Slides for Sociology W3480:
Revolutions, Social Movements, and Contentious Politics
Columbia College
Spring 2007
Prepared by
Charles Tilly and
Ernesto Castañeda
send questions to
ec2183@columbia.edu
Preface
• This turned out to be Professor Tilly’s last undergraduate
course. Professor Tilly died of lymphoma on April 29, 2008.
May he rest in peace. We’ll miss him greatly.
• For testimonials on his many human and scholarly
contributions visit: http://www.ssrc.org/essays/tilly/
• I hope that these slides are a partial testimony to Tilly’s
enduring analytical power.
Ernesto Castañeda. New York. October 6, 2008.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
2
Copyright notes
•
Instructors and students can use this material for educational purposes as
long as they cite the source as: “Contentious Politics Class Slides and Notes.
2007. Prepared by Charles Tilly and Ernesto Castañeda. Columbia University.” If
you are seeing a .pdf version and want the power point version to see the
animations or make edits for a new course e-mail: ec2183@columbia.edu
•
Copyright note: the diagrams, texts, and pictures are reproduced here under fair
use terms for educational not-for-profit purposes. Many of them come directly
from Tilly’s computer files often from manuscripts of books and articles prior to
publication. If you feel you are the owner of copyrighted material used here and
want it removed from these slides please e-mail: ec2183@columbia.edu
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
3
From Tilly’s Syllabus
•
•
•
This course should help undergraduates who already have a background in social
science and/or modern history to think systematically about contentious politics –
processes in which people make conflicting collective claims on each other or on third
parties – as they participate in them, observe them, and/or learn about how they are
happening elsewhere. We will spend little time reviewing theories of political contention or
methods for gathering and analyzing evidence. We will spend most of our time examining
how such forms of contention as social movements, revolutions, nationalist mobilization,
and ethnic conflict have worked in different times and places, as well as thinking through
parallels and differences among them. Most sessions will operate as lecture-discussions.
For their own inquiries, students will choose some current site of contention, use a
standard source (for example, a daily newspaper or online reports of human rights
agencies) to catalog episodes of contention occurring in that site during the semester, and
then write three memoranda as they go: brief summaries and interpretations of the
patterns of contention they discover with connections to the required course readings. We
will have short-answer midterm and final examinations. Examinations will draw on class
sessions, required reading, and memoranda.
Ambitious students may propose different inquiries, just so long as they are at least
equally valuable and difficult; subject to the instructor’s prior approval, for example,
students might a) interview social-movement activists, b) report participant observation in
contentious politics, c) compare reporting of some particular stream of contention in two
different media, or d) reconstruct the history of a significant contentious episode or a
cluster of connected episodes. (Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
4
Required readings
Beth Roy, Some Trouble with Cows. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1994.
Charles Tilly, Social Movements, 1768-2004. Boulder:
Paradigm Press, 2004.
Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow, Contentious Politics.
Boulder: Paradigm Press, 2006.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
5
SPRING 2007: SCHEDULE OF SESSIONS AND ASSIGNMENTS
A. Claims, Politics, and Contention
Read Charles Tilly & Sidney Tarrow, Contentious Politics, chapters 1-3
(Lectures by Charles Tilly except where noted)
17 January Introduction to contentious politics and this course
22 January forms of government and of politics
24 January how contention works and changes
B. Who, How, and What?
Read: Beth Roy, Some Trouble with Cows
29 January networks, boundaries, and identities; Ernesto Castañeda lecture
31 January ethnicity, race, religion, and nationality
5 February identity politics; memorandum #1 due: brief report (maximum 1,000 words) on plan for collecting
and analyzing contentious episodes; include a paragraph on likely strengths and weaknesses of your
sources
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
6
SPRING 2007: SCHEDULE 2
C. Mobilization, Demobilization, and Struggle
Read Tilly & Tarrow, Contentious Politics, chapters 4-6, plus Appendices A & B
(Charles Tilly lectures)
7 February
opportunities, threats, and constraints
12 February
mobilization processes
14 February
contentious repertoires
19 February
how forms of contention vary and change
D. Social Movements and Other Forms of Contention
Read Tilly, Social Movements, chapters 1-4
21 February
social movements in history
26 February
how people get involved
28 February
social movements across the world
5 March
review
7 March
midterm examination
12-14 March
spring holidays
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
7
SPRING 2007: SCHEDULE 3
E. Contention and Democratization
Read Tilly, Social Movements, chapters 5-6
19 March regimes and democracy; (class canceled Professor Tilly in the hospital)
21 March waves of democratization; (Ernesto Castañeda lectures)
26 March struggle and democratization; (class canceled)
28 March democracy today and tomorrow; (class canceled)
F. War and Revolution
Read Tilly & Tarrow, Contentious Politics, chapters 7 and 8
(All these lectures by Ernesto Castañeda)
2 April
Returning midterms and Democratization
4 April
Violent specialists, civil wars, and interstate wars
(memorandum #2 due: brief report on progress of contentious episodes project)
9 April
Violence, Terror, and Politics. Revolutions.
11 April
Coda on mercenaries, terror, violent events and organized crime.
Information on how to create an event catalogue.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
8
SPRING 2007: SCHEDULE 4
G. Contention Today and Tomorrow
Read Tilly, Social Movements, chapter 7 and Tilly & Tarrow, Contentious Politics, chapter 9
16 April
National, transnational, and international (Ernesto Castañeda lectures)
18 April
Globalization and contention (Charles Tilly and Ernesto Castañeda lecture)
23 April
More on globalization (Charles Tilly and Ernesto Castañeda lecture)
25 April
The present and future of contentious politics (Charles Tilly lectures)
30 April
Conclusions and challenges (Charles Tilly lectures)
memorandum #3 due: report (maximum 3,000 words, not including appendices) on contentious
episodes project
7 May
FINAL EXAMINATION.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
9
Components of Contentious Politics
CONTENTIOUS POLITICS
contention
collective
politics
action
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
10
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Contentious Politics on the Reuters and BBC Newswires,
New Year’s Day 2007
New Year brings 3,000th US death in Iraq; peace groups rally after 3,000th soldier killed
Somali Islamists flee toward Kenya and to the hills
Hispanics battle blacks in Major California prison riot
Foreigner, Palestinian gunmen abducted in Gaza
Gunfire between Palestinian factions
Indian mob clashes with police over backyard bones; crowd protests at Delhi murders
New Year bombs shake Bangkok
Thai PM blames rivals for blasts
Two killed in Kashmir gun battle
Kashmir protest against killing
DR Congo troops clash with rebels
Burkina police and army in truce
Goodyear deal set to end strike [in US]
Fijians wary after military coup
Voices from Bishkek [Kyrgyzstan] protest rally
Saddam’s supporters vow revenge
Palestinian deaths rose in 2006
Top Indian Maoist ‘is shot dead’
Pakistan police break up protest [in Rawalpindi]
Police disperse Ershad supporters [in Rangpur, Bangladesh]
French marchers say ‘non’ to 2007
Train strike [in UK] runs into second day
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
11
French Protestors Say No to
New Year 2007!
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
12
The Simple Regime Model
Challenger
Regime
Member
Outside
Actor
Government
Regime
Limits of
Government’s
Jurisdiction
Outside of Regime
Coalitions
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
13
POSSIBLE STUDENT PROJECTS
•
Monitor one ongoing civil war (e.g. in Ivory Coast, Sri Lanka, Palestine, or Colombia). Prepare a background sketch
of the conflict from a standard source such as the Annual Register, reports of Human Rights Watch, or the US State
Department’s regional reports; an online search will identify many possible sources. For at least two months of the
conflict, scan a daily source such as a national newspaper or CNN online for reports of actions, declarations, and
interventions. Prepare a timeline, analyze it for signs of change, and watch especially for signs that parties,
alignments, patterns of conflict, and stakes of the struggle are shifting. (If your evidence is rich enough, you might
concentrate on the conflict’s geography.) Write a brief report of your conclusions, linking them to course materials.
Make sure to include a summary of the central evidence you’re interpreting such as a table, graph, chronology,
map, and/or appendix.
•
Choose two countries and two years since 1999, when the Battle of Seattle occurred. Adopting plausible definitions
of “anti-globalization” and “protest,” prepare catalogs of anti-globalization protests in the two countries over the two
years. Examine what changes occur in claims participants make, what means they use to make those claims, how
they identify themselves, and how observers identify them. Look for similarities, differences, and connections
between the patterns you see in the two countries. Write a brief report of your conclusions, linking them to course
materials. Make sure to include a summary of the central evidence you’re interpreting such as a table, graph,
chronology, map, and/or appendix.
•
Identify one major social movement mobilization from the past, for example civil rights activism in Mississippi 19641968, one of the student uprisings of 1968, or anti-abortion activity in one American state during the decade
following the Supreme Court’s 1973 Roe vs. Wade decision. Using at least ten sources (scholarly works,
newspaper accounts, films, oral histories, and/or interviews with participants), prepare a) a diagram of major groups
participating and their relations to each other, b) a chronology of the mobilization. Using course materials as your
guide, write an analysis of what effects that mobilization produced, and how it produced them. Make sure to include
a summary of the central evidence you’re interpreting such as a table, graph, chronology, map, and/or appendix.
•
Do the same for a current mobilization: for or against US policy in Iraq or Afghanistan, Brazilian responses to
American security policy, responses to sexual abuse by priests, calls for reparations to victims of racial
discrimination, South African AIDS policy, Chinese treatment of the Falun Gong, public discussions concerning the
reconstruction of Ground Zero, or something else. Make sure to include a summary of the central evidence you’re
interpreting such as a table, graph, chronology, map, and/or appendix.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
14
Political Opportunity, Political Threat, and
Their Impacts on Contention
Shifts in Opportunity = changes in the environment of political actors (in this case, idealized single
challenger) that signal shifts in likely consequences of different interactions with other actors
Category
Increasing Threat
Increasing Opportunity
openness of regime
regime closing down
regime increasingly open
coherence of elite
increasing solidarity of elite
increasing divisions within elite
stability of political alignments
increasing stability
rising instability
availability of allies
potential allies disappear or lose
power
new allies in regime available to
challengers
repression/facilitation
decreasing facilitation, rising
repression
increasing facilitation, declining
repression
This also applies cross-sectionally: if regime A is more open, its elites more divided, more generally
unstable, richer in potential allies, and less repressive than regime B, similar challengers will
contend more extensively and effectively in regime A
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
15
Variation in Regimes
Zone of
Authoritarianism
1
Zone of
Citizenship
Govern-
Mental
Capacity
0
0
1
Democracy
Zone of
Fragmented Tyranny
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
16
Crude Regime Types
1
HIGH CAPACITY
UNDEMOCRATIC
HIGH CAPACITY
DEMOCRATIC
LOW CAPACITY
UNDEMOCRATIC
LOW CAPACITY
DEMOCRATIC
Govern-
Mental
Capacity
0
0
1
Democracy
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
17
Rough Placement of Selected Regimes in
2007
1
MOROCCO
CANADA
INDIA
PERU
Govern-
Mental
Capacity
UGANDA
0
0
1
Democracy
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
18
Revolutions, Social Movements, and Contentious Politics
Spring 2007
Networks, Identities, and Boundaries
Lecture
January 29th, 2007
Ernesto Castañeda
Networks
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
20
Relational Account
Georg Simmel’s (1858-1918) Formal Analysis
Dyad
Triad
A
A
B
B
Web of Social Affiliations
or Social Network
C
A
Some Types of Ties
Social Tie
Transaction,
Conversation,
Routine contact,
Relationship…
B
C
D
Professional
Family
Romance
Business
21
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
Triad Power Dynamics
tertius gaudens
A
B
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
C
22
Social Networks
Florentine alliances (Padgett 1993).
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
23
High school friendship: James Moody, Race, school integration, and friendship segregation in America,
American Journal of Sociology 107, 679-716 (2001).
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
24
Identities
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
25
Medieval Model
Independent corporations with specific attributes, obligations, and rights (Simmel).
Nobility
Army
Church
Franciscans
Guild
Burgers and
Bourgeoisie
Peasantry
26
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
Identity is Relational
In modern times, and
especially in cities,
identity depends on the
context and the public:
(home/work/leisure…).
k
j
a
i
b
u
h
c
g
d
f
e
27
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
Embedded and Detached Identities
(Tilly)
DETACHED
Many
Democrat/
Republican
Social
settings
ACLU
member
AA
Grassroots
organizations
Friends
Roommate
Family
EMBEDDED
One
Little
All
Social life
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
28
Networks, Identities, and
Boundaries
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
29
Some Trouble with Cows
Beth Roy (1994)
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
This trouble occurs in 1954 in Panipur which, after successive partitions belonged to India,
then to Pakistan, and then to Bangladesh. At that time, Panipur belonged to Pakistan, a
predominantly Muslim state with a substantial Hindu minority; only later would its region,
East Pakistan, acquire independence as overwhelmingly Muslim Bangladesh.
The village includes households labeled as Hindu or Muslim, but who live from day to day
with a much finer – and often cross-cutting – set of distinctions of: caste, class, property,
and gender.
What happened in 1954?
Golam Fakir’s cow got loose, strayed across the limits of Golam’s property, and ate lentils in
Kumar Tarkhania’s field. Instead of settling their differences immediately, however, both
farmers called in kinfolk, patrons, and allies. As a result, a minor dispute precipitated
broader and broader alignments of bloc against bloc. Escalation continued. Supporters
eventually took up available weapons.
Police intervened and eventually fired on the crowd.
Local and regional authorities sought pacification.
With each step outward and upward, redefinition of the conflict proceeded; the farther
and higher the incident went, the less it concerned complex, caste-and-class-mediated local
relations among farmers and the more it became part of national level communal struggles
between Hindus and Muslims.
The collective memories of the event were shaped not by the embedded, complex identities
but from the detached identities and larger categories.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
30
India
Pakistan
ENGLAND
Panipur
A BENGALI SOCIETY
Bangladeshis
State Officials
Hindus
Police
Mussalmans
Brahmins
Muslim officials
Kayasthas
Muslim Peasants
Namasudras
Converted Hindus
Kumar Tarkhania
Golam Fakir
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
31
Boundaries, Ties, and Identities (Tilly)
Shared
stories
about
history,
social
boundaries,
and identity.
boundary
Ys
Xs
relations
within Xs
relations
relations across boundary
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
within Ys
32
POWER
• Power depends on network location and not on intrinsic
characteristics of the actors but on the social structure.
