ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 IRISH LEAGUE OF CREDIT UNIONS RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT Strictly Confidential This report contains information of a confidential nature to the credit union movement and is not for distribution to third parties without the prior authorisation of the ILCU Rationalisation Committee. 1 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 Irish League of Credit Unions Report of the Rationalisation Committee Written by Noreen Byrne (Centre for Co-operative Studies, UCC) in conjunction with the Rationalisation Committee March - 2006 2 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 FOREWORD As President of the Irish League of Credit Unions, I acknowledge and recognise the work of the Rationalisation Committee members, who have given their time, commitment, experience and expertise to this project. For over a year the committee has researched, discussed, sought expert advice and consulted with the movement to bring forward this report. At CGM the movement again has an opportunity to reflect on the recommendations for change contained in the report. Rationalisation is one of the key strategic issues that face the movement to-day. Every credit union movement worldwide has been forced to rationalise. The Irish League of Credit Unions wants to lead the strategy on rationalisation/co-operation rather than it being lead by market forces or regulatory pressures. This document is a lesson in co-operation and will be a litmus test to see how real cooperation is in the Irish credit union movement. If it is real – then the models contained in the report will work. In order for credit unions to give access to financial services to all in their communities and to continue to develop our business services co-operation is the only way forward. There is an imperative for credit unions to co-operate which will strengthen the credit business model and the movement itself. Many thanks is extended to all committee members who have co-operated in this unique and important undertaking. This report is essential reading for all credit union personnel. Anne O’Byrne President – Irish League of Credit Unions March 2006 3 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 CHAIRMAN’S REPORT As Chairman of the Rationalisation Committee, I am pleased to have reached the point where the report of the committee can now be presented through the League for consideration by the whole movement The process has lasted almost eighteen months during which an enormous amount of research, discussion and consultation and evaluation has taken place. This was absolutely essential to fully inform the committee and to ensure that all aspects of rationalisation were considered. While the term can be a daunting one for the movement – if looked at from a purely business viewpoint – the often perceived threat diminishes when the ethos and cooperative nature of the movement set the context of the deliberations. The result, as set out in this report, gives sensible options for consideration. Whilst all credit unions are independent legal entities we cannot escape the inevitable conclusion that if we are to progress into the future we must collaborate in some way or other to provide the best service to our members. As we face the challenge we can draw huge strength from our co-operative ethos. It is clear that the League must lead through the development of a clear vision for the movement and through proactive encouragement and actions to achieve that vision. I commend the report for your consideration and action and look forward to a high level of innovation and collaboration in putting the recommendations in place. A special word of thanks is extended to all who willingly gave of their time and expertise on the committee, the Regulators for their opinions, and to all of the credit unions that participated in the recent workshops. Kathleen Prendergast CHAIRMAN 4 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY _________________________ This report is based on the work of the Rationalisation Committee, which was formed by the ILCU in late 2004. The committee was set up as a result of an SGM 2002 motion, which instructed the ILCU to look at the issue of Rationalisation in the movement. Significant credit union consultation took place before and during the lifetime of the committee. Feedback from all the various consultative forums highlighted to the committee that credit unions believe the movement has reached a cross-roads in its development and that change is now required. Credit unions There is also clear recognition that one of the ways of now at a crossimplementing that change and facing the challenges ahead is roads – change through greater inter-credit union co-operation. Feedback also required showed that credit unions did not want to be forced into ‘a one size fits all’ type of plan and wanted the ILCU to develop rationalisation models, which could inform credit unions in making a choice. To develop rationalisation models for the Irish movement, the committee examined the experience of International credit union movements. The experience of Credit Union Movements within an International context The process of rationalisation has been taking place for many years in credit union movements throughout the world. It can be clearly seen from the Table that credit unions in Ireland have been on a Country Number of Credit Unions course of expansion, in terms of From at its peak Today number of credit unions, rather than United States 23,866 9,274 Canada 6,000 635 a consolidation as is the case Australia 780 163 elsewhere. In the international New Zealand 300 41 Poland 340 80 movements, rationalisation has The Gambia 80 67 mainly came about as a result of UK 485 390 Albania 42 32 mergers and liquidations. The Ireland 536 * (STILL AT ITS PEAK) question for the committee was: What is driving this rationalisation? Table E1 Only focusing on affiliated ILCU credit unions Driving Forces for Rationalisation The committee’s review of the international credit union experience highlighted the following main driving forces for rationalisation: Intensifying competition Declining growth Increased regulatory burdens and restrictive legislation Limited products and service offerings 5 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 Increased need for technological capability Scale Governance issues Failure Strategic business decision (For further discussion of the above, go to Section Two of this report.) Are these forces present within the Irish Credit Union Movement1? The committee examined the Irish credit union movement to see if these rationalisation forces are present. From that analysis, it found that there are clear challenges ahead for credit unions. Market share in lending is decreasing, margins have become tighter, delinquency is increasing, some credit unions have potential solvency and other problems leading to the possibility of credit union failures, the product range and technology base is limited and there is possibly an increasing democratic deficit in the movement. Credit unions will find it difficult to rectify these issues and also develop the product and technology infrastructure, while operating as single entities. There is a clear need for greater and more effective co-operation between credit unions to create the necessary leverage to strengthen the business model and develop the required products and the supporting technology. If this is done it will help to put credit unions on a sound footing for the future. So how should rationalisation take place within the Irish movement? There are clear challenges for the credit union movement which signal the need for rationalisation. Credit unions need to strengthen their business model and at the same time build on their main competitive advantage - their distinctive co-operative nature. To achieve these aims while limiting costs, they will need to collaborate with other credit unions. We believe that credit unions have three potential paths of development. These are presented in Diagram E5. Diagram E5 Three potential paths of development for the credit union movement to maximise member benefit 2 1 Large-scale amalgamations Reduced down to a tiny number of large credit unions Not always desirable Decline of the CU as a Co-operative Movement – leading to eventual demutualisation Strategic and Sustainable way forward A mix of amalgamations and networks (reducing costs, development of products and technology base) 3 Do Nothing Large number of credit unions all operating independently of each other and declining business performance Most desirable Not Sustainable Sustainable way forward Decline of the CU movement 1 The analysis in this report is only based on ILCU credit unions. It must be recognized that there are other Irish credit unions which are affiliated to other groups in the ROI and NI. 6 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 The committee is of the view that Path 2 is the most desirable direction for the Irish credit union movement, leading to a stronger movement in terms of credit unions as businesses and as co-operatives. The committee feels that Path 3 would lead to continuing worsening trends in the movement and Path 1 would lead to the eventual demutualisation of the credit union movement. The Rationalisation Committee Survey asked credit unions to indicate their preference for three forms of rationalisation/co-operation (which where developed out of the BDM 2005 feedback), namely informal co-operation, strategic alliances and amalgamations. The responses showed that 55% of credit unions who responded would favour the informal co-operation route, while 24% of credit unions prefer strategic alliance as a form of rationalisation and 15% prefer amalgamations. It is very positive that 94% of the surveyed credit unions (101) responded to this question. It is also positive that there is a significant degree of co-operation already taking place within the movement and that credit unions are open to further co-operation. The literature indicates that informal co-operation or networks are necessary for the development of formalized and sustainable networks. Therefore, the current level of informal co-operation taking place in the movement is an excellent foundation for more formalised networks such as Credit Union Service Organisations (CUSOs) and Strategic Alliances. (For further discussion, see Section Four.) Appropriate Models of Rationalisation for Irish Credit Unions There are a number of potential models of co-operation which will lead to rationalisation in terms of costs and give leverage to develop products and services and the technology base. As part of its strategic planning process, each credit union should choose the most appropriate model for their own organisation. The models are as follows: Networks Strategic Alliances Credit Union Service Organisations (CUSOs) Shared Branching Amalgamations Transfer of Engagements Wind-up The committee presents these models to allow credit unions to decide for themselves how they would like to collaborate with other credit unions. For example, for credit unions that experience constant difficulty, the best option may be to consider a transfer of engagements; or for those who have close relationships with neighbouring credit unions, the development of networks may be the most appropriate option; and so on. (For greater detail, see Section Five of this report.) 7 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 Where do we go from here? – Recommendations As well as strengthening the business model, credit unions will also need to maintain and strengthen their co-operative ethos and identity. After all, this is the main competitive advantage of credit unions within the financial services marketplace. This has led us to make recommendations in two key themes: 1. Rationalisation through greater inter-credit union co-operation & development of the business model 2. Strengthening and reinforcing credit union vision and ethos Within these two main themes, we make detailed recommendations in four key areas: Increased inter-credit union co-operation & strengthening the credit union business model 1. Strengthen the business model of the credit union Develop products and services which meet real needs Develop performance categories for credit unions Reduce delinquency within the movement Lobby for enabling credit union legislation Investigate common bond effectiveness 2. Strengthen inter-credit union collaboration Ensure proper governance Re-enforce co-operative identity Monitor impact of changes on co-operative nature of credit union Develop social auditing guidelines Vision and Ethos 3. Maintain and reinforce the co-operative nature of the credit union (member control and ownership) Strategic Plan for the movement and individual credit unions Form senate to inform the strategic direction of movement 4. Formulate clear strategic direction for credit unions and the movement Develop National Common Bond of Service IT – increase compatibility between systems & establish national IT platform Build on current co-operation already happening in movement Develop detailed practical guidelines of models of co-operation League must strengthen relationships with other representative bodies and Regulators No new credit unions to be developed 8 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 Credit unions examine their own situation and decide on the most appropriate model (Networks, CUSOs, Amalgamations, Transfer of Engagements, Strategic Alliances, Wind-up) (For further detail on the recommendations, please see Section Six of this Report) 9 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 TABLE OF CONTENTS ________________________ Section 1: Background to the Debate on Rationalisation in Ireland Section 2: Literature and Research on Rationalisation Section 3: Current Status of the Irish Credit Union Movement Section 4: View of Rationalisation from the Movement Section 5: A Way Forward – Potential Models Section 6: Conclusions & Recommendations Bibliography Appendices ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The Rationalisation Committee would like to thank all the credit unions which participated in the survey and attended the consultative forums. ABBREVIATIONS ILCU CUDA CUMA ROI NI IFSRA FSA CUSO ICCA ABCUL UFCU Irish League of Credit Unions Credit Union Development Association Credit Union Managers Association Republic of Ireland Northern Ireland Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority Financial Services Authority Credit Union Service Organisation Irish Credit Co-operative Administration Association of British Credit Unions Limited Ulster Federation of Credit Unions 10 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 SECTION ONE BACKGROUND TO THE DEBATE ON RATIONALISATION IN IRELAND _____________________________________________ 1.1 Introduction This report is based on the work of the Rationalisation Committee of the Irish League of Credit Unions. After one year of work involving research, group discussion, expert advice and consultation with the wider movement, the committee now presents its report. The report outlines the arguments for and against of various rationalisation choices, offers a number of models for consideration and makes recommendations. To introduce the report, we present the background to the formation of the Rationalisation Committee. 1.2 From where did the concept of Rationalisation in the Irish Movement originate? Rationalisation was considered in the Review Commission Report (2002) as follows: “Credit unions are co-operative financial institutions facing a rapidly changing financial market place and regulatory environment. Some will, undoubtedly, find the consequences and demands hard, if not impossible to meet. For many credit unions, to meet the coming regulatory requirements and to deliver the kind of service their members will expect in the future, they may have to think seriously about rationalisation; about forms of close association with neighbouring credit unions. This need not mean loss of identity or a reduction in outlets, but it will require pre-planning and an openness to change”. Following the Review Commission recommendation, Resolution (No. 42) was passed at the SGM of the ILCU in 2002. It read as follows: “That the League Project on Credit Union Development due to commence this year, consider the issue of credit union rationalisation, identify barriers and make recommendations”. Following regional consultative road shows held in early 2004 to receive feedback from the movement on rationalisation, various presentations were made at the CGM 2004. The Rationalisation Committee was formed in late 2004 and consisted of credit union directors, managers, both ICCA2 and CUMA3 representatives, academic researchers and League personnel (Appendix 1 contains a list of the committee members). All regions of the country were represented. The committee met throughout 2005 and early 2006 and consulted widely with the movement, researched the international and Irish experiences and discussed how rationalisation could take 2 3 ICCA: Institute of Credit Co-operative Administration CUMA: Credit Union Managers Association 11 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 place in the Irish credit union context. Its remit was to identify barriers and make recommendations to credit unions on how rationalisation might take place within the movement. To frame the work of the committee, it was first necessary to develop and adopt a definition of rationalisation. 1.3 Definition of Rationalisation Adopted by the Committee After lengthy discussion and debate among the committee members, taking into consideration the consultations from the wider movement, the following working definition of rationalisation was adopted: “Rationalisation enables credit unions to access the necessary support mechanisms to address their service needs, business issues and compliance requirements. This development and support process can be best achieved and developed by co-operation, strategic alliances or amalgamations”. The committee felt that this definition of rationalisation reflected the spirit of Resolution No. 42 of SGM 2002, whilst being broad enough to incorporate the various forms of rationalisation and allow credit unions freedom and choice. The committee is of the view that embracing rationalisation in whatever format should ensure the autonomous survival of the credit union concept within the communities credit unions aim to serve. 1.4 Approach of the Committee The Rationalisation Committee did not want to design a ‘grand plan’ for the movement, but instead wished to present a number of options to credit unions whereby they themselves would start to strategically examine the development of their own organisations and consider how they can develop their credit unions into the future, both in terms of financial strength and in the provision of maximum member service and benefit. This could mean forming amalgamations or strategic alliances, formal networks between credit unions or engaging in greater informal networking. 1.5 Layout of the Report This Section has presented the background to the establishment of the Rationalisation Committee. Section Two discusses how rationalisation has taken place in other credit union movements across the world and explores what the literature has to say on the various rationalisation choices. We consider the current status of the credit union movement in Ireland in Section Three. This is followed by a Section on the views from the movement on rationalisation. Section Five presents a possible way forward and with a number of potential rationalisation models. Finally, the last Section sets out the recommendations of the committee. 12 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 SECTION TWO LITERATURE AND RESEARCH ON RATIONALISATION _________________________________________ 2.1 Introduction In this section, we analyse and focus on the experience of rationalisation within other credit union movements across the world and the Irish Agricultural Co-operative Movement. This helps us to learn from their successes and avoid their mistakes, thereby assisting us in the development of models that are appropriate to the Irish credit union context. 2.2 Co-operative Movements and Rationalisation 2.2.1 Current situation with regard to consolidation in credit unions throughout the world. The story of credit union movements throughout the world has been one of consolidation and rationalisation, as can be seen from the table below: Table 2.1 International Credit Union Movement Rationalisation Country Number of Credit Unions From at its peak Today United States 23,866 9,274 Canada 6,000 635 Australia 780 163 New Zealand 300 41 Poland 340 80 The Gambia 80 67 UK 485 390 Albania 42 32 Ireland 536* (STILL AT ITS PEAK) * This report focuses on ILCU affiliated credit unions only. However, it must be remembered that there are a number of credit unions who are affiliated to representative bodies such as CUDA, UFCU and ABCUL. As can be seen from Table 2.1, the number of credit unions is decreasing in all countries. This is true for both mature and the relatively new credit union movements of The Gambia, Poland and Albania. In Ireland, however, until very recently, the movement has been expanding with new credit unions been formed year on year. Therefore, credit union numbers in Ireland have been on a course of expansion, rather than consolidation, as is the experience elsewhere. Before examining rationalisation in credit union movements in other countries, it may be useful to examine rationalisation in another co-operative movement in Ireland – the Irish Agricultural Co-operative Movement. 13 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 2.2.2 Rationalisation in the Irish Agricultural Co-operative Movement: possible lessons for credit unions4 Some may view the story of the development of the Irish Agricultural Co-operative Movement as having little relevance to credit unions, but there are, in fact, a number of interesting parallels. Firstly, credit unions are now at the same point of development as agricultural co-operatives were in the 1960s and 1970s. During the 1960s, the State commissioned a number of reports and studies on the dairy sector, mainly in preparation for EEC membership. Enright (1997:9) asserts that all these studies stressed the need for rationalisation and amalgamations in the dairy industry to achieve economies of scale and to allow diversification, and emphasised the need for orderly marketing (Smith & Quinn, 1974, cited in Enright). Analysis showed that 80% of creameries in Munster were within six miles of each other, while improvements in transport and roads had long made such proximity redundant. The same could be said of credit unions in the cities, which are often just walking distance apart from each other. Secondly, credit unions display many of the weaknesses that were highlighted in the agricultural co-operatives during this period. During the 1960s there was a major evaluation of the agricultural co-operative movement. One of those reviews was the Knapp Report (1964), which highlighted a number of weaknesses in the Agricultural Co-operative Movement. Some of these are strikingly similar to the Irish credit union movement. For example, Knapp (1964) cited lack of communication throughout the entire agricultural co-operative movement as a weakness, where there was little communication between the co-operative and the members to a point where the cooperative was looked upon as a ‘service centre’ rather than being of direct interest to the member. Possibly the same could be said for some Irish credit unions, where the member relationship does not often go beyond the transaction. He also cited the lack of co-operation and communication between the co-operatives themselves, where effectively co-operatives were all working alone. Irish credit unions also tend to work alone. Knapp also cited lack of direction, where some co-operatives appeared to be more ‘concerned in protecting of the status quo than in improving the services to members’. Of course this would not apply to all credit unions, but could be applied to those with limited opening hours and services. He also cited governance weaknesses in some of the co-operatives, where the board was weak and direction and leadership were left to the manager. There was limited input from members, with annual reports that were not easily understood and AGMs which were usually ‘perfunctory and poorly attended’ with little effort made to ‘stimulate discussion’. The ROI Regulator of Credit Unions (2005) recently highlighted that this is also the case for a number of credit unions and he has suggested that there is an increasing democratic deficit in the movement. Goth (2005) and McCarthy (2005) support this view. Knapp also highlighted a lack of systematic planning for future development. The majority of credit unions do not involve themselves in strategic planning in a time of increasing competition and decreasing market share. The Rationalisation Committee would like to thank Ted O’Sullivan who highlighted the parallels between the Agricultural Co-operative Movement and the Credit Union Movement. 4 14 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 Interestingly, Knapp also cited the over-emphasis on price in the agricultural cooperatives as a weakness, where it was used as the only measure of performance and member benefit. Credit unions often assume that once they provide a satisfactory dividend and interest rebate, they are maximising member benefit. Knapp pointed out that membership of a co-operative should be about more than just getting the right price. He also cited lack of member education on the co-operative ethos. He asserted that Irish Agricultural co-operatives have: “done better in building volume of business and financial strength than they have in maintaining co-operative strength of their organisations”. Many subsequent writers (Ward et al, 1982, 2000, 2005; Bolger, 1983) believed that the weaknesses cited by Knapp (1964) paved the way for the weakening of the cooperative nature of the agricultural co-operatives and for a number of the subsequent conversions to PLC. It should be remembered that conversion to PLC is not an alien concept to the credit union movement. There have been cases of conversion to PLC in the Swedish and Belgian movements (Modell, 1993, Fisher, 2002). There have also been cases of credit union demutualisation in the US, Canada and Australia (Goth 2005). While Knapp made a number of recommendations with regard to member education and maximisation of member benefit, his overall recommendation was the need for greater rationalisation and consolidation within the movement. On the back of this report, the agricultural co-operative movement went through a major period of amalgamations, takeovers and joint ventures from 1970 to the 1990s, where the number of such co-operatives decreased from 160 to 30 today (Ward, 2000, 2005). Ward (2005) indicates that various forms of rationalisation took place in the movement, from large-scale amalgamations to federated network models. While there was consolidation within the movement, it is not clear whether rationalisation has helped the co-operatives to address the weaknesses highlighted by Knapp. It could be said that for those that privatised, some of these weaknesses were intensified. Ward (1982, 2005) would advocate that the network models were better at dealing with the weakness highlighted by Knapp. However, Ward (1982, 2005) also stress that, in some circumstances, amalgamations were the best option, particularly in cases where there was not a clear group of local co-operatives which could network together or where a co-operative had a very close relationship with a local co-operative and where it made strategic sense to amalgamate. The question for us here is, how should successful rationalisation be measured? Should the result be large international businesses or should it be the maximisation of member benefit? If rationalisation is measured in terms of the creation of large international businesses, then the rationalisation of the Irish Agricultural Co-operative Movement was a success. However, if measured in terms of member benefit, then that success is less clear. It should be noted that those cooperatives which decided to primarily focus on the farmer, rather than on the 15 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 development of an international business, have consistently offered a better milk price to the farmer, e.g. The West Cork Agricultural Co-operatives. What can credit unions learn from the experience of the Agricultural Cooperative Movement? First of all, many of the issues raised above are also weaknesses of Irish credit unions. These very weaknesses of the agricultural co-operatives were key factors which contributed to the eventual privatisation of many of the co-operatives. Credit union boards, managers and members do not wish to see privatisation or demutualisation of credit unions. The credit unions must ensure that they reinforce the co-operative nature of the credit union, with a strong volunteer board that is representative of the membership and must ensure that they continually remind members of the distinctive nature of the credit union. The Regulator, the ILCU and credit unions themselves must always measure the impact of any changes (legislation, regulation, product introduction and so on) in terms of their potential for the dilution of member control and ownership. Secondly, the Agricultural Co-operative Movement, through wide-scale rationalisation, reduced itself down from 160 co-operatives to 30 today. The Rationalisation Committee does not wish to see the credit union movement reduced down to such numbers. However, at the same time, the credit union movement will naturally go into decline if it does not strengthen its business model, and develop its technology and product and service base. We believe credit unions will need to cooperate with other credit unions in order to do this. This could be through a number of amalgamations and through the formation of networks. Thirdly, there were two forms of rationalisation in the Agricultural Co-operative Movement; one which was highly focused on the creation of international business and the second, which was more focused on member benefits. The former led to varying levels of dilution of member control and ownership. Credit unions must ensure that all business decisions, including rationalisation, are based on member benefits - where member control and ownership is strengthened and not diluted. This leads us to make the following recommendation: The League, Regulators and credit unions must ensure that any changes (legislation, regulation, new products and so on) do not impact negatively on the members’ control and ownership of the credit union. An impact assessment model must be developed (Recommendation 3) Credit unions must also ensure that they strengthen their co-operative and credit union ethos. After all, this is their primary competitive advantage. Part of this will involve educating and increasing awareness among members, staff and volunteers of the credit union ethos and its relevance in the modern world. 