WHO GOVERNS TODAY?
A Need for Comparative Power Analysis
Erkki Berndtson
Department of Political Science
P.O.Box 54 (Unioninkatu 37)
00014 University of Helsinki
Finland
Fax: (+358-0) 191 8832
E-mail: Berndtson@cc.Helsinki.fi
Prepared for Presentation at the Conference on "Comparative Power Analysis", a Joint Meeting
of the Finnish Political Science Association and the International Political Science Association
Research Committee on "Political Power"
Helsinki, Finland, December 14-17, 1995
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1. In Defense of Robert A. Dahl and "Who Governs?"
Pluralists vs. elitists has been one of the longest run shows in political science (of evidence for
this, see, e.g., Waste, ed. 1986; Dye 1995). However, it may be claimed that this much heralded
debate between pluralists and elitists has not for the most part convinced the participants of the
merits of the other side. In fact, research in the field with often contradictory findings has
created an impasse (Ricci 1984, 269). One of the signs of the impasse has been a neurotic search
for the right definition of power. More work has been spent in criticizing concepts than in actual
research.
The two approaches to power have, however, clearly focused on different problems. Pluralists
have seen power as an influence that can be studied empirically through political process.
Elitists have not given much thought on political process as such, but have tried to analyse
resources and effects of power. On the other hand, this has been one of the main criticisms by
pluralists against elitists, because, "a potential for control is not, except in a peculiarly
Hobbesian world, equivalent to actual control" (Dahl 1958, 465).
One of the central figures in this debate has been Robert A. Dahl. In fact, he very much initiated
the whole debate with his 1958 article "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model" (Dahl 1958). It
was no wonder that elitists counterattacked using as their target Dahl's 1961 book "Who
Governs?"
It is no use to repeat here all the twists and turns of this debate. My own starting point, however,
is a defense of pluralism, and especially the work of Robert A. Dahl. This does not mean that I
agree with Dahl totally, only that I see some important aspects in Dahl's writings on pluralism
which usually have gone unnoticed in the literature of power.
In the sense Dahl has always been a difficult person to understand. He has been an adherant to
democratic socialism all his life (Dahl 1991), but, on the other hand, he has always been a loyal
member of the American political science profession, praising, e.g., behavioralism (Dahl 1961),
values of New Deal politics (Dahl 1993) and, at the same time political status quo and the ideas
of economic democracy.
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It is no wonder that Dahl's book "Who Governs?" has been either praised as an empirical study
of American pluralism or criticized as its apology. It is possible to understand the latter
accusation. For instance, Dahl has recently pointed out that one of the central themes of the book
was announced in the very first page of the book, namely, how it is possible, if you have a good
deal of inequality in resources in a society, for a democratic order to exist (Dahl 1991, 175).
Now someone may read this as a fear of revolution. However, the same beginning may be read
also in another way. The opening sentence of the book, in fact, reads, "In a political system
where nearly every adult may vote but where knowledge, wealth, social position, access to
officials, and other resources are unequally distributed, who actually governs?" (Dahl 1961, 1).
And in that sense Dahl's question could be posed also by radical social scientists asking, why
hasn't the universal suffrage been able to guarantee the hegemony of the working class
(Therborn 1980). It is this latter meaning that I see as an intersting starting point for the analysis
of power in modern societies.
Another problem is the title of the book. Actually the book doesn't tell who governs, but how
political decisions are made. And although Dahl has been taken as a main representative of
decision-making approach to the study of power (e.g. Ricci 1971), this basic fact has been too
often forgotten. The book is about political decision-making in democracy.
This fact cannot be too much emphasized. The most important difference between Dahl and
elitists, the one which makes Dahl's contribution to the study of power more interesting than that
of elitists, is the linkage of power to democracy. While Dahl analyses this relationship, elitists
deny the existence of democratic political order. As Dahl notes "to some, a pluralistic
democracy with dispersed inequalities is all head and no body; to others it is all body and no
head" (Dahl 1961, 89).
