ECONOMIC CONVERGENCE AND A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT Macro-economic Convergence in Cyprus By Dr. Mustafa Besim Member of the Economic Committee in the Cyprus Talks 6 February 2007 LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS Objective & Scope of the Presentation • Focus will be on the macro-economic convergence and its contribution to a settlement • The scope will cover: – Convergence and its link to settlement – Recent history on the economies (up to 2000) : Convergence or Divergence ? – Contribution of Economics to the Referenda – Integration and convergence – Does convergence contribute to a settlement? 2 Convergence Concept for Settlement • Convergence: – of incomes of citizens within an economy and with other economies; – of institutions, sectors ( interdependence), macroprudential indicators and market structures; – criterions of EU for those members recently acceded to EU ( i.e. inflation, interest, budget deficit) • The model for convergence for Cyprus: – importance of economic integration within the island – Model that would improve economic interractions 3 Economic History of Cyprus • (1960)- Republic of Cyprus : A Power sharing partnership between two ethnic communities, Greek Cypriots (G/C) and Turkish Cypriots (T/C) – Rapid growth mainly in the agricultural economy, export oriented • (1963)- Inter-communal conflict led to collapse of the partnership. T/C set up a separate administration – Income gap started to widen as T/C did not have much access to be active in economics as the G/C • (1974)- Up to 1974 there was one economy: – GDP : $ 600 M with per capita income close to $1,000 for G/C and – Among T / C per capita income was $500 • Following a G/C coup d’etat with backing from Military junta in Greece, Turkey militarily intervened and divided the island into two: G/C in South and T/C in the North 4 South Cyprus Economy • Moved from agriculture-based towards service-oriented structure; tourism, shipping and financial activities including “off-shore” sector. • Low interest and inflation rates. Highly developed financial sector with a credible exchange regime from fixed to a currency basket and now towards EURO. • A flexible labour market; shortages and wage pressures overcomed by seasonal immigrants. • As the EU membership approached the liberalization process speeded up, transforming the economy into a modern, market-based and liberal economy. 5 Growth Rate in South Cyprus (2) Growth Rate (%) 20 15 10 5 0 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 Years •Stable growth with close to 5% between 1977-2000 •Main source of growth have been tourism, construction, business and financial services •The challenge ahead: Sustainability of the growth and the macroeconomic stability: control of the budget deficit....stability and growth pact and adoption of Euro. 6 North Cyprus Economy (1) • After 1974, Northern Cyprus did not fulfil its potentials: – External factors: non-recognition, economic isolation, trade mainly with Turkey. – Decision of the European Court of Justice limited the trade of agriculture products (citrus, potatoes) (Certificate of origin). – No trade integration, economy was not liberalised and market conditions were very much distorted – Depended on the aid from Turkey, which was in fact helping to enlarge the public sector. – Admistration did not push for a proper institutional settings for the private sector and governance – Market based but economy has been relying on public sector; public has been the producer as well as the employer, crowding out private sector. – Poor political will to have a private sector driven economy 7 North Cyprus Economy (2) • Private and public (infrastructure) investments were not sufficient....uncertainty, weak banking sector • Using TL = High and unstable inflation and interest rates Inflation Rate in North Cyprus 100 Inflation rate (%) 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 Inflation Rate (% Change in CPI) in North 20 10 0 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 Years 8 Growth Rates in North Cyprus (3) 20 Growth rate (%) 15 10 5 0 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 -5 -10 Years Most shocks originating from Turkish economy After the crises between 1999-2001 and the stabilization of TL, the growth started to pick-up as high as 10%s Export oriented services: tourism, universities and construction turned out to be major sources of income 9 Meanwhile: Economic relations between T/C and G/C..... Inter-communal conflicts in 1963 have worsen the economic conditions for T/C By the time of de facto division (1974) per capita GDP in the North was about half that in the South. For almost 30 years, Green-Line stood as the internal border with no traffic and/or trade at all High volume of smuggling through certain channels: Mainly through Pile and Sovereign Base Area of Britain Commuting workers with permission T/C have been very depended on trade with Turkey, whereas G/C have been trading with the world 10 Diverging Economies ! 1995 GNP T/C (Cyp M) 367 GDP G/C (Cyp M) 4,089 GNP T/C Per Capita 2,027 GDP G/C Per Capita 6,283 TC / GC per Capita Income 32 % No freedom of movement. No grounds for economic 2000 interaction. Two diverged economy. 659 North not converging to South and to EU. South converging to EU. 5,407 No convergence of institutional and market 2,650 structures between North and South. Economics did not have incentives for supporting a 7,791 political solution. Diverged economies stoned separation 34% 11 New Economic Environment for Cyprus • November 2002, UN proposal for a Comprehensive settlement (Annan Plan) • Rallies led to opening of the gates (23 April 2003) • T/C demonstrated explicitly their will for a united Cyprus in EU • Free movement of people have allowed considerable amount of economic interaction even without any institutional setup – Retailing – Services (Tourism, casino, hospitals) – Labour (commuting workers) 12 Economics Did not Contribute to Referenda • UN Plan (1.Versin November 2002) did not pay enough attention to economics..