16 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 This leads us to make the following recommendation: Greater need for credit union and member, volunteer and staff awareness of the credit union ethos (refocusing on what it means to be a co-operative) a. The League must develop educational programs/seminars which help boards, staff and volunteers to ‘re-understand’ the meaning of the co-operative ethos of the credit union b. The League, within their new national marketing campaign, must develop templates of promotional material/programs which develop the brand of the credit union based on its unique ethos c. Individual credit unions must educate all new and existing staff and volunteers in the meaning of the credit union as a co-operative (Recommendation 2) In the future, credit unions will come under increasing pressure to prove that they are different from other financial institutions. This pressure will come from legislators, members and from the general public. A useful way of providing such proof, while also keeping credit unions focused on their social as well as economic objectives, is to produce a social audit in addition to a financial audit. VanCity Credit Union in Canada and the Co-operative Bank in the UK are two well-known examples of organisations which produce an annual social audit report. The League should develop social auditing guidelines for credit unions (Recommendation 4) 2.3 Rationalisation in the credit union movements across the world 2.3 Rationalisation in credit union movements across the world 2.3.1 What form did it take? The vast bulk of credit union rationalisation throughout the world has come about through mergers and liquidations. US credit unions have rationalised primarily through mergers, but over recent years, are increasingly using other rationalisation models such as the development of shared services structures such as CUSOs, outsourcing non-core services and the development of strategic alliances. These models will also be discussed later in this Section. 2.3.2 Primary driving forces of rationalisation for credit unions In the United States, Wilcox (2005) notes that the primary driving force in the early years of credit union rationalisation was credit union failure. During the 1970s and 1980s, rationalisation was brought about by the liquidation of failing credit unions and the merging with healthy credit unions. This was a period of economic recession and Wilcox (2005:2) notes that the “high and volatile unemployment, inflation and interest rates adversely affected depositories of all kinds”. Rick (1985:5) indicates that before 1982, credit union mergers were induced by regulatory authorities or the board of directors for one or more of the following reasons: 17 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 Poor asset quality Inadequate reserves or profitability Retirement of a CEO without a successor Another factor driving mergers, according to Rick (1998:3), is credit union asset size. He states that from 1980 to 1996 there was a 45% reduction in the number of credit unions in the US. Most of these credit unions had assets of less than $10 (€8.3) million with the greatest reductions in those with less than $5 (€4.6) million. Rick (1998) points out that the credit unions within this smaller category either merged, liquidated, grew to a larger asset class, or failed. He highlights that these credit unions have had the most difficulty meeting members’ service needs, adjusting to increased regulatory burdens, adopting new technology, and reaching the volume needed to achieve greater economies of scale and efficiency. Also small credit unions found it hard to cope with stringent regulatory requirements. Goth (2005) highlights that increasing regulation was one of the factors driving rationalisation in Canada. In Australia, Garden (1999) states that the motivations behind mergers were the “drive for greater operational economies; legislative incentives; the need to broaden bonds of association; demand for wider distribution networks, and the desire for interstate links between related credit unions” (Crapp & Skully, 1985:160). He further states that regulatory authorities tend towards enforcing mergers to ensure greater efficiency and stability within the financial system. In Australia and New Zealand, the main driving force for rationalisation (due to mergers or liquidations) was pressure from the new regulatory regime which favoured such rationalisation. Sibblad & McAlevey (1999:1) cite the Australian Regulator who stated that: “My main aims are the promotion of rationalisation and efficiency within credit unions”. Rick (1998:5) notes that today, credit unions are deciding to merge for strategic business reasons rather than financial distress. He indicates that many small and medium sized credit unions are now merging to reduce overhead costs, to afford new technology, and to offer better products. He concludes that, “credit unions now view mergers not as a strategy to survive, but to do better”. An additional factor that is driving mergers in the UK is volunteer burnout and governance issues (Goth, McKillop, Ferguson, 2005). In summary, the primary forces driving rationalisation are as follows: Increasing competition Declining growth Scale Increased regulatory burdens and legislation concerns Increased need for technological capability Limited service offerings Governance issues Failure Strategic business decision 18 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 Section Three of this report will examine Irish credit unions in terms of these forces. 2.3.3 Research Evaluation of Rationalisation Models Applied in Credit Unions in Other Countries As the majority of rationalisation across credit union movements has mainly consisted of mergers and liquidations, the analysis of rationalisation around the world focuses on mergers of credit unions, and primarily focuses on the impact on individual credit unions rather than on the overall movement. We present some of this analysis here. Mergers Fried, Lovell and Yaisawarng (1999) studied 1,600 credit unions in the US, which were involved in one or more mergers during the 1989-1994 period. They set out to answer three research questions in relation to credit union mergers: 1. Do members of acquiring* credit unions benefit from mergers? 2. Do members of acquired* credit unions benefit from mergers? 3. What are the characteristics of relatively successful, and relatively unsuccessful mergers? The results indicate that, on average, service provision to members had improved in acquired credit unions, and had remained unchanged in acquiring credit unions. However, with more detailed analysis, they find that roughly half of acquiring credit unions and roughly one fifth of acquired credit unions do experience a decline in service provision following a merger. An Australian study of thirty one credit union mergers found that mergers are not associated with improvements in efficiency superior to those achieved by internal growth (Ralston, Wright & Garden, 2001). These researchers believe that the twin goals of economies of scale and improved member service: “may be better gained through aligning with other small financial institutions and centralised bodies to purchase aggregated services, and outsourcing specialised technology support and product development expertise”. They go on to say that to remain competitive, a credit union, like other firms, must create a balance between the size of the organisation and the member service. They conclude that mergers alone will not ensure the survival of credit unions in the third millennium. Another Australian study (Garden, 1999) found that on “average there were no gains for merged credit unions in either allocative efficiency5 or x-efficiency6 relative to other credit unions”. Of the sixteen mergers studied, three showed a gain in efficiency, four resulted in no change and nine institutions declined in efficiency in the three-year post-merger period. However, the impact of mergers may not be seen for many years, therefore a three-year period may be too short (Rick, 1998). * These are the terms used in the literature and are not those of the Rationalisation Committee. Allocative efficiency reflects the ability of the firm to use inputs in optimal proportions, given the price of those inputs. 6 X-efficiency is directly linked to managerial ability to control costs or to maximize revenue. 5 19 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 Rick (1998) points to the disruptive nature of mergers on credit unions, where they can breed controversy over who will get to be the new Chair of the credit union, which is going to be the surviving credit union and who will sit on the board. He also highlights that mergers can be disruptive to credit union employees as their ‘functions are consolidated and reorganised’. However, these are all areas that can be negotiated. For example, in the case of mergers, the majority of staff maintain their jobs and for those who do not, they should be adequately compensated. Rick further states that mergers can diminish credit unions’ ‘collective voice with regulators and legislators’. As credit unions merge, there are fewer volunteers and possibly fewer people who are “willing to raise their voices in support of their credit union”. In terms of the US study, Fried, Lovell and Yaisawarng (1999) also examine the various characteristics of credit unions which benefit from mergers. They found that acquired credit unions are likely to benefit from mergers if they have room to improve, for example, weak loan portfolios and so on. Acquiring credit unions are likely to benefit from mergers if they have previous experience with mergers. Finally, they indicate that merger partners, both acquired and to a lesser extent acquiring, are likely to benefit from mergers if they are both different, where each can benefit from the unique competency of the other. Hoel (2004) states that acquired credit unions benefit from a merger when the acquiring credit union is much larger, where the acquired loan quality is poor, where there is a big difference in products per member and where there is a small difference in loans to savings ratios. However, several successful mergers have taken place in the US as well as elsewhere (Hoel, 2004; Rick, 1998). Hoel (2004) maintains that mergers can be particularly beneficial to the acquired credit union. This is usually the credit union which is in a weaker position and which greatly benefits from the resources and competence of the larger acquiring credit union. In such a situation the members of the acquired credit union receive increased member benefit from the merger, through better products and services. Hoel cites Forbes, a CEO of Westminster Savings Credit Union Canada, who states that the goal of mergers should be when: “a merged credit union adds value for members, creates opportunity for managers and staff, becomes a stronger member of the credit union system and is a bigger contributor to its community”. Amalgamations Within much of the literature reviewed in the last section, amalgamations are hardly mentioned and where they are, the term is used interchangeably with mergers. However, there is a difference between a merger and an amalgamation. A merger is the acquisition of one company by another so that only one remains: for example where one company acquires most or all of the shares in another so that the latter becomes a subsidiary. Amalgamation, on the other hand, is the actual coming together of two or more credit unions to create a new credit union as their successor. It should be noted that the Credit Union Act, 1997, makes reference not to mergers but instead, to amalgamations and transfers of engagements. In an amalgamation, both co-operatives must agree joint policies and strategies going forward as a new entity. In a sense, both arrive at the negotiating table as equals. In a merger context, Welsh 20 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 (2004:14) asserts that ‘a merger of equals’ approach is ‘doomed to failure’. He states that one player must be dominant and both parties must understand from the beginning that “one of the players must be empowered to make the tough calls”. In the case of the agricultural co-operative amalgamations, equality of partners often resulted in very large boards, where neither co-operative was willing to relinquish board positions. Ward (1982, 2005) and Enright (1997) asserted that this sometimes worked against rationalisation objectives. Mergers and amalgamations are not the only forms of rationalisation. The remainder of this section will examine some of the alternatives that could also be considered. Alternative forms of rationalisation In this sub-section, we discuss various forms of rationalisation open to credit unions: Networks Strategic Alliances Credit Union Service Organisations (CUSOs) Shared Branching Out-sourcing Networks Networks are, in essence, associations of people, or organisations, who join together for mutual benefit (Holmlund & Fulton, 1999:1). They are usually characterised by a formal co-operative arrangement between a number of organisations who have come together to achieve a common goal (Gubik (2005) citing Kocsis (2000)). Within the business development literature (see Porter, 1998, 2000), there is significant interest in the role of networks and clusters in the development of small and medium sized businesses. Gubik (2005:28) refers to it as corporate co-operation, which she defines as the “connection of independent companies or partners, whose objective is to combine their resources and efforts in the value creation process”. She asserts that this increased interest among small to medium sized businesses in corporate cooperation is a result of a changed economic environment and increased competition. Holmlund & Fulton (1999), talking in an agricultural context, discuss the importance of networks in the new knowledge or ‘know-how’ economy. They state that knowledge, almost by definition, is something that cannot be produced in isolation. They state that: “unlike the old ways of doing business, networks allow for specialisation and diversification at the same time. Each member can specialise in their own area, but still have access to the know-how of all the others. Networks are the basis for communication and information sharing. They allow ideas, actions, plans etc. to work together for a combined result that is greater than the sum of their individual parts. In short, the network allows for both specialisation and access to new ideas and new know-how (and therefore diversification)”. 21 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 They conclude that, logically, it is not possible for one autonomous operation to both diversify and specialise at the same time. But it is possible to ally with others to form a large, profitable and energetic entity made up of many autonomous parts. Writing within a credit union and co-operative bank context, Fischer (2002) subdivides governance models into federated-network and atomised-competitive or nonnetwork models. He defines the first as an integrated tightly organised (strategic) network and the second as a looser arrangement with low levels of integration. He shows the credit union movements which fit each model by country, as presented in Table 2.2. Table 2.2 Fischer’s (2002) Categorization Federated-Network Non-network Austria Australia Belgium English Canada Finland Italy France Spain French Canada Switzerland Germany United Kingdom Luxembourg United States Korea (South) (Ireland) Netherlands Although he did not include Ireland in his categorisation, it is clear that it falls under the non-network classification. Based on his analysis of data from the credit union movements of these sixteen countries, and using the Data Envelopment Analysis (recently also used by Goth, Mckillop & Ferguson, 2005), he shows that financial cooperatives operating under the federated-network governance model have equal or superior (but not inferior) performance to those operating under the non-network governance model. In a later study, Desrochers & Fischer (2003) compared the Quebec Desjardins Movement with the United States Credit Union System - the first, coming under the network model categorisation and the latter under the non-network model. In their study they found that the Desjardins model had a higher overall efficiency than the US credit union model. They assert that the strategic network provides a monitoring system which helps to counter the problems associated with the dilution of internal governance as a result of size. They also make the proposition that strategic networks are a “superior form of governance mechanism over mergers as a strategy of rationalisation and consolidation”. Goth (2005) also highlights the relevance of the network model for the future development of Irish credit unions. However, there are also challenges with regard to networks. Ward, Briscoe & Linehan (1982) indicate that tension and conflict can arise between the members of a network and the central hub, particularly in the case of ongoing financial commitment and investment. If a member decides to leave the network, it can greatly increase its vulnerability. However, Ward et al (1982) stress that most of this tension can usually be avoided if the network is properly constituted in the first instance. Successful networks are also highly dependent on the elimination of opportunism or the ‘freerider problem’. Therefore, the development of trust between the members is essential (O’Reilly & Haines (2004); Ouden, Ziggers, Duysters (2005)). Hence, the creation of 22 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 a successful network will take time as it will first require the development of strong relational capital between the members before the formal network is developed. We will now discuss a number of network options. Strategic Alliances A strategic alliance is a type of network – a partnership that is strategic because it is entered into by design, with serious thought given to benefits to be gained from the partnership. Holmlund & Fulton (1999) indicate that strategic alliances represent the balance between being entirely on your own in the market-place and being completely swallowed up by bigger interests. They present this diagrammatically as follows: Diagram 2.1 Strategic Alliances Independence Integration Strategic Alliances Taken from Holmlund & Fulton (1999) Rick (1998) discusses two forms of strategic alliance that have relevance for credit unions. These are Credit Union Service Organisations (CUSOs) Shared Branching networks. Credit Union Service Organisations (CUSOs) CUSOs are organisations set up by a group of credit unions to provide services to their member credit unions. CUSOs seem to be mainly an American phenomenon. However, Fischer (2004) believes that the CUSO model could easily be adapted for other credit union movements. CUSOs were first formed in 1970. By 1995 there were 300 and by 2003 this had grown to 3,500 (NCUA, 2004). Under US law, a CUSO must be structured as a corporation, limited liability company or limited partnership. Rick (1998) states that the Federal7 Credit Union Act provides that loans to CUSOs from credit unions should be approved by the board of directors and shall not exceed 1% of the available capital and surplus of the credit union. In terms of investments, the federal credit union may invest funds in the CUSO of up to 1% of the available capital and surplus of the credit union. Therefore, a federal credit union has a maximum of 2% of its funds invested in a CUSO. Fischer (2004) indicates that the majority of American CUSOs have taken the limited liability company structure, with the credit union participating as a limited partner only. Credit unions are not authorised to be a general partner. Fischer (2004) points out that this isolates the credit 7 Credit Unions in the United States are either legislated under the Federal Credit Union Act or under a state charter. 23 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 union from risks that may be assumed in the CUSO. The CUSO operational structure is presented in Diagram 2.1. Diagram 2.2 CUSO Operational Structure SERVICE PROVIDER CU CUSO CU CU CU Ownership Service Fischer (2004) Rick (1998:22) states that the many products and services available through CUSOs make it possible for smaller credit unions to compete. In the US, CUSOs operating under National Credit Union Association (NCUA) regulations can offer the following services: Operational and Management Services: credit card and debit card, ATM, accounting systems, data processing, management training and support, payment item processing, record retention and storage, research, debt collection, credit analysis and loan serving and coin and currency, internetbased services for securities, cash ordering, electronic fund transfer (EFT), sale or lease of computer hardware and software and marketing. Services to Members: financial counselling, retirement counselling, investment counselling, discount brokerage, estate planning, income tax preparation, developing and administering individual retirement accounts, deferred compensation and other personal benefit plans, trust, acting as trustee, guardian, conservator, estate administrator, or in any other fiduciary capacity, real estate agency, agent for sale of insurance, personal property leasing, and provision of vehicle warranty programs. Consulting Services: Charter conversions, asset-liability management, modelling, research, marketing and strategic planning Property Management: personal property leasing and development of leasing plans 24 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 Other Services as determined by the directors and that are associated with the routine operation of credit unions While CUSOs can, under NCUA regulations, provide the services above, Fischer (2004) states that CUSOs tend to offer the following services in order of popularity: shared branching, followed by data processing, cheque clearing and financial and retirement planning services for credit union members. Section 5 will discuss the CUSO model in greater detail, in terms of its appropriateness for the Irish context. (For a full detailed list of the services a CUSO is allowed to offer, see Appendix Two.) Shared Branching Networks Rick (1998:23) asserts that banks are ‘formidable competition’ for credit unions primarily because of their scale. One way for credit unions to compete is to form cooperative shared branch facilities to counter banks’ advantages of scale. A shared branch operation provides branch office services for more than one credit union. The common bonds of some credit unions overlap with others, with members often belonging to both credit unions. Rick asserts that a shared branch is a good way to conserve resources, serve members, and plan for the future. Shared branching is not new in the United States having been in existence since the 1970s (Johnston (2004). By 1998, 6.8% of all credit unions were participating in some sort of shared branch system with larger credit unions more heavily involved (Rick, 1998). Shared branching means that members become a guest member at the participating credit union, allowing them access to all the services they would have at their own credit union, including savings and withdrawals, loan payments and advances, and so on. The current network system depends on a chain of faxing confirmations to verify balances and amounts. Although this method is based on a paper system, Johnston (2004) states that “it is very efficient and provides members with the necessary safety and flexibility”. Rick (1998) highlights the benefits of shared branching. He maintains that it allows those credit unions which have insufficient funds to build a branch themselves to participate in a shared branch system, thereby allowing greater accessibility for their members. This may also increase member convenience by having more evening and weekend hours and can also help relieve some of the queuing in an overstretched onebranch system. He highlights other benefits as: Reviving dormant member relations Delivering new accounts Cross-selling services and expanding account relationships Retaining members who relocate Serving members in various locations Allowing for effective competition against regional and national banks; and Reducing the need to build new branches and possibly allowing some branches to close 25 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 Rick (1998) points out that shared branch systems are owned and governed by the participating credit unions. For example, in New Jersey, seventeen credit unions, together with their service organisations, and the New Jersey Credit Union League formed the Credit Union Service Network, a state-wide shared branching, 24-hour lending, and ATM Co-operative. The network has 10 shared branch locations. The network also connects with 256 other shared branch locations nationwide and offers 24-hour lending and a call centre. Shared Branching is something that could work very well within the Irish credit union context. Many credit unions are already performing a limited version of this role informally by processing share withdrawals for members of other credit unions. This could be further developed to create a national common bond of service, while still maintaining the local membership common bond. Outsourcing/sub-contracting Kacheiski (2002) defines subcontracting as outsourcing work that is not the credit union’s core competency. Kacheiski (2002) presents a number of areas of outsourcing in credit unions as back office operations, such as accounts, payroll, technology and marketing. In the US, there are a number of credit unions which only have a ‘front office’ and all back office operations are outsourced to a larger credit union or other organisation. By outsourcing, credit unions can concentrate on their core member service. He outlines the main advantages and disadvantages of outsourcing as follows: Table 2.3 Advantages and Disadvantages of Outsourcing Advantages Disadvantages 1. Greater flexibility 1. The reliability of the outsource provider 2. Experts do a better job 2. Less quality control 3. Fewer overheads 3. Disassociation of the main organisation 4. Faster implementation of innovations As can be seen from the list of advantages and disadvantages, the success of outsourcing is very dependent on the level of trust between the credit union and the outsourcing partner. Disadvantages 1 and 2 are directly related to trust. With regard to the third disadvantage, the Filene Research Institute (2003), in a recent report, highlighted the fact that outsourcing allows credit unions to remain viable and retain their identity at the same time. The report discusses outsourcing and sharing of management in credit unions. Some credit unions outsource their day-to-day operational management but still retain a board for the strategic running of the credit union. Green Bay Credit Union Centre (in the US) is an example of such outsourcing. This centre is run as a co-operative and is owned by five credit unions with combined assets of $30 (€25) million. It was set up in 1973 with the objective of providing greater professional management to a number of small credit unions. Radue (2003), the CEO of the Centre, points out that if an individual credit union hired full-time professional staff and moved into its own building, costs would be much higher than if they were using co-operative facilities and management. He asserts that this allows the credit unions to concentrate on offering a better and wider range of services. Some 26 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 of the services offered by the credit unions are ATM access cards, debit cards, Individual Retirement Accounts, loans and savings, financial planning, first mortgages and home equity loans. He goes on to say that because the Centre is cooperatively owned, the Centre works in the interests of the credit unions and does not try to make a profit at their expense. Cost sharing is subdivided as follows: 45% based on assets, 5% based on the number of members, 25% based on income and 25% based on activity. Each participating credit union develops a commitment to the Centre and if they wish to leave they must seek Regulator approval. Radue (2003:26) concludes that: “for those who don’t want to lose their identity and still reap the efficiencies of scale, a shared management system is a reasonable option”. The Filene report also presents a second model, which may have relevance for the Irish context. This is the State Employees Credit Union (SECU), which provides management services to three credit unions. It has provided complete management and operational services since 1985 for one credit union, which currently has $3 (€2.5) million in assets and is now growing at 30% a year. For another, a $373(€310.8) million credit union, the only employees of which are the CEO and nine other high level managers, it has provided nearly-complete management since 1985. For a third, it has provided extensive support for a new credit union serving a local Latino community. The participating credit unions pay a percentage of their gross income to SECU as a service fee. However, Mike Lord, the CEO, states that in 2002, the revenue for SECU from these relationships was $6 (€5) million, but that there were many ‘soft’ costs which would reduce this income. Lord (2003) states that many of these relationships grew out of unique circumstances and with a philosophical underpinning that may not be replicable in more general cases. Possibly the most replicable is where SECU has an ATM-network, in which forty five other credit unions participate. For this, they pay a once-off fee. Lord indicates that this is a win-win situation for both SECU and for the participating credit unions, as SECU earns income to cover some of its sunk capital costs and participating credit unions do not have to make a large investment in expensive technology. Perhaps in Ireland, this is a model worth considering. 