shadow commerce – stable enough to
continue its usual business. "[Maduro] has been and will continue to be forced to take all the unpopular macroeconomic steps and
corrections that are painful, but Chavez never took," Farah says. "There is going to be, I would guess, a great temptation to turn to
[the elites] for money." "Most
criminalized elements of the Boliavarian structure will gain more
power because he needs them," he says, adding "it won't be as chummy a relationship" as they enjoyed with the evercharismatic Chavez. [CHART: What the DEA Refuses to Admit About Drugs] U.S. officials might try to engage the new
Venezuelan president first in the hopes of improving the strained ties between the two
countries. But Maduro has never been close with the senior military class in his home country, and will likely adopt a more
confrontational approach to the United States to prove his credentials to these Bolivarian elites. "Maybe if he were operating in
different circumstances, he could be a pragmatist," Farah says. "I don't think he can be a pragmatist right now." Under Chavez,
Venezuela also created strong ties with Cuba, which for decades has navigated treacherous financial waters and desperate economic
straits, all while dodging U.S. influence. But the help Venezuela receives is not limited to its own hemisphere. Farah produced a
research paper for the U.S. Army War College in August 2012 about the "growing alliance" between state-sponsored Iranian agents
and other anti-American groups in Latin America, including the governments of Venezuela and Cuba. This
alliance with Iran
uses established drug trade routes from countries in South and Central America to penetrate
North American borders, all under a banner of mutual malevolence toward the U.S. The results of
this access are largely secret, though security experts who spoke with U.S. News believe the attempted assassination of the Saudi
Arabian ambassador in Washington, D.C.'s Georgetown neighborhood was carried out by Iranian intelligence operatives.
Venezuelan narco terror is a threat to the US—Iranian infiltration
Shinkman 4/8 (By PAUL D. SHINKMAN April 8, 2013 Paul D. Shinkman is a national security
reporter for U.S. News & World Report. “Venezuelan Narco-Terrorism, Encroaching Arctic
Among Top U.S. Threats” http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/04/08/venezuelannarco-terrorism-encroaching-arctic-among-top-us-threats)
NATIONAL HARBOR, Md. — While America draws down from wars in one section of the globe and prepares for possible conflicts in
another, it has become sandwiched between two growing and relatively unreported threats in its own hemisphere, top defense
officials said Monday. Foreign
backed narco-terrorism out of Venezuela and other South American
countries, as well as a developing frontier in the Arctic will be at the forefront of U.S. defense efforts in the
coming decade, said leaders of the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard while speaking at the Navy League's annual Sea-AirSpace expo. [ALSO: Candidates Remain Roiled in Venezuela Election] Any crystal ball predictions of America's next enemy will
require looking at a map differently, they said. "There are new challenges, and what you're seeing depends on where you're looking
from," said Adm. Jonathan Greenert, chief of Naval Operations. He pointed to a map of the arctic region, showing northern borders
of countries such as Russia, Norway and Danish-controlled Greenland, all within a cramped neighborhood with the U.S. and Canada.
"The Arctic is a challenge. It's a future challenge," he said, particularly as shrinking ice caps give way to increased shipping through
the Bering Strait and Russia's northern waters. Increased commerce means more governance and demands for higher security,
Greenert said. "The natural resources present in the arctic region are being surveyed currently for exploitation. Virtually every arctic
nation has made claims of sovereignty, some quite visible," said Vice Adm. John P. Currier, the vice commandant of the Coast Guard.
"They exist on a daily basis and pose a real challenge to our country." Ship-born commerce, fishing, on-land mineral development
and eco-tourism are quickly expanding in the Arctic region, he said. [READ: Kerry Takes a Stab at Norwegian] Currier and Greenert
delivered opening remarks with Gen. James Amos, commandant of the Marine Corps, to open the annual exposition organized by
the Navy League. The three military leaders discussed the changing scope of maritime-based militaries drawing out of protracted
land-based conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and "rebalancing to the Pacific," in keeping with the ongoing White House foreign
policy directorate. Amos outlined the continuous hot spots of activity that have dominated headlines in recent years, including
conflict in Syria and Mali, ongoing piracy in the Indian Ocean rim and an increasingly tense standoff on the Korean peninsula. "There
is no sense of stability, ladies and gentlemen," he said. "There are and there will be these types of issues that our nation is going to
have to face." [SEE: Top 10 Most Competitive Countries] But
he drew attention to a widespread issue on a
nearby continent that has escaped much public attention in the U.S. and remains an ongoing
source of danger. "Narcoterrorism just on our south border: [it is] yet to be seen just how that is
going to play out in our own nation, but it is an issue and it is something that our nation is going
to have to deal with," he said, pointing to the importance of addressing "narco-terrorism" among
transnational criminal syndicates engaged in the drug trade. Well-worn drug shipping routes
through Central America and into the U.S. have caught the attention of outside powers in recent
years, including the Iranian government. Iranian agents have likely entered the U.S. through
these channels, Military.com reports. "Colombia is doing particularly well, but there is an insurgency growing," he said. "They
have been fighting it, probably the greatest success story in this part of the world." Amos said it is "yet to be seen what is
going to happen in Venezuela," where a week from Monday the country will select a new president between the late
Hugo Chavez' handpicked successor or the unfavored reformer.
Venezuela houses Iranian terrorist training camps—funded by drug trafficking
Mahjar-Barducci ’11 (by Anna Mahjar-Barducci May 4, 2011 at 4:00 am—employed at
Gatestone Institute, International Policy Council “Iran Trains Terrorists in Venezuela, Hides
Behind Mercenaries” http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/2094/iran-trains-terrorists-venezuela)
Iran is trying to take advantage of the uprisings in the Arab world to spread its influence. The Kuwaiti daily Al-Seyassah
reported that Tehran is recruiting and training Shiites from Gulf countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain, which are
oppose their Sunni-dominated regimes. Iran is trying to push the Arab uprisings in countries with a Shiite population from antigovernment protests to sectarian violence, with the aim of toppling Sunni-dominated regimes to have new governments under the
Iran's influence. Saudi Arabia understands that sectarian violence could endanger Sunnis' rule, especially in countries like Bahrain
which has a Shiite majority. In order to safeguard the borders of the Sunni-world, therefore, Saudi Arabia is deploying its troops in
Bahrain to prevent the ousting of the Sunni regime there. The
ultimate battlefield, though, between Shiites and
Sunnis over the rule of the Muslim world will be in Iraq. Tehran is already preparing for this
scenario with the help of Latin American countries such as Venezuela. Al-Seyassah has published
reports about Iranian training camps on the border between Venezuela and Colombia, where
Shiites from the Arab world are taught to make bombs, carry out assassinations, kidnap people
and transport hostages to other locations. These training camps are run by Iranian
Revolutionary Guards in cooperation with Hezbollah and Hamas. The newspaper reports that the Shiite
trainees fly to Caracas via Damascus, probably on the Venezuelan airline Conviasa, which covers the Caracas-Damascus-Tehran
route. The weekly Conviasa's flights to Tehran are a cause for concern in Washington, due to the lack of transparency about what or
whom they might be transporting.. The Kuwaiti paper mentions as well the trainees' presence in Colombia. The
Iranian
government allegedly enjoys in Latin America the support of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
the Colombian group, the FARC, which derives its primary source of income from drug trafficking. It is not a coincidence,
therefore, that Al-Seyassah mentions that Iran finances its militias through narco-trafficking. Iran's support in
Latin America should worry the US. The Iranian regime is expanding its ties and its influence in the US's
backyard, and helping groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas finding new safe havens for their terrorist activities. Recently,
Uruguay also showed strong interest in strengthening relations with Teheran. The Uruguayan Foreign Minister even went so far as to
hail Iran's role in the promotion of human rights in the world.
Narco-terror needs to be stopped—funds Iranian terrorists and causes the
threat of an attack on the US
Neuman ’11 (By Vanessa Neumann December 2011 Vanessa Neumann is a Senior Fellow of the
Foreign Policy Research Institute and is co-chair, with FPRI Trustee Devon Cross, of FPRI’s
Manhattan Initiative. “THE NEW NEXUS OF NARCOTERRORISM: HEZBOLLAH AND VENEZUELA”
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/2011/201112.neumann.narcoterrorism.html)
Press stories, as well as a television documentary, over the past two months have detailed the growing cooperation
between South American drug traffickers and Middle Eastern terrorists, proving that the United States
continues to ignore the mounting terrorist threat in its own “backyard” of Latin America at its own peril. A greater portion of
financing for Middle Eastern terrorist groups, including Hezbollah and Al Qaeda, is coming from
Latin America, while they are also setting up training camps and recruiting centers throughout our
continent, endangering American lives and interests globally. Some Latin American countries that were
traditional allies for the U.S. (including Venezuela) have now forged significant political and economic alliances with regimes whose
interests are at odds with those of the U.S., particularly China, Russia and Iran. In fact Iran and Iran’s Lebanese asset, “the Party of
God,” Hezbollah,
have now become the main terror sponsors in the region and are increasingly
funded by South American cocaine. Venezuela and Iran are strong allies: Venezuelan President Hugo
Chávez and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad publicly call each other “brothers,” and last year signed 11 memoranda of
understanding for, among other initiatives, joint oil and gas exploration, as well as the construction of tanker ships and
petrochemical plants. Chávez’s assistance to the Islamic Republic in circumventing U.N. sanctions has got the attention of the new
Republican leadership of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, resulting in the May 23rd, 2011 announcement by the US State
Department that it was imposing sanctions on the Venezuelan government-owned oil company Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) as a
punishment for circumventing UN sanctions against Iran and assisting in the development of the Iran’s nuclear program. Besides
its sponsored terrorist groups, Iran also has a growing direct influence in Latin America, spurred
by three principal motivations: 1) a quest for uranium, 2) a quest for gasoline, 3) a quest for a
base of operations that is close to the US territory, in order to position itself to resist diplomatic
and possible military pressure, possibly by setting up a missile base within striking distance of
the mainland US, as the Soviets did in the Cuban Missile Crisis. FARC, Hezbollah and Al Qaeda all have training
camps, recruiting bases and networks of mutual assistance in Venezuela as well as throughout the continent. I have long argued that
Latin America is an increasing source of funding for Middle Eastern terrorism and to overlook
the political changes and security threats in the region with such geographic proximity to the US
and its greatest source of immigrants is a huge strategic mistake. It was inevitable that South
American cocaine traffickers and narcoterrorists would become of increasing importance to
Hezbollah and other groups. While intelligence officials believe that Hezbollah used to receive as much as $200 million
annually from its primary patron, Iran, and additional money from Syria, both these sources have largely dried up due to the onerous
sanctions imposed on the former and the turmoil in the latter. A recent New York Times front-page article (December 14, 2011)
revealed the extensive and intricate connections between Hezbollah and South American cocaine trafficking. Far from being the
passive beneficiaries of drug-trafficking expats and sympathizers, Hezbollah has high-level officials directly involved in the South
American cocaine trade and its most violent cartels, including the Mexican gang Los Zetas. The “Party of God’s” increasing foothold
in the cocaine trade is facilitated by an enormous Lebanese diaspora. As I wrote in my May 2011 e-note, in 2005, six million Muslims
were estimated to inhabit Latin American cities. However, ungoverned areas, primarily in the Amazon regions of Suriname, Guyana,
Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and Brazil, present easily exploitable terrain over which to move people and material.
The Free Trade Zones of Iquique, Chile; Maicao, Colombia; and Colón, Panama, can generate undetected financial and logistical
support for terrorist groups. Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru offer cocaine as a lucrative source of income. In addition, Cuba and
Venezuela have cooperative agreements with Syria, Libya, and Iran. Some shocking revelations into the global interconnectedness of
Latin American governments and Middle Eastern terrorist groups have come from Walid Makled, Venezuela’s latter-day Pablo
Escobar, who was arrested on August 19, 2010 in Cúcuta, a town on the Venezuelan-Colombian border. A Venezuelan of Syrian
descent known variously as “El Turco” (“The Turk”) or “El Arabe” (“The Arab”), he is allegedly responsible for smuggling 10 tons of
cocaine a month into the US and Europe—a full 10 percent of the world’s supply and 60 percent of Europe’s supply. His massive
infrastructure and distribution network make this entirely plausible, as well as entirely implausible the Venezuelan government did
not know. Makled owned Venezuela’s biggest airline, Aeropostal, huge warehouses in Venezuela’s biggest port, Puerto Cabello, and
bought enormous quantities of urea (used in cocaine processing) from a government-owned chemical company. After his arrest and
incarceration in the Colombian prison La Picota, Makled gave numerous interviews to various media outlets. When asked on camera
by a Univisión television reporter whether he had any relation to the FARC, he answered: “That is what I would say to the American
prosecutor.” Asked
directly whether he knew of Hezbollah operations in Venezuela, he answered:
"In Venezuela? Of course! That which I understand is that they work in Venezuela. [Hezbollah] make money and all of that
money they send to the Middle East." A prime example of the importance of the Lebanese diaspora in triangulating amongst South
American cocaine and Middle Eastern terrorists, is Ayman Joumaa, a Sunni Muslim of the Medellín cartel with deep ties with Shiites
in the Hezbollah strongholds of southern Lebanon. His indictment made public on Tuesday “charges him with coordinating
shipments of Colombian cocaine to Los Zetas in Mexico for sale in the United States, and laundering the proceeds” (NY Times, Dec.
14, 2011).
The growing routes linking South American cocaine to Middle Eastern terrorists are
primarily from Colombia through Venezuela. According to an April 2011 report by the United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is the most prominent country of origin for
direct cocaine shipments to Europe, with the cocaine coming mainly from Colombia, primarily the FARC and ELN
terrorist groups. Shipments to Africa, mostly West Africa, gained in importance between 2004 and 2007, resulting in the emergence
of a new key trans-shipment hub: centered on Guinea-Bissau and Guinea, stretching to Cape Verde, The Gambia and Senegal, thus
complementing the already existing trafficking hub of the Bight of Benin, which spans from Ghana to Nigeria. As the cocaine is
transported through Africa and into Europe, its safe passage is guaranteed (much as it was in Latin America) by terrorist groups—
most prominently, Al Qaeda and Hezbollah. The cocaine can also travel from Latin America's Tri‐Border Area (TBA)—bounded by
Puerto Iguazu, Argentina; Ciudad del Este, Paraguay; and Foz do Iguaçu, Brazil—to West Africa (particularly Benin, Gambia and
Guinea-Bissau, with its poor governance and vast archipelagos) and then north into Europe through Portugal and Spain or east via
Syria and Lebanon. Hezbollah’s traditional continental home has been the TBA, where a large, active Arab and Muslim community
consisting of a Shi’a majority, a Sunni minority, and a small population of Christians who emigrated from Lebanon, Syria, Egypt and
the Palestinian territories about 50 years ago. The TBA, South America’s busiest contraband and smuggling center, has long been an
ideal breeding ground for terrorist groups, including Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah and Al Qaeda—the latter since 1995 when Osama bin
Laden and Khalid Sheikh Mohammad first visited. Hezbollah is still active in the TBA, according to Argentine officials. They maintain
that with Iran's assistance, Hezbollah carried out a car‐bomb attack on the main building of the Jewish Community Center (AMIA)
in Buenos Aires on July 18, 1994, protesting the Israeli‐Jordanian peace agreement that year. Today, one of the masterminds of
those attacks, the Iranian citizen and Shia Muslim teacher, Mohsen Rabbani, remains not only at large, but extremely active in
recruiting young Brazilians, according to reports in Brazilian magazine Veja. This region, the third in the world for cash transactions
(behind Hong Kong and Miami), continues to be an epicenter for the conversion and recruitment of a new generation of terrorists
who then train in the Middle East and pursue their activities both there and in the Americas. According to Lebanon’s drug
enforcement chief, Col. Adel Mashmoushi, as cited in The New York Times, a main transportation route for terrorists, cash and drugs
was aboard a flight commonly referred to as “Aeroterror,” about which I wrote in my May 2011 e-note for FPRI. According to my
own secret sources within the Venezuelan government, the flight had the route Tehran-Damascus-Caracas-Madrid, where it would
wait for 15 days, and flew under the direct orders of the Venezuelan Vice-President, according to the captain. The flight would leave
Caracas seemingly empty (though now it appears it carried a cargo of cocaine) and returned full of Iranians, who boarded the flight
in Damascus, where they arrived by bus from Tehran. The Iranian ambassador in Caracas would then distribute the new arrivals all
over Venezuela. I wrote in my May 2011 e-note that reports that Venezuela has provided Hezbollah operatives with Venezuelan
national identity cards are so rife, they were raised in the July 27, 2010, Senate hearing for the recently nominated U.S. ambassador
to Venezuela, Larry Palmer. When Palmer answered that he believed the reports, Chávez refused to accept him as ambassador in
Venezuela. Thousands
of foreign terrorists have in fact been given national identity cards that
identify them as Venezuelan citizens and give them full access to the benefits of citizenship. In
2003, Gen. Marcos Ferreira, who had been in charge of Venezuela’s Department of Immigration and Foreigners (DIEX) until he
decided to support the 2002 coup against Chávez, said that he had been personally asked by Ramón Rodríguez Chacín (who served
as both deputy head of DISIP—Venezuela’s intelligence service, now renamed SEBIN—and Interior Minister under Chávez) to allow
the illegal entry Colombians into Venezuela thirty-five times and that the DISIP itself regularly fast-tracked insurgents including
Hezbollah and Al Qaeda. The newly-minted Venezuelan citizens during Ferreira’s tenure include 2,520 Colombians and 279
“Syrians.” And that was only during three of the past twelve years of an increasingly radicalized Chávez regime. While Chávez has
done more than anyone to strengthen these relationships with Middle Eastern terrorists, in an attempt to use what he calls “the
International Rebellion” (including Hezbollah, Hamas and ETA) in order to negotiate with the US for power in Latin America, the
coziness of the seemingly strange bedfellows dates back to the fall of the Soviet Union, when the USSR abandoned Cuba. At the Sao
Paulo Forum of 1990, prominent Venezuelans and international terrorists were all in attendance, including: then-Venezuelan
President Carlos Andrés Pérez (against whom Chávez attempted a coup in 1992); Alí Rodríguez, then-President of PDVSA (Petróleos
de Venezuela, the government-owned oil company); Pablo Medina, a left-wing Venezuelan politician who initially supported Chávez,
but has now moved to the opposition; as well as Fidel Castro, Moammar Qaddafi and leaders of the FARC, Tupamaros and Sendero
Luminoso (Shining Path). The extent to which these alliances have deepened and become institutionalized is exemplified by the
Continental Bolivarian Coordinator, the office that coordinates all the Latin American terrorists. According to a well-placed
Venezuelan military source of mine, they are headquartered in the Venezuelan state of Barinas—the same state that is effectively a
Chávez family fiefdom, with their sprawling family estate, La Chavera, and their total control of local politics. Their extreme antiSemitism is not ideological, but simply out of convenience: to court and maintain Iranian support. According to the Congressional
Research Service, with enactment of the sixth FY2011 Continuing Resolution through March 18, 2011, (H.J.Res. 48/P.L. 112-6)
Congress has approved a total of $1.283 trillion for military operations, base security, reconstruction, foreign aid, embassy costs, and
veterans’ health care for the three operations initiated since the 9/11 attacks: Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) Afghanistan and
other counter terror operations; Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), providing enhanced security at military bases; and Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF). Yet for all this massive spending on fighting terrorists and insurgents in the Middle East, we are leaving ourselves
vulnerable to them here, on a number of fronts. First and foremost, the United States is under territorial threat through its Mexican
border. Hezbollah operatives have already been smuggled, along with drugs and weapons, in tunnels dug under the border with the
US by Mexican drug cartels. Only a week after my October 5th interview by KT McFarland on Fox, where I specifically warned of a
possibility of this resulting in a terrorist attack carried out inside the US with the complicity of South American drug traffickers, the
global press revealed a plot by the elite Iranian Quds Force to utilize the Mexican gang Los Zetas to assassinate the Saudi
ambassador to Washington in a bombing that would have murdered many Americans on their lunch hour. Second, American assets
in Latin America are under threat. Embassies, consulates, corporate headquarters, energy pipelines and American- or Jewishsponsored community centers and American citizens have already been targeted by terrorist groups all over Latin America for
decades: FARC in Colombia, Sendero Luminoso and Tupac Amaru in Peru and Hezbollah in Argentina. Al Qaeda is also rumored to
have a strong presence in Brazil. Third, while American soldiers give their lives trying to defeat terrorists and violent insurgents in the
Middle East, these same groups are being supported and strengthened increasingly by Latin America, where they receive training,
weapons and cash. This makes American military engagement far more costly by any metric: loss of life and financial cost. Indeed
over the last decade, Latin America is a region spiraling ever more out of American control. It is a region with which the United
States has a growing asymmetry of power: it has more importance to the United States, while the United States is losing influence
over Latin America, which remains the largest source of oil, drugs and immigrants, both documented and not. Latinos now account
for 15 percent of the US population and nearly 50 percent of recent US population growth, as well as a growing portion of the
electorate, as seen in the last presidential elections. The discovery of huge new oil reserves in Brazil and Argentina, that might even
challenge Saudi Arabia, and the 2012 presidential elections in Venezuela, make Latin America of increasing strategic importance to
the U.S., particularly as the future political landscape of the Middle East becomes ever more uncertain, in the wake of the Arab
Spring and the political rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in previously secular Arab governments. The growth of transnational gangs
and the resurgence of previously waning terrorist organizations pose complicated new challenges, as violence and murder cross the
U.S. border, costing American lives and taking a huge toll on U.S. law enforcement. The United States needs to develop a smart
policy to deal with these challenges. So while the US is expending vast resources on the GWOT, the terrorists are being armed and
reinforced by America’s southern neighbors, making the GWOT far more costly for the US and directly threatening American
security. Even though Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez may be removed from the presidency either through an electoral loss in
the October 7, 2012 presidential elections or through his battle with cancer, certain sectors of the
Venezuelan
government will continue to support international terrorism, whose activities, bases and training camps
have now spread throughout this region. By understanding the dynamics of the increasingly entrenched narcoterrorist network, the
U.S. can develop an effective policy to contend with these, whether or not President Chávez remains in power.
