The Role of Leadership in Managing the Development Process
-- The case of the Ramos Administration in the Philippines -1. The Ramos Administration in the Philippines – the crucial role of
leadership
Political leadership plays an important role as the driver of policy shifts and administrative
reforms.
While the fundamental government structures may stay unchanged within a country,
results and outcomes of policy reform initiatives, institution building, and development
management would differ significantly, under different political administrations with different
political leaders.
In the Philippines, it is widely viewed that, among successive political administrations, the
Ramos Administration (1992-1998) showed a development orientation and political savvy very
effectively.
Despite initial challenges, the Ramos Administration successfully realized political
and economic stability which is necessary for growth and development, and deepened economic
and social reforms.
Such achievements were, in a large way, said to be attributed to the
leadership and management style of President Ramos, and the emulation of these by the people
who worked with him.
The Government structure in the Philippines
The Philippines has adopted the current Constitution in February 1987, after the Marcos Regime
(1965-1986) ended and restored democracy through the People Power Revolution in 1986.
This new Constitution established under the Aquino Administration (1986-1992) restored a
presidential form of government comprised of three branches – executive, legislative and
judiciary. The Constitution assures separation of the three powers – Filipino people have a
sense of strong vigilance toward presidential dictatorship, which is a bitter legacy from the
Marcos Administration. The President, elected to a term of six years without reelection by
direct voting, exercises the executive power. The elected Congress, composed of the Senate
(24 members) and the House of Representatives (not more than 250 members), exercises the
country’s legislative authority. The Supreme Court and lower courts exercise the country’s
judiciary authority.
One of the noteworthy features of the Philippine government is that the
Congress has strong control over the executive branch, typically in the budget process, which
often leads to the marginalization of the role of economic technocrats. In fact, the executive
branch has often times been challenged by legislative intervention.
In addition, the Ramos
Administration confronted judicial activism in economic policy making.
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Legislature
Judiciary
Intervention
President
Intervention
Technocrats
(Central Economic
Agencies)
Ministries, departments, other state
organs and local governments
Executive
Comparison of three successive political administrations in the Philippines
When comparing the three consecutive political administrations (i.e., Marcos, Aquino and
Ramos), main features can be described as follows:
 Marcos Administration (1965-1986) can be characterized as a dictatorship government.
President Marcos created a centralized administrative body for development planning – the
National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA).
This centralized system,
however, was utilized only as a means to maintain his dictatorship. As a result, power
was limited to, and amassed by the technocrats and cronies who faithfully obeyed his word.
 Aquino Administration (1986-1992) can be considered as a revolutionary government
aiming to normalize the country.
President Aquino put an end to Marcos’s dictatorship
and initiated a democratization process following the People Power Revolution in February,
1986.
Initially, people’s support for Aquino was very wide and diverse. However, the
coalition unraveled almost immediately after realizing that she could not meet people’s
expectations due to inexperience and inability to articulate a clear vision and political will.
As such, Aquino Administration was often view as weak and fractious government, and
was challenged by a series of military coup attempts. On top of this, the Administration
was struck by natural calamities (major earthquake, volcanic eruption, typhoons, and
drought) and energy crisis that aggravated the situation, and weakened government base.
 Ramos Administration (1992-1998) can be regarded as a reformist government.
President
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Ramos initially confronted with such challenges as political instability, internal and
external insecurity, and judicial activism in economic policy making. However, he was
able to overcome such challenges and successfully realized political and economic stability,
and accelerated reform efforts initiated by the Aquino Administration.
In fact, it was the
Ramos Administration that further institutionalized administrative functions that President
Aquino has initiated, and made the system actually work.
Early life and professional background of President Ramos
President Ramos’s professional background – the combination of engineer and military service,
trained in West Point (US Military Academy) – seem to have an impact on his way of thinking
and working style.
Ramos served the Marcos’s authoritarian regime for more than 20 years in
the military, as the Vice Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces.
