Activating the unemployed: directions and divisions in Europe
Paper prepared for the International Symposium
“Reforming Unemployment Policy in Europe”
Hamburg, May 15-16 2009
Patrizia Aurich
Centre for Globalisation and Governance
University of Hamburg
Institute for Sociology
Allende-Platz 1
20146 Hamburg
Patrizia.Aurich@uni-hamburg.de
0
Abstract:
One continuously debated aspect on reforming the welfare state has been the idea
that policies towards the unemployed play a crucial role in activating hidden
potential on the supply side of labour. Accordingly, unemployment policy has
undergone major reforms in several countries since the beginning of the 1990s.
Activation has become a key term for an overall description of these
developments, but considerable differences in relation to content and target groups
of such activation are apparent.
This paper aims to contribute to an understanding of what “activating the
unemployed” means in different welfare state contexts. It analyses developments
for three European countries: Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom. A
multi-dimensional conception of activation based on individual action
construction, on the one hand, and provision of active support, on the other, allows
for distinguishing different models of activating unemployment policy. Changes
are traced for programmes of unemployment insurance and social assistance over
the last 15 years, comparing policies for insiders with policies for outsiders of the
labour market at different points of time. It is argued that symbolic convergence
towards a paradigm of activation is contrasted by different ways of ascribing
responsibility for managing the risk of unemployment. The comparison of two
allegedly ideal-typical schemes of activation (UK, DK) with recent reforms in
Germany questions assumptions about different types of activation while making
us more cautious for differences not only between, but also within countries.
1.
Introduction
The focus in the fight against unemployment changed in the 1990s towards
questions of labour supply (OECD 1994). Continuously high unemployment rates since
the 1970s supported the view that unemployment had become structural showing major
divisions within the labour force (Clasen und van Oorschot 2002). Accordingly, efforts
have been taken to reconstruct the labour force: since reducing the labour force through
leave schemes or early retirement proved costly and inefficient (Streeck und Heinze
1999), institutional changes towards an activation of the labour force trying to
reintegrate the unemployed into the labour market became the main goal. The latter
concept has been promoted by a number of supra-national actors (EC 2001; OECD
1994) and informed reforms in a number of different welfare states. It has been argued,
however, that this convergence was symbolical, in the sense of a similar terminology,
and that policies remain distinct (Serrano Pascual 2007), resembling a type of
“divergent convergence” (Hinrichs 2001; Seeleib-Kaiser 2001; Visser 2003).
This paper intends to add to the debate in arguing for a differentiated view on
activation. On the one hand, I argue that previous comparative analyses of reform in
unemployment policy have tended to focus on indicators emphasising either
convergence or divergence thereby excluding the possibility that both reform dynamics
can coexist (Barbier und Ludwig-Mayerhofer 2004; Hvinden 2003; Serrano Pascual
2007). Secondly, the paper shows considerable potential for a deeper understanding of
activation through applying a contextual view on policy change. It is argued that the
content of activation differs not just across, but also within countries and that overall
programmatic features should be taken into account. These differences become
increasingly relevant if we consider the relevance of shifting and constructing target
groups in order to avoid blaming (Pierson 1994). The framework suggested here allows
analysing change in relation to programmes, countries and target groups.
2.
Accounting for policy change: divergent convergence?
With rising pressures on welfare states ideas of convergence gained in popularity
(Gilbert 2002), yet have proven difficult of being substantiated (Esping-Andersen 1996;
Scharpf und Schmidt 2000). While the concept of “divergent convergence” seems to be
appropriate, degree and causes of such convergence are still disputed. Convergence
usually means the reduction of difference over time (Knill 2005). Divergent
convergence, however, implies changes in diversity with a common reference point
1
(Kitschelt 1999: 443). So as O’Connor pointed out, the most important question to be
answered is the question of what we expect to have been converging and under what
reference (O'Connor 2007: 221). This means that before time enters the equation, we
need to take a very close look at the social phenomenon in question: on what grounds
are we supposing change and what indicator is related to these?
Defining activation is not an easy task: firstly, it is not as new as sometimes
advertised, since active labour market policies, such as job search assistance, training
schemes, subsidised employment and mobility grants (Eichhorst, et al. 2008b: 6), have
long standing traditions in some countries (for Sweden: Köhler, et al. 2008). Secondly,
it feeds from very different ideological positions (Serrano Pascual und Crespo Suárez
2005). However, taking the perspective of recalibrating reforms, a term coined by Paul
Pierson for the adaptation of existing programmes towards new goals (Pierson 2001), it
can be assumed on a very general level that, every type of activation policy aims at
increasing activity levels among the unemployed. A comparative study of activation
should therefore analyse how this goal is pursued differently in different cases, be it
nations, programmes or target groups. Taking this common reference point just as
starting point for comparison, from which the scope for more detailed policy responses
needs to be developed, also avoids the problem of recalibration as a catch-all term
comprising many different directions of reform, as has been critically remarked by
Jørgen Goul Andersen (Andersen 2007: 4).
While the chosen concept determines what we are looking for in terms of our
understanding of welfare, the indicators used to measure a concept determine what kind
of variety we may find (the so called “dependent variable problem” (Clasen und Siegel
2007; Kühner 2007)). In this regard, it has been controversial, which levels of policy
implementation to consider (Andersen 2007). Jørgen Goul Andersen distinguishes 5
levels of policy change: paradigms and discourse, institutions, policy, expenditure and
outcomes, all of which I believe can be linked to different stages of the policy process
(see figure 1): discourses and paradigms frame the development of policies, institutions
and policies represent the actual design of welfare in the legislative output, while
expenditure and outcomes represent application and effects of policies. These phases are
of course not easily disentangled and policy-making seldom proceeds in such tidy order.
However, their distinction is of heuristic value (see similarly: Sabatier 2007) and it is
important to state explicitly the focus of research.
Figure 1: The process of policy-making.