The book must be read also as an analysis of how decisions are made in a democratic
community which is a part of the capitalist system. As Dahl himself has confessed:
"I do think, and here my critics have a good point, that while there is probably more in Who
Governs? than some critics have paid attention to about the limiting factors on the decision
makers, it would seem useful to say more about the limits. Some of them I took for granted, but
I am not sure it's a good idea to take them for granted; perhaps it would be better to spell out the
limitations. For example, I took for granted that New Haven, like any other city in the United
States, operates as a part of a capitalist system..." (Dahl 1986: 192)
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Dahl has also pointed out that New Haven was a case study. And although he believes that it
tells something general about power and decision-making, there is a need for comparative
studies of power. One has to focus on the increasing interconnectedness of different poltiical
systems, how they relate to and are influenced by other (higher level) systems:
"The study of the American political system really should be comparative and not simply a
study of American politics. Without a comparative focus, you can't really understand how the
American system of politics is similar and how it differs from other regimes, nor can you
explain the similarities and differences" (Dahl 1986: 191-192) and "That's why at the
subnational, national, and international levels, we are going to have to pay more attention to the
comparative dimension of governments, to focus on their increasing interconnectedness, and to
sketch this out so that we have a clearer picture of the ecosystems of local governments and how
these ecosystems relate to and are influenced by the national and international systems in which
they are embedded" (Dahl 1986, 195).
It is an interesting fact, however, that there exists very few comparative studies of power.
Although "Who Governs?" was a part of the behavioral revolution in political science, it did not
lead to comparative studies. Of course this is a general problem of comparative politics. Many
studies labeled as such are case-studies of different countries and comparisons are left to
individual readers (van Deth 1994, 2). In the case of American power studies another factor
seems to have been, however, American parochialism. The pluralist-elitist debate was so tied to
the American political context that it was difficult to get rid of it.
In the pluralist-elitist debate it is pluralists, however, who have at least talked about the need for
comparative research. For elitists it is a basic axiom that elites rule, so it is not necessary to have
comparative studies on the subject. Dahl's demands for comparative power research and for
focusing on interconnectedness of political systems are important. How to do that is another
problem. And it is on this point that I disgree with Dahl. I don't see, how this could successfully
be done within the empiricist framework of Dahl.
2. In Defense of the Pluralist Concept of Power
Stewart Clegg (1989) has tried to show that there are two different traditions dealing with
power, one beginning with Thomas Hobbes, the other stemming from the ideas of Niccolo
Machiavelli. Clegg claims that the basic difference between these two traditions is that "where
Hobbes and his successors may be said to have endlessly legislated on what power is,
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Machiavelli and his successors may be said to have interpreted what power does" (Clegg 1989,
5).
This differentiation is important, but not as clear as is usually thought. On surface it would be
easy to think that one can trace the roots of Dahl and pluralists to Hobbes, and those of elitists
via Mosca and Pareto to Machiavelli. Nothing could be more wrong.
A classic modern pluralist definition is that by Robert A. Dahl:
"A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise
do" (Dahl 1969, 80),
which can be traced, however, back to Max Weber:
"In general, we understand by "power" the chance of a man or of a number of men to realize
their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating
in the action" (Weber 1967, 180),
and even further back to Hobbes:
"The power of a Man (to take it Universally.) is his present means, to obtain some future
apparent Good" (Hobbes 1968, 150),
but Hobbes can be read also in another way:
"Power may be defined as the production of intended affects. It is thus a quantitative concept:
given two men with similar desires, if one achieves all the desires that the other achieves, and
also others, he has more power than the other" (Russell 1983, 25)
or
"The influential are those who get the most of what there is to get. Available values may be
classified as deference, income, safety. Those who get the most are elite; the rest are mass"
(Lasswell 1958, 13).
Indeed it is Hobbes who stands more than Machiavelli behind elitists, while it is both Hobbes
and Machiavelli who have influenced the pluralist thinking. One of the reasons for this seeming
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contradiction is the American background of the pluralist-elitist debate. Elitism is a version of
American populist liberalism, while pluralism represents both the liberalism and the classical
republicanism in the U.S. Constitution (Pocock 1989, 106-107; Lienesch 1988, 120-121;
Gunnell 1994, 20). This leads also to the more many-sided concept of power than is the case
with elitists (and even with some pluralist critics of pluralism).
This can be seen by focusing on the concept of pluralism in more detail. Of course the concept
has a European background (Gierke, Duguit, Maitland, Figgis, Laski, etc.), but its impact has
always been most noticeable in the United States, where Laski had an important role in
introducing this European tradition to American political scientists. In doing this he used also
ideas from William James and John Dewey (Eisenberg 1994).
After the Second World War pluralism gained a dominant position in American democratic
theory, losing, however, its analytical sharpness. Today the concept is plagued with definitions
and propositions which overlap but are not logically coherent (Miller 1983, 734). A useful way
to focus on the nature of pluralism, however, is to divide it into different components. Nicholas
R. Miller (1983), for instance, has made a division into: 1) pluralism as dispersed power, 2)
pluralism as group politics, and 3) pluralism as dispersed preferences. Although these three
forms of pluralism are by no means independent each other, they can be used to illustrate
different faces of pluralism. Pluralism as dispersed power refers to the study of political power
and acceptance of various, but unequal, elites; pluralism as group politics to the empirical study
of political groups; and pluralism as dispersed preferences to the relevance of different political
attitudes to the stability of government.