Iran using Venezuela as a terror route—Iranian cells and key geographical
positioning
Powell 8/13 (Houston Chronicle| by Stewart M. Powell, reporter for the Houston Chronicle,
Aug 13, 2012 “Venezuela as Iranian Terror Route Worries US” http://www.military.com/dailynews/2012/08/13/venezuela-as-iranian-terror-route-worries-us.html)
WASHINGTON -- Ever since Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad struck a deal with dictator Hugo Chavez for weekly air service
between the nations' capitals, American
officials have worried that Iranian-backed terrorists could reach
to the rim of Latin America, pick up fake Venezuelan passports and sneak into the United States.
Now, with growing talk of a pre-emptive Israeli attack to slow Iran's suspected nuclear arms program, Iran has threatened that it
would retaliate across the globe. And its easy access to the Western Hemisphere has the U.S. particularly concerned. The
commercial service between Tehran and Caracas by Iran Air and Conviasa Air Venezuela,
including a stop in Damascus, Syria, is so secretive that there's confusion among intelligence
agencies about whether the flights are continuing. Israel believes they are; the U.S. isn't so sure. Nevertheless,
American fears are elevated. "Some Iranian officials -- probably including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei -- have
changed their calculus and are now more willing to conduct an attack in the United States in
response to real or perceived U.S. actions that threaten the regime," James Clapper, director of National
Intelligence, warned the Senate Intelligence Committee in his latest threat assessment. If that attack comes, experts see it being
staged by Iranian operatives who have entered the U.S. through Latin America. "There's pretty much of a general consensus within
the intelligence community that Iranian-backed
cells providing financial support to Hezbollah could easily
convert to operational cells and light up the place," says U.S. Rep. Mike McCaul, a Republican whose district
stretches from Austin to Houston. McCaul, chairman of investigations for the House Committee on Homeland Security, led a sevenday fact-finding mission across Latin America last week. "From our observations on this trip, the Iranian threat to the United States is
very real and it would be difficult to defend against all of these operatives." Iranian retaliation would likely fall to pre-positioned
operatives drawn from the ranks of the 15,000-strong Iranian Revolutionary Guards Quds Force or 10,000-member, Iranian-backed
Hezbollah based in southern Lebanon. McCaul said Hezbollah is fundraising with impunity in the tri-border area surrounded by
Paraguay, Argentina and Brazil, where some 30,000 Lebanese expatriates and immigrants live among a population of 800,000. He
said enterprising businesses there are being required to tithe as much as 2 percent of gross revenues to the Lebanon-based terrorist
organization. Threat 'downplayed' Yet the suspected terrorist haven largely is ignored by the three adjacent countries. "Authorities
downplay the threat," McCaul said. "They talk about trans-national crime. But they don't want to talk about terrorism. If you use the
T-word, they pucker up." The Iranian-backed suicide bombing of an Israeli tourist bus in Bulgaria on July 18, killing five Israelis and
wounding 30, is the latest sign Tehran remains ready to strike abroad. "Iran has methodically cultivated a network of sponsored
terrorist surrogates capable of conducting effective, plausibly deniable attacks against Israel and the United States," reports the
Pentagon's latest assessment of Iran's military power. There also are signs that Iranian agents are forging ties with murderous,
multibillion-dollar Mexican drug cartels. "Iranian operatives are stepping into power vacuums," said Rep. Henry Cuellar, D-Laredo, a
member of the House Committee on Homeland Security who made the trip. "If
you were Iran and you wanted to
retaliate against the United States you would go through the backyard. Latin America is
America's backyard." Federal authorities unmasked an alleged Iranian Quds Force plot last fall that featured attempts by a
naturalized American born in Iran to enlist a member of the Mexican narco-terrorist group Los Zetas in a $1.5 million scheme to kill
the Saudi ambassador to the U.S. Manssor Arbabsiar, a Corpus Christi resident arrested Sept. 29 at John F. Kennedy International
Airport, faces trial in New York in October on multiple charges stemming from the alleged plot to assassinate Adel Al-Jubeir by
bombing his favorite restaurant in Washington. "We have to presume that Hezbollah cells are present and being fortified while
awaiting orders from Iran," retired Marine Col. Timothy Geraghty warned Congress last fall after the assassination plot came to light.
Operatives are here? Congressional investigators working for the GOP majority estimate there are now "at least hundreds of
Hezbollah operatives" in the U.S., said Rep. Peter King, R-N.Y., chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security. Most
suspected Iranian operatives are believed to have come into the U.S. through the 327 ports of entry, including airports, border
crossings and maritime ports. A handful may have surreptitiously crossed the 1,969-mile Southwestern border. Of 59,017 nonMexican citizens arrested crossing the U.S.-Mexico border in 2010, 14 came from Iran and 11 from Lebanon. "We are constantly
working against different and evolving threats involving various terrorist groups and various ways they may seek to enter the
country," Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano told Congress in late July. Yet suspected terrorists have "from time to time"
slipped across the border, Napolitano conceded. Her comments reflect continued partisan differences over the Iranian threat. GOPdrafted legislation backed by 82 co-sponsors -- including nine Texas Republicans in the House -- would require the Obama
administration to "use all elements of national power to counter Iran's growing presence and hostile activity in the Western
Hemisphere." The White House remains more circumspect. Iran may have rapidly expanded across Latin America in recent years by
setting up 11 embassies and 17 cultural centers. But the State Department's annual report on terrorism concluded "there were no
known operational cells of either al-Qaida or Hezbollah in the hemisphere."
Venezuelan narco terror is a threat to the US—Iranian infiltration
Shinkman 4/8 (By PAUL D. SHINKMAN April 8, 2013 Paul D. Shinkman is a national security
reporter for U.S. News & World Report. “Venezuelan Narco-Terrorism, Encroaching Arctic
Among Top U.S. Threats” http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/04/08/venezuelannarco-terrorism-encroaching-arctic-among-top-us-threats)
NATIONAL HARBOR, Md. — While America draws down from wars in one section of the globe and prepares for possible conflicts in
another, it has become sandwiched between two growing and relatively unreported threats in its own hemisphere, top defense
officials said Monday. Foreign
backed narco-terrorism out of Venezuela and other South American
countries, as well as a developing frontier in the Arctic will be at the forefront of U.S. defense efforts in the
coming decade, said leaders of the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard while speaking at the Navy League's annual Sea-AirSpace expo. [ALSO: Candidates Remain Roiled in Venezuela Election] Any crystal ball predictions of America's next enemy will
require looking at a map differently, they said. "There are new challenges, and what you're seeing depends on where you're looking
from," said Adm. Jonathan Greenert, chief of Naval Operations. He pointed to a map of the arctic region, showing northern borders
of countries such as Russia, Norway and Danish-controlled Greenland, all within a cramped neighborhood with the U.S. and Canada.
"The Arctic is a challenge. It's a future challenge," he said, particularly as shrinking ice caps give way to increased shipping through
the Bering Strait and Russia's northern waters. Increased commerce means more governance and demands for higher security,
Greenert said. "The natural resources present in the arctic region are being surveyed currently for exploitation. Virtually every arctic
nation has made claims of sovereignty, some quite visible," said Vice Adm. John P. Currier, the vice commandant of the Coast Guard.
"They exist on a daily basis and pose a real challenge to our country." Ship-born commerce, fishing, on-land mineral development
and eco-tourism are quickly expanding in the Arctic region, he said. [READ: Kerry Takes a Stab at Norwegian] Currier and Greenert
delivered opening remarks with Gen. James Amos, commandant of the Marine Corps, to open the annual exposition organized by
the Navy League. The three military leaders discussed the changing scope of maritime-based militaries drawing out of protracted
land-based conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and "rebalancing to the Pacific," in keeping with the ongoing White House foreign
policy directorate. Amos outlined the continuous hot spots of activity that have dominated headlines in recent years, including
conflict in Syria and Mali, ongoing piracy in the Indian Ocean rim and an increasingly tense standoff on the Korean peninsula. "There
is no sense of stability, ladies and gentlemen," he said. "There are and there will be these types of issues that our nation is going to
have to face." [SEE: Top 10 Most Competitive Countries] But
he drew attention to a widespread issue on a
nearby continent that has escaped much public attention in the U.S. and remains an ongoing
source of danger. "Narcoterrorism just on our south border: [it is] yet to be seen just how that is
going to play out in our own nation, but it is an issue and it is something that our nation is going
to have to deal with," he said, pointing to the importance of addressing "narco-terrorism" among
transnational criminal syndicates engaged in the drug trade. Well-worn drug shipping routes
through Central America and into the U.S. have caught the attention of outside powers in recent
years, including the Iranian government. Iranian agents have likely entered the U.S. through
these channels, Military.com reports. "Colombia is doing particularly well, but there is an insurgency growing," he said. "They
have been fighting it, probably the greatest success story in this part of the world." Amos said it is "yet to be seen what is
going to happen in Venezuela," where a week from Monday the country will select a new president between the late
Hugo Chavez' handpicked successor or the unfavored reformer.
Condition On Privatize PDVSA
1NC shell
USFG should [insert plan text] under the condition that the government of
Venezuela privatize PDVSA
CP solves – Now is the key time to use leverage to change internal Venezuelan
policy, only oil privatization can solve for economic stability.
Roberts ‘13 (James Roberts, master’s degree in international and development economics from
Yale University and also holds a master of business administration from the University of
Pittsburgh, Research Fellow For Economic Freedom and Growth, Center for International Trade
and Economics (CITE), and Sergio Daga, Visiting Senior Policy Analyst, Center for International
Trade and Economics (CITE) “Venezuela: U.S. Should Push President Maduro Toward Economic
Freedom,” Issue Brief #3911, 4-15-13)
Hugo Chavez’s hand-picked successor, former trade union boss Nicolás Maduro, appears to have defeated Governor Henrique
Capriles by a narrow margin in a contentious and hard-fought special election on April 14. Venezuela
is in such shambles
ultimately be
forced to pursue more moderate policies and seek help from the U.S. to restore stability. The
Obama Administration and Congress should exploit this opening by using U.S. leverage to push
Venezuela to turn from Chavez’s failed experiment in oil-cursed[1] “21st-century socialism” toward economic
freedom. An Economy in Ruins The foundations of economic freedom in Venezuela have
crumbled. When Chavez took office in 1999, Venezuela scored 54 out of 100 possible points in The Heritage Foundation/Wall
after 14 years of seat-of-the-pants mismanagement that Maduro—assuming his victory is confirmed—may
Street Journal’s annual Index of Economic Freedom. Today, however, after 14 years of Chavez’s soft authoritarian populism,
Venezuela merits a score of just 36 points. This nearly 20-point plunge is among the most severe ever recorded by a country in the
history of the Index. Its 2013 rank—174th out of 179 countries—places Venezuela among the most repressed nations in the
world.[2] Venezuela’s dismal economic freedom score is reflected in statistics that translate into real-time hardship for Venezuelans,
who must spend more of their incomes on higher prices for necessities—if they can find them on empty store shelves. There are
scarcities of nearly all staple food and fuel products. In fact, according to the Banco Central of Venezuela’s (BCV) shortages index,
Venezuela faces the most severe food shortages in four years.[3] And what food is available comes at a price: Mary O’Grady reports
in The Wall Street Journal that “over the past 10 years inflation in food and nonalcoholic beverages is 1,284%.”[4] Financial
disequilibrium in Venezuela is the result of a sharply widening fiscal deficit that reached almost 15 percent of gross domestic product
(GDP) last year.[5] Government control of the formerly independent BCV also contributed to a massive expansion of the money
supply. There are anecdotal reports in Caracas of people paying as much as 23 bolívars for one U.S. dollar in the black market as of
early April. The official rate is just 6.3 bolívars per dollar—and that is after a significant 32 percent devaluation in February.[6] These
problems were aggravated by Chavez’s foreign adventurism—which drained billions of petrodollars from the economy to keep afloat
the failed economy in Fidel Castro’s Cuba—as well as generous subsidies to his Chavista cronies in the region through such schemes
as ALBA and PetroCaribe. Corruption and Weak Rule of Law As reported in the Index, political interference in Venezuela’s judicial
system has become routine, and corruption is rampant. The landscape in Caracas and elsewhere in the country is littered with halffinished, publicly funded infrastructure and housing projects. The government funds needed to complete them often disappear. As
government expanded under Chavez, corruption became institutionalized. Chavez doubled the size of the public sector, many of
whose 2.4 million[7] employees have no real job other than to work to keep the regime in power. A World Economic Forum (WEF)
survey found little trust among businesses, politicians, the judicial system, and the police in Venezuela.[8] The
tragic result is
that Venezuela is now one of the most dangerous countries of the world. According to the Venezuelan
Violence Observatory, in 2012 nearly 22,000 people were murdered.[9] An inefficient and non-transparent
regulatory environment that is hostile to private foreign direct investment obstructs long-term
development and hampers entrepreneurial growth. The investment regime is tightly controlled by the state and
favors investors from China, Russia, Iran, and other democracy-challenged countries.[10] Investor protection in
Venezuela is ranked at 140 out of 144 countries, according to the WEF report.[11] In 1998, before Chavez took
power, there were more than 14,000 private industrial companies in Venezuela; in 2011, after 13 years of extensive nationalizations
and expropriations, only about 9,000 remained.[12] The Chavez government did make one product very inexpensive for
Venezuelans: Generous energy subsidies mean a car can be filled up with 15 gallons of gasoline for less than one U.S. dollar.[13]
Although that might buy short-term political advantage for the Chavista government, in the long term these energy subsidies are
very destructive to future economic growth, since Venezuelan companies have a distorted cost base and thus cannot compete
globally. Operations of the state oil company, PDVSA, have also deteriorated significantly under
Chavez. When he took office, PDVSA was producing 3.5 million barrels per day (bbl/d); today, it is down to 2.5 bbl/d.[14] Social
Programs and Inequality Ironically,
Chavez’s years in power did not result in much reduction of poverty
and inequality. Although some measures of income inequality (such as the Gini coefficient) did improve under Chavez,[15]
according to a recently published research paper by Darryl McLeod and Nora Lustig[16] that used data for 18 Latin American
countries, market democracies such as Chile and Brazil were far more successful at reducing inequality and poverty than the populist
Chavista regimes. Despite
its vast oil wealth, Venezuela’s economic growth performance has also
been poor. Between 1999 and 2012, average annual per capita growth was just 1.1 percent, while in the top four Latin American
countries (Panama, Peru, the Dominican Republic, and Chile) the rate was 3.6 percent.[17] Not surprisingly, the rate of
private investment in Venezuela—under 5 percent—is also one of the lowest in the region. In Peru and
Chile, it is almost 20 percent.[18] U.S. Policy Toward the New Maduro Government Washington should insist on
strict conditionality before sending a new U.S. ambassador to Caracas or assenting to any new
lending to Venezuela by international financial institutions until the new government: Produces a
comprehensive plan for reform that reduces the size of the public sector, reverses
nationalizations and expropriations of land and enterprises with just compensation to owners, restores the independence of
the central bank and judicial institutions, reforms the electoral system, and submits to an internationally supervised audit of the
government’s books during the Chavez years; Takes
steps to privatize PDVSA to bring in international equity
partners with the expertise and financial capacity to restore PDVSA to the high level of
professional operational and managerial expertise for which it was widely respected prior to
1999; Immediately stops all subsidies to Cuba and terminates wasteful and economically destabilizing subsidy programs such as
PetroCaribe and ALBA; Ceases cooperation with international state sponsors of terrorism (such as Iran) and joins the international
community’s cooperative efforts in the fight against transnational crime, narco-trafficking, and terrorism; and Restores freedom of
the press and access to information for all Venezuelans. Use
U.S. Leverage The foundations of economic
freedom in Venezuela were severely weakened during the 14-year misrule by Chavez. Although
Chavez’s death may aggravate instability and further polarize Venezuela, it need not be that way. Venezuela is in need of
immediate and sweeping reforms, but these changes will take time, effort, determination, and, above all, dedicated
reformers in Venezuela. The Obama Administration should step into the breach with active and forwardlooking policies to bring Venezuela back into the globalized economic system.
Offering normalized trade relations in exchange for privatized economic reform
solves US influence, Venezuela stability, and trade.
Pagano ‘13 (James, contributing writer to the Truman Doctrine, “Moving Venezuela to the
Center,” 3-18-13, http://trumanproject.org/doctrine-blog/moving-venezuela-to-the-center/)
After over a decade in power, Hugo
Chavez is now dead, providing U.S. policy makers an opening to
mend fences and steer Venezuela’s next president towards the center. With smart policy and a
light touch, the United States can help Venezuela’s next president lead his country out of the mess that Chavez built.
