Major Joe Granducci
Schism; The unfortunate relationship between SAC and TAC in the European Theater of
Operations during World War II
Thesis: The experience of the First World War and the interwar period, combined with technology, political and economic forces adversely affected American airpower in
World War II by creating an unfortunate schism between tactical and strategic airpower in the ETO.
Table of Contents
1.
Introduction
2.
World War I
3.
Interwar Years
4.
North Africa
5.
Strategic Airpower over Germany
6.
Tactical Airpower over Europe
7.
Combined operations; Promise of Airpower correctly applied
8.
Conclusion
1

Introduction
The development of the airplane and airpower from the Wright brother’s first flight to the end of World War II was incredibly swift. As with many new military innovations it suffered difficulties between its actual use and the doctrine that governed its use. In
World War I airpower’s contribution was extremely limited at the beginning. But, it developed quickly and by the end of the war performed many of the same roles and missions it would carry out in World War II. Its full potential in World War I went unfulfilled however, and operational fact was often overshadowed by theory and speculation in the interwar period. During the interwar period, American airpower began its unfortunate partition between the tactical and strategic components. The preponderance of airpower in World War I was tactical in nature. Small fighter/spotter aircraft operations near the front. The limited strategic bombing campaigns of World
War I had opened theorist’s eyes to the speculative promise of strategic airpower.
Between the wars, the air prophets began speculating on the ‘revolutionary’ nature of aircraft in regards to the way wars are fought, and potentially won. It is from this point in the history of American airpower that an unfortunate struggle began between the two camps of airpower proponents. Tactical and strategic airpower would strangely be considered almost mutually exclusive. This division was particularly severe in the US
Army Air Corps. It had far reaching consequences for the American plans and operations during the air war in Europe Theater of Operations (ETO) during World War II. The often-strained relations, and development between tactical and strategic airpower produced an interesting dynamic for study in the ETO. From North Africa to the Battle of the Bulge, tactical air and strategic air took two, often separate, paths. Unfortunately,
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American airmen had split airpower into two separate, and not equal camps. After the war this unfortunate schism would be formalized with the creation of a separate Air
Force. The process started in World War I, where airpower spent its infancy.
World War I
The promise of airpower at the beginning of World War I was not widely held to be great. Large European ground armies were slow to grasp the possibilities. Nevertheless, the stagnation of the ground fighting into costly trench warfare and the disillusionment with “Grand Offensives” turned the combatants minds to other possibilities. The Great
War developed several weapons, which would play central roles in World War II.
1
The airplane and airpower would be chief among them. Much like early cavalry units in ancient infantry armies, the early aircraft were used as spotters and reconnaissance forces.
Their value and capability in this mission was soon evident. These missions were decidedly tactical as the range of aircraft limited the scope of their operations to the front lines. Even so, the area under surveillance by a single aircraft was potentially much greater than that covered by a whole squadron of cavalry. Already airpower was stretching the battlefield by its inherent capabilities of mobility. Soon enough aircraft were battling each other in the skies above Europe. The denial of the enemies prying eyes over the battlefield below necessitated arming aircraft for combat against each other.
It was the earliest form of the air superiority mission. Rapid aircraft development followed, the slow ungainly and often dangerous aircraft of 1914 were soon developed into quite capable air-to-air machines by 1916. It soon followed that aircraft were used to attack ground targets. From this point several factors would combine to start the development of strategic and tactical theories.
1 Tanks, Machine Guns and Submarines are other examples
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On the strategic side, the Germans inaugurated the idea of deep strikes in the enemy’s homeland with their Zeppelin raids. Zeppelins, a decidedly strategic weapon (Within the limits of its inaccuracy) peaked the interest of some air power proponents. While the
Zeppelin proved an unlikely candidate for further development.