2.4 The potential future paths for Irish credit union development and rationalisation? From our analysis of rationalisation in the Irish Agricultural Co-operative Movement and in credit union movements across the world, we feel that the Irish credit union movement has three potential paths of development. These are presented in Diagram 2.3. 27 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 Diagram 2.3 Three potential paths of development for the credit union movement to maximise member benefit 1 2 Large-scale amalgamations Reduced down to a small number of large credit unions 3 Strategic and Sustainable way forward A mix of amalgamations and networks (reducing costs, development of products and technology base) Do Nothing Large number of credit unions all operating independently of each other and declining business performance Not always desirable Most desirable Not Sustainable Decline of the CU as a Co-operative Movement Sustainable way forward Decline of the CU movement The committee is of the view that Path 2 is the most desirable direction for the Irish credit union movement, leading to a stronger movement in terms of credit unions as businesses and as co-operatives. The Committee feels that Path 3 would lead to continuing worsening trends in the movement and Path 1 would lead to the eventual demutualisation of the credit union movement. 2.5 Conclusion Irish credit unions are now operating within a financial services system which consists of very large and sometimes globalised financial institutions. Within such an environment, being small (all Irish credit unions are small in these terms) can be a competitive advantage. Goth (2005) indicates that, in the future, the market may consist of very large global financial institutions and very small financial providers, with the middle group coming under the most pressure – not having the strength of the large or the flexibility of the small. Goth sees a clear niche role for credit unions within the Irish market in the future. He highlights the importance of flexibility and the need to be competitive. However, flexibility is decreasing in the credit union where, under increasing compliance requirements, the flexibility of the loan product and service is decreasing. And as its loan interest rates are perceived as higher than in other financial institutions and as services are mainly delivered using manual transactions - the competitive advantage of the credit union may be eroding, particularly in terms of loans. The declining trends in credit union loan growth is, perhaps, evidence of this eroding competitive advantage. To develop the technology, products and services required, credit unions will need to link more closely with one another credit unions to create the necessary leverage and resources required for such development. 28 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 In this Section, we have presented a variety of models of rationalisation, as well as the literature on the pros and cons of the models that have been used in other credit unions movements. We also presented a number of the key factors that have driven rationalisation in these movements. In the next Section, we examine if these same forces are present in the Irish Credit Union Movement. 29 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 SECTION THREE CURRENT STATUS OF THE IRISH CREDIT UNION MOVEMENT8 ______________________________________________ 3.1 Introduction This Section will examine the current status of the Irish credit union movement, particularly in light of the main driving forces of rationalisation, as discussed in the previous Section. These were: Increasing competition Declining growth Scale Increased regulatory burdens and legislative concerns Increased need for technological capability Limited service offerings Governance issues Failure Strategic business decision The material for this Section draws heavily on ILCU Call Report data, the recent Environmental Scan produced by the ILCU, and on the results of the Rationalisation Committee Survey9. 3.2 Current Structure of the Irish Credit Union Movement The credit unions in the Republic of Ireland (ROI) are regulated by the Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority (IFSRA) and legislated for under the 1997 Credit Union Act. The Credit Unions in Northern Ireland (NI) are regulated by the Registry of Companies, Credit Unions and Industrial & Provident Societies and legislated for under the Credit Unions (Northern Ireland) Order 1985. Credit Unions are memberowned organisations which are governed by a representative volunteer board. Being democratic in nature, they are run on a one-member-one-vote principle. This is the main factor distinguishing credit unions from other financial institutions. We will now focus on the key issues for the Irish Credit Union Movement (both North and South). This section of the report draws heavily on the ILCU’s report ‘Environmental Scan for Credit Unions’ written by Finbarr McCarthy (2003). 9 The Rationalisation Committee designed and administered a survey to the entire movement (both in the ROI and NI). 101 surveys were returned. 8 30 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 3.3 Key issues for Irish Credit Unions 3.3.1 Competition Competition in the Irish financial services market is increasing. This has lead the ROI Credit Union Regulator (2005) to assert that: “given the competitive nature of the retail financial services sector, it will not be feasible for credit unions to service their members’ needs into the longer term unless change takes place”. Until the late 1990s, the Irish banking sector was primarily made up of two large players – AIB and Bank of Ireland, and a number of other smaller financial institutions. However, in recent years, other players have moved into the market such as Rabobank which purchased the state-owned ACC, and Bank of Scotland which purchased ICC. Within the Irish market there has been significant merger/acquisition activity. The primary reasons for this activity are: Economies of Scale Economies of Scope Access to new markets Table 3.1 Rationale for Mergers/Acquisitions in the Irish Market Institutions Irish Life Irish Permanent TSB (Life Assurance) (Mortgages) (Retail Banking) First Active (Mortgages) Rationale Economies of Scope and Scale Royal Bank of Scotland Ulster Bank (Retail Banking) Economies of Scope and Scale Bank of Scotland ICC Bank Access to Market Rabobank ACC Bank Access to Market The Environmental Scan (2003:40) highlights the fact that this level of concentration will increase competition in the Irish market and indicates that it may become difficult for niche players in a market that is ‘increasingly being governed by globalisation and extremely large players’. The Scan poses the following questions: Credit Union Considerations (Market Structure) 1. Considering that the small/medium players in the market are merging or being acquired by larger institutions, can credit unions maintain their current structure? 2. If credit unions opt to follow the developments in market structure could they derive the same benefits that underlie the merger and acquisition of small and medium institutions i.e. Economies of Scale (Cost reduction & rationalisation) Can significant economies of scale be derived at a local level? Economies of Scope (new income streams and products Can significant new income streams be built at a local level? Access to new markets Can significant access to new markets be made at a local level? 31 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 However, as we indicated earlier in this report, the movement does not have to confine itself to amalgamations only, as there are other models of rationalisation which may be more appropriate in certain cases. The ROI Credit Union Regulator (2005) stresses that credit unions could, in the “various Chapter areas or regions, establish structures to support each other, to gain the benefit of enhanced buying power for the professional and other services they need”. These structures could follow the CUSO model as discussed earlier and outlined in Section Five. In terms of competition, it must also be remembered that the credit unions’ competitive advantage lies in its ‘people before profit’ ethos. This was clearly indicated in the recent marketing research carried out by Millward Brown IMS, on behalf of the ILCU. The image position of credit unions as compared with other financial institutions is presented in Diagram 3.1. Diagram 3.1 How do consumers see the positions of different financial institutions? Professional New banks BOS First-active Halifax PTSB First Direct Trad. Banks BOI AIB ULSTER NIB Building Societies EBS, ICS, Irish Nationwide Warm Insurance Co Irish Life Hibernian AXA Eagle Star Cold Post Office Credit Unions TESCO Amateur Taken from Millward Brown IMS Research (on behalf of ILCU) Millward Brown’s research indicates that credit unions are seen as ‘warm’ institutions, but are also seen as more amateur than the other financial institutions. However, it must be remembered that it is far easier to acquire a professional image than a ‘warm’ image. It is interesting to note the location of the EBS, which has recently put significant resources into advertising a mutual and caring nature. Millward Brown’s research highlights that a key differentiation between banks and credit unions is that “banks are focused primarily on making profit, credit unions are focused on the welfare of their customers”. They also found that people strongly believe that the statement “Credit Unions Put People’s Needs First” best describes the credit union. 32 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 3.3.1.1 Tightening Margins in the Credit Union The Environmental Scan (2003) highlights that all financial institutions, including credit unions, are ‘experiencing tightening interest margins as the level of competition in the financial market place intensifies’. However, conventional financial institutions are less dependent on interest income than credit unions as they have diversified significantly. These financial institutions are also in the process of reducing their costs through outsourcing non-essential operations and through the development of remote electronic service delivery channels (Environmental Scan, 2003). It is interesting to note that many credit unions now have a larger staff and occupy more expensive premises than banks in many Irish towns and thereby have a more expensive infrastructure. The following table (3.2) highlights the cost/income ratios of the two largest banks with that of the average credit union: Table 3.2 Comparison of the cost/income ratio of the credit union and the AIB/BOI Cost/Income Ratio AIB (2002) BOI (2002) Credit Union (2003) Cost (including costs of funds)/Income 57.8% 55.9% 80% The Environmental Scan (2003) highlights that the cost/income ratio for the credit union movement is significantly higher than the cost/income ratio for conventional financial institutions. It notes that while: “these commercial entities are driving down their costs bases and maximising the income derived from the costs expended there is no similar united approach within the credit union movement.” Rationalisation is one way of reducing the costs in the credit union. 3.3.1.2 Quality of the Loan Book of Irish Credit Unions Irish credit unions have traditionally been very dependent on the interest generated from lending as the primary source of income. However, within today’s low-interest environment, credit unions are attracting large amounts of savings but are finding it difficult to re-circulate it in the form of loans. This has led the ROI Credit Union Regulator to state that “credit unions are massively under lent”. This section will examine the quality of credit union lending in terms of loans to assets and delinquency ratios. Loans to Assets The loans to assets ratio measures the percentage of assets out on loan to the members. Under the PEARLS Ratios, this is known as Ratio E1. It is recommended that this ratio should be greater than 70%. Based on 2003 call report data cited in the Environmental Scan, the ratios are presented in below: 33 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 Table 3.3 Loans/Assets Ratio (ROI & NI) Loans/Assets (>70%) ROI NI Ratio (E1) (2003 data) Below 70 % 82% 79% Above 70% 18% 21% As can be seen from this Table 3.3, 82% of ROI credit unions and 79% of NI credit unions do not meet the ‘greater than 70%’ PEARLS recommendation. Trends over the last number of years are presented in Diagram 3.2. Diagram 3.2 Loans/assets Ratio Trends (ROI & NI) 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 June ROI 66% 63% 57% 55% 49% 48% NI 70% 67% 64% 61% 58% 57% Diagram 3.2 shows that loans to assets ratios have been in decline since 2000, down from 66% in 2000 to 48% in 2005 for ROI credit unions and, down from 70% in 2000 to 57% in 2005 for NI credit unions. The Environmental Scan notes that the declining loans to assets ratios for credit unions in both ROI and NI are as a direct result of the massive growth in savings coupled with a much slower growth in lending. However, when a credit union lends money, it must also ensure that the loan is repaid. Therefore, we will now examine delinquency. Delinquency The Environmental Scan highlights that of all PEARLS ratios, the “delinquency ratio is one of the most important measurements of institutional weakness”. The Scan indicates that if delinquency is high, then it usually impacts on all other key areas of credit union operations. Under PEARLS, delinquency is measured under Ratio AI. The purpose of this ratio is to measure the total percentage of delinquency in the loan portfolio. The goal for this ratio is less than 5%. Based on Call Reports for 2003, the A1 ratio for both ROI and NI is presented in Table 3.4. 34 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 Table 3.4 Delinquency Ratio (A1) for both NI and ROI (2003) Gross loans in arrears/Total Loans ROI and NI (2003 call report for 448 CUs) (A1) (PEARLS recommendation: <5%) Below 5% Above 5% 28% 72% As can be seen from Table 3.4, 72% of credit unions are over 5%. This indicates that a large number of Irish credit unions have delinquency issues. The Environmental Scan highlights that, for those with an A1 Ratio less than 5%, 52% have attained a result below 100% on the PEARLS Ratio P110, which means that they must improve their provisioning to cover the delinquent loans as calculated by Resolution 49. The Scan concludes that the current degree of delinquency in some individual credit unions increases the risk to the overall movement in terms of: reputation of all credit unions potential impact on the Savings Protection Scheme (SPS) potential regulatory consequences. It is interesting to note that, in the Rationalisation Committee survey, 49% of those surveyed who did not meet the requirements with regard to the A1 PEARLS delinquency ratio, indicated that they had no or limited difficulty with regard to controlling delinquency. This is worrying because these credit unions are either ignoring their delinquency problems or are not aware of them. Diagram 3.3 presents the AI trends from 1999 to 2005. Diagram 3.3. Delinquency Ratio (A1) Trends for both NI and ROI 10.00% 8.00% 6.00% 4.00% 2.00% 0.00% 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 ROI 5.20% 5.70% 5.20% 6.50% 7.28% 8.05% NI 5.00% 4.60% 5.10% 6.90% 7% 6.50% As can be seen from Diagram 3.3, delinquency in ROI credit unions is increasing, from 5.2% in 2000 to 8.05% in 2005, with a slight decrease in 2002. The A1 average for the NI movement is also increasing from its below 5% level in 1999 to 6.5% in 2005. It should be noted that these are average trend figures and some individual credit unions have very significant adverse ratios. 10 The purpose of the P1 Ratio is to ensure that the credit union is complying with bad debt provisioning requirements. The goal is a minimum of 100%. 35 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 3.3.2 Market Share and Growth Market Share Market share is an important measure of how well a particular industry or sector is doing within an economy, whether that share is growing, stagnating or declining. The ILCU Strategic Review (2005) stated that, while the Irish economy is experiencing rapid growth in personal credit borrowing, credit unions are ‘not participating fully in this growth and are thus losing share in their key market’. The Review goes on to say that, according to the Call Reports for December 2004, 96% of credit unions experienced loan growth that was less than the market average. Growth We also examine share and loan growth in credit unions for the last number of years. This data is presented in Table 3.5. Table 3.5 Growth Shares/deposits 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Lending 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Share and loan growth trends in Credit Unions Credit Unions ROI NI 23% 21% 23% 15% 17% 18% est 11% 13% 15% 12% 9% 9% est 22% 14% 11% 10% 7% 8% est 10% 9% 9% 6% 6% 6% est As can be seen from Table 3.5, credit unions in both the ROI and NI are experiencing a decreasing rate of growth in both their shares and particularly in their loans (in the case of ROI where loan growth fell from 22% in 2000 to 7% in 2004. The Environmental Scan highlighted that this “divergence has implications on the investment strategy and portfolio of credit unions and the need to derive additional income from the investment portfolio while taking cognisance of the risk profile of the investment portfolio”. However, credit unions need also to examine how they are perceived by the general public. Millward Brown’s research (2005) shows that credit unions “did not emerge with a particularly strong image in terms of either cheap loans, nor attractive returns on savings”. 36 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 This may explain the decreasing level of loan growth in the credit union and may also signal a future decline in savings growth. The Rationalisation Committee survey also asked the credit unions to indicate their growth potential for the next one to five years, in terms of membership, loans and shares. Unfortunately, due to misunderstanding, many credit unions completed this question incorrectly for the three and five year period. Therefore, the analysis will only focus on one year’s estimate. The responses are presented in Table 3.6. Table 3.6 Credit unions estimation of growth for the next year (survey responses) Growth Potential Percentage of Credit Unions Surveyed Membership Shares Loans Higher (>5%) 28 (28%) 27 (27%) 17 (17%) Medium (3-5%) 44 (44%) 40 (40%) 31 (30%) Low (1 to 2%) 16 (16%) 20 (20%) 33 (32%) Zero/Neg4 (4%) 3 (3%) 11 (11%) No Reply 9 (9%) 11 (11%) 9 (9%) As can be seen from Table 3.6, the credit unions’ estimate the highest growth in membership and savings with lower growth estimates for loans. As can be seen from the Table, the vast bulk of credit unions have very conservative growth estimates across the three areas of membership, shares and loans. 3.3.2.1 Common Bond and Market Penetration The credit unions’ market is confined to its common bond11 area. Credit unions often suggest that their common bonds are limiting their growth. The Rationalisation Committee Survey asked credit unions the following question: Does your credit union’s common bond restrict the growth potential of your credit union? The responses are presented in the Diagram 3.4 below. Diagram 3.4 Does your Credit Union’s common bond restrict the growth potential of your Credit Union? (sample size = 101) No reply 6% Yes 45% No 49% 11 Membership of a credit union is confined to a common bond, of residence or working in a particular area, working for a common employer or membership of an association of persons, work or live common bond 37 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 As can been seen from Diagram 3.4, 49% of the credit unions surveyed stated that the common bond does not restrict their growth, while 45% feel it does limit their growth. The question for these credit unions is how will they continue to grow in the future? We can also ask, have they fully penetrated their common bond in terms of membership and use of the credit union? However, we do not have this information and it can be difficult to estimate the population of the common bond. So for indicative purposes, we examine the population of county areas and examine the market penetration in terms of credit union membership. We collated the tables from data presented in the Environmental Scan (2003). As the data is presented differently for NI, it was necessary to confine our analysis, in this instance, to the ROI. Counties (incorporating cities and counties) : Republic of Ireland The population figures for each county (including both urban and rural areas) are presented. The counties are sub-divided into Highest Market Penetration (membership >70%), Medium Market Penetration (membership in the 60% range) Lowest Market Penetration (membership <60%) The results are presented in the following three tables. Table 3.7 Counties Cavan Highest Market Penetration (in terms of credit union membership) Pop. No Pot. Membership CU % of (2001 of Mem. per penetraBorrowers Total Average CSO CUs CU tion data) 46,014 7 1:6573 40,040 5,720 87% 10,884 (27%) 56,546 9 1:6282 44,867 4,985 79% 11,573 (26%) Cork 447,829 42 1:10,662 355,785 8,471 79% Kilkenny Limerick Louth Monaghan Tipperary Waterford 80,339 175,304 101,821 52,593 140,131 101,546 10 25 21 6 15 9 1:8,033 1:7,612 1:4,848 1:8765 1:9,342 1:11,282 59,759 126,126 75,701 50,266 111,963 80,986 5,975 5,045 5,823 8,377 7,464 8,998 74% 72% 74% 96% 80% 80% Carlow 109,297 (31%) 16,985 (28%) 34,014 (27%) 23,737 (31%) 15,120 (30%) 34,383 (31%) 28,273 (35%) As can be seen from Table 3.7, Monaghan County has the highest market penetration in terms of credit union membership and Waterford has the highest percentage of credit union borrowers. Table 3.8 Counties Kerry Leitrim Meath Wexford Westmeath Medium Market Penetration (in terms of credit union membership) Pop. No Pot. Mem Membership CU % of (2001 of per CU Borrowers Total Average penetraCSO CUs tion data) 132,527 12 1:11,043 82,453 6,871 62% 19,051 (23%) 25,799 8 1:3,224 15,975 3,029 62% 3,029 (19%) 134,005 17 1:7,882 84,959 4,998 63% 26,397 (31%) 116,596 8 1:14,574 78,526 9,816 67% 25,389 (32%) 71,858 6 1:11,976 43,241 7,206 60% 11,753 (27%) 38 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 Table 3.8 presents those counties which fall in the middle range, with on average 63% of the population as credit union members in the five counties of Kerry, Leitrim, Meath, Wexford and Westmeath. The Lowest Market Penetration counties are presented in Table 3.9. Table 3.9 Counties Clare Donegal Galway Longford Mayo Roscommon Sligo Dublin Wicklow Offaly Kildare Laois Lowest Market Penetration (in terms of credit union membership) Pop. No Pot. Membership CU (2001 of Mem. penetration Total Average CSO CUs Per CU data) 103,277 9 1:11,475 54,121 6,013 52% 137,575 14 1:9,826 65,942 4,710 48% 209,077 20 1:10453 111,257 5,562 53% 31,068 3 1:10,356 13,357 4,452 43% 117,446 11 1:10,676 65,274 5,934 56% 53,774 5 1:10,754 15,278 3,055 28% 58,200 5 1:11,640 11,920 2,384 20% 1,122,821 116 1:9679 517,428 4,460 46% 114,676 7 1:16,382 34,585 4,905 30% 63,663 6 1:10,610 29,763 4,960 47% 163,944 14 1:11,710 72,671 5,191 44% 58,774 9 1:6,530 30,285 3,365 51% % of Borrowers 13,675 (25%) 16,732 (25%) 24,445 (22%) 2,965 (22%) 13,183 (20%) 3,403 (22%) 3,415 (29%) 207,600 (40%) 9,443 (27%) 8,831 (30%) 20,502 (28%) 8,768 (29%) As can be seen from Table 3.9, Co. Sligo has the lowest market penetration in terms of credit union membership. It is interesting to note that many of the counties of the West and North West feature in the lowest market penetration category. Perhaps there is a need here for credit unions to develop a marketing group as has happened in other regions to promote credit unions. Also, a significant number of eastern counties feature in the lowest market penetration category too. Perhaps a similar combined marketing drive would be beneficial here also. It should be noted that the population in all these counties has increased dramatically in the last number of years. All counties in the three categories of highest, medium and lowest have room for growth. Therefore, credit unions should consider giving full support to the new national ILCU marketing effort. A