2
Formal
institutional
level
Social level
Input
Throughput
Policy
aims and
goals
Implementation
through law and
administrative
personnel
Social actors: primary, collective.
Interests
Culture
Output
• Institutionally shaped
logic of the situation
• Restructuring of
functional relationships
Outcome: effects on social
order, social practices,
functional relationships etc.
Social relations
Source: Own depiction based on Jann und Wegrich 2003.
It seems that the most manifest point of institutional reform is the legislative output
(see similarly: Green-Pedersen 2004). The practical output of policies, such as
participants stocks or expenditure, is influenced by a number of variables not directly
related to the policy process or its goals (Clasen und Clegg 2007). More analytical
rigour can be applied in analysing only one level of implementation at a time asking:
how have goals been translated into policies?
In the following I will therefore focus on the level of legislative policy strategies. In
part three, I will analyse the new policy agenda in terms of its common reference point
and present the overall framework for comparison, before presenting results of the
country comparison in part four.
3.
Symbolic convergence vs. institutional output: what indicators?
The “activation paradigm” (Serrano Pascual 2007), which frames reforms towards
activation, is based on an awareness of ambiguous effects of welfare in the sense that
policy instruments aimed at facilitating inclusion might at the same time produce
exclusion. Developed at first in order to ease the risks of the workforce in an
industrialised economy (Achinger 1971; Wilensky und Lebeaux 1965), the welfare state
used to ensure that groups on the fringes of society had the means to lead a decent life.
While inclusion has never been wholly unconditional (Clasen und Clegg 2007), but
3
rather a determinant of social appreciation (Lessenich 2008), the main focus of debates
has been on economic support and vertical aspects of inclusion (Lahusen und Stark
2003), for example in terms of a gap to be preserved between transfers and wages. Only
recently have horizontal aspects of social exclusion come into focus (see also: Luhmann
1994; Mohr 2007; Percy-Smith 2000) culminating in the view that inclusion through
welfare benefits may contribute to the deprivation of other aspects of social life, such as
the labour market (for example: Giddens 1998: 113).1
In this regard a central instrument of welfare policy, the de-commodification of the
workforce (Esping-Andersen 1990), is called into question. It has been argued that so
called “rest areas” set up by the welfare state (Streeck 1998) have reduced economic
pressure and consequently the incentive to work (Layard und Nickell 1998; Sinn 2002;
Streeck und Heinze 1999). The activation paradigm therefore contends that measures to
achieve inclusion via paying benefits need to be complemented by efforts to bring
individuals into work and that this to a certain degree requires an activation of
individual capacities by reducing disincentives. Jepsen and Serrano-Pascual found that
supra-national policy-making via the European Employment Strategy is very much a
compromise between these two goals (Jepsen und Serrano-Pascual 2006).
However, since these are two goals with no obvious hierarchy among them, it is
unlikely that they will translate into one coherent strategy (see also: Serrano Pascual
2007). Rather the opposite is to be expected: depending on the relative preference on
one of these goals, strategies may differ in terms of output.
3.1
Separating the dimensions
A common feature in research on activation has been the analysis of differences
between empirically observable national policy sets. At first, in a rather static
perspective, opposing poles of activation such as “enabling” and “workfare” (Jensen
1999) or “defensive” and “offensive” (Torfing 1999) were distinguished. These
distinctions were found to correspond to two main ideological positions: the neo-liberal
view, on the one hand, purporting that unemployed people are rationally deciding not to
work and therefore need stronger economic incentives to do so, and the egalitarian,
This is a topic prominently covered by works on cultural dependency and “crowding-out”-effects of social
policy: while some assume that the poor receiving welfare develop a certain culture of a life without work
(Murray 1984), theorists of the “crowding-out”-hypothesis assume negative effects of social policy on selfhelp and the use of social capital in order to overcome needy situations (de Swaan 1988).
1
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universal view emphasising the need of unemployed individuals for enabling support
(Barbier und Ludwig-Mayerhofer 2004; Serrano Pascual 2007: 287).
While some see these views ideal-typically represented by two countries (the UK
and Denmark respectively, see: Barbier 2005), it can also be argued that most existing
activation policies combine aspects of both of these types (see also: Dean 2007: 584),2
which makes these ideal-typical features useful in order to identify differing elements
within those policies, but useless, if you use them separately or want to distinguish
distinct configurations (likewise: Dingeldey 2003: 23).3 The space in between therefore
needs to be looked at more closely assuming a continuum with a number of different
possibilities along the new dimension of “dynamic social protection”4 rather than two
opposing positions (likewise: Goul Andersen 2002: 3; Leisering und Hilkert 1999: 49).
While the general need for a more gradual distinction of activation policies has been
recognised by some scholars (Lødemel und Trickey 2001) and different combinations of
workfare and enabling have been analysed (cf. Dingeldey 2007), the tools on offer are
still based on a one-dimensional distinction of how labour market integration is pursued
rather than on a systematic assessment of change in unemployment policy in relation to
the two goals outlined above.
A more refined attempt at classifying activation policies has been made in clustering
formal and substantive policy traits. Amparo Serrano Pascual, for example, compared
different policy sets in regard to two dimensions: their contractual balance between state
and individual, on the one hand, and their modes of managing individuals, on the other
(Serrano Pascual 2007). The operationalisation of these two main variables, however,
seems at times ambiguous: Whereas it is not quite clear how the differences in the
contractual balances are actually measured, the distinction of the managing modes is not
completely convincing either. The again dichotomous distinction between “moraltherapeutic regulation of behaviour” and “matching individuals to labour market
demands” doesn’t allow for measuring gradual differences.
2
The coexistence of these somewhat contradictional policy approaches is also represented in supra-national
policy recommendations, such as for example the European Employment Strategy (Serrano Pascual und
Crespo Suárez 2005).