2
Large aircraft
3
capable of penetrating deep into enemy territory held greater promise. Technology then played a role in the development of strategic and tactical airpower thought. Strategic airpower proponents began to think of the large bomber as the primary air weapon. Indeed, it would eventually become the focus of American airpower strategy. Another significant factor in the early split of tactical and strategic airpower would be the conduct of the war itself. The stagnation of trench warfare and the incredible death tolls made men question the wars conduct, and precipitated searches for alternate ways of fighting, and quickly ending wars. Of all the new weapons developed in World War I, the airplane, and specifically the bomber seemed to hold a revolutionary promise. Strategic thought was in its infancy, and while the theories seemed sound, the practical application lagged as large aircraft development was given small priority as compared to tactical aircraft. Tactical air only influenced the immediate battlefield, where millions of men were already dying, and was not considered terribly ‘revolutionary’. Even so, tactical airpower was beginning to have a significant effect on the battlefield itself. Starting with isolated incidents of pilots strafing enemy airfields and trenches, and dropping small crude bombs on the same, aircraft in the ground attack role were increasingly making their presence felt. Allied airmen involved in the tactical battle at the front developed and coordinated
2 Zeppelins were vulnerable to the newer, better performing, aircraft and suffered unsupportable losses
3 Large, multi-engine, aircraft were required to carry a sufficient bomb load for strategic targets.
Interestingly the Russians led in this area of aircraft development, but their contributions were cut short by
Russia pulling out of the war
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combined ops with ground units.
4
Toward the end of the war their effects on the battlefield were promising. Much like the early use of tanks, it was sign of things to come in World War II. Operational necessity had begun to create the machines and tactics needed on the front. German aircraft development was at the forefront with several excellent aircraft designed specifically for ground attack. But this was as far as the development of aircraft and tactics would go. The Germans capitulated and signed the armistice. Airpowers promise in war was just beginning to be revealed, its true capabilities, and limitations, would have to wait for the next war.
“The First World War ended before the theory of bomber dream could be proved.
The German collapse caused by relentless pressure on the western front, by naval blockade and by America’s growing influence on the war occurred before the full strength of the planned allied bomber fleets could be put into the air to give this weapon a true test. But every major feature of the Second World War’s strategic bombing campaigns had its origin in that earlier war: the general idea that strategic bombing could starve the land armies of their materials and cause their collapse; the particular idea that concentration on industrial bottlenecks could hasten the process; the argument that it was better to attack, instead, the spirit of the civilian population until they demanded that their leaders end the war; the desirability of carrying out the bombing by day and the dangers inherent in that course.” 5
Against this tableau airpower theory continued development during the interwar period without the revealing light of actual operations. Additionally the desire to not let the world suffer another war like the ‘Great One’ would influence airpowers development immensely in the inter war period.
Inter War Period
After World War I, airpower development slowed, yet airpower theory accelerated.
Disarmament rapidly followed the armistice. Consequently the gathering and study of
4 German/French and British forces were at the forefront of this development. America’s late entry and limited air assets gave them much less experience in this arena
5 Middlebrook, Martin. The Schweinfurt-Regensburg Mission; American raids on 17 August 1943.
Cassell
Military Paperbacks, London, 1983, p16
5

data for airpowers effectiveness in World War I was scarce to non-existent. Records and analysis of airpowers contributions to the fighting essentially did not exist. This lack of analysis combined with an almost cathartic desire to forget the wars horrible cost. The result was a poor understanding of airpowers actual contribution to World War I. The interwar period had the opposite effect on strategic and tactical airpower that the war had.
Whereas, the war concentrated on tactical airpower and its ability to affect the immediate battlefield, the interwar theorists in America virtually ignored tactical airpower. On the other hand, while strategic airpower in World War I barely ‘got off the ground’, it’s development, especially in theories, during the interwar period was extensive. Strategic airpower was seen as revolutionary, it would transform the way wars were fought.
America was ready to try a new way of waging war.
“What self interest and strategy made compelling, the nation’s mood made politic.
America’s response to the bloodletting and disillusionment of World War I ruled out dispatch of another great army to fight abroad. In the 1920s it had been neither prudent nor especially compelling for airmen to offer their bombers as a substitute for the expeditionary armies of the past. In the 1930s, as crises abroad imperiled American interests, airmen guardedly advanced the case for a bomber force that could strike across the seas.” 6
The air prophets had many converts, and it further helped to divide America’s airpower camps.