number of credit unions are lobbying for a relaxation of the common bond requirement, as they believe that this is the only issue which is limiting their growth. However, we are of the view that many credit unions have low penetration of their common bond, particularly in terms of lending, and that there is scope for improvement within their current common bonds. We feel that there are many issues other than the common bond which are limiting credit union growth, such as inadequate marketing, lack of electronic delivery of products and limited product range. It could well be the case that with larger common bonds and fewer credit unions, membership in the overall movement could be lower. Emmons & Schmid’s (1999:41) research would seem to support this view where they found that credit union participation rates generally decline as the group of potential members becomes larger - that is, the larger the pool from which a credit union can draw, the less effective it is in attracting members. Before expansion of the common bond is considered, we would advocate that credit unions should first focus on developing their product range, move towards electronic delivery of their services, greatly improve their marketing and develop co-operative partnerships with other credit unions. And where a credit union is restricted by its common bond, it should 39 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 investigate the possibility of amalgamating with a local credit union. However, there is a need for the movement to formally investigate the impact of the common bond on the growth and efficiency of credit unions and make recommendations arising from that investigation. We make the following recommendation: The Common Bond a. The ILCU Strategic Review must formally consider and investigate b. the impact of the common bond on the growth and efficiency of credit unions and make recommendations arising from that investigation. A central database of all credit union common bonds should be created to identify the existence of any service gaps (Recommendation 9). New credit unions a. The credit union movement must now focus on consolidation of its position – no new credit unions should be developed, except in very exceptional circumstances (Recommendation 17) 3.3.3 Scale Scale or size is another force which drives rationalisation in credit union movements. As discussed in Section 2, there was a significant reduction in the number of credit unions in the US in the ‘less than $10 (€8.3) million’ and ‘less than $5 (€4.6) million’ asset size. Because of this, we were interested in examining how many Irish credit unions are in the less than €10 million asset size category. Therefore, the asset breakdown of the Irish credit union movement is presented in Table 3.10. Table 3.10 Asset Categories of Irish Credit Unions as at 30/09/2004 (ILCU) Asset Categories (€) ROI NI <1 Million 7 (2%) 11 (10%) 1 to 3 Million 41(11%) 29 (28%) 3 to 5 Million 37 (9%) 28 (27%) 5 to 10 Million 83(20%) 18 (17%) 10 to 15 Million 52(13%) 9 (9%) 15 to 20 Million 23 (6%) 3 (3%) 20 to 25 Million 33 (8%) 2 (2%) 25 to 30 Million 28(7%) 1 (1%) 30 to 40 Million 31 (7%) 0% 40 to 60 Million 30 (7%) 2 (2%) 42 (10%) 1 (1%) > 60 Million As can be seen from Table 3.10, 22% of ROI credit unions fall within the ‘less than or equal to $5 (€4.6) million’ category, whereas 65% of NI credit unions fall into this 40 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 category. In growth terms, there is clearly a large difference between the ROI and the NI credit unions. In terms of credit unions of ‘less than or equal to €10 (€8.3) Million in asset size’, we can see that 42% of ROI credit unions and 82% of NI credit unions fall into this category. Credit unions in the ROI are quite large and Goth (2005) indicates that many credit unions in Ireland are much larger than their counterparts in Canada. There would also appear to be many small credit unions operating in the US. Sometimes, there is a false perception that the American movement only consists of very large credit unions of bank size proportions. In 2004, 47% of US credit unions had an asset size below or equal to $10 (€8.3) million (CUNA, 2005). The main difference between the US and Irish movements is that even very small credit unions of less than $5 (€4.6) million in asset size in the US are offering a wide range of services, similar to those of a bank in some cases. However, Rick (1998), discussing credit union rationalisation within a US context, indicated that credit unions that are less than $10 (€8.3) million in asset size will find it difficult to meet the regulatory and service requirements in the future and suggested that credit unions within this category need to collaborate with other credit unions either through amalgamations or strategic alliances. Therefore, as 42% of the credit unions in ROI and 82% of credit unions in the NI are either less than or equal to €10 million in asset size, it is necessary for these to consider collaborating with other credit unions, to enable them to increase their service offerings, develop their technology and strengthen their position going forward. 3.3.4 Regulatory Burden and Restrictive Legislation 3.3.4.1 Regulatory Burden, Compliance, Risk Management Compliance requirements within all financial institutions are increasing, including credit unions. Credit unions are now in a situation where they will have to constantly lobby to protect their position in terms of regulations, which are designed for the large for-profit financial institutions. This is particularly the case with regard to EU Directives. The regulatory burden in other credit union movements was one of the key driving forces behind rationalisation. As discussed in Section 2, compliance in the credit union is measured using the Prudential Return which all credit unions make to the Regulator (IFSRA) in the ROI and FSA in NI and to the ILCU. The data in the Prudential Return is used to compile the PEARLS ratios. We confine our examination here to the ratios for Solvency, Delinquency and Liquidity. We also present some of the performance levels within each ratio, or ‘codes’, being developed by the ILCU. P4 Solvency The purpose of this ratio is to measure the degree of protection that the credit union has for members’ savings in the event of liquidation of the credit union’s assets and liabilities. The goal set out by the PEARLS ratio is 100%. The codes are set out in Table 3.11. 41 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 Table 3.11 Codes for Solvency Code 1 Code 2 Code 3 >112% 109% - 111.9% 106%-108.99% Code 4 103%-105.99% Code 5 <103% A1 Delinquency The purpose of this measure is to measure the total percentage of delinquency in the loan portfolio. The PEARL goal for this ratio is less than 5%. The codes being developed by the ILCU are as follows in Table 3.12: Table 3.12 Codes for Delinquency Code 1 Code 2 Code 3 <1.5% 1.5% -3.49% 3.5%-5.49% Code 4 5.5%-7.49% Code 5 >7.5% L2 Liquidity The purpose of this ratio is to identify the level of uncommitted savings and cash available to meet unforeseen or day to day requirements. The goal for this ratio is a minimum of 20%. The codes developed by the ILCU are as follows in Table 3.13: Table 3.13 Codes for Liquidity Code 1 Code 2 Code 3 >20% 15%-19.99% 10%-14.99% Code 4 5%-9.99% Code 5 <5% Provisional results for the movement on these three ratios from the June 2005 Prudential Returns Table 3.14 Ratios and Codes Results for the Movement Codes Number of credit unions (NI & ROI) that fall into each code Solvency (P4) Delinquency (AI) Liquidity (L2) 1 Highest 328 (74%) 20 (5%) 240 (54%) 2 100 (22%) 26 (6%) 57 (13%) 3 3 (<3%) 76 (17%) 74 (17%) 4 2 (<2%) 127 (28%) 52 (12%) 5 Lowest 1 (<1%) 197 (44%) 23 (5%) As can be seen from Table 3.14, a high percentage (44%) of Irish credit unions fall into the 5 (lowest) category for delinquency. It should be noted that 72% of credit unions fall into the 4 and 5 category. This may indicate serious near future problems for some credit unions requiring an increase in bad debt write off and provision, which in turn will be the source of further pressure on margins. The analysis of delinquency needs to be extended to a review of credit granting processes, underwriting standards and adequacy of credit control procedures. 42 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 In terms of delinquency in the movement, we make the following recommendation: Delinquency Greater attention should be given to the whole area of loan approvals, credit underwriting, credit control, treatment of loan delinquency and bad debt write off. To this end, the League should establish and disseminate best business practice standards, issue procedures manuals and undertake training so as to and uplift standards of operations in This credit is unions in these Inextensive terms of solvency, 3 maintain credit unions falltheinto category 4 and 5. serious for matters (Recommendation 7) these credit unions and if they fail it has consequences for the rest of the movement. In terms of liquidity 85 or 17% of credit unions fall into the 4 and 5 code category. In In the interests of their members and the wider movement, these credit unions need to critically evaluate their situation. However, it must be remembered that codes are under review and are only at a development stage and are therefore only indicative in nature. We make the following recommendation: Develop performance categories for credit unions a. The League in conjunction with the Regulators needs to develop performance systems, which categorise credit unions into strong down to weak credit unions (in terms of PEARLS). b. For credit unions which consistently fall into the weakest category, the League must be mandated, in the interests of the members and the wider movement, to intervene in that credit union and recommend various options to resolve the matter. If the credit union fails or refuses to co-operate, the League must be given the authority to apply various sanctions, up to and including recommendation for wind-up. c. It should be a requirement that each credit union must issue performance reports from the Regulator and the League to all board members and supervisors of the credit union. (Recommendation 6) 3.3.4.2 Restrictive Legislation Credit unions in both the ROI and NI are governed by different legislation. In the ROI, the relevant credit union legislation is the Credit Union Act, 1997, and in NI, it is the Credit Unions (Northern Ireland) Order 1985 as amended by the 1996 Deregulation Order12. Credit union legislation tends to be very detailed and prescriptive in nature, while the modern trend in legislation design tends to be enabling in nature, with the detail expressed in the forms of rules and regulation. In particular in the case of the ROI, both written and oral feedback at the consultative forums indicated the high level of dissatisfaction among credit unions, in particular in relation to credit union lending. Section 35 of the 1997 Credit Union Act severely limits the ability of credit unions to offer long-term loans to their members. This may restrict the growth of the ROI credit unions. This is clearly seen from the credit 12 Northern Ireland is currently under review. 43 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 unions’ decreasing market share in lending. Therefore, we make the following recommendation: Credit Union Legislation a. The League and Credit Unions must lobby for enabling legislation which allows the credit union movement to grow and prosper. b. Future legislation changes must be reflect the developing needs of credit unions c. The Minster for Finance must revise the current 1997 Credit Union Act so as to allow immediate short-term changes which are currently damaging the growth of credit unions. (Recommendation 8) 3.3.5 Technology Limited technology resources within a credit union movement is often a primary driving force for co-operating with other credit unions in order to develop more unified systems. Technology in the Irish system is highly fragmented, with many noncompatible systems in operation. This piecemeal development has produced some good systems, there is little or no compatibility13 between them. There are more than 11 systems operating throughout the movement. The largest credit union computer companies are Progress, ICE Group, Octagon, Pallas, Fern and Wellington, with 99 credit unions using Progress and 38 using the Wellington system. Other smaller operators are CUSD, Oakwood, Percom, Everest and Custom. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to integrate these systems once they have developed separately. This will cause for the future development of individual credit unions and for the overall movement as it makes it difficult to develop uniform products and services across the movement and means that the development of products is costly and inefficient. The National Technology Committee of the ILCU needs to develop guidelines to which all further technology development in the movement must adhere. We would be of the view that the IT companies themselves need to consider greater collaboration and amalgamation with each other. Credit unions should encourage such collaboration. Collaboration is already happening between Octagon and Wellington where they are both involved in an EFT pilot project with four credit unions. This project is two pronged: 1. EFT element a. To bring in monies (e.g. Social Welfare etc) b. To send out monies (e.g. Direct Debits) 13 This is similar to what happened in Ontario where the Central did not orchestrate the implementation of technology by the various credit unions. And when the time came to develop a province wide system there were 23 individual systems that were incompatible with each other and thus could not ‘talk to each other, resulting in the inability for network ATMs or the development of inter-credit union deposit and withdrawal services. 44 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 2. ATM element: The four credit unions involved are currently piloting an ATM service from any Bank of Ireland ATM machine for their members. The Rationalisation Committee survey asked credit unions if they consider that a central IT system should be developed for the Credit Union Movement. The responses are presented in Diagram 3.5. Diagram 3.5 Does your credit union consider that a central IT system should be developed for the Credit Union Movement No 28% No Reply 7% Yes 65% Sample Size = 101 As can be seen from Diagram 3.5, 65% of credit unions surveyed showed support for the development of a central IT system. The main reason given was that a central system would create consistency and efficiency within the movement. However, many of those who supported the idea stressed that key requirements would include correct project-management, as well as cost efficiency and value for money. 28% of the credit unions surveyed did not support the idea of a central system. The primary reason given was that they did not have any trust in a central system after the failure of the ISIS project. An interesting suggestion made by a credit union at one of the March 2006 ILCU Rationalisation Roadshows was that the League should be allowed to borrow from the movement for the development of a central IT system. Use of the Internet in Credit Unions The Environmental Scan (2003) cites survey results by the National Technology Committee (NTC) which found that while 68% of credit unions stated that they had email addresses, fewer than one in five credit unions (17.4%) transact member business via email and fewer than one in ten (9.5%) have individual email addresses for staff. Only 38% of credit unions in the NTC survey use online banking facilities for their own business. The Environmental Scan highlights the need for credit unions to become more familiar with transacting their business online, as government, regulatory agencies and the League are streamlining their electronic operations. In relation to technology we make the following recommendation: Increase the compatibility of the current IT systems in the movement. a. The League must agree an approach to develop a standard common IT Platform and a timeframe within which this must be achieved. b. The National Technology Committee of the League must develop a set of guidelines (computer language etc) for the development of future IT in the movement. c. Credit unions should then issue these guidelines to their IT companies for any 45 future developments to their systems. (Recommendation 13) ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 3.3.6 Products & Services offered in Irish Credit Unions It is useful to compare the product and service range of Irish credit unions with those offered in credit unions in other countries. US, Canadian and Australian credit unions offer a wide range of services from full electronic service to mortgages to member investment services. Irish credit unions’ core products and services are limited to basic savings and personal credit. However these products have met two clear needs: 1. credit at a fair and reasonable rate of interest 2. a safe place to save. The ILCU Strategic Review (2005) indicates that historically these were pressing needs and that credit unions developed a very successful movement by meeting these needs. However, the Review stresses that, for the majority of members who now have easy access to financial services, their needs are changing. In order to remain relevant, credit unions must now meet today’s pressing needs. The Strategic Review highlights the importance of wealth management products and also the increasing expectation of convenience. Credit unions will not be able to increase their product range and the investment in the technology required by working as individual units. They should consider greater collaboration with other credit unions to create the necessary leverage. Develop products and services which must meet key financial needs of people in Ireland today Credit unions should fund a central R & D function which: a. Determines the main financial concerns and issues of members and nonmembers b. Determines the key gaps in the credit union services and those offered by other financial institutions. c. Makes consultations with key opinion leaders and practitioners in key social, economic and political arenas to determine the main needs and concerns within Irish society d. Forms a project team to develop templates for products and services which credit unions could consider implementing. Acceptability of the products and services must be well determined before introduction into credit unions. (Recommendation 5) 3.3.7 Governance of Credit Unions The importance of good governance is highlighted to us on a daily basis. A number of recent crises in some of our largest institutions (Church, Garda Siochána, Banks, Political Parties) are a direct result of poor governance. Within the wider corporate world, the failure of the likes of Enron and Barings highlights the central importance of good governance. While there have been no major crises within the credit union 46 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 movement, there have been governance failures at a local level in individual credit unions. 3.3.7.1 Volunteerism in the Credit Union Movement There are currently more than 10,000 volunteers in the credit union movement. This is a large number of people and must mean that the credit union movement has one of the highest levels of volunteer involvement in the country. However, it is often stressed within credit unions that it is getting more difficult to source and retain volunteers. The ROI Credit Union Regulator has pointed out that the volunteer base in the credit union movement is aging and that this will eventually cause governance problems. However, he states that credit unions tend to focus on: “causes external to credit unions and very little on internal obstacles to volunteering to be found in the way credit unions operate”. Byrne, McCarthy & O’Shaughnessy’s (2004) research would support this, where they found that while credit unions stressed that it was difficult to attract volunteers, they had, at the same time, limited volunteer policies14 or supports in place to source or retain voluntary input. Therefore, while credit unions cite lack of time and interest as the main reasons why people have less interest in volunteering, lack of support by the credit union may be a bigger issue. The Rationalisation Committee survey asked credit unions if they had a succession plan in place for securing volunteers for the board. Diagram 3.6 Does the Board have specific arrangements for the possible succession of officers to ensure ongoing presence of their requisite skill sets on the Board? No re ply 6% Ye s 42% No 52% Sample Size = 101 As can be seen from Diagram 3.6, 42% of credit unions surveyed state that they do have specific arrangements, while 52% do not. In terms of the long-term governance of the credit union, the ROI Credit Union Regulator has highlighted the importance of ‘getting new blood’ into credit unions. He suggests that “it seems to be the case that in some credit unions certain directors of long standing are reluctant to make way for new blood”. He concludes that in some credit unions: 14 For templates of Volunteer Policies, please see the League website: www.creditunion.ie 47 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 “the idea of attracting volunteers is fine in principle in some boards so long as they don’t rock the established power structures”. He also cited the need for a proper election process where positions are actually contested. He concludes that credit unions need to consider three issues with regard to the development of the volunteer base and in turn, the governance of the credit union. These are presented in Box 1. Box 1: Excerpt from a speech made by the ROI Credit Union Regulator at the Diploma in Credit Union Studies Summer School, Centre for Co-operative Studies, UCC Elect: new directors and supervisors to their credit union by opening the electoral process to as wide a membership base as possible and by fixing defined terms for their own service in office Direct: their credit unions by placing a greater emphasis on strategic planning, policy development and proper oversight rather than by engaging mainly in ‘hands on’ activity. Connect: with their fellow credit unions locally by forming structures for mutual support in specialist areas. The Regulator has also highlighted the need for credit union boards to have the required skill sets. However, he does indicate that credit unions will not have all the necessary skills on an elected board, and therefore it is necessary to provide training to fill the skill gaps. Goth’s (2005) research examines how much emphasis credit unions put on skills when sourcing volunteers for their boards. His results are presented in the Table 3.16. Table 3.16 Director selection criteria and needs in the credit union To what extent does the Directors selection criteria reflect the Board or Credit Union’s required skills Great Significant Some Little None ROI 1 (0.8%) 5 (4.2%) 26 (21.8%) 38 (31.9%) 49 (41.2%) NI 2 (4.2%) 7 (16.6%) 16 (38.1%) 17 (40.5%) Membership Size Less than 2000 2001-5000 5001 and above 2 (2.6%) 7 (9.1%) 3 (4.2%) 4 (6.2%) 12 (15.6%) 15(21.1%) 23 (35.4%) 30 (39%) 22 (31%) 16 (24.6%) 26 (33.7%) 31 (43.7%) 22 (33.8%) Table 3.16 shows that the majority of credit unions in Goth’s survey do not select directors on the basis of the board’s or the credit union’s required skills. Goth (2005) also found that, on average, only 40% of credit unions provide formal orientation and training programmes for new directors. This compares with 85% of Canadian credit unions. Therefore, it would seem that many Irish credit unions do not take skills needed into consideration at the time of nomination or do not provide the training to meet skill shortages. Leighton and Thain (1997, cited in Goth, 2005) highlight the importance of “introducing new directors to the job” and argue that without 48 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 appropriate orientation and training, the contribution made by the directors to the board and organisation is delayed. In relation to volunteerism and governance we make the following recommendation: Ensure proper governance in credit unions a. Credit unions must develop a plan for the succession of new volunteers on to the board of directors and the supervisory committee b. Credit unions must provide training and supports to new volunteers and c. d. e. f. in particular new board directors. Within two years of being on a board, volunteers should have taken part in the necessary training and then become certified as being a trained board member. All credit unions boards must regularly carry out a training needs analysis of their board. The League must develop a database of director training indicating the level of training undertaken by all boards members in each credit union. This database will be updated on an annual basis. Credit union volunteers and staff must continue to be offered a wide range of accredited training and educational programs, which build skills and knowledge and recognize prior learning and experience. Nominating Committees must be proactive in encouraging a full election process for vacant board positions, in terms of encouraging competition for each post. (Recommendation 1) An important part of the role of the board is to design policy and strategy. We now examine these two areas. Direction: Policy and Strategy and Strategic Orientation Policy The Rationalisation Committee survey asked credit unions if they had developed policies in the following areas: savings, lending, credit control, investments, money laundering, information technology, security, membership, complaints, health & safety, human resource, governance, training, and youth. For ease of presentation, the results are grouped and presented in Diagram 3.7. 49 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 Diagram 3.7 Number of policies and percentage of credit unions 43% 45% 40% % of Credit Unions 35% 29% 30% 25% 15% 20% 15% 10% 5% 5% 4% 3% 1% 0% All policies More 8 to 11 4 to 7 1 to 3 than 11 policies policies policies Policies None No reply As can be seen from Diagram 3.7, 61% of the respondent credit unions have eight or more policies developed, while 34% have developed fewer than eight policies. The ROI Credit Union Regulator has highlighted on numerous occasions the importance of clear policies as part of good governance. This is the responsibility of the board. One issue, which has caused significant problems in some credit unions, relates to human resources. It is interesting to note that only 50% of the credit unions surveyed have a human resource policy. Strategy Setting the strategic direction for the credit union is a key role of the board of directors. The Rationalisation Committee survey asked credit unions if they had a strategic plan. The responses are presented in Diagram 3.8. Diagram 3.8 Does your credit union have a strategic plan? No reply 7% Yes 28% No 65% Sample Size = 101 50 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 As can be seen from Diagram 3.8, 65% of credit unions indicated that they do not have a strategic plan. This is worrying, as it is often only during the strategic planning process that credit union boards will systematically discuss the long-term direction of the credit union. This process forces the board to ask itself what the credit union is and what does it want to be. Goth (2005) highlights the importance of knowing the difference between an ‘end’ and ‘a means to an end’. He indicates that one of the most critical mistakes a board can make is to believe that, if it completes the list of activities it sets out in the strategic plan, then it has achieved its objectives. Instead, the board should be asking itself – by doing these ‘things’ are we achieving the intended result? Goth (2005) stresses that slipping into a focus on products and services creates a significant governance risk to the credit union. He says that he has come across credit union strategic plans which set out a ‘merger as an objective’. However, a merger is not an end, it is only a means to some intended end. Goth (2005) asserts that in the case of a merger or a collaboration of any form, or the development of products and services, a board needs to ask itself: What is our objective here? Why do we want to merge, collaborate or develop a certain product or service? What do we want to achieve? If a board merely focuses on the activity, then it will not know if it accomplished what it set out to achieve. (See Appendix Four for strategic planning guidelines. ) Strategic Orientation In terms of strategic orientation, Goth (2005) presents some interesting data comparing the Irish and Canadian credit union movements. In his research, he presents four possible ‘strategic orientations’ to the studied credit unions. These are presented in Table 3.17. Table 3.17 Strategic Orientations Pattern 1 Pattern 2 Pattern 3 Pattern 4 The board of directors views the credit union’s primary function as that of a financial institution providing its members with a full range of financial services in direct competition with other financial institutions and must generate sufficient profits to remain competitive. The board of directors views the credit union’s primary function as that of a financial cooperative providing its members with financial services for the maximum benefit of its members regardless of the level of profit generated. The board of directors views the credit union’s primary function as providing for the financial needs of its borrowing members while meeting operating expenses and maximizing the return to saving members. The board of directors views the credit union’s primary function as providing credit services for financially excluded individuals who would otherwise be unable to access credit. 