• Power is spread through society (see Foucault) since it
depends on social relations, tacit consent and implicit
and explicit laws.
• Power relations depend on embodied social knowledge
and norms which allow for social reproduction of durable
inequalities and power allocation (ideology, hegemony,
habitus, etc.)
• Social movements are times where people take action
to change relations of power and the existing social
arrangements. The results are contingent.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
33
Political Identities and Social Movements
•
In social movements, political identities are at stake. Claim-makers are
acting out answers to the question, "Who are you?“
•
In social movements a common identity is constructed and put forward.
Members have to show "WUNC": worthy, united, numerous, and committed.
•
Social movements link two complementary activities: assertions of identity
and statements of demands.
•
Social movements grew up in the nineteenth century as means by which
people currently excluded from political power could band together and
claim that power-holders should attend to their interests, or the interests
they represented.
•
Recognition of their claimed identities as wronged workers, dispossessed
peasants, or persecuted religious minorities constituted them as political
actors, but also drew them into bargaining collectively with existing holders
of power. That stress on identity assertion persists in social movements,
especially in their earlier stages, to the present day. Social movements
continue to assert the right to respect and political voice of indigenous
peoples, gays, conservative Christians, unborn children, etc.
•
Adapted from: Contentious conversation. Charles Tilly. Social
Research. New York: Fall 1998.Vol.65, 3; pg. 491, 20 pgs.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
34
Conclusions
• Violent conflict stems from relations that may or may not be
primarily violent.
• “…humans turn out to be interacting repeatedly with others,
renegotiating who they are, adjusting the boundaries they occupy,
modifying their actions in rapid response to other people's
reactions, selecting among and altering available scripts,
improvising new forms of joint action, speaking sentences no one
has ever uttered before, yet responding predictably to their
locations within webs of social relations they themselves cannot
map in detail. They tell stories about themselves and others that
facilitate their social interaction rather than laying out verifiable
facts about individual lives. They actually live in deeply relational
worlds. If social construction occurs, it happens socially, not in
isolated recesses of individual minds” (Tilly 1998).
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
35
Bibliography
Hanneman, Robert A. and Mark Riddle. Introduction to social network methods
http://faculty.ucr.edu/~hanneman/nettext/index.html
Hogan, Richard. Charles Tilly Takes Three Giant Steps from Structure toward Process: Mechanisms for
Deconstructing Political Process. Contemporary Sociology, Vol. 33, No. 3. (May, 2004), pp. 273-277. Stable
URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=00943061%28200405%2933%3A3%3C273%3ACTTTGS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-2
Newman, Mark. Gallery of network images. http://www-personal.umich.edu/~mejn/networks/
Padgett, John F., Christopher K. Ansell. Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici, 1400-1434. American Journal
of Sociology, 98: 1259-1319, 1993
Pescosolido, Bernice A.; Beth A. Rubin. 2000. The Web of Group Affiliations Revisited: Social Life,
Postmodernism, and Sociology. American Sociological Review, Vol. 65, No. 1
Roy, Beth. 1994. Some Trouble with Cows: Making sense of Social Conflict. University of California Press.
Berkeley: CA.
Tilly, Charles. 2002. Stories, Identities, and Political Change. Rowman & Littlefield.
Tilly, Charles. 1998. Contentious conversation. Social Research. New York: Fall 1998.Vol.65, Iss. 3; pg. 491.
Simmel, Georg. 1955. Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations. Translated by K.H. Wolff and R. Bendix. New
York. Free Press.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
36
Political
Identities and
the Census
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
37
Definitions from Appendix One of
Contentious Politics (2006)
• Government: within a given territory, an organization controlling the principal concentrated
means of coercion and exercising priority over all other organizations within the same
territory in some regards. In England of 1785, the organization included a king, ministers,
civil servants, Parliament, and a network of appointed agents throughout the country.
• Political actors: recognizable sets of people who carry on collective action in which
governments are directly or indirectly involved, making and/or receiving contentious
claims. In Ukraine, supporters of outgoing president Kuchma, backers of presidential
candidate Yushchenko, Interior Ministry troops, and external sponsors on both sides all
figured as weighty political actors.
• Political identities: as applied to political actors, organized answers to the questions “Who
are you?” “Who are they?” and “Who are we?” In late eighteenth-century England, some
of those answers included Abolitionists, slaveholders, and Parliament.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
38
Definitions 2
• Contentious politics: interactions in which actors make claims that bear on someone else’s
interests, leading to coordinating efforts on behalf of shared interests or programs, in which
governments are as targets, the objects of claims, or third parties.
• Contentious performances: relatively familiar and standardized ways in which one set of
political actors makes collective claims on some other set of political actors. Among other
performances, participants in Ukraine’s Orange Revolution used mass demonstrations as
visible, effective performances.
• Contentious repertoires: arrays of contentious performances that are currently known and
available within some set of political actors. England’s antislavery activists helped to invent
the demonstration as a political performance, but they also drew on petitions, lobbying, press
releases, public meetings, and a number of other performances.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
39
Definitions 3
• Institutions: within any particular regime, established, organized, widely recognized routines,
connections, and forms of organization employed repeatedly in producing collective
action. Eighteenth-century antislavery activists could work with such available institutions
as religious congregations, parliamentary hearings, and the press.
• Social movements: sustained campaigns of claim making, using repeated performances that
advertise that claim, based on organizations, networks, traditions, and solidarities that
sustain these activities.
We divide social movements into the following:
Social movement campaigns: sustained challenges to power holders in the name of a
population living under the jurisdiction of those power holders by means of public displays
of that population’s worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment [WUNC].
Social movement bases: the social background, organizational resources, and cultural
framework of contention and collective action.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
40
Major Explanatory Concepts in
Contentious Politics
• Sites of contention: human settings that serve as originators, objects, and/or arenas of
contentious politics. Example: Armies often play all three parts in contention.
• Conditions: characteristics of sites and relations among sites that shape the contention
occurring in and across them. Initial conditions are those that prevail in affected sites at
the start of some process or episode. Example: In Italy of 1966, an array of political
organizations and the existing connections among them provided the background for the
cycle of conflict that occurred over the next seven years.
• Streams of contention: sequences of collective claim at or across those sites singled out for
explanation. Example: a series of strikes by workers in a given industry against their
firm(s).
• Outcomes: changes in conditions at or across the sites that are plausibly related to the
contention under study, including transformations of political actors or relations among
them. Example: During or after a series of strikes, management fires workers, changes
work rules, and/or raises wages.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
41
Major Explanatory Concepts 2
• Regimes: regular relations among governments, established political actors, challengers,
and outside political actors including other governments; eighteenth-century England and
twenty-first-century Ukraine obviously hosted very different regimes.
• Political opportunity structure: features of regimes and institutions (e.g., splits in the ruling
class) that facilitate or inhibit a political actor’s collective action; in the case of Ukraine
2004–2005, a divided international environment gave dissidents an opportunity to call on
foreign backers in the name of democracy.
• Mechanisms: events that produce the same immediate effects over a wide range of
circumstances. Example: Diffusion of tactics from one site to another often occurs during
major mobilizations, thus altering action at origin and destination as well as facilitating
coordination among the affected sites.
• Processes: combinations and sequences of mechanisms that produce some specified
outcome. Example: Major mobilizations usually combine brokerage and diffusion with
other mechanisms in sequences and combinations that strongly affect the collective action
emerging from the mobilization.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
42
Major Explanatory Concepts 3
• Episodes: bounded sequences of continuous interaction, usually produced by an
investigator’s chopping up longer streams of contention into segments for purposes of
systematic observation, comparison, and explanation. Example: We might compare
successive petition drives of antislavery activists in Great Britain (each drive counting as a
single episode) over the twenty years after 1785, thus not only seeing how participants in
one drive learned from the previous drive but also documenting how the movement as a
whole evolved.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
43
Mechanisms used in Contentious Politics
Attribution of similarity: identification of another political actor as falling within the same
category as your own.
Boundary activation/deactivation: increase (decrease) in the salience of the us-them
distinction separating two political actors.
Boundary formation: creation of an us-them distinction between two political actors.
Boundary shift: change in the persons or identities on one side or the other of an existing
boundary.
Brokerage: production of a new connection between previously unconnected or weakly
connected sites.
Certification: an external authority’s signal of its readiness to recognize and support the
existence and claims of a political actor. (Decertification: an external authority’s signal that
it is withdrawing recognition and support from a political actor.)
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
44
Mechanisms 2
Co-optation: incorporation of a previously excluded political actor into some center of power.
Defection: exit of a political actor from a previously effective coalition and/or coordinated action.
Diffusion: spread of a contentious performance, issue, or interpretive frame from one site to
another.
Emulation: deliberate repetition within a given setting of a performance observed in another
setting.
Repression: action by authorities that increases the cost—actual or potential— of an actor’s
claim making.
For more explanations, examples, and processes see source:
Tilly and Tarrow. 2006. “Contentious Politics.” Appendix A and B. Paradigm Publishers.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
45
Political Opportunity, Political Threat, and
Their Impacts on Contention
Shifts in Opportunity = changes in the environment of political actors (in this case, idealized single
challenger) that signal shifts in likely consequences of different interactions with other actors
Category
Increasing Threat
Increasing Opportunity
openness of regime
regime closing down
regime increasingly open
coherence of elite
increasing solidarity of elite
increasing divisions within elite
stability of political alignments
increasing stability
rising instability
availability of allies
potential allies disappear or lose
power
new allies in regime available to
challengers
repression/facilitation
decreasing facilitation, rising
repression
increasing facilitation, declining
repression
This also applies cross-sectionally: if regime A is more open, its elites more divided, more generally
unstable, richer in potential allies, and less repressive than regime B, similar challengers will
contend more extensively and effectively in regime A
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
46
Aerial Graph of Contention in Russia
(based on Bessinger 2001).
Figure 5.4: Demonstrations and Violent Events in the Soviet Union and Successor States,
1987-1992
300
250
Violent Events
Cumulative Number of Events
Demonstrations
200
150
100
50
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
0
Year
Source: Data Supplied by Mark Beissinger
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
47
Chronology of the Beijing Student Movement, 1989
4/16
At death of Hu Yaobang, former secretary general of Chinese Communist Party, students post wreaths and
elegiac couplets in Tiananmen Square and many Beijing colleges.
4/17
Students march to Tiananmen to memorialize Hu Yaobang.
4/20
Skirmishes between police and students at Xinhua Gate; some students begin class boycott.
4/22
Hu’s funeral in Great Hall of the People; about 50 thousand students march to Tiananmen to participate;
numerous student actions include kneeling on the Great Hall’s steps to deliver a petition and request a
meeting with premier Li Peng.
4/23
Students form Beijing Student Autonomous Union Provisional Committee.
4/26
People’s Daily editorial calls student mobilization “planned conspiracy” and “turmoil”.
4/27
About 100 thousand students march to Tiananmen and protest the editorial. State Council announces
willingness to meet with students.
4/29
Senior government officials meet with 45 selected students from 16 Beijing universities, but other
students challenge both the dialogue and the student representatives.
5/4
Students march in commemoration of the May 4th Movement (of 1919).
5/5
Students form Beijing Student Dialogue Delegation. Most students end class boycott.
5/13
300 students start a hunger strike at Tiananmen, with numbers eventually rising to about 3 thousand, plus
thousands more as spectators and supporters.
5/14
High-level state delegation meets student activists, chaotic discussion ensues because of student
divisions, students withdraw from the talks.
5/15
Mikhail Gorbachev arrives for a state visit; because of Tiananmen’s occupation, government holds its
official reception at the Beijing airport.
5/17
More than a million Beijing residents march in support of students and hunger strikers.
5/19
Government declares martial law, but residents and students block the troops. Students from outside
Beijing continue to arrive in the city.
6/3
Military repression begins, with hundreds of people killed by government troops.
6/4
Troops encircle remaining 4 thousand students at Tiananmen; students leave the square.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
Source: adapted from Zhao 2001: xxv-xxvi
48
Major Chinese Peasant Protests, May-August 1997
May
Henan: in Yiyang and Changde prefectures, a total of about 200 thousand peasants
assemble in 80 locations, often demonstrating and submitting petitions, and
sometimes burning vehicles or attacking county governments, with 3 deaths and 54
reported injuries
May
Hubei: an estimated 120 thousand peasants staged at least 70 demonstrations
opposing peasant exploitation and official expropriation; in Tianmen county, 3
thousand villagers attacked party-government buildings, with 90 injuries
May-June
Anhui: some 70 thousand peasants in 40 townships engage in 60 separate challenges
to authorities, variously attacking official buildings, seizing guns and ammunition,
blocking a cargo train, seizing goods, and confronting the railroads’ security officers,
with 40 injuries and 11 deaths, including 5 police
May-June
Jiangxi: peasants in 70 townships, totaling around 100 thousand, mounted a hundred
challenges to authorities, occupying party and government buildings, attacking supply
and marketing cooperatives, looting fertilizer and cement; in Yifeng County, 800
people attacked the Public Security bureau; elsewhere crowds surrounded important
officials, whom the military rescued
July-Aug
Hubei: across 75 townships, perhaps 200 thousand peasants demonstrated,
petitioned, and protested against improper payments for crops, high-priced inputs,
and illegal taxes; authorities called 8 of the episodes “riots” or “rebellions”; in one
bloody fight, 40 peasants were killed or wounded
July-Aug
Jiangxi: on the order of 200 thousand peasants in 78 townships protested against
payment in IOUs, high-priced inputs, low prices for grain, and increased taxes;
participants variously attacked (or even burned) party-government buildings, for a
total of 200 peasants and 50 security officers wounded; in Yongfeng, security
officers fired on the crowd, causing 70 casualties
Source: Bernstein & Lü 2002: Table 5.1
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
49
Contentious Conversation
Subject – Verb – Object (of claims)
E.g. Union demands that the government __.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
50
Contrasting Principles of 18th and 19th Century
Repertoires in Western Europe
Eighteenth Century
Nineteenth Century
• Local object
• Abstract object
• Parochial
• Cosmopolitan
• Particular
• Modular
• Bifurcated
• Autonomous
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
51
Contrasting Principles of 18th and 19th Century Repertoires in Western Europe
Eighteenth Century
Nineteenth Century
Frequent employment of authorities’ normal
means of action, either as caricature or as a deliberate, if temporary, assumption of authorities’
prerogatives in the name of a local community
Use of relatively autonomous means of action,
of kinds rarely or never employed by authorities
Convergence on residences of wrongdoers and
sites of wrongdoing, as opposed to seats and
symbols of public power
Preference for previously planned action in visible public places
Extensive use of authorized public celebrations
and assemblies for presentation of grievances
and demands
Deliberate organization of assemblies for the
articulation of claims
Common appearance of participants as members or representatives of constituted corporate
groups and communities rather than of special
interests
Participation as members or representatives of
special interests, constituted public bodies, and
named associations
Tendency to act directly against local enemies
but to appeal to powerful patrons for redress of
wrongs beyond the reach of the local community
and, especially, for representation vis à vis outside authorities
Direct challenges to rivals or authorities, especially national authorities and their representatives
Repeated adoption of rich, irreverent symbolism
in the form of effigies, dumb show, and ritual
objects to state grievances and demands
Display of programs, slogans, and symbols of
common membership such as flags, colors, and
lettered banners
Shaping of action to particular circumstances
and localities
Preference for forms of action easily transferred
from one circumstance or locality to another
Summary:
parochial, particular, and bifurcated
Summary:
cosmopolitan, modular, and autonomous
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
52
Building a Social Movement
Campaigns
Campaign
Repertoires
Repertoire
WUNC
Displays
WUNC
Display
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
53
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
54
Sample Exam Questions:
1.