The problem has been that scholars have been labeled as pluralists, if they have adhered even to
one of these faces of pluralism. So we have had very different kinds of pluralists. But in regard
to Dahl it is important to note that although he has been taken mainly as a representative of the
first form of pluralism, he has accepted also the other two ingredients. In fact, he has always
used the term only in the meaning of "the existence of plurality of relatively autonomous
(independent) organizations....within the domain of the state (Dahl 1982, 5). And in that way he
understands pluralism also as group politics. Because he has also always stressed the importance
of "the democratic creed" for the existence of the pluralist democracy (Dahl 1961, 311-325), he
adheres also to pluralism as dispersed preferences.
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It is also important to note that it is Machiavelli, who was an important forefather of the third
version of pluralism. As Giovanni Sartori has argued, pluralism in this sense emerged in a
gradual acceptance of tolerance and it still rests on the acceptance of difference (Sartori 1987).
Sartori himself traces the roots of pluralism to the aftermath of the wars of religion after the 17th
century, but the idea can be found in Machiavelli, who in "Discourses" claimed that discord can
strangthen the state and there is no need for moral cohesion within states (Crick 1970, 33).
On the other hand, one of the modern heirs of Machiavelli, Michel Foucault, has been labeled
also as a pluralist (Dallmayr 1983). Although many have denied that (Malecki 1990, 5-6), it is
interesting that there may be some truth in the claim. In arguing that power does not exist as
such, but is everywhere, and can be understood only as a complex strategic situation in a society
(Foucault 1980, 198; Foucault 1981; 93), Foucault pointed out that visible power relations and
institutions are always dependent on a network of micro-powers. There is no elite controlling
everything, but the society consists of a mass of overlapping systems and grids of power. Behind
every historical event and existing institution there is always an established disciplinary and
normalizing network of power (Malecki 1990).
Foucault did not ask "who has power", but "how power works" and "what are the effects of
power". In that respect he was much closer to pluralists than to elitists. Studying different
discourses on power, he also focused on socializing mechanisms of power. The importance of
these mechanisms has also been forcefully stressed by Steven Lukes (Lukes 1977) in the
pluralist-elitist debate. They have had an important place even in Dahl's argument. In fact, Dahl
has an interesting idea of political socialization as a recurring process of political interchange
between political actors (Dahl 1961, 316).
As my argument is that pluralists have a more manysided concept of power than elitists, it is
necessary to explicate this in more detail. I have earlier identified four different aspects of power
(Berndtson 1994). Power is not something which exists as such, "it is not a resourse, but the
mobilization of resources by an actor" (Wrong 1988: ix). In that sense it is important to ask how
power works and what are its effects. Power consists of numerous forces, counterforces and
relations which dominate people and make them act the way they do, placing people into
different social positions with different rewards. It is important to specify and study different
levels, institutions, positions, mechanisms and actors of power, but it is not possible to call one
aspect of this process power. That is why it is necessary to differentiate: 1) resources of power,
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2) the institutional structure of power in society, 3) techniques of power and, 4) conditions of
power.
Because power is mobilization of different resources, it is important to identify these resources,
whether they are linked to the use of force, economic sanctions or charisma. The second aspect,
a formal decision-making system is also a resource of power, but because of its special role in
society, it has to be taken as an aspect of its own. In every organized political association there is
some kind of an institutionalized way of making desicions. How well actors are able to use their
resources and institutional positions, depends, however, on the techniques and conditions of
power. How to use different power resources in different situations requires skill and
knowledge. What is useful in some situations, may not be so in others.
Conditions of power, on the other hand, refer to the situation where power is used. If people
fight against the powerholders all the time and are even ready to die rather than consent, power
loses some of its effects (Merriam 1964, 21). Conditions of power are dependent on networks of
micro-power. These structures vary from language to social practices sedimented in time. Power
is a circuit.
What makes the pluralist concept of power more fruitful than that of elitists or that of, e.g.,
Foucault, is the fact, that it comprises all four aspects of power. While elitists look only at the
first two and Foucault mainly at the last two, pluralists look at all four. This does not mean that
pluralists make a better analysis of them, only that they have a wider perspective. In this sense,
much of the criticism against pluralism has been misplaced, but it is possible to learn from its
critics (Malecki 1990). For comparative power analysis, it is necessary to focus on all four
aspects of power.