51 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 The responses from the credit unions in Canada and Ireland are presented below. Table 3.18 Comparison of Canadian and Irish movements in terms of strategic orientation Credit Unions Pattern 1 Pattern 2 Pattern 3 Pattern 4 Ireland (NI & ROI) 10 (6%) 55 (35%) 86 (54%) 8 (5%) Canada 25 (66%) 7 (18%) 6 (16%) 0 (0%) Canada: N = 38 Ireland: N = 159 As can be seen, the bulk of Irish credit unions fall into patterns 2 and 3. The bulk (66%) of the Canadian credit unions fall into the Pattern 1 category, where they see themselves as competing directly with the banking sector, while only 6% of Irish credit unions see themselves in this light. Only 5% of Irish credit unions see themselves existing solely to meet the needs of the financially excluded (all of these credit unions came from NI). 3.3.8 Possibility of credit union failures It is interesting to note that much of the early rationalisation within the US and Canadian credit union movements was the result of failures in credit unions. As we will see later, with decreasing trends in loan growth, increasing delinquency and increasing direct competition, it is not unreasonable to think that there will probably be Irish credit union failures in the coming years. It is the responsibility of all credit union boards of directors to ensure that this does not happen. The credit union is run for the benefit of the members, and not for the benefit, convenience or nostalgia of directors or staff. All credit union boards need to critically evaluate their credit union in terms of: how member benefit is maximised in the credit union how strong the credit union is and how its position can be further strengthened how the board is positioning the credit union for long term sustainability (so that it will be around not just for the next generation but for many generations to follow) Byrne (2000) found in her research that some credit union directors, when asked to indicate how they would see the credit union developing in ten to twenty years time, responded that they had not thought that far ahead and probably would not be involved in the credit union by then. This is surely a poor reflection on our credit union directors. Directors of any board do not just lead for today but are constantly designing the organisation for its long-term sustainability. If directors are not designing the credit union for the future – then who is? 3.4 Summary In this section we have examined if the main rationalisation forces (increasing competition, declining membership base, increased regulatory burdens, technology, limited products and services, increased need for technological capability, governance issues and credit union failure) are present within the Irish credit union movement. In 52 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 our analysis, we found that all these forces are present and are intensifying. Some of the key issues are that costs are increasing and income growth is decreasing, the credit unions’ market share in lending is slipping, competition has intensified, regulatory and compliance requirements have greatly increased. At the same time, credit unions have only made limited advances in the development of their technological capability or in their product and services range, and their governance structure is becoming weaker rather than stronger. Therefore, credit unions need to seriously consider how they will successfully deal with these issues. Part of the solution will come from the credit unions strategically evaluating how they can rectify some of these issues internally and then how they can collaborate with other credit unions to further strengthen their position. 3.5 Are credit unions thinking strategically about consolidation and rationalisation? Feedback from the various consultation forums showed that the majority of credit unions are not planning strategically for the future. Possibly, in some of the forums, the focus was confined to the problems in the credit union rather than searching for possible solutions. This is only natural as credit unions have come out of a period of good growth and some of the negative downward trends are becoming apparent only in recent years. However, it is now time to shift the focus to planning and implementation of change which would help to alleviate and rectify some of the key issues within credit unions. Part of the solution will come from internal implementation of change but part will also come from greater collaboration with neighbouring credit unions, whether that be through networks, strategic alliances, amalgamations or informal co-operation. 3.6 What is the potential strategic direction of the Irish Credit Union Movement? The recent Strategic Review Discussion paper (2005) sets out a direction for the development of the Irish credit union movement. While we recognise that it is only a discussion paper and not a strategic plan, we have a number of concerns with this document: The Strategic Review Discussion Paper does not contain any broad strategic and inspiring vision, as would be expected for a co-operative movement such as the credit union movement. It mainly focuses on products and services. We are reminded of Goth’s (2005) research, which warned us that a strategic process which “slips into a focus on products and services creates a significant governance risk”. He was referring to an individual credit union. This statement is so much more relevant to a strategic planning exercise which focuses on an entire movement. Our second concern is that the actual discussion of products and services also seems to be limited. While it rightly indicates that credit unions will need to remain relevant by meeting the current needs of members, it seems to focus only on products and services which are widely available throughout the financial services industry. The fact to remember throughout any development of products and services, is that credit unions should not develop standardised products that are widely available elsewhere. 53 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 This would only drive the credit union into competing only on price where credit unions are unlikely to succeed. However, the point of opportunity could be to identify the gaps in an increasingly standardised financial products and services market. In terms of new products and services, which are widely available elsewhere, flexibility could be the main point of difference. The Strategic Review Paper indicates that credit unions have been poor at innovation and in the development of new products and services. And perhaps when thinking about developing new products and services, there is a tendency to look primarily at what other financial institutions are doing. O’Connor, McCarthy & Ward (2002) highlight this point as follows: “Rather than look at what banks and other financial institutions are doing, would credit unions’ interests be better served if they took time to identify what these financial institutions are not doing and whom they are excluding?” This not only means meeting the needs of the financially excluded, but also those whose needs are not met by the standardised financial services sector. This will require research back-up from the ILCU, as credit unions will need to investigate thoroughly what these unmet needs are. Rather than just concentrating on what products and services members would like, this research should also focus on their main concerns. From this research, innovative products and services could be developed. It is only from a broader context that something new can be developed. We should note that Nora Herlihy and Sean McEoin were both involved in Social Science studies in UCD and the credit union idea was set within that broader context. Credit unions will also need to be innovative in how they look at the marketplace. They need to stop thinking from the perspective of banking institutions. This is how innovative companies operate – they look at things in different ways to the rest of their competition. Another factor which will be of increasing importance in the coming years, is the level of personal debt in Ireland, which the Central Bank indicates is the 4th highest in the Eurozone. For the first time in the history of the country, Irish people now owe more than they earn. At the end of 2004, personal debt represented 113% of disposable income, compared to 48% in 1995. This can hardly be ignored. What will the needs of this group be in a few years time? Another factor, which seems at odds with the issue of increasing personal debt, is that people are becoming more interested in investment portfolios which help to increase and manage their personal wealth. Credit unions from the start, through the provision of cheaper loans and through the encouragement of thrift, have been involved in wealth management for their members. How can credit unions now do this at a more sophisticated level? There seems to be a perception in some quarters of the credit union movement that EFT services are not for the ordinary credit union member and are only for the welloff. However, this could not be further from the truth. In the future, all social welfare payments will be paid electronically. Therefore, EFT services may be even more important for the less well-off in our society, as the better-off have plenty of choices within the financial services sector. 54 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 Therefore, it is our view that credit unions need to develop an EFT service and the required supporting technology. They also need to develop products and services which will build on their ability to be flexible in service provision. However, both flexibility in terms of the development of non-standard products and services and technology are expensive. The only way credit unions can achieve these developments is through collaboration with other credit unions, by creating networks of know-how and economies of scale. Our third concern with the Strategic Review Discussion Paper is that is seems to be more of a Strategic Plan for the ILCU rather than for the credit union movement. The vast bulk of the document focuses on the ILCU. If this was immediately transparent to us, it will also be transparent to credit unions and will thus breed cynicism. Any discussion on the strategic direction of the movement should be centrally focused on the movement and, within that context, the role of the ILCU, not the other way around. We feel that if the forthcoming Strategic Plan is to have any long term and sustainable impact on the development of the credit union movement as a co-operative movement, then the concerns raised above would need to be considered. A strong unifying Strategic Plan is essential for the strategic rationalisation of the credit union movement. We make the following recommendations: Development of an integrated strategic planning process within the credit union movement. a. A Strategic Plan for the movement must be developed which is based on a new and inspiring vision for credit unions. b. Based on the Movement’s Strategic Plan, each credit union must develop its own c. strategic Plan. This should ‘fit’ with the Movement’s Strategic Plan. The credit union plan should also address the key issues facing credit unions and should evaluate where collaboration with other credit unions would be of strategic benefit to their own credit union. Each credit union must develop an operation plan which indicates how its Strategic Plan will be implemented. (Recommendation 10) Form a Senate within the credit union movement consisting of individuals with vision to inform the future direction of the Irish credit union movement. (Recommendation 11) The League and relationships with other representative bodies and the Regulators a. The League, the other relevant representative bodies and the Regulators (NI & ROI) must ensure that they develop a good working relationship. (Recommendation 16) 55 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 3.7 Conclusion In this section we examined the various forces which drive rationalisation and showed how these are present and intensifying in Irish credit unions. We have highlighted that the development of greater collaboration between credit unions will be a significant part of the solution. In the next section, we will discuss feedback from the Irish credit union movement with regard to rationalisation. 56 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 SECTION FOUR VIEWS FROM THE CREDIT UNION MOVEMENT ON RATIONALISATION ______________________________________________ 4.1 Introduction The League was adamant from the start, that the debate on rationalisation would be informed through consultation with credit unions. With this in mind: discussion on rationalisation was encouraged at Chapter meetings consultative road shows were held during December 2004 presentations were made at SGM 2004 and BDM 2005 a survey to determine views on rationalisation was issued to all credit unions both North and South rationalisation was discussed at the Strategic Review Consultative road-shows in November, 2005 consultative road shows were held in March 2006 This Section of the report will focus on the responses from these various forums. 4.2 Need for Rationalisation There would appear to be a broad consensus within the credit union movement both in the ROI and NI that there is a need for rationalisation within the Irish movement. Feedback from credit unions clearly shows that credit unions are keenly aware that the movement is at a cross-roads in its development and that change is required. There is also broad consensus that one of the ways of meeting future challenges is to encourage greater co-operation between credit unions. However, it was pointed out that credit unions have a tendency to ‘put their heads in the sand’ and to hope the problems of the movement will ‘go away’. At the same time, proactive leadership from the League was seen as being a requirement of any attempts to rationalise. A number of barriers were identified at the various forums. These are discussed in the next section. 4.3 Barriers to Rationalisation Feedback at the various forums indicate that there is a fear of rationalisation which was expressed in the following ways: people associate it with downsizing/mergers/take-over/closure promotion of the idea that ‘Big is Better’ a take over by professionals a sidelining of elected boards the elimination of volunteers an aggressive expansion course a weakening of local identity and ownership. 57 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 Many of the rationalisation models suggested in this report do not weaken local identity, do not mean the elimination of the voluntary board and even help to ensure the long term sustainability of the small credit union. Therefore, these fears are unwarranted. While the Rationalisation Committee was not interested in the promotion of ‘big is better’, it was interested in the development of sustainable credit unions, be they big or small. 4.4 What form should rationalisation take? – Views of the Movement The various consultative forums all discussed, to varying degrees, how rationalisation should take place in the Irish movement. While the primary focus was on informal cooperation between credit unions, other forms of rationalisation suggested were Strategic Alliances and Amalgamations. In order to determine the views of the wider movement, the Rationalisation Committee issued a survey to the entire movement, both in the ROI and NI. Credit unions were asked to indicate their preference for these three rationalisation options as presented below: Co-operation: Informal arrangements among credit unions Strategic Alliances: More formal (possible legal arrangements among credit unions) Amalgamations: amalgamations/transfers of engagements The responses are presented in Diagram 4.1. Diagram 4.1 Which rationalisation approach would your credit union most favour? Co-operation - informal arrangements) 55% Stategic Alliances (More formal arrangements) 24% Amalgamations/mergers/transfer of engagements No reply 0% 15% 6% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% % of Credit Unions As can be seen from Diagram 4.1, 55% of credit unions chose informal co-operation, 24% chose strategic alliances, and 15% chose amalgamations as their most preferred options. Only 6% of the credit unions surveyed chose not to reply to this question while 94% responded, which seems very positive and indicates that credit unions are open to developing greater co-operation within the movement. The credit unions also indicated their primary reasons for choosing each option. These are presented in Table 4.1 below. 58 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 Table 4.1 Reasons given for rationalisation choice Informal Co-operation Strategic Alliance Identity/autonomy Identity/autonomy Flexibility Allows for formal co-operation but Allows credit union to maintain the credit union identity can still maintain Any legal arrangement could its identity and endanger the identity – which is independence the credit union’s greatest Support strength. the credit Allows the credit union to Helps union to deal with maintain its independence and the regulatory autonomy burden Safeguards the philosophy and A formal ethos of the credit union arrangement like ‘Bigger is better’ not always the this is needed to best avoid confusion Local knowledge is still retained Movement not ready We must not rationalise our for amalgamations movement in the same manner Best option is strategic alliance as as they did in the US and the movement is Australia not ready for We must look at the possibilities amalgamations – for a ‘niche’ role as opposed to a credit unions ‘big bank’ one before making fiercely major long term decisions independent and Would not like to be swallowed prefer to compete up by a large credit union rather than coPast experience operate Has worked for our credit union – we have had great benefits Is in line with the operating principles of the credit union Economies of scale/scope Economies of scale can be gained Creates opportunities to share costs Creates opportunities to share expertise Growth Strengthen movement Issues with mergers/amalgamations We see problems with mergers – who will be the manager, who will sit on the board, how to reconcile different policy orientations Amalgamations For credit unions in trouble Only as a last resort if the credit union is in difficulty – for a limited number of credit unions Support Would increase knowledge and support in the credit unions Growth Would solve the common bond issue Would be a good option in a case where a local credit union is not meeting the needs of the common bond Creates potential for growth Would allow the credit unions to compete directly with the banks Economies of Scale/Economies of Scope Would allow credit unions to offer wider and better services Would allow for greater centralisation of services – more efficient Some credit unions are too small to be viable into the future Allow for Economies of Scale Decrease costs Long term solution to issues in movement Best option as strategic alliances and informal co-operation are not binding – Amalgamations are a long term solution Best option as strategic alliances and informal co-operation are too slow for the current environment Volunteerism is decreasing in the credit union Would create a strong cohesive movement Competition increasing, and within 10 years credit unions will become a smaller player in the financial services sector In the future, the credit union will only be attractive to an aging membership who do not wish to use EFT. Would allow for the development of one system – current situation of many IT systems not viable We have always welcomed more cooperation with neighbouring credit unions – has not worked out. Amalgamations are a must if the movement wishes to progress 59 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 4.5 What forms of co-operation and rationalisation are already taking place within the movement? 4.5.1 Co-operation (Informal and Formal Co-operation Networks) A recent survey carried out by the students of the Diploma in Credit Union Studies at UCC for their final year project asked credit unions about the types of formal and informal co-operation they participated in with other credit unions. A collation of the results of their research15 would indicate that most of the co-operation is of an informal nature. However, some of the networks were based on semi-formal agreements, although it is difficult to tell if these agreements would have any binding legal authority. There were thirty two usable questionnaires. The results are presented in Diagram 4.2. % of credit unions surveyed (32) Diagram 4.2 Level of informal co-operation in credit union movement 100% 80% No 60% 40% Yes 20% 0% Marketing Technology Training Credit Control Service Provision Community Development As can be seen from Diagram 4.2, there is significant informal co-operation happening in the movement, with the highest levels in marketing and credit control. The credit unions indicated that they derived a very significant benefit from cooperating with each other in terms of credit control as a method to reduce delinquency. As regards marketing, a number of very successful marketing networks between credit unions have been formed in recent years. Examples include ‘West Cork Credit Unions’, ‘North Dublin Marketing Group’, ‘Chapter 11 Marketing Committee’ and ‘Waterford Credit Unions Marketing Group’. These groups actively market themselves as a brand, through joint radio and newspaper advertising and through the production of calendars and other promotional material. In some cases, they have also agreed a common interest rate for particular loan types, such as car loans. Diagram 4.2 also indicates that there is quite a high level of co-operation in Technology. Numerous credit unions are part of formal IT user groups. However, there is little co-operation between the different user groups or more importantly little compatibility between their IT systems. This was discussed earlier in Section Three. 15 On-going at the Centre for Co-operative Studies, UCC 60 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 There is also a high degree of co-operation in terms of service provision. This mainly arises in the case of transfer of accounts and providing a facility where members can make share withdrawals from credit unions other than their own. Many credit unions would appear to operate this system. This creates the basis for the development of a shared branching system or a national common bond of service, while maintaining the membership common bond. In order to present an overall picture of the level of co-operation within the Irish credit union movement at present, the number of co-operative arrangements for each credit union is grouped in the following categories: High Level (participating in 5 to 6 co-operative arrangements) Medium Level (participating in 3 to 4 co-operative arrangements) Low Level (participating in 1 to 2 co-operative arrangements) None (not participating in any co-operative arrangement) The results are presented in Diagram 4.3. Diagram 4.3 Level of informal co-operation in the Irish Credit Union Movement 44% 45% % of Credit Unions 40% 35% 31% 30% 25% 20% 13% 12% 15% 10% 5% 0% High Medium Low None Level of co-operation Sample Size = 32 As can be seen from Diagram 4.3, there is a high level of co-operation taking place in 31% of the credit union sample, with 44% operating at a medium level of cooperation and 13% at a low level of co-operation. 12% of the sample are not part of any co-operative arrangements with other credit unions. It is also interesting to cross-tabulate level of co-operation and asset size for the sample of thirty two credit unions to determine if there is any relationship between the size of a credit union and the extent to which it co-operates with other credit unions. This is presented in Table 4.2 61 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 Table 4.2 Level of co-operation and asset size Level of CoAsset Size operation 1 to 10 11 to 20 Million 21 to 50 Million Million High 0 (0%) 2 (40%) 3 (25%) Medium 2 (50%) 3 (60%) 6 (50%) Low 2 (50%) 0 (0%) 1 (8%) None 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (17%) 51 to 100 Million 4 (44%) 2 (22%) 1 (11%) 2 (22%) Table 4.2 indicates that credit unions in the €11 million to €20 million asset category are the most likely to co-operate with other credit unions at either a high or medium level. Almost half of credit unions under with €10 million in assets co-operate at a low level. However, those in the €21 million to €100 million asset range have a greater tendency not to take part in co-operation with other credit unions16. The Chapter structure is an important platform for increased co-operation between credit unions. However, it is widely recognised that more effective use could be made of this valuable structure. The League is currently reviewing the role of Chapter, with the intention of increasing it effectiveness within the credit union movement. 4.5.2 Knowledge or Know-How Networks Knowledge is seen as one of the key assets of a company. Kim (1993:38) compares operational learning with strategic learning. He refers to the first as know-why and the latter as know-how. In what way can a credit union increase its level of know-how? Holmlund & Fulton (1999:8) indicate that the development of knowledge is a collective practice and that networks are a good way of developing know-how. The Rationalisation Committee was interested in estimating the number of credit unions that would be interested in forming such networks. In the survey, credit unions were asked to indicate if they would be interested in offering and accepting mentoring advisory support from other credit unions. The responses are presented in Diagram 4.4 and 4.5. Diagram 4.4 Willingness to give mentoring and advisory support to other credit unions No Reply 10% No 29% Yes 61% As can be seen from Diagram 4.4, 61% of credit unions are willing to give mentoring and advisory support to other credit unions. This is very positive and shows that there is a definite base upon which to build advice and support networks between credit unions. 16 Please note that the sample is small and that the results are not statistically significant and therefore the table only indicates tendencies. 62 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 Diagram 4.5 Willingness to accept mentoring and advisory support from other credit unions The credit unions were also asked to state if they were willing to accept mentoring and advisory No support from other credit unions. 