When he realized that the Marcos
Regime was about to collapse, Ramos changed allegiance and sided with Aquino. He played a
key role in the People Power Revolution in 1986, and became the living symbol of military
defiance against Marcos. After Aquino assumed the Presidency, Ramos served as Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces by her appointment, and later became the Secretary of National
Defense.
Ramos assumed the Presidency at the age of 64 – the oldest person to become
President of the Philippines, but he was considered to be uncharismatic and untested as a
political leader.
Initial challenges of the Ramos Administration (1992-1998)
The Ramos Administration was able to advance reforms effectively despite its initial
confrontation with various challenges as described below, under the volatile political and
economic situation:
 Weak support base (a minority President at a staring position)
Ramos won the presidency with just 23.6% of vote against 6 other candidates, the lowest
plurality in the country’s history.
As such, he had to initiate coalition building and
solidify his Administration’s political base in the Congress.
He also had to deal with
confrontations from the judiciary – the activist court.
 Weak institutions
Ramos Administration had to take appropriate measures to address issues on bureaucratic
inertia and strong control by interest groups. Such groups pushed for particular interests,
giving no thought about the general welfare of people, and undermined sound institutional
base.
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 Political instability
Ramos Administration had to confront with internal security problems concerning three
insurgency groups within the country – rebel soldiers, communist party members and Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF) members.
The previous Aquino Administration was
challenged by a series of military coup attempts (seven times), and had difficulty dealing
with such rebellious groups. The Ramos considered peace and order as a precondition for
economic development.
 Macroeconomic instability
Ramos Administration had to deal with macroeconomic challenges inherited from the
previous Aquino Administration – a large budget deficit, high inflation rates, current
account imbalance, balance of payments crises, and sudden exchange-rate adjustments.
 Poor state of the country’s infrastructure
Ramos Administration had to tackle with structural bottlenecks to economic growth. The
poor situation of the physical infrastructure at the time was the result of misguided public
policies form the past.
 Power crisis of 1990s
Ramos Administration had to resolve serious power outage problems caused by the
misjudgment in the previous Aquino Administration. The peak of the crisis happened in
1992, with daily brownouts lasting 10-12 hour.
Ramos assumed the Presidency in the
midst of the national emergency situation.
Development vision of the Ramos Administration – Philippines 2000
The development vision of the Ramos Administration is manifested in Philippines 2000.
Philippine 2000 seeks to place the country on its way to become a newly industrializing
economy (NIE) by 2000. President Ramos looked at the East Asian NIEs as the main models
toward modernization and industrialization, but he made sure that reform would be pursued
through a democratic process – never to repeat Marcos’s authoritarian regime.
Philippine 2000 is grounded on the two pillars: sustainable economic development, and people
empowerment.
The seven points in platform are: political stability, economic growth, people
empowerment, effective bureaucracy, environmental protection, responsible foreign policy, and
moral recovery.
The Administration has set measurable guideposts as follows:
 Raising per capita income to at least U$1,000 by 1998 (from less than U$800 in 1992);
 Achieving GDP growth by at least 6 to 8 %;
 Reducing poverty incidence (% of number of household) down to 30% by 1998 (from the
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base figure of 39.9% in 1991).
Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan (MTPDP 1992-98) as a concrete program of
action
The Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan (MTPDP 1992-98) specifies the concrete
program of action to bring Philippine 2000 to realization.
The National Economic and
Development Authority (NEDA) is the government’s central economic planning agency in
charge of preparing MTPDP, among its other tasks. President Ramos delegated authority to
the NEDA for inter-agency coordination in the MTPDP preparation process. The MTPDP
under the Ramos Administration is generally regarded as more cohesive than other Plans under
other administrations.
It firmly reflected the underlying themes of sustainable economic
development and people empowerment – the two pillars of Philippine 2000. It was prepared in
a highly consultative way.
Bottom-up, and participatory approach was taken up at every step
and at every level to provide inputs in the course of the preparation process.