We have looked at “old” and “new” repertoires of contention in Western Europe. Name three characteristics
of claim-making performances in each repertoire and give two examples of performances that fit the
descriptions.
CHARACTERISTICS
OLD
NEW
1)
2)
3)
EXAMPLES
1)
2)
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
55
Sample Exam Questions
•
Circle one of these episodes: nationalist mobilization in the USSR 1987-1992, student claim making in
Beijing 1989, antislavery activism in 19th century US and Britain, American resistance to British rule
during the 1760s. In a sentence, describe one performance that participants employed in that episode.
•
In a sentence, say whether that performance comes closer to the “old” or “new” repertoire, and give one
reason for your answer.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
56
Waves of Democratization
Wednesday March 21st, 2007
Ernesto Castaneda
•
•
•
•
•
Waves of Democracy (Tilly vs. Huntington)
Democracy and Contention
Democracy and Social Movements
Switzerland
Mexico
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
57
Waves of Democracy (Huntington)
• First wave, long 1828-1926 (29)
• First reverse wave 1922-1942 (12)
• Second, short 1943-1962 (32)
• Second reverse wave 1958-1975 (30)
• Third wave 1974-1991 (60)
Huntington writes. "Economic development makes democracy possible;
political leadership makes it real." [Top down perspective]
Samuel P. Huntington. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the
Late Twentieth Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
58
Waves of Democracy (Tilly)
•
•
•
•
•
1789-1800
1830-1848
After WWI
After WWII
1989-
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
59
What is the relationship between
democracy and social movements?
?
Democracy
Social mobilization
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
60
Democracy and Social Movements
Possible causal pathways
Background causes. Historical Context.
Social Movements
Democratization
De-democratization
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
61
A Chronology of Contentious Politics
in Switzerland, 1830-1848
A Chronology of Contentious Politics in Switzerland, 1830-1848
1830, 4 July
reformist constitution in Ticino
1830, July
revolution in France
1830, Fall
throughout Switzerland, except Neuchâtel (member of federation, but ruled by King of Prussia) and Basel: clubs, local public meetings,
pamphleteering, petitions, press campaigns, and marches to cantonal capitals on behalf of cantonal elections for constituent assemblies
by manhood suffrage
1830, Fall
elections of constituent assemblies
1831, Jan
Basel: armed uprising of country people against urban domination, put down by cantonal troops
1831, JanMarch
meetings of assemblies, enactments of new cantonal constitutions, generally asserting
popular sovereignty and declaring civil liberties but restricting suffrage significantly by property, education, gender, and age
1831, 13 Sep
Neuchâtel: after overlord king of Prussia grants moderate constitution, republicans attempt to seize power by force of arms, but Swiss
federal executive (fearing external intervention) sends troops to put them down
1831-1832
bitter political struggles between radicals and conservatives in Basel, ending in split of Basel into two half-cantons, central city vs. rural
areas; on 14 May 1832 the rural half-canton adopts a broadly democratic constitution
1832
Schwyz: communes of canton's dependent territories declare themselves an independent half-canton, only to receive military occupation
by Innerschwyz; federal authorities broker new constitution enfranchising outer territories
1832, July
appointment of commission to revise the federal constitution (strictly speaking, the Pact)
1833, March
after liberal cantons attempt to force revision of the federal pact of 1815 through the Diet, cantonal authorities of Schwyz send troops to
repress liberals and radicals in the neighborhood of Küssnacht, Outer Schwyz; Diet calls up 16,000 troops to advance on Küssnacht,
Schwyz troops withdraw; separation of Schwyz into two half cantons becomes definitive
1833, JulyAugust
Basel: rural uprising against city’s dominance; battle (3 August 1833) at Pratteln in which country people suffer five deaths and
Basel troops fifty four
1834, Jan
armed band including Mazzini raids Carouge (Savoy), sacks customs post, but is overwhelmed by Geneva police
1834
liberals from seven cantons meet to plan anticlerical program, then propose to create cantonal councils; liberal clergy stop movement, but
"unrest" in Aargau brings in troops from neighboring cantons
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
62
Switzerland 2
1836
Glarus: after new constitution abolishes separate Protestant and Catholic Landsgemeinden, Catholics try to hold their own separate
assembly, but federal occupation of communes Näfels and Oberurnen ends Catholic resistance
1838
half canton of Outer Schwyz: Landsgemeinde of Rothenthurm breaks up in brawl between supporters of Hooves (small peasant liberals)
and Horns (large peasant conservatives)
1839, Feb-Sep
Zürich: when by a bare majority the cantonal education council appoints to the university a liberal theologian (David Friedrich Strauss of
Tübingen), committees of protest form throughout the hinterland, localities send petitions; Zürich authorities pension off Strauss before he
begins teaching
1839
Valais: when liberals (mainly from Lower Valais) try to force a new constitution through the Diet of Sion, conservatives (mainly from Upper
Valais) withdraw and form their own separate government at Sierre
1839, 6 Sep
Zürich: 1,500 armed country people assemble and march to town singing hymns, scuffle with government troops, finally disperse
1840
Valais: troops from Upper and Lower Valais confront each other before settlement backed by federal Diet reunifies cantonal government
1841, January
Aargau: cantonal authorities decree suppression of convents, Catholics storm capital under arms and are r epelled by government troops;
Swiss Diet brokers compromise reopening nunneries, but not houses of male orders
1841
Lucerne: newly-elected Legislative Assembly asks Jesuits to take over secondary education; widespread demands in Protestant cantons
for expulsion of Jesuits, formation of anti-Jesuit societies
1842, fall
free corps (Freischaren) of volunteers form, attempt military expeditions against Lucerne
1844, May
Valais: after cantonal government asks Lucerne authorities to intervene against adherents of Young Switzerland in Lower Valais,
inhabitants of region ambush emissary (Bernhard Meyer) on his way to deliver decree against them
1844
Basel: national shooting festival occasion for manifestations (speeches, cheers, etc.) by Catholics and (esp ecially) radicals
1844, 8 Dec
Lucerne: a "few hundred" men in armed bands from Zürich and elsewhere head for city to overthrow government, but give up en route; in
the city, radical anti-Jesuit "riot" put down by government forces
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
63
Switzerland 3
1845, spring
musters of free corps in a number of rural locations
1845, March
skirmishes between free corps and government troops
1845,
31 March
canton of Lucerne: 3,600 radical volunteers (Freischärler) enter from Aargau under command of Bernese Ulrich Ochsenbein
(former member of Mazzini's Young Europe), march to capital, where government troops repel them, killing 105 (or 115) and jailing 1785;
Lucerne celebrates with a religious procession
1845, spring
Lucerne: petition campaign to save Jacob Steiger, military leader of March raid, from Lucerne's death penalty; when Steiger escapes
from his prison in Savoy, widespread radical celebrations, honorary citizenship for Steiger in Zürich and Bern
1845
Lausanne: mass march of country people to government building, demanding removal of conservative council; radical leader takes over
1845,
December
Catholic cantons (Lucerne, Uri, Schwyz, Unterwald, Zug, Fribourg, Valais) form mutual defense league (Sonderbund), approach
Austrian, Sardinian, and French governments for aid
1846, July
Bern adopts a new constitution strengthening state powers and broadening political participation, thus increasing power of radicals
1847
widespread mobilization of Catholics: pilgrimages to Saints' tombs, collective attendance at masses
1847, spring
Geneva: popular uprising (radical-led peasants, artisans, and factory workers); after arrest of leaders, street barricades against
conservative-liberal militia; radical-dominated provisional government comes to power, enacts more democratic constitution
1847, spring
radical coup d'état in Lausanne displaces conservative militia and government
1847, spring
elections favorable to radicals elsewhere
1847, spring
Fribourg: failed radical coup attempt
1847, July
Diet (by twelve votes to ten) demands dissolution of Sonderbund
1847, 10 Oct
Valais: voters approve canton’s adhesion to Sonderbund
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
64
Switzerland 4
1847, 4 Nov
Diet orders dissolution of Sonderbund by force of arms, mobilizes cantonal troops, begins military operations under General Dufour,
relatively moderate veteran of Bavarian and Dutch armies
1847, 14 Nov
Fribourg surrenders to Dufour
1847, 22 Nov
Zug capitulates without a fight; Dufour proceeds to Lucerne, where general exit of authorities begins
1847, 24 Nov
Dufour attacks Lucerne, which surrenders; Sonderbund collapses after minor skirmishes elsewhere (e.g. Schwyz, 26 November)
1847, 29 Nov
end of hostilities; within next few days, federal troops occupy all Sonderbund cantons, including Valais
1847, 7 Dec
Diet refuses French offer of mediation, rejects all intervention in settlement by external powers
1848
new Swiss constitution approved by referendum establishes federal government (bicameral assembly, Federal Council, Federal
Tribunal), divides sovereignty between federal government and cantons, establishes federal citizenship including rights of mobility and
settlement throughout the state
1848, Feb
on news of February revolution in Paris, democratic force invades Neuchâtel (Neuenburg) from Chaux de Fonds, establishes republican
regime on 2 March
1848, April
referendum in Neuchâtel endorses republican constitution 5800 to 4400; rejected by Prussian king
1848, April
canton of Basel: when Johann Ludwig Becker starts recruiting a German Legion to support revolutionaries in Baden, federal government
sends troops to seal borders with Baden and Alsace
1848
as German revolutions begin in March, German workers in Switzerland meet and organize in support, eventually forming military forces
to support revolutionary activity in various German territories
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
65
Fluctuations in Swiss National Regimes, 1790-1848
Zone of
Authoritarian
Citizenship
Zone of
Authoritarianism
1
GovernMental
Capacity
Zone of
Citizenship
1848
1798
1830
1815
1847
1790
0
0
1
Protected Consultation
Zone of
Fragmented Tyranny
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
66
Mexican Democratization
minimal timeline
1876-1911
Porfirio Diaz’s Dictatorship
1910-1920
Mexican Revolution
1917
Federal Constitution
1929
PNR (PRI) is founded
1934-1940
Lázaro Cardenas (land reform, oil expropriation and party consolidation)
1968
Tlatelolco Massacre / Olympic Games
1982
Peso crash
1983-present
Neo-liberal reform
1985
Earthquake, millions die in Mexico City
1988
Competitive but unfair election between Carlos Salinas and Cuauhtémoc Cardenas
1989
PAN wins Baja California’s governorship
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
67
Mexican Democratization 2
January 1st, 1994
NAFTA takes effect. EZLN rebellion in Chiapas begins.
1994
Luis Donaldo Colosio is assassinated as well as Ruiz Massieu.
December 1994
Ernesto Zedillo becomes president.
Pesos crashes again economic crisis.
July 1997
Cuauhtémoc Cardenas is elected the First Mayor of Mexico City.
July 2000
Vicente Fox of the PAN is elected
2000-2005
Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO) of the PRD becomes mayor of Mexico City
Summer 2006
Revolts in Oaxaca.
July 2006
Election between AMLO and Felipe Calderon (PAN). Election results are contested but IFE gives
victory to Calderon.
2006
AMLO does not recognize the election results and carries out a series of contentious events.
68
Class Goal
To correctly match
Episodes ↔ Concepts ↔ Analytic Devices
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
69
Concept:
Standing Claims
• Standing claims, say that the actor or group belongs and represents an
established certified category within the regime and therefore deserves
the rights and respect that members of that category should receive
(see Tilly and Tarrow 2005:82).
• E.g. EZLN posing as representatives of Chiapas indigenous people
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
70
Contention Events in Venezuela
Monday April 2nd, 2007
Ernesto Castañeda
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
71
1947-48
President Romulo Gallegos, Venezuela's first democratically elected leader, overthrown
within 18 months in military coup led by Marcos Perez Jimenez, who forms government
with backing from the armed forces and the US.
1958
Admiral Wolfgang Larrazabal ousts Marcos Perez Jimenez; leftist Romulo Betancourt
of the Democratic Action Party (AD) wins democratic presidential election (1959-1964).
1964
Venezuela's first presidential handover from one civilian to another. Dr Raul Leoni (AD)
is elected president.
1973
Venezuela benefits from global oil boom. Oil and steel industries nationalized.
1982-84
In 1982 On the so-called Black Friday the Venezuelan currency suffers an important
devaluation. Fall in world oil prices generates unrest and cuts in welfare spending. Dr
Jaime Lusinchi (AD) elected president signs pact involving government, trade unions
and business.
