Australia and the Asia-Pacific
R. James Ferguson © 2006
Lecture 11:
Regional Engagement and Competing Regionalisms
Topics: 1. Regionalism and Regionalization in the Asia-Pacific Area
2. Regional Processes: Beyond Values and Identity Politics
3. Asian Regional Cores Verses the Wider Asia-Pacific?
4. Multiple Cores Or Tiered Multipolarity?
5. Challenges To Regionalism and to an Indo-Pacific Tiered-multipolar
System
6. Bibliography, Resources and Further Reading
1. Regionalism and Regionalization in the Wider Asia-Pacific
As we have seen, no single organisation or group of organisations, covers the
governance of the entire Indo-Pacific region, with only relatively limited
organisations such as APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum covering different
aspects of trade and security cooperation. Even within Southeast Asia and South Asia,
the construction of regional organisations (ASEAN and SAARC, see weeks 6 and 10)
has been a gradual process with only limited integration and institutionalisation of
these groups. The East Asian Summit (EAS) process based on the ASEAN-PlusThree (APT), has begun to emerge through 2003-2006, but it remains to be seen how
strong this will be in shaping the wider region, especially since it suffers from
tensions over membership, differences between Chinese and Japanese viewpoints,
and a circle of activity that tends to overlap the ASEAN-Plus-Three and the ARF
(Strategic Comments 2005.
A clear-cut definition of a region can no longer be given on narrow geographical
grounds, and is not merely based on physical proximity. Strong linkages and flows
of information, money, people, affiliation or shared concerns and threats are
needed form a region: The literature on new regionalism stresses several key linkage factors as necessary
conditions under which regionalism or regional integration can take place among a
group of states, including linkage by geographical proximity and by various forms of
shared political, economic, social, cultural, or institutional affinities. Regions are also
defined by combinations of geographical, psychological, and behavioural
characteristics. (Kim 2004, p40).
Put simply, political regions are not ‘natural’: they are ‘socially constructed and
politically contested’ (Kim 2004, p45), they can be built up on historical experience
or destroyed by conflict and new trends. Just as modern nations and nationalism
projects are partly ‘imagined communities’ (see Anderson 1991), regional grouping
are also imagined and invested in by political leaders, domestic audiences, civil
society, corporations, and governments (He 2004, p119). Shared security concerns
and complexes can also drive regional processes to some degree (see Buzan &Waever
2003): this was partially the case of ASEAN and remains an important factor for the
ASEAN Regional Forum. Likewise, multilateral and regional groups may increase
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the security and ‘voice’ of small and medium powers (He 2004, p121), part of the
background ASEAN, APEC and to a lesser degree IOR-ARC. How far they can
restrain great powers, however, dependents upon relative power balances in the wider
region and whether the stronger powers need a 'concert' or alliance system to support
their wider needs and agenda (see below).
In part, this slow progress has been driven by the great diversity of the region, as
well as by pressing national and sovereign needs by many Asian states still going
through national-building processes over the last fifty years. For Southeast Asia: Southeast Asia is arguably the most diverse region in the world. Whether it is
measured in terms of differences in economic development, divergent social and
religious traditions or differing political regimes, there are few places where such
diversity is woven into the very fabric of national life. Indeed, there are considerable
grounds for questioning whether what we think of as contemporary Southeast Asia
constitutes a region at all. And yet, despite this remarkable difference at the level of
individual nations, Southeast Asia has also given rise to some of the most enduring
transnational and regional institutions in the developing world. This paradox is at the
heart of one of the most distinctive features of modern Southeast Asia: despite the
national diversity that is its defining feature, there are a number of region-wide
processes that have given Southeast Asia both a particular identity and a set of
additional political, economic, social and even environmental dynamics that have in
turn shaped national outcomes. (Beeson 2004, p1)
In turn, we can question how deep this integration as been, with limited
supranational aspects, with sovereignty and decision making being retained at the
level of national governments, and organisations such as ASEAN largely working
through inter-governmental agreements, voluntary treaties with little formal
enforcement, and an ongoing dialogue process. This has in part been maintained by
the non-interference concept with the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), but in
reality the region is moving towards the understanding that shared action is needed
on shared problems.