It adopted
comprehensive, cross-cutting view of development, which showed that intensive coordination
among different department, agencies and relevant stakeholders has duly taken place. The
targets included in the Plan were more realistic, taking into account of projected constraints and
the actual situations.
Major reform agenda reflected in the MTPDP to realize development
vision and philosophy are as follows:
 Realizing political stability
 Opening up economy and competing in the world market (trade liberalization as well as
financial and capital market liberalization)
 Developing a business-friendly environment
 Promoting privatization and competition, and bring down inefficiency
 Breaking up monopolies and cartels, and to eradicate crony capitalism
 Promoting of Social Reform Agenda
 Fighting against corruption
 Restructuring bureaucracy and facilitating cooperation between government, business,
people’s organizations and NGOs
 Strengthening tax and customs administration
 Reforming legal and judicial system
Distinguishing features of President Ramos’s leadership style
As mentioned above, President Ramos adopted participatory, consensus-building approach in
the policy process. Ramos considered policy making process as important as policy decision
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itself.
Such approach gave a sense to people that they are being consulted and are part of the
whole process. This enabled him to win political support from different stakeholders, and
facilitated his development-oriented visions to realize.
Distinguishing features of President
Ramos’s leadership style commonly pointed out are as follows:
 Inclusivity
Ramos opened the door to and created institutional mechanisms for the poor/marginalized
people to participate in policy making and implementation process (e.g. Social Reform
Agenda, see below).
 Collaborative
Ramos enhanced effective mechanisms for relevant stakeholders to collaborate and
facilitate reform with shared development vision from cross-cutting, holistic viewpoint.
 Reformist
By carefully maintaining security and political stability, Ramos carried out various reforms
in many fronts: political, economic, social and institutional.
 Accountability for results
Ramos prompted changes in people's way of thinking to be more responsible and
accountable for their work. He required results on the ground and insisted on getting
quick feedback or report on the actions taken by concerned agencies. In doing so, he
actually set explicit target completion date by indicating, “Not later than (NLT) – ”.
 Complete Staff Work (CSW)
Ramos made quick and firm policy decisions based on CSW. He delegated authority to
the NEDA for inter-agency coordination in making policy decisions, and expected that any
agenda item brought to the Cabinet for approval to have been subjected to inter-agency
assessment.
President Ramos’s working style that exerted influence on its development management
In fact, President Ramos’s working style exerted influence on its development management.
From NEDA’s perspective, Ramos’s disciplinary, “hands-on policy” effectively mobilized
people to be action-oriented for results and to be accountable to people.
Cabinet members and
people around him were happy to work with him – Ramos gave people a strong sense of
commitment for reform and confidence.
A NEDA officer at the time of the Ramos
Administration recalled that “Ramos Administration was the best time in bureaucracy. He was
a competent political leader not only to influence policy and mobilize people, but to capture
imagination of bureaucracy.”
In fact, the NEDA provided a strong supportive role to
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President Ramos to make the plans work. The NEDA played a significant role in facilitating
inter-agency coordination for decision making in important policy agenda.
President Ramos himself admits that his background as a military man by training and an
engineer and builder may have affected his way of thinking and working style. Those who
closely worked with him during the Ramos Administration widely acknowledge that following
management style and way of thinking that he adopted have contributed to advance major
policy reforms despite initial challenges and weak starting position he had to confront with.
 Democratic minded and open to new ideas
Ramos demonstrated that he was committed to every important initiative, and was visible
at all levels of reform process. People could clearly identify who was responsible for
what task, and identify channels that lead to Ramos’s policy decisions.
 Delegated authority to Cabinet Secretaries and relevant stakeholders
Ramos gave confidence to Cabinet Secretaries and relevant stakeholders by delegating
authority effectively – he was in full control of them. Ramos knew the need for greater
continuity in the Cabinet, and thus, stable Cabinet with minimal replacements was realized.
 Complete Staff Work (CSW) (see above as well)
Ramos expected that outputs that have gone through the CSW process have following
characteristics: well-researched, properly coordinated and validated, analyzed extensively,
provides options and recommendations especially for contentious issues, provides the
proper action documents to implement decisions, simple and well-written, with ideas
chronologically and logically sequenced, and with follow-up action such as monitoring and
reporting to the superior.