Tactical Airpower development between the wars was nearly non-existent in the
United States. Fighter development progressed slowly, but was concentrated on air-to-air capability. Tactical airpower theory and operational capability essentially fell by the way side. Thomas Alexander Hughes, in his book about General Pete Quesada sums up the state of tactical airpower theory well in a chapter aptly named, “They Allowed their
6 Sherry, Michael S. The Rise of American Airpower; The Creation of Armageddon.
Yale University
Press, New Haven CT, 1987, p 53
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Doctrine to Become Their Strategy”. Writing about General Quesada’s experience at the
Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) in Maxwell Alabama in 1935, the author says.
“He and his fellow students learned quickly that the curriculum would directly advocate doctrines of strategic bombardment. At an orientation session, Major
Harold George, a director and senior instructor at Maxwell, outlined the essential theme of the year. “We are not concerned with fighting the last war,” he began,
“that was done eighteen years ago. We are concerned, however, in determining how air power shall be employed in the next war and what constitutes the principles governing its employment.” Finishing, he argued that aviation had revolutionized the art of war and had “given to air forces a strategic objective of their own independent of either land or naval forces which can, in itself, accomplish the purpose of war.” 7
It was strategic airpower theory and development that would take center stage in the
US Army Air Corps between the wars. Proponents of the bomber were disciples of such airpower theorists as Douhet and Mitchell. The US Army Air Corps embraced the possibilities of the bomber. The experience of World War I, America’s unique position in the world and the political/economic forces of the 1930s all combined to create a war strategy that relied heavily on strategic bombardment. It was reasoned that America could execute an air war, and win, with the bomber alone. Therefore, tactical airpower could be virtually ignored, as it was only an extension of the ground and naval forces, which because of the very existence of the bomber were becoming obsolete. The fateful effect of this embracing of the bomber theory for the Air Corps was to split its officers and civilian leaders into two opposing camps. And while the strategic advocates held sway, and were more numerous, there were some few who still advocated tactical airpower’s role in war. It is remarkable that the tactical advocates rarely excluded the strategic capability of airpower from their thoughts while the strategic thinkers often regarded tactical airpower to be of no consequence and a waste of resources. Tactical
7 Hughes, Thomas A. Overlord, General Pete Quesada and the Triumph of Tactical Air Power in World
War II . The Free Press, New York, N.Y., 1995, p 53
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airpower was not considered necessary to win the ‘next’ war. How wrong they were, and the cost of those assumptions would begin to be apparent at the beginning of World War
II. The American North African campaigns would showcase the shortcomings, and difficulties created by airpower split into two competing camps.
North Africa
Nov 8, 1942 saw the first landings of American troops on North African soil. North
Africa witnessed some of the first tests of American airpower in World War II. And in what is definitely a cliché, the American plans for the employment of airpower did not survive first contact with the enemy. This early campaign serves well to highlight the split relationship between tactical and strategic airpower. The Americans went into the
North African campaign with an airpower strategy heavily reliant on strategic bombardment theory. The operational realities of the desert war were not conducive to the American airpower doctrine. There were virtually no ‘strategic’ targets in the desert.
There were precious few ‘choke’ points and no civilian population to demoralize. The only real choke points were the supply routes, and those were most vulnerable at sea, which was the Allied navy’s domain.
8
The only real targets were the enemy forces themselves.
“The U.S. Army Air Forces were as responsible as any combat arm for the poor showing of American forces. The air arm’s prewar stress on independent bombardment rendered its pilots poorly prepared for the desert. The fundamentals of strategic bombardment and the plans of AWPD-1 had assumed an enemy with a traditional economic infrastructure, but in the desert there was no industrial base, and the lines of communication were primitive.” 9
8 The relationship between Naval and Air Force objectives, along with the duplication of roles and responsibilities is another subject, and though related will not be delved into further
9
Hughes, p 86
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The Army Air Corps saw the North African invasion as a draw on already lean resources. Sending men and machines to this theater slowed the build up of the 8 th Air
Force in England. Most senior American airmen resigned themselves to supporting the invasion, but only with the minimum of air forces. They sent such units and aircraft as were of little use to the strategic campaign planned in Europe. Though the resources were relatively lean, the tactical doctrine and planning for the operations in North Africa and Italy were even leaner.