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Religious Diversity in Southeast Asia: Mosque in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam
(Photocopy copright R. James Ferguson 2002)
The diversity of Southeast Asia is complicated by its multi-ethnic and multireligious populations, even within one state, by diversity among nations as to wealth,
developmental level, governmental style and religion, as well as sub-regional
diversity among South Asia, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, the South Pacific, South
American states (within APEC and in intensified trade relations with China and
North-east Asia), and developed states with European cultural features such as
Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United States. Some of this diversity can be
seen in Table 1 below, where even states with dominant religious groups also have
significant religious minorities, e.g. Christians, Buddhists and Hindus in Indonesia.
Even in Vietnam there are Christian minorities, Chinese sub-communities, and a
small Muslim community.
Table 1 (modified from Beeson 2004)
Country
Brunei
Population
million)
.344
Cambodia
12.6
Indonesia
Lao PDR
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
208.9
5.4
23.8
48.3
78.3
Singapore
Thailand
4.1
61.1
Vietnam
79.5
(approx.
Government Type
Main Religion
[Constitutional]
Monarchy
Constitutional
Monarchy (from 1993)
Democratic Republic
Communist
Procedural Democracy
Military Junta
Democracy
Islam
Procedural Democracy
Constitutional
Monarch/Democracy
Communist
Buddhism
Islam (plus others)
Buddhism
Islam (plus others)
Buddhism (plus others)
Christianity
(plus
Muslim minority)
Taoism (plus others)
Buddhism (plus others)
Buddhism (plus others)
One key point is that regional processes are not always driven by similarity and
convergence, though this may be required in the long term. Rather, complementarity
among economies, services and development level can also provide strong regional
flows. Furthermore, regional organisations can also be driven by crisis and the
requirement for crisis management and preventive diplomacy. Thus, the first
phase of ASEAN regionalism from 1967 was driven by the need to reduce political
tensions among member states, especially Indonesia and Malaysia, and the desire to
reduce great power interventions in local conflicts (see lecture 6). The second phase
of ASEAN regionalism after 1998 was driven in part by a reaction to the Asian
financial crisis of 1997-1998, and that East Asian states could not rely on a supportive
financial and economic environment being generated by the U.S. and other Western
states (for different phases of regionalism, see Kim 1998, pp41-42). Likewise, a web
of bilateral ties, including free trade agreements under negotiation, have also begun
to shape the region, e.g. Australian negotiations with Singapore, Thailand, the U.S.,
China and Japan, plus a range of proposed free trade agreements focused on
Singapore, Korea, and Japan (see Kim 2004, pp56-57).
It is important to distinguish between regionalization and regionalism: 3
To make sense of these differences, it is useful to make a widely employed initial
conceptual distinction between processes of regionalization on the one hand, in
which the private sector and economic forces are the principle drivers of regional
integration, and regionalism, in which self-consciously pursued political projects drive
closer transnational cooperation on the other. One of the most noteworthy
comparative qualities of the Southeast Asian experience in this regard is that regional
integration has primarily been uncoordinated and principally driven by multinational
corporations and the evolving logic of cross-border production strategies. (Beeson
2004, pp7-8)
Of course, there are strong interactions between regionalization and regionalism.
Transnational regionalization processes will make regionalism projects more
acceptable to political and economic elites. In turn, regionalism projects tend to create
a more transparent civil and economic space, and promote free trade and other
multilateral frameworks, e.g. AFTA, the AIA, plus ASEAN’s agreements with China,
Japan (ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership) and India (via and FTA
with ASEAN) that are gradually making trade and standards more compatible through
2003-2012 (He 2004, p106), though the ASEAN-Chinese Free Trade Agreement
(ACFTA) seems most likely to lock into place first, perhaps causing some ‘angst’ in
Tokyo (Kim 2004, p51). We should also note that the China-ASEAN FTA does not
include Taiwan, unlike APEC (He 2004, p115). The ‘whole idea is to establish a
comprehensive and close relationship between ASEAN and China involving an FTA,
and cooperation in finance, regional development, technological assistance,
macroeconomic cooperation, and other issues of common concern’ (Cai 2003).