 Fast tracking
Recognizing that bureaucracy may stifle economic growth and development, Ramos was
able to fast track projects. He instituted and made full use of Administrative Orders,
which he had the power over, in order to facilitate approval process and to reduce
transaction costs, particularly with power sector projects in confronting a national
emergency situation.
 Consensus building
Ramos himself was a good coordinator to advance major policy initiatives by making
conscious efforts for consensus building among various stakeholders.
For example, he
established the LEDAC (Legislative-Executive Development Advisory Council) that
served as platform for consensus building between the executive and the legislative on
important policy decisions.
Peace talks with rebels would be another example.
As a
consequence of aggressive peace talks with the MNLF, the Ramos Administration
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succeeded in signing the peace accord. In addition, Ramos convened a Multi-sectoral
People’s Summit (1993) comprising of representatives from the executive, Congress and
the private sector to come up with a common legislative agenda in support of development
objectives.
 Coalition building
Because Ramos won the Presidency with only a small majority in the election, it was
highly critical that he build and solidify his Administration’s political base in the Congress.
For example, Ramos took advantage of the “pork barrel funds” to win political support of
the Congress.
Pork barrel funds are allocated to each legislator, in which the President
possesses its approval authority. Pork barrel funds allow individual congresspersons to
allocate public funds to personally selected expenditures. This fund is regarded as the
source of the power behind their interventions to the executive branch.
 Work ethics giving sense of urgency to get things done right away
Ramos succeeded in establishing work ethics to get things done right away and to produce
outputs.
He was esteemed not only as a visionary and a planner, but also a doer.
He has
closely followed-up various reform initiatives to get both process and results right.
 Facilitated private sector participation and utilization
The Ramos Administration put great reliance on private initiatives for economic
development program. This entailed structural policy reforms and institutional changes,
including, trade liberalization, privatization, and deregulation. The Ramos Administration
also aimed at improving business environment to bring in domestic and foreign
investments necessary to speed up economic growth.
Ramos traveled extensively abroad
to entice foreign investors.
President Ramos’s philosophy
Having a good fortune to interview President Ramos himself, Ramos kindly shared his
philosophy in political management in pursuit of the benefit of the country. He considers that
leadership, team work and national unity, and national pride and spirit as the three critical
elements that support the foundations of a country, which can never be outsourced. Ramos
pointed out his principles in problem-solving when faced with difficulties – to analyze the
situation (analysis must be based on facts), to consult with various relevant people, and come up
with one decision (leader must be decisive, based on a fair judgment), and never to lose sight of
the vision (strategic, backward planning is critical).
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Initiatives for Power Sector Reform and the Social Reform Agenda would be relevant cases to
examine how the Ramos Administration has managed development process effectively.
Both
cases meet following necessary conditions: (1) initiatives regarded as high priority with
strategic importance within the national development (leading to promote sustainable
development); (2) initiatives in which President Ramos’s leadership exercised substantial
influence on their successful output/outcome; (3) initiatives which involve a range of
stakeholders possessing different interests and incentives; and (4) initiatives which call for
adequate institutional mechanisms for coordination and policy decision making.
2. Reform experience under the Ramos Administration
2-1.
The case of the power sector reform
When Ramos assumed the Presidency in 1992, power shortage hit a peak, with daily brownouts
lasting 10-12 hour.
Root problems could be traced back to the 1983 foreign debt crisis under
the Marcos Regime.
The National Power Corporation (NPC), a government monopoly in
power generation and transmission, could not build new generating capacity, due to the
country’s moratorium on foreign-debt services. Other root problems come from what is often
conceived as the previous Aquino Administration’s misjudgment in the power sector
management: the Department of Energy (DOE) was abolished and reduced to an Office of
Energy Affairs under the Office of the President. (In light of the national urgency, Ramos
resumed DOE right after he assumed the Presidency.)
