The U.S. Electoral College
N. R. Miller
POLI 423
How the EC Works in Practice
• Instead of electing a President (and Vice President) in a single
national election on Presidential election day,
– we have 51 separate state (+ DC) elections,
• in which voters (reasonably enough but incorrectly) think they are voting
directly for a Presidential/Vice Presidential ticket.
– the plurality winner in each state (except ME and NE) wins all of
the state’s electoral votes (“winner-take-all”)
• which are equal in number to the state’s total representation in Congress,
– i.e., its House seats + 2
– plus DC has 3 electoral votes, so
– total EV = 538, and
– these electoral votes are added up to determine the winner of the
election,
• with 270 required for election.
• Thus in practice (about 95% of the time), the EC is merely a vote
counting system that
– takes the popular votes in each state,
– automatically translates them into nationwide electoral votes, and
– declares a winner.
Implication of the EC in Practice:
“Battleground”/“Swing” States
• The principal implication of the EC in practice is that it creates
battleground (or swing) states, because
– it matters only which party ticket carries a state,
– and not what the margin of victory or defeat is.
• cf. marginal constituencies in the UK.
• Hence states that are expected to be close become “battlegrounds”
while other are substantially ignored.
– Today (frequent and relatively accurate) state polls make it easier to
identify battleground states.
• Until a decade or two ago, there were relatively few state (as opposed to
national) polls.
• Contemporary campaign resources (especially TV on local channels
and cable services) ads can be both
• focused on particular states, and
• can moved from one state to another,
– in contrast to
• party organization rooted in states and localities in the 19th century, and
• national TV advertising (mid- to later-20th century).
More Esoteric EC Details
• Lurking beneath electoral votes are real people called Presidential
electors,
– who voters actually vote for on Presidential election day,
– who are actually elected on Presidential election day, and
– who actually cast the electoral votes (about six weeks later).
• Underlying the “winner-take-all” system is the fact that (in almost
universal practice) Presidential electors are elected not individually
but on statewide party slates (“general ticket system”).
• The Constitution gives state legislature the power to determine how
their state’s electors are elected (or appointed).
• A variety of methods other than winner-take-all for selecting
Presidential electors have been used by some states in the past,
which could often produce split electoral votes from a state.
• Indeed, at the present time, ME (since 1972) and NE (since 1992)
do not award electoral votes on a winner-take-all basis,
– but rather on the basis of the Modified District Plan,
– so their electoral votes may be split (though in fact this never happened
until 2008 in NE).
Esoteric Details (cont.)
• Party nominees may occasionally be deprived of electoral votes by
“faithless electors,”
– who cast electoral votes in a way that contradicts their “pledge” to support their
party ticket, and
– in a way that does not reflect popular vote in the state
– and produces a split electoral vote from a state.
• If no candidate wins 270 electoral votes, either because
– a third candidate wins some electoral votes or
– there is a (mathematically possible) 269-269 tie,
the election is “thrown into the House of Representatives” (which
last happened in 1824),
– where voting by state delegation (one delegation — one vote).
• A number of elections have other displayed electoral vote oddities -- for example
– President Truman received no votes in AL in 1948,
– President Johnson received no votes in AL in 1964,
• because no elector candidates pledged to these Presidents were on the ballot.
– “unpledged electors” were elected in AL and MS in 1960.
• Even presumptive experts (e.g., textbook authors) often
mischaracterize esoteric features of the Electoral College.
– Adkinson and Elliot, “The Electoral College: A Misunderstood Institution,” PS,
March 1997
Evaluating the Electoral College
• Alexander Hamilton, Federalist 68:
– The mode of appointment of the Chief Magistrate of the United States is
almost the only part of the system, of any consequence, which has
escaped without severe censure, or which has received the slightest
mark of approbation from its opponents. . . . I venture somewhat
further, and hesitate not to affirm that if the manner of it be not perfect, it
is at least excellent.
– Actually there were some Antifederalist criticisms of “the mode of
appointment of the Chief Magistrate,” but they were not among the
leading arguments against the proposed Constitution.
• Many subsequent evaluations (and the many proposed
constitutional amendments) suggest a less favorable
assessment of the “mode of appointment of the Chief
Magistrate,”
• Range of evaluations: the Electoral College was
–
–
–
–
part of a generally elitist and anti-democratic constitution; or
a last-minute jerry-built compromise; or perhaps
a well designed compromise among diverse considerations, or possibly
the embodiment of well-thought-out selection criteria.
Evaluating the Electoral College (cont.)
• Today, as a rough generalization,
– “liberals” mostly criticize the Electoral College and
advocate its replacement by a national popular vote,
e.g.,
• George Edwards, Why the Electoral College is Bad for
America, and
• Neal R. Peirce, The People’s President,
– while “conservatives” mostly oppose a national
popular vote and defend the existing Electoral
College, e.g.,
• Judith Best, assigned reading on webpage and The Case
Against Direct Election of the President, and
• Tara Ross, Enlightened Democracy: The Case for the
Electoral College (with an Introduction by George Will).
Evaluating the Electoral College (cont.)
• However, in the mid-20th century “liberals” mostly
defended the existing Electoral College system, which
they viewed as having features that
– enhanced the voting power of major constituencies of the New
Deal, in particular,
• urban dwellers,
• racial and ethnic minorities, and
• union members,
– and which counterbalanced the rural and conservative
advantage
• in the malapportioned House of the that era, and
• In the malapportioned Senate of every era.