Individual agreements with ASEAN are likely to come into play before any
formal, wider East Asian Free Trade Area (EAFTA), which has now been shifted
into the group of medium-range projects by the ASEAN-Plus-Three (Kim 2004, p56).
Likewise, the ASEAN-India efforts to build a free-trade agreement will take time to
move beyond a wide range of exceptions and limitations (Gaur 2003), though some
'early fruits' of this process will result in some 105 products having tariffs cut as early
2007 (Xinhua 2005; see lectures 6 & 10).
Political elites have accepted that a conscious regionalism also helps countries to
cope with globalization, and give some economic and developmental support to
regimes (Beeson 2004, p10) with limited democratic credentials, e.g. in Malaysia,
Singapore, and Vietnam. Thus, ‘regionalization can be said to breed regionalism’
(Kim 2004, p40). However, in turn, regionalization make it possible for
governments to consider developing shared values, norms, aspirations (Kim
2004, p40), and in cases of deep integration over the long term, a certain layer of
regional identity or at least shared cultural processes may be developed. However, it
may be dangerous to either to assume or mandate some notion of a shared identity
when cultural system remain diverse, as in East Asia. Some general aspirations for
minimum standards in terms of treatment of citizens and peaceful codes of conduct
(e.g. in the South China Sea) have also begun to emerge, but has had only a limited
impact on countries such as Myanmar. Likewise, pluralism and democratisation,
though gaining regionally, e.g. Indonesia's transition, remain problematic norms for
countries such as Vietnam and PRC, and have not yet become part of a more inclusive
pattern of regional governance (see lecture 6). At present, neither Australia nor the
US, even with the earlier aid of Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia, seem able to
insist on a democratic-led form of regionalism in the Asia-Pacific (contra Terrill
2005). In turn, the stability of democracies in Thailand and Philippines is limited, and
even in Indonesia there are major concerns about the delivery of basic rights in
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regions such as Aceh (slowly improving through 2005-2006) and West Papua
(Strategic Comments 2006).
2. Regional Processes: Beyond Values and Identity Politics
In the past, efforts have been made to built regional projects in Asia, either on the
basis of some shared identity, on resistance to Western colonialism and power,
and on the notion of shared ‘Asian values’ or at least a ‘shared ASEAN way’. One
of the earliest models for this was the intense interaction among earlier kingdoms,
mandala systems of prestige and influence and extended trading networks for over
two millennia (see Wolters 1992; Higham 1989). Beyond this, however, there was an
attempt in the early 20th century to shape a sense of Pan-Asian values and PanAsianism in contrast to Western colonial dominance and narrow patterns of
nationalism, a trend of though influencing thinkers as diverse as Gandhi,
Rabindranath Tagore (the great Bengali writer and thinker), Aurobindo, Sun Yat-sen,
Rin Kaito and Major General Kenji Doihara and others (He 2004, pp107-108; Duara
2001). Such ideas would soon founder on Japanese militarism through the 1930s, and
come to be rejected in India, China and Korea (He 2004, p110).
The Asian values debate would be revived through the 1980s and 1990s as part of
the debate over the causes of revived ‘tiger’ economies in East Asia, leading to a
reappraisal of the relationship of traditional values systems (including Confucianism
and Taoism) to modern life (see Dupont 1996). Though a tempting move politically,
and supported at time by governments resisting outside influence or seeking
legitimation for governments with limited democratic credentials, this has been a
problematic path for Asian regionalism. In the worst case scenario, support for
‘Asian values’ verses ‘Western’ human rights may be a way of justifying ‘soft
authoritarian’ regimes with limited degrees of political freedom (Beeson 2004,
p11), e.g. in Malaysia, Singapore, and in a different form in PRC. For a time this
‘New Asianism’ was given some support in Japan, e.g. via the search to create a new,
shared contemporary Asian culture, thereby allowing a secondary and safe outlet for
some Japanese nationalism (He 2004, p114), but this now seems a minor trend. In the
long run, regionalism based on exclusive cultural systems or anti-Westernism
may be a kind of ‘trap’ since modern and Western ideas and technology are freely
used in much of urban Asia, and trade linkages into the U.S., Canada and Australasia
remain important (adapting He 2004, p121). Likewise, emerging middle-classes
throughout Asia share elements of modernism drawn from Western culture.