1989
Carlos Andrés Pérez (AD) elected president against a background of economic
depression. President imposes austerity measures and takes an IMF loan. Social and
political upheaval includes riots. Violent riots erupt in the streets of Caracas, "El
Caracazo“, at least 300 people die. Martial law and a general strike follow.
1992
Some 120 people are killed in two attempted coups, the first led by junior military officer
Colonel Hugo Chavez, and the second carried out by his supporters. Chavez is jailed
for two years before being pardoned.
1993-1996
President Carlos Andrés Pérez impeached on corruption charges.
Ramon Jose Velasquez becomes interim president. Rafael Caldera elected president.
Carlos Andres Perez is later convicted and imprison for corruption.
December 1998
A military engineer and the son of schoolteachers, Hugo Chavez Frias is elected the
38th president of Venezuela with 59 percent of the vote. His political party, the
& Castañeda
2007) three decades of democratic rule by two
72
Movement of the Fifth(Tilly
Republic
(MVR), ended
parties, Democratic Action (AD) and the Social Christian Party of Venezuela (COPEI).
Venezuela 2
August 1999
131 elected officials of the National Constituent Assembly convene to draft a new
Constitution. Ratified with 70 percent approval among voters, the 1999 constitution
defines Venezuela's current system.
Among other things the new Constitution calls for the construction of neighborhood
groups to promote the "Bolivarian Revolution" with estimates of more than 70,000.
1999
Chavez prohibits U.S. aircrafts from flying over Venezuela to patrol drug trade in
neighboring Colombia.
2000
Foreign Minister Jose Vicente Rangel discloses plot to kill Chavez.
Chavez wins another six years in office and a mandate to pursue political reforms.
2001
First head of state to visit Iraq since the 1991 Gulf War.
November 2001
President Chavez appears on TV to hail 49 decrees, including land and oil industry
reforms. With this Chavez ends many traces of neo-liberal policies. The opposition starts
to get radicalized and tries to bring Chavez down by any means.
February 2002
Government scraps exchange rate controls. National currency, the Bolivar, plummets
25% against the US dollar.
February 25, 2002
Chavez appoints new board of directors to state oil monopoly Petroleos de Venezuela
(PDVSA) in move opposed by executives of the state company.
April 9, 2002
Trade unions and the Fedecamaras business association declare general strike to
support Petroleos de Venezuela dissidents (supported with $US877,000 by US
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
government NYT April 26 2002)
73
Venezuela 3
April 11 2002
Some 150,000 people rally in support of strike and oil protest. National Guard and proChavez gunmen clash with protesters - more than 10 are killed and 110 injured. Military
high command rebels and demands that Chavez resign.
April 12 2002
Armed forces head announces Chavez has resigned, a claim later denied by Chavez.
Chavez is taken into military custody in a Island in the Caribbean. CIA airplane
involved.
Military names Pedro Carmona, one of the strike organizers, as head of transitional
government.
The coup arises from a national strike called by Fedecámaras, La Confederación de
Trabajadores de Venezuela (CTV) and the so-called Coordinadora Democrática.
April 14 2002
Chavez returns to office after the collapse of the interim government.
December 2002
Opposition strike cripples the oil industry. Organizers demand that Chavez resign. The
nine-week stoppage leads to fuel shortages.
May 2003- 2004
Opposition delivers petition with more than three million signatures demanding
referendum on Chavez's rule. Government and opposition sign deal brokered by
Organization of American States (OAS) which sets out framework for referendum on
Hugo Chavez's rule. Referendum on August 2003. Carter and other international
observers validate Chavez popular victory in the referendum.
March 2004
The opposition calls for a general strike. During the recent general strike, independent
media stations broadcast an estimated 700 pro-strike (and anti-Chavez) advertisements
a day, according to government reports. During the same two-month period, President
Chavez used 40 hours of airtime, in addition to his weekly television and radio program
Hello President.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
74
Clashes between opponents and supporters of President Chavez, several people are
killed and many are injured.
Venezuela 4
January 2005
President Chavez signs decree on land reform which aims to eliminate Venezuela's
large estates. President says land redistribution will bring justice to rural poor; ranchers
say move is an attack on private property.
December 2005
Parties loyal to President Chavez make big gains in parliamentary elections. Opposition
parties boycott the poll, leaving parliament entirely made up of supporters of the
president.
December 2006
Hugo Chavez wins a third term in presidential elections with 63% of the vote.
January 2007
Chavez announces that key energy and telecommunications companies will be
nationalized.
National Assembly grants President Chavez sweeping powers to rule by decree for the
next eighteen months (this is stipulated in the present and previous constitution and has
been granted to many previous presidents).
Chavez announces the formation of the Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela which
aims to unite all the forces from the left under his command including groups that have
called for “Chavismo without Chavez.”
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
75
Figure 3.4: Freedom House Ratings for Venezuela, 1972-2000
7
1989
1976
1996 1972
2000
Political
Rights
4
1992
1999
1
1
4
7
Civil Liberties
Note: We have inverted the actual Freedom House ratings, which run from 1 (high) to 7
(low).
Source: Freedom House 2000.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
Taken From: Tilly and Tarrow (2007:65)
76
Analytic Devises
I.
Forms of struggle change in time and in relation to the POS
and regime type.
II. We observe a rise in the intensity of claim making along with
changes in the regime and other contentious events. The
waves observable in Venezuela 1983-1999 are comparable to
Beissinger USSR 1987-1992, and Tarrow’s Italy 1966-1973.
Take home point:
• Venezuelan forms of collective claim making change with the
struggles over the character of the regime. So as regime
transition occur, with Chavez in 1999, there is a peaking on the
number and intensity of struggles because both losers and
winners are stepping up their claims.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
77
Contention in Venezuela
Lopez Maya et al. (2002)
Figure 3.1: Protest Events in Venezuela, 1983-1999
400
Cumulative Number of Events
350
300
250
Violent
Confrontational
Conventional
200
150
100
50
0
1983
1988
1993
1998
Year
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
78
Sources
Event catalogue compiled by Ernesto Castañeda from:
• López Maya, Margarita cited in Charles Tilly and Sidney
Tarrow. 2005.“Contentious Politics.” Boulder: CO. Paradigm
Press. And Chapter III in Tilly and Tarrow 2005.
• López Maya, Margarita Venezuela en la encrucijada
• http://www.aporrea.org/actualidad/a1670.html
• PBS online
http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/venezuela/facts.ht
ml
• BBC Online
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/country_profiles/122934
8.stm
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
79
Tilly (2007)
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
80
Tilly’s Definition of Regime
• Regime, set of relations between states and
citizens, and major political actors, including
groups such as parties, corporations, labor
unions, organized ethnic groups, patronclient networks, warlords, etc. (adapted from
Tilly 2007:12).
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
81
The Simple Regime Model
Challenger
Regime
Member
Outside
Actor
Government
Regime
Limits of
Government’s
Jurisdiction
Outside of Regime
Coalitions
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
82
Regimes and Democracy
(make up for March 19th lecture)
Capacity and Consultation
• State capacity and its relation with state-society
consultation; institutionalized relations among
governments and political actors, especially at
state level.
• Governmental capacity: extent of control by state
agents over people, activities, and resources within
the government's claimed jurisdiction; e.g. compare
China with Rwanda.
• Extent of protected consultation: collective
control by subjects over governmental personnel,
resources, and action; at high end, democracy.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
83
Democratization and De-Democratization
(make up for lecture on March 26th)
Democratization occurs when a regime moves toward these
conditions:
• regular and categorical, rather than intermittent and
individualized, relations between the government and its
subjects: citizenship
• those relations include most or all subjects: breadth
• those relations are equal across subjects and categories of
subjects: equality
• governmental personnel, resources, and performances change
in response to binding collective consultation of subjects:
binding consultation
• subjects, especially members of minorities, receive protection
from arbitrary action by governmental agents: protection
Moves away from these conditions qualify as de- democratization
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
84
These processes generally promote democratization:
• increases in the sheer number of people available for
participation in public politics and/or in connections among
those people
• equalization of resources and connections among those
people
• insulation of public politics from existing social inequalities
• integration of interpersonal trust networks into public politics
• reversals of these processes promote de-democratization
Major forms of struggle that have often activated these
processes:
•
•
•
•
revolution
conquest
confrontation
colonization and de-colonization
85
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
Freedom House Checklist for Political
Rights and Civil Liberties
Political Rights
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Is the head of state and/or head of government or other chief authority elected through
free and fair elections?
Are the legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections?
Are there fair electoral laws, equal campaigning opportunities, fair polling, and honest
tabulations of ballots?
Are the voters able to endow their freely elected representatives with real power?
Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive
political groupings of their choice, and is the system open to the rise and fall of these
competing parties or groupings?
Is there a significant opposition vote, de facto opposition power, and a realistic possibility
for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections?
Are the people free from domination by the military, foreign powers, totalitarian parties,
religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any other powerful group?
Do cultural, ethnic, religious, and other minority groups have reasonable selfdetermination, self-government, autonomy, or participation through informal consensus in
the decision-making process?
(Discretionary) For traditional monarchies that have no parties or electoral process, does
the system provide for consultation with the people, encourage discussion of policy, and
allow the right to petition the ruler?
(Discretionary) Is the government or occupying power deliberately changing the ethnic
composition of a country or territory so as to destroy a culture or tip the political balance in
favor of another group?
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
86
Freedom House Checklist for Political
Rights and Civil Liberties
Civil Liberties
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Is there freedom of assembly, demonstration, and open public discussion?
Is there freedom of political or quasi-political organization, including political parties, civic organizations, ad
hoc issue groups, etc.?
Are there free trade unions and peasant organizations or equivalents, and is there effective collective
bargaining? Are there free professional and other private organizations?
Is there an independent judiciary?
Does the rule of law prevail in civil and criminal matters? Is the population treated equally under the law?
Are police under direct civilian control?
Is there protection from political terror, unjustified imprisonment, exile, or torture, whether by groups that
support or oppose the system? Is there freedom from war and insurgencies?
Is there freedom from extreme government indifference and corruption?
Is there open and free private discussion?
Is there personal autonomy? Does the state control travel, choice of residence, or choice of employment?
Is there freedom from indoctrination and excessive dependency on the state?
Are property rights secure? Do citizens have the right to establish private businesses? Is private business
activity unduly influenced by government officials, the security forces, or organized crime?
Are there personal social freedoms, including gender equality, choice of marriage partners, and size of
family?
Is there equality of opportunity, including freedom from exploitation by or dependency on landlords,
employers, union leaders, bureaucrats, or other types of obstacles to a share of legitimate economic
gains?
Adapted by Tilly from Karatnycky 2000: 584-585.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
87
Democracy Today and Tomorrow
(make up for March 28th)
Measuring Democratization
•
Freedom House monitoring defines “democracy” as civilian government
competitively elected by general adult suffrage, with parties having significant
public access to voters [weak criterion].
•
Freedom House also makes more refined ratings of political rights and civil
liberties, based on with scores from 1 (high) to 7 (low) on each item.
“Free” means that ratings for political rights and civil liberties averaged 3 or less;
“Not Free” meant average greater than 5.5.
•
By that standard
1900: 0 of 55 independent national regimes;
1950: 22 of 80;
2003: 117 of 192;
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
88
Freedom House Ratings of European Countries on
Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 2001
1,3: Bulgaria,
Greece
1
2
2,4: Moldova
3
3,4: Albania
1,2: Belgium, Czech Rep.,
Estonia, France, Germany,
Hungary, Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland,
Slovakia, Slovenia,
Spain, United Kingdom
Political
Rights
4
4,5: Turkey
4,4: Macedonia,
Ukraine
1,1: Andorra, Austria,
Greek Cyprus, Denmark,
Finland, Iceland, Ireland,
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg,
Malta, Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, San
Marino, Sweden,
Switzerland
2,2: Croatia,
Romania
2,1: Monaco
3,3: Yugoslavia
NO BINDING, GENERAL,
COMPETITIVE
ELECTIONS =
UNDEMOCRATIC
5
5,5: Russia
6
5,4: BosniaHerzegovina
6,6: Belarus
7
7
6
5
4
3
(Tilly & Castañeda
2007)
Civil Liberties
2
1
89
Source: Compiled from Freedom House 2000
Trajectories of Four Post-Socialist Regimes, 1991-2001
1
2
Estonia
Croatia
3
Political
Rights4
Russia
5
Belarus
6
7
7
6
5
4
3
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
Civil Liberties
2
1
90
Freedom House Ratings for All Countries by Total Population, 1981-2002
7000
6000
5000
Not Free
4000
Partly Free
M i l l i ons of P e opl e
Free
3000
2000
1000
0
1981
1985
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
91
• note low point of 1994, with some recovery since then (India back in free as of 1999), with about half the world’s “unfree” population in China
by these measures and 41 percent of world population lives in free countries.
Violent Specialists
Intra & Interstate Wars
Castañeda April 4th, 2007
• Official specialists in coercion: police, military, guards, etc.
• Institutionalized coercive systems: paramilitaries, guerrillas,
posses, vigilantes, drug lords, mercenaries, organized
crime, mafiosi, etc.
• Non-institutionalized violence: street robbers, sporadic
crime, personal vendettas, etc.
• There is a continuum from state agents to thugs (legitimacy
determined by third party support for coercive action from
these groups).
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
92
Mafias and Mercenaries
• Mafiosi are “first and foremost entrepreneurs in one
particular commodity—protection . . .” (see Diego
Gambetta 1993).
• Mafiosi are sellers of protection; hence privatizers
of public goods. When, then, should we expect
mafias to proliferate? We observe a near
disappearance of Sicilian mafia under fascism, and
reappearance with liberation. Revival in the U.S.
meant a later revival in Italy.
• Likewise, mercenaries sell protection but at a
larger scale.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
93
Space, States, and Specialists in Violence
High
S
P
E
C
I
F
I
C
I
T
Y
POLICE
REGULAR ARMY
G
A
N
G
S
MERCENARIES
OF
T
E
R
R
I
T
O
R
Y
MAFIA,
THUGS,
ETC.