• In that era, proposals to modify (but not abolish) the
Electoral College (the Modified District and Proportional
Plans) were supported mostly by conservatives.)
Evaluating the Electoral College (cont.)
• My own take on the Electoral College (“Why the Electoral
College Is Good for Political Science”):
– The original EC was a compromise among diverse considerations
that was cleverly designed but had a fatal flaw that had to be (and
was) corrected by the 12th Amendment to the Constitution in 1804.
– The original EC established a selection system
• that was designed to operate in a non-partisan environment, but
• did not operate satisfactorily once political parties formed to contest
Presidential selection.
– The EC was rapidly transformed into an institution quite different
from its designers had intended.
• So, even if you like the existing EC, you can’t really give credit to “the
wisdom of the framers [of the Constitution].”
• Likewise, even if you dislike the existing EC, you can’t really blame the
framers.
– The transformed EC has proved to be a serviceable institution but
is problematic in a number of ways.
“Why the Electoral College is Good for
Political Science”
• Moreover, the Electoral College is a terrific boon for
political science research and teaching -- hence, my title
(a play on the title of the Edwards book).
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
the origins of the Electoral College and applied social theory;
unanticipated consequences in institutional design;
political strategy and institutional equilibrium;
voting power in weighted voting systems;
comparative institutional analysis;
individual voting power and the Electoral College;
election inversions;
Electoral College deadlock;
circumventing formal structure through commitment.
“Problems” with the EC in Practice
• It typically produces a disparity between popular and electoral vote
proportions, which
– almost always exaggerates the winner’s margin, for example
Popular Vote Electoral Vote
2008
Obama
53%
365
McCain
46%
173
– But is this really a problem?
“Problems” with the EC in Practice (cont.)
• It “disenfranchises” voters in non-battleground states.
– On the other hand, are all voters “disenfranchised” in landslide
elections?
• It produces a small state advantage resulting from the
apportionment of electoral votes.
– Regardless of population, every state
• has two Senators, and
• at least one House seat, and therefore
• has at least three electoral votes.
• It produces a large state advantage resulting from the
winner-take-all system (not fixed by the Constitution) in
casting electoral votes.
– But can both of the problems be true?
“Problems” with the EC in Practice (cont.)
• An creates an incentive for disputes or fraud concerning vote
counting in pivotal states,
• e.g., Florida in 2000.
– But with a close national popular vote, any such dispute would be
nationwide.
• It tolerates an absence of national standards for
•
•
•
•
voter qualifications,
voter registration,
voting technology,
ballot access, etc.
– But imposing national standards might be controversial.
• It is subject to spoiler effects, so that
– the presence or absence of a third candidate who cannot win the
election may tip the outcome between the two major candidates,
• e.g., Nader (and possibly Buchanan) in 2000.
– But in fact, every electoral system whatsoever is vulnerable in some
degree to spoiler effects.
“Problems” with the EC in Practice (cont.)
• It can produces “minority” Presidents,
– who win less than a majority of the popular vote, but
– are elected on the basis winning a majority (270+) of electoral
votes, e.g.,
–
–
–
–
–
–
Bush in 2000,
Clinton in both 1996 and 1992,
Nixon in 1968,
Kennedy in 1960,
Truman in 1948,
Wilson in both 1916 and 1912.
– But many electoral systems do the equivalent.
• The British refer to such an effect as a manufactured majority.
• Every British election since WWII has produced a manufactured
majority except the two (February 1974 and May 2010) that did not
produce any majority (that produced a “hung Parliament”), i.e.,
– in which the leading party held fewer than half the seats in House of
Commons.
“Problems” with the EC in Practice (cont.)
• Most important, it produces election inversions (or
“reversals of winners,” “wrong winners,” “EC misfires,”
etc.) in which
– a candidate who wins less than a plurality of the popular vote
– is elected on the basis of electoral votes.
2000:
1888:
1876:
1960(?):
Bush (R)
Gore (D)
Harrison (R)
Cleveland (D)
Hayes (R)
Tilden (D)
Kennedy (D)
Nixon (R)
Popular Vote
47.87%
48.38%
47.80%
48.63%
51%
48%
49.464%(?)
49.548%(?)
Electoral Vote
271
267
233
168
185
184
303
219
“Problems” with the EC in Practice (cont.)
• The election inversion problem is usually regarded as
the most serious flaw in the Electoral College.
– In fact, every districted electoral system is subject to election
inversions.
– Election inversions occur in parliamentary systems as well as
U.S. Presidential elections (but get less attention).
UK 1951:
Conservative
Labour
Votes
47.97%
48.78%
Seats
321
295
– In fact, election inversions can occur under (list) proportional
representation systems:
Netherlands 2010: VVD+PVD+CDA*
All other parties
49.55%
50.45%
* This coalition of parties actually formed the government.
76
74
Problems with Details of the EC
• Unpledged or faithless electors might determine the outcome of the
election.
– But this is unlikely --- they’re looking for their 15 minutes of fame.
• State legislatures can manipulate the manner of selecting electors.
– Colorado Proposition 36 in 2004 (Democratic supported initiative)
– Republican efforts in CA in 2008 and PA in 2012
– If a state decides to select electors by district, the districts may be
gerrymandered.