The ‘ASEAN Way’ and Asian values did to some degree drive the proposal for
an East Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG) which would exclude non-Asian states
on the basis of culture and identity (He 2004, p112), given most vocal support by
former Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia from 1990 as at first an alternative to
APEC. This project was attacked by the U.S. and not supported by Australia, while
Japan and South Korea in the end were unwilling to effectively exclude or downgrade
relations with major trade partners across the Pacific. This led to the subsequent
downgrading of EAEG to the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), a loose grouping
within APEC (Kim 2004, p46). However, this grouping was reborn both as the Asian
‘table’ within the ASEM (Asia-Europe Meetings), and as the ASEAN-Plus-Three
from 1997 (He 2004, p112), though now driven largely by economic and security
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concerns. However, narrower grouping might meet the short-term needs of countries
such as Malaysia or PRC if they feel that their national needs are too readily
constrained by US or Australian influences.
The problem of founding East Asian or Southeast Asian regionalism on shared
values or identity has been summarised: Indeed, the defining feature of East Asia is not a singular set of “Asian values,”
whatever that may mean, but linguistic, cultural, and religious diversity. Such diversity
is pronounced not only between East Asian states but also within particular Asian
states, mostly in Southeast Asia. Paradoxically, the most vocal and stringent rallying
cries for “Asian values” have come from Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia (and
also China), where multicultural, multireligious, and even multi-ethnonational fault
lines produce deep fissures. . . . East Asia is defined by its plurality of cultural and
historical traditions. (Kim 2004, p54).
On this basis, it has been suggested that East Asian regionalism is largely driven
forward by ‘intergovernmental collaboration’ on free trade and a security dialogue,
but ‘lacks systematic thinking, an ethical foundation, and a region-centric framework’
(He 2004, p119). On this basis, too, regional commitment towards a truly
participation-based regionalism, with strong inputs from civil society, and
convergence on democracy, will remain limited (Acharya 2003).
Rather, over the last two decades, regionalism in the Asia-Pacific has been driven
in part by wider concerns over great-power dominance, and then by the impact
of globalisation on relatively weak and developing states. In this sense, regional
groups can be buffers preparing nations for wider globalisation trends (e.g. the
ASEAN Free Trade Area and APEC preparing Southeast Asia and China for the
wider opening of their economies to the world economy via WTO processes), but also
act as conduits for ongoing trade and investment liberalization (as in the AIA,
ASEAN Investment Area). Indeed, elite support for regionalism in Southeast Asia had
already been conditioned by the transnational patterns of trade and production run
via business and corporations: Yet even the most cursory glance at the empirical data associated with ‘globalization’
reveals that global flows of trade and investment, and even the transnational
production strategies of multinational companies, reveal a distinction regional bias. In
other words, whatever we take globalization to be, it is powerfully shaped by national
and regional forces as countries, companies and a range of other actors attempt to
respond to the challenges of external competition and the transnational integration of
edconomic and political activity. In this context, globalization is simply a convenient
shorthand for that complex array of processes – economic, political, social and even
strategic – that have transformed the context within which states conduct themselves
and which have constrained their autonomy as a consequence. If this contention
about diminished autonomy has merit as a general statement about the status of
contemporary states, It is doubly true of Southeast Asia, where the modern,
independent state is a relatively recent invention, and where the sovereignty of states
has already been compromised to some extent. (Beeson 2004, p3)
Put another way, the states of East Asia are ‘coping with forces and demands of both
regionalization and regionalism amid the twin pressures of globalization from above
and localization from below (so-called glocalization)’ (Kim 2004, p39). Thus,
regional processes have been revived as conduits of change as well as ways of
sustaining the decision making ability of groups of states (thus indicating that
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Thomas Friedman’s truism, “It’s globalization, stupid!’, may not always be true, see
Kim 2004, p43).