3. Power and Comparative Politics
To compare is to play with differences and similarities. The subject matter of comparative
politics is always full of choices, from concepts to cases. The more general the concepts are the
more cases one can subsume under them, but then the clarity of the analysis is in danger. On the
other hand, the more narrow the concepts are, the clearer one can see, but the range will be
smaller.
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In this sense, the nature of concepts is crucial for comparison. One of the proposed solutions to
the problem is a creation of "the ladder of abstraction" with high-level, medium-level and lowlevel categories (Sartori 1969). High-level categories aim for universal conceptualizations and
cross-area comparisons. They are generic, allusive and non-testable. Medium-level categories
aim for taxonomies and intra-area comparisons among relatively homogenous contexts. They
have high denotative content, but low descriptive precision. Low-level categories aim for
country by country analysis. They have high descriptive precision, but low denotative content.
The importance of this ladder of abstraction is in its recognition. In comparative research one
must be aware of the nature of the concepts one uses.
Some scholars have argued for the use of medium-level categories, because they are a kind of a
compromise. On the other hand, it has been possible to see in them an analogy with Max
Weber's ideal types. Of these Max Weber wrote:
"An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the
synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete
individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized
viewpoints into a unified analytical construct (Gedankenbild). In its conceptual purity, this
mental construct (Gedankenbild) cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality. It is a utopia.
Historical research faces the task of determining in each individual case, the extent to which this
ideal-construct approximates to or diverges from reality (Weber 1969, 90).
The ladder of abstraction and ideal types don't, however, solve the problem of cultural
differences, although they point out the problem. The importance of culture for comparative
politics is clearly revealed by the pluralist-elitist power debate. The analysis of power has
usually taken as its starting-point the nation-state. Power has been analysed within states or
between states. Most students of power have then presented their results in a form of universal
explanations. However, political theories have always been products of their contexts. In that
way it is not possible to speak about the theory of power as such, but an American theory of
power or a French theory of power, etc. Although many of these theories have many common
features, the problem is that there are not very many countries, where social scientists have
developed indigenous theories. Economically and politically hegemonic countries tend to import
also their ideas to others.
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This does not mean that the concepts of power which have been developed within American
social science could not be applied in other countries. Because of the huge output of American
social science it is always possible to learn from it (if done critically). As much as the politics of
a given country resemble that of the United States, it is also possible to use the concepts of
American discourse in that country.
But there are problems. American society is a highly individualistic society and this means that
power is mainly understood from a perspective of an individual with her/his rights. Many other
societies, however, stress more the importance of a community and people's duties towards each
other (Parekh 1992, 170). Because of the nature of American society and political system, the
theories of power have also concentrated mainly on political practice and American social
scientists have not conceptualized the role of political structure (political institutions and
constitution) in the use of power.
This has also been a problem with Dahl. As I have argued earlier (Berndtson 1994), although
Dahl focuses on political decision making system, he takes it for granted. His main problem in
the analysis of power is political practice while he has accepted the basic features of American
constitutional system as unproblematical.
Other features of American exceptionalism can be found in the nature of American political
system, in which the Federal government has always been weak, while states and cities have had
a more important role in the life of people. The centerlessness of American society has offered
groups and social movements a ground to operate in a way different from politics in many other
countries. Besides, the nature of political parties has been different compared for instance with
European parties. When the practical nature of American politics without any Grand Ideologies
is added to the situation, it is no wonder that interest group pluralism has always been an integral
part of American politics and democracy.
For comparative power analysis it is then necessary to differentiate between structurally
different societies. Every political association consists of three spheres, political, economic and
social. Their structure and relations with each other also vary country by country. In some states
political sphere is much more developed than in others, in some states social sphere takes care of
functions which are taken care by governmnet in some other states, etc. That is why it is difficult
to speak about the state as such. States differ culturally, their functions are dissimilar and they
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do not offer the same possibilities for political action for their citizens. It is in many respects
misleading to claim that China and Tuvalu are both states. There are, however, today 192
independent territorial units, which one should be able to compare. There is a need to link power
both with democracy and with various shades of totalitarianism. It is also clear that the four
aspects of power (resources, institutions, techniques, conditions) vary enormously around the
world.
The first conclusion is that power must be analysed in each country's own cultural context using
methods of historical and cultural studies. One implication of this for empirical research is that
one should never aim at similar concepts in comparative research, but at equivalent ones (van
Deth 1994). On the other hand, comparison can be done from a perspective of "the other".