Chavez won the presidency in 1999 on a promise to “sow” the oil wealth of Venezuela into its social program. Bolstered by record
high oil prices, Chavez spent billions on such programs. While millions of Venezuelans were able to obtain healthcare and an
education, the poorly designed programs left little money to reinvest in oil exploration; output in Venezuela declined threatening
the longevity of all Chavez’s initiatives. Meanwhile, Chavez became an increasingly authoritarian leader,
consolidating power in the executive. He blacklisted opposition figures, altered the constitution and unevenly enforced laws for
personal benefit. By creating a steeply slanted playing field, Chavez was able to retain power. Venezuela’s
next president
will have to decide whether to reverse these trends, or continue the slide to outright
authoritarianism. The United States can and should influence this decision. The United States
must support the democratic process and engage the likely winner of April’s election, Chavez’s chosen successor, Nicolás
Maduro. He will have a real opportunity to put Venezuela back on the path to a free-market
democracy. The next president will face an extremely politicized Supreme Court and military and reforms are likely more
palatable if made by Maduro. Changes to apportionment, food subsidies or tax rates coming from Enrique Capriles (the opposition
candidate) could spark a legal challenge from the supreme court; or worse, opposition from the military. What
should the
U.S. role be? It must work with its Latin American allies in the region, Chile, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico to gently
pressure Maduro into making the types of institutional and economic changes necessary for
Venezuela to prosper. Failure to do so could lead to the reemergence of authoritarianism in
Latin America, instability in world oil markets and serious regional security repercussions. Chavez
was infamous for his anti-American tirades. George W. Bush’s poor global standing gave Chavez an easy target. With a more positive
global image, the most important step President Obama can take is to normalize relations with Cuba. As Venezuela’s closest ally,
Cuba has remained a persistent problem in U.S.-Latin American relations. By normalizing relations, Obama would take a huge step in
reducing anti-Americanism in Venezuela. Simultaneously, Obama would ingratiate himself to the rest of the region by ending the
dated embargo. Perhaps most importantly, eliminating this issue would give Venezuela’s next president the political cover necessary
to mend relations with the United States. The U.S. should push for economic reform with the help of Brazil which
seeks a greater role in international and regional politics. Former Brazilian President Lula da Silva has close ties to Venezuela, and
touting the recent successes of his center-left government in Brazil could help persuade Maduro to moderate his government. Brazil
has made huge societal gains without suffering the kind of economic setbacks seen in Venezuela. Friendly
cajoling, along
with the promise of closer economic ties could help lead Maduro onto a path of economic
reform necessary to extend certain “Chavista” social programs. Colombia, Brazil and the U.S. also have a shared interest in
improving Venezuelan security. Under Chavez, Venezuela became on the most violent countries in Latin America, as drug related
crimes skyrocketed. Violence is the number one concern of Venezuelans, and significant reductions would be a major political
victory for whoever is in power. Brazil and Colombia together should pressure Venezuela to accept sorely needed D.E.A assistance
with the tacit acceptance of modest political reforms, most importantly freer press. The
death of Chavez is a critical
juncture in U.S.-Latin American relations and it is important the United States not miss this
opportunity. Having a stable trustworthy Venezuela would allow the United States to continue
to draw down operations in the ever-volatile Middle East, fight narcotrafficking and expand
trade. Careful, well thought-out overtures and policy changes will help quell lingering antiAmericanism while also improving regional stability. Ending the Cuban embargo would provide absolute
economic gain for all parties, while providing cover for Maduro to thaw relations with the United States and receive aid to stop
uncontrollable violence. Strategic engagement
with regional allies could help spur the economic and
institutional reforms necessary for Venezuela to prosper moving forward. The situation in
Venezuela could be potentially destabilizing to the region. The United must act deliberately to make Hugo
Chavez’s passing an unmitigated positive development.
Terrorists get support from oil company—privatization solves the instability
Johnston ’10 (Peter Johnston Winter 2010 Centre for Operational Research and Analysis,
Defence Research and Development Canada Johnston, Peter. 2010. “The Security Impact of Oil
Nationalization: Alternate Futures Scenarios. Journal of Strategic” Security, 3 (4): 1-26.
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1085&context=jss)
Oil nationalization can have a more direct impact on security when revenues are used in
destabilizing ways. In some cases, oil revenues sustain extensive armaments programs that can lead to regional arms races.
For example, it has been reported in recent years that Venezuelan expenditures on arms have been
far in excess of any amount necessary to safeguard the country. President Chavez spent approximately $4
billion on arms purchases during 2005 and 2006, leading all other Latin American countries during this period. A portion of this
spending went toward the purchase of 100,000 Kalashnikov assault rifles along with the rights to manufacture more of these
weapons and their ammunition in Venezuela. Critics point out that Chavez did not consult the National Assembly and has been
arming not only the Venezuelan military but also his partisan civilian reserve, suggesting that these measures might protect him
should he lose the support of the military.23 Some
other countries in Latin America are alarmed by
Venezuela's program and consider it to be destabilizing for the region. Brazil, for example,
increased its defense spending from $1.1 billion in 2007 to $2.5 billion in 2008, in part because
of its concerns over Venezuela's military purchases.24 Given that PDVSA provides a very large
share of government revenue, 37.8% in 2007,25 these acquisitions could not be sustained
without the oil industry. Venezuela's neighbors have reason to be concerned about its behavior in light of the 2008
revelation that President Chavez was linked, by captured computer files on a rebel leader's laptop, to a program providing arms,
training, and advice to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) and its effort to overthrow Columbia's Government.26
Other reports suggest that Chavez permits FARC, and Columbia's other leftist guerrilla group, the National Liberation Army (ELN), to
operate within Venezuela. This has created several problems for Venezuelans since FARC and the ELN partially fund their operations
through destabilizing acts, including cocaine trafficking, ransoming hostages, and selling weapons. Chavez has openly lauded FARC in
the National Assembly and is alleged to consider FARC and ELN allies against a feared U.S. invasion. It is telling that during the
decade of his presidency, the rate of kidnappings in Venezuela has increased tenfold.27 Chavez's
use of oil revenues to
fund these groups destabilizes Columbia and Venezuela as well as the broader region. Venezuela is
not alone in its use of oil revenue to export instability. Money generated from oil and gas operations has
funded radical jihadist movements and has armed insurgencies throughout the world. For example,
a 2006 UN report noted that the Islamic Courts Union in Somalia received Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 3 No. 4
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol3/iss4/13 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.3.4.132he Security Impact of Oil
Nationalization: Alternate Futures Scenarios 9 shipments of arms and supplies from nationalized oil-producing states helping it to
fight the Somali Transitional Federal Government. Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen were among the countries noted, along with
Hizbollah, who is supported by Iran.28 Iran's support for Hizbollah exemplifies another destabilizing use of oil revenue. Hizbollah is
not the only terrorist group supported by Tehran, nor is Iran the only nationalized oil producer that offers these groups assistance.
Terrorist organizations that receive support from oil-producing countries include al-Qaida,
Hizbollah, Hamas, the Palestine Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation for Palestine—
General Command, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, FARC, ELN, and Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA). The oil-producing
states identified as providing support for these groups include Iran, Sudan, Syria,29 and as noted above, Venezuela.
Solvency
Privatization of PDVSA would spur investment—its social spending scares off
potential investors
Parraga 3/22 (By Marianna Parraga, journalist that reports on Venezuelan issues—author of
“Red Gold.” Fri Mar 22, 2013 6:39pm EDT “Venezuela's PDVSA revenue slips on domestic fuel
sales” http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/22/venezuela-pdvsaidUSL1N0CEB7U20130322)
ARACAS, March 22 (Reuters) - Venezuelan state oil company PDVSA's 2012 revenue slipped 0.2 percent from
the year before despite an increase in oil prices as the company sold more fuel on the subsidized
domestic market, the oil minister said Friday. The OPEC nation's fuel subsidy leaves the cost of gasoline and gas oil for power
generation at less than 10 cents per gallon, which creates consistent losses for the state oil giant. The company paid $43.9
billion to finance social programs and a development fund created by the late socialist leader
Hugo Chavez, who died this month after a two-year battle with cancer. Under his leadership, PDVSA evolved from a profitoriented company into the financial engine of anti-poverty efforts. "This is not a company designed to generate profits. This is a
national company. We're not here to provide benefits to private individuals," Oil Minister Rafael Ramirez, who is also PDVSA
president, said in comments to reporters. Revenue slipped to $124.5 billion, while profit fell 6.1 percent to $4.2 billion. Analysts
and bondholders tend to give less relevance to PDVSA's profits than it would for publicly listed
oil companies because of its heavy social spending. Debts to service providers, which began accumulating after
the 2008 financial crisis, rose 35 percent to reach $16.5 billion. Ramirez said the company was setting up financing arrangements to
help pay off debts to oil services giant Schlumberger to ensure the company can continue operations in Venezuela. He did not say
how much was owed. Active drilling rigs in Venezuela rose from the year before to reach 381 by the end of 2012. Investment
jumped 37 percent to reach $24.5 billion. PDVSA
funds programs ranging from free health clinics to sports
and cultural projects. Last year, it led an ambitious government plan to build hundreds of
thousands of homes. Critics have said the government has not invested enough in increasing production and that it has
scared off many foreign investors by nationalizing most of the industry. Venezuela's oil production was
targeted to reach 3.5 million barrels per day (bpd) in 2012. Ramirez said the 2012 production figure would be given on Monday.
Much of the new production is slated to come from the vast, mostly untapped Orinoco extra heavy oil belt, one of the planet's
biggest crude reserves. But some executives of PDVSA's partner companies working on Orinoco projects have said delays in
payments by the giant state oil company are slowing development.
Impacts
Nationalization of oil gives states the power to disrupt the market—causes instability
because other countries can’t just shift oil suppliers
Johnston ’10 (Peter Johnston Winter 2010 Centre for Operational Research and Analysis,
Defence Research and Development Canada Johnston, Peter. 2010. “The Security Impact of Oil
Nationalization: Alternate Futures Scenarios. Journal of Strategic” Security, 3 (4): 1-26.
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1085&context=jss)
Oil as a Weapon Another significant impact of nationalized oil operations is the use of the "oil
weapon" by exporting states in order to influence the behavior of, or possibly inflict economic
damage on, consumer countries. There are contemporary examples of this, such as Russia's cessation of oil exports to
the Czech Republic on the day that Prague agreed to accept a U.S. radar installation on Czech territory as part of the European
Ballistic Missile Defense.21 Consumer states
often lack the ability to quickly change sources of oil supply
due to the nature of contracts, the difficulty in shiftJournal of Strategic Security, Vol. 3 No. 4
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol3/iss4/13 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.3.4.134he Security Impact of Oil
Nationalization: Alternate
Futures Scenarios 7 ing refinery processes to handle different grades of
crude and, in periods of short supply, the dearth of spare global capacity to replace interrupted
petroleum shipments. Yet, exporting states can also suffer from their own use of the oil weapon
since they often depend on the revenue they obtain from their exports. If they cannot find new buyers,
they must have other sources of revenue or can only afford to disrupt their exports for short periods of time. There has been
considerable debate in recent years regarding the longevity of the oil supply, with some analysts suggesting that global peak oil
production has already been reached and others suggesting that it will occur at some point during this century.22 The issue of peak
oil is outside of the scope of this article, although it is important to understand that the availability of adequate quantities of oil on
the market reduces the impact of supply disruptions. A
well-supplied market can lessen the degree and
longevity of disruptions better than an inadequately supplied one. It seems logical then that
states that have nationalized their oil resources might be reticent to interrupt exports for
political reasons if the market is well-supplied. This is because, under this circumstance, countries whose supplies
are cut will be more able to find alternative sources. However, this is not guaranteed since converting refineries to handle different
crude can take some time; therefore, the impact of supply disruptions will still be felt to a limited degree, even when markets are
well-supplied. Consumer states do have some options to reduce the impact of the use of the oil weapon. The development of
strategic petroleum reserves provides some protection against short periods of supply disruption. Indeed, the impetus for creating
the International Energy Agency (lEA), with its strategic reserves prerequisite for members who are net-importers, was the 1973
OPEC oil embargo. Another option is to diversify oil suppliers in order to reduce dependencies on particular sources. Switching to
alternative sources of energy or reducing consumption through changing habits are also options. Development of new technology
and techniques to increase the output of existing oil fields or to extract crude from more challenging reserves can also help to
overcome the potential negative energy security impacts of the oil weapon. However,
since oil is a finite resource, it
will eventually become scarce. Consequently, it is possible that competition among states for
access to oil will increase and could become violent during the coming decade.
USFG should [insert plan text] under the condition that the government of
Venezuela stop restricting human rights activists
Venezuela ignores human rights—engaging with them would ruin credibility if
unconditional
HRW ’13 (Human Rights Watch The World Report is Human Rights Watch’s twenty-third annual
review of human rights practices around the globe. It summarizes key human rights issues in
more than 90 countries and territories worldwide, drawing on events from the end of 2011
through November 2012. “WORLD REPORT 2013” http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/)
The Chávez government has intensified its efforts to marginalize the country’s human rights
defenders by repeatedly accusing them of seeking to undermine Venezuelan democracy with
the support of the United States government. While some human rights nongovernmental organizations have
received funding from US sources—a common practice among independent groups throughout Latin America—there is no credible
evidence that the independence and integrity of their work has been compromised as a result. The weight of the government’s
unfounded allegations has been compounded by Chávez supporters, who have filed multiple criminal complaints against leading
NGOs for receiving foreign funding. In
addition, the Supreme Court ruled in 2010 that individuals or
organizations that receive foreign funding could be prosecuted for “treason” under a provision
of the criminal code that establishes a prison sentence of up to 15 years for anyone who
“collaborates directly or indirectly with a foreign country or Republic … or provides or receives
money from them … that could be used against the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the integrity of
its territory, its republican institutions, citizens, or destabilizes the social order.” The National Assembly, moreover, has enacted
legislation blocking organizations that “defend political rights” or “monitor the performance of public bodies” from receiving
international assistance.
These efforts to harass and discredit human rights defenders have
contributed to an environment in which they feel more vulnerable to acts of intimidation by
government officials and violence or threats by its supporters. The Chávez government has also enacted rules
that dramatically reduce the public’s right to obtain information held by the government. In combination, these
measures have significantly increased the government’s ability to prevent or deter human rights
defenders from obtaining the funding, information, legal standing, and public visibility they need
to be effective advocates.
The USFG should [insert plan text] under the condition that Venezuela works with
the US to take anti-climate change measures
Venezuela is key to solve for warming but that won’t happen in the status
quo—oil, current negotiations, and residual capitalism rhetoric
Edwards and Mage 3/7 (Guy Edwards is a research fellow at Brown University's centre for
environmental studies and is co-founder of Latin America's first multilingual website on climate
change, Intercambio Climático. Susanna Mage is a recent graduate from Brown University and is
currently interning at Intercambio Climático Mar 7, 2013 “Death of Hugo Chávez gives
Venezuela a choice on climate change”
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/blog/2013/mar/07/death-hugo-chavez-venezuelaclimate-change)
Regardless of one's position on el Comandante Hugo Chávez, the death of the Venezuelan president opens the
door for a policy debate on a critical issue for Venezuela and the world's security: climate
change. As the 2015 deadline to create a new global treaty on climate change approaches, the
question for the oil-rich country looms: will Venezuela be a key architect of an ambitious and
equitable deal, or will it sabotage progress? The International Energy Agency reports that no more than one-third of
proven fossil fuel reserves can be consumed prior to 2050 if we are to limit warming to 2C. Writer Bill McKibben pointed out that
if Venezuela were to exploit its heavy crude oil and Canada's tar sands are fully tapped, this would mean
"game over" for the climate as both reserves would fill up the remaining "atmospheric space" or
"carbon budget." President Chávez oversaw a schizophrenic posture on climate change. He insisted that climate change
is an existential crisis caused by capitalism, while simultaneously pushing for the development of the Orinoco's heavy
crude. Under Chávez, Venezuela's oil dependency increased and it now obtains 94% of export earnings and more than 50% of its
federal budget from oil revenues. Due to high oil prices and Chávez's leadership, poverty and inequality have dropped. Chávez's
administration appeared committed to increase oil production to continue funding its social programmes, often through long-term
agreements with China to supply oil. Venezuela's "commodity backed loans" from China, estimated at more than $35bn, require it to
pay back China in oil. The
key to solving climate change is shifting all countries to low carbon
economies. At a United Nations negotiation in Bonn, Germany, in 2009, however, a Venezuelan official said that a shift to a lowcarbon economy would adversely impact developing country oil exporters, suggesting that a robust climate change treaty would
conflict with Venezuela's development model. At
the climate negotiations, Venezuela has clung to arguments
that developing countries have the right to emit to ensure their development. Undermining
Venezuela's position at the negotiations has been their often vociferous rhetoric, while exhibiting a lack of action at home.
Meanwhile, a number of poorer countries have shown a willingness to take on far more ambitious emissions cuts. Venezuela
releases only 0.56% of the global total of greenhouse gas emissions, but its per capita emissions (at approximately six tonnes per
person) are much higher than the world's poorest nations. Venezuela's current emissions, however, pale in significance compared to
what is at stake if it does fully develop its oil reserves. Former UK special representative for climate change John Ashton has said that
a country's ability to contribute to global efforts to tackle climate change depends on the credibility of its domestic policies.
Venezuela's national development plan (2013-19) includes measures to limit emissions, which include the oil industry and would
create a world movement to confront climate change. The Venezuelan government has invested $500m in windfarms and
distributed 155m energy-saving lightbulbs. However, critics
suggest that Venezuela has little interest and
commitment in tackling climate change, and that the plan's objectives are unlikely to be implemented. According to
ClimateScope, which ranks a country's ability to attract capital for low-carbon energy sources and efforts to build a green economy,
Venezuela is currently 24th out of 26 countries. In the UN climate negotiations, Venezuela is part of the Bolivarian Alliance for the
Peoples of Our Americas (ALBA) with Ecuador, Bolivia, Cuba and Nicaragua, which is praised by many citizens' groups for fighting for
climate justice. Venezuela is also a member of the Like-Minded group alongside China, India, Saudi Arabia and its ALBA partners.
Venezuela will understandably not stop oil production at the expense of its social programmes, nor its loan
repayments to China. Partial or full compensation for loss of revenue from keeping the oil in the ground is unlikely. Venezuela could
consider backing Ecuador's fascinating plan to be proposed at the next Opec meeting to create a 3-5% 'Daly-Correa' tax on every
barrel of oil exported to rich countries to raid billions for poor countries to adapt to climate change. With
the death of its
great leader, Venezuela has a choice on climate change. It can rebrand itself as a proactive actor
at home by working towards a low-carbon economy while joining with its ambitious neighbors
at the UN climate negotiations. With the largest known oil reserves, Venezuela's position on
climate change is pivotal. En route to 2015, it remains to be seen whether it will be regarded as an engineer of an
ambitious and equitable global treaty, or as a saboteur.