American tactical air leaders in North Africa had to literally invent from scratch the
American doctrine of tactical air war. Sent to Africa with no real theory or doctrine they went about supporting the Army as best they could. This lack of foresight would cost lives and materiel though it would bring to light many shortcomings which required attention. First and foremost, the basic operational practice of parceling aircraft out to separate ground commanders was flawed. The inherent ability of aircraft to use maneuver, mass and surprise was diluted by giving control of air assets to various commanders. It was difficult to coordinate large attacks at critical points during the campaign, and near impossible to perform close attack missions. In some cases ground commanders would hold their aircraft from operations in order to have them available should something happen in their area of responsibility. This deficiency could have been addressed with good communication between air and ground forces, along with doctrinal processes for air-land combined operations. The Americans had neither.
10
As a result of
10 German air forces were often parceled out amongst various ground commanders. Their air-land doctrine was generally solid enough to handle the dilution of airpower this represented. Being tactical in nature, their doctrine and forces were well equipped (Initially) to be effective in this manner. Germany suffered the opposite problem of American airpower, excellent tactical theory and poor strategic capability
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these failures tactical air forces were consolidated under air commanders, providing centralized command with close liaison to the ground commanders.
The humiliation in Tunisia (especially when contrasted to El Alamein) forced a major reassessment of how American tactical air forces were employed. They were assigned to an independent central air command, which worked in tandem with the army commanders.
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A basic organizational flaw had been addressed. The actual operational use of the air assets had a long way to go.
The North African campaign began to bring grudging acceptance of tactical airpower needs to the American strategic bombardment advocates. Still, it was seen as a sidelight to the real effort, the daylight strategic bombardment of Germany. Tactical airmen brought these lessons with them to England in preparation for the Normandy invasion.
Tactical airmen were learning about combined operations, but America’s air forces continued with two competing camps.
Strategic Airpower Over Germany
The main focus for American airpower in the ETO was the strategic air campaign against Germany. America’s air plan for fighting World War II was developed with daylight precision bombing as its main feature. The majority of American senior Army
Air Corps leaders believed in this theory and supported it to the near exclusion of other missions. In fact, the underlying goal of their concentration on the strategic mission was partly a desire to gain independence for the Air Force.
“Arnold and his team knew that if their system of bombing worked, and they could destroy vital industry in the enemy’s home land and bring him to his knees, air power would become the dominant military force. And if that happened who could deny them the full autonomy of a United States Air Force?” 12
11 Robt Overy's Why the Allies Won, p 225-6
12 Freeman, Roger A. The Mighty Eighth.
The Bath Press, London, 2000, p 3
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A quasi-political reason for pushing a strategic doctrine to the near exclusion of a comprehensive air power doctrine was a less than optimum way to run a war. There have been many studies and opinions of the actual effect of strategic airpower on Germany’s war effort written after the fact. However, one thing became increasingly clear to the men fighting the war at the time. After witnessing the British and German experience, along with the American experience in the Mediterranean, it became evident that the idea that strategic bombing could win the war alone was flawed. It was flawed for many reasons beyond the scope of this work, but the realization that it could not do the job alone again exposed the lack of tactical planning. Indeed, it exposed an overall poorly conceived airpower doctrine. Still, some few still clung to the hope that the daylightbombing offensive would do the job and marched doggedly on. Others realized it would not be victorious alone, or secretly hoped so, while attempting to address the weakness of
American airpower doctrine in other areas.