Low
Local
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
Area
National
94
History of Western Wars
From
Militias
Feudal levies
Mercenaries
Pirates
Bandits
To
Rise of consolidated states
Concentrated coercion
Rise of interstate violence
Militarization of deaths
National armies
Mass conscription
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
95
Further resources:
Tilly, Charles. War Making and State Making as
Organized Crime in Bringing the State Back In
edited by Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer,
and Theda Skocpol. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1985 pp. 169–191.
Barkey, Karen. 1994. Bandits and Bureaucrats: The
Ottoman Route to State Centralization. Cornell
University Press.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
96
Source: Mary Kaldor. 2006 [1991]. New Wars Old Wars. Blackwell. Figure 2.1
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
97
World death rate for large-scale war
Time
18th century
Rough amount of
deaths per million of
population.
90/million
19th century
150/million
20th century
430/million
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
98
Increases in civilian deaths
Time
Percent of civilian
casualties
World War I
5 percent
World War II
50 percent
Wars of the 1990s
90 percent
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
99
Number of Civil Wars per Year, 1960-1999
30
25
20
15
10
5
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
99
19
96
19
93
19
90
19
87
19
84
19
81
19
78
19
75
19
72
19
69
19
66
19
63
19
19
60
0
100
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
101
Source: Mary Kaldor. 2006 [1991]. New Wars Old Wars. Figure 5.1
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
102
New and Old Wars
Logistical/organizational differences
• “old wars”: vertically organized, territorially
contiguous governments with built-in military
support systems, taxation, conscription.
• “new wars”: relative weakening of states,
cross-cutting organizations, international
networks, segmentary recruitment, related to
flows of precious commodities, including oil,
diamonds, and human labor.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
103
Tilly’s Conclusions
1)
During the monopolization of force by great states that occurred in the
West from the 17th to 20th centuries domestic violence decreased
dramatically, independent military forces lost ground enormously, but
states engaged in increasingly destructive international warfare,
2) During the 20th century however, civilians increasingly became victims
through bombing and other changes in military tactics,
3) After World War II warfare shifted for a while to anti-colonial struggles, but
interstate wars then declined remarkably in overall frequency and intensity
–despite Afghanistan and Iraq!
4) Within newly independent states, military internal struggles for control -civil wars -- multiplied into the 1990s,
5) Once most such struggles got settled in post-socialist states, civil wars
began to decline in frequency, although they didn't disappear as Congo,
Sri Lanka, and Colombia indicate, by U.S. official figures terror attacks
generally declined along with civil wars, despite 9/11. [It certainly doesn't
seem like it from the news, which necessarily emphasizes violent conflict,
but on the whole intrastate and interstate violence are declining. That is
partly a result of the slow, partial advance of semi-democratic regimes].
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
104
Terror and Politics
April 9th, 2007
What is terror?
• Asymmetrical use of violence and threats of
violence against political enemies.
Terror as strategy:
• Signals that the target is vulnerable, that the
perpetrators exist, that the perpetrators have the
capacity to strike again.
• Signals typically reach three different audiences:
the targets themselves, potential allies of the
perpetrators, and third parties that might cooperate
with one or the other.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
105
Terrorism as a political tool
• a recurrent strategy of intimidation occurs widely in
contentious politics, and corresponds
approximately to what many people mean by terror
• a wide variety of individuals, groups, and networks
sometimes employ that strategy.
• the strategy relates systematically to other forms of
political struggle proceeding in the same settings
and populations
• specialists in coercion ranging from government
employees to bandits sometimes deploy terror
under certain political circumstances, usually with
far more devastating effects than the terror
operations of non-specialists
• examples: Basque country, Rwanda, anti-abortion
activism in the U.S.(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
106
Typology of Terror-Wielding
Groups and Networks
Specialists
MILITIAS
CONSPIRATORS
Degree of
Specialization
ORDINARY MILITANTS
in Coercion
Non-specialists AUTONOMISTS
Home Territory
ZEALOTS
Outside Home Territory
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
107
Definitions of Terrorism Used in
State Department Reports
•
•
•
•
•
•
No one definition of terrorism has gained universal acceptance. For the purposes
of this report, however, we* have chosen the definition of terrorism contained in
Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656(d). That statute contains the
following definitions:
The term terrorism means premeditated, politically motivated violence
perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine
agents, usually intended to influence an audience.
The term international terrorism means terrorism involving citizens of the territory
of more than one country.
The term terrorist group means any group practicing, or that has significant
subgroups that practice, international terrorism.
The US Government has employed this definition of terrorism for statistical and
analytical purposes since 1983.
Domestic terrorism is probably a more widespread phenomenon than
international terrorism. Because international terrorism has a direct impact on US
interests, it is the primary focus of this report. However, the report also describes,
but does not provide statistics on, significant developments in domestic terrorism
(State 2004: xii).
* i.e. State Department reporters
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
108
Significant Terrorist Incidents, January 2003,
According to U.S. State Department
Date
Incident
•
1/5 India: In Kulgam, Kashmir, a hand grenade exploded at a bus station injuring 40
persons: 36 private citizens and four security personnel, according to press reports. No
one claimed responsibility.
•
1/5 Pakistan: In Peshawar, armed terrorists fired on the residence of an Afghan
diplomat, injuring a guard, according to press reports. The diplomat was not in his
residence at the time of the incident. No one claimed responsibility.
•
1/5 Israel: In Tel Aviv, two suicide bombers attacked simultaneously, killing 23 persons
including: 15 Israelis, two Romanians, one Ghanaian, one Bulgarian, three Chinese, and
one Ukrainian and wounding 107 others – nationalities not specified – according to press
reports. The attack took place in the vicinity of the old central bus station where foreign
national workers live. The detonations took place within seconds of each other and were
approximately 600 feet apart, in a pedestrian mall and in front of a bus stop. The al-Aqsa
Martyrs Brigade was responsible.
•
1/12 Pakistan: In Hyderabad, authorities safely defused a bomb placed in a toilet of a
Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant, according to press reports. Two bomb explosions in
Hyderabad in recent months have killed a total of four persons and injured 33 others, all
Pakistanis. No one has claimed responsibility.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
109
Significant Terrorist Incidents 2
•
1/21 Kuwait: In Kuwait City, a gunman ambushed a vehicle at the intersection of alJudayliyat and Adu Dhabi, killing one US citizen and wounding another US citizen. The
victims were civilian contractors working for the US military. The incident took place close to
Camp Doha, an installation housing approximately 17,000 US troops. On 23-24 January, a
20-year-old Kuwaiti civil servant, Sami al-Mutayri, was apprehended attempting to cross the
border from Kuwait to Saudi Arabia. Al-Mutayri confessed to the attack and stated that he
embraces al-Qaida ideology and implements Usama Bin Ladin’s instructions although there
is no evidence of an organizational link. The assailant acted alone but had assistance in
planning the ambush. No group has claimed responsibility.
•
1/22 Colombia: In Arauquita, military officials reported either the National Liberation Army
(ELN) or the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) terrorists bombed a section
of the Cano Limon-Covenas oil pipeline, causing an unknown amount of damage. The
pipeline is owned by US and Colombian oil companies.
•
1/24 Colombia: In Tame, rebels kidnapped two journalists working for the Los Angeles
Times. One was a British reporter and the other a US photographer. The ELN is
responsible. The two journalists were released unharmed on 1 February 2003.
•
1/27 Afghanistan: In Nangarhar, two security officers escorting several United Nations
vehicles were killed when armed terrorists attacked their convoy, according to press reports.
No one claimed responsibility.
•
1/31 India: In Srinigar, Kashmir, armed terrorists killed a local journalist when they entered
his office, according to press reports. No one claimed responsibility.
•
Source: State 2004: 95-96.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
110
Connection Between Large Inequalities
and Social Unrest
India's Naxalites
“Other terrorists attack the Indian state at its strong points—its
secularism, its inclusiveness, its democracy. Naxalism attacks where it
is weakest: in delivering basic government services to those who need
them most. The Naxalites do not threaten the government in Delhi, but
they do have the power to deter investment and development in some
of India's poorest regions, which also happen to be among the richest in
some vital resources—notably iron and coal. So their movement itself
has the effect of sharpening inequity, which many see as the biggest
danger facing India in the next few years, and which is the Naxalites'
recruiting sergeant.”
The Economist August 17th, 2006.
cited in Neha Nimmagudda’s student memo
http://economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=7799247
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
111
Considerations
•
Terrorism paradox, when there is relative peace, terrorism
becomes very visible in the medias, it appears as big
concern for governments, and is therefore more effective
in causing terror among the civilian population.
•
In high and medium capacity states terrorist and security
threats can provide grounds for growing authoritarianism
to appear.
•
In low capacity democratizing states, terrorism and
organized crime pose a great threat to democratization
and to a consolidation of state capacity.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
112
Revolutions
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
113
Revolutions
• Revolution = forcible transfer of power over a state
in the course of which at least two distinct blocs of
contenders make incompatible claims to control the
state, and some significant portion of the
population subject to the state’s jurisdiction
acquiesces in the claims of each bloc.
• A full revolution combines a revolutionary situation
with a revolutionary outcome.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
114
Revolutionary Situations
1) contenders or coalitions of contenders advancing
exclusive competing claims to control of the state or
some segment of it: mobilization process.
2) commitment to those claims by a significant segment
of the citizenry: mobilization plus diffusion
3) incapacity or unwillingness of rulers to suppress the
alternative coalition and/or commitment to its claims:
ruler-subject interaction
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
115
Revolutionary Outcomes
1) defections of regime members
2) acquisition of armed force by revolutionary
coalitions
3) neutralization or defection of the regime’s armed
force
4) control of the state apparatus by members of
revolutionary coalition
5) transfer of state power to new ruling coalition.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
116
CONFLICT, REVOLT, AND REVOLUTION
complete
great
revolution
civil war
top-down seizure
of power
TRANSFER
OF
POWER
coup
revolt
routine
politics
none
none
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
SPLIT IN REGIME
complete
117
How to Analyze Contentious
Event Catalogues
Adapted from Tilly’s
“How to Detect and Describe
Performances and Repertoires”
Chapter 2 of upcoming book
“Contentious Performances”
April 11th, 2007
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
118
Aerial Graph of Contention in Russia (based on Bessinger 2001).
Figure 5.4: Demonstrations and Violent Events in the Soviet Union and Successor States,
1987-1992
300
250
Violent Events
Cumulative Number of Events
Demonstrations
200
150
100
50
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
0
Year
Source: Data Supplied by Mark Beissinger
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
119
Event Analysis
• The fundamental unit of analysis in this study is the
contentious event.
• Event analysis is widely recognized as a tool for
studying waves of mobilization.
• It is essentially a way of tracking over time the rise
and fall of particular types of events and the
features associated with them (Beissinger 2002:
42).
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
120
Different Soviet nationalities staged protest
demonstrations month by month from 1987 through 1991
(Beissinger 2002: 84).
For the most active, these were the peak months:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Armenians
Estonians
Moldavians
Russians
Crimean Tatars
Ukrainians
Latvians
Lithuanians
Azerbaijanis
Georgians
May 1988
November 1988
February 1989
January 1990
April 1990
November 1990
December 1990
December 1990
December 1990
September 1991
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
121
Results
• “In all, I have been able to identify thirty-two major waves of
nationalist violence in the former USSR during the 1987-92
period, part of sixteen larger ethnonationalist conflicts
involving violence during these years. Only in four of these
conflicts (the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict, the GeorgianOssetian conflict, the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, and the
Moldovan-Transdniestr conflict) did violence become a selfsustaining strategy of contesting state boundaries, with
relatively short waves of violence growing increasingly
protracted over time. In all other cases, violent mobilization
remained short-lived. What distinguished conflicts in which
mass violence grew sustained from those in which violence
ceased to proliferate was the relationship of state
institutions to the production of violence” (Beissinger 2002:
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
122
309).
Graficas de violencia
Source:
Samuel González Ruiz
Mexican specialist in comparative legal systems,
in relation to the fight and prosecution of organized crime.
Increase of Violence in Mexico due to Organized Crime
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
Niveles
de
Violencia
en
México
Violencia
mortal
Terrorist
a
Violencia
mortal
intimidat
oria
Generaliz
ada
Utilizació
n de
armas de
destrucci
ón media.
Violencia
contra
políticos
y de
primer
nivel
Violencia
mortal
contra
funcionar
ios y
periodista
s
Violencia
mortal
contra
Terceros
Violencia
mortal
contra
Rivales
Violencia
física
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
0
1
9
9
9
19
98
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
6
X
5
6
X X
7
8
13
14
X XX
25
23
15
X
16
X
X X
X X
17
19
18
XX
26
27
24
Violencia
Moral
1
9
9
0
1
9
8
9
35
36
X
10
11
37
38
39
X
21
22
X X
X
X
1
30
28
31
1
9
8
8
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
4
40
32
X X X X X X X
43
41
44
2
45
46
X X
47
48
49
X X X X XX X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X x
50
51
52
53
55
56
57
54
X X X X XX X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
67
68
69
70
71
72
X
x
x
73
66
X X X X XX X X X X X X X X X X XX X X X x x
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
1
1
9
9
1
X
X
29
42
34
20
X
X X X X X XX X X X
33
1
9
9
2
9
X XX X X
12
1
9
9
3
2
X XX X
4
1
9
9
4
X
1
3
1
9
9
5
74
124
X X X X XX X X X X X X X X X X XX X X X x x
Reduction of Violence in Colombia
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
Niveles
de
Violenc
ia en
Colom
bia
Violenc
ia
Terrori
sta
Violen.
intimid
atoria.
General
izada
armas
de
destruc
ción
media.