3
Of course, this is a general flaw inherent in ideal types, that they are not supposed to be representing
actual phenomena (Weber 1922/1980). They are, however, supposed to help explain and distinguish real
phenomena and they can differ in terms of their usefulness for this task.
4
Activation can be seen as a dynamic strategy of welfare, in that it tries to achieve something (individual
autonomy) in time. This time dimension can be seen as a qualitatively new aspect of activation policies (see
also: Leisering und Hilkert 1999: 55; Mohr 2007: 24).
5
To sum up, current conceptualisations of activation lack a systematic and dynamic
analysis of activation. I contend that this failure is due to the use of criteria derived from
empirical observation of policies labelled as activation rather than through systematic
assessment of activating effects of unemployment policy as a whole. Konle-Seidl and
Eichhorst in their comprehensive study emphasise that programmes themselves have
become moving targets concluding that this …
“…,contingent convergence’ … implies the obsolescence of established typologies of
activation styles” (ebd.: 432),
In contrast to this view, I interpret this as a chance to elaborate on and discuss
established typologies rather then discarding them altogether. Analysing change might
require a different concept of ideal-types than previous cross-sectional studies used: one
that is based on dimensions rather than ideal-typical categories. This would also be
more in line with recent literature on incremental change in welfare policy (Streeck und
Thelen 2005).
In the following a theoretical model of unemployment policy5 is introduced which
will, so the argument, be better able to analyse how small changes in policy sets towards
either one of these goals might change the meaning of the policy as a whole.
3.2
Governing activation
The described paradigm has lead to a functional shift in unemployment policies,
managing the risk of unemployment via activating “hidden” potential on the supply-side
of labour and via increasing activity among benefit recipients. It therefore needs to be
asked how individual action is constructed, on the one hand, and how activity provision
is governed, on the other.
The first goal deals with aspects of social rights: Previous classifications show a
spectrum of instruments in shaping individual dynamics from conditional enforcing
kinds of strategies to more supportive and enabling ones (see: Barbier 2005;
Fleckenstein 2004; Larsen 2005). Social rights, irrespective of their nature, determine
the degree to which it is attractive for individuals to stay on welfare. However, this
5
Unemployment policy shall here be defined as policies designed specifically in order to provide for the
unemployed as compared to the broader term of labour market policy, which also comprises actions
towards employers and markets. Unemployment policies, however, are all social policy measures which
provide for the unemployed with some form of income, training or other support to re-enter the labour
market. It has increasingly been seen not only as a tool to provide social security. in case of job loss, but
also as an instrument to facilitate and promote labour market integration (OECD 1994).
6
effect of unemployment policy schemes has been questioned and the provision of social
rights has increasingly become conditional (Clasen und Clegg 2007). This conditionality
can be understood as an increase of pushing individuals into the labour market while
decreasing their range of choice, i.e. their autonomy. Concerning the dimension of
action construction it therefore might be useful to rank policies along a continuum
between coercion and autonomy, where the balance of social rights and conditionality
sets push- and pull-incentives between work and welfare.
However, as has been shown, the argumentation for activation is twofold: While
some contend that unemployed individuals are financially dependent on unemployment
benefits trading off disadvantages of being unemployed for financial advantages of
being on benefits (Nickell 1998; Sinn 2002; Streeck und Heinze 1999), there have also
been claims that unemployed individuals, especially long-term unemployed, become
culturally dependent on benefits in that their work norms or their knowledge about how
to behave in the world of work have diminished (Murray 1984). These complex
arguments require us to take a more comprehensive view on unemployment policy than
would be possible by using concepts such as de-commodification for example. Whereas
studies of de-commodification are in line with the first argument focusing their analysis
on the generosity of income compensation, the debate about activation shows that
unemployment policy touches heavily on social aspects, such as employability, as well.
A useful tool for such a re-conceptualisation of unemployment policy is the
distinction made by Franz-Xaver Kaufmann. Kaufmann analyses 4 kinds of
interventions through social policy: legal, economic, pedagogic and ecological
(Kaufmann 2002: 86-106). While this is a richer approach towards social policy than
just considering income compensation, a further distinction seems necessary: whereas
the legal intervention concerns the more general construction of individual action
between coercion and autonomy, the economic and the pedagogical intervention give
information about the nature of those rights. Since we are dealing with questions of
intervening on the supply-side of labour the ecological intervention, which aims at
changing the environment of benefit recipients, is unnecessary for our analysis.
However, the pedagogic intervention may prove a useful addition in the catalogue of
policy analysis (I will use the term “social” intervention as a more neutral term). The
main conclusion to be drawn here is that social rights as well as conditionality can be
affective economically as well as socially. For instance, economic measures such as
income support can increase or reduce levels of autonomy, depending on the level of
7
benefits provided (as assumed by studies on de-commodification), the benefit duration
granted and additional earnings allowed while being on welfare. Likewise, the social
design of policies affects the autonomy of individuals: the range of choice of activities
encouraged while on benefits increases autonomy, whereas mandatory participation
requirements limit autonomy. Furthermore, regulations on what constitutes reasonable
employment also influence autonomy in market behaviour.
In relation to the second goal of activity provision it was contended that a
comparative model of activation should include aspects of how opportunities to become
active are provided. Building on Lødemel and Trickey (Lødemel und Trickey 2001) it
seems useful to distinguish policies according to the extent to which they pursue direct
labour market attachment or facilitate attachment to work through welfare. However,
while Lødemel and Trickey construct state intervention as only relevant in terms of
human resource development, or in other words the enabling dimension of
unemployment policy, there are also other ways, in which the state can intervene in
order to achieve inclusion into work activities, such as providing work placements
outside the market. While this is usually understood as “workfare” in the literature and
in that sense as a case of “negative” activation, it is distinct from direct labour market
attachment thereby presenting a third model that is different from the dichotomous
distinction of policy types discussed above. The criterion to be applied should be the
question to what extent the state is ascribed responsibility for activity provision (the
right to activation) or whether individuals are left to their own devices on the market.6
Crossing both dimensions allows analysing activation policies on a four-fold scheme
(Figure 1) outlining four different activation strategies.