• A state legislature might decide to appoint electors.
– There is “no constitutional right to vote for President” (or even
Presidential electors).
• The most problematic feature of the Electoral College is Contingent
Procedure (when an election is “thrown into the House”).
– We have little understanding of how this would work in practice.
– State equality regardless of population appears to be unsupportable
(especially today, e.g., CA vs. WY)
– A President would not be selected until about two weeks before
Inauguration Day (if then).
Alternatives to the Existing Electoral
College System
• As we have noted, some changes in the EC system can by made by
individual state legislatures,
– namely, how their electors are selected and thus how state electoral
votes are cast (winner-take-all or otherwise).
• Other changes would require an amendment to the Constitution, e.g.,
– to change or abolish position of electors,
– change the apportionment of electors/electoral votes among the states, or
– abolish or change the contingent procedure.
• Of course, a constitutional amendment is also required to make
nationally uniform changes in how electors are selected and electoral
votes are cast.
• Congress can’t direct change the EC by simple legislation; however, it
can
– change the size of the House or Representatives,
– admit new states (and thus increase the size of the Senate),
• both of which would change the size of the Electoral College and the
magnitude of the small state advantage in the apportionment of
electoral votes), and
– change the method of apportioning House seats among the states on the
basis of the decennial census.
Alternatives to the Existing EC System (cont.)
• The Automatic Plan. Regularize the existing system by abolishing
the position of elector while retaining electoral votes to be
automatically awarded on a winner-take-all basis to the popular-vote
winner in each state.
– This requires a U.S. constitutional amendment, which probably should
abolish or revise the contingent procedure as well.
• The Pure District Plan. Select electors by plurality vote in singlemember districts within states.
– This can be implemented on a state-by-state basis.
– But if it is effected by a constitutional amendment, it should probably
revise the contingent procedure as well.
• The Modified District Plan. Select electors by plurality in the
existing single-member Congressional Districts, with the two
remaining (“Senatorial”) electors elected state-wide.
– This can be implemented on a state-by-state basis (as ME and NE have
done).
– The Mundt-Coudert Plan proposed this as a constitutional amendment
in the 1950s and in revised form in the 1960s.
• It modified the contingent procedure to a joint ballot of the whole Congress
voting as individuals.
Alternatives to the Existing EC System (cont.)
• The (Pure) Proportional Plan. Award the electoral votes of each
state to candidates precisely (out to three or more decimal places) in
proportion to their popular votes within each state.
– Since fractional electoral votes would result, the office of elector would
have to be abolished.
– This therefore requires a constitutional amendment, which should
probably abolish or revise the contingent procedure as well.
– The Lodge-Gossett Plan proposed this as a constitutional amendment
in the 1940s and 1950s,
• and it modified the contingent procedure to a joint ballot of the whole
Congress voting as individuals.
• The Whole-Number Proportional Plan. Award the electoral votes
of each state to candidates in whole numbers that are proportional
as possible to their popular votes within the states.
– An established PR apportionment formula could be used.
– Since electors could be retained, this can be implemented on a stateby-state basis,
• e.g., Colorado Proposition 36 in 2004 (using an ad hoc PR formula).
– But if it is effected by a constitutional amendment, it should probably
abolish or revise the contingent procedure as well,
• especially as minor candidate could more easily win electoral votes.
Alternatives to the Existing EC System (cont.)
• The National Bonus Plan. Retain the existing system (or use the
Automatic Plan) but award an additional bonus of [perhaps 102]
electoral votes to the national popular vote plurality winner.
– This would require a U.S. constitutional amendment.
– Its obvious rationale is to preclude election inversions and it
would effectively preclude the contingent procedure as well.
• Revision of Contingent Procedure. Many options exist, but these
have received the most attention:
– abolish the electoral vote majority requirement for election
entirely, or
– reduce the majority requirement, and/or
– change the nature of the contingent procedure, i.e.,
• to election by a joint session of Congress, voting one-member, one-vote.
– But the problem of electoral vote ties (which also leads to the
contingent procedure) remains so long as the number of
electoral votes is even.
• The current problem was created by the 23rd Amendment giving DC three
electoral votes (starting in 1964).
Alternatives to the Existing EC System (cont.)
• The Popular Vote Plan. Abolish the Electoral college in
its entirety and hold a national direct popular election for
President (and Vice President),
– with or without an runoff (“instant” or otherwise), and
– perhaps (if a runoff is used) using a 40% (rather than 50%) quota
for election in the first round.
– This would require a constitutional amendment.
• Such a national popular vote might/should entail national
administration of Presidential (and Congressional, while
we’re at it?) elections, including
– nationally uniform voter qualifications,
– national voter registration (and voter ID requirements,if
any),
– nationally uniform ballot types and voting technology,
– nationally uniform rules for ballot access (listing of
candidates), etc.
The
National
Popular
Vote
Plan
National Popular Vote Plan (cont.)
• This is a proposal to (in effect) enact a direct national
popular election for President
– without using a constitutional amendment,
• which requires ratification by three-quarters of the states,
• and is therefore believed to be very difficult to obtain.
• Its starting point is the fact that, under the Constitution,
– state legislatures have sole power over how their Presidential
electors are selected.
National Popular Vote Plan (cont.)