In addition, Bataan Nuclear Power Plant
(BNPP) project, which was intended to provide cheap electricity, was mothballed during the
Aquino Administration. (While several reasons are pointed out by various groups for shelving
the BNPP, the first thing to be noted would be that the BNPP was a pet project of the Marcos
Regime, and Aquino seemed to have held suspicion that the project itself was tainted with
corruption.)
President Ramos’s leadership and political will to overcome the power crisis
In order to overcome the national urgency, President Ramos encouraged private sector
participation to build new power generating capacity as quickly as possible. This shift in
strategy called for structural policy reforms and institutional changes, including privatization
and deregulation.
In order to fast track administrative process of power projects, President
Ramos exercised strong leadership to push the Congress to quickly pass the following laws in
resolving the power crisis:
 The Electric Power Crisis Act of 1993 (RA 7648)
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This Law gave President Ramos emergency powers that allowed him to negotiate
Independent Power Producer (IPP) contracts thought the NPC, and to “fast-track”
government’s approval process based on “take-or-pay” system.
 The amended Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Law of 1994
This law increased the scope of private sector participation, providing for direct negotiation
of contracts and investment incentives in certain cases.
As a consequence of the power sector reform, power industry has transformed from a
government monopoly, to a highly competitive, private-sector dominated industry.
By
December 1993, critical power outages were eliminated.
Coordination among relevant stakeholders to overcome the power crisis
President Ramos made continuous efforts in coordinating and communicating with relevant
stakeholders to overcome the power crisis.
<Coalition building in Congress>
 President Ramos rallied the Congress to approve the Electric Power Crisis Act, and
amendments to the BOT law.
Legislature shared a sense of urgency and national unity to
deal with the crisis.
 Ramos created and fully utilized the Legislative-Executive Development Advisory Council
(LEDAC), a forum for consensus building between the executive and the legislative on
important bills, particularly, economic policy reform measures.
<Responding to the judicial activism>
 The Ramos Administration appointed justices that were pro-market and liberal minded. In
addition, some ODA-funded technical assistance was worked out for the judiciary in
support of a judicial reform program.
<Consensus building among the executive, the Congress and the private sector>
 As previously mentioned, Ramos convened a Multi-sectoral People’s Summit in 1993 to
forge a common legislative agenda supportive of development goals.
Social Pact for
People Empowered Development was the covenant.
<Relationship between the government and the private sector>
 The Ramos Administration adopted various measures to reduce social, economic, and
political risks to the private sector and encouraged their participation. (e.g., “take-or-pay”
arrangements under the Electric Power Crisis Act, and “enhancements” under the Amended
BOT Law both provided advantageous contracts to the IPPs.)
<Relationship between the government and the people>
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 The Ramos Administration adopted measures to reduce end-users’ burden on the electric
power charge by having the government take over the costs.
Such arrangements, however, may have lead to disadvantageous contracts to the government,
and eventually aggravated the fiscal situation of the NPC, leading to the path for its
privatization. Despite such adverse consequence in the future, many people admitted that the
power crisis at the time was highest national urgency situation that Ramos had no other choice
to overcome the situation.
Creation of LEDAC (Legislative-Executive Development Advisory Council) for consensus
building between the executive and the legislative
As mentioned above, Ramos exercised strong initiative to create LEDAC in 1992 as an advisory
and consultative body to ensure policy consistency between the executive and the legislative.
By fully utilizing the LEDAC mechanism, Ramos closely followed up policy agenda at issue.
It is frequently pointed out that the Congressional agenda during the Ramos Administration are
more aligned with the executives, compared with those of other administrations.
LEDAC is
officially composed of 20 members with the President as Chairman and the following as
members: Vice President, President of the Senate, Speaker of the House of Representatives,
seven Cabinet members, three Senators, three Congressmen, the National President of the
League of Provinces, a representative of the Youth Sector, and a representative of the Private
Sector.
LEDAC meetings were held weekly through the coordination of the LEDAC Secretariat.