The 8 th
Air Force bore the responsibility for the strategic bombing of Germany. Led by General Doolittle it consisted of both bomber and fighter units. The fighters were mainly assigned to the escort role. The first 8 th
missions were flown in late 1942. The greatest lessons learned in the early efforts would reinforce what was already apparent, and seemingly ignored, from the German/British and Mediterranean efforts with unescorted bombers. They were terribly vulnerable to fighter attack and required fighter escort to keep losses to acceptable levels. One of the greatest side effects of the polarization of the Army Air Corps between tactical and strategic camps was uncovered.
The lack of research and development of fighter type aircraft had created a great vulnerability to the strategic arm. It was more luck than planning that the P-38/47 and
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especially the P-51 were adaptable for the escort role. Although, especially in the case of the P-51, they arrived too late to help many crews already lost over Germany to enemy fighters. More emphasis on tactical air and fighter aircraft would likely have aided the
Air Corps strategic plans by producing a more capable fighter, sooner, to defend the bombers. The split between the tactical and strategic thinkers, where ‘never the two shall meet’, served neither sides efforts in the ETO.
The organization of the American air forces in the ETO also played a significant role in its performance. As stated earlier most of the senior leaders were advocates of the bomber theory. However, the realized need for tactical forces to support the inevitable ground war necessitated organization of tactical forces. The eighth air force under
Doolittle was given the responsibility to perform the strategic war effort, while the ninth air force under the combined command of Brereton 13 and Vandenburg was responsible for the tactical air war. Except for the heavy bombers, which flew the strategic missions, both numbered air forces used the same types of aircraft. The effect of this was to create two separate organizations with duplicated systems of organization and training.
Interestingly, the American strategic air force headquarters had administrative control over the tactical air forces and controlled the flow of supplies and personnel to the tactical air force. It is little wonder that the tactical air forces sometimes received lower priority for men and equipment. While the very size of the Army Air Corps would necessitate some duplication, the very idea that air power was ‘split’ between strategic and tactical forces ensured maximum duplication and minimum cooperation. In the end,
13 It is interesting that this command, being tactical, was a combined allied effort. The British and
American strategic arms very rarely coordinated operations as the Americans bombed in daylight and the
British bombed at night with very different doctrines, though it has been argued they produced essentially the same results
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some of the American success was somewhat more a function of the vast resources she produced than superior organization and doctrine employed by the two separate, and not quite equal commands.
Tactical Airpower over Europe
The Ninth Air Force bore the responsibility for the tactical air war in the ETO.
Drawing on lessons from the Mediterranean, Generals Vandenburg, Quesada and others organized their forces to support the Army and the planned invasion of the continent.
The Ninth was comprised of mainly fighter aircraft, or more correctly fighter-bomber
14 aircraft whose mission was both simple and at times nebulous. On the surface, they were to support the Allied Army ground operation. This meant carrying out air attacks on enemy forces near the front. Preparation for attacks by bombing enemy forces, interdiction of forces and supplies directly behind the front and lastly Close Air Support
(CAS) of Army units in direct contact with the enemy were three primary missions.
While the eighth concentrated on destroying the enemies industry, the ninth would concentrate on destroying those units and supplies that actually made it to the front.
Despite the 8 th
Air Forces best effort, there continued to be no shortage of those types of targets.
The lack of planning for tactical operations forced the leaders of the Ninth Air Force to create, basically from scratch, a doctrine of tactical airpower. It was a difficult task, which was not helped by the fact that the main air effort continued to be the strategic campaign. Fortunately the vast resources created by America in materiel and men allowed the Ninth to quickly become combat capable. Experience was taken from the
14 Important because crews in the 9 th Air Force were more specialized in the ground attack role and somewhat less proficient in the escort role
13

Mediterranean effort as well as some missions supporting the strategic campaign. The strategic forces needed fighters to escort the bombers, as the Allies prepared for the invasion of Europe, and the Ninth gained aircraft, many of them were ‘loaned’ to the eighth to support the strategic campaign. The unfortunate side effect of this was to deny the full capability to train with the Army units exercising for the invasion in England.
Ninth Air Force participation in the war games leading up to the invasion of Europe was limited by the siphoning off of aircraft and crews to support the strategic campaign.