• NPVP proposes that states collectively controlling at
least 270 electoral votes
– enter into an interstate compact
– that would commit them to select Presidential electors
who would cast their electoral votes,
• not for the candidate who carries their state, but
• for the “national popular vote winner.”
• Note that “national popular vote winner” means plurality
winner, so
– NPVP would also preclude the House contingent
procedure
• barring a national popular vote tie.
Problems with the NPVP
• NPVP does not (and cannot) address the problems entailed by
direct popular vote previously identified; in particular,
– national rules for and administration of Presidential elections and
– runoff or related provisions
• There is no officially certified “national popular vote winner.”
• Would the compact hold, especially in the event of an extremely
close/disputed (with respect to the national popular vote) election?
– In every election, some states in the compact would have to cast
electoral votes for the candidate that lost the popular vote in that
state.
– In some (close) elections, such electoral votes would be
decisive.
• In particular, would the compact hold in the event that there would
otherwise be an election inversion (the very event the NPVP is
designed to preclude)?
Why Do We Have an Electoral College?
• The answer goes back to 1787 and the framing of the U.S.
Constitution.
• The charge to the Constitutional Convention was to revise and
strengthen the Articles of Confederation.
• Under the A of C, the only central government institution was
Congress.
– Each state legislature appointed Congressional delegates.
– Each state delegation had one vote (the same rule was used in the Constitutional
Convention).
– A 9/13 supra-majority was required for substantive matters.
– 13/13 unanimity was required to amend the A of C.
– Congress had very limited powers; in particular,
• It could not lay and collect taxes, and
• It could not pass laws that directly exercised its powers.
• In both respects, Congress had to rely on the cooperation of state
legislatures.
– There was no national executive or judiciary.
Why Do We Have an Electoral
College? (cont.)
• The Constitution
– expanded the powers of Congress and
– allowed Congress to exercise its powers by passing
laws that bound individuals directly, and
– that would be executed by a national executive
(President), who also had other independent powers,
and
– that would be enforced by a national court system.
• The executive (and judiciary) would also “check and
balance” the “naturally predominant” legislature.
Designing The Original Electoral College
• Designing the mode of selecting the President was one
of the most difficult tasks that confronted the framers.
• Their most famously difficult task was designing the
scheme of representation for a new national legislature.
– The difficulty in the legislative case lay in the fact that most
delegates knew what they wanted, but different delegates
wanted different things:
• small-state delegates wanted to preserve the principle of state
equality, while
• large-state delegates wanted state representation proportional to
state population (and/or wealth).
• In contrast, the difficulty in the executive case was that
most delegates were not at all sure what they wanted,
– though the small-state versus big-state conflict remained a
factor).
Designing The Original Electoral College
• The menu of options for Presidential selection:
– Selection by states,
• But this would be too much like the Article Confederation;
– Selection by the Congress,
• which was the “default option” found in both VA and NJ plans.
• But many feared it would make the President too dependent on and
(if eligible for re-election) subservient to Congress.
• How would a bicameral Congress (as provided for by the “Great
Compromise”) elect a President?
– House only
– Senate only
– concurrent ballot
– joint ballot
– Selection by some kind of popular election
• which presented many practical difficulties.
– Some kind of mixed system, which might distinguish between
• a first round of selection (“nomination”) and
• a second round of selection (“election” or “runoff”), and
• might use “intermediate electors.
Designing The Original EC (cont.)
• The perceived advantages of an Electoral College of
intermediate electors:
– unlike Congress, the EC would perform a single task – i.e., cast
votes for President -- and would then disband, so
• the President would be subservient to neither Congress nor the
Electoral College; and
– unlike popular election, the EC
• avoided difficult questions about the extent of suffrage, and
• allowed a compromise between the large vs. small states through
its fine details, and
• and public opinion could be informed and refined through
representation.
• Since legislative election was the default choice, it is
more accurate to say the framers settled on the EC
– as an alternative to legislative election, rather than
– as an alternative to popular election.
The Original Electoral College Rules
• Each state selects a number of “electors” equal in
number to its total (House + Senate) representation in
Congress (H + 2).
• The legislature of each state determines the mode of
selection of the electors from its state, the most likely
options being
– Election/appointment by the legislature itself,
– popular election from districts, and
– popular election on a state-wide general ticket.
• Congress has the power to determine
– when electors are selected, and
– when electors cast their votes (which must be the
same day for all states).
– Originally, Congress gave the states a window of
about 30 days within which to select electors.
The Original Electoral College (cont.)
• The “Electoral College” never meets as a group in one
place.
– Rather electors meet and vote in their own state capitals
• Electors were originally required to
– cast two votes for two different candidates,
– at least one of whom had to be a resident of another state,
– In effect, electors could vote for one “favorite son” but were required
also vote for at least one “national candidate.”
• Once cast, the electoral votes are each are transmitted
to Congress,
– to be counted before a joint session presided over by the President of
the Senate (Vice President of U.S.).
• To be elected by the Electoral College, a candidate was
originally required to receive
– votes from a majority of electors and
– more votes than any other candidate.
– Given this double vote system, these requirements were logically
distinct.
• In particular, more that one candidate could receive the required
majority.
The Original Electoral College (cont.)
• If no candidate met both requirements, the election would
be “thrown into the House of Representatives.”