LEDAC Secretariat is composed of career specialist from various disciplines such as economics,
business, development administration, law, information technology etc. and is managed by an
Executive Director.
2-2.
The case of the Social Reform Agenda (SRA)
As described above, President Ramos’s MTPDP (1992-1997) centered on sustainable economic
development and people empowerment as its development objectives, and promoted Social
Reform Agenda as one of the concrete programs of action with the Administration’s high
priority.
Prior to 1992, successive administrations had fought against poverty, because the struggle for
poverty alleviation has been a continuing struggle for social reforms in the Philippines.
In fact,
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the Aquino Administration’s MTPDP (1987-1992) aimed at poverty alleviation as one of the
national development goals.
However, the series of coup attempts by military rebels
threatened the political stability of the country, and natural calamities aggravated the economic
situation.
President Ramos possessed a strong sense of urgency and regarded poverty as
“another form of tyranny” and vowed to “wage against it the moral equivalent of war”.
Hence,
the Ramos Administration emphasized on the peace process and sound economic fundamentals.
(The Ramos Presidency and Administration, Record and Legacy).
As such, President Ramos strongly committed himself to fight against poverty and in August
1992, created the Presidential Commission to Fight Poverty (PCFP), which was tasked to
formulate strategic government program to address poverty issues featuring the Minimum Basic
Needs (MBN) of poor and disadvantaged sectors. Ramos also created the Presidential Council
for Countryside Development (PCCD), which sought to focus on the poorest provinces to
prioritize and deliver programs and projects. However, even with such initiatives, it was
difficult to achieve results.
Hence, President Ramos adopted the Social Reform Agenda (SRA) in 1994 to vigorously push
forward social reforms. The SRA is a comprehensive package of reforms that would address
the issues on poverty and inequity, social injustice and abuse of power, indifferent local
governance and uncaring attitude toward the environment.
In fact, the SRA is the country’s
first integrated set of reforms against poverty in a systematized way.
The SRA is regarded as
the centerpiece anti-poverty program of the Ramos Administration, which is the result of a wide
range of consultations that underscored the partnership between government and civil society.
Actually, Ramos himself initiated and participated in range of consultations with the poor
people in formulating/implementing the SRA.
The SRA’s three-point agenda seek to address the following areas of inequity:
 Access to quality basic social services
 Access to productive assets, livelihood and other economic opportunities
 Capability building for communities and people’s organizations to enable them to
participate in local development and governance
Unlike that of the power sector reform, the outcomes of the SRA is rather difficult to assess –
social reform takes time to produce outputs and outcomes, and it would be difficult to single out
the Ramos’s SRA initiatives from other poverty alleviation measures under the other
administrations.
At any rate, the SRA succeeded in building foundations to the country’s
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social reform initiatives in the succeeding administrations especially in terms of three major
aspects: (1) capacity to institute reforms, (2) the ability to focus resources for poverty reduction,
and (3) the capability to develop institutions for anti-poverty and people empowerment.
President Ramos’s leadership and political will to promote Social Reform Agenda
It should be noted that President Ramos took the initiative in adopting a new approach to fight
poverty – putting the marginalized Basic Sectors back in the center of human development. As
a result, the way poverty is defined has changed, and SRA has called for institutional changes.
In fact, many people share the view that the SRA was the most consultative, policy
reform-oriented, well-budgeted, clearly delineated, well-targeted anti-poverty program in the
recent history in the Philippines.
Some of the distinguishing features of the SRA can be
summarized as follows:
 The SRA manifests a clear vision as contained in Philippine 2000, and identifies poverty
reduction targets.
 Programs under the SRA adopt the Minimum Basic Needs (MBN) approach by
determining the actual needs of families and targeting to them.
MBN checklist of 33
indicators were developed corresponding to survival needs (health and nutrition, water and
sanitation), security needs (income security, shelter, peace and order), and enabling needs
(basic education and literacy and participation in governance). Hence, the definitions of
poverty have changed. (For reference, previous definitions were pegged on an income
threshold – the minimum income required by a family to purchase a basket of goods and
services). The SRA approach was localized to serve the actual needs of the poor and
disadvantaged people – it was not a bureaucracy driven, but demand driven initiative.