The USFG should [insert plan text] under the condition that Venezuela demand
free, fair and verifiable elections
Elections are the root cause of no democracy—future elections will have the same
problems as the last one
Christy 3/15 (By PATRICK CHRISTY March 15, 2013 Patrick Christy is a senior policy analyst at
the Foreign Policy Initiative. “Democracy in Post-Chavez Venezuela”
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/03/15/after-chavez-us-mustencourage-democratic-venezuela)
Venezuela's upcoming election to replace the late Hugo Chavez gives the country an important opportunity to break away from
over a decade's worth of strongman rule—and move towards better governance, improved
internal security and stability, a stronger and more vibrant economy, and a truly constructive
role in regional and global affairs. It's critical that the United States do what it can to
encourage Venezuela to seize that opportunity. For over a decade, Chavez led ideologically-driven efforts to erode U.S.
standing in Latin America and around the globe. The populist leader expanded Venezuela's ties with rogue states such as Cuba and Iran,
aided and protected terrorist organizations such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and actively undermined the rule
of law in Venezuela and throughout the Americas. In the Western Hemisphere alone, Chavez used record petrol prices to
prop up anti-American socialist leaders, most notably in Bolivia, Cuba and Nicaragua. Chavez leaves behind a broken economy, a deeply divided nation
and a dysfunctional government, all of which will take years—if not decades—to overcome. Venezuela is plagued with double-digit inflation, mounting
budget deficits and rising levels of violence. While the OPEC nation maintains one of the world's largest geological oil reserves, crude exports—which
account for roughly 45 percent of federal budget revenues—have declined by nearly half since 1999. The United States imports roughly one million
barrels from Venezuela per day. [See a collection of political cartoons on the economy.] Chavez's protégé Nicolas Maduro, the former vice president
who's now acting as Venezuela's interim president, is running to succeed the late strongman, but it's not preordained that he'll win. It remains to be
seen the extent to which he can properly unite prior to the election the many competing populist factions that benefited under Chavez for so many
years. What is clear is that he will drape himself in the political ideology of chavismo in the run up to April 14 elections, and use—and quite possibly
abuse—government institutions and petrodollars in attempt to woo the country's voters. What's
perverse is how the Obama
administration's move to "reset" relations with Maduro is doing more to legitimize him as the
rightful heir to Venezuela's presidency than to resuscitate relations between the two
governments. The move showed itself to be even more naive after Maduro accused the United States of plotting to poison Chavez shortly after
the strongman's death. [Check out our editorial cartoons on President Obama.] Washington must realize that a strategy of
engagement alone will not ensure a renewed and improved partnership with Caracas. Failure to
realize this will not only undermine whatever influence America has in the months ahead, but also send a troubling signal to Venezuela's increasingly
united political opposition. The
Obama administration should instead pursue a more principled policy towards a post-Chavez
Venezuela. In particular, it should: Pressure Caracas to implement key election reforms. Venezuela's opposition faces
formidable obstacles. Interim President Maduro will use the government's near-monopoly control of public airwaves, its established networks of
political patronage and last-minute public spending programs to bolster his populist agenda. Washington should stress publicly and privately that any
attempts to suppress or intimidate the opposition runs contrary to Venezuela's constitution and the principles defined in the Inter-American
Democratic Charter, which was adopted by Venezuela in 2001. To this point, José Cárdenas, a former USAID acting assistant administrator for Latin
America, writes, The Venezuelan opposition continues to insist that the constitution (which is of Chavez's own writing) be followed and have drawn up
a list of simple electoral reforms that would level the playing field and better allow the Venezuelan people to chart their own future free of chavista and
foreign interference. Demand free, fair and verifiable elections. Although Venezuela announced that a special election to
replace Chavez will be held next month, it is important to remember that elections alone do not make a democracy. Indeed, Chavez long embraced the
rhetoric of democracy as he, in reality, consolidated executive power, undermined Venezuela's previously democratic political system and altered the
The Obama administration should make clear that
free and fair elections, properly monitored by respected international election observers, are
essential to Venezuela's future standing in the hemisphere and the world. Likewise, Secretary of State John
outcomes of election through corruption, fraud and intimidation.
Kerry should work with regional partners—including (but not limited to) Brazil, Canada, Colombia and Mexico—to firmly encourage Maduro's interim
government. A unified regional voice would send a powerful signal to Chavez's cronies in Caracas and longtime enablers in China, Iran and Russia.
Condition future diplomatic and economic relations. Corruption and criminality were widespread under the Chavez regime, as high-level government
and military officials benefited from close ties to corrupt businesses and international drug traffickers. Yet to date, the Obama administration has done
little to hold Venezuela's leaders accountable. [See Photos: The Life of Hugo Chavez] Washington should make clear that full diplomatic relations with
the United States will be contingent upon Venezuela ending ties to international terrorist groups and rogue regimes like Iran. If
Venezuela
takes meaningful steps to end these ties and ensure future elections, the United States should
work with Caracas and the private sector to reform Venezuela's energy industry and identify
key development projects and reforms to improve the country's economic future. The United States
can play an important role in shaping Venezuela's post-Chavez future. But to do so, the Obama administration will need to stand with the people of
Venezuela by publicly defending democratic principles and the impartial rule of law in Latin America.
Aff Answers
A2 Iran Relations
Iran influence decreasing—sanctions check expansion
Goodman 6/26 (By Joshua Goodman - Jun 26, 2013 4:15 PM MT Reporter for Bloomberg News
“Iran Influence in Latin America Waning, U.S. Report Says”
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-26/iran-influence-in-latin-america-waning-u-sreport-says.html)
Iran isn’t actively supporting terrorist cells in Latin America and its influence is waning in the region after
almost a decade of promises to increase investment, according to a State Department report. While Iran’s interest in Latin America
is a “concern,” sanctions
have undermined efforts by the Islamic republic to expand its economic
and political toehold in the region, according to the unclassified summary of yesterday’s report. “As a result of
diplomatic outreach, strengthening of allies’ capacity, international nonproliferation efforts, a strong sanctions policy, and Iran’s
poor management of its foreign relations, Iranian influence in Latin America and the Caribbean is waning,” according to the report.
The findings disappointed some Republican lawmakers who say President Barack Obama’s administration is underestimating the
threat from Iran. The report comes as the U.S. takes a wait-and-see approach to President-elect Hassan Rohani, who has vowed to
seek more dialog with the U.S. “I believe the Administration has failed to consider the seriousness of Iran’s presence here at home,”
said Congressman Jeff Duncan, a Republican from South Carolina who wrote the legislation requiring the State Department report. “I
question the methodology that was used in developing this report.” Chavez Alliance The
U.S. stepped up its monitoring
of Iran’s presence in Latin America in a bid to isolate the country over its nuclear program and after President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad forged closer ties with anti-American allies of the late Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. While Iran’s
outreach bears watching, claims about more sinister activities are unproven, said Christopher Sabatini, senior policy director
at the Council of the Americas. “It’s a shame that in such a dynamic hemisphere in which we have so many diplomatic initiatives that
for some -- especially Congress -- attention to
the region has boiled down to mostly spurious charges
about Iranian infiltration,” Sabatini said via e-mail. Ahmadinejad made repeated trips to Latin America after taking office in
2005, most recently to Caracas to attend Chavez’s funeral in March and the inauguration of his successor, Nicolas Maduro, a month
later. By contrast, Rohani has said little about the region since his surprise victory earlier this month.
Instead, he said one of his main foreign policy priorities will be seeking “constructive dialog” with the U.S. and U.K., two nations with
which the country has traditionally been at odds. ‘Good Relations’ “We’ll seek to have good relations with all nations, including Latin
American states,” Rohani said during his first post-election press conference June 17, in response to a question about the attention
he’ll devote to Latin America. Under Ahmadinejad’s watch, Iran added embassies in Latin America and more than doubled trade
with Brazil, the region’s biggest economy. With Chavez, Ahmadinejad signed more than 100 accords to support everything from a
campaign to build homes in Venezuela to a joint venture to manufacture bicycles, which Chavez jokingly referred to as “atomic”
two-wheelers. The two countries also established in Caracas the Banco Internacional de Desarrollo, which together with its main
Iranian shareholder, Bank Saderat, is accused by the U.S. of being a vehicle for the Ahmadinejad government’s funding of the Middle
Eastern terrorist group Hezbollah. Yet with
Iran’s economy crippled by sanctions, many of the projects
haven’t gotten off the ground. For example, pledges from 2007 and 2008 to help build a $350 million deep-water port off
Nicaragua’s Atlantic coast and an oil refinery in Ecuador have yet to materialize. Nor has it built what former Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton warned would be a “huge” embassy in Managua. That hasn’t prevented the Obama administration from trying to curb
Iran’s influence. In 2011, it imposed sanctions on state-owned oil company Petroleos de Venezuela SA for defying sanctions on Iran.
It also implicated an Iranian man working out of Mexico in a plot to kill Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to Washington.
Iran influence declining—sanctions and countries are unreceptive
IP 3/24 (Iran Primer March 24, 2013 | 7:10pm “The Iran Primer” brings together 50 experts—
Western and Iranian—in comprehensive but concise online chapters on Iran’s politics, economy,
military, foreign policy, and nuclear program. “U.S. General: Iran’s Influence Waning in Latin
America” http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2013/mar/24/us-general-iran%E2%80%99s-influencewaning-latin-america)
Iran is “struggling to main influence” in Latin America, General John Kelly told the Senate Armed Services Committee
on March 19. The region as a whole has not been receptive to Iran’s diplomatic and economic
outreach. But the head of U.S. Southern Command warned that “limited intelligence capabilities” may not provide a full picture
of all Iranian activities in Latin America. Iran’s proxy, the militant organization Hezbollah, has established a presence in Latin
America, the general noted. General Kelly estimated that the Lebanese Shiite diaspora could generate up to “tens of millions of
dollars” for Hezbollah through licit and illicit means. During a Pentagon news briefing on March 20, he advised U.S. allies in the
region to deal cautiously with Iranians claiming to be journalists or peace workers ― who oftentimes are not “what they appear to
be.” The following are excerpts from Kelly’s remarks to the Senate Armed Services Committee and the press. Iran in the Western
is struggling to maintain influence in the region, and
that its efforts to cooperate with a small set of countries with interests that are inimical to the
United States are waning. In an attempt to evade international sanctions and cultivate anti-U.S. sentiment, the Iranian
regime has increased its diplomatic and economic outreach across the region with nations like
Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Argentina. This outreach has only been marginally successful, however, and the region
as a whole has not been receptive to Iranian efforts. Members and supporters of Iran’s partner, Lebanese
Hemisphere
… The reality on the ground is that Iran
Hezbollah, have an established presence in several countries in the region. The Lebanese Shi’a diaspora in our area of responsibility
may generate as much as tens of millions of dollars for Hezbollah through both licit and illicit means. There is also precedent for
Iranian and Hezbollah collusion to conduct attacks in the region, as evidenced in the 1992 and 1994 bombings in Argentina. In
Venezuela, government officials
have been sanctioned for providing financial support to Hezbollah,
take Iranian activities
and for providing support to the FARC’s narcotics and arms trafficking activities in Colombia. We
very seriously and, along with U.S. government agencies and international partners, we remain vigilant to the activities of Iran
and affiliated extremist groups and remain prepared to work with our partners to counter any direct threat to U.S. national security.
I would be remiss, however, if I did not share with the Congress my assessment that U.S. Southern Command’s limited intelligence
capabilities may prevent our full awareness of all Iranian and Hezbollah activities in the region. Click here for the full text. Pentagon
News Briefing GEN. KELLY: “…[T]he last five or six years there's been an increase in their establishment of embassies, you know,
normal, you know, kind of country team embassies in Latin America, cultural centers too, and, you know, as -- as you probably know,
there's a fair number of -- of Muslims that live in -- they're clustered in various places in -- in Latin America, but, you know,
embassies, cultural centers. So all of that's above board. And -- and if that's what they want to do -- they don't -- they're not getting
much traction by the way in terms of influence, although there are some Latin American countries that I won't go into that are -that are concerned because they -- they -- although they haven't got much traction in certain places, they're getting traction in other
places. The concern is that, you know, certainly they're looking, I would guess, for influence say for votes in the U.N. on sanctions or
whatever, try to -- to warm up to people and gain friends. I mean, that's certainly the way international politics works. But also, and
I've warned some of the -- made mention to some of our friends in -- in the region that these guys are very, very good at what they
do, and very, very skilled at what they do, and that people should just be careful as to who they're dealing with, whether they claim
to be an Iranian journalist or an Iranian, you know, peace worker or something, just -- just to be careful because these oftentimes
are not what they -- what they appear to be or they're stated that they're -- what they're doing in their country… QUESTION: What's
your main concern? I mean, do you think these activities are -- could be related to terrorism, for example? GEN. KELLY: Yes. Not -not accusing them of that, but that's kind of the business they're in in many parts of the world, we think. We do know that some
terrorist organizations are able to skim -- skim off fairly substantial sums of money from the drug profits that come out of America.
And so there has to be kind of a network for that to happen. So, that's kind of what we're looking at, but nothing to, you know, in a
sense, nothing to be too concerned about right now, but -- but, you know, they're establishing an above-board network and I'll leave
it go at that -- an above-board network of interaction with many countries in Latin America… QUESTION: And as far as where this is
all going, I mean, looking down the road, 10, 20 years, is the greatest -- one of the great fears that terrorists will use this,
quote/unquote, "highway" to get into the United States? I mean, to go up through Africa and to Europe? GEN. KELLY: Yes. I mean,
it's a very effective... QUESTION: Evidence, or, yes, that's sort of the fear? GEN. KELLY: I think the only evidence would be the -- the
Iranian agent that was picked up by our guys on the way here to D.C. to kill the ambassador… I would just say again the Iranians are
very, very, very good at what they do. And you have to be very careful when you deal with them.
Relations declining—regime shifts for both countries
Lansberg-Rodriguez and Zonis 7/4 (Daniel Lansberg-Rodriguez & Marvin Zonis · July 4th,
Daniel Lansberg-Rodriguez is a fellow at The Comparative Constitutions Project and a columnist
for the Venezuelan newspaper El Universal. Marvin Zonis is Professor Emeritus at Booth School
of Business “Venezuela and Iran: The End of The Affair?”
http://www.economonitor.com/blog/2013/07/venezuela-and-iran-the-end-of-the-affair/)
Over his fourteen year reign, the late Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez developed strong political ties to Iran:
visiting that country several times and hosting Iranian presidents on reciprocal visits. Since then, spring boarding off of
these Venezuelan ties, Iran has spread its tendrils into Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua
and Brazil. Yet with Chávez deceased, and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad stepping down to be replaced by an
ostensibly reform-minded successor, what – if anything – does the future have in store for this political odd couple? At first glance,
Iran and Venezuela may seem an unlikely match: more a recipe for redundancy than synergy. Both are relatively autocratic and rich
in oil, rentier states with poorly diversified economies. And while geopolitical friendships between states can likewise be predicated
on shared culture or values, here Venezuela
and Iran might also seem mismatched. Socially, Venezuela
has always been very progressive – among the first countries to allow for absolute freedom of religion and in 1863, the
first country in the world to outlaw capital punishment. Meanwhile, Iran is heavily theocratic, legally imposing Islamic
social conservatism, and with a justice system that executes more prisoners per capita (often publically) than any other country in
the world. Perhaps nothing illustrates the cultural differences more aptly however than an incident that took place in March 2013,
during Hugo Chavez’s funeral. A picture surfaced showing Iranian president Ahmadinejad embracing Elena Chávez, the grieving
elderly mother of his deceased friend. In Iran, where public physical contact between women and men is strictly forbidden barring a
close family relationship, the result was a scandal. Ahmadinejad eventually announced that the photograph had been photoshopped by some shadowy cabal of his enemies seeking to discredit him. Yet regardless of these complicating factors there exists a
strong connection. Under the respective administrations of Messrs. Chávez and Ahmadinejad there were two bellicose and
opinionated “revolutionary” countries fallen upon hard times and nostalgic for remembered past glories. Both
countries
have likewise isolated themselves, by design, from much of the international establishment – instead, seeking to trade
resource wealth for influence among their respective smaller, weaker neighbors – and in this regard both see the United States as
their principle enemy. In a speech at the University of Tehran, for example, Chavez, according to Reuters, claimed, “If the U.S.
Empire succeeds in consolidating its dominance, then humankind has no future. Therefore, we have to save humankind and put an
end to the U.S. Empire.” Yet now, given that they never did get around to ending the Empire, does this alliance still have a future?
The answer to this question will be of no small consequence to the world as a whole. It will extend beyond their role as a selfproclaimed rhetorical international disestablishment: an Axis of Insults. The alliance between these two countries has generated
concerns beyond the rhetoric. They have provided financial benefits to poorer neighbors and generated security risks to a great
many others. Some commentators, more than a few of them Republican congressmen, have publically surmised that Iran might have
been using Caracas as a staging ground for terrorist plots throughout the Western hemisphere, although a State Department report
released last week would seem to belie that fact. Others believe that Iran’s true interest’s lies in accessing Latin America’s largely
undeveloped uranium reserves, in hopes of advancing its ambitions towards the status of a nuclear power. What cannot be denied is
that there are, at present, numerous Iranian agents active in Latin America operating at various official levels. The Iranian security
apparatus has been instrumental in teaching Chavista security forces to more efficiently repress dissent among their own people.
(The Venezuelan Jewish community, once among the largest in Latin America, has been a particular target.) So what happens next?
Venezuela’s new president, Nicolas Maduro, has announced that he will meet soon with Iran’s new president-elect, Hassan
Rowhani. And while neither country has provided any details, if
Rowhani is the moderate he is touted to be, he
may well seek better relations with Europe and the United States, advanced economies capable of engaging
with Iran on more than a rhetorical level. Meanwhile, barring some unforeseen crisis precipitating the collapse of regime in Caracas,
the Venezuelan government seems unlikely to do likewise. Under fire from accusations of having stolen the recent election,
Maduro’s domestic legitimacy is predicated primarily on his having been fingered by Chávez
himself as successor, rather than on any personal charisma or qualifications. Under these
circumstances, seeking rapprochement with “The Empire,” so often vilified by his hallowed
predecessor, would be a dangerous game. In geopolitics, much as in interpersonal relationships, countries
sometimes outgrow each other. For an Iran that might finally be coming of age, maintaining close ties
with declining, unpopular Venezuela, would be no great benefit, and might hold back a more fruitful
potential dalliance with the West.
Says no
Venezuela needs Iran—investments in the economy, means Venezuela says no
to cutting ties
Habibinia 4/29 (Omid Habibinia April 29, 2013 Omid Habibinia is an Iranian journalist and
media researcher, and the co-founder of the International Association of Independent Iranian
Journalists. “Iran-Venezuela ties: win-win game for reformists and conservatives”
http://www.yourmiddleeast.com/columns/article/iranvenezuela-ties-winwin-game-forreformists-and-conservatives_13490)
On Wednesday, Iranian president Ahmadinejad’s government announced a day of mourning in respect of Hugo Chavez death,
despite the fact that some clergies criticized the decision. Iranians quickly reacted to Chavez passing, and few were surprised when
Ahmadinejad said that he would travel to Venezuela to attend the funeral. What was strange though is his religious condolence
message, in which he wrote that Hugo Chavez will return along with Messiah and the 12th Imam at the apocalypse to establish
justice in the world. Iran
and Venezuela have enjoyed strong ties ever since Khatami’s term and both
Khatami and Chavez regularly visited their respective capitals. This relationship has deepened during
Ahmadinejad’s reign; Chavez visited Tehran 13 times after his rise to power in 1999, and Ahmadinejad has himself been to
Venezuela six times after he became president in 2005. ALSO READ Memories of Tehran International School Iran
got
increasingly involved in Venezuela’s economy with large-scale projects through companies run
by the Islamic Republican Guards or groups connected to them. Private companies started to
“win” major deals such as hospitals, road construction, and housing complexes in Venezuela. In a
2012 report from The American Foreign Policy Council, Norman Bailey wrote: ”Since 2005, with Venezuela’s assistance, Iran has
created an extensive regional network of economic, diplomatic, industrial and commercial
activities, with significant effect. The sum total of Iran’s declared investments in the region now stands at some $20
billion.” Kayson is one of the biggest private companies working in Venezuela, but it came under scrutiny by oppositional media
when it was clear that it had ties with the Iranian government. The company is owned by reformist technocrats, yet work closely
with the current conservative government in Iran. When it comes to money-making machines, there seems to be no war between
the political factions. Last year, leftist oppositional media accused reformist politicians to have shares or ownership in Kayson and
because of these benefits their relatives can easily go back and fourth to Iran without difficulty. One of those ending up in the
spotlight was Farrokh Negahdar, ex-leader of Fadaian Khalgh Organisation (Majority), who is now a main reformist figure abroad. He
was accused to reap huge economic benefits and of being a conformist. Negahdar recently denied the accusation and said he is not
the owner of the company but stated that one of his close relatives inside Iran owns it. Last month, another scandal for the company
emerged when Tahmaseb Mazaheri, Khatami’s economic minister and Iran’s former central bank chief, was interrogated at
Dusseldorf airport by German police for not indicating that he carried a 300 million Bolivar cheque (equivalent of nearly $70 million).