“Already joint air-ground exercises for OVERLORD had revealed the consequences of diverting so much fighter strength to the bombardment campaign. The infantry divisions slated for the invasion had been war-gaming along the southern English coast since early January. Operation Duck, the first of these maneuvers, was a rehearsal for Major General Charlie Gerhard’s Twenty
Ninth Division. As landing craft churned toward shore on 30 December, Gerhard searched the sky for the fighter planes that the air leaders had promised for the exercise. The birds never showed. Duck lasted four more days, and not once did a sizeable complement of tactical aircraft arrive to practice close-support techniques with liaison parties and attack battalions. Each day, planes were siphoned off by urgent Eighth Air Force escort requests. Gerhard hated it, and
Quesada did not like it much, but neither could do much about it as long as higher authorities placed greater stress on the bombardment campaign than on
OVERLORD rehearsals.
15
While lip service was given to supporting the Army, the actual practice was much different. Even at this late date too few American air leaders had a good appreciation for what the tactical air-land battle required.
Combined Operations; Promise of Airpower Correctly Applied
For the most part strategic and tactical air forces went about their missions with limited interfacing. However, there were a few operations where combined efforts showed the possibilities, and difficulties, of a unified command structure. These operations saw the employment of aircraft not as ‘strategic’ or ‘tactical’ assets, but
15 Hughes, p 118
14

simply as ‘air’ assets used as required for the given situation. The coordination required and the problems encountered again illustrate the result of unnaturally splitting air power into two forces. Preparation for the invasion of Normandy and Operation Cobra are examples of the possibilities.
Preparation for the Normandy invasion included a massive ‘softening up’ of the immediate invasion area by the Army Air Corps. Against the wishes of many of the strategic air bosses, the 8 th Air force was actively employed in operations that were decidedly tactical in nature. Both the 8 th
and 9 th
Air Forces were employed in bombing targets near the coast of Normandy as well as deception raids in other areas to keep the
Germans guessing. Interdiction of supplies, bombing of railheads, supply depots and troop concentrations, as well as defenses along the coast of ‘Fortress Europe’ were intended to make ready the invasion area and aid the amphibious landing. After the initial hesitation by the 8 th
air Force leaders, the operation got under way. It is an excellent example of correctly and efficiently using the air power resources at hand for a desired effect. The differentiation between strategic and tactical was not important. The capabilities of the aircraft and crews were the driving factor for targeting and missions.
The preparation of the Normandy landing area is a good example of coordinated ops.
In late July 1944 the Normandy invasion had stalled. Due to a dogged defense by the
Germans a quick breakout had not been achieved. Allied airpower with both air superiority and a massive advantage in numbers had not made much of a difference in the ground situation. Tactical Army Air Corps leaders wanted to prove their air assets could affect the battlefield decisively, and lobbied the ground commanders and strategic air force commanders alike to allow them to stage a massive air operation on a small front.
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The tactical aircraft had not been enough, so far, to open up an avenue for advance. It was reasoned that with the addition of more aircraft, specifically the large bombers, condensed into a narrow target area the air forces could virtually eliminate a small front of enemy troops. It was a common formula for the American leaders. The current numbers of aircraft were not doing the job, therefore more and bigger would be the answer. Although the reasoning made mathematical sense, it was hampered by the Army
Air Corps’ organization. Strategic forces were poorly trained to take part in the tactical operation so near to friendly forces. In order to achieve the breakthrough without giving the German Army time to plug the hole created; friendly ground forces were required to be fairly close to the bombing area.
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The very number of aircraft used would prove to be unwieldy. It was hard enough to put large numbers of bombers over strategic targets, which were often relatively large. Additionally, miss distances inside Germany were not critical as there were no friendly forces were nearby. The theory of the operation was sound, but the organizational and doctrinal format was not conducive to an easily effective operation. The selected target area of Cobra, being near the front lines, made coordination of bomb lines critical. The planning session with all players present seemed to indicate that the bombing would be parallel to the front so as to minimize friendly losses. The tactical airmen were well aware of this requirement. However, the 8 th
Air
Force aircraft bombed perpendicular, and thus dropped some of their bombs on the friendly forces waiting to exploit the breakthrough. The bombing of friendly forces, essentially out in the open and bunched together so they could move through the breach caused serious casualties. Both Army and tactical commanders were furious, and
16 Additionally, the American forces would be bunched up, ready to move out and therefore more vulnerable to stray bombs
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attempted to find out what happened. “Leigh-Mallory discovered that the perpendicular course was no mistake. Eighth Air Force planners had determined that that was the only way to stuff their planes over the target within Bradley’s tight time frame”.