– The House chooses
• between the two (or more) tied candidates, in the event both
(or all) received votes from a majority of electors, or
• (in the original EC) among the top five candidates, in the event
no candidate received votes from a majority of electors.
– Voting in the House is by state delegation, with each
delegation casting one vote.
– Balloting continues until some candidate is supported
by a majority of state delegations.
The Fatal Flaw in the Original
Electoral College
• However, the Committee was concerned that some
electors might “throw away” their second votes.
– It believed a second office had to be at stake to induce electors
to take their second votes seriously.
• For this reason (only), it proposed the office of Vice
President.
– The Vice Presidency was ‘introduced only for the sake of a
valuable mode of election which required two to be chosen at the
same time,’
• which largely explains the awkward and largely impotent
place this office occupies in the overall constitutional
scheme.
• This turned out to be a miscalculation that produced a
fatal flaw in the original EC,
– and created what historian Richard McCormick has called a
“hazardous game” of Presidential selection.
The Electoral College: An Example
THE ORIGINAL ELECTORAL COLLEGE BEFORE THE
12th AMENDMENT AND USING THE PROVISIONAL
APPORTIONMENT OF HOUSE SEATS
House Size = 65
Number of Electors = 65 + (2 × 13) = 91
Number of Electoral Votes = 2 × 91 = 182
Maximum Vote Any Candidate Can Receive = 91 (one vote from every
elector)
Required Majority = 46 (one vote from a majority of electors)
If no one gets 46 votes or if there is a tie among those who do:
Required Vote in House = 7
In any event, the runner-up becomes Vice President
[Note: these numbers were never actually used.]
Expectations Concerning the Original EC
• This original Electoral College system was designed to
operate in a non-partisan environment.
– It therefore was expected that
• typically there would be many potential Presidential candidates,
• who would not declare themselves as such, let alone actively
campaign for the office, and
• electors would choose among these candidates on the basis of
their character and connections, not party affiliation or policy
promises.
– Therefore, it was also expected that electoral votes would
be widely scattered and the “House contingent procedure”
would be used “19 times out of 20” (George Mason’s
estimate), so
• big states would have the dominant role in “screening/nominating”
candidates (in the EC), while
• small states would have equal role in most final/runoff elections (in
the House).
Expectations Concerning the EC (cont.)
• However, James Madison (a “big-state” advocate)
thought/hoped that big state electors would coordinate
their electoral votes so as to keep the election out of the
House (where small states would have the advantage).
• Madison, not Mason, was correct in his expectation, but
not for the reason he gave.
• It was generally hoped and expected that electors would
typically be
– popularly elected
– from single-member districts (like most state legislators,
delegates to the state ratifying conventions, members of the
British House of Commons, and as was expected also for
members of the new U.S. House); and
– that they would be well-informed local notables who would act as
representative trustees of their states and districts.
The Hazardous Game: President Selection
under the Original Electoral College
• There were problems from the very start.
• From the outset, electors and those who selected them
(and most everyone else) thought of a presidential
election, not as an occasion to cast two votes for two
worthy presidential candidates, but as an occasion to
elect a Presidential-Vice Presidential ‘ticket.’
• In the very first election of 1789, it was generally agreed
that
– George Washington should be the first President, and
– John Adams should be the first Vice President.
• Most or all electors were expected to cast one vote for
Washington and one vote for Adams.
The Hazardous Game (cont.)
• But this expectation was precarious:
– If just one elector were to cast one vote for Adams and one vote
for anybody but Washington, Adams would be elected President
and Washington would be relegated to the Vice Presidency.
– On the other hand, if every elector did in fact cast one vote for
Washington and one for Adams, there would be an electoral vote
tie, sending the election to the House.
• Indeed, Alexander Hamilton (who disliked Adams) was
afraid that some New England electors would withhold
votes from Washington, thereby making Adams
president.
– In anticipation of this, he urged some other electors to withhold
votes from Adams.
• In fact, all electors voted for Washington but quite a few
did not vote for Adams,
– so in fact the agreed upon “ticket” was elected.
The Election of
1789
– Not literally
unanimous
– Double-vote
system
– NC and RI had
not yet ratified
– NY failed to cast
electoral votes
Scattering of
second votes
– Fears that
northerners
wanted to make
Adams President
The Election of 1792
• We see beginnings of the Federalist-Republican twoparty system in the second (“Vice Presidential”) votes
Schattschneider’s Law
• The framers’ expectations did not anticipate the
development of a national two-party system.
• Schattschneider’s Law: if you create a large popularly
elected legislative body,
• party caucuses will arise in the legislature, and
• political parties will develop in the electorate.
– Caucuses and parties are organized attempts to win by
concentrating votes (through a bloc vote [in the
legislature] or nominating process [in elections]) on a
few motions or candidates,
– They arise because ambitious politicians find it
expedient to conspire with others to win these contests.
Duverger’s Law
• Duverger’s Law: If you have single-winner elections, you
get (in equilibrium) two political parties, i.e.,
– two rival organized attempts, each trying to
concentrate votes on a single candidate.
• Conversely, parliamentary systems using proportional
representation in large districts tend to produce and
sustain multi-party systems.
• In part, Duverger’s Law is driven by strategic (or tactical)
voting by ordinary voters who are reluctant to “waste”
their votes by voting for third candidates/parties that
have no real chance of winning.