Violenc
ia
contra
político
s y de
primer
nivel
Violenc
ia
mortal
contra
funcion
arios y
periodi
stas
Violenc
ia
mortal
contra
Tercero
s
Violenc
ia
mortal
contra
Rivales
Violenc
ia física
0
7
0
6
0
5
X X X
1
2
3
0
4
2000
9
9
XXX
X
x
4
7
X X X
15
16
17
0
3
5
0
2
0
1
6
X
X
19
Violenc
ia
Moral
97
9
6
9
5
9
4
8
9
3
9
2
9
1
9
0
25
26
27
8
7
8
6
8
5
8
4
X
9
11
14
13
10
12
82
X
X
21
8
3
23
22
X X X X X X
24
8
8
XXX
X X
20
8
9
XX
18
X
28
x
X
29
X X X X X X X
30
31
32
33
34
35
XXx x
39
36
37
X X
X
X x
43
45
46
44
X
X X X X X X
52
X
70
53
54
55
56
57
X X X X X
X X X X X X
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
66
72
41
68
73
X
42
XX
x
51
50
X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X X X
X
69
XXX
74
x
x
75
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
XXXXXXX
65
67
x X
40
49
XXXX
71
X X X X X X X
38
X X X X Xx
47
48
76
1
9
8
125
X X X X X X X X X X X X X XX X
77
Trends of Organized Crime in Ireland
(not linked to terrorist organizations)
Niveles de
Violencia en
Irlanda
0
7
0
6
Violencia
mortal
Terrorista
Violencia
mortal
intimidatoria
.
Generalizada
Utilización
de armas de
destrucción
media.
Violencia
contra
políticos y
de primer
nivel
Violencia
mortal contra
funcionarios
y periodistas
0
5
0
4
0
3
0
2
9
9
98
9
7
9
6
9
5
94
9
3
9
2
9
1
9
0
8
9
8
8
8
7
x
X
x X
vi
8
6
8
5
8
4
8
3
8
2
X
ii
iii
X
X
ix
x
vii
x
x
xi
xii
ivv
viii
X X
Violencia
mortal contra
Rivales
X X X X
X X
xxxii
xxx
xxvii
xxix
xxxi
Violencia
Moral
2
0
0
0
Xi
Violencia
mortal contra
Terceros
Violencia
física
0
1
xiii
xiv
x
xv
x
xvi
Xxvii
X
xviii
x
X
xx
xix
x
xxi
X
xxii
X
xxiii
X
xxiv
X
X
xxv
xxvi
x
x
x
x
x
x
xxxiii
xxxiv
xxxv
xxxvi
xxxvii
xxxviii
xxviii
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
X
126xxxix
X
x
xl
xli
Violence in Italy
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Niveles
de
Violencia
en Italia.
Violencia
mortal
Terrorist
a
Violencia
mortal
intimidat
oria.
Generaliz
ada
Utilizaci
ón de
armas de
destrucci
ón
media.
Violencia
contra
políticos
y de
primer
nivel
Violencia
mortal
contra
funcionar
ios y
periodist
as
Violencia
mortal
contra
Terceros
Violencia
mortal
contra
Rivales
Violencia
física
Violencia
Moral
0
6
0
5
0
4
0
3
0
2
0
1
2
0
0
0
99
9
8
97
9
6
9
5
9
4
9
3
9
2
9
1
9
0
8
9
88
8
6
8
5
X
XX
i
8
7
8
3
82
X
iii
ii
8
4
iv
X X X X X X XX X X X
v
X
X
vi
X
ix
X
vii
viii
X
X
XX
XX XX
x
xi
xii
xiv
xv
xiii
xvi
xvii
X1
x
x
xviii
xix
X
xx
X
xxi
X
xxii
X
xxiii
X Xxxv
xxiv
X X
xxvi
xxvii
X X X X
xxviii
xxix
xxx
xxxi
X
xxxii
X X X X XX
xxxiii
X X X X X X XX
xxxv
xxxvi
xl
X X X X X X X X X X X XX X X
xli
X X X X X X XX
X X X X X X XX
xxxiv
x x
xxxviii xxxix
xxxvii
xlii
xliii
X X X X X X X X X X X XX X X
127
X X X X X X X X X X X XX X X
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
Reported “corruption” offences - rates per 100.000 inhabitants
(Italy 1989-2000)
Rates per 100.000 inhabitants
1,40
1,20
1,00
0,80
0,60
0,40
0,20
0,00
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
Year
“Concussione”
Passive corruption
Active corruption
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
Instigation to corruption
128
Convicted people for “corruption” offences Rates per 100.000 inhabitants (Italy 1989-2000)
0,60
Rates per 100.000 inhabitants
0,50
0,40
0,30
0,20
0,10
0,00
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
Year
“Concussione”
Passive corruption
Active corruption
Instigation to corruption
129
•
“La relación entre la violencia, la corrupción y la obstrucción a la justicia son de protección directa de la
delincuencia organizada y se configuran como un círculo exterior que protege el silencio o la oferta de
las organizaciones criminales” (Gonzalez y Flores 2007).
Organized Crime ↔ Corruption ↔ Obstruction of Justice
= Escalation of Violence and Loss of State Capacity
Source forthcoming as:
. “Violencia, corrupción y narcotráfico: el desafío del México democrático.
”González Ruiz, Samuel y Carlos Flores.” Foreign Affairs en Español ▪
Volumen 7 Número 2.
Special thanks to Samuel Ruiz for sharing his research and slides with the Mexican Graduate Student
Groups at Conferences at Yale and Columbia.
130
Tarrow’s Italy Study
•
•
•
•
•
•
Tarrow examined Italy’s cycle of protest from 1965 to 1975, for which the
national newspaper Corriere della Sera yielded 4,980 “protest events”, nonroutine actions in which the participants revealed a collective goal.
Tarrow tells us,
I collected information on ‘protest events’, a category which included strikes,
demonstrations, petitions, delegations, and violence, but which excluded
contentious behavior which revealed no collective claims on other actors.
I defined the protest event as a disruptive direct action on behalf of
collective interests, in which claims were made against some other group,
elites, or authorities (Tarrow 1989: 359).
Tarrow produced a record for each event. But he enriched the enterprise in two
important ways:
First, he incorporated textual descriptions at a number of critical points –
summaries of events, grievances, policy responses, and more. That made it
possible to refine his classified counts without returning to the original
newspaper sources.
Second, within the record he placed checklists where two or more features
could coexist. As a result, he was able to analyze not only the overall
distribution of events but also the frequency of such features as different forms
of violence – clashes with police, violent conflict, property damage, violent
attacks, rampages, and random violence (Tarrow 1989: 78).
(Taken from Tilly Contentious Repertoires. Forthcoming [It has now appeared in
Cambridge university Press. 2008]).
131
Figure 5.2: Italian Contention, 1966-1973
600
550
500
450
400
350
Conventional Events
300
Confrontational Events
Violent Events
250
200
150
100
50
66
.1
66
.2
67
.1
67
.2
68
.1
68
.2
69
.1
69
.2
70
.1
70
.2
71
.1
71
.2
72
.1
72
.2
73
.1
73
.2
0
Semester
Source: Tarrow 1989: p. 70
132
(Source: Tilly and Tarrow 2007)
Tilly’s Great Britain Study
•
•
•
•
•
Over about ten years, research groups at the University of Michigan and the New School
for Social Research worked with me to create a systematic body of evidence on actions,
interactions, performances, repertoires, and their settings in Great Britain between 1758
and 1834.
The central data set we produced includes machine-readable descriptions for 8,088
contentious gatherings (CGs) that occurred in southeastern England (Kent, Middlesex,
Surrey, or Sussex) during thirteen selected years from 1758 to 1820, or anywhere in
Great Britain (England, Scotland, and Wales, but not Ireland) from 1828 to 1834.
In this study, a CG is an occasion on which ten or more people gathered in a publiclyaccessible place and visibly made claims which, if realized, would affect the interests of at
least one person outside their number. In principle, CGs include almost all events that
authorities, observers, or historians of the time would have called "riots" or "disturbances"
as well as even more that would fall under such headings as "public meeting",
"procession" and "demonstration".
Our standardized descriptions of CGs come from periodicals: the Annual Register,
Gentleman's Magazine, London Chronicle, Morning Chronicle, Times, Hansard's
Parliamentary Debates, Mirror of Parliament, and Votes and Proceedings of Parliament;
we read these periodicals exhaustively for the years in question plus January-June 1835.
Although we frequently consulted both published historical work and archival sources such
as the papers of the Home Office in interpreting our evidence, the machine-readable
descriptions transcribed material from the periodicals alone.
We did not try to find every event about which information was available or even a
representative sample of such events. Instead, we assembled a complete enumeration of
those described in standard periodicals whose principles of selection we could examine,
and sometimes even test.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
133
Tilly’s Great Britain Study
Tilly laced computer-stored records for Contentious Events into separate sections and provided:
• a general description of each event (8,088 machine-readable records)
• a description of each formation -- each person or set of persons who acted distinguishably
during the event (27,184 records)
• supplementary information on the geographical or numerical size of any formation, when
available (18,413 records)
• a summary of each distinguishable action by any formation, including the actor(s), the crucial
verb, (where applicable) the object of the action, and an excerpt of the text(s) from which we
drew actor, verb, and object (50,875 records)
• excerpts from detailed texts from which we drew summary descriptions of actions (76,189
records)
• identification of each source of the account (21,030 records)
• identification of each location in which the action occurred (11,054 records)
• a set of verbal comments on the event, or on difficulties in its transcription (5,450 records)
• special files listing all alternative names for formations and all individuals mentioned in any
account (28,995 formation names, 26,318 individual names)
• Except for straightforward items such as date, day of the week, and county names, the
records do not contain codes in the usual sense of the term. On the whole, we transcribed
words from the texts or (when that was not feasible) paraphrases of those words. Think of
formation names: Instead of coding names given to formations in broad categories, we
transcribed the actual words used in our sources.
• For example, the transcription of each action includes the actor’s name, a verb
characterizing the action, and (in the roughly 52 percent of cases in which there was an
object) the object’s name.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
134
Subject – Verb - Object
Transcription
subject
verb
object
the same night the mob (gathered)
mob
#gather
none
the mob committed great violences in
Surry-Street, in the Strand, particularly
at the Coach Office, not a window was left
with a whole pane of glass
mob
#break
owner of Coach Office
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
135
My research team found multiple accounts of these attacks in 1829’s Times of London.
Here is how we transcribed and classified the major actions within a cutting incident on
May 4th:
Transcription
Verb
Broad Verb Category
certain evil-disposed persons riotously assembled
assemble
move
entered the dwellings of the journeymen silk weavers
enter
move
and maliciously cut and destroyed the silk in the looms
destroy
attack
#end
#end
end
a reward of 200L is hereby offered
offer
negotiate
The left hand verb presents our simplified transcription of the phrase’s central action.
The right hand column shows our placement in one of eight extremely broad categories
of verbs: attack, control, end, meet, move, negotiate, support, and other. (More on
verb categories in a moment.)
Source: Tilly. Contentious Performances Chapter 2. Unpublished draft 2007.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
136
Figure 2-3: Major Categories of Verbs in British Contentious Gatherings, 1758-1834
100%
Percent of All CGs Featuring Verbs in Category
90%
80%
70%
60%
ATTACK
CONTROL
MEET
OTHER
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
1758 1759 1768 1769 1780 1781 1789 1795 1801 1807 1811 1819 1820 1828 1829 1830 1831 1832 1833 1834
Year
137
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
Figure 2-2: Locations of Action Verbs in Two Factor Space
F1 = Indoor (low) vs. Outdoor (high)
F2 = Disagreement (low) vs. Agreement (high)
GATHER
0.90
MOVE
CONTROL
0.60
PROCEED
DISPERSE
SUPPORT
NEGOTIATE
RESIST
ENTER
ATTACK
0.30
BLOCK
DELIBERATE
ATTEMPT
ASSEMBLE
FIGHT
MARCH
REQUEST
F1
DECRY
RECEIVE
ADDRESS
COMMUNICATE
CHEER
0.00
OPPOSE
-0.30
VOTE
-0.60
PETITION
HEARPET
-0.90
CHAIR
RESOLVE
THANK
MEET ADJOURN
-0.90
-0.60
-0.30
0.00
0.30
0.60
0.90
F2
138
Over-represented Verb Categories* by Broad
Type of Gathering, Great Britain, 1758-1834
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
authorized celebrations (78 CGs): bracket, celebrate, cheer, dine, enter, gather, observe, proceed, receive
delegations (79): address, bracket, deliberate, gather, negotiate, proceed, receive, support
parades, demonstrations, rallies (142): attempt, block, bracket, celebrate, cheer, decry, dine, enter, gather,
march, negotiate, observe, oppose, other, proceed, receive, support, vote
pre-planned meetings of named associations (985): dine, hear petition, meet, petition
pre-planned meetings of public assemblies (3197): none
other pre-planned meetings (1672): dine, meet
strikes, turnouts (76): attack, attempt, block, control, deliberate, donkey, gather, hear petition, march, move,
negotiate, observe, other, proceed, resist, turnout
attacks on blacklegs (27): attack, block, control, decry, die, enter, fight, gather, move, observe, turnout
brawls in drinking places (24): attack, attempt, block, bracket, celebrate, control, deliberate, dine, enter,
fight, gather, give, move, negotiate, request, resist, turnout
market conflicts (12): address, block, gather, negotiate, oppose, other, proceed, request, support
poachers vs. gamekeepers (71): attack, attempt, block, bracket, control, deliberate, die, disperse, enter,
fight, gather, hunt, move, negotiate, observe, other, proceed
smugglers vs. customs (49): attack, attempt, block, bracket, celebrate, control, die, fight, gather, give, move,
observe, other, proceed, resist, smuggle
other violent gatherings (1156): attack, attempt, block, bracket, control, decry, enter, fight, gather, give,
march, move, negotiate, observe, petition, proceed, resist
other unplanned gatherings (520): block, celebrate, cheer, control, decry, demonstrate, enter, gather,
march, move, negotiate, observe, other, proceed
•
* over-represented = 2+ times the proportion in all gatherings or (in the case of end and meet, which appear
in 73 and 54 percent of all gatherings respectively) 20%+ more than their general proportions
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
139
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
From Hector Forero’s Student Memorandum
140
Takeshi Wada
•
Wada (Wada 2003, 2004) drew accounts of protest events from the daily newspapers
Excélsior, Unomásuno, and La Jornada for 29-day periods spanning national elections
over the 37 years, a total of 13 electoral periods.
• From the newspapers he identified 2832 events, some linked together in campaigns, for a
total of 1797 campaigns.