Kayson denied assumptions that any suspicious activities were behind the episode, saying Mazaheri merely transported the check as
a favor to the company. The incident brought more curiosity to the Kayson Company and its possible ties to the current Iranian
government. At the same time reformists abroad, who have always warned the alternative movement to not go too far in its
rhetoric and actions against the establishment, seems to believe the regime is capable of reform. They
write letters to
Khamenei and put forward demands to the head of the judiciary to show they believe in the
legitimacy of the Islamic Republic. Such political games, negotiations and lobbying make segments of the traditional
Iranian opposition angry and ultimately dissatisfied with anything less then the overthrow of the regime and the establishment of a
laïque democratic republic.
Cuba
Condition On Environment
1NC
Text: The United States federal government should lift the
embargo on Cuba if and only if Cuba agrees to become a fair
democracy that mandates environmental reforms and the
development of a non-governmental organization to advocate on
behalf of the environment.
If the embargo is lifted reforms from the US need to be
demanded - without demanding reforms, US consumer goods
and capitalist processes will lead to ecological disaster
Connell 9 (Christiana Connell, research associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, The Council of Hemispheric Affairs,
6/12/09, " THE U.S. AND CUBA: DESTINED TO BE AN ENVIRONMENTAL DUO?", http://www.coha.org/the-us-and-cuba-anenvironmental-duo/)
The Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) has conducted research in Cuba since 2000, working with Cuban partners on
scientific investigations and strategies for protecting coastal and marine resources. Operating under a special license from
the United States government, EDF experts are collaborating with Cuban scientists on research
projects aimed at ensuring that if Cuba taps offshore oil and gas reserves, it will be done
in an environmentally concious way. The US should establish more partnerships like
these as President Obama has the legal authority to institute far-reaching cooperation
with Cuba on joint marine environmental projects. These partnerships should be implemented as the
first step in creating an elaborate alliance for environmental protection between the two countries.¶ If the embargo
is lifted, symbols of meretricious American capitalism are likely to invade the once
relatively isolated island. Opinion columnist Cynthia Tucker has commented on such matters: “Mickey Mouse is
sure to arrive, bringing with him the aptly predicted full frontal assault of American culture and consumer goods,”
suggesting that if Obama lifts the embargo, a functioning system of environmental protection
supported by both the U.S. and the Cuban public must be present for the island to be
protected.¶ It is Cuba’s lack of development that makes the island attractive to tourists and although tourism boosts
the economy, it also could have detrimental effects on the environment. If the embargo is
lifted, strict development restrictions need to be in place in order to prevent further
environmental exploitation. Currently, without a severe shift in enforcement of
environmental laws and the formation of a hard-working U.S.-Cuba partnership, the
Caribbean’s most biodiverse island will continue to be damaged. The key to a new dynamic in the
U.S.-Cuba relationship might be to embark on a series of strategic actions that aim to establish a bilateral relationship for
sustainable development and associated activities based on mutual respect and the autonomy of each country’s
sovereignty and traditions.
Cuba headed towards an ecological disaster - dumping, coal
outputs and deforestation
US Department of State 4 (Bureau of Western Hemisohere Affairs, US State Department, 5/6/04,
Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba, http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/wha/rt/cuba/commission/2004/32253.htm)
Cuba has many natural assets and challenges. The natural environment has suffered
degradation as a result of the harmful policies stemming from a Soviet-style economic
system. Cuba faces degraded soil, old and decaying water and sanitation infrastructure,
wildlife habitat destruction, and salt water intrusion into its fresh water supplies. It also
lacks an independent non-governmental organization (NGO) sector that can advocate on
behalf of environment and natural resources and serve as a mechanism to raise public
awareness and bring new ideas and issues to the attention of policy makers for action. ¶
Among Cuba’s assets are a rich biodiversity, mineral reserves, relatively low levels of
industrialization, elements of an environmental framework law, an educated population,
and highly trained experts and scientists. These assets could serve as a foundation for sustainable development in a free Cuba. Only a Cuban
government prepared to meet the environmental challenges of accelerated growth will be in a position to provide long-term benefits to the Cuban people.¶ The poor
environmental protection policies that have been in effect are evident in the quality of
land, water, air, and natural habitats that exist on the island today.¶ Land and Soils: Like many of its Caribbean
neighbors, Cuba faces deforestation and over-cultivation of the land, compaction of soils due to the use of heavy farm
machinery, and strip mining. These practices have resulted in salinity in soils and heavy erosion of the land.¶ Water: Agricultural runoff from heavily
treated fields has contributed to the degradation of surface water streams, in addition to the untreated
wastewater from cities, sugar mills and other food-processing plants, and nickel mining operations. Irrigation practices have resulted in low groundwater levels, causing significant salt-water
intrusion in fresh water and salinity in coastal soils. Low river flows due to dam construction have in turn caused lower re-charge of aquifers and further salinity in the streams.¶
Wildlife habitat has been affected by water quality in freshwater streams,
which is in turn affected by runoff from agricultural practices, erosion due to
deforestation, and sedimentation of freshwater streams. The introduction of non-native species has also had a significant impact on their ecological health. The construction of
hotels and tourism infrastructure projects has affected fragile ecosystems.¶ Air: Air emissions from industry and transportation
cause significant health problems. Stationary sources of emissions (electric power plants, petroleum refineries, cement plants, nickel plants, and other old
industries) emit large amounts of sulfur dioxide and particulate matter. Although, compared to other countries, there is a low
density of vehicles per capita in Cuba, the vehicles are old and require pollution controls
and maintenance
Habitat/Biodiversity:
US key to helping stop environmental degradation - Castro
policies and reforms are inefficient
US Department of State 4 (Bureau of Western Hemisohere Affairs, US State Department, 5/6/04,
Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba, http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/wha/rt/cuba/commission/2004/32253.htm)
U.S. cooperation and technical assistance can help a free Cuba address the short- and
long-term needs it will face in a post-Castro era. As an immediate step, the U.S.
Government can help a transition government conduct arapid assessment of equipment
needs to ensure that drinking water systems are operational and chemicals needed to
treat the water are made available. For medium- and long-term actions, a wide range of cooperation and
assistance possibilities exist, such as training to build Cuba’s environmental governance capabilities; cooperative activities
related to marine science and fisheries management; developing coral reef management tools; identifying and developing
control strategies for high-priority stationary sources of air pollution; and providing on-site technical assistance to Cuban
park staff to develop and maintain park infrastructure and provide visitor services. All cooperation and
assistance options seek to build on existing capacity. Implementation of the
recommendations assumes availability of adequate funding.¶ It is important to select a few key
areas where there can be a short-term success as well as work on medium- and long-term capacity building efforts.
Generating and providing quality environmental information to the public will be a
cornerstone for engaging a free Cuban people in environmental and natural resources
management.
US and Cuba have similar interests in regards to protecting the
environment - lifting the embargo is key to working together cooperation key
EDF 12
(Environmental Defense Fund, 2012, " U.S. and Cuba seek common ground Teaming up to protect vital
marine resources" ,http://www.edf.org/oceans/us-and-cuba-seek-common-ground)
Vast untapped reserves of “black gold” are thought to lie off Cuba’s north shore—enough, experts say, to wean the country
from its dependence on Venezuelan oil imports. This year Spanish oil giant Repsol plans to begin exploratory drilling in
deep waters 50 miles off Key West, and foreign oil companies from Russia, Malaysia, Brazil, India and Venezuela, among
others, are lining up behind them.¶ For the United States, Cuba and Mexico, the risks of drilling in deepwaters of the Gulf
of Mexico are enormous. Experts warn that a large spill in Cuban waters could be more
catastrophic than the BP disaster, given the three countries’ sensitive marine
ecosystems.¶ The problems could be compounded by delays in getting the expertise and
state-of-the-art technology needed to deal with a large, deepwater accident. U.S. policy
restricts American companies from working with Cuban enterprises to protect the waters
we share.¶ Can environmental concerns bridge the political gulf?¶ “For half a century, a political gulf has
divided our two countries,” says EDF’s chief oceans scientist Doug Rader. “It is time for a
pragmatic approach that would help Cuba prepare for the worst, while developing a
strong foundation for our shared environmental future.Ӧ Over the past decade, Cuban
environmental lawyers have been developing regulations for offshore oil and gas drilling that include strict oversight.
During the BP oil spill crisis in 2010, EDF’s oceans staff provided regular updates to Cuban environmental officials to help
them assess what damage might occur to the island’s ecosystems and coastal communities.¶ Luckily, oil from the BP
blowout did not wash onto Cuban beaches. But given prevailing currents and winds, neither country may be as fortunate
next time around. EDF urges that the United States begin a dialogue with the Cuban and
Mexican governments on oil and gas drilling in the Gulf.¶ The National Commission on the BP
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill recommends that international standards be developed and specifically that “it is in our
country’s national interest to negotiate now with these near neighbors to agree on a common, rigorous set of standards
[and] a system for regulatory oversight…”¶ Tapping clean energy to reduce oil imports¶ As part of a
national strategy to gain energy independence and reduce global warming pollution,
Cuba also hopes to develop cleaner sources of energy. In 2008, at the request of our Cuban partners
we organized an international symposium on ocean energy to explore ways to develop this largely untapped source
without harming the environment.¶ Cuba provides good conditions for a variety of ocean energy options—including wind
and current—and may prove ideal for ocean thermal energy conversion. As with any large-scale technology, building and
operating energy facilities may pose risks to marine life and habitat. Sensitive ecosystem —such as coral reefs and
mangroves, and important nursery and rookery areas for fish, marine mammals, seabirds and sea turtles—must be
protected.¶ “With good standards and policy in place, Cuba could be a model for clean
energy development in the Caribbean,” says Dr. Rod Fujita, EDF senior scientist and
director of Ocean Innovations.¶ Fostering further cooperation¶ Cooperation is as critical
to U.S. interests as it is to Cuba’s. Cuban waters provide vital spawning and nursery grounds for snapper,
grouper and other commercially important reef fish in the United States. Cuba is also the major stopover point on
migration routes to and from South America for most of the familiar songbirds along the U.S. East Coast.¶ And the two
nations quite likely share a recently discovered deepwater coral ecosystem that extends north to North Carolina.
“Though the United States and Cuba share many ecological resources, we have different
ways of managing them,” says EDF attorney Dan Whittle, director of our Cuba program. “Fishing, coastal
development, and offshore oil and gas exploration in Cuba can have huge impacts on the United States and vice-versa.”
NGO's solve - key to effectiveness on Cuban environmental
policy
US Department of State 4 (Bureau of Western Hemisohere Affairs, US State Department, 5/6/04,
Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba, http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/wha/rt/cuba/commission/2004/32253.htm)
At this time, Cuba is not a member of and does not receive loans or credits from the World Bank, the Inter-American
Development Bank or the Caribbean Development Bank. While mobilization of private investment, including from local
capital markets, will most likely be the long-term financing source for Cuba’s sustainable development, multilateral
development banks can play a key role in helping to improve environmental governance, democratizing decision-making
and making it more transparent, and creating a climate favorable for private investment. The U.S. Government could help
a post-Fidel Castro Cuba access the public international financial community (e.g., the IDB’s Multilateral Investment
Fund and the World Bank initiatives on infrastructure and municipal governance) in order to create sustainable finance
systems for environmental protection and natural resources management.¶ The U.S. Government should be
prepared to provide assistance to a post-Castro government to create conditions
favorable to the provision or modernization of environmental services, democratizing
environmental decisions making, and upgrading conventional production processes,
thereby stimulating indigenous investment and attracting foreign investment in these
areas. Sectors of interest in this connection would include water and wastewater infrastructure, solar energy and energy
efficient technologies for rural and urban applications, waste reduction and waste management technologies, biodiversity
conservation, and “green” tourism. In several of such sectors, upgraded monitoring and measurement technologies are
likely to be needed as well.¶ The international environmental NGO community will be key
partners for assistance to a post-Castro Cuba. Currently, there is a very limited presence
of international NGOs in Cuba and these organizations have had some small-scale
success. A democratic Cuba will likely create a climate where the work of these
organizations can flourish.¶ Environmental NGOs have tremendous technical and policy
expertise on a wide variety of topics —- such as protected areas management, public
participation, and debt-for-nature swaps. This expertise along with any additional financial resources that
they can bring can be leveraged in support of U.S. assistance efforts. The U.S. Government should be prepared to
coordinate with these groups and may want to consider establishing an advisory committee to facilitate this process.
Other Cards
Turn - lifting the embargo is key to stopping communism and
spurring a regime change
Ruiz 10 (Albor Luiz, writer for NY Daily News, New York Daily News, 4/15/13, "Hillary Clinton implies Castros like
embargo, Gloria Estefan misses opportunity for change in Cuba", http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/hillary-clintonimplies-castros-embargo-gloria-estefan-misses-opportunity-change-cuba-article-1.168659)
Hillary Clinton has been called many things, but dimwitted has not been one of them.¶ That's why comments last week by
the secretary of state about the Cuban embargo were so surprising.¶ "It is my personal belief that the
Castros do not want to see an end to the embargo and do not want to see normalization
with the U.S., because they would lose all of their excuses for what hasn't happened in
Cuba in the last 50 years," Clinton told a group of college students.¶ Wait, did I hear that right?
Did Clinton actually imply that "the Castros" like the embargo although, sly dogs that they are, they deny it?¶ Think of it
this way: The secretary of state has just declared that the central piece of our 50-year-old Cuba policy has done exactly the
opposite of what it intended to accomplish. Washington, for all practical purposes, has been a loyal - if unwitting - ally of
the communist regime.¶ This is big.¶ Someone needs to ask Clinton the question that is crying out for an answer: If the
embargo is good for "the Castros" wouldn't it make sense to lift it ASAP?¶ Last night, pop singer
Gloria Estefan, a powerful leader in the Cuban-American community, may have missed the chance to put the question to
the President himself.¶ Obama was to visit the Miami Beach home of the Cuban-born Estefan and her husband, Emilio.
The power couple, known supporters of all things Republican and staunch opponents of better relations with their
homeland, seem to have undergone a political epiphany: hosting Obama at a $30,400-a-couple cocktail reception to raise
funds for the Democratic National Committee.¶ Call it the President's most successful bipartisan effort.¶ At those prices
what did the Estefans expect in return? According to Miami Herald columnist Myriam Marquez they expected "to get
Obama's ear on Cuba."¶ "U.S. policy toward Cuba - flawed and failed as it is today - should
reflect both the national interest of the country and the views of all Americans, not just
the fortunate few," said Sarah Stephens, executive director of the Center for Democracy in the Americas.¶ Yes, it
should, except that the DNC is getting a nice chunk of change - $1 million some say - thanks to the songstress and her
friends. Political campaigns are expensive and the 2012 presidential race is getting closer. As they say, money talks ...¶
"What Obama did was to thank Estefan and her group of wealthy expatriates for a cool million dollars," said Miami radio
commentator Francisco Aruca. "Yet conversations with Havana are continuing and Obama
doesn't want to antagonize conservatives at this time."¶ Recently Gloria Estefan
organized a well-attended march in Miami to protest human rights conditions in Cuba,
something Obama probably likes. What he may not like - and may not know about - is that one of the
marchers was Luis Posada Carriles, the man behind the 1976 bombing of Cubana Flight 455, that killed the 73 people
onboard, including the whole Cuban national fencing team.¶ "Posada Carriles continues to walk free, and the U.S.
continues to list Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism," Stephens said. "And now that Luis Posada Carriles has marched
with Ms. Estefan, Ms. Estefan is holding a fund-raiser for the President." Not good.¶ What would have been good is for the
Estefans to have used their 15 minutes with the President to ask him to end the cruel and hypocritical embargo. They
missed the opportunity, though, and that is a shame. After all, the secretary of state herself believes the
blockade (as Cubans call it) is helping the communists next door.
Castro likes the embargo - gives him excuses for Cuba's
crumbling socio-economic infrastructures
Griswold 2 (Daniel Griswold, he associate director of the Cato Institute’s Center for Trade Policy Studies, The Cato
Institute, 5/27/02, "No: The Embargo Harms Cubans and Gives Castro an Excuse for the Policy Failures of His Regime",
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/no-embargo-harms-cubans-gives-castro-excuse-policy-failures-regime)
Former president Jimmy Carter’s five-day visit to Cuba arguably did more to promote freedom on that oppressed island
than the U.S. government’s trade and travel embargo has accomplished in four decades. In a live, televised speech to the
people of Cuba, Carter challenged his host, communist dictator Fidel Castro, to allow free speech, free elections — and free
religious worship. In addition to publicizing a pro-democracy petition campaign that the state-run Cuban media had
ignored, Carter challenged the U.S. government to lift its trade and travel embargo, a
position entirely consistent with his demand for more human rights in Cuba.¶ Since 1960,
Americans have been barred from trading with, investing in or traveling to Cuba. The embargo had a national-security
rationale before 1991, when Castro served as the Soviet Union’s proxy in the Western Hemisphere. But all that changed
with the fall of Soviet communism. Today, a decade after losing billions in annual economic aid
from its former sponsor, Cuba is only a poor, dysfunctional nation of 11 million people
that poses no threat to U.S. or regional security.¶ A 1998 U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency report
concluded that, “Cuba does not pose a significant military threat to the U.S. or to other
countries in the region.” The report declared Cuba’s military forces “residual” and
“defensive.” Some officials in the Bush administration charge that Castro’s government may be supplying biologicalweapons material to rogue states and terrorists abroad, but the evidence is not conclusive. And even if it were true,
maintaining a comprehensive trade embargo would be a blunt and ineffective lever for change. The Cuban
embargo already is tighter than U.S. economic sanctions against Iraq, even though Iraq
is a far greater security threat.¶ If the goal of U.S. policy toward Cuba is to help its people
achieve freedom and a better life, the economic embargo has failed completely. Its
economic effect is to make the people of Cuba worse-off by depriving them of lower-cost
food and other goods that could be bought from the United States. It means less
independence for Cuban workers and entrepreneurs, who could be earning dollars from
American tourists and fueling private-sector growth. Meanwhile, Castro and his ruling
elite enjoy a comfortable, insulated lifestyle by extracting any meager surplus produced
by their captive subjects.¶ Cuban families are not the only victims of the embargo. Many of the dollars Cubans
could earn from U.S. tourists would come back to the United States to buy American products, especially farm goods. The
American Farm Bureau estimates that Cuba could “eventually become a $1 billion agricultural-export market for products
of U.S. farmers and ranchers.” The embargo stifles another $250 million in potential annual exports of fertilizer,
herbicides, pesticides and tractors. According to a study last year by the U.S. International Trade Commission, the
embargo costs American firms between $684 million and $1.2 billion per year.¶ As a foreign-policy tool, the
embargo actually enhances Castro’s standing by giving him a handy excuse for the
manifest failures of his oppressive communist system. He can rail for hours about the
suffering the embargo inflicts on Cubans, even though the damage done by his domestic
policies is far worse. If the embargo were lifted, the Cuban people would be a bit less
deprived and Castro would have no one else to blame for the shortages and stagnation
that will persist without real market reforms.¶ Congress mistakenly raised the embargo to a new level in
1996 with the passage of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act. Known as the Helms-Burton act, it threatens to
punish foreign-based companies alleged to engage in the “wrongful trafficking in property confiscated by the Castro
regime.” The law is legally flawed because it allows U.S. courts to rule on actions of parties who were not U.S. citizens
when the alleged offense took place. As a foreign-policy tool, the law perversely punishes not the Castro regime itself, but
some of our closest allies, such as Canada and the European Union.¶ Economic sanctions rarely work. Trade
and investment sanctions against Burma, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea have failed to
change the behavior of any of those oppressive regimes; sanctions have only deepened
the deprivation of the very people we are trying to help. President George W. Bush and Republican
leaders in Congress understand that economic engagement with China offers the best hope for encouraging human rights
and political reforms in that country, yet they fail to apply that same thinking to Cuba.¶ Pressure has been building in
Congress for a new policy toward Cuba. Two years ago Congress voted to allow limited sales of food and medical supplies
to Cuba on a cash-only basis, and the House voted by wide margins in 2000 and 2001 to lift the travel ban (although that
provision died in the Senate). Both the Senate and the House voted this spring in favor of third-party financing for farm
exports to Cuba while debating this year’s farm bill, but the provision was stripped from the final bill in the conference
committee.¶ A new House caucus, the Cuban Working Group, composed of 20 Democrats and 20 Republicans, unveiled a
plan recently for easing the embargo. Speaking for the group, Rep. Jeff Flake (R-Ariz.) delivered a withering indictment of
U.S. policy: “For over 40 years, our policy toward Cuba has yielded no results. Castro hasn’t held free and fair elections, he
hasn’t improved human rights and he hasn’t stopped preaching his hate for democracy and the U.S. It’s time to try
something new.Ӧ Instead of relaxing the failed Cuban embargo, the Bush administration wants to continue the status quo.