Duverger’s Law (cont.)
• In much greater part, Duverger’s Law is driven by the strategic
calculations of ambitious candidates and parties.
– If a party splits and runs two (more or less clone) candidates, they will
be spoilers against each other and throw the election to the other party.
• This prospect of electoral disaster creates a huge incentive for even
a highly factionalized party to unite behind a single candidate.
– Conversely, if there are three significant candidates or parties are
contesting an election, there is a huge incentive for two of them “to
make deal” under which one makes a strategic withdrawal in favor of
the other (in return for something).
• In general, each party in a competitive two-party system has a huge
incentive to remain united and not split into rival factions that run
candidates in general elections.
• With respect to the Electoral College system, Duverger’s Law
implies that (contrary to the Framers’ expectations) the House
contingent procedure will be bypassed at least “19 times out of 20.”
The Hazardous Game:1796
• The first contested Presidential election:
• Federalists: John Adams (MA) & Thomas Pickney (SC)
• Republicans: Thomas Jefferson (VA) & Aaron Burr (NY)
• They were “nominated” by their respective Congressional Caucuses.
– Note the regionally (North & South) balanced tickets.
• Each party nominated elector candidates pledged to vote their party’s
candidates.
– Intra-Federalist maneuvering:
• Hamilton (continuing to feud with Adams) unsuccessfully urged some
Southern electors to vote for Pickney & anybody but Adams
• However, some Northern electors learned about this and withheld votes from
Pickney.
– The electoral vote outcome was very close:
• Federalists won 71 electors, all of whom voted for Adams, giving Adams the
required majority of 70 for election as President.
• Republicans won 68 electors, all of whom voted for Jefferson.
– But the withholding of second votes from Pickney lowered his vote total to
59, dropping him to third place behind Jefferson,
• So the defeated Republican Presidential candidate became Vice President.
• Burr won only 30 votes.
The Election of 1796 (cont.)
[Electors =138; Electoral votes = 276, Required majority = 70]
The Election of 1796 (cont.)
Sectionalism is
evident, despite
the sectionally
balanced tickets.
Many states did
not select
electors by
popular vote.
Most state
electoral votes
are cast winnertake-all.
Lessons from the Hazardous Game
• Electors are expected to be “party men,”
– i.e., “pledged electors.”
– However, Samuel Miles (Fed., PA) violated his pledge (first
“faithless elector”).
• An angry Federalist supporter complained: “What, do I chuse Samuel
Miles to determine for me whether John Adams or Thomas shall be
President? No! I chuse him to act, not to think.”
• State legislative elections (perhaps coming a year or more
in advance of Presidential elections), become very
important for politicians with national ambitions, because
– legislatures chose how to select electors and may change the
method from election to election; and
– legislatures may choose to appoint the electors themselves.
Lessons from the Hazardous Game (cont.)
• A party that controls a state legislature may not want to
risk a popular election for electors.
– States using legislative election increased to 10 in 1800.
• And if a controlling party is confident it can win popular
election, the particular mode of popular election can be
manipulated (e.g., to winner-take-all) to short-term party
advantage.
• Jefferson to Monroe (1800):
– “All agree that an election by districts would be best if it could be
general, but while ten states choose either by their legislatures
or by a general ticket, it is folly or worse for the other six not to
follow.”
The Hazardous Game: 1800
• Largely a repeat of 1796:
– same candidates (except one Pickney replaced by another); and
– same battle lines.
• However, the strategic implications of the EC rules were
(even) better understood:
– manipulation of elector selection; and
– danger of withholding too many votes.
• The election of 1800 was as close as 1796 but tipped the
other way.
– Republicans won 73 electors vs. 65 for Federalists.
– The Republicans (unlike the Federalists) failed to withhold one
“Vice Presidential” electoral vote.
•
•
•
•
•
Jefferson: 73
Burr: 73
Adams: 65
Pickney: 64
Jay: 1
The Hazardous Game: 1800 (cont.)
• But the original EC rules did not distinguish between
“Presidential” vs. “Vice-Presidential” electoral votes.
• So the election was “thrown into House,” under the
contingent procedure,
– choosing between the tied candidates Jefferson and Burr only.
– Burr did not chose to withdraw.
• Four electoral votes from GA had been improperly certified
but the “intent of the voters” was clear (four votes for each
of Jefferson and Burr).
– Had they been disqualified as invalid, no candidate would have received the
required 70 electoral votes, in which case
– the House could have chosen any of the five candidates as President.
– But Vice President Jefferson, presiding over the counting of electoral votes,
“counted himself [and Burr] in.”
• Note that the single Federalist elector who voted for Adams
and Jay could have voted for Adams and Burr,
– in which case Burr would have immediately been elected President on the
basis of electoral votes (with no House election) and
– Jefferson would have remained Vice President.
The Hazardous Game: 1800 (cont.)
•
•
Until 20th Amendment (1933), a newly elected Congress did not convene until
late in the year following Congressional elections.
So the 1800 Presidential election was thrown into the “lame duck” House
elected in 1798, which was still controlled by the Federalists (55-50), though
Republicans controlled the House elected in 1800.
– There were 16 state delegations, so 10 votes were required for election.
– Each delegation would decide how to vote by majority vote within the
delegation.
• Republicans controlled 8 state delegations.