This doesn’t require actual funding for programmes, the provision of income to the unemployed during
this period already constitutes state responsibility.
6
8
Figure 1: Conceptual framework for outputs of activation.
Coercion
Coercive Welfare
Re-commodification
• Most active
• Partly active
• high pressure
• high pressure
• high service provision
• low social provision
Low
Active
support
High
Enabling
De-commodification
• Partly active
• most passive
• low pressure
• low pressure
• high offer of social provision
• low social provision
Autonomy
Construction of individual action situation
Source: Own depiction.
In a way the antipodes produced by dichotomous standards of comparison can be
found here: While the upper right-hand field represents a strategy of activation “recommodifying” individuals, the lower left-hand field represents a strategy with high
income support and comprehensive service structures thereby focusing on “enabling”
individuals. However, the combination of both dimensions produces two more fields:
“de-commodification”, on the one hand, which is based on high income support with a
slim offer of services and activities, and “coercive welfare”, on the other, which entails
mandatory service consumption or work-for-your-benefit-measures with less focus on
the market. The former one seems to refrain largely from both, an activation of the
individual by pressure as well as from activation via offering inclusion into work or
training. In that sense, this framework serves not only to compare different types of
activation, but also differing degrees of activation. The latter type of “coercive welfare”
in that sense combines both activation objectives pointing out the type of “state
activation” hinted at above. These programmes are not mainly oriented towards labour
market integration, but, in acknowledging problems of long-term unemployment, aim at
designing welfare so as to include activities for the unemployed. Whereas conventional
classifications of activation policies see pressuring individuals as something opposed to
helping them, so called workfare vs. enabling (Dingeldey 2007), this distinction shows
9
that social welfare provision is not always supportive, but through mandatory schemes
actually can eliminate choice.7
However, the activation approach with its emphasis on individual behaviour not
only touches on functional, but also on moral aspects questioning the deservingness of
benefit recipients (BMWI 2005; Murray 1984; Streeck und Heinze 1999). The outlined
variations of individual action institutionalise perceptions about the situation of the
unemployed, the role of the state and the behaviour of benefit recipients implying
different models of responsibility and the role of work in contemporary societies.
The autonomous schemes assume the unemployed to behave dutifully with little
responsibility for their situation of unemployment. The schemes differ, however, in their
assumptions about the degree of help the individual needs to re-enter the labour market:
While the enabling scheme focuses on an investment approach helping individuals to
compete on labour markets, the de-commodification scheme leaves it up to the
individual to engage in such activities.
The coercive schemes are not based on such an optimistic view of the individual.
The unemployed are assumed to be passive by nature; activities need to be forced on
them and in case of non-compliance sanctions apply. As far as activities are concerned
the coercive welfare scheme emphasises social intervention. Such policies entail
behavioural requirements about how to pursue labour market integration, for example.
However, requirements might also entail working for your benefit. Guidance is more
important than direct labour market attachment; individuals are seen as unable to help
themselves. The content of work varies, however: while most work-for-your-benefitschemes are targeted at low end jobs, some activities allow for more quality and the use
of talent (such as voluntary jobs or higher education).
The re-commodification scheme, on the other hand, is based on the assumption of
self-sufficient individuals that rationally trade off time on benefits against work. These
individuals are seen as able, but lacking the necessary work ethic. This scheme
emphasises individual responsibility and tries to deter individuals from receiving
benefits through the introduction of time limits, retrenchment, sanctions etc.. The use of
7
While Dingeldey in later publications recognises that both elements, pressure and service provision can be
combined, she focuses on the enabling contribution of social service provision towards labour market
integration and ignores largely that workfare doesn’t necessarily aim first and foremost at labour market
integration, but rather at social integration (be it via socially including individuals or via re-validating work
norms).
10
work-for-benefit-schemes may be used as further deterrence (Wolff und Hohmeyer
2008), but at the same time the engagement in such activities takes energy away from
the jobseeker’s search efforts. As far as the content of work is concerned, individuals
are expected to be more flexible accepting various kinds of working conditions. Again,
work in general is more important than what kind of work.
In the following the policy development in three formerly distinct welfare regimes is
compared in order to get a more nuanced picture of change towards activation in
unemployment policy in terms of degree, but also direction of change.
4.
Divergent convergence?
In order to investigate change towards activation in Europe, appropriate units of
analysis need to be identified in relation to time as well as space. Both aspects are related
in the sense that reform pace differs between countries. But in general, the international
debate on activation arose in the 1990s so that the time-frame should be set from 1990
until today. Specific cases in time and corresponding hypotheses about change are
discussed in more detail below.
4.1
Sample and hypotheses
As in many other fields of welfare state research, the works by Esping-Andersen and
his framework of ideal-typical welfare regimes have served as starting point for
comparing activation (Esping-Andersen 1990). In this regard, Jean-Claude Barbier
stated that two ideal-typical concepts of activation are inherent in the policies of liberal
Great Britain and social-democratic Denmark. In that sense the assumption has been
that the liberal welfare regime type also produces more “liberal” activation policies:
based on a market-oriented type of social protection, emphasising self-reliance and
taking only a limited role in providing active measures. The universalistic regime type,
on the other hand, even after introducing activation reforms keeps providing more
complex and extended services, while granting high degrees of living standards (Barbier
2005: 115). While Barbier and Mayerhofer contend that there is no such thing as a
“conservative” type of activation (Barbier und Ludwig-Mayerhofer 2004) that would
match the tripartite distinction of conventional regime types, others have argued that a
distinct continental path of activation can be discerned in the selective treatment of
groups (Clegg 2007). Taking this debate into account it makes sense to look at countries
of different welfare regimes and to compare the ideal-typical poles of Denmark and the
UK with a conservative policy scheme. Germany, as a Bismarckian welfare state with a
11
long history of welfare focused on status maintenance, has recently introduced quite
transformative reforms8 and seems a good case in point.