 In making policy decisions, bureaucracy was mobilized effectively.
Institutional
mechanisms such as Social Reform Council (see below), LEDAC (see above), and Cabinet
Cluster System (see below) etc. were heavily utilized for coordination among relevant
stakeholders.
 The program under the SRA ensured Basic Sector participation for policy formulation and
implementation. (see below for SRC membership) Representatives from farmers,
fisherfolks, indigenous cultural communities, urban poor workers (especially in the
informal sector), and other disadvantaged groups (such as women, persons with disabilities,
youth, disadvantaged students, elderly and victims of disasters) were the important part of
the initiative.
Efforts have been made to enhance coordination, interface and feedback
system among Basic Sectors and between Basic Sectors and the government.
 In order to secure accountability of programs under the SRA, feedback mechanisms were
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developed to facilitate continuous monitoring. To promote shared vision on social reform
and to disseminate its objectives, significance as well as achievements of the SRA, Ramos
visited countryside frequently wearing hats and jackets with the SRA logo mark, getting a
lot of media exposure.
Coordination among relevant stakeholders in making policy decisions in the SRA
President Ramos established the Social Reform Council (SRC) as the SRA’s policy-making
body, with himself as Chairman.
Ramos was highly visible in the SRC, which gave big push
to facilitate SRA programs.
SRC members include Cabinet Officers for Regional
Development (CORDs) as well as Basic Sector representatives – every Cabinet Secretary was
assigned each region in charge of SRA. This CORD system was introduced under the Aquino
Administration, and President Ramos strengthened/enhanced it.
Through SRC platform,
continuous policy dialogue took place between the government and the relevant stakeholders.
Just as he has demonstrated himself, President Ramos required each Cabinet Secretary to
disseminate the progress of SRA undertakings, utilizing media.
The priority target clientele of the SRA package are based on Basic Sectors and geographical
areas.
20 priority poorest provinces, also known as “Club 20” were chosen based on a set of
criteria composed of: poverty incidence, accessibility, peace and order, economic potential and
presidential prerogative.
With regards to funding, Poverty Alleviation Funds (PAFs) provided
additional resources to support the SRA programs as a deliberate initiative to fill equity gap.
The PAFs funded following nine SRA flagship programs in the 20 priority provinces.
SRA flagship programs
Socialized Housing Delivery for the Poor
Agency champion
Housing and Urban Development Coordinating
Council (HUDCC)
Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery Department of Social Welfare and Development
of Social Services
(DSWD)
Agricultural Development
Department of Agriculture (DA)
Fisheries Management and Development
Department of Agriculture (DA)
Protection of Ancestral Domain
Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENTR)
Workers Welfare and Protection
Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE)
Expansion of Credit
Department of Finance (DOF)
Livelihood Programs
Department of Labor and Employment and
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)
Institution-Building
and
Effective Department of Interior and Local Government
Participation in Governance
(DILG)
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The SRA institutional arrangements/coordination mechanism
Institutional arrangements to localize the SRA are shown below. The network-like structure is
aimed at ensuring complementation and collaboration in the implementation of SRA nationwide,
by clearly delineating accountabilities.
President Ramos convened Cabinet meetings in the
region frequently, with the engagement of congressmen, local/regional government, private
sector etc.
The SRA institutional arrangements/coordination mechanism
National level
LEDAC
Cabinet Cluster
System
Social Reform Council
Flagship champion, Cabinet Officers
(CORDs) & Basic Sector Representative
National technical working group
The President and
SRA Lead Convenor
SRA Secretary-General
Social Reform Council Secretariat
Regional level
Regional Development Council
Regional technical working group
Regional composite Secretariat
Provincial level
c/o NEDA Regional
Office with DILG
Regional Office and
Office of the CORD
Provincial Social Reform Council/ Provincial
Development Council
Provincial technical working group
Provincial Planning and Development Office
Municipal level
CORD and RDC
Chairperson
Governor
Provincial Planning
and Development
Coordinator
With corresponding counterpart structures …..