• Federalists controlled 6 state delegations.
• Two state delegation were equally split.
– Evidently, all Republican representatives supported Jefferson as the
intended Presidential candidate.
– Likewise, all Federalist representatives supported Burr, in order to deny
the presidency to more formidable Jefferson.
– The two internally tied delegations had to abstain.
– For 35 ballots, the House deadlocked: Jefferson 8 and Burr 6 with 2
abstentions.
– Ultimately, the four Federalists within in the tied delegations abstained,
resulting in Jefferson’s election on the 36th ballot.
Contingent Procedure in the House, 1801
The 12th Amendment
• After the 1800 fiasco, Congress proposed, and the
states quickly ratified (in time for 1804 election), the 12th
Amendment to the Constitution.
– Electors now cast separate (single) votes for President and Vice
President.
– The required electoral vote majority for President (and for Vice
President) is a simple majority of votes cast (= number of electors),
which at most one candidate can achieve.
– If no candidate receives the required simple majority for President, the
House (still voting by state delegations) chooses from among the top
three [vs. top five] candidates.
– If no candidate receives the required majority for Vice President, the
Senate (voting individually) chooses from among the top two
candidates.
– Early drafts of the amendment included a requirement that electors be
popularly elected from districts, but this provision was later dropped.
• The 12th Amendment remains the constitutional
language governing Presidential elections.
The Transformation of the
Electoral College
• By the 1830s, the Electoral College, already formally
modified by the 12th Amendment, had been further
transformed into the kind of (essentially) automatic
popular vote counting system that exists today.
• This transformation
– was driven largely by the development of a two-party
system, and
– was brought about without any further constitutional
amendments or (with one minor exception) change in
federal law,
– but rather by changes in state laws and party
practice.
Elements of the Transformation (cont.)
• In early elections, the mode of selecting Presidential
electors was regularly manipulated by party politicians in
each state, on the basis of partisan calculations.
• By 1832, Presidential electors were almost universally
selected by popular (vs. legislative) vote (and by much
expanded electorates).
– South Carolina was the lone hold out.
• By 1836, the mode of popular election in every state was
(following Jefferson’s strategic advice) the general ticket
(or party slate), rather than election from districts (or by
some kind of proportional representation).
– This induced the almost universal “winner-take-all” rule for the
casting electoral votes at the state level.
– However, at the present time two small states (ME and NE) use
the “Modified District Plan.”
Mode of Elector Selection
Mode of Elector Selection (cont.)
• Why were state legislatures willing to give up the power to select
Presidential electors?
– The intensity of party competition declined after 1800.
– There was a minor split in Democratic-Republican ranks in 1812.
• DeWitt Clinton sought the Presidency as an “Independent Democratic-Republic”
and was endorsed by the Federalists.
• Democrats did the same in 1872 when Horace Greeley ran as a “Liberal
Republican.”
– Legislative appointment of electors was disrupting state legislative elections.
• cf. the willingness of state legislatures to ratify the 17th Amendment (popular
election of U.S. Senators)
Mode of Elector Selection (cont.)
• Why were state legislatures willing to give up the power to select
Presidential electors?
– The intensity of party competition declined after 1800.
– Legislative appointment of electors was disrupting state legislative
elections.
• cf. the willingness of state legislatures to ratify the 17th Amendment
(popular election of U.S. Senators)
• Why did election of electors by districts give way to election of electors
at-large (usually on a slate or “general ticket”)?
– Partisan strategic considerations,
• as expressed by Jefferson to Monroe in 1800.
– More important: state strategic considerations.
• No matter what other states may do, each state could enhance its
influence in Presidential politics by casting electoral votes on a winnertake-all basis.
• There is no “equilibrium” until all states use the winner-take-all method.
• It turns out that this “equilibrium” results in a new balance of Electoral
College voting power that is more favorable to the large states, more
than counterbalancing the small-state advantage in apportionment of
electoral votes.
“Winner-Take-All”
• Most states use a general ticket system in which votes
chose among party slates of elector candidates.
Vote for one slate of electors:
Democratic electors
Republican electors
[Minor party electors]
– This effectively guarantees that a state’s electoral votes are cast
“winner-take-all.”
• However, earlier in some states electors ran as
individuals on a generalized plurality basis.
Vote for no more than four elector candidates:
D1
D2
D3
D4
R1
R2
R3
R4
– Typically almost every voter would vote for all Democratic elector
candidates or all Republican elector candidate, again producing a
“winner-take-result.”
“Almost Winner-Take-All”
• However, when the Presidential contest within the state
was very close, small discrepancies among the votes for
elector candidates might produce a divided electoral
vote:
D1
D2
D3
D4
93,456
93,381
92,358
91,679
R1
R2
R3
R4
91,993
91,553
90,852
90,761
• In this case, the electoral vote would be divided 3 for the
Democratic ticket and 1 for the Republican ticket.
– By convention, the “popular vote” for President in this state
would be recorded as:
Democratic ticket
93,456
Republican ticket
91,993
Bypassing the Contingent Procedure
• Given a two-party system accommodated by the 12th
Amendment, it is virtually assured that one or other
Presidential (and Vice Presidential) candidate will receive
the required majority of electoral votes.
• Thus Madison hope to keep the election out of the House
is realized,
– not by coordination among the big states, but
– by coordination (a nominating process) within each of two political
parties.