• Wada’s subject-verb-object-claim transcriptions made it possible for him to employ
sophisticated network models of who made claims on whom. Overall, they reveal a sharp
politicization of Mexico’s collective claim making as the country’s partial democratization
proceeded. From claims on business, landowners, and universities, protesters moved to
making increasingly strong claims on the government itself.
• According to Wada’s analysis, the weakening of network ties among the elite
(especially as concentrated within the longtime ruling party PRI) provided an
opportunity for claimants to divide their rulers. It thus advanced the partial
democratization of the 1990s. Technically, Wada broke free of many restrictions
imposed by classified event counts. That technical freedom opened the way to a
sophisticated treatment of interaction in Mexican politics.
Source:
Wada, Takeshi (2003): “A Historical and Network Analysis of Popular Contention in the Age of
Globalization in Mexico,” unpublished doctoral dissertation in sociology, Columbia
University. (2004): “Event Analysis of Claim Making in Mexico: How Are Social Protests
Transformed into Political Protests,” Mobilization 9: 241-258.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
141
Lessons
The innovations of Tilly, McPhail, Tarrow, Franzosi, Beissinger,
Wada and others offer three lessons for analysts of
contentious politics:
• First, it is practically feasible to record and analyze the
internal dynamics of episodes instead of settling for classified
event counts.
• Second, the recording of particular verbs rather than general
characterization of the action is crucial for that practical
purpose.
• Third, verbs with objects make it possible to move from
individualistic analyses to treatments of connections among
contentious actors (relational).
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
142
Extra lecture:
What Happened in Oaxaca?
Triangulating Outside Witness Accounts
to Analyze the Contentious Politics
in Oaxaca, Mexico
Nayeli Chavez-Geller, UNIVISION
Rene Ramos, MPA Student SIPA Columbia
Ivania de la Cruz Orozco, MPA Student SIPA Columbia
Manuela Garza, The New School and Fundación Comunitaria Oaxaca
Ernesto Castañeda-Tinoco, PhD Student Department of Sociology, Columbia
Leslie A. Martino, PhD Student, Department of Sociology, CUNY, The Graduate Center
Thursday April 12th, 2007
.
Organized by
Mexican Initiative
Co-sponsored by the
Institute of Latin American Studies, LASA-SIPA, and ALAS-TC.
Brief overview on
Oaxaca

Completion rate of primary
education below 88%

Less than 87% of women assisted
by a doctor during labor

Infant mortality rate is above 30/1000 births

30% of the population lack access to running water

40% of the population live in houses with no sewage

7% of the population live in houses with no electricity

There have been no Governors from opposition parties thus far
Sources:
Los Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio en México: Informe de Avance 2006
Map: http://oaxaca-travel.com
INEGI
Chronology Oaxaca 2006
• May 22:
– Primary and Secondary school teachers from all over the state arrive to Oaxaca City
to ask for wage increases (as they often do year after year)
– State Governor offers only a third of what they ask for
– Teachers block the access to government buildings, stores, gas stations, airport and
main entrances to the city
• June 14:
– Governor withdraws offer and attempts to end the strike by using public force
– The attack fails and professors are joined by NGOs and other social actors
– Creation of the APPO
• July:
– PRI loses 9 out of 11 National Congress positions to the PRD
– Implications: budget negotiations and political control
• October 27:
– At least 3 people are killed during a shooting, including journalist Bradley Roland Will
• October 29-30:
– Federal Police enters Oaxaca City
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
What Happened in Oaxaca?
Triangulating Outside Witness Accounts to
Analyze the Contentious Politics in
Oaxaca, Mexico
Ernesto Castañeda
Before
Police Repression of June 14th
Mobilized Teachers Watching the World Cup
Photos by Ernesto Castañeda June 10-18th, 2006
Teachers in the Public Plaza
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
During Police Repression
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
152
Source: http://www.asambleapopulardeoaxaca.com/
Source: http://www.asambleapopulardeoaxaca.com/
After
Police Repression
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
Escalation of Demands and Polarization
Increase in political gratifies across the city
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
Social Situation in Oaxaca
• Important state/society divide.
• Previous patronage and corporative relations
disrupted.
• Generalized discontent among organized groups.
• Growing polarization between mobilized citizens,
and small business owners, tourism workers and
non-mobilized citizens.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
APPO’s Programmatic Goals
•
•
•
•
Scholarships,
Better school infrastructure,
Salary increases
The resignation of the governor Ulises Ruiz so, as in
the 18th century, the main target is not an abstract
state but a concrete figure who is supposed to hold
power (Tilly 2005, Foucault 1975).
APPO’s self-declared goals also include:
• a real democratic system, and
• ideological elements such as the struggle against
capitalism, imperialism and fascism.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
APPO Repertoire
•
•
•
•
•
Extended sit-ins and camping downtown.
Marches, demonstrations, and rallies.
Pamphlets, flyers, radio programs, CDs.
Members generally unarmed.
Few violent attacks against state agents except for
self-defense.
• No civilian targets.
• Have set fire to police vehicles and have entered
public and private buildings that represent state
power or large capital.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
Photos NYT.
Revolutionary Situation in Oaxaca?
1) contenders or coalitions of contenders advancing exclusive
competing claims to control of the state or some segment of it:
mobilization process.
–
YES (to an extent but later divisions would appear and most are for
conducting changes through conventional electoral politics)
2) commitment to those claims by a significant segment of the
citizenry: mobilization plus diffusion
–
YES within APPO but important opposition by other civil society groups
specially small businesses and tourism industry would appear
3) incapacity or unwillingness of rulers to suppress the
alternative coalition and/or commitment to its claims: rulersubject interaction
–
No. As of 2008 they have been able to placate the movement and the
Governor still holds his post.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
Revolutionary Outcomes
(Table 7-2 Tilly 2006. Regimes and Repertoires.)
1)
2)
3)
4)
defections of regime members
acquisition of armed force by revolutionary coalitions
neutralization or defection of the regime’s armed force
control of the state apparatus by members of
revolutionary coalition
5) transfer of state power to new ruling coalition.
So far for Oaxaca the answer to these questions is NO
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
Anti-APPO
mobilizations
Source: “El Imparcial”
References and sources:
•
•
•
•
Michel Foucault. Discipline & Punish. 1975.
Charles Tilly. 2004. Social Movements. Paradigm.
Charles Tilly. 2005. Popular Contention in Great Britain.
Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow. 2007. Contentious Politics.
Paradigm.
• Charles Tilly. 2006. Regimes and Repertoires. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
• Charles Tilly. 2007. Democracy. Cambridge.
•
•
•
•
•
http://web.media.mit.edu/~andresmh/oaxaca/
http://nyc.indymedia.org/en/bradleywill/archive.html
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G_JQfGfLEU8
http://www.narconews.com/otroperiodismo/oaxaca/en.html
http://zapagringo.blogspot.com/2006/10/q-with-appo-spokesperson.html
Local, National, and Transnational
Social Movements
April 16th, 2007
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
167
Local Movements Going National
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
168
Repertoire Diffusion
from Greensboro, NC to all the other Southern States
(TT 07) Figure 9.2: Sit-Ins in the American South, February 1 to April 14, 1960
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
Source: Andrews and Biggs 2005: Figure 2.
169
Figure 9.1 African-American Total Movement and Protest Events
700
Campaigns in Many States
Number of Events
600
March on Washington 1963
500
400
All Events
Protest Events
Greensboro 1960
300
200
Brown 1954
100
0
1946
1950
1954
1958
1962
1966
1970
1974
1978
1982
1986
1990
1994
Year
Source: Courtesy of J. Craig Jenkins. In TT 2007. Chapter 9.
170
Transnational Contention
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
171
Transnational Contention
a) objects of claims
- go beyond the nation-state, including:
transnational corporations, international
organizations such as the UN, WB, IMF, WTO,
etc. and sets of countries such as EU, NATO, G8,
etc.
b) claimants
– are not necessarily members of the state, are
part of multinational coalitions.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
172
Internationalization of claims
CLAIMANTS:
International
Internationalization
National
Regional
Local
Local
Regional
National
(Tilly
& Castañeda 2007)
OBJECTS OF CLAIMS
International
173
Transnational contention yesterday
• Religious mobilizations
e.g. Protestant Reformation, Zionism, Islamism.
• Formation of consolidated states, concentrated
claims at a higher level (national);
• Nevertheless, transnational action occurred:
antislavery and temperance movements, Irish
independence, anti-colonial mobilizations, world
socialist federations, etc.
• We’ve seen transnational targets and actors:
interstate wars, nationalist wars, Rwandan civil
war, Catholic visionaries, Soviet disintegration,
antiwar protests.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
174
Is something new happening?
Shift of reformist, emancipatory and revolutionary
hopes from national to international arenas:
Global civil society (subject) - Empire (object)
Is this Justified?
• Reasons for saying YES:
– INGO expansion, transnational networks, new
technologies, globalization.
• Reasons for saying NO:
– persistent importance of strong social ties and trust
networks for mobilization, local issues and persistence of
social movement repertoire.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
175
Yes Global Civil Society Events June-July 2003
(Tilly 2006 Table 8-1)
•
6/1-3
Evian, France: 150,000 protesters demonstrate against the G8 meeting.
•
6/7-10
Lisbon, Portugal: first Portuguese Social Forum
•
6/16
China: in response to international anti-dam campaign, government
admits that cracks have appeared in controversial Three Gorges Dam
•
6/16-29
Cartagena de Indias, Colombia: following up Third World Social Forum,
activists stage a forum on democracy, human rights, war, and drug trafficking
•
6/20-22
Thessaloniki, Greece: first Greek Social Forum, marking culmination of
protests during Greek presidency of the European Union
•
6/20-25
Sacramento, USA: activists demonstrate at World Trade Organization [WTO]
ministerial conference on agricultural science and technology.
•
6/21-23
Cairo, Egypt: international women’s and children’s rights groups hold a threeday conference on legal instruments for the prevention of female genital
mutilation.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
176
Global Civil Society Events June-July 2003
(Tilly 2006 Table 8-1)
•
6/26
Sharm al Shaikh, Egypt: WTO holds unofficial ministerial meeting, with NGO
representatives (Greenpeace among them) excluded from closed sessions
but present in public
•
6/29
Calcutta, India: first gay pride march in India
•
7/1
Hong Kong, China: 500,000 people march against new national security
legislation for the region
•
7/6
Reading, England: after worldwide controversy, canon Jeffery John, a gay
celibate priest, withdraws his nomination as Anglican Bishop of Reading; later
appointed Dean of Reading Cathedral
•
7/15
Damascus, Syria: following human rights and civil liberties campaign, Syrian
president pardons hundreds of prisoners and orders end of judicial pursuit for
head of Syrian Human Rights Organization.
•
7/16
Internet: site launched for World Campaign for In-depth Reform of the
System of International Institutions.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
177
Global Civil Society Events 2003
•
7/18
São Paulo, Brazil: judge suspends eviction of 4,000 members of
Workers Without a Roof, who are squat-ting on a plot owned by
Volkswagen
•
7/21-24
Tegucigalpa, Honduras: fourth Foro Mesoamericano meets,
campaigning against Free Trade Area of Americas and neo-liberalism
•
7/23
Colombia: trade union members call for worldwide boycott of Coca-Cola,
alleged to have employed militias for the murder of union members
•
7/23
Juarez, Mexico: Mexican and international NGOs plus UN observers meet
with government officials to demand end of violence including murders of
women and children in Juarez.
•
7/28-30
Montréal, Canada: during a WTO pre-meeting, hundreds of protesters
demonstrate, some smashing storefront windows of multinational brands
(Tilly 2006; summarized from Anheier, Glasius, Kaldor & Holland 2005: 354-355).
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
178
Migrant Transnational Communities
Based on fieldwork, photos, and
working papers by Ernesto Castañeda
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
179
Theoretical Framework
Transnational practices link migrants with both the sending
country and the receiving country, thus spanning national
borders (R.C. Smith 1998, 2005; Levitt 2001; Massey et al
1987; Glick-Schiller et al. 1992; Goldring 1996)
•
•
•
•
Transnational practices include:
Physical the movements of people
Transfers of goods and money (remittances)
Exchanges of ideas, information and cultural values
Peggy Levitt (2001) calls social remittances, to the set of
habits, values, created needs and expectations brought
home from another country.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
180
New York-Guerrero
Transnational
Networks
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
181
Transnational Household Economies
• By transnational household we mean nuclear or extended
families divided in two countries where their shared combined
income is used to support the life of a family (Smith, Castañeda,
Martino et al. 2004).
• The concept of transnational household economies captures
both the economic and familial dimensions of social life and
everyday practices
• Transnational Household Economies also raise the issues of the
division of labor across countries. E.g. child bearing and
nurturing in Mexico, working cycle in the US, retiring in Mexico.
• “Tele-parenting” and creating distorted population
demographics.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
182
Communication and Technology
• Communication with families
- telephone in home
- telephone at community telephone stations
- via messages from the indigenous radio station
• Videos from community celebrations (Levitt 2001, Smith 1993,
2005).
• Computer technology capacity in Mexico
- limited number of Internet cafes in rural areas,
- e-Mexico (government run computer rooms)
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
183
Transmigration as a rare and temporal
phenomenon
•
•
•
•
Not a new phenomenon
Circular migration
Not all migration is transnational
Household transnational practices may be
temporary
• The state matters
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
184
Further Research Questions
• Do these flows and practices show the existence
of a transnational community?
• What are the economic and social prospects for
these communities?
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
185
Migration, Remittances and their
Different Social Meanings
Thursday May 17th, 2007
411 Fayerweather Hall
11:00 am to 4:00 p.m.
-Kai Ho, Remittances and Rural-Urban Migration in Contemporary China, 1989 to 2004
-Jesus Fernandez-Huertas Moraga, New Evidence on Emigrant Selection
-Randa Serhan, Building Uninhabited Villas: Resisting Occupation Through Construction in the
West Bank
-Ernesto Castaneda-Tinoco, Migration, Remittances, and Their Missing Link to Development
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
186
New Transnational
Social Movements?
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
187
Are there appearing new transnational
protest repertoires?
Relation between regimes and repertoires
– little change of the repertoire has occurred as
social movements have become increasingly
transnational in scope (Tilly, Regimes and
Repertoires, 198).