Barangay level
Addition made to the Sourcebook on the Social Reform
Agenda: Vol. 5. Local Strategies to Fight Poverty
Utilization of Cabinet Cluster System to enhance interagency coordination
In addition to the SRC and LEDAC, Ramos intensively utilized Cabinet Cluster System as well.
The Cabinet Clusters (as listed below) serves as advisory committees of the President and the
Cabinet, and it aims to enhance interagency coordination in government decision-making
process and to expedite the implementation of vital interagency programs and projects.
Cabinet Cluster System was established during the Aquino Administration and enhanced by
Ramos – cluster meetings were held either monthly or as necessary.
Any Cabinet Secretary
may attend any cluster meetings to ensure policy and operational matters are consistent with the
overall thrusts of the government.
 Cluster A: Agro-industrial development
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 Cluster B: Macro-economy and Finance
 Cluster C: Human resources and development
 Cluster D: Physical infrastructure support
 Cluster E: Security and political development
 Cluster F: Development administration
 Cluster G: Water resources management
 Cluster H: International relations
3. Some questions
Experiences and the lessons from the Ramos Administration suggest that the key elements
necessary for effective leadership are: proper vision, strong political will, and decisive action.
People may pose a fundamental question that President Ramos just happened to be at the right
place at the right time, and any President would have done the same thing given the country’s
emergency situations. The real assessment of President Ramos’s leadership would be done by
imagining what would happen in the Philippines were it not for President Ramos. We do not
have another Philippines to compare with so this is impossible.
But we should pay due
attention to people’s remarks in response to these questions: “Nobody could have managed
better than President Ramos – if Ramos stayed longer, the outcome must have been different.”
References
Almonte, Jose T., To put our House in Order: We Must Level the Playing Field, Metro Manila:
Foundation for Economic Freedom, Inc. (2007)
Bernardo, Romeo L. and Tang, Marie Christine G., The Political Economy of Reform during the
Ramos Administration (1992-1998), final draft of country case study as input for Commission
on Growth and Development, World Bank (July 2007)
Canlas, Dante B., Political Governance, Economic Policy Reforms, and Aid Effectiveness: The
Case of the Philippines with Lessons from the Ramos Administration, the lectures delivered at
the GRIPS seminar and at the GRIPS course (Policy Design and Implementation in Developing
Countries) on June 2007, Tokyo
Hermoso, Reuel R., An Introduction to Economics and Economic Development Issues in the
Philippines, ACSPPA and PCJC-HRD and Bookmark, Inc. (1997)
Kawanaka, Takeshi, Posuto Edosa-Ki no Firipin (The Philippines in the Post-EDSA Period),
Kenkyu Sosho (2005)
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Izumi Ohno and Masumi Shimamura, Managing the Development Process and Aid—East Asian
experiences in building central economic agencies—, GRIPS Development Forum (2007)
Ramos, Fidel V., Responsible Citizenship, Responsible Governance, Ramos Peace and
Development Foundation, Inc. and SGV Foundation Inc. (2007)
Ramos, Fidel V., Leadership for the 21st Century, Our Labors Today Will Shape Our Country’s
Future, Friends of Steady Eddie (1997)
Ramos, Fidel V., Our Time Has Come, The Goals We Set Ourselves To Obtain For Our People
Are Now Within Our Reach, Friends of Steady Eddie (1996)
Sourcebook on the Social Reform Agenda Vol. 1-8, consolidated by the Secretariat of the Social
Reform Council in close coordination with the national and regional Technical Action Officers
The Ramos Presidency and Administration, Record and Legacy (1992-1998), University of the
Philippines Press (1998)
The Ramos Presidency and Administration, Contemporary Views and Assessments (1992-1998),
University of the Philippines Press (1998)
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