17
The first day of Operation Cobra was another example of the possible negative impact the split in airpower during World War II could have. Strategic planners, with no real operational experience in planning tactical missions had made a critical error for which they were not experienced or doctrinally trained. Operation Cobra continued with some good success, but only after more painful lessons and what were avoidable losses to friendly fire.
It is interesting that in the case of operation Cobra, the doubters were from the strategic camp. They were not convinced that airpower used in this manner would create the effect desired. It was in this case the tactical airmen that believed this use of airpower would open up the avenue for advance by the ground forces. Overconfidence in the capabilities of airpower was not limited to the strategic thinkers; tactical airmen were not immune to this kind of opinion. What should really have been learned from operation
Cobra is this. The split between tactical and strategic airmen was limiting the possibilities of American airpower.
Conclusion
On 26 September 1947 the Army Air Corps became the United States Air Force. On this date the two competing camps of airpower officially came into being. Strategic Air
Command and Tactical Air Command stood up with two separate missions. The genesis of these separate, and still not equal commands was the killing fields of World War I.
The Air prophets of the interwar period added further emphasis to the strategic air arm, and its ‘revolutionary’ effect on war. When the predictions of the air prophets failed to
17 Hughes, p 208
17

come true, the organization and doctrine of the American Army Air Corps they spawned was poorly prepared to fight the reality of World War II. Competing command structures, political infighting and a general lack of coordinated operations all hampered the American air war effort.
“For Pete Quesada, the bickering revealed how pre-war struggles sometimes colored the conduct of World War II. “A lot of these people were still fighting the battles of the 1930’s, and it hurt our efforts in the execution of the war. Of that there is absolutely no doubt.” 18
The unfortunate schism of American airpower cost lives and materiel, and still the lesson was not learned. Because, at the end of it all, the atomic bomb ushered in yet another perceived ‘revolutionary’ way to wage war. The bomb seemed to give the strategic arm the weapon they needed. They convinced themselves it was not accuracy or numbers of airplanes they had needed to carry out their doctrine after all. It was just a lack of the right bomb.
“We were forgetting the teachings of the war in Europe”
- General Pete Quesada
18 Hughes, p
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SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bailey, Ronald H. and the Editors of Time-Life Books. The Air War in Europe . Time-
Life Books, Alexandria, Virginia, 1979, 208 p.
Bekkar, Cajus. The Luftwaffe War Diaries . Da Capo Press, Inc., New York, 399 p.
Blumenson, Martin. U.S. Army in World War II; European Theater of Operations,
Breakout and Pursuit.
Office of the Chief of Military History, Washington, D.C., 1961,
784p.
Chant, Christopher. Warfare and the Third Reich . Barnes and Noble Books, New York,
1998, 451 p.
Cooling, Benjamin F. Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support.
Office of
Air Force History, Washington, D.C., 1990, 293p.
Deighton, Len. Blood Tears and Folly. Castle Books. Edison, NJ, 1999, 653 p.
Freeman, Roger A. The Mighty Eighth.
The Bath Press, London, 2000, 311p.
Hughes, Thomas A. Overlord, General Pete Quesada and the Triumph of Tactical Air
Power in World War II . The Free Press, New York, N.Y., 1995, 380p.
Middlebrook, Martin. The Schweinfurt-Regensburg Mission; American raids on 17
August 1943.
Cassell Military Paperbacks, London, 1983, 363 p.
Sherry, Michael S. The Rise of American Airpower; The Creation of Armageddon.
Yale
University Press, New Haven CT, 1987, 435p.
19