17% As can be seen from Diagram 4.5, Yes 73% of credit unions were in 73% favour of the idea. This is also very positive in that credit unions are willing to accept help from one another. The credit unions were also asked to indicate the areas in which they felt proficient enough to offer advice and support to another credit union and the areas where they felt that they needed help. The responses are presented in Table 4.3 No Reply 10% Table 4.3 Areas within which credit unions are willing to give and accept mentoring advice and support (sample size = 101) Areas Willing to Give - feel proficient in Willing to accept – feel they need help in Investments √ √ Strategic planning √ √ Credit control √√ √√ Credit committee work √ √ Management √ Governance Internal auditing/control √ √ √ Marketing √ √√√ New Services √ √ Accounting √√√ Community Development √ √ Strategic Planning √ √ IT √ √ Day-to-day operations √ √ Training √ Policies √ Youth √ √ √√√ Almost all credit unions express an interest √√ Many credit unions express an interest but not all √ A small number of credit unions express an interest 63 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 As can be seen from Table 4.3, the areas of credit control, marketing and accounting were most cited as areas where credit unions were willing to offer support and advice. However, as can be seen from the table, accounting is one area where no credit union surveyed was willing to accept advice or support. This area of mentoring advice and support could be greatly facilitated by the development of an on-line discussion forum, where credit unions could log their queries and other credit unions could offer advice. It would also facilitate the sharing of best practice and networking within the movement. Other possible areas of co-operation The following suggestions were made by members of the Rationalisation Committee at a special focus group which considered possible areas of co-operation between credit unions: commonality within the Chapter i.e. interest rates. possibility of the viability of having a secretariat service – looking after all the returns to the Regulators, AGM notifications, etc. common Credit Controller dealing with, say, three/four credit unions. facility to pay in/withdraw from another credit union – not necessarily having the IT in place. mechanism to facilitate smaller credit unions which may not be working particular days, etc. bulk purchasing computer services. credit unions pooling monies to give deposits for first time borrowers. treasury management – cluster of credit unions coming together within Chapter with the possibility of obtaining a better return. The above are some areas in which the credit unions can become involved. This may be possible outside of the legal framework. 4.5.3 Federated Networks ‘West Cork Credit Unions’ is a group of credit unions which have been co-operating in the area of marketing for a number of years. This group now wishes to advance this co-operation to other areas. They are considering developing co-operation in areas such as credit control, IT, training, internal audit and compliance, external auditing, investment assessment, insurance purchase, community projects, Irish Credit Bureau (ICB), HR and product research & development, among other areas. The group have now formed a steering committee made up of representatives from each credit union to design proposals on how the group can achieve such co-operation through more formal structures. The purpose of such co-operation is to reduce costs and duplication and to provide each credit union with the necessary leverage and resources to develop products and services for their members and potential members. 64 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 As far as the Rationalisation Committee are aware, this is the first federated network type structure that is developing among credit unions on the island of Ireland. Therefore, this is a very exciting development. It is interesting to note that the West Cork Credit Unions are following a similar path to the innovative and much admired West Cork Agricultural Co-operatives, which operate under a federated network structure. The Rationalisation Committee very much welcomes this initiative. 4.5.4 Strategic Alliances The Rationalisation Committee are not aware of any formal Strategic Alliances between credit unions in Ireland at the present time. However, there are a number of examples of Strategic Alliances between credit unions and third parties, such as insurance companies and mortgage brokers. One particular credit union in the South West has developed a number of formal Strategic Alliances with third parties. This is only at an early stage of operation and it is difficult to determine its success at the present time. 4.5.5 Amalgamations There is one relatively recent example of an Amalgamation which has taken place in the Irish credit union movement. This happened in an inner city community credit union, where the membership base had seriously declined and it approached a local credit union and amalgamated with it. After a period of negotiation this amalgamation has successfully come about. There are currently a number of queries being addressed to the ILCU by credit unions wishing to amalgamate. 4.5.6 Transfer of engagements There are a number of examples of Transfers of Engagements. We present one such case researched by the committee in the Box below: In 2003, there was a transfer of engagements between a very small credit union and a larger credit union in the South-East of the country. The small credit union ‘put out feelers’, indicating that it was interested in transferring its engagements to a neighbouring credit union. Due to the age composition of the board, it was concerned for the future of the credit union. It was felt that it was in the best interests of their members to follow this path. A neighbouring credit union was decided upon and the transfer happened smoothly. The only issue of concern expressed by both credit unions was that it took two years to finalise the process. The Regulator has now indicated that future transfers of engagement will only take six months and that the ILCU will do the background work prior to the transfer. 4.5.7 Wind-up There are a number of examples of wind-up within the Irish credit union movement. This may arise, for example, in the case of an Industrial credit union, where the 65 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 industry is in decline or has closed. In this case, the credit union is no longer viable and decides to wind-up its assets. It may also arise where the board, based on poor performance of the credit union, decides that the credit union is no longer viable and makes a decision, with the consent of the membership, to liquidate the credit union, distribute the assets among the membership, and transfer memberships to local credit unions. In all cases, the ILCU assists the credit unions in the transfer of member accounts to other local credit unions and also ensures the continuity of the member’s records. 4.6 Conclusion From the discussion in this Section, we can see that credit unions are open to the development of greater co-operation with other credit unions and that, in fact, there is quite a significant degree of informal co-operation already taking place. This is a good foundation upon which to build further co-operation in the movement. We make the following recommendation: Build on current co-operation models already taking place in the credit union movement a. The League must develop a database of best practice of current cooperation that is already taking place in the movement b. An on-line discussion forum should be developed which would act as a The next support and advice network for credit unions. For example, where a credit union has a query it could log-on to a discussion forum and other credit unions can offer advice. c. An independent body should be approached for the management of the The Centre for Co-operative Studies, for UCC would be an Sectionforum. will present a number of potential models consideration. appropriate body to run such a discussion forum. (Recommendation 14) The next section, Section Five, will present a number of potential models for consideration. 66 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 SECTION FIVE A WAY FORWARD - POTENTIAL MODELS ______________________________ 5.1 Introduction At the consultative road shows, participants requested that the ILCU should develop a set of models for types and degrees of rationalisation to enable a credit union to make an informed choice. In this Section of the report, the Rationalisation Committee will present a number of models that may be appropriate to the Irish credit union movement. The section will cover: networks, strategic alliances, CUSOs, Shared Branching, amalgamations, transfer of engagements and voluntary liquidation. However it must be remembered that whatever option is chosen, it must be clearly based on member needs and benefits. 5.2 Potential Models of Collaboration and Rationalisation In this report, it is only possible to set out very general models of collaboration, cooperation that may be appropriate when considering rationalisatoin. We set out general models for the following: Networks Strategic Alliances CUSOs Shared Branching Amalgamations Transfer of Engagements Merger 5.2.1 Development of a Network We will start this Section by discussing a model developed by Ward, Briscoe & Linehan (1982) and adapted for a credit union here. The model is based on the premise that any collaborative efforts must be strongly developed out of clearly identified members’ needs. The model is also a very much a ‘bottom-up approach’ where the collaborative effort is initiated by the credit unions themselves. This model is presented in Diagram 5.1. 67 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 Diagram 5.1 Developing Co-operation between Co-operatives (adapted from Ward, Briscoe & Linehan, 1982) 1. Within the strategic planning process, individual credit union involves members, management and staff in identification of their priority needs and problems No 17. Review situation – are additional joint tasks ready for implementation? Yes 16. Monitor performance 2. Communicate results of member needs identification to neighbouring credit unions. 3. Postpone further collaboration attempts but continue with member development 15. Implement co-operation proposal Set up inter credit union study groups to perform following tasks Acceptance Rejection 4. Identify ways in which credit unions can work together to meet members’ needs more effectively 14. Debate and vote by members of each credit union involved If none If any 5. Select priority task areas for initial study 6. Conduct or commission feasibility studies to assess potential benefits/problems favourable 13. Boards initiate implementation plan unfavourable favourable unfavourable 7. Select one priority joint task area for initial implementation 8. Appoint inter-credit union steering committee 9. Set specific goals in joint task area 12. Study groups prepare and present co-operation proposal to boards 11. Report back to study groups 10. Design organisation structure to ensure efficient task performance and select appropriate control structure to ensure effect member control of joint tasks 68 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 We will now discuss some of the steps in the diagram in greater detail. This section draws heavily on Ward, Briscoe & Linehan (1982) Step 1: Identify Members’ Priority Needs and Problems Before credit union board decides to create any co-operative structures with other credit unions, they must first identify their members’ priority needs and problems and examine the relevance of the credit union’s current activities. This should be carried out within the context of a strategic planning process involving members. The credit union was set up and designed to meet members’ needs and any further re-design must also be based on members’ needs. Ward, Briscoe & Linehan (1982:53) indicate that this process cannot be successfully carried out unless the members fully understand and appreciate the nature of a credit union as a co-operative. Therefore, they state that member education is a necessary preliminary step to such discussions. Step 2: Communicate to neighbouring credit unions To encourage other credit unions to involve members in needs identification, each credit union board of directors should communicate the results of its own deliberations to neighbouring credit unions. Initially, neighbouring credit unions should try to understand and appreciate each other’s positions and strive to eradicate any prejudices or misunderstandings which may have developed over the years. Otherwise, meaningful talks to explore solutions to common problems might be difficult to initiate and in the long term prove fruitless because of mutual suspicion. The credit union must also communicate the results of the member identification process to its own staff. Step 3: Set up inter credit union study groups After the individual credit unions have spent some time identifying members’ needs and possible approaches to meeting them, the next logical step is to set up inter credit union study groups composed of representatives from neighbouring credit unions who have been involved in similar exercises. Step 4: Identify how the co-operatives can work together to meet members’ needs The inter credit union study groups should proceed to identify ways in which neighbouring credit unions can work together to meet members’ needs more effectively. The emphasis here is on identification of tangible benefits which would accrue to members from collaboration between their credit unions. This should be done before discussing any joint organisation structures. Ward, Briscoe & Linehan (1982) indicate that obviously there is no point going through the “trauma of reorganisation for its own sake”. The aim, they point out, throughout the process should be to achieve the maximum benefit for members with the minimum, organisational change. 69 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 Step 5: Select priority task areas for initial study Study groups should then select a number of priority task areas for further study. Task areas should be chosen according to their likelihood of meeting priority member needs. Step 6: Conduct or commission feasibility studies Having selected a few priority task areas, the next step is to conduct or commission feasibility studies to assess the potential benefits and problems of each of the priority task areas. Benefits and costs of future collaboration structures should be analysed. Sometimes there is a tendency to only look at the benefits. Costs such as loss of staff morale or declining member loyalty might well out-weigh the financial benefits which might follow from any consolidation. Also benefits such as the development of member involvement or the resultant knowledge or learning that may accrue in the credit union will be more difficult to evaluate than financial savings. Section 7: Select ONE priority joint task area. Following the feasibility studies, pick a single joint task for initial implementation. Pick one which promises substantial benefits, poses minimal problems and is expected to be relatively easy to implement. Pick an area in which the activities of the various credit unions are complementary or at least do not compete with one another. Alternatively, if this is not possible, try to pick an area in which the necessary internal adjustments within the credit unions are not too frightening. Initial success will be important to further collaborative efforts. Step 8: Appoint inter-credit union steering committee Step 9: Set specific goals in the joint task area It is important to set goals which are measurable and have a timeframe. Joint goals should not be incompatible with the goals which the individual credit unions set for themselves. Step 10: Design appropriate organisational structures An organisation structure is required to ensure not only efficient task/operation performance but also effective control by the credit unions involved. Steps 11- 17 are self-explanatory (see Diagram 5.1) We will now go on to discuss a number of particular network structures, namely strategic alliances, credit union service organisation (CUSO) and shared branching. 70 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 5.2.2 Strategic Alliances Formal networks and strategic alliances can come about from an on-going relationship, by a deliberate search for a partner or in response to opportunity’s knock. In all cases, there are four basic steps to forming a strategic alliance: Diagram 5.2 Strategic Alliance/Networking Model Step 1: Strategic Planning Step 2: Choosing a Partner(s) Step 3: Negotiation Step 4: Implementation Working through these steps, it must be remembered that a strategic alliance/network is more than just an arrangement – it is a relationship. Holmlund & Fulton (1999) indicate that the first step (strategic planning) is by far the most important – as it forms the foundation of the alliance. They say that if an alliance is going to be meaningful and strategic, it must involve careful thinking and planning. As highlighted in the previous model, strategic planning must be based within a context of identification of members’ needs. In selecting a partner, first search, then choose the best fit. Holmlund & Fulton point out that this is a ‘drawn-out process that requires patience’. They indicate that organisations should start early and not wait until their backs are to the wall as this will mean that rash decisions are made and a poor alliance is the result. They state that potential partners should have: A history of successful relationships Personal chemistry with your credit union A willingness and ability to contribute Research has shown that, for an alliance to be successful, three factors have to be different but complementary: Resources Technology Employees 71 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 In this way, each partner needs the other to fill their resource gap. Partners also need to be similar in the following ways: Perceived need for the venture Ownership of it – risks and benefits should be shared Commitment to it – top-level people often move on or retire; commitment should permeate the organisation Conflict management techniques Communication styles – communication is vital; you must agree on how best to do it Values – openness, respect and trust of outsiders Finally, there needs to be understanding. Partners may not necessarily see things in exactly the same light, but they need to agree on certain issues: A definition of ‘success’ – so you both know when the alliance is working Goals – again, they need not be the same but they cannot be contradictory, If you are committed to mutual benefit, you must understand your partner’s goals as well as your own so you do not inadvertently undermine them Decision–making style - you may have different internal styles but you must agree on how the alliance will operate How to manage and staff the alliance Power – you must recognise the relative power of each partner Rewards – you must understand the partner’s internal reward system In summary, you and your partner must be different in some ways, similar in others, and have a mutual understanding. The next stage is negotiation. Here the partners begin a series of discussions to talk about organisation, control, resource contributions, and of course to build trust between the partners. At this stage you will need to figure out what the ‘deal breakers’ are for you and your partner. The final stage is implementation: At this stage the partners will decide what type of alliance they will develop. It could be: Formal (a contract) or informal (a handshake) Equity or non-equity In terms of equity or non-equity, these can be structured as follows: Equity Joint venture, in which you form a third company 72 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 A swap, in which each takes 10% of the other’s organisation and you are bound in a relationship of mutual ownership A straight minority or majority ownership Non-Equity (no money changes hands, you simply share commodities or strengths) Contracts/Licensing agreements 5.2.3 Credit Union Service Organisations (CUSOs) As discussed on Section 2, CUSOs are formed when a group of credit unions decide to come together and set up a separate business entity which is jointly owned by them. However, as indicated in the previous models, a participating credit union should only decide to set up a CUSO or become part of one after a strategic planning process, which includes the identification of members’ needs. Only on this basis can they determine if the CUSO will meet their objectives. Many of the previous models will also apply to the development of a CUSO – so here we will just highlight the steps that are particular to the development of the CUSO. Diagram 5.3 Outline model for the development of a CUSO Strategic Planning, identification of member needs, choosing partners, negotiation Develop a clear business plan outlining the purpose, structure, operation and funding of the CUSO Approach the Regulator to seek approval for the setting up of the CUSO If approval is gained: Register Elect board Appoint staff (if required) Decide on policies, fees, etc. 73 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 5.2.4 Shared Branching Shared branching can mean that credit unions jointly set up a shared credit union office, possibly in areas where there is significant membership overlap or possibly in new shopping centres, where the members of a number of credit unions carry out their shopping. Shared branching can also mean that members of one credit union become guest members at the other participating credit unions. This is already occurring to some extent within Irish credit unions, where members can, on occasions, withdraw money from a credit union other than their own. This form of shared branching could be further developed to create a national common bond of service while still maintaining the membership common bond. While technology would make this process of shared branching much simpler, it is still possible through manual faxing or telephoning for the confirmation of balances and amounts. Therefore, credit unions should not wait until the ideal technology is in place but should start to develop such collaborative efforts now. We make the following recommendation: Development of a National Common Bond of Service a. The League needs to develop and maintain a database of credit unions that are already b. c. offering a shared common bond of service. The League should issue procedures on how to make this service operate effectively and efficiently The League should encourage credit unions to offer this service. (Recommendation 12) 5.2.5 Amalgamation17 An amalgamation is the coming together of two or more credit unions to create a new credit union as their successor. This can be diagrammatically presented as follows: Diagram 5.4 Amalgamation Credit Union A + Credit Union B = Credit Union C Effectively credit union A and credit union B close and decide to set up a new credit union – credit union C. The procedure for the development of an amalgamation follows a similar development path to the strategic alliance model outlined earlier. However, it is initially more complex in that both credit union A and credit union B need to agree 17 This section draws heavily on the material developed by Ciaran Bishop and the Legal and Secretariat Department of the Irish League of Credit Unions (ILCU) 74 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 mutual policies and operational procedures. They also need to consider board and staffing arrangements. Staff need to be reassured that they will either have employment in the new entity, or if not, that they will be adequately compensated. Informing staff of amalgamation developments should happen as soon as possible and should be transparent. In terms of the board, both credit unions need to agree who will sit on the board, this will usually involve an equal number of representatives from both credit unions. There will be significant negotiation around all of these issues and reaching agreement will be time-consuming and sometimes difficult. Of course, before either credit union decides to amalgamate, they must be clear on why they are doing so. How will this amalgamation help the credit union to meet its strategic objectives? How does the amalgamation meet the members’ needs and maximise their benefits? The credit union must be able to clearly answer these questions. We present a general model in Diagram 5.5 Diagram 5.5 General Amalgamation model Step 1: Strategic Planning within the context of members’ needs identification Step 2: Choosing a Partner(s). As the credit union will be following a complete integration strategy with another credit union (s). A positive relationship between the two is essential Step 3: Negotiation: Both credit unions will need to jointly agree the future board composition, staffing, policies and operations. For the success of the amalgamation, both credit unions will have to be in full agreement. In addition the credit unions will need to: agree on the rules for the regulation of the new credit union approve the terms of amalgamation by a special resolution jointly make an application to the Registrar for the confirmation of the amalgamation sending copies of the Rules on confirmation of amalgamation of the Registry a certificate will be issued and all the property, rights and liabilities of each credit union will be transferred to the new credit union and each of the credit unions will be dissolved, but would have been deemed effective immediately before the dissolution. Step 4: Implementation: Setting up of the new entity – Credit Union C. 75 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 5.2.6 Transfer of engagements18 This is where one credit union is transferring its engagements to another credit union. This can be diagrammatically presented as follows: Diagram 5.6 Transfer of engagements Credit Union A Credit Union B (activities of A are transferred to B) In this situation, Credit Union A will decide that it no longer wishes to continue as a credit union. It approaches a local credit union to determine their interest in acquiring the business of Credit Union A. After this Step, there are two approaches open to the credit union: 1. By a special resolution 2. By the consent of the Regulator if he considers it expedient to do so, followed by a resolution of the board of directors. Special resolution procedure Action required: The transfer must be recorded in an instrument of transfer of engagements. The transfer has to be confirmed by the Regulator. A certificate of confirmation of the transfer will be issued. Where the Regulator confirms a transfer of engagements he will register a copy of the instrument of transfer of engagements and issue to the credit union taking the transfer a certificate of confirmation. A statement must be sent to every member entitled to notice of a general meeting of the credit union and to the auditor of the credit union, as suggested by the Regulator, showing the proposals with a copy of the annual accounts. Resolution of the Board of Directors If the Regulator consents to the credit union proceeding by a resolution of its board of directors, the secretary will send, within seven days, to every member and to the auditor: Notice of the resolution passed by the board of directors A statement, in such form as the Regulator may direct, showing the proposal and the actions required. No statement will be issued unless approved by the Regulator. An application for confirmation of an amalgamation or a transfer will, within seven days after the date of the application, have to be published in at least 18 This section draws heavily on the material developed by Ciaran Bishop and the Legal and Secretariat Department of the Irish League of Credit Unions (ILCU) 76 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 two daily newspapers and any representations relating to it can be made in writing to the Regulator within not less than 21 days. 5.2.7 Wind-up19 If a credit union has been in difficulty on all the key issues discussed in Section Three and cannot see any viable way of resolving all of these issues, it should consider winding-up the credit union. This may well prevent a very public failure at a later date and it also means that the credit union (with the assistance of the League) can make arrangements for the transfer of their members to neighbouring credit unions. In this case, the League ensures that the member’s record continues unbroken. Many credit unions throughout the history of the movement have opted, in the interests of their members, for this option. This is diagrammatically presented as follows: Diagram 5.7 Wind-up Credit Union A Assets are distributed among the membership ILCU identifies local credit unions for the transfer of the membership accounts (maintaining record of members) There are three options