It is possible to improve understanding of one country by studying at least one another country,
and then by seeking to explain the the first one in the terminology and hidden assumptions of the
latter (Daalder 1987).
On the other hand, there is no single proper method of analysing power, but empirical surveys
are needed as well as case studies. It is simply preposterous to think to achieve all possible aims
by using a single method. The goals of research determine the methods. A description of power
resources is another problem than the analysis of power strategies. It is important that there are
concepts and "variables" to guide research, but comparison power must be made with special
care, because power is always linked to psychological reality and that reality cannot be
understood without cultural analysis.
One problem of comparative politics is also that it is based on the idea of nation state, but the
nation state is only a recent innovation and, on the other hand, it seems nowadays to be a
declining institution. The huge contemporary literature on globalization is one sign of that.
Although the nation state (or rather, a territorial state) has not yet disappeared, states have
changed in nature. In the economic sphere of society investments, production, trade and money
move more freely across the borders than before and in the social sphere of society the
consciousness of people is rapidly changing through innovations in new technology and a
possibility to move easily from one place to another.
The changing nature of territorial states requires an analysis of relations between states. The
solution cannot be, however, a simple structural analysis of different nation states, but a
11
construction of a topological typology of the world from the perspective of history and culture.
One of the most interesting attempts for this direction (in regard to Europe) has been suggested
by Stein Rokkan (e.g. Rokkan 1981) and this is the path that comparative politics should follow
more closely.
Rokkan's approach has at least four merits. First, it allows one to compare states using their
location as a system of nations as an important variable. Secondly, it offers a possibility to take
notice of the so-called Galton's problem. Because the problem of diffusion of ideas is above all a
question about research strategy (Karvonen 1994), this strategy is built into Rokkan's
framework. Thirdly, Rokkan's approach allows one to break down countries as single units of
study, if necessary. In contemporary world this is a necessity, which comparative politics has
often neglected (Teune 1990). Lastly, an important feature in Rokkan's analysis is the fact that
he tried to include all European countries in his topology. For the study of comparative politics
it is important to avoid the easy assumption that the only important countries are either large
countries or one's own country (Daalder 1987).
Globalization demands also that one takes a look at power from the perspective of future.
History is usually explained from the past or from the present. A third way is to try to
understand it from the future. The globalization is already pointing power in new directions.
Power is at the same time integrating and disintegrating. If this development changes the nature
of power drastically, it is no use studying it from its present condition. Studying power from the
present will direct the attention of a researcher only to towards the past.
4. Towards a Dialogue in Comparative Power Analysis
There is a new controversy among students of politics. The old behavioralist school still seeks
general explanations, while a new breed of postmodernists want to deny totally a possibility of
comparing states. This paper has been an attempt to find a third way. It looks for dialogue
between cultures.
In this dialogue, power has an important place. For the realization of a true dialogue, a division
of power into negative and positive power is necessary. The first form of power includes all
those means by which one influences another actor, whether it is by force, by money or by
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manipulation, and the actor does something s/he wouldn't otherwise do. In that sense a common
definition of power has a negative tone in it. Actually pluralists and elitists are alike in that
respect with almost all theorists of power.
A positive form of power I call authority. This is power which one accepts, although s/he may
disagree with concrete acts of those who use power. I am well aware of the fact that authority
can be defined also in other ways. Usually it has been understood as ideological power, coming
into general use in social sciences with Max Weber's concept of legitimacy (Peabody 1968,
474). It is then understood as the power over the opinion of others.
A definition of authority adopted in this paper, however, is that by Peter Wich. He argues
convincingly that authority is not a causal relation between individual wills but an internal
relation (Winch 1967, 98). Basing his analysis on Wittgenstein's notion that communication and
understanding presuppose the notion of following a rule, he claims that to participate in rulegoverned activities is, in a certain way, to accept authority. From this it follows that "authority is
essentially bound up with systems of ideas, and systems of ideas essentially involve the
possibility of discussion and criticism" (Winch 1967, 106). In this way Winch argues that
authority is something which is inherent in all social processes. It is a positive concept of power,
because it refers to the acceptance of power in the form of acceptance of rules of social practice.
There can be a conflict of interest between actors, but they can agree on how to proceed in the
pursuit of their interests.
Comparative power analysis should be a way of strengthening the positive aspects of power and
critically revealing the mechanisms of negative power. We must leave the ideology of
behavioralism behind us, but doesn't mean that we have to succumb to the challenge of
postmodernism. Dialogue between different cultural contexts (and time zones) is one way to
understand power in contemporary world and at the same time a way to a world with less
domination.
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