In line with Barbiers argument (Barbier 2005) it could be expected that the UK has
developed along lines of pressure and reduced support, whereas the social-democratic
regime of Denmark could be expected to focus on enabling measures (inclusion into
work via welfare) and be less concerned with coerciveness. In terms of the above
typology the UK would be expected to feature a “re-commodification”-scheme, while
the policies of social-democratic Denmark would be expected to resemble an
“enabling”-scheme.
Implications for Germany are more difficult to estimate. Two scenarios are
conceivable: if change had been minimal, it could be expected to show resemblance to
the “de-commodification”-type, granting earnings-related benefits and low levels of
services.9 However, considering the idea of selective activation in convervative regimes,
it might be important to distinguish different programmes of unemployment protection,
such as unemployment insurance and social assistance, which may differ in their
approach according to different target groups (Clegg 2007). While unemployment
insurance programmes cover the clientele closer to the labour market, other programmes
such as social assistance cover more problematic groups with less organised interest
groups. As for a direction of activation it has been claimed that Germany developed
towards a liberal model (Clasen 2005; Mohr 2007; Seeleib-Kaiser und Fleckenstein
2007).
The number of cases resulting from these deliberations is 13, if for all three
countries policies are compared for two points in time for all programmes in
unemployment protection (unemployment insurance, unemployment and social
assistance).10
4.2
Methods: how to measure the concept?
Two dimensions have been identified as constitutive for the paradigm of activation:
the construction of individual action and the mode of activity provision. In addition,
different indicators of unemployment policy were identified, by which to measure
8
The Hartz-IV-law in 2005 has been widely interpreted as a break with conservative traditions (Eichhorst,
et al. 2008a; Fleckenstein 2008).
9
As van Kersbergen has shown, policies with Christian democratic roots have rather underdeveloped
service sectors due to an emphasis on subsidiarity (van Kersbergen 1995).
10
Only Germany had 3 programmes in place in the 1990s, therefore the uneven number.
12
output on both dimensions. Transfers as well as measures of social intervention were
assigned to the values of both dimensions the following way (see also Table 1):
1) The autonomy of an individual over the decision, whether he/she wants to stay
on welfare is assumed to be the higher, the more generous the replacements
rates, the broader the range of activities that can be combined with welfare and
the higher the amount of income accumulation allowed. At the same time the
degree of coercion can be assumed to be influenced by the number of
requirements to reciprocate benefit receipt, the sanctioning instruments
available and the definition of reasonable employment to be accepted, if offered.
2) The dimension of activity provision has been operationalised taking into
account the degree and intensity of placement services as well as the range and
quality of activity options provided. The elements were indexed in their values
and then ranked comparatively on all dimensions (see Table 1).
Table 1: Indicators for activation in unemployment policies.
Policy elements
Indicator
Replacement Rates
Simple more or less comparison of net
replacement rates
Types of activities
encouraged
Range of choice in activities offered by
PES or allowed to undertake while on
benefits
Transfer reduction
rate
Both: degree of earnings accumulation
and time expenditure allowed
Definition of
reasonable jobs
Both: wage in relation to benefit, travel
time, personal situation
Sanctions
Both: degree of sanction (susp. vs.
gradual), timeframes
Code of conduct
Requirements to reciprocate benefit
receipt: range of requirements,
concreteness, exemption clauses
Activities offered
Intensity (duration), quality (education
or workfare)
Case management
Duration, intensity and client ratio.
Indices
Social Rights
Balance of coercion
and autonomy
Conditionality
activity provision via Balance of market
welfare
and welfare
Source: Own compilation.
For the construction of individual action a scale ranking from 1 to 5 was used, with
5 being the highest possible and 1 the lowest possible value (for a similar approach see
Hasselpflug 2005: 5), the total of the additive index was then recoded again into a scale
of 1 to 5 and resulting values of autonomy and coercion were balanced against each
13
other. The mode of activity provision was measured on a scale from -5 to 5, where -5
was the most extensive provision by the state with high quality activity options and 5
the least. Data used included the MISSOC-Database, country-reports by the OECD and
literature on activation reforms. While actual outcomes might differ, this comparison
shows different strategies of risk management as they are inherent in different
legislative settings. It should be kept in mind, however, that the data available only
shows a comparison of the countries in question: the values are therefore relative.
However, since the main goal was to compare the countries against each other, no
absolute values were needed. Furthermore, since the countries compared are seen as
rather different in most comparative studies presenting even opposite poles of welfare at
times, a sufficient degree of variety seems to have been provided for.
4.3
Country-comparison
The analysis shows that all programmes have increased the degree of coerciveness
in their schemes for the long-term-unemployed (figure 3). Germany and Denmark show
the highest increases in this regard leading to changes from de-commodifying and
enabling schemes to re-commodification and coercive welfare.
The order in degree of coercion stayed the same compared to the beginning of the
1990s: the UK still has the highest degree of coercion, which is due to very low benefit
levels, strong obligations of benefit recipients and severity of sanctions (the JSA, which
already pays rather low income compensation, can be completely suspended for
weeks).11 The German assistance for long-term unemployed reached a very similar
degree of coercion by now due to a reduction in benefits (now a flat-rate minimum) and
a strong code of social conduct. Sanctions, however, are applied gradually in Germany
starting from 10% in case of minor to 60% reductions in case of repeated misconduct.
Finally, Denmark has changed from a type of policy granting recipients high autonomy
to a scheme mixing autonomy with coercion. Main elements of this strategy are a
redefinition of reasonable employment (after three months every job is seen as
reasonable: Kvist, et. al. 2008) and a strong code of conduct (ranking equally with the
UK on this: see Annex 1). However, income compensation remained relatively
untouched (changes in replacement rates are due to context developments rather than
changes in unemployment policy: Hansen 2007: 11).