– And in that sense subjects are targeting the
same type of objects.
– Nonetheless, Donatella de la Porta claims that
new repertoires are appearing e.g. social fora.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
188
International-NGOs World Capitals
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Brussels (1392)
London (807)
Paris (729)
Washington (487)
New York (390)
Geneva (272)
Rome (228)
Vienna (190)
Tokyo (174)
Amsterdam (162)
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
Madrid (140)
Stockholm (133)
Buenos Aires (110)
Copenhagen (108)
Berlin (101)
Nairobi (100)
Oslo (95)
Mexico City (87)
Montréal (86)
Milan (82)
(List as of 2001)
Source: Tilly R&C 2006:200 taken
from Glasius, Kaldor & Anheier
189
2002: 6.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
Warnings
• Avoid technological determinism;
– recognize that most new features of social movements result from alterations in
their social and political contexts rather than from technical innovations as
such.
• Notice that communications innovations always operate in a two-sided
way:
– on one side, lowering the costs of coordination among activists who are
already connected with each other;
– on the other, excluding even more definitively those who lack access to the
new communications means, and thus increasing communications inequality.
And they also allowing larger state coordination and possibilities for repression.
• Remember that most social movement activity continues to rely on the
local, regional, and national forms of organization
• Avoid the supposition that globalization and anti-globalization movements
now dominates the social movement scene
Despite internationalization, local, regional, and national issues in social
movements persist.
(Adapted from Tilly, Social Movements:98).
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
190
Other References:
Tilly, Charles. 2006. Regimes and Repertoires. Chicago,
IL: University of Chicago Press.
Tarrow,Sidney. 2005. The New Transnational Activism.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tarrow, Sidney and Donatella della Porta, eds. 2005.
Transnational Protest and Global Activism.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly.
2001.Dynamics of Contention. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Fisher, Dana. 2006. Activism Inc. How the Outsourcing of
Grassroots Campaigns Is Strangling Progressive
Politics in America. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
191
Possible Trade-Offs
(depending on the case)
• Professionalization
• Institutionalization
• Lack of Accountability
• WUNC
• Grassroots
• Democratization
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
192
Globalization and Contention
April 18th, 2007
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
193
Globalization
high
impact of average
intercontinental
transaction/
equal
impact of average
local or regional
transaction
GLOBALIZATION
low
low
high
proportion of all transactions intercontinental
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
194
Globalization & De-Globalization
• Globalization occurs when a distinctive set of social
connections and practices expands from a regional to a
transcontinental scale.
• Globalization as a proxy for long distance transactions.
• Transactions e.g. telephone calls, travel, transfers of
funds, communications, trade, coordination of collective
action, etc.
• But if the relative size and impact of local or regional
transactions actually increases faster than the
proportion of all transactions passing between
continents, de-globalization occurs.
• Globalization is a two-way process, not an unstoppable
force.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
195
Waves of Globalization
(after 1500)
I. 1500-1650.
– Growth of European influence in the old world, Africa, the Pacific,
and the recently-discovered Americas.
– Growth of the Ottoman Empire.
– Parallel expansions of Chinese and Arab merchants networks
into the Indian Ocean and Pacific.
– In the 17th century large amounts of silver mined in South
America were ending up in Chinese treasuries, drawn by the
export of precious Chinese commodities to the West.
II. 1850-1914.
- Spread of railroads, steamships, telephone, and telegraph.
- Unprecedented levels of trans-continental trade and investment
that increased global disparities.
III. Post-1945 - ?
– Lost of state capacity to control transnational flows such as:
capital, goods, labor, contraband, arms, etc.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
196
Influenza across the World
• In 1918 influenza (called the Spanish flu) caused
40 million deaths, as compared with 10 million in
combats of World War I. The spread of the disease
was aided by military personal mobilizations in
World War I.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
197
International Migration
• People coming out of Africa 40,000+ years ago.
• 1500-1650.
– Large intercontinental migrations out of China, Europe,
and the Middle East, slave trade.
• 1850-1914.
– 3 million Indians,
– 9 million Japanese,
– 10 million Russians,
– 20 million Chinese, and
– 33 million Europeans
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
198
Wave Turners
•
•
•
•
•
Wars e.g. World War I, World War II, “war on terror”?
Great depression of 1929.
Keynesian revolution.
Social Democracy.
1850-WWI, states regularized national passports and their firm
attachment of citizens to particular states (Torpey 2000).
– In the process working agreements emerged among
governments, capital, and organized labor at the national
scale.
– Those bargains eventually turned states from free trade
toward protection of industries that combined large labor
forces with extensive fixed capital e.g. chemicals, steel, and
metal-processing industries.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
199
The Washington Consensus
During the 1980s and 1990s, major capitalist powers including the United
States generally agreed on a set of reforms for developing economies that
people called the “Washington Consensus.” It included these elements:
• Fiscal discipline
• Redirection of public expenditure toward education, health, and
infrastructure investment
• Broadening the tax base and cutting marginal tax rates
• Market determined, positive, and moderate interest rates
• Competitive exchange rates for national currencies
• Trade liberalization, which involved replacement of protective tariffs by
low, uniform tariffs
• Openings to foreign direct investment
• Privatization of state enterprises
• Abolition of regulations impeding entry into national markets, restricting
competition within them – with exceptions for protection of personal safety,
the environment, consumers, and financial institutions
• Legal security for property rights
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
200
The World Bank Changes Focus
The World Bank, a powerful worldwide financial institution based in Washington D.C., issues an annual
report on the world economy, with special emphasis on prospects for economic development. The Bank
began organizing its annual report thematically in 1991. Titles of reports from 1991 to 2005 give an idea of
the great lender’s changing preoccupations:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
1991:
1992:
1993:
1994:
1995:
1996:
1997:
1998:
1999:
2000/2001:
2002:
2003:
2004:
2005:
The Challenge of Development
Development and the Environment
Investing in Health
Infrastructure for Development
Workers in an Integrating World
From Plan to Market
The State in a Changing World
Knowledge for Development
Entering the 21st Century
Attacking Poverty
Building Institutions for Markets
Sustainable Development in a Dynamic World
Making Services Work for Poor People
A Better Investment Climate for Everyone
During the early years, annual reports centered on capital investment and return, with special attention to
poor countries and post-socialist regimes. They moved dramatically away from the assumption that
integration into world markets would more or less automatically promote capitalism and development toward
the view that market capitalism required extensive institutional underpinnings, including property rights and
the rule of law. The most recent two years show a further shift toward concern about poverty and equal
opportunity.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
201
Globalization Processes
Monday April 23rd, 2007
Tilly and Castañeda
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
202
A Good Provider Is One Who Leaves
“On June 25, 1980 (a date he would remember), a good-natured Filipino poolmaintenance man gathered his wife and five children for an upsetting ride to the
Manila airport. At 36, Emmet Comodas had lived a hard life without growing
hardened, which was a mixed blessing given the indignities of his poverty.
Orphaned at 8, raised on the Manila streets where he hawked cigarettes, he
had hustled a job at a government sports complex and held it for nearly two
decades. On the spectrum of Filipino poverty, that alone marked him as a man
of modest fortune. But a monthly salary of $50 did not keep his family fed.” So
he migrated to Saudi Arabia (…)
“Two years later, on Aug. 2, 1982 (another date he would remember), Emmet
walked off the returning flight with chocolate for the kids, earrings for Tita and a
bag of duty-free cigarettes, his loneliness abroad having made him a chain
smoker. His 2-year-old son, Boyet, considered him a stranger and cried at his
touch, though as Emmet later said, “I was too happy to be sad.” He gave himself
a party, replaced the shanty’s rotted walls and put on a new roof. Then after
three months at home, he left for Saudi Arabia again. And again. And again and
again: by the time Emmet ended the cycle and came home for good, he had
been gone for nearly two decades. Boyet was grown (DeParle 2007).”
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
203
A Good Provider…
“Deprived of their father while sustained by his wages, the Comodas children
spent their early lives studying Emmet’s example. Now they have copied it. All
five of them, including Rowena, grew up to become overseas workers. Four are
still working abroad. And the middle child, Rosalie — a nurse in Abu Dhabi —
faces a parallel to her father’s life that she finds all too exact. She has an 18month-old back in the Philippines who views her as a stranger and resists her
touch. What started as Emmet’s act of desperation has become his children’s
way of life: leaving in order to live.”
This quotes show the family aspects behind migration, and remittances.
[Having recently gotten out of the hospital Chuck came to class and read part of
this article the day after it was published in the Sunday NYT Magazine.]
Source: De Parle, Jason. 2007. “A Good Provider Is One Who Leaves.” New York
Times. April 22, 2007. Full text free at:
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D04E7D6113FF931A15757C0
A9619C8B63&sec=&spon=&partner=permalink&exprod=permalink
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
204
Technological Determinism in Explaining Globalization
(Proposed by technology enthusiasts such as Howard Rheingold)
1833
introduction of the telegraph
1876
introduction of the telephone
1895
Marconi’s demonstration of radio
1920s
experimental television
1966
initiation of satellite communication
1977
first mobile telecommunications system (Saudi Arabia)
1978
first computer modem
1989
initial plan for World Wide Web
1995
public internet established in US
1996
Wireless Application Protocol
(adapted from UNDP 2001: 33)
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
205
Country
Internet Connections
per 1,000 people 2003
New Zealand
788
Iceland
772
Sweden
756
Malta
750
Denmark
696
Korea, Rep. of
657
Australia
646
United States
630
Finland
629
United Kingdom
628
Canada
626
Netherlands
614
Source UNDP http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/statistics/indicators/124.html
206
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
Mediated Mediation
• “Most friends and relatives with whom we maintain socially
close ties are not physically close. These ties are spread
through metropolitan areas, and often on the other side of
countries or seas. Mail, the telephone, cars, airplanes, and
now email and the Internet sustain these ties. Most people
do not live lives bound in one community. Instead, they
maneuver through multiple specialized partial communities,
giving limited commitment to each. Their life is “glocalized”:
combining long-distance ties with continuing involvements
in households, neighborhoods, and worksites”
(Haythornthwaite & Wellman 2002: 32 in Tilly 2004:93).
• Integration of communications innovations into existing
social relations and practices extends projects that people
already have under way
• The use of technology, media and communications is
mediated by social relations.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
207
Commercial, Social and Political Circuits
Circuits have:
1) a well-defined boundary with some control over
transactions crossing the boundary,
2) a distinctive set of economic transactions,
3) distinctive media (reckoning systems and tokens of
value) employed in the pursuit of those
transactions, and
4) meaningful ties among participants
Circuits create an institutional structure that
reinforces credit, trust, and reciprocity within its
perimeter, but organizes exclusion and inequality in
relation to outsiders.
(Zelizer 2004 in Nee & Swedberg, eds. The Economic
Sociology of Capitalism).
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
208
Top Down Globalization
Multinational corporations, International Financial
Institutions (loans and conditionality packages),
inter-government agreements (GATT-WTO), W.C.,
global media, copyright, internet protocols, and
portals
INGO’s, organized crime
and terrorist networks
Bottom Up Globalization
Migration flows, world music, environmental and
social movements, open source media, wikis, enduser media, alternative media, civil society
cooperation across borders, international education
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
209
Tilly’s Predictions
• Since top-down, bottom-up, and intermediate changes all increase
connectedness among sites that share interests and, on the average, reduce the cost
of communication, we might expect an increase in the frequency of campaigns
involving similar or identical targets simultaneously at many different sites.
• As for repertoires, we might expect decreasing reliance on expressions of
program, identity, and standing claims that require the physical co-presence of all
participants in favor of locally clustered performances connected by long, thin strands
of communication. At the extreme, that trend would yield virtual performances
requiring no physical co-presence whatsoever.
• When it comes to WUNC displays, we might expect an interesting bifurcation: on
one side, ways of signaling WUNC to the world; and on the other side,
increasingly localized WUNC codes for their local environments. E.g. Indonesian
demonstrators wearing locally intelligible headbands but holding English-language
signs up to television cameras illustrate the bifurcation.
• internationally-oriented performances combine codes linking participants closely
to their own localities and groups with other WUNC codes of worldwide currency
such as peace signs and chanting in unison.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
210
Important distinctions
•
•
•
•
Globalization as discourse vs. phenomena
Anti-globalization as discourse and as action
Global causes from global action
Responses to structural adjustment vs.
group claims and rights based claims
Source: Tilly, Charles. 2004. Social Movements 1768-2004.
Chapter 5. Boulder: CO. Paradigm Publishers.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
211
the present and future of contentious
politics
Charles Tilly
April 25th, 2007
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
212
References
Goodin, Robert E. and Charles Tilly. 2006. The Oxford handbook of contextual political analysis. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
McAdam, Doug, Sidney G. Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. 2001. Dynamics of contention. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Tilly, Charles. 1998. Durable inequality. Berkeley: University of California Press.
—. 2002. Stories, identities, and political change. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
—. 2003. Contention and democracy in Europe, 1650-2000. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
—. 2003. The politics of collective violence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
—. 2004. Social movements, 1768-2004. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.
—. 2005. Identities, boundaries, and social ties. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.
—. 2005. Popular contention in Great Britain, 1758-1834. Boulder ,CO: Paradigm Publishers.
—. 2005. Trust and rule. New York: Cambridge University Press.
—. 2006. Regimes and repertoires. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
—. 2006. Why? Princeton: Princeton University Press.
—. 2007. Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
—. 2008. Contentious performances. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
—. 2008. Credit and blame. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
—. 2008. Explaining social processes. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.
Tilly, Charles and Sidney Tarrow. 2007. Contentious politics. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
213
More on Professor Charles “Chuck” Tilly
Books
http://web.gc.cuny.edu/dept/bildn/courses/tillybooks.shtml
Bio
http://web.gc.cuny.edu/dept/bildn/courses/tillybio.shtml
Conference in Honor of Tilly
http://www.ssrc.org/hirschman/event/2008/agenda
Castañeda on Tilly
http://ernestoetc.blogspot.com/search/label/Charles%20Tilly
More material at Davenport’s in Memoriam
http://www.cdavenport.com/
(Tilly & Castañeda 2007)
214