In a speech on May 20, the president reaffirmed his support for keeping the trade and travel embargoes in place until the
Cuban government holds free elections. The administration already has quadrupled the number of Americans cited for
violating the travel ban in 2001 compared with the number cited the last year of the Clinton administration. For example,
one 75-year-old retired schoolteacher was fined $1,000 for a recent bicycle tour through rural Cuba. According to U.S. law,
citizens can travel more or less freely to such “axis of evil” countries as Iran and North Korea. But if Americans want to
visit Cuba legally, they need to be a former president or some other well-connected VIP or a Cuban-American.¶ The
strongest supporters of the Cuban trade embargo are Cuban-Americans concentrated in Southern Florida — an important
constituency in a key electoral state. Yet those very same Cuban-Americans routinely and massively violate the spirit if not
the letter of the embargo. Each year, they send $800 million in hard-dollar remittances to their friends and families back
in Cuba; another 100,000 Cuban-Americans actually visit their homeland each year through a special program for
“emergency” visits (most of which occur around the Christmas holiday). In the name of politics, Cuban-American leaders
want to restrict the freedom of other Americans to visit Cuba while retaining that freedom for themselves.¶ Lifting or
modifying the embargo would not be a victory for Castro or his oppressive regime. It
would be an overdue acknowledgment that the four-decade-old embargo has failed and
that commercial engagement is the best way to encourage more-open societies abroad.
The U.S. government can and should continue to criticize the Cuban government’s abuse
of human rights, while allowing expanding trade and tourism to undermine Castro’s
authority from below.¶ Instead of the embargo, Congress and the administration should
take concrete if incremental steps to expand American influence in Cuba. First, the travel ban
should be lifted. Yes, more American dollars would end up in the coffers of the Cuban government, but dollars also would
go to private Cuban citizens. Philip Peters, a former State Department official in the Reagan administration and an expert
on Cuba, argues that American tourists would boost the earnings of Cubans who rent rooms, drive taxis, sell art and
operate restaurants in their homes. Those dollars then would find their way to the 300 freely priced farmers’ markets, to
carpenters, repairmen, tutors, food venders and other entrepreneurs.¶ Second, restrictions on remittances should be lifted.
Cuban-Americans currently can send a maximum of $1,200 a year to friends and relatives in Cuba. Like tourism,
expanded remittances would fuel the private sector, encourage Cuba’s modest economic reforms and promote
independence from the government.¶ Third, American farmers and medical suppliers should be allowed to sell their
products to Cuba with financing arranged by private commercial lenders, not just for cash as current law permits. Most
international trade is financed by temporary credit, and private banks, not taxpayers, would bear the risk.¶ Finally, the
Helms-Burton law should be allowed to expire in 2003. Like every other aspect of the embargo, it has failed to achieve its
stated objectives and has, in fact, undermined U.S. influence in Cuba.¶ In an April 4 speech on the importance of tradepromotion authority, President Bush noted that trade was about more than raising incomes. “Trade creates the habits of
freedom,” the president said, and those habits “begin to create the expectations of democracy and demands for better
democratic institutions. Societies that are open to commerce across their borders are more open to democracy within their
borders. And for those of us who care about values and believe in values — not just American values, but universal values
that promote human dignity — trade is a good way to do that.”¶ Bush should apply that same moral and practical
reasoning to his administration’s policy toward Cuba. The most powerful force for change in Cuba will not be more
sanctions or a short visit by a former U.S. president, but daily interaction with free people bearing dollars and new ideas. ¶
Cuba and US work together now - cooperation on lifting the
embargo and enacting environmental policies would be no big
deal
Haven 13 (Paul Haven, writer for the Associated Press, Denver Post, 4/11/13, "Under the radar, Cuba and U.S. often
work together", http://www.denverpost.com/nationworld/ci_22997924/under-radar-cuba-and-u-s-often-work)
Cuba and the United States might be longtime enemies with a bucket overflowing with
grievances, but the fast return of a Florida couple who fled U.S. authorities with their two
kidnapped children in tow shows the Cold War enemies are capable of remarkable
cooperation on many issues.¶ Indeed, diplomats and observers on both sides of the
Florida Straits say American and Cuban law enforcement officers, scientists, disaster
relief workers, Coast Guard officials and other experts work together on a daily basis,
and invariably express professional admiration for each other.¶ "I don't think the story
has been told, but there is a real warmth in just the sort of day-to-day relations between
U.S. and Cuban government officials," said Dan Whittle, who frequently brings scientific
groups to the island in his role as Cuba program director for the Environmental Defense
Fund. "Nearly every time I talk to American officials, they say they were impressed by their Cuban counterparts. There
really is a high level of mutual respect."¶ Almost none of these technical-level interactions make the headlines, but
examples are endless. Just last week, Cuba's top environmental official Ulises Fernandez and several island oil experts
attended a conference in New York of the International Association of Drilling Contractors after the State Department
expedited their visas.¶ The American government maintains a Coast Guard representative in
Cuba, and the two countries work together to interdict suspicious boats. A U.S. diplomat
involved in the process said that security officials on both sides are on a first-name basis
and that the Cubans happily accept FBI and Coast Guard baseball caps as gifts.¶ "There are
so many weird and abnormal aspects of the relationship between Cuba and the United States, things that don't occur
between other countries, that when something normal happens it is a surprise," said Carlos Alzugaray, a former Cuban
diplomat.¶ He said Cuba has in recent years taken a pragmatic approach, more often than not cooperating on drug
enforcement and judicial issues. "It is important to highlight ... that in judicial matters there is a
willingness to cooperate and that could open a path to other types of cooperation," he said,
citing the return of Joshua Michael Hakken and his wife, Sharyn, as a case in point. ¶ The Hakkens are accused of
kidnapping their young sons from the custody of Sharyn's parents and sailing with them to Havana. Cuba promptly
informed the State Department of the couple's weekend arrival on the island and worked with U.S. officials to send the
family home. The couple is now in jail on charges of kidnapping.¶ In Washington, State Department spokesman Patrick
Ventrell termed cooperation as "extensive" but said the case should not be taken as a sign of political opening. ¶ "I'm not
sure I would read into it one way or another," he said.
No need to hold out embargo for regime change - Castro is retiring soon
Delahunt 13 (William Delahunt, chairman of the Delahunt Group and former
representative, The Huffington Post, 3/21/13, "Let Cuba Open Itself to the World, and
Let the World Open Itself to Cuba", http://www.huffingtonpost.com/william-ddelahunt/cuba-travel-embargo_b_2926362.html)
Yoani Sanchez was first denied permission to travel abroad in 2008, when she received an award for her blog, Generación
Y, where she frequently publishes bold commentary critical of Cuba's government.¶ Back in 2009, when she was still
unable travel abroad, Ms. Sanchez sent a letter calling on the U.S. Congress to allow Americans to freely travel to Cuba.
She wrote that abolishing our "long obsolete travel restrictions" would make the "anachronistic
travel permit that we Cubans need to enter and leave our country... even more ridiculous
and could bring more results in the democratization of Cuba than the indecisive
performance of Raul Castro.'¶ Perhaps unexpectedly, it is the "indecisive" Raúl Castro who has fully
liberalized travel. This January, his government eliminated the exit visa that had given it
strict control over the comings and goings of its citizens. In fact, President Castro has put
in motion a concert of reforms that includes licensing small businesses and private
cooperatives, offering bank credits, opening up the real estate market, and restoring the
right of return to Cubans who defected while travelling abroad, such as baseball players
and doctors.¶ Today she is on an 80-day tour of South America, Europe and the United States, accepting many of the
awards she had not been allowed to collect in the past.¶ Ms. Sanchez wrote recently in an op-ed published by Foreign
Policy that these changes involving both economic freedom and the freedom of Cubans to travel "are gradually reducing
the state's influence in the daily life of Cubans" because "those who cease to receive their salaries from a state institution
and come to support their families through self-employment will undoubtedly gain more political autonomy." She even
went so far as to say, "every step the authorities take in the direction of greater flexibility is like pointing a loaded gun at
their own temples."¶ That's what Yoani says; and, yet, the Cuban government keeps taking them.¶ Just last month,
Raúl Castro announced his retirement plans. His likely successor, Miguel Diaz-Canel, a
52 year-old party leader, has taken the number two position on the Council of State. This
imminent transition will check-off one of the requirements for lifting the U.S. embargo
on Cuba, as codified by the Helms-Burton Act. However, the Cold Warriors in Congress, less prepared to
move forward than the Cubans, are turning a blind eye to all these developments.¶ In Ms. Sanchez's letter to legislators,
she quoted Pope John Paul II's message from over two decades ago, "Let Cuba open itself to the world, and let the world
open itself to Cuba." She predicted four years ago that if the U.S. would allow Americans to freely travel to Cuba then only
the first part of the Pontiff's plea "would remain to be accomplished.'' But she had it backwards.¶ Although President
Obama has since removed travel restrictions on Cuban Americans and somewhat relaxed regulations on other forms of
travel, nearly all U.S. citizens must still ask for a specific license to travel to Cuba and must formally account for their
activities on the island in detail.¶ As Ms. Sanchez is welcomed to Washington, D.C., I hope that Cuba's sternest critics don't
forget: it is now easier for Yoani to visit our country, than it is for most Americans to visit hers.
Ethanol Cooperation - Biofuels CP
1NC
Text: The United States federal government should lift its economic embargo
on Cuba if and only if it accepts to participate with US ethanol cooperation and
revitalize its ethanol industry.
The CP solves 100% of the case - the US needs to not only lift the embargo but
demand that Cuba participates to send a signal of commitment to possible US
investors
Feinberg 12 (Richard, professor of international political economy at the Graduate School of International Relations and
Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego, The Brookings Institute, December 2012, "The New Cuban Economy What Roles
for Foreign Investment?",
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/12/cuba%20economy%20feinberg/cuba%20economy%20feinberg
%209.pdf)
It is time for Cuba to extract its rightful share of benefits from participating actively in the global
¶ economy . But the Cuban economy has a long way to go before most foreign investors would
be ¶ willing to take significant risks on the island .¶ Most importantly, Cuba needs to overcome its animosities and
fears and reach a national consensus that, as a small island economy, its economic future depends upon a healthy engagement with
As many other proud nations have discovered, it is possible to accept ¶ FDI
without sacrificing national sovereignty and governance capacity . On the contrary, FDI can
provide resources—including investment capital and fiscal revenues—that enhance national
choices .¶ If Cuba had allowed FDI inflows equal to 5 percent of its GDP during the last decade, or roughly ¶ $2 .5 billion a year,
¶ the international economy .
Cuba would have supplemented its domestic savings by some $25 billion . This ¶ would have enhanced its ability to recapitalize its
productive base while preserving and upgrading ¶ the quality of its social services . The
Cuban government should send
clear signals—including to its ¶ own bureaucrats—that it has moved beyond ambiguity and
distrust toward a reasoned appreciation of the benefits that foreign investment can bring to a
small island economy .¶ To begin to gradually improve the investment climate, Cuba could:¶ •
Complement the 2011 reform guidelines with a coherent national competitiveness strategy ¶
that announces a prominent role for foreign investment . In designing this forward-looking ¶ strategy, the
government should consult with existing joint venture executives .¶ • Completely overhaul the investment approval process, making
it more transparent and ¶ much faster, as promised in the 2011 guidelines . To
facilitate rational decision making by ¶
both parties, representatives of proposed investments should have ready access to responsible
government officials . So that potential investors can better design projects to meet ¶ Cuban
national priorities, official rulings should be accompanied by robust explanations .¶ Smaller
investments should be placed on a fast-track authorization process .5454545454he New Cuban Economy: • Detail the approval
criteria for the new FTZs, with its fiscal incentives, and include a coherent list of priority clusters .¶ • Remove the fixed-time horizon
facing investments outside of the FTZs, which promotes ¶ myopic behavior and disinvestment as the deadline approaches .¶ • Not
exclude multinationals that serve the domestic market simply because they do not ¶ readily fit into a national export promotion
strategy . Cuban firms cannot replicate the massive R&D and product innovation pipelines that characterize international giants such
as ¶ Nestlé or Unilever, and whose outputs Cuban consumers will demand .¶ • Build forcefully on the successful strategy of selling
quality Cuban products through established international marketing machines . This can be accomplished, for example, by ¶ forging
alliances among pharmaceutical giants with global reach to make patented Cuban medical innovations available to consumers
worldwide .¶ • Encourage FDI to integrate local firms into their supply chains . An inter-ministerial committee should build an
integrated strategy to assist local firms to meet acquisition ¶ requirements . Include private businesses and cooperatives in an
ambitious trade facilitation strategy that targets small and medium enterprises .¶ • Permit foreign investors to form a business
association that would allow them to engage ¶ in a constructive dialogue with the government . Encourage investors to adapt
corporate ¶ responsibility practices that observe Cuban laws and national goals and serve corporate stakeholders, including workers,
communities, and consumers .¶ • Sharply reduce the implicit tax on labor, to the benefit of Cuban workers and ¶ the
competitiveness of exports . Eventually dismantle the dual currency labor payment ¶ system altogether .¶ • Recast the anticorruption campaign to focus on root causes: low wages and non- ¶ transparency . This can be done, for example, by shining sunlight
on the procurement procedures of government entities and SOEs . Combating corruption in both the public and ¶ private spheres is
critical to sustainable economic development, but properly structured ¶ incentives, not arbitrary prosecutions, are the more
sustainable pathway toward ethical ¶ business practices .¶ • Publish
much more data and analysis on the capital
account and on FDI, including impacts ¶ on savings and investment, employment and wage
levels, supply chain integration, and net ¶ export earnings . Such publications would help Cuba to
gradually converge with international best practices while improving the capacity of Cuban
economists to analyze experiences and improve policymaking . Not all of this must await a relaxation of
threatening U .S .¶ sanctions .¶ Cuba could benefit tremendously from learning from other nations that
have successfully extracted ¶ benefits from foreign investment . The international financial institutions (IFIs)
offer a cost-effective short-cut to assess the applicability of comparative country experiences . As argued in Reaching Out: Cuba’s
New Economy and the International Response, now is the time for the international ¶ development community to engage in Cuba
and support its incipient economic reform process .55555555555555555555555555he New Cuban Economy: What Roles for Foreign
Investment?¶ Under
their own new guidelines, the international financial institutions are capable of
working ¶ within Cuban national priorities while they contribute their unique bundles of
knowledge and capital . With regard to FDI, IFIs are particularly well equipped . Furthermore, the presence of the IFIs ¶
would add credibility to Cuban investment commitments and to contract enforcement—important ¶ ingredients in establishing a
more secure investment climate in a changing Cuba .
For these reasons, Cuba should signal to the IFIs its
interest in entering a gradual path toward receiving, first ¶ technical assistance (studies, training)
and eventually full membership
Cuba has been mixed - US intervention now is key
Feinberg 12 (Richard, professor of international political economy at the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific
Studies, University of California, San Diego, The Brookings Institute, December 2012, "The New Cuban Economy What Roles for
Foreign Investment?",
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/12/cuba%20economy%20feinberg/cuba%20economy%20feinberg
%209.pdf)
The rise and fall in the stock of joint ventures (JVs) on the island has reflected the dramatic shifts
¶ in Cuban economic policies since the revolution . Over the last five decades, we can distinguish five ¶ periods
(Figure 1) . During the revolutionary 1960s, the regime systematically nationalized most ¶ foreign and Cuban-owned properties,
beginning with large U .S .-owned properties and eventually ¶ extending to small-scale enterprises and even mom-and-pop retail
outlets . Much
of the educated middle class exited the island, eventually creating the prosperous
Cuban-American community based in South Florida . In Cuba, Soviet-style planning came to
dominate economic policymaking .¶ In the second phase, the sudden loss of the large Soviet subsidy occasioned an
interlude of liberalization, of warm welcomes to European, Canadian, and Latin American investors, often extended ¶ 7¶ For a critical
discussion of performance requirements, see Moran (2011) by Fidel Castro himself . But
once the economy showed
signs of recovery, Castro reevaluated the ¶ opening to foreign capital and ordered the closure of
many JVs, especially smaller firms, amidst a ¶ more general recentralization of economic
decision making . During the fourth phase, the Cubans ¶ turned toward state-backed projects
involving Venezuela, China, and Brazil. Since assuming the presidency in 2008, Raúl Castro has sent contradictory
signals regarding foreign investment . In principle, Cuba’s foreign investment laws offer favorable conditions and—as ¶ the case
studies reveal—some
JVs are successfully navigating the Cuban economic system . But ¶ the
government has been keeping many suitors waiting for the final green light . Projects for large ¶ golf and
marina resorts have been pending for years . The owners of the prime commercial office space in Havana have been unable to
secure authorization for next-phase construction . An ¶ international hotel chain that offered to refurbish the shabby downtown
Habana Libre hotel was ¶ refused an equity share . Brazilian
negotiators have been urging Cuba to allow large
investments in sugar mills and associated ethanol plants, only to be frustrated by “political
symbolism”8 —lingering fears of compromising the sacred gains of the revolution and
endangering national security .¶ Even more alarming, major JVs have recently been shuttered or challenged by the
authorities for ¶ failing to meet demanding performance requirements (as the case studies discuss) . Nevertheless, ¶ the
government has been debating revisions to the foreign investment law, opening the possibility ¶
for a new, more positive phase in Cuba’s treatment of FDI .¶ Following a quick primer of the Cuban economy,
the first section of this monograph assesses ¶ the elastic legal framework and chilly business climate that await prospective foreign
investors .¶ Section
two digs into the numbers and distinguishes five phases of Cuban policy toward
FDI—only ¶ one of which, during the 1990s, could be characterized as welcoming5656
The CP gives Cuba American technology - this energy investment is key to
solving relations
The Ambassador asked where Garcia saw possibilities for cooperation, particularly with the
Summit of the Americas coming up in April. Garcia said that energy is a natural basis for
cooperation and should be deepened. He also said that Lula is committed to helping the smaller
and poorer countries of the region withstand the economic downturn, explaining that they are
especially vulnerable because they are dependent on the U.S. economy, U.S. remittances, or oil
(which, he added, is the key to Venezuelan President Chavez's ¶ success). He suggested that one
possibility for cooperation ¶ in this area would be to expand our "triangular" cooperation ¶ on
biofuels, in which the United States provides capital, ¶ Brazil and the United States provide
technical expertise, and recipient countries provide the labor and land to develop their own
biofuel production. On climate change, Garcia said ¶ that an early discussion between the
United States and Brazil "could change the world." ¶ ¶ 4. (C) On the political side, Garcia began,
"the two ¶ presidents will need to speak frankly." Relations between the United States and Latin
America are not easy, he said, and are as complicated with U.S. friends in the region as they are
with those countries hostile to the United States. ¶ With regard to complications with U.S.
friends, Garcia ¶ mentioned Colombia with a knowing nod, but without providing ¶ any details.