11
Though hardship-payments are possible, if the danger of such can be proven to the agency.
14
Figure 3: Activating the long-term unemployed from 1990-2007
5
4
UK-SA-new
3
UK-UI-new
2
DK-UI-new
1
DE-SA-new
DK-SA-new
0
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
DE-UI-new
0
-1
1
2
3
DE-SA-old
4
UK-UI-old
DE-UI-old
DE-UA-old
-2
DK-UI-old
-3
DK-SA-old
-4
-5
Source: Own calculations based on OECD data, MISSOC database and literature.
UK-SA-old
5
However, notwithstanding increased coercion in all cases there are marked
differences in the direction of reform as far as the dimension of active support is
concerned. This is interesting for two reasons: First, the expected differences between
the UK and Denmark don’t seem to hold in reality. Both started from rather low
provision in the 90s towards much more active support in the beginning of the new
century. While they used to differ in terms of action construction, they have converged
recently towards a coercive-welfare-pole following parallel trends. Secondly, German
unemployment assistance has developed in a different direction than the other two
schemes shifting towards more coerciveness as well as stronger market-orientation.
These differences are discussed in more detail below considering the combined effects
of both dimensions on the countries’ strategies within their particular context.12
4.3.1 Denmark
As we have seen, Denmark’s development is not quite in line with assumptions
about “universal activation”. While it has the strongest focus on qualification of all the
schemes compared, the Danish scheme has also increased strongly the coercion applied.
One explanation for this is that there has been a notable shift in Denmark from a
“safety net model to a trampoline model” (Torfing 1999: 15). While originally
activation was seen as an additional right unemployed persons should have, in recent
years activation measures have become more mandatory and the definition of
reasonable employment much broader (Andersen und Pedersen 2006). Today any job
offer has to be accepted as long as it pays minimum wage and does not require more
than 4 hours of daily travel (Andersen und Pedersen 2006). This is very close to
definitions of reasonable employment applied by the other countries. Denmark also
scores highest together with the UK on the code of conduct (see annex). As far as
autonomy is concerned Denmark has a very low value on the possibility to combine
employment with benefits: generally no accumulation of earnings with benefits is
possible (MISSOC 2008).
Overall the balance has therefore tipped towards coercion increasing individual as
well as state responsibility. The new state responsibility entails a high quality provision
of service and activities while being on benefits. Activities supported comprise full-time
education, wage subsidies and rehabilitation over the entire benefit period (Kvist, et. al.
12
For a full over-view of the countries ranking see the Annex.
16
2008: 238). While this is the most comprehensive programme of provision of the three
cases, the drastic nature of change on this dimension is also due to a rather passive
history in Denmark compared to other Scandinavian countries. Whereas Sweden has
quite a long active line in its policy tradition (Kvist, et al. 2008), in Denmark work duty
has been weak from the 1970s to the 1990s (Andersen 2007: 14). Only very few
programmes were in place in the beginning of the 1990s and these were targeted at
persons unemployed longer than 2 years (Jensen 2008: 121-122). They included
subsidised jobs (so called “job-offer scheme”) and were mainly intended to re-establish
eligibility for benefit receipt (Kvist, et. al. 2008: 240). The chance to develop this policy
area has obviously been embraced boldly leading to a fully fledged system of activation
measures. The strategy is complemented with structured case management including
profiling and individual action plans. The action plan entails a number of obligations
and compliance requirements are high (Jensen 2005).
How can we explain the strong degree of reform in Denmark with both activation
strategies given similar priority? Larsen and Mailand argue that this is due to the
institutional structure of corporatism, which facilitated “complementary strategies”
pursuing economic as well as welfare goals (Larsen and Mailand 2007: 111). In this
context the perception that unemployment had exclusionary effects was strongly
acknowledged making work a solution to social problems (ibid. 106). However, there
have been different phases of development: during the early years of the new socialdemocratic government in the beginning of the 1990s structural unemployment was
seen as a “qualifications deficit”, later there was a shift in discourse towards
interpreting the problem of unemployment as a problem of moral, a “motivational
deficit” (ibid.: 105). Evaluations undertaken by various institutions showed negative
lock-in effects of activation, which supported this view. The corresponding
implementation of more coercive measures in order to avoid these problems was
facilitated by institutional reforms that have weakened trade union influence (ibid..:
122). Furthermore, a very favourable context of labour market development may have
reduced resistance of the public to coercive policies (Andersen and Pedersen 2006),
since their effects are likely to be less harsh. Furthermore, such context leads to keeping
the increase in labour supply in relative proportion to labour demand thereby reducing
potential for the creation of low end jobs.
All in all, change in the Danish unemployment policy scheme has been remarkable
considering its passive nature in the beginning of the 1990s.
17
4.3.2 Germany
Germany, as a status-protecting welfare state, started from a position of quite
generous replacement rates and low pressure. It differed, however, from the Danish
scheme having less generous net replacement rates and, more importantly, tighter
regulations on reasonable employment: In 1982 a directive came into force ruling that
during the first 4 months only very limited decreases (20%) in income were deemed
reasonable, but that after that recipients were required to take on jobs on levels below
their qualification thereby leading to possibly much higher decreases in income (Sell
1998: 536). While the decrease was cushioned by the “temporäre Qualifikationsschutz”
(temporary qualification protection), a gradual approach ranking jobs from university
level, to college, high school and lower education, Denmark only introduced regulations
on reasonability in 1994 for persons unemployed longer than a year (Kvist, et. al. 2008:
243).