available for a credit union in the wind-up process: A Special Resolution of the Board, that would be wound up by an instrument of dissolution which sets out the assets and liabilities of the credit union and all relevant information. Alterations can be made by not less than three quarters of the members present and voting at a special general meeting. The instrument of dissolution is then sent to the Regulator for approval. The Regulator shall place a notice of dissolution to be advertised at the expense of the credit union. The Regulator may petition the High Court. The Regulator may order the wind up of a credit union if it appears that the credit union is unable to pay sums due to members, etc. or if there is a failure to comply with any provision made under the Act and it is continued after notice from the Regulator. Wound up in accordance with the Companies Act and any modifications apply as if a credit union were a company limited by shares 19 This section draws heavily on the material developed by Ciaran Bishop and the Legal and Secretariat Department of the Irish League of Credit Unions (ILCU) 77 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 5.5 Conclusion As can be seen there are many rationalisation options open to credit unions. Different models will be appropriate to different credit unions or at different stages of development. For example, for credit unions which are in constant difficulty (with persistently poor performance on the PEARLS Ratios), the most appropriate model may be to wind-up the credit union or to amalgamate with a local credit union. For those who wish to co-operate with other credit unions and who have the skills required, networking may be an appropriate model. For a credit union which does not wish to enter into a networking structure, amalgamating with a local credit union could be the best option. Credit unions need to strategically decide for themselves what the best options for their members and credit unions are. We make the following recommendations: Develop detailed practical guides for the implementation of the various models presented in this report a. The League must develop detailed guidelines (including legal and operational requirements and procedures) on all the models outlined in this report: b. c. Networks and Strategic Alliances Credit Union Service Organisations (CUSOs) Shared Services Amalgamations Transfer of engagements Wind-ups Outsourcing The League must establish a procedure where credit unions can be supported The League should establish a small team of trained/experienced facilitators, managed by a rationalisation manager, to work on a regional/chapter basis with credit unions to advise them on the development of the most appropriate rationalisation model and to support them in the implementation of an agreed model. (Recommendation 15) Credit unions must consider the most appropriate models for the future development of their credit union and the movement We make suggestions for credit unions in the following categories (see main recommendations for greater detail): i) Credit unions with on-going problems ii) Credit unions with governance issues iii) Credit unions which do not have the resources to develop products or services but do have the skills to develop collaborate networks with other credit unions iv) Credit unions that do not have the resources to develop products or services and do not have the skills required to develop collaborate networks with other credit unions but does have a close relationship with one local credit union v) Credit unions who are progressive and recognize the opportunities for development vi) Credit unions are not experiencing any difficulties (in terms of: delinquency, have a thriving loan book, have good technological capability, are developing their products and services, have good governance in place, and are not experiencing any difficulty with regard to regulatory pressures). (Recommendation 18) 78 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 SECTION SIX CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS ________________________________________ This report discusses the need for rationalisation within the Irish credit union movement. It highlights that all the major forces which drove rationalisation in other credit union movements are also present within the Irish Movement. Therefore the report concludes that rationalisation is required in Irish credit unions. However, we point out that rationalisation can be achieved through amalgamations, transfer of engagements to network structures such as strategic alliances, CUSOs, shared branching to outsourcing non-core activities. However, as we pointed out, no matter how rationalisation is achieved, it must be based on member needs so as to maximize member benefit. The consultation with the movement indicates that there is significant informal co-operation already taking place between credit unions and that credit unions are open to the further development of this inter credit union cooperation. We now set out a number of key recommendations. Where do we go from here? –Recommendations Our recommendations are based on four main areas as follows: Maintain and reinforce the co-operative nature of the credit union (member control and ownership) Strengthen the business model of the credit union Formulate clear strategic direction for credit unions and the movement Strengthen inter-credit union collaboration These recommendations can be grouped into two main strands 1. Vision & Ethos 2. Rationalisation This is diagrammatically presented in Diagram 6.1 79 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 Diagram 6.1 Securing the future – two strands 1. VISION & ETHOS Clear Strategic Direction Strengthen CoOp Nature •Proper Governance •Integrate •Ethos d Strategic Planning for Movement Preservation •Member Awareness •Common •Develop Bond of Service products to meet members needs Strengthen Inter CU Collaboration •Compatibility of IT Systems •Build on Current Cooperation •Establish and implement Performance Categories Strengthen the Business Model 2.RATIONALISATION The recommendations are listed below: Maintain and reinforce the co-operative nature of the credit union (member control and ownership 1. Ensure proper governance in credit unions a. Credit unions must develop a plan for the succession of new volunteers on to the board of directors and the supervisory committee. b. Credit unions must provide training and supports to new volunteers and, in particular, new board directors. Within two years of taking a position on a board, volunteers should have taken part in the necessary training and then become certified as being a trained board member. c. All credit unions boards must regularly carry out a training needs analysis of their board. b. The League must develop a database of director training indicating the level of training undertaken by all boards members in each credit union. This database will be updated on an annual basis. 80 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 c. Credit union volunteers and staff must continue to be offered a wide range of accredited training and educational programs, which build skills and knowledge and recognize prior learning and experience. d. Nomination Committee must be proactive in encouraging a full election process for vacant board positions, in terms of encouraging competition for each post. 2. Greater need for credit union and member, volunteer and staff awareness on the credit union ethos (refocusing on what it means to be a co-operative) a. The League must develop educational programs/seminars which help boards, staff and volunteers to re-understand the meaning of the co-operative ethos of the credit union b. The League within their new national marketing campaign must develop templates of promotional material/programs which develop the brand of the credit union based on its unique ethos c. Individual credit unions must educate all new and existing staff and volunteers in the meaning of the credit union as a co-operative 3. The League, Regulators and credit unions must ensure that any changes (legislation, regulation, new products and so on) do not impact negatively on the members control and ownership of the credit union. An impact assessment model must be developed. 4. The League should develop social auditing guidelines for credit unions Strengthen the business model of the credit union 5. Develop products and services which must meet key financial needs of people in Ireland today Credit unions should fund a central R & D function which: a. Determines the main financial concerns and issues of members and non-members b. Determines the key gaps in the credit union services and those offered by other financial institutions. c. Makes consultations with key opinion leaders and practitioners in key social, economic and political arenas to determine the main needs and concerns within Irish society d. Forms a project team to develop templates for products and services which credit unions could consider implementing. Acceptability of the products and services must be well determined before introduction into credit unions. 81 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 6. Develop performance categories for credit unions a. The League in conjunction with the Regulators needs to develop performance systems, which categorises credit unions into strong down to weak credit unions (in terms of PEARLS). b. For credit unions which consistently fall into the weakest category, the League must be mandated, in the interests of the members and the wider movement, to intervene in that credit union and recommend various options to resolve the matter. If the credit union fails or refuses to co-operate, the League must be given the authority to apply various sanctions, up to and including recommendation for wind-up. c. It should be a requirement that each credit union must issue performance reports from the Regulator and the League to all board members and supervisors of the credit union. d. The SPS Review Group should consider strengthening the ability of the SPS to impose sanctions. 7. Delinquency in the Movement Greater attention should be given to the whole area of loan approvals, credit underwriting, credit control, treatment of loan delinquency and bad debt write off. To this end the League should establish and disseminate best business practice standards, issue procedures manuals and undertake extensive training so as to maintain and uplift the standards of operations in credit unions in these matters. 8. Credit Union Legislation a. The League and credit unions must lobby for enabling legislation which allows the credit union movement to grow and prosper. b. Future legislation changes must be reflect the developing needs of credit unions c. The Minster for Finance must revise the current 1997 Credit Union Act so as to allow immediate short-term changes which are currently damaging the growth of credit unions. 9. The Common Bond a. The ILCU Strategic Review must formally consider and investigate the impact of the common bond on the growth and efficiency of credit unions and make recommendations arising from that investigation. b. A central data base of all credit union common bonds should be created to identify the existence of any service gaps. 82 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 Formulate clear strategic direction for credit unions and the movement 10. Development of an integrated strategic planning process within the credit union movement. a. A Strategic Plan for the movement must be developed which is based on a new and inspiring vision for credit unions. b. Based on the Movement’s Strategic Plan, each credit union must develop its own strategic Plan. This should ‘fit’ with the Movement’s Strategic Plan. The credit union plan should also address the key issues facing credit unions and should evaluate where collaboration with other credit unions would be of strategic benefit to their own credit union. c. Each credit union must develop an operation plan which indicates how its Strategic Plan will be implemented. This could be diagrammatically presented as follows: Strategic Plan of the Movement Individual Credit Union Strategic Plans Strategic plan for Network of Credit Unions Operational Plans Operational Plans 11. Form a Senate within the credit union movement consisting of individuals with vision to inform the future direction of the Irish credit union movement. Strengthen inter-credit union collaboration 12. Development of a National Common Bond of Service a. The League needs to develop and maintain a database of credit unions that are already offering a shared common bond of service. b. The League should issue procedures on how to make this service operate effectively and efficiently 83 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 c. The League should encourage credit unions to offer this service. 13. Increase the compatibility of the current IT systems in the movement. a. The League must agree an approach to develop a standard common IT Platform and a timeframe within which this must be achieved. b. The National Technology Committee of the League must develop a set of guidelines (computer language etc) for the development of future IT in the movement. c. Credit unions should then issue these guidelines to their IT companies for any future developments to their systems. 14. Build on current co-operation models already happening in the credit union movement a. The League must develop a database of best practice of current co-operation that is already happening in the movement b. An on-line discussion forum should be developed which would act as a support and advice network for credit unions, where a credit union has a query it could log-on to a discussion forum and other credit unions can offer advice. c. An independent body should be approached for the management of the forum. The Centre for Co-operative Studies, UCC would be an appropriate body to run such a discussion forum. 15. Develop detailed practical guides for the implementation of the various models presented in this report a. The League must develop detailed guidelines (including legal and operational requirements and procedures) on all the models outlined in this report: Networks and Strategic Alliances Credit Union Service Organisations (CUSOs) Shared Services Amalgamations Transfer of engagements Wind-ups Outsourcing b. The League must establish a procedure where credit unions can be supported c. The League should establish a small team of trained/experienced facilitators, managed by a rationalisation manager, to work on a 84 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 regional/chapter basis with credit unions to advise them on the development of the most appropriate rationalisation model and to support them in the implementation of an agreed model. 16. The League and relationships with other representative bodies and the Regulators a. The League, the other relevant representative bodies and the Regulators (NI & ROI) must ensure that they develop a good working relationship. 17. New credit unions a. The credit union movement must now focus on consolidation of its position – no new credit unions should be developed, except in very exceptional circumstances. 18. Credit unions must consider the most appropriate models for the future development of their credit union and the movement Credit unions need to consider which rationalisation model is the most appropriate for them. Credit unions will fall into different groupings as follows: i. Credit unions with on-going problems Within the Irish credit union movement, there are a number of credit unions which are experiencing persistent difficulty. The options open to these credit unions could be as follows: Rectify the situation: the board should call a special board meeting and critically evaluate their situation. If they feel that the situation can be internally rectified, they should immediately, without delay, set about developing a business plan, which will rectify matters. This will prove to the board and to the regulator that the situation is internally rectifiable. Transfer of engagements: if the credit union is in serious difficulty it may be difficult to find a local credit union willing to take on that credit unions problems. In this situation, if the credit union has a good relationship with a local credit union they could approach them and start negotiations. The credit union should also approach the League to assist them in their identification of a willing local credit union. Amalgamate with a local credit union: The credit union will need to find a willing credit union to amalgamate with. In the case of an amalgamation, a good relationship with the potential partner is essential. Wind-up: This can often be the best option for the members, as the credit union’s residue assets are distributed back to them and they are also assigned to another credit union of their choice, with their member record in tact. 85 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 For these credit unions that are in trouble and cannot seem to rectify the situation, they must seriously consider whether they are working in the interest of the member. It will become harder for such credit unions to operate in the future and if they continue to struggle on and do not take proactive steps, a point will come when the credit union will publicly fail. This is certainly not in interests of the member, the board, the staff, local credit unions and to the wider movement. It should be remembered that not all of these credit unions are small – some are large. ii. Credit Unions with governance issues20 This could be where a credit union is in effect run by limited number of people. In this situation there is no proper governance structure and the credit union could consider the following options: Wind-up Transfer of engagements Amalgamate with a local credit union In this situation, the credit union may not have the co-operation or willingness of the entire board to internally rectify the situation. They will also not have the skills or resources from which to develop strategic alliances or networks with other credit unions iii. Credit unions which do not have the resources to develop products or services, but do have the skills to develop collaborate networks with other credit unions In this situation, the credit unions could consider the following options: Develop a separate entity like a CUSO with other credit unions so as to develop their products and services. Could also consider outsourcing certain non-core activities iv. Credit unions that do not have the resources to develop products or services and do not have the skills required to develop collaborate networks with other credit unions but does have a close relationship with one local credit union (1) Could amalgamate with another credit union v. Credit unions who are progressive and recognize the opportunities for development CUSOs 20 This could result from changing demographics in the common bond, ageing volunteer base, burden of running the credit union left to one or two, one or two dominant people in the credit union) 86 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 Developing Networks with other credit unions Amalgamate with a another credit union vi. Credit unions that are not experiencing any difficulties (in terms of: delinquency, have a thriving loan book, have good technological capability, are developing their products and services, have good governance in place, and are not experiencing any difficulty with regard to regulatory pressures). These credit unions might have scope to continue to grow internally. Could informally network with other credit unions. Must ensure Strategic Planning Processes are in place. Diagram 6.2 Pulling it all together Recommendations of report Greater inter-credit union Co-operation Strengthen the Business Model of the CU AND Re-assert Co-operative identity Set a future vision for the Credit Union Movement Outcomes Outcomes Achieve Rationalisation In terms of: Decreasing costs Developing Tech Develop product range Increasing scale SECURE THE FUTURE OF CREDIT UNION MOVEMENT 87 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 Goals and Core Responsibility (commencing delivery from CGM 2006) Action/Recommendation Timescale for goals Core Responsibility Succession plans for directors Director Training - Certification Regular training needs analysis Database of director training Accredited training 2006 2008 2006 2007 2008 Activation of nomination committees Education programs/seminars on ethos Promotional materials – developing clear brand based on distinctive nature of the CU Education of new volunteers/staff on ethos of CU Investigate the impact of changes on the co-operative nature of the credit union Develop social auditing guidelines/templates Provide funding for the development of an R & D function If funding agreed, formation of R & D function Development of Performance Indicators for CUs Give mandate for League to intervene in weak credit unions Issue CU Prudential Reports/Performance reports to all directors on CU boards and ensure all understand Delinquency Lobby for enabling legislation Lobby for immediate changes to Legislation Investigate impact of common bond on CU effectiveness Database of common bonds/identify service gaps Movement Strategic Plan Individual CU Strategic Plans Form Senate of individuals to inform the future direction of the credit union movement from time to time Database of names of CUs who are participating in a shared common bond of service Encourage CUs to join Issue procedures in relation to best practice – shared common bond of service Develop Common IT Platform Develop standardised guidelines for IT companies CUs issue standardized guidelines to their IT companies Database of best practice of current co-operation models already happening in Movement Development of on-line support/advice network Develop detailed practical guides for the models outlined in main Rationalisation Committee Report Establish rationalization support structure (appoint a Rationalisation Manager and train a team of facilitators) Develop good working relationship between League and other representative bodies and Regulators Develop policy in relation to the formation of new credit unions CUs start to evaluate their own credit union in terms of strengthening the business model and investigate how this can be done both internally and through co-operation with other credit unions. Choose most appropriate model. 2006 2007 2007 CUs CUs CUs League League and training/education institutions eg UCC CUs League League 2007 Ongoing CUs League/Regulators 2007 AGM 2007 2007 2006 AGM 2007 ongoing League CUs League League & Regulators (NI & ROI) CUs CUs 2006 2007 2006 2007 2007 2006 2007 2007 League League/CUs League/CUs League League Movement/League CUs CU movement 2006 League 2006 2007 League League 2006 2006 2007 2006 Movement NTC CUs League 2007 2006 Centre for Co-op Studies, UCC League 2006 League Ongoing 2006 Initiated by the League/open response to the initiation of other groups League 2006 CUs 88 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 BIBLIOGRAPHY _________________ Byrne, N. (2000). An Analysis of Member Commitment and Organisational Identity within a Credit Union Context. Unpublished MSc Thesis, UCC. Byrne, N., McCarthy, O. & M. O’Shaughnessy (2004). A Study of Volunteerism in Irish Credit Unions and Social Enterprises. Centre for Co-operatives Studies, NUI, Cork. CUNA Statistics (2005). www.cuna.org Desrochers, M. & K.P. Fischer (2003). Theory and Test on Corporate Governance of Financial Co-operative Systems: Merger vs. Networks. Cahier de Recherche, Working Paper 03-34, CIRPEE. Emmons Wm & Schmid’s F. A. (1999). Credit Unions and the Common Bond. CFS Working Paper, No. 1999/01. Enright, P. (1997). National Regulation and the Changing Geography of the Irish Dairy Processing Industry. Agribusiness Discussion Paper No. 16, Department of Food Business & Development. Filene Research Institute (2003. Outsourcing and Sharing Credit Union Management: A colloquium sponsored by the Filene Research Institute and the Centre for Credit Union Research. University of Wisconsin –Madison, School of business and Filene Research Institute. Fisher K. P. (2002). Governance, regulation and mutual financial intermediaries performance. CREFA Working Paper No. 01-11, Laval University. Fried H., O, Lovell K and S. Yaisawarng (1999). The Impact of Mergers On Credit Union Service Provision. Journal of Banking & Finance, No. 23, pp. 367-386 Garden, K. (1999). Credit Union Mergers: Efficiency Gains? Centre for Australian Financial Institutions Newsletter, Vol. 3, No. 1. Goth, P (2005). Issues in Credit Union Corporate Governance: A comparative analysis of Canadian and Irish credit unions. Unpublished PhD Thesis, Queens University Belfast. Gubik, A. (2005). New Opportunities for SMEs Founded by Cooperation. European Integration Studies, Miskolc, Vol. 4 No. 1, pp 25-36. Hoel, B. (2004). Credit Union Mergers: Who’s Best Interest are we Serving” Filene Research Institute. Presentation to WOCCU Conference, 2004. 89 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 Holmlund, M & Fulton M. (1999). Networking for Success: Strategic Alliances in the New Agriculture. Centre for the Study of Co-operatives, University of Saskatchewan. ILCU (2003). Environmental Scan for Credit Unions, ILCU, Dublin Johnson, K (2004) Shared Branching: Taking it Global. World Credit Union Magazine, Volume 6, Issue 3, October. Kacheiski, B. (2002). Outsourcing through Strategic Partnerships. Presentation to the World Council of Credit Unions (WOCCU), 2002. Kim D.H (1993). The Link between Individual and Organizational Learning. Sloan Management Review, Fall. Knapp J (1964). Knapp Report. Published by the Stationery Office, Government publications, Dublin. Lord, M. (2003). State Employees Credit Union. In Outsourcing and Sharing Credit Union Management. Centre for Credit Union Research and the Filene Research Institute, pp 41-54 McCarthy O. (2005). The Irish Credit Union Movement: Member Participation and Organisational Effectiveness. Unpublished PhD Thesis, UCC, Cork. McCarthy, O., Briscoe, R. & M. Ward (1998). Irish Agricultural Co-operatives: An Overview. Department of Food Business & Development, UCC, Cork. Discussion Paper. Modell, S. (1993). Foreningsbanken: Credit Union Movement going PLC. Paper prepared for the Postgraduate Diploma in Co-operative Organisation, Rural Development and Food Marketing, UCC, Cork O’Connor, R., McCarthy, O. & M. Ward (2002). Innovation and Change in Irish Credit Unions. Centre for Co-operative Studies, UCC, Cork. O’Reilly, S & M. Haines (2004). Marketing Quality Food Products: comparison of tow SME Networks . Acta Agriculture Scandinavicia: Food Economics, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp 137-150 Ouden, B, Ziggers, G. W. and G. Duysters (2005). Capabilities, Management, Relational Capital and the Impact on Alliance Performance: An Empirical Study with Non-equity Alliances. In Eds Theurl, T. & Meyer, E. C, Strategies for Cooperation, Münstersche Schriften zur Kooperation, Band 63, Shaker Verlag, Aachen. Radue, C. (2003). Green Bay Credit Union Centre. In Outsourcing and Sharing Credit Union Management. Centre for Credit Union Research and the Filene Research Institute, pp. 1528 90 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 Ralston, D. Wright, A. & K. Garden (2001) Can Mergers Ensure the Survival of Credit Unions in the Third Millennium? Journal of Banking & Finance, No 25 pp 2277-2304. Rick, S.W. (1998). Credit Union Restructuring: A response to the developments in the international finance industry. World Council of Credit Unions, Research Monograph Series, No. 11. Sibbald A. and L. McAlevey (1999). Examination of Economic of Scale in Credit unions: A new Zealand Study. Regulator of Credit Unions (2005). Talk given at the Diploma in Credit Unions Studies Summer School Ward, M., Briscoe, R. and M. Linehan (1982). Co-operation between Co-operatives: A case study of agricultural co-operatives in the north east of the Republic of Ireland. Centre for Co-operative Studies, UCC, Ireland Ward, M. (2005). Feeding Ourselves 11: Farmers’ Co-operatives and Food. In Eds. Briscoe. R. & Ward, M. Helping Ourselves: Success Stories in Co-operative Business and Social Enterprise. Oaktree Press, Cork, Ireland. Ward, M. (2000). Ireland’s Multipurpose Dairy Co-operatives. In Eds. Briscoe, R. & M. Ward, The Co-operatives of Ireland. Centre for Co-operative Studies, NUI, Cork. Welch M. (2004). Credit Union merger ends up in Divorce before Marriage. Credit Union Times, June 16 pg. 14. Wilcox J. A. (2005). Credit Union Failures and Insurance Fund Losses: 1971 – 2004. FRBSF Economic Letter, No. 20, August. 