(2003 wasted) ....but by 2004 with revised versions more economics were included. • Four sub-economic committees prepared tremendous work and had most of what needed to run a Federal State. • Since there was no work or proper studies done at all before the UN talks, and no interaction between economies, it was very difficult to observe the cost but more importantly the benefits of a settlement. 13 Economics and the Referenda...... • Economics uncertainties and risks, such as: – “who will pay the bill?” for a united Cyprus (Territorial adjustments, fiscal federalism) – How would businesses be affected from such a settlement? (Competitiveness of the tourism and other industries) – The income gap myth! • From the economic perspective only the cost and risks of unification were challenged not benefits at all 14 After the Referenda: Non-recognized State with a Legal Status • • • • UN plan did not enter into force due to the Greek Cypriots solid ‘NO’ vote in their referendum Protocol 10 is suspended the application of EU acquis, in North However, Article 3 provides that “nothing in this Protocol shall preclude measures with a view to promoting the economic development of the North Cyprus Legal statues of the Turkish Cypriots are defined as the areas where the “Government of ROC” does not exercise effective control EU Council on 26 April 2004 invited Commission to bring forward proposals: Green Line Regulation: Intra-trade (In action since August 2004) Financial support Regulation (In action recently) Direct Trade Regulation enabling the North to trade directly with the EU countries. Important challenge for business people as well as public to succeed institutional convergence. (Not in action yet) 15 Integration Triggered the Growth o Even though technical, legal problems still exists, green line regulation is in action and contributing a lot especially to the North economy • A very first step towards a modest economic integration between non-recognised entity and EU. • The Annan Plan process, opening of the North to the world, even with modest integration has reflected significantly to the economics Real GDP Growth Rates in N/C and S/C 2001 South North 4.1 5.4 2002 2.1 6.9 2003 1.9 11.4 2004 3.8 15.4 2005 3.9 10.6 2006* 4.0 7.0 16 Economic sizes (1991-2000) Economic Sizes (1980-1990) 8.8% 8.9% 91.1% 91.2% Economic Sizes (2005) 12.1% 87.9% No indication of change in the share of economic activities relative to whole economic size of the island from 1980 to 2000 > North’s economic size have shown tremendous increase recording a 12.5% of whole island 17 Converging Economies 1995 2002 2005 GNP T/C (M $ ) 756 941 2,328 GNP G/C ( M $) 8,234 10,568 16,958 GNP T/C Per Capita 4,167 4,409 10,567 GNP G/C Per Capita 12,653 14,913 21,571 T/C / GC per Capita Income 32 % 30% 49% - The substantial increase in the income of the North reduced the gap tremendously Integration has helped not only incomes to converge but to an extend to retail prices as well. Some convergence of institutional and market structures between North and South (Göçekuş, 2006) Economics do have incentives for supporting a political solution. With a more converged incomes shed some light to a settlement. 18 Steep Convergence 6060 Percentage (%) Percentage (%) 5050 4040 3030 4949 Ratio of TC’s per capita income / GC’s per capita income 3030 5151 3838 3232 2020 1010 00 2002 2002 2003 2003 2004 2004 2005 2005 2006 2006 Years Years Note: World Bank reports suggest that the living standards in North is as much as three quarters of the South 19 Economic Convergence and Prospects for a Settlement • Economics is not everything for a settlement but converging economies provides fertile grounds for political dynamics • The convergence have speeded and the income gap has been shrinking fast • More focus should be on the economic incentives and opportunities that may be created with a settlement. (i.e. tourism, higher education and other business services) • Willingness for a settlement is positively correlated with more economic incentives and opportunities • This can be eliminating many of the pessimisms that 20 individuals had about the economics of unification The Way Ahead: Challenges and Opportunities (1) Policies and measures that would increase the integration process to push for steeper convergence (institutions, markets and income): • Labour market is already converging, some frameworks have to be coordinated with South for different types of benefits and regulations. (Role of trade unions) • Revised GL regulation to allow more flow of goods and services • Financial aid; (help adapt acquis, improve infrastructure) • Direct trade; (for converging institutions and markets) Economic reform agenda should be to enhance the constituencies for unification North will have to speed up with adopting the acquis communautaire,. This will help North to better convergence institutionally as well as for market structure. Shadowing the acquis also helps for coordinating reforms. 21 The Way Ahead: Challenges and Opportunities (2) Eliminating the income gap between the G/C and T/C faster contribute to the solution process of the Cyprus issue better. BUT ! Economic convergence can only contribute to a settlement if there is more integration with the Southern economy and EU. If the present status continues and there is no better economic integration with South Cyprus and only per capita convergence is realized to an extend, then this will only be an “Artificial convergence” and will not contribute to a settlement at all. === divergence Support to UN initiative ( Gambari’s process) to establish bicommunal technical communities to look into key and operational issues (criminal, legal as well as economics) that may reinforce economic integration 22 Thank you … 23