With the Hartz-IV-reform in 2005 coercion has been increased further. It entailed a
higher code of conduct, a very broad definition of reasonable employment and a
reduction in replacement rates. A major part of the reform was a reduced benefit for
long-term unemployed and a reduction of benefit duration for unemployment insurance
thereby potentially enlarging this group (Aurich 2007). The formerly separate schemes
of social assistance and unemployment assistance have been merged and the new
“Arbeitslosengeld 2” is now the only scheme complementing unemployment insurance.
Overall the rules of this new benefit for long-term unemployed shifted towards former
social assistance regulation: low benefits, sanctions reducing the amount of benefit
below the socio-cultural subsistence level and stricter behavioural requirements
(Eichhorst, et. al. 2008). The catalogue of obligations has been extended and sanctions
became to some extent individualised, since any breach against some stipulation in the
integration agreement signed at the beginning of the benefit period can lead to sanctions
(Eichhorst, et al. 2006).
On the active support dimension conservative states have been known for relatively
low service provisions (van Kersbergen 1995). However, according to the results of this
study Germany actually had a relatively active level before the reform:13 unemployed
had rights to vocational training and subsidised job placement, even to the relatively
13
This may however be due to the comparison with one liberal and one rather atypical social-democratic
regime.
18
expensive ABM (Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen), which offered employment in jobs
with proper wages and subject to social security contributions. The reform has reduced
the access to these schemes considerably. While the merger was originally intended to
bring social assistance recipients into the sphere of employment law delivering more
active labour market measures to this group (Aurich 2007), it has not determined
specific rights of the unemployed. The new Social Security Code II (SBG II) covering
the long-term unemployed refers to Social Security Code III, which regulates support
for short-term unemployed with insurance benefits. However, while it stipulates that
recipients covered by SGB II have a right to placement services, their access to other
instruments of active support, so called “Arbeitsförderung”, is something that can be
granted. This is a very clear language for German law: while the placement services
have to be guaranteed, other instruments, such as activity provision, are granted at the
discretion of the case manager.
Furthermore, specific regulations of activity provision are part of the SGB II: § 16
describes a slimmed version of the SGB III catalogue and is exempt of any offers of
ABM, training or education. It lists some financial supplements available in order to
secure self-employment or an offered employment position as well as the so called
“work opportunities (Arbeitsgelegenheiten)”. These work-opportunities are jobs for
unemployed that have problems on the first labour market and which are paid at 1-2 €
per hour. Not only are these jobs low paid, they are also supposed to be secondary
activities that are not in the interest of market actors. They are therefore often jobs with
low qualification and no connection to the real labour market.
Germany accordingly scores lowest of the three countries on social services, since
training or other activities preparing individuals for the labour market are slim and most
work opportunities are intended to deter benefit receipt rather than qualifying people for
better jobs. The direction of reform has even strengthened this conservative element of
subsidiarity and personal responsibility. The reform has been used to emphasise work
ethics and market orientation rather than increasing state intervention as seen in other
countries. In line with this are the rather generous regulations on accumulating earnings
while on benefits: the transfer reduction rate of the German scheme is much more
sophisticated than in the other countries leading to a high number of so called
“Aufstocker”, workers that need to supplement their wages with benefits. However, this
is interestingly only true for the long-term unemployed, while for the insured active
support has been expanded.
19
The German unemployment policy scheme has changed the content of its activation
policy from an enabling to a re-commodifying one. Very often this is explained in the
literature with a new “discourse” on unemployment (Seeleib-Kaiser and Fleckenstein
2007) and “ideational leadership” (Stiller 2007). During times of public discontent with
rising unemployment and how it was handled (see for example the placement scandal in
2002: Fleckenstein 2008), a “window of opportunity” opened and was used by leaders
such as Gerhard Schröder and Wolfgang Clement (former minister of economy and
labour affairs) to promote a new policy agenda and to convince the social-democratic
basis of its necessity (Eichhorst et. al. 2008: 23-25). It is argued that policy makers took
the UK-experience as an example and referred to it extensively in order to justify
changes (Eichhorst et. al. 2008: 23; Seeleib-Kaiser and Fleckenstein 2007: 440).
However, it has been largely ignored that only part of the UK-development was
mirrored in Germany leaving out the focus on social inclusion through work activities.
4.3.3 United Kingdom
The British scheme has done a major shift on the active support dimension whereas
the construction of action has changed only little compared to Denmark and Germany.
Again this can be explained with previously existing programme structures: The UK
policy was already rather coercive, when activation became a topic (see Annex: UK
1993). It scored highest of the three schemes on all three coercion-indicators. An
increase in activation could therefore be more easily achieved on the dimension of
support. This is especially plausible, if we take the actors of reform into account: while
coercion had started to increase already under the conservative government in the mid
80s (Clasen 2005), the new government of the Labour Party endorsed something in
opposition to this relatively straight retrenchment agenda. While the prefix “New”
pointed out some distance to earlier Labour positions, the agenda that won the election
in 1997 still distinguished itself from the former conservative government by suggesting
to supplement conservative policies with ingredients to make this approach more
humane (Lindsay 2007). New Labour endorsed the JSA-scheme, but it complemented it
with policies that were supposed to support and ensure a transition into the labour
market (Clasen 2002: 68; Lindsay 2007). One reason for this was the advice by social as
well as economic scientists pointing out the dangers of long-term exclusion from the
labour market: especially Richard Layard and Anthony Giddens are to be named in this
regard (Cebulla 2004: 3, 20).
20
The New-Deal strategy included access to more intensive support, especially for the
long-term unemployed (Finn and Schulte 2008: 313), and activities for individuals that
hadn’t found a job after completing the “Gateway”-period of job counselling (Clasen
2005). The New Deal offered activity options, such as subsidised job placements,
temporary employment in community projects or education (Finn and Schulte: 2008).
Whereas the conservative Government withdrew from pilots of work-based training
policies (Lindsay 2007), New Labour emphasised exactly this issue. Furthermore these
measures were introduced as guaranteed rights.