91 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 APPENDIX ONE - COMMITTEE MEMBERS ________________________________________ Chairperson: Kathleen Prendergast, Tipperary Credit Union Nineteen years of voluntary service to Tipperary Credit Union and current President. She has served in many credit union areas including Planning & Development, I.T. and Marketing. She has also served Chapter Ten as Secretary and Treasurer. Kathleen has completed the BSc in Mutual and Credit Union Business in UCC and is currently studying for the MBS in Cooperative and Social Enterprise. Secretary: Margaret Byrne, ILCU Over thirty years experience as staff of the ILCU. She is assigned to the Monitoring Department and has serviced various committees and working groups. She also holds the position of Secretary of the ILCU International Development Foundation Limited. Members: Eilis Brennan, Belfast Teachers Credit Union Involved as a volunteer and director of Belfast Teachers’ Credit Union for over twenty five years. She has served as Credit Control Chairperson and Secretary and is currently Chairperson of the credit union. She is also currently Chairperson of Chapter No. 3 having served previously as Secretary. She is Secretary to the Northern Ireland Chapter Group. Billy Carroll, Ballinrobe Credit Union Founder member of Ballinrobe Credit Union in 1981. He has served on various Committees and also held the position of Treasurer. He is Manager since 2002 and also member of CUMA. Chapter and Inter Chapter Delegate and Secretary of Inter Chapter. Jim Kearney, Baltinglass Credit Union Member of Baltinglass Credit Union Limited since 1990 and has held Honorary Office of Secretary, Chairman and Treasurer, member of Credit Committee, Credit Control Committee and Nomination Committee. Tony Cullinan, St. Francis Credit Union, Ennis Board Director in St. Francis (Ennis) Credit Union, Co. Clare. Member – 40 years - Volunteer – 36 years – Director 35 years Served on League Board for nine years and is a Past President of the ILCU Brendan Cotter, CUMA Representing CUMA on the Committee. He is a founding member of CUMA and has served on its national executive for the past two years. He holds a diploma in Credit Union Studies from University College, Cork and a BSc in Mutual and Credit Union Business also from UCC. Brendan is a Qualified Financial Adviser and holds the QFA designation through the LIA. Brendan is Manager of Fermoy Credit Union since 1990. Olive McCarthy, Centre for Co-operative Studies, UCC Lecturer in co-operative and credit union studies at the Centre for Cooperative Studies and the Department of Food Business and Development, University College Cork. She has conducted numerous credit union research studies and recently completed her PhD, examining member participation and organisational effectiveness in the Irish Credit Union Movement. Olive is also Secretary of St. Gabriel's Credit Union Ltd. in Cork and is a current member of CUAC. 92 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 Kevin Helferty, League Board Volunteer and director of Lisburn Credit Union and in Chapter 3 for over 35 years. He is currently a director of the League Board—on his second term— and serves on the Insurance, P&D and SPS Committees. Pat Coughlan, ICCA Manager of The Lough Credit Union, in Cork since 1982. Chapter delegate, Treasurer of ICCA, presented ILCU seminars, previous member of CUAC and a member of CUMA. Served on previous ILCU Committees in establishing UCC Diploma and Financial Correspondence Courses Carmel Dowling, League Board League Board Director from 1998 to-date, serving three years as Treasurer. She is a member of the Board of Mitchelstown Credit Union Limited since 1986 and currently holds the position of Secretary. She has served as Chairman and Secretary of Chapter 12 and holds the Diploma in Credit Union Studies Pat Fay, League Executive Manager, ILCU During his 37 years with the Irish League of Credit Unions, Pat served as field-officer and was involved in the formation of many credit unions. The author of management positions with the Irish League of Credit Unions. He also supports the work of the ILCU International Credit Union Development Foundation and served as Secretary. His international credit union development experience includes technical assistance missions to Asia, Eastern Europe, Africa and the Caribbean. He currently serves as Executive Manager of the Irish League of Credit Unions. Ciaran Bishop, Business Unit Manager, ILCU Involved in the credit union movement since the early seventies when he became a director of Bray Credit Union. He joined the Irish League of Credit Unions in 1988 as a field officer and in that role was instrumental in developing study groups throughout the country which are now vibrant credit unions. His current role as a Business Unit Manager is to support and review credit unions. David Florida James. Involved with Limavady Credit Union since the late 1960’s. He was originally a Teller, then Director and is currently the Secretary. He has been involved in Chapter No. 1 and the Inter Chapter Group. He was elected to the League Supervisory Committee in 2002. Anne O’Byrne (was on committee initially before her appointment as President of ILCU. Carmel Dowling was co-opted in her place). First elected to the Board of Blessington & District Credit Union twenty eight years ago and was subsequently Assistant Treasurer, Secretary and Chairperson. She became a League Board Director eight years ago and held the position of Chairperson of the Administration Committee and member of the Legislation Committee. She was also Vice-President of the ILCU for two years and last year was elected first woman President in the 47th year history of the Credit Union Movement. 93 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 Arthur Briscoe, Clonsilla Credit Union (resigned from Committee due to pressure of work). Currently Manager of Clonsilla Credit Limited. Peter Goth, Queens University (on committee for a short while, but during year had to return to Canada). Recently has completed a PHD in Credit Union Governance at Queens University, Belfast and works as a Consultant within the Irish and Canadian Credit Union Movements. ____________________________________________________________________ Report Writer (not a member of the Committee) Noreen Byrne (Centre for Co-operative Studies, UCC. Lecturer at the Centre for Co-operative Studies and the Department of Food Business and Development, University College Cork. She has conducted numerous credit union research studies and is currently reading for a PhD in Co-operative Identity. Noreen has previously worked in a consultancy capacity with a number of credit unions, primarily focusing on strategic planning. 94 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 APPENDIX TWO – CUSO SERVICES __________________________________ Cheque and Currency Services (Cheque cashing; coin and currency services and; money order, savings bonds, travellers cheques and purchase) Clerical, professional and management services (Accounting services; courier services; credit analysis; fax transmissions and copying services; internal audits for credit unions; locator services; management and personnel training and support; marketing services; research services and supervisory committee audits) Mortgage loan origination Electronic transaction services (ATM services; credit card and debit card services; data processing; EFT services, Electronic income tax filing; payment item processing; wire transfer services and internet financial services) Financial counselling services (developing and administering Individual Retirement Accounts, deferred compensation, and other personal benefit plans; Estate planning; financial planning and counselling; income tax preparation; investment counselling and retirement counselling) Fixed asset services (management, development, sale or lease of fixed assets and sale, lease or servicing of computer hardware or software) Insurance brokerage or agency (Agency for sale of insurance; provision of vehicle warranty programs and provision of group purchasing programs) Leasing (real estate leasing) Loan support services (debt collection services; loan processing, servicing and sales; sale of repossessed collateral) Record retention, security and disaster recovery services (alarm-monitoring and other security services; disaster recovery services; microfilm, microfiche, optical and electronic imaging, CD-rom data storage and retrieval services; provision of forms and supplies and record retention and storage) Securities brokerage services Shared credit union branch (service centre) operations Student loan origination Travel agency services Trust and trust-related services (acting as administrator for prepaid legal service plans; acting as trustee, guardian, conservator, estate administrator or in any other fiduciary capacity; trust services 95 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 APPENDIX THREE –PEARLS RATIOS FOR THE MOVEMENT _______________________________________________ Ratio Sep 05 Goal P1 BAD DEBT PROVISION REQUIREMENTS P2 LOANS WRITTEN-OFF/TOTAL LOAN 148.05 0.79 100% 112.40 48.71 47.48 87.50 109% 70%+ <30% 80 - 0.12 10.82 10.10 6.10 5.21 9.30 3.30 6.40 2.80 43.21 12.52 22.29 31.73 77.44 8.20 18.80 11.50 18.10 16.90 3.10 13.30 0% >15% >10% <5% <5% minimise P3 SOLVENCY E1 LOANS / TOTAL ASSETS E2 TOTAL INVESTMENTS/TOTAL ASSETS E3 MEM RESOURCES / TOTAL ASSETS 90% E4 BORROWED FUNDS / TOTAL ASSETS E5 TOTAL RESERVES / TOTAL ASSETS E6 STAT RES/PRIOR YR SAVINGS A1 GR.LOANS ARREARS/TOTAL LOANS O/S A2 NON-EARN ASSETS/TOTAL ASSETS R1 LOAN INCOME/AVE GROSS LOAN PORTFOLIO R2 TOT INV INCOME/AVG TOTAL INVEST R3 TOTAL INCOME/AVE TOTAL ASSETS R4 EXPENSES/AVE TOTAL ASSETS R5 EXPENSES/INCOME R6 WAGES/INCOME L1 LIQ INVEST/UNCOMMITTED SAVINGS L2 PERCENT OF MEMBERS WHO BORROW L3 TOTAL INVEST / UNCOMM. SAVINGS S1 GROWTH IN LOANS S2 GROWTH IN TOTAL INVESTMENTS S3 GROWTH IN TOTAL MEMS RESOURCES S4 GROWTH IN TOTAL RESERVES S5 GROWTH IN STATUTORY RESERVES S6 GROWTH IN MEMBERSHIP S7 GROWTH IN TOTAL ASSETS <5% <43% <15% minimum 20% high as possible minimum 10% 96 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 APPENDIX FOUR –STRATEGIC PLANNING GUIDELINES _______________________________________________ Strategic Planning in Credit Unions: The financial marketplace that credit unions in both jurisdictions operate within is currently undergoing and will continue to undergo, rapid change. To assist credit unions in planning for these changes the ILCU initiated a strategic business planning project and is piloting this process with a credit union. This section of the Quarterly Bulletin is to share with other credit unions the process undertaken and outline the steps that may be taken by credit unions that wish to develop their own strategic business plan. Overview: Before going through the strategic planning process it is essential to set out some of the rationale for strategic planning in a credit union. Similar to most organisations, credit unions operate in a day to day environment and react to changing circumstances after these factors have impacted on the credit unions. The effort and resources available to the credit union are directed on the necessary duties of dealing with the membership and current issues impacting on the credit union, rather than preparing for things that will shape the future of the organisation. Strategic planning is a method that may be used by the credit union to anticipate events and prepare accordingly. Essentially strategic planning is: Deciding what you want your credit union to be in the future Determining what changes you need to make in your credit union to become what you want your credit union to be Examining your credit union, your competitors and the environment that you operate within both now and in the future Identifying and understanding how changes in either the competition or in the environment can directly impact on your operations and your members; Preparing your credit union for these changes through a logical step by step plan to address the issues brought up by these changes Implementing these changes so that you can make effective use of your resources It is important to remember that for a credit union to change from what it currently is to what it wants to be takes time, thus the strategic plan will run for a specified number of years typically 3/5 years. 97 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 It should be borne in mind at all times that your analysis will not be totally correct at all times but it will enable you to react quickly in an ever changing business environment. Step1 (Future Focus): What should the credit union aim to be? To determine how a credit union should plan strategically the first step must be to decide on a clear unambiguous view of what the credit union will be in the future. To assist in determining what you wish the credit union to be in the future there are two fundamental questions that must be asked. 1. Why does the credit union exist? 2. What do you want the credit union be in 5/10 years time? Taking these two questions into account, it is essential that all participants in the credit union have an opportunity to influence its development. This is best done by way of a facilitated discussion that includes the volunteers and staff of the credit union. Care must be taken so that the process does not become too unwieldy and will require an independent facilitator. In addressing the questions it is best to take them one at a time and look at what they mean and how they enable the development of a strategic plan. 1. Why does the credit union exist? Questioning the reason for the existence of the credit union is a very important step in the planning process as it enables the board to get a clear view as to why the credit union has been successful and what will underpin its success in the future. This questioning will enable the development of a clear statement about the credit union’s reason for being, the basic purpose towards which its activities are directed and the values that guide its transactions with its members. This statement is generally referred to as the “Mission” of the credit union. The credit union’s operating principles provide the framework for the values that underpin the Mission. The Mission of the credit union can take many forms, but should clearly link the reason for the existence to the needs of the membership and common bond that it serves. Finbarr McCarthy, ILCU. 98 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 APPENDIX FIVE –SOCIAL AUDITING ___________________________________________________ Excerpt from Briscoe & Ward, FE 2702 Mutual & Credit Union Business, 2002 There are at least three main approaches that co-operatives are using to select the goals and objectives to be used with the social audit. They are: 1. Identify specific benefits and services that the co-op will attempt to provide for its members 2. Set objectives for each of the seven co-operative principles 3. Set objectives for meeting the needs of each of the major stakeholder groups affected by the co-operative’s operations. Sometimes one of these methods will be used on its own; sometimes in combination with one of the others. Let’s look at each of these approaches in turn: 1. Identify specific benefits and services that the co-op will attempt to provide for its members The aim here would be to identify a list of distinctive benefits and services, which are in some way unique to the co-operative or credit union. These benefits should be key elements in the credit union’s competitive advantage, being largely unavailable to competitors. Therefore, excellent performance in these areas would tend to enhance the credit union’s competitiveness. If we do a good job of compiling a list of the benefits and services we are trying to provide for our members, we are close to having a list of the primary objectives we are trying to achieve through the co-operative. The success of these services will to some extent be measurable by reference to traditional financial indicators: e.g., usages rates such as sales volume, market share, and we are set indicative target objectives in the appropriate indicator. The services and benefits identified through the above process provide the goals areas in which we can set targets and deadlines which enable us to measure our success at achieving our social objectives. Note that these social objectives also help to ensure business success. 2. Setting objectives for each of the seven co-operative principles Another way of setting social objectives (for a business that is trying to operate according to co-operative principles) is to identify objectives for each of the seven cooperative principles. A recent report on social auditing21 attempted to draw up a list of co-operative indicators to help consumer retail co-operatives measure their effectiveness at implementing the principles. A sample of their indicators for each of the co-operative principles are summarised and paraphrased below: 21 Measuring the Co-operative Difference. A report adopted by the EURO COOP General Assembly, 1999. 99 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 1st Principle: Open and Voluntary Membership How high are membership fees? Can all who are eligible for membership afford to join? How do member demographics compare with the population as a whole? Is the co-operative open to all who can use its services? Is it easy for members to withdraw their capital? 2nd Principle: Democratic Member Control Does each member have one vote? What percentage of members attend meetings, vote, participate in committees? Are there other channels for participation in democratic decision-making in addition to the AGM? 3rd Principle: Member Economic Participation Is capital rewarded by a fixed rate of interest? What % of surplus is distributed to members? What % of surplus is allocated to reserves? 4th Principle: Autonomy and Independence How does the co-operative maintain its autonomy and independence? Does the co-operative have a Code of Business Conduct? 5th Principle: Education, Training and Information How big is the education/training budget? How many members, elected representatives, staff members participate in educational/training activities? How big is the budget for raising awareness of co-operative issues? How big is the budget for member education & training? 6th Principle: Co-operative between co-operatives What are the linkages with other co-operatives? Does the co-operative support the development of new co-operative ventures? To what extent does the co-operative invest in other co-operatives? What efforts are made to support co-operatives in developing countries? 7th Principle: Concern for community What attention is given to environmental management and reporting on this issue? Does the co-operative engage in consumer campaigns? What initiatives does it take to support the interests of consumers and members? Does it represent consumer interests and lobby on their behalf? Is it a good employer? Does it invest in the local community? 100 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 3. Set objectives for meeting the needs of each of the major stakeholder groups. This third approach to setting objectives for a social audit is probably the most widely used approach in co-operative and conventional business alike. The approach is summarised in the following quotation from the Chief Executive’s introduction to the first Social Accountability Report published in 2000 by Britain’s Cooperative Wholesale Society (the CWS, better known now as the Co-operative Group since its recent merger with Co-operative Retail Services). This report brings greater accountability to the things not measurable in the balance sheet. We are attempting to measure our performance in relation to the people who are involved in and affected by our business, our stakeholders – people like you. It is also an attempt to assess whether we are doing what we say we do, practising what we preach , and acting in line with our co-operative ethical values.22 The key stakeholders identified in the report were as follows: Individual members Corporate members Employees The wider community Customers Suppliers The co-operative sector These were the key groups of people who were involved in and affected by the business. The Social accountability Report attempted to measure the performance of the CWS in relation to these stakeholders This means that each stakeholder grouping was a goal area for the social audit and for each of these stakeholder groups, a ‘code of conduct’ was set out, indicating the specific ways in which the various stakeholders should be treated. Samples of stakeholders were then polled, using questionnaires and/or focus groups, inviting them to express their approval or disapproval of the items in the Code of Conduct and to make suggestions for change. The Code was then revised in response to these suggestions. The resulting code was then used as a framework of objectives for assessing the extent to which the CWS has lived up to its commitments. One year after the adoption of the code of conduct, the CWS produced its own report on how it had performed in terms of Social Accountability. An independent social auditor was then used to assess the accuracy of the Report, to comment on the effectiveness of the programme and to make suggestions for improving its effectiveness. The CWS published the Social Auditor’s Report, along with its own Social Report, so that members and their stakeholders could assess the performance of the co-operative. Much the same approach was used by UK’s Co-operative Bank when developing its own Ethical Policy Statement. Graham Melmoth’s “Chief Executive’s Introduction” to Working Together: CWS Social Accountability Report, year Ended January 8, 2000. Manchester: CWS. Page3. See www. Co-op.co.uk for the current Social Accountability Report and for more information on the Co-op Group’s approach to social auditing. 22 101 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 4. A Simpler Approach to Social Auditing: a combination of the last three approaches Simpler, scaled down versions of the three methods used above (particularly methods 1 and 2) can be helpful to small co-operatives as a means of keeping them focussed on what they really should be doing. This approach involves the three components of the co-operative process: 1. Activation of members 2. Mutual aid 3. Design for use The social audit process will assess the extent to which these three aspects are being adopted and the new competitive advantages and tangible member benefits arising. Possible criteria relevant to each of these components might include some of the following: Activation of Members The number of members active in committees and work groups Attendance rates at AGMs, other meetings, educational events, etc The extent to which members are given timely information about the activities of the co-operative The number and significance of opportunities available for members to participate in active decision-making The extent to which members are trained in the skills needed to participate effectively in the co-operative The extent to which members are representative of the community as a whole (in terms of socio-economic grouping, age, gender etc) Mutual Aid The number of opportunities available for members to work together on mutual needs and problems The number of collective solutions to mutual problems identified and implemented Design for Use The number of ways in which the activities, services and structures of the cooperative are redesigned to meet the particular needs of the prime users The extent to which members engage in the redesign and improvement of existing activities The extent to which the organisation responds creatively to changing needs of members The extent to which the co-operative expands its activities or facilitates the development of new co-operatives to meet a wider range of community needs. A framework such as the above, can be used to analyse the current effectiveness of the organisation and provides a structure for setting new targets in each of the criteria that are seen as important by members. 102 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 VanCity Credit Union and Social Auditing VanCity uses formal social accountability standards in its social auditing process. We have taken an excerpt form most recent social auditing report (2003). Excerpt from VanCity’s Social Accountability 2003 Report (https://www.vancity.com/MyCommunity/AboutUs/OurValues/CorporateSocialResponsibilit y/SocialAudit/) Overview of VanCity’s Social Audit Process We use the following standards to guide our process and report content: AA1000 Framework and Assurance Standard, Institute of Social and Ethical AccountAbility www.accountability.org.uk AA1000 is an internationally accepted voluntary standard for the process of social accounting, auditing, and reporting. The assurance standard is a demanding process standard for assessing, attesting to, and strengthening the credibility and quality of an organization’s sustainability reporting. It requires us to assess how well our Accountability Report meets the three key principles of materiality, completeness, and responsiveness. Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) Sustainability Reporting Guidelines www.globalreporting.org These guidelines are an international voluntary standard for reporting on a company’s economic, social, and environmental performance. They include a sector-specific supplement on social performance for the financial services sector (SPI-Finance).This report has been prepared in accordance with the GRI Guidelines. Canadian Public Accountability Statements fcac-acfc.gc.ca Regulated Canadian financial institutions with equity in excess of $1 (€0.83) billion are required to publish annual statements describing their contributions to the Canadian economy and society. This report voluntarily includes the Public Accountability Statement reporting requirements. SOCIAL AUDIT PROCESS OVERVIEW CERES Principles and Reporting Requirements ceres.org VanCity is an endorser of the CERES Principles relating to environmental awareness and accountability, and that commit us to an ongoing process of continuous improvement, dialogue, and comprehensive public reporting. This report satisfies the CERES reporting requirements. VALUE OF REPORTING As a member-owned financial institution it is important to understand the value that members place on reporting. In 2003,we asked members to tell us how importantit is for them to receive information about how VanCity lives up to its Statement of Values and Commitments. We learned that 71% of members consider this to be important; and 43% say that it is extremely important. While we have yet to measure the impact our commitment to corporate accountability and transparency has on our financial performance, we know anecdotally that members and employees are attracted to VanCity, and remain at VanCity, because of our 103 ILCU RATIONALISATION COMMITTEE REPORT - MARCH 2006 values and contributions to our employees, local communities, and the environment. We also know that communicating our performance in a credible and meaningful way is essential. Engaging our members, employees, and community leaders in measuring our performance has immense value to VanCity. It helps us understand and keep on top of what matters most to those who influence our longterm success, and provides a more ‘holistic’ picture of our performance in order to improve. And over the long term, reporting our performance in a meaningful and credible way – warts and all – and demonstrating a commitment to continuously improve performance, builds loyalty and trust. We also believe that conducting a social audit to rigorous international standards and publishing an externally verified report on performance has many business benefits, including enhanced reputation, a way to differentiate ourselves from other financial institutions, improved economic, social, and environmental performance, improved risk management, strengthened internal management systems, and reduced costs due to operational efficiencies. The value in reporting is in being transparent and accountable to our members, employees, and our communities for the results of our business decisions and actions. Acting on the findings in our Accountability Report is testimony to the importance 104