• In this way, the Electoral College system was transformed
into something in two ways more favorable to large states
than the Framers expected, i.e.,
– not only do large states gain more power in the first (electoral vote)
stage (due to winner-take-all electoral votes), but also
– the second (House contingent election stage) stage (where small
states have equal power) is almost always bypassed.
“Inverse” Duverger’s Law and the
Election of 1824
• The “inverse” of Duverger’s Law implies that
– if one of the parties in a two-party system is greatly weakened, or is
unable or unwilling to compete for votes effectively,
– the dominant party is very likely to break apart, because the external
threat that otherwise keeps it together is removed.
• The election of 1824 (the second and last time an election was
thrown into the House) is the “exception that proved the rule” that a
two-party system bypasses the contingent procedure.
– The Federalist Party had collapsed and the Democratic-Republican
Party was unchallenged.
– Consequently there was no longer pressure for D-Rs to unite behind a
single Presidential-Vice Presidential ticket.
– Four candidates, all nominally belonging to the same D-R party, sought
the Presidency.
– Unsurprisingly, no candidate received a majority of the electoral votes
and the election was thrown into the House.
The Election 1824 (cont.)
• The four candidates were:
John Quincy Adams (Secretary of State)
Henry Clay (U.S. Representative and Speaker)
William Crawford (Secretary of the Treasury)
Andrew Jackson (hero of the Battle of New Orleans and
representative of the “common man”)
Presidential election results (“first round”):
Jackson
Adams
Crawford
Clay
Others
Electoral Votes
99
84
41
37
0
Popular Votes*
41%
31%
11%
13%
4%
*Bear in mind that six states still appointed electors and that states that used
popular election varied considerably with respect to the extent of franchise.
The Election of 1824 (cont.)
• The compromise candidate Clay (most everyone’s second
choice, who probably could have defeated each other
candidate in a “straight fight”) was squeezed out of third
place in the electoral vote ranking by Crawford.
• Under the 12th Amendment, the House could chose only
from among top three candidates.
• Clay probably would have been elected president
– if the House could still chose among the top five candidates; or
– if Crawford had not been a candidate (i.e., Crawford was a spoiler
to Clay).
• Even if Adams or Jackson had won all the electoral votes cast
for Crawford, Clay would have been among top three
candidates.
• However, if Jackson had won at least 32 of Crawford’s
electoral votes, Jackson would have been elected without a
House runoff.
The Election of 1824 (cont.)
• New York’s 36 electoral votes were split among all four candidates.
– If Adams had won Crawford’s five electoral votes in addition to the 26
he actually won, Adams probably would have lost the election, as Clay
then would then have placed third in electoral votes and probably won
the House runoff.
– This provides a historical example of ‘monotonicity failure’ in [instant]
runoff [AV] elections.
• Clay had great influence in the House, detested Jackson and
endorsed Adams.
• Adams (just) won on the first ballot (24 state delegations):
Adams
13
Jackson
7
Crawford
4
• Adams subsequently appointed Clay Secretary of State.
• Jackson and his supporters denounced the “corrupt bargain”
between Adams and Clay.
House Runoff (cont.)
• Whenever there is a “serious” third-party ticket (especially
one with a geographical base of support such that it may
win electoral votes), the possibility arises that the election
may be thrown into the House arises.
• Moreover, since the 23rd Amendment (giving the District
of Columbia three electoral votes) was ratified in 1961,
the total number of electoral votes has been an even
number (538),
– so a 269-269 electoral vote tie is possible, and
– an election might be thrown into the House even in the absence of
a third-party candidate winning election votes.
• Prior to the 1825 House election, the House adopted
special rules for its conduct.
– These rules remain in effect and would (presumably) by used in
any future House election.
The EC as a Vote-Counting Mechanism
• In 1845 Congress established a uniform nationwide
Presidential election day (i.e., day for selecting
Presidential electors), namely
– the Tuesday after the first Monday in November.
• On Tuesday, November 6, 2012, voters in each state will
go to the polls and vote for either the Democratic or
Republican (or possibly some other) slate of elector
candidates, who are pledged to their party’s (Pres. + VP)
nominees.
– With popular election of slates of pledged electors, American
voters may be forgiven for thinking they are actually voting
directly for a Presidential-Vice Presidential ticket.
• Often only fine print on the ballot indicates otherwise
– and in some states not even that.
Vote-Counting Mechanism (cont.)
• In each state, the elector slate receiving the most votes is elected
(with the possible exceptions noted for ME and NE).
• The electors will meet in their state capitals in mid-December and
cast their electoral votes as pledged.
• Electoral vote tallies will be transmitted from each state capital to
Congress and will be counted before a joint session on January 5,
2009.
• The President of the Senate [Vice President Biden] will announce
the votes for President and Vice President and proclaim that ?? and
?? are the President-elect and Vice President-elect.
• So (almost certainly) everything will be determined on election night
in November, and the remaining steps are merely ceremonial; that
is, TV prognosticators can
– report the popular vote winner in each state,
– add up the corresponding electoral votes, and
– declare a President-elect.
According to Nate Silver’s Forecasting Model
Women only:
Obama 347, Romney 140, Toss-Up 51
According to Nate Silver’s Forecasting Model
Men only:
Obama 146, Romney 321, Toss-Up 71