Castro will say yes to FDI ethanol reform
Schiava 12 (Dr. Schiava, medical doctor and founder of the Center for Christian Studies and Global Peace. Dr. Schiava has a
master of theology, from Notre Dame University and a master in International Affairs, Oct 22, 2012, “Fidel Castro is alive and well
while Raul Castro announces freedom to travel (Photos)”, http://www.examiner.com/article/fidel-castro-is-alive-and-well-whileraul-castro-announces-freedom-to-travel)
Raul Castro, who succeeded his brother Fidel as president, has been busy working to open the
island to the world and to its citizens, hoping to improve the economic conditions of the island
through international trade, despite the embargo by the U.S. Dropping the requirement to be invited to Cuba,
or to ask permission to leave the island is indeed an historical event. While exiles have the dream of returning to
Cuba, social status, social institutions and structures of the island are very different from what
they left behind. Many think that when Fidel Castro dies the socialist regime will disappear. Yet,
Cuban leadership is unified, and Raul Castro seems strong, taking steps to give more freedoms to his people. Raul made the
decision to let Cubans travel abroad, and has spent years working on transforming Cuba into a
limited free market economy with a more efficient government by reducing bureaucracy and
allowing his people to become entrepreneurs. Raul Castro is interested in attracting foreign
direct investment that can provide employment for the well-educated people of the island.
Cuban people have great education, and one of the highest rates of literacy in Latin America.
Raul is giving firm and cautious steps to open the island without losing what he considers “the
gains of the revolution.” The Castro brothers see now that it is very difficult to keep Cuba isolated from the world. The
economy of Cuba cannot work if they do not open the island to free market and foreign
investment. International trade needs a free market, even if it is limited, to subsist and to lose
the burdensome regulations that keep foreign direct investment away.
Mexico
Condition on Biofuels
1NC
The USfg should substantially increase its economic engagement toward
Mexico by assisting in the expansion of pre-inspection clearance programs on
the condition that Mexico increase its bioenergy use to 16.17% of its total
energy supply.
Increased bio energy massively reduces emissions of CO2
Iglas et al 7 (Jose, Fabio Manzini, Omar Masera, a Centro de Investigación en Energía, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de
México (CIE-UNAM), Aptdo. Postal 34, Temixco, 62580 Morelos, Mexico
b Centro de Investigaciones en Ecosistemas, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (CIECO-UNAM), Antigua Carretera a
Pátzcuaro No. 8701, Morelia 58190, Michoacán, México, A prospective study of bioenergy use in Mexico,
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0360544207001351, anuss)
In the moderate scenario, the total estimated penetration of bioenergy in electricity generation,
transportation and rural residential sectors would reach 38.5 PJ by 2015 and 906.5 PJ by 2030 and would be
equivalent to 0.30% and 7.08% of the total consumed energy by these sectors, respectively.
Additionally, the avoided CO2 emissions from electricity generation, transportation sector and the
avoided emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in the rural residential sector would total
1.7 million tons of CO2 by 2015 and 38.98 million tons of CO2 by 2030. These avoided emissions would
account for 0.34% and 7.95% of the total emissions of electricity generation and transportation sectors in the base scenario,
respectively. 4. Conclusions and recommendations The
present prospective study shows that the use of
bioenergy in a high penetration scenario may be increased substantially in order to reach up to
16.17% of Mexico's total energy supply in electricity generation, transportation and rural
residential sectors by 2030. Transportation sector is expected to be the major bioenergy consumer with up to 8.60% of the
total energy consumed in all included sectors, followed by power generation (6.68%) and residential (0.89%) sectors. The use of
fuelwood in traditional cookstoves may be equivalent to 17.84% of the total bioenergy
participation in electricity generation, transportation and rural residential sectors. When our
calculations are analyzed by sector, they indicate that the participation of bioenergy in electricity generation (forest plantations,
bagasse, biomass residues and biogas from sanitary landfills) may represent 15.45% of all electricity produced in 2030. Similarly,
the participation of bioenergy (ethanol and biodiesel) in the transportation sector may
represent 20.17% of the liquid fuels used in this sector. With regard to the rural residential sector, the
saturation of the efficient cookstoves is only of 47%, which indicates that there is still a big substitution potential in this area.
Furthermore, the more intensive use of bioenergy, under the scenarios depicted in this paper, would help reduce up to 16.57% of
the annual CO2 emissions in electricity generation and transportation sector by 2030. The major reduction potential is found in
transportation (12.17%), followed by electricity sector (4.40%). The deployment of only 59% of the low estimated bioenergy
potential (3050 PJ/year) may reduce as a much as 81.21 million tons of Mexico's CO2 emissions in electricity generation and
transportation sector by 2030 and would be equivalent to 18.3% and 16.9% of the 1990 [58] and 2002 [59] national CO2 emissions,
respectively. Carbon emissions saved through the utilization of efficient cookstoves in the rural residential sector would amount to
6.23 million tons of CO2eq in 2030. This potential would be equivalent to 7.68% of total avoided emissions in electricity generation
and transportation sector by 2030. What is more, it is equivalent to 12.25% of 2002 captured CO2 in national managed forests
(estimated in 50.85 million tons of CO2eq) and enough to offset their net CO2 emissions (estimated in 4.93 million tons of CO2eq)
[60]. These results point out that it is essential for the current energy system to evolve towards an ever-greater use of bioenergy as a
substitute for fossil fuels in order to achieve environmental sustainability. Therefore, if
Mexican bioenergy resources
are not developed in a timely manner, Mexico would be losing the opportunity to diversify the
country's energy system. At the same time, jobs would not be created, and the
underdevelopment in rural areas and the social problems associated with poverty would remain
for a long time. The use of bioenergy would allow Mexico to foster sustainable development
strategies, particularly in the rural sector.
CO2 is the main cause of global warming
Walsh 13 (Bryan, senior writer for TIME magazine, covering energy and the environment, interviewing geochemist Charles
David Keeling, Greenhouse Effect: CO2 Concentrations Set to Hit Record High of 400 PPM, 5//2/13,
http://science.time.com/2013/05/02/greenhouse-effect-co2-concentrations-set-to-hit-record-high/, anuss)
Climate change is, first and foremost, a consequence of the addition of carbon dioxide into the
atmosphere. We emit carbon dioxide, through burning fossil fuels or forests, and some of that
carbon stays in the atmosphere, intensifying the heat-trapping greenhouse effect and warming the
climate. What kind of global warming we’ll see in the future will largely be due to how much
carbon dioxide—and to a lesser extent, other greenhouse gases like methane—we add to the atmosphere. And to
fully understand the future, we need to understand the present and the past, and track the concentration of CO2 in the Earth’s
atmosphere. The fact that we can and have been tracking that very important number is due largely to the efforts of the geochemist
Charles David Keeling. As a postdoctoral fellow at the California Institute of Technology in the 1950s, Keeling developed the first
instrument that could accurately measure the CO2 levels in the entire atmosphere through sampling. When he got to the Scripps
Institution of Oceanography a few years later, Keeling began taking regularly CO2 measurements at the Mauna Loa Observatory in
Hawaii. Keeling discovered that atmospheric
CO2 underwent a seasonal cycle, as plants bloomed and
decayed in the Northern Hemisphere, and more importantly, that CO2 was rising fast. In 1958,
CO2 levels recorded at Mauna Loa were about 316 parts per million (ppm). By 2005, when Keeling
died—and his son, Ralph Keeling, took up the project—CO2 levels were just under 380 ppm. Plotted on a graph,
the readings over time curve upwards sharply as humans added more and more CO2 to the
atmosphere—which is why the readings came to be known as the Keeling Curve. (MORE: As the World Keeps Getting Warmer,
California Begins to Cap Carbon) Now, thanks to Keeling’s successors at Scripps, we know that global CO2 levels are about to pass a
major threshold: 400 ppm. It’s a momentous enough occasion, at least for scientists, that Scripps has begun releasing daily
readings—today the level is 399.50 ppm—on a website and via a Twitter account. We
should pass 400 ppm any day
now—possibly, by the time that you read this. And that’s not good. The fact that we’re going to cross 400
ppm doesn’t mean that much by itself. It’s not like the sound barrier—the difference in warming between 399 ppm
and 400 ppm would likely be minute. But the sheer rate of increase over just the past 55 years shows how
fast global warming could hit us in the future—and the present—and underscores how much
we’ve failed as a planet to slow down carbon emissions. As Ralph Keeling put it in a statement: I wish it weren’t
true, but it looks like the world is going to blow through the 400-ppm level without losing a beat. At this pace we’ll hit 450 ppm
within a few decades.
Tipping point is now- going over causes ecosystem collapse and extinction
Morgan 9(Dennis Ray, Professor of Foreign Studies at Hankuk University, December, “World on fire: two scenarios of the
destruction of human civilization and possible extinction of the human race” Futures, Vol 41 Issue 10, pgs 688-690 , ScienceDirect)
anuss
As horrifying as the scenario of human extinction by sudden, fast-burning nuclear fire may seem,
the one consolation is that this future can be avoided within a relatively short period of time if
responsible world leaders change Cold War thinking to move away from aggressive wars over natural resources
and towards the eventual dismantlement of most if not all nuclear weapons. On the other hand, another scenario of
human extinction by fire is one that may not so easily be reversed within a short period of time
because it is not a fast-burning fire; rather, a slow burning fire is gradually heating up the planet
as industrial civilization progresses and develops globally. This gradual process and course is long-lasting; thus it
cannot easily be changed, even if responsible world leaders change their thinking about ‘‘progress’’ and industrial development
based on the burning of fossil fuels. The
way that global warming will impact humanity in the future has
often been depicted through the analogy of the proverbial frog in a pot of water who does not
realize that the temperature of the water is gradually rising. Instead of trying to escape, the frog tries to adjust
to the gradual temperature change; finally, the heat of the water sneaks up on it until it is debilitated. Though it finally realizes its
predicament and attempts to escape, it is too late; its feeble attempt is to no avail— and the frog dies. Whether this fable can
actually be applied to frogs in heated water or not is irrelevant; it still serves as a comparable scenario of how the slow burning fire
of global warming may eventually lead to a runaway condition and take humanity by surprise. Unfortunately,
by the time
the politicians finally all agree with the scientific consensus that global warming is indeed human
caused, its development could be too advanced to arrest; the poor frog has become too weak
and enfeebled to get himself out of hot water. The Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change (IPCC) was
established in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the United Nations Environmental Programme to ‘‘assess
on a comprehensive, objective, open and transparent basis the scientific, technical and socio-economic information relevant to
understanding the scientific basis of risk of human induced climate change, its potential impacts and options for adaptation and
mitigation.’’[16]. Since then, it has given assessments and reports every six or seven years. Thus far, it has given four assessments.13
With all prior assessments came 12 ‘‘Comment and Note on Probability’’ 13 The most recent was completed in 2007 688 D.R.
Morgan / Futures 41 (2009) 683–693 attacks from some parts of the scientific community, especially by industry scientists, to
attempt to prove that the theory had no basis in planetary history and present-day reality; nevertheless, as more and more research
continually provided concrete and empirical evidence to confirm the global warming hypothesis, that it is indeed human-caused,
mostly due to the burning of fossil fuels, the scientific consensus grew stronger that human induced global warming is verifiable. As
a matter of fact, according to Bill McKibben [17], 12 years of ‘‘impressive scientific research’’ strongly confirms the 1995 report ‘‘that
humans had grown so large in numbers and especially in appetite for energy that they were now
damaging the most basic of the earth’s systems—the balance between incoming and outgoing
solar energy’’; ‘‘. . . their findings have essentially been complementary to the 1995 report – a constant strengthening of the
simple basic truth that humans were burning too much fossil fuel.’’ [17]. Indeed, 12 years later, the 2007 report not only
confirms global warming, with a stronger scientific consensus that the slow burn is ‘‘very likely’’
human caused, but it also finds that the ‘‘amount of carbon in the atmosphere is now increasing
at a faster rate even than before’’ and the temperature increases would be ‘‘considerably higher
than they have been so far were it not for the blanket of soot and other pollution that is temporarily helping to cool the
planet.’’ [17]. Furthermore, almost ‘‘everything frozen on earth is melting. Heavy rainfalls are becoming
more common since the air is warmer and therefore holds more water than cold air, and ‘cold days,
cold nights and frost have become less frequent, while hot days, hot nights, and heat waves have become more frequent.’’ [17].
Unless drastic action is taken soon, the average global temperature is predicted to rise about 5 degrees this century, but it could rise
as much as 8 degrees.
As has already been evidenced in recent years, the rise in global temperature is
melting the Arctic sheets. This runaway polar melting will inflict great damage upon coastal
areas, which could be much greater than what has been previously forecasted. However, what is
missing in the IPCC report, as dire as it may seem, is sufficient emphasis on the less likely but still plausible worst case scenarios,
which could prove to have the most devastating, catastrophic consequences for the long-term future of human civilization. In other
words, the IPCC report places too much emphasis on a linear progression that does not take sufficient account of the dynamics of
systems theory, which leads to a fundamentally different premise regarding the relationship between industrial civilization and
nature. As a matter of fact, as early as the 1950s, Hannah Arendt [18] observed this radical shift of emphasis in the human-nature
relationship, which starkly contrasts with previous times because the very distinction between nature and man as ‘‘Homo faber’’ has
become blurred, as man no longer merely takes from nature what is needed for fabrication; instead, he now acts into nature to
augment and transform natural processes, which are then directed into the evolution of human civilization itself such that we
become a part of the very processes that we make. The more
human civilization becomes an integral part of
this dynamic system, the more difficult it becomes to extricate ourselves from it. As Arendt
pointed out, this dynamism is dangerous because of its unpredictability. Acting into nature to
transform natural processes brings about an . . . endless new change of happenings whose
eventual outcome the actor is entirely incapable of knowing or controlling beforehand. The moment
we started natural processes of our own - and the splitting of the atom is precisely such a man-made natural process -we not only
increased our power over nature, or became more aggressive in our dealings with the given forces of the earth, but for the first time
have taken nature into the human world as such and obliterated the defensive boundaries between natural elements and the
human artifice by which all previous civilizations were hedged in’’ [18]. So, in as much as we act into nature, we carry our own
unpredictability into our world; thus, Nature can no longer be thought of as having absolute or iron-clad laws. We no longer know
what the laws of nature are because the unpredictability of Nature increases in proportion to the degree by which industrial
civilization injects its own processes into it; through self-created, dynamic, transformative processes, we carry human
unpredictability into the future with a precarious recklessness that may indeed end in human catastrophe or extinction, for
elemental forces that we have yet to understand may be unleashed upon us by the very environment that we experiment with.
Nature may yet have her revenge and the last word, as the Earth and its delicate ecosystems,
environment, and atmosphere reach a tipping point, which could turn out to be a point of no
return. This is exactly the conclusion reached by the scientist, inventor, and author, James Lovelock. The creator of the wellknown yet controversial Gaia Theory, Lovelock has recently written that it may be already too late for humanity to change course
since climate centers around the world, . . . which are the equivalent of the pathology lab of a hospital, have reported the
Earth’s
physical condition, and the climate specialists see it as seriously ill, and soon to pass into a
morbid fever that may last as long as 100,000 years. I have to tell you, as members of the Earth’s family and an
intimate part of it, that you and especially civilisation are in grave danger. It was ill luck that we started polluting at a time when the
sun is too hot for comfort. We have given Gaia a fever and soon her condition will worsen to a state like a coma. She has been there
before and recovered, but it took more than 100,000 years. We
are responsible and will suffer the
consequences: as the century progresses, the temperature will rise 8 degrees centigrade in
temperate regions and 5 degrees in the tropics. Much of the tropical land mass will become
scrub and desert, and will no longer serve for regulation; this adds to the 40 per cent of the Earth’s surface we
have depleted to feed ourselves. D.R. Morgan / Futures 41 (2009) 683–693 689 . . . Curiously, aerosol pollution of the northern
hemisphere reduces global warming by reflecting sunlight back to space. This ‘global dimming’ is transient and could disappear in a
few days like the smoke that it is, leaving us fully exposed to the heat of the global greenhouse. We
are in a fool’s climate,
accidentally kept cool by smoke, and before this century is over billions of us will die and the
few breeding pairs of people that survive will be in the Arctic where the climate remains
tolerable. [19] Moreover, Lovelock states that the task of trying to correct our course is hopelessly impossible, for we are not in
charge. It is foolish and arrogant to think that we can regulate the atmosphere, oceans and land surface in order to maintain the
conditions right for life. It is as impossible as trying to regulate your own temperature and the composition of your blood, for those
with ‘‘failing kidneys know the never-ending daily difficulty of adjusting water, salt and protein intake. The technological fix of
dialysis helps, but is no replacement for living healthy kidneys’’ [19]. Lovelock concludes his analysis on the fate of human civilization
and Gaia by saying that we will do ‘‘our best to survive, but sadly I cannot see the United States or the emerging economies of China
and India cutting back in time, and they are the main source of emissions. The worst will happen and survivors will have to adapt to
a hell of a climate’’ [19]. Lovelock’s forecast for climate change is based on a systems dynamics analysis of the interaction between
human created processes and natural processes. It is a multidimensional model that appropriately reflects the dynamism of
industrial civilization responsible for climate change. For one thing, it takes into account positive feedback loops that lead to
‘‘runaway’’ conditions. This mode of analysis is consistent with recent research on how ecosystems suddenly disappear. A 2001
article in Nature, based on a scientific study by an international consortium, reported that changes in ecosystems are not just
gradual but are often sudden and catastrophic [20]. Thus, a
scientific consensus is emerging (after repeated
studies of ecological change) that ‘‘stressed ecosystems, given the right nudge, are capable of
slipping rapidly from a seemingly steady state to something entirely different,’’ according to Stephen
Carpenter, a limnologist at the University of Wisconsin-Madison (who is also a co-author of the report). Carpenter continues, ‘‘We
realize that there is a common pattern we’re seeing in ecosystems around the world, . . .
Gradual changes in vulnerability accumulate and eventually you get a shock to the system - a
flood or a drought - and, boom, you’re over into another regime. It becomes a self-sustaining
collapse.’’ [20]. If ecosystems are in fact mini-models of the system of the Earth, as Lovelock maintains, then we can expect the
same kind of behavior. As Jonathon Foley, a UW-Madison climatologist and another co-author of the Nature report, puts it, ‘‘Nature
isn’t linear. Sometimes you can push on a system and push on a system and, finally, you have the straw that breaks the camel’s
back.’’ Also, once the ‘‘flip’’ occurs, as Foley maintains, then the catastrophic change is ‘‘irreversible.’’ [20].