Concluding it could be said that the British activation strategy started with the
conservative’s focus on coercion and ended with New Labour’s “integration policy” and
these combined efforts culminated in a coercive-welfare scheme.
5.
Conclusion
This paper has argued for a comparative model of activation that takes account of
different degrees as well as different types of activation. It was argued that in order to
fully understand activation as a recalibrating reform, i.e. as an adaptation of old policy
instruments to new goals, it is necessary to contrast the new ways of achieving these
goals to “old” policy solutions. The dimensions of individual action construction and
activity provision found to be central for the activation paradigm were chosen as
comparative yardsticks along which to compare change in unemployment policy
schemes.
For individual action construction it seemed sensible to distinguish autonomyenhancing from coercive schemes, whereas for activity provision the distinction to be
drawn related to whether it was seen as public responsibility to enable such
opportunities or not. This exercise produced four ideal-typical fields of managing
unemployment. It was shown that an activation of the unemployed could be pursued via
offering activities (enabling), via forcing individuals into activities (coercive welfare) or
via forcing individuals to engage in market activities (re-commodification). In so doing,
an antagonistic concept of activation was avoided. Methodologically, the model allows
for an analysis of differences between different ideal-types as well as for an analysis of
change within ideal-typical fields. In addition to these different instrumental paths of
activating the unemployed different normative implications of policy types were
derived.
21
All three countries experienced significant changes, i.e. changes that lead to a change
in the type of policy. However, while the UK and Denmark endorsed a strategy pursuing
both objectives of the activation paradigm, Germany changed its focus from enabling to
coercive activation. The results contradict the literature at least in two ways: firstly, the
assumed differences between the British and the Danish activation schemes are not as
marked, when viewed from the analytical perspective utilised in this comparison.
Acknowledging that the quality of service provision still differs (full-time education in
Denmark and short-term training courses in the UK), the general approach of dividing
responsibility between state, market and individual is comparable.14 The second
assumption of the literature contradicted here is the assumption of convergence between
Germany and the United Kingdom (Clasen 2005; Mohr 2007): it could be shown that
both countries developed rather different approaches of coercion. These differences in
reform direction can be explained with different underlying concepts of the problem of
unemployment and the corresponding interpretation of the “right” kinds of solutions.
Finally, this paper has shown for the specific field of unemployment policy that
activation in three European welfare regimes varies considerably questioning premature
assumptions about path-dependent differences. The results indicate a “divergent
convergence”, in the sense that convergence towards a new policy paradigm has
resulted in different policy solutions. It would be a task of future research to account for
these differences and to provide us with deeper insights about the shift towards
activation in European societies.
14
Differences in quality provision may rather be interpreted as a functional equivalence matter, since the
types of training can be expected to differ in relation to the context of the different national economies
(Hall und Soskice 2001).
22
Annex 1): Ranking of policy elements on individual action construction.
Social Rights - Autonomy enhancing
replacement rates
Rank
Transfer reduction rate
Type of activities
Conditionality - Coerciveness
Def. of reasonable
empl.
Sanctions
Code of conduct
DK-94 ( 79/83)
DE-07 (no time limit,
max. income allowance:
280 €)
UK (3 programmes)
UK-07 (every job on
min. wage); DE-07
UK-07
(every job unless
caring for
(temporary
children/sick)
suspension)
UK-07 (5 requ.), DK-07
(5 requ.)
DK-04 (61/63)
DK-93 (1 year of casual DK-07 (2 programmes,
work up to 8000 DKK) diff. Training)
DK-07 (after 3
months every job)
DE-07 (3 requ.)
DE-01 (54/54), UK-94
(48/74)
DK-93, DE-04
UK-93 (after 13
DE-04 (max. 15h, €165 (discretionary training and weeks expansion of DE-07 (10-60%
allowance)
subs. Empl.)
range)
cuts in benefit)
5
4
3
2
DE-04 (after 6
months every job
paying amount of
transfer)
UK-04 (45/56)
UK (max. 15h, £ 5-10)
UK-93 (2 discretionary
programmes for LTU)
DE-06 (35/46)
dK-07 (accumulation
not possible)
DE-07 (discretionary
DK-93 (after 12
training, work-for-benefit) months)
net replacement rates
Both: degree of earnings
Both: wage in
accumulation and time Range of choice of
relation to benefit,
expenditure allowed
activities while on benefits time frame
1
Explanation
UK-93 (40% of
minimum ben.)
DE-04
(suspension, but
SA); DK-07
(suspension, but
SA)
DK-93 (no
explicit
regulation)
Both: degree of
sanction (susp.
vs. gradual),
timeframes
UK-93 (actively seeking
every week)
DE-04 (accept
reasonable jobs or
integration measures)
DK-93 (obligation to
activ. after 4 years)
Range of requirements,
concreteness, time
frames
Annex 2): Ranking of policy elements on active support.
Active Support
Activity provision
5
4
3
UK-93 (projects of inDK-93 (no action plans, work-benefit and training
limited guidance)
schemes for LTU)
UK-93 (voluntary backto-work-plan, job
matching through JobCentres)
2
DE-07 (work-for-benefit,
discretionary training)
1
DE-04 (guidance
through PES)
DK-93 (Job offers for
long-term unempl.,
education allowances)
0
-1
DE-07 (case
management, PIA
asap, no contact,
discretion)
-2
DE-04 (rights to receive
vocational training,
subsidised jobs)
-3
-4
-5
DK-07 (profiling, IAP
after 9 months,
intensive contact
schemes)
UK-07 (limited periods
of rights-based activities
which can be chosen
from 4 options)
UK-07 (intensive
period, IAP after 2
weeks, low discretion,
quarterly interviews)
DK-07 (right to full-time
education, wage
subsidies, rehabilitation
over entire benefit
period)
Explanation Intensity (duration,
obligation), Action
Plan
Range, quality and
legal status of
activities (rights or
discretion), time limits
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