2NC Solvency
Mexican use of renewables solves the environment
Huacuz 5 (Jorge, Non-Conventional Energy Unit, Electrical Research Institute, The road to green power in Mexico—reflections
on the prospects for the large-scale and sustainable implementation of renewable energy, November 2005,
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421504001041, anuss)
Green power is in its infancy in Mexico. Facilitation of grid-connected applications is the main
objective of a Pilot Plan launched in 1999 under an agreement between SENER and IIE, with the
following criteria: close interaction with industry, to speed up the process of technology
transfer; international cooperation, to close the growing gap with the more advanced countries;
shared financial risk, to complement limited government funds; and operational links with academia, to
foster the development of specialized human resources. This Pilot Plan includes PV roof tops for peak power
shaving; solar concentrators for remote power generation; electricity generation for municipal
services using biogas from sanitary landfills; and the development of technical and non-technical
elements to support the large-scale implementation of wind energy. Off-grid PV has been applied for over
one decade, mostly to bring electricity-based services to remote rural communities. Close to 90,000 solar home systems and over
13,000 PV-powered rural telephones have been installed thus far. Hundreds of schools, health centres and communal buildings are
also equipped with PV. Over 2500 rural communities are now electrified with renewables (Huacuz and Agredano, 1998). New
programmes to serve native Indian communities currently without access to the electrical grid are under preparation. Electricity
supply in off-shore oil rigs, cathodic protection of oil and gas ducts, signalling and telecommunications, eco-hotels, natural preserves
and forest surveillance posts are also growing applications of PV in Mexico. 5.2. Bilateral and multilateral projects Several
green
power projects are in progress with financial support from the Global Environment Facility
(GEF). The following are being implemented by the World Bank in association with Mexican
Agencies: (a) A gas-fired combined cycle power plant of around 240 MW, which may incorporate a
fraction of no less than 25 MW using solar concentrators. As of this writing, a call for bids to build this project in northwest Mexico
was in progress (CFE, 2002); (b) Electricity
production with biogas from sanitary landfills, executed by the
municipality of Monterrey in northern Mexico (World Bank, 2002). This project is already on line; (c) A water
pumping project is in progress for small agro-industrial operations and cattle raising, implemented through the Mexican Trust Fund
for Agricultural Infrastructure (FIRCO); (d) A new initiative under development with SENER seeks to establish a green fund to foster
green power projects (GEF, 2003). The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) is implementing jointly with IIE the GEFsupported project “Plan of action for removing barriers to the full-scale commercial implementation of wind power in Mexico”,
which includes the creation of the Regional Wind Energy Technology Centre in the state of Oaxaca. 6. The road ahead Green
power offers Mexico potential benefits, beyond kW and kWh, and good prospects for
sustainable development. Green power is environmentally sound and can help solve hard
recurring local environmental problems; for instance, using urban solid waste as fuel, thus reducing the problem of
final disposal, or reclaiming already deforested land for the production of energy crops. On the social dimension, renewables are
oftentimes the only reasonable possibility of providing electricity-based services to remote communities, improving quality of life
and facilitating local economic development through productive projects. In the urban and industrial sectors, renewables
can
constitute a “democratising force” to move away from centralized forms of energy supply:
individuals and businesses can generate their own power and hence financially contribute to the creation of energy infrastructure.
Larger green power projects can attract fresh private capital to build new generating capacity.
Green power technologies are well within the existing capabilities of the Mexican industry and
represent a good opportunity for participation in this new power technology market. This will mean
new jobs, new forms of the energy business and reactivation of stagnant industries. The use of renewables can help extend the life
time of the national oil and natural gas reserves, lowering at the same time the carbon intensity index of the economy. This will put
Mexico in a good position to honour international environmental obligations and to benefit from the economic mechanisms deriving
from the Kyoto Protocol, which in turn may pay off in political benefits both at home and abroad. The question is how to move
forward in a strategic manner to make all these potential benefits come true. The remaining of his section presents alternative
scenarios that have been proposed for the penetration of renewables in the Mexican power sector over the next 10 years. Then, the
rationale for an approach to the implementation of green power in alternative sectors is presented.
Say Yes
Empirics prove Mexico says yes to biofuels- helps farmers
Rosenberg 07 (Mica, reporter for Reuters, Mexico to encourage biodiesel production, 12/19/07,
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2007/12/19/environment-mexico-biofuels-dc-idUKN1941689220071219, anuss)
Mexico plans to encourage production of biodiesel from crops like beets, yucca root and
sorghum after a new biofuel law comes into effect early next year, the country's agriculture minister said on
Tuesday. "Mexico could develop biodiesel faster than ethanol," said Agriculture Minister Alberto
Cardenas at a news conference. Ethanol, an alcohol used as an additive in gasoline to reduce emissions, is usually made from
corn or sugar. But competing with the United States, the world's number one corn producer and Brazil, a leader in sugar-based
ethanol will be a challenge for Mexico, where cane is expensive to produce and farmers grow less corn than the country consumes.
"We
have to seek out other sources for biofuel to differentiate ourselves from Brazil and the
U.S.," said Cardenas. The law, passed last week, offers unspecified support to farmers that grow crops for the production of
any renewable fuel. Cardenas said a biodiesel industry would help the country's poorest farmers, and
that none of the crops Mexico currently grows for food would be replaced with biofuel plants.
Drug War
1NC
The USfg should substantially increase its economic engagement toward
Mexico by assisting in the expansion of pre-inspection clearance programs on
the condition that they launch investigations of corruption within the judicial
system.
Corruption in the judicial system allows for the continuation of drug-related
violence
Rawlins 13 (Aimee, Assistant Professor, Center for International Relations, Council on Foreign Relations expert on Mexico and
international politics, Mexico's Drug War, 1/11/13, http://www.cfr.org/mexico/mexicos-drug-war/p13689, anuss)
From 2006 to 2012, Calderón sent more than 50,000 soldiers onto Mexico's streets, invested
billions of dollars on equipment and training, attempted to vastly reform the police and judicial
systems, and strengthened Mexico's partnership with the United States (PDF). But a legacy of
"political manipulation of law enforcement and judicial branches, which limited professionalization and
enabled widespread corruption" has left the government with "only weak tools to counter increasingly
aggressive crime networks," writes CFR's Shannon O'Neil in America's Quarterly. The police are easily bought, in part
because in many cities, they earn less than teachers or even burrito vendors. On the website InSight Crime, Patrick Corcoran notes
that "an underpaid officer could double or triple his salary by simply agreeing to look the other way." The CFR report notes police
agencies "suffer from dangerous and deplorable working conditions, low professional standards, and severely limited resources."
"It is ultimately the great shame of the last decade that we've made all this effort, we've lost all
of these lives, and at the end of the day, we've made no real substantive progress in reducing
the availability of drugs, and the cost is extraordinary violence." --David Shirk The Calderón administration
attempted to counter police corruption by dramatically increasing the role of the military in the fight against drug cartels. Not only
have tens of thousands of military personnel been deployed to supplement, and in many cases replace, local police forces, they have
also been heavily recruited to lead civilian law enforcement agencies (PDF). Mexico's
judicial system—with its
autocratic judges and lack of transparency—is also highly susceptible to corruption. The
Congressional Research Service report noted that even when public officials are arrested for
working with a cartel, they are rarely convicted. Calderón's militarization strategy also resulted in accusations of
serious human rights abuses. A November 2011 report by Human Rights Watch found that "rather than strengthening public security
in Mexico, Calderón's 'war' has exacerbated a climate of violence, lawlessness, and fear in many parts of the country." The report,
which looked at five states, documented more than one hundred and seventy cases of torture, thirty-nine disappearances, and
twenty-four extrajudicial killings.
Mexican reforms are key to stopping systemic drug violence
Castaneda 10 (Jorge, Jorge Castañeda was foreign minister of Mexico during the administration of President Vicente Fox and
is coauthor of El Narco: La Guerra Fallida (Punto de Lectura, 2009). This article is based in part on his lecture at the Cato Institute
Benefactor Summit on March 7, 2009, on the Mayan Riviera, Mexico, Mexico’s Failed Drug War, 5/6/10,
http://www.cato.org/publications/economic-development-bulletin/mexicos-failed-drug-war, anuss)
Does that mean that Mexico cannot do anything until the United States does something, and that, in the meantime, we have to
continue with this fratricidal war on drugs? I don’t think so. There
are things Mexico can do, although they are
controversial even in Mexico. First, we need to go back to the modus vivendi that the government, society, and the
cartels had over the past 50 years. There was no explicit deal or negotiation, but there was an understanding, and those tacit rules
were followed by all sides. They were not ideal rules, and every now and then there were screw-ups: we would have to hand
somebody over to the United States as a scapegoat, or we would have a problem with the United States that we had to fix. This
could be shocking to many who might wonder how a democratic government could reach an
understanding with criminals. Well, Mexico would not be the first country in which this
happened. We also have to push for drug decriminalization in Mexico and in the United States. Even though we can’t do it
unilaterally in Mexico, we can’t be silent about it either. This is not just a U.S. decision, since it affects everybody — especially
Mexico — and if there is one country in the world that feels the effects of what the United States does in any field or endeavor, it is
Mexico. We need to move in those directions, even though they are controversial and complicated. Last
year, some 7,600
people died in drug-related episodes in Mexico — more than a thousand deaths more than in
2008. And the death rate in 2008 was, in turn, double that of the previous year. Mexico is paying
an enormous price to fight a war which is going nowhere, which we are not winning, which we cannot win, and which
the United States does not want to fight in its own territory, but wants others to fight elsewhere. We should find other solutions
with the United States, not against the United States.
This structural violence, brought to is ultimate conclusion, is the endless
perpetuation of warfare- it creates priming that psychologically structures
escalation
Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois ‘4 (Prof of Anthropology @ Cal-Berkely; Prof of Anthropology @ UPenn) (Nancy and
Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22)
This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized,
bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes,
Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side
(Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the “smelly”
working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdetermine
and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US
“inner city” to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political
self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical
Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories
and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close attention to the “little”
violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our
attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. More important, it interrupts the
suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34).
voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with
social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology
we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also Scheper- Hughes
1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing
homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. The
violence continuum also
refers to the ease with which humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into
expendable nonpersons and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soulmurder. We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide
studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the
term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that,
to the contrary, it
is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking
violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in
Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life
where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and there
is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize
ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as
normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes, such as prison
construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the
evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States
(Waquant, Chapter 39), constitute
the “small wars and invisible genocides” to which we refer. This applies to
African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. These
are “invisible” genocides not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but quite
the opposite. As Wittgenstein observed, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are
right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. In this regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory
of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative
everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in
communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of
violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression, Similarly,
Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence.
Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday
crimes of public consent applied systematic- ally and dramatically in the extreme context of
war. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence
of US immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known
as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic
peace possible. Internal “stability” is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of
professionally applied “strangle-holds.” Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace”
possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or
apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military,
postindustrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil
disobedience. The
public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the
mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public
executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel
more secure for the affluent? What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing
experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the
end it
is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise
good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less
dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in
genocidal acts and policies possible (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we
would like to recognize. Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of
radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and
reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant selfmobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to
Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency” (Taussig, Chapter 31). We
are trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco
Basaglia among other mid-twentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e.,
between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other “total
institutions.” Making
that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see
the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical
technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of
rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are
born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life. The mad, the differently
abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as
have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious,
sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment. Erik Erikson referred to “pseudo- speciation” as the human tendency to
classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human - a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during
the unremark- able peacetimes that precede the sudden, “seemingly unintelligible” outbreaks of mass violence.
Collective
denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide. But so are formal
bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil
(Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully
hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of “angel-babies,” and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free
Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and
routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. It
baby coffins but no food to hungry families.
is close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by “symbolic violence,” the violence that is often “nus-recognized” for something else,
usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls “terror as usual.” All these terms are meant to
reveal a public secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and “peace-time
crimes.” Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts,
in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in
social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies
“rneconnaissance” as the prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence,
and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu,
Chapter 42; see also Scheper-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989). Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern
theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination;
it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic domination are not to be
equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are
presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, we
need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of “controlling processes” (Nader 1997b) that assault basic human freedoms
and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once
again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification, depersonalization,
institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible?
In this volume we are suggesting that
mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially
incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by
victims themselves - as expected, routine, even justified. The preparations for mass killing can be found in
social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. They harbor the early
“warning signs” (Charney 1991), the “priming” (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the “genocidal continuum” (as we call it) that
push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life and lifeways from the refusal of
social support and humane care to vulnerable “social parasites” (the nursing home elderly, “welfare queens,” undocumented
immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the
technologies of heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of
victimization).
Say Yes
Nieto’s policies prove he says yes
Matsangou 6/10 (Elizabeth, London School of Economics and Political Science, Peña Nieto Policies to Change Mexican-US
War on Drugs, http://globalriskinsights.com/2013/06/10/pena-nieto-policies-to-change-mexican-us-war-on-drugs/, anuss)
Shortly after Enrique Peña Nieto was sworn in as Mexico’s new President in December 2012, he
announced a new strategy in Mexico’s drug war. His policy reverts from cross-border policing
and capturing cartel leaders and instead focuses on suppressing violence and protecting
civilians. Peña Nieto’s objectives are more proactive than reactive as they aim to encompass the
economic and social issues that encourage drug trafficking in the first place. By making reforms to the
education system, implementing youth programmes, closely monitoring schools and expanding the employment market, those
individuals so easily picked from the streets of cities such as Uruapan will be less available to be used as pawns in the drug trade.
Peña Nieto explains that without job opportunities and social programmes in place, countless
Mexicans “have no option other than to dedicate themselves sometimes to criminal activity“.
Oil
1NC
The USfg should substantially increase its economic engagement toward
Mexico by assisting in the expansion of pre-inspection clearance programs on
the condition that they open the oil industry to private investors.
Private investors key to preventing industry collapse
Montes 6/18 (Juan, reporter for the Wall Street Journal in politics and economics, Mexico in Talks to Open Energy Sector to
Private Investors, 6/18/13, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324520904578551810770396702.html, anuss)
"If they finally do it, this
would undoubtedly be a game-changing reform," said Carlos Elizondo, a political analyst
at Mexico's CIDE college and research institute. "That's the kind of change in the oil sector that every
government in Mexico has dreamed of, and hasn't been able to do, for the last 20 years." Mexico's crude
output has stagnated at around 2.5 million barrels a day in recent years, down from a peak of
3.4 million in 2004. Government officials estimate that the increased investment and production would add as much as two
percentage points to Mexico's annual economic growth. For Mexico, the overhaul could be the last chance to bring
the billions of dollars required to develop deep-water reserves and to avoid becoming a net
importer of oil, which Pemex officials have warned could happen as early as 2020 if nothing is done. For foreign firms, it
could mean access to a major oil producer, with proven reserves of 13.9 billion barrels of crudeoil equivalent, and to possibly the world's fourth-largest shale-gas reserves, according to the U.S.
Energy Information Administration. The changes would bury one of the last symbols of Mexico's 20th century
revolutionary nationalism, cemented when President Lázaro Cárdenas expropriated the oil industry in 1938. Mexico was the first
major energy producer to nationalize, setting a trend which would last decades and sweep the industry. The
move highlights
a willingness to break with the past among young, reformist members of the Institutional Revolutionary
Party, or PRI, which nationalized the oil and ruled Mexico for much of last century. It returned to power in December
after 12 years in opposition.
Decline in Mexico oil industry causes global price rise
Hargreaves 12 (Steve Hargreaves, reporter for CNNMoney, Mexico's big oil problem, 8/17/12,
http://money.cnn.com/2012/08/17/news/economy/mexico-oil/index.html, anuss)
Industry experts say Mexico could revive production if it allowed more investment from
international oil companies. But under current policy, EIA says Mexico will have to start importing oil by
2020. For the United States, the decline in Mexico's oil industry means it will likely be buying more oil
from Canada and Saudi Arabia, the No. 1 and No. 2 sources of U.S. oil imports. Mexico is now third. Related: Wind power
hits 57% mark in Colorado And because oil is a global market, any drop in production one place could
mean higher prices worldwide. The loss of Mexico's current exports of about 1 million barrels a
day would be greater than the amount lost due to sanctions on Iran -- albeit over a longer time period.
Many experts blame the structure of Mexico's oil industry for the decline. Mexico: We want your
investment money Mexico: We want your investment money Mexico nationalized its oil industry in 1938. Since then companies such
as Exxon Mobil (XOM, Fortune 500), Royal Dutch Shell (RDSA) and BP (BP) have been prohibited from taking a meaningful stake in
the country's oil operations. The state oil giant, Petroleos Mexicanos, or PEMEX, has run the show. PEMEX is one of the largest
companies in the world, and provides the Mexican government with 32% of its revenues, according to the EIA. But oil
exploration requires big investments and Mexican lawmakers have long resisted giving the firm
the money it needs to go out and find new sources of crude.
*Need high oil prices bad
2NC Solvency
Reform key to stop industry collapse
Garcia and Barrera 7/18 (David Garcia and Adriana Barrera are reporters on economics, politics, and international
policy for Reuters, Mexico’s conservatives propose energy reform, concessions, 7/18/13,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/19/us-mexico-energy-idUSBRE96I02020130719, anuss)
The plan put forward by leaders of the National Action Party, or PAN, aims to amend several
articles of Mexico's constitution, a long-standing roadblock to permitting private concessions or joint
ventures with multinational oil companies. President Enrique Pena Nieto of the centrist Institutional Revolutionary
Party, or PRI, has also promised a sweeping energy reform, but details are not expected until September. The PAN's proposal
follows the presentation of a separate energy reform plan by the leftist Party of the Democratic
Revolution, increasing pressure on Pena Nieto to show his hand. "Our oil industry model has run
dry," PAN party chairman Gustavo Madero told reporters. "It is an unsustainable, non-viable
model that needs to be thoroughly reformed in order to return to productivity." Madero said turning
around Mexico's flagging oil and gas production would be achieved "by means of concessions," and the party's plan would
allow Pemex to operate more like a private company with managerial and budget autonomy.
Mexican oil production has fallen to 2.5 million barrels per day from a peak of 3.4 million bpd in
2004. Mexico's current legal framework gives Pemex exclusive rights to explore, produce, refine
and commercialize the country's oil and its derivatives. Pemex is allowed to contract out to third-parties for a wide
variety of oilfield services, but payment for services rendered as a percentage of production or profits is strictly prohibited. PAN
congressman Ricardo
Anaya described the plan as a "deep reform" that would spur greater
competition. Such an opening, he said, would lead to as much as $30 billion in annual private
investment and at least 100,000 new jobs each year. Anaya stressed that the party's plan would keep
oil and gas resources under state ownership. Mexico, the world's seventh largest crude
producer, has jealously guarded its oil since nationalizing the industry in 1938, and any plan that gives
foreigners any ownership of the crude would meet strong opposition from leftists and traditionalists in Congress. The PAN's plan
would put the national hydrocarbons commission in charge of awarding concessions, and create a new, independent Mexican
Petroleum Fund charged with administering oil profits.
Say Yes
Mexico’s ruling party will say yes- party platform proves
Licon 13 (Adriana, reporter for AP on government and politics, MEXICO'S RULING PARTY SAYS 'YES' TO ENERGY REFORM,
3/3/13, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/mexicos-ruling-party-says-yes-energy-reform, anuss)
MEXICO CITY (AP) — Mexico's
ruling party changed its platform on Sunday to allow for private
investment in the oil industry, paving the way for a possible overhaul of a state-owned company
that is seen as a pillar of the nation. Nearly 5,000 members of the Institutional Revolutionary Party, also known as the PRI,
voted unanimously at their national convention to remove language in the party's platform that
for years had opposed injecting private money in the sector. Petroleos Mexicanos, or Pemex, is the only
company that can carry out oil refining. The party also erased its opposition to sales taxes on food and medicines. President Enrique
Pena Nieto, who led last year's electoral comeback for the party that governed from 1929 to 2000, said
the energy and
fiscal reforms are needed for Mexico to become more competitive. He urged party members to
support him when he sends the bills to Congress, likely in the second half of this year. "The PRI is seeking
renovation to bring the changes Mexico needs," Pena Nieto told a crowd of thousands. "The PRI is not pleased and it is
choosing to reexamine and redefine where it stands on the challenges facing the country."