Likewise, these factors have boosted environmental and ecological pressures for
many of the developing countries of Asia. Environmental problems affect local,
national, regional and global groups, depending on the particular problem. Many
resource and environmental problems, e.g. the Haze, over-used river systems,
polluted coastal waters, or over-exploited fisheries, are often transboundary in
nature and require regional cooperation. Growing consumption rates,
industrialisation, growing urban populations (40% of Southeast Asia lived in cities
through 1999, a ratio that may double by 2025), and energy consumption rates that
double approximately every 12 years have led to increased pressure on the
environment and its resources (Elliott 2004, pp180-181). There have also been trends
of intensified agriculture, great usage of pesticides and fertilizers, and overtaxing of
soil fertility (Elliott 2004, p183). Possible GDP losses due to environmental and
related health problems have been estimated in the order of 3%-8% for Southeast Asia
(Elliott 2004, p183; see earlier discussions in week 3 and 7).
3. Asian Regional Cores Verses the Wider Asia-Pacific?
One key question that has emerged through 1997-2006 has been the debate over
whether Indo-Pacific processes will remain strongly mandated by U.S. policy, or
whether stronger cores of decision-making and policy formation have emerged in
Southeast Asia, East Asia (perhaps focused on future PRC initiatives), and to a
lesser degree in South Asia. Here there may be differences in the vitality of the
ASEAN and ASEAN-Plus-Three-Groupings verses the more diffuse ARF and APEC
groups, partly based on ‘great power’ competition in the wider Asia-Pacific (see
Bell 2003). Indeed, Samuel Kim has suggested that the ‘center of gravity for
economic regionalism has already shifted away from the U.S. dominated APEC,
which suffers from partial ‘paralysis and marginalization’, towards the ASEAN+3’
(Kim 2004, p51, p62). Thus: . . . East Asian regionalism is on the rise. The new regionalism in the area is based
on the shared embrace of economic development and well-being and the shared
sense of vulnerability associated with the processes of globalization and
regionalization. Greater regional cooperation is one of the few available instruments
with which East Asian states can meet the double challenge of globalization from
above and localization from below. Operating in a regional context, the East Asian
states can “Asianize” the response to globalization in a politically viable form. (Kim
2002, p61)
However, it must be noted that this is not based on deep integration, nor strong
convergence. China, for instance, as used the idea of ‘finding common ground while
preserving differences” (qiutong cunyi) in its diplomacy (Kim 2004, p60), suggesting
some limit to community building in East Asia. This is a gradual process, rather than
the construction of strong rule-based institutions with deep integration.
Total GDP of East Asia almost reached that of Europe and North America form the
early 1990s, accounting for around 30% of global GDP through the early 1990s, while
through 2002, Northeast Asia held 48% of global foreign exchange reserves (Kim
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2004, p44). However, this wealth has only begun to be translated into global
power project and coherent regionalism, and does not yet have the ability to set
global agenda, norms and regimes. Samuel Kim has suggested that one of the key
organisations that can begin to translated this wealth into institutional power is
the ASEAN-Plus-Three, with the grouping having ‘the broader strategic objective of
enmeshing an increasingly powerful China into a regional financial regime in the
making’ (Kim 2004, p48). PRC has become both a more forceful player in this type of
regionalism, as well as promoting ‘continental regionalism’ into Central Asia via the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), perhaps as part of wider Eurasian
strategy, in part focused on energy access for future development (He 2004, p116; see
further Xiang 2004).
This has also included some willingness to engage in regional financial diplomacy.
PRC’s willingness not to devalue its currency after the 1997-1998 crisis, and
currency swaps among central banks through the ASEAN-Plus-Three (mandated
after the Chiang Mai Initiative, CMI, and with the support of the Asian Development
Banks) aimed at strengthening regional currency reserves to avoid any future financial
collapse and contagion n the region (Kim 2004, p49). The CMI was designed as a
measure to work alongside normal IMF operations: At the ASEAN Plus Three Finance Ministers Meeting in Chiang Mai in May 2000, one
of the main topics of discussion was how to develop a regional financing arrangement
that could be utilized to maintain financial stability in the East Asian region. At that
time, the discussion on the expansion of the ASEAN swap arrangement (ASA) to
include all ASEAN countries and increase its size to US$1 billion by the ASEAN
central banks was near its final stage. The ASEAN Plus Three countries decided to
combine the expanded ASA with a network of bilateral swap arrangements (BSAs)
among the ASEAN Plus Three countries to establish the first regional financing
arrangement called the "Chiang Mai Initiative" (CMI).
The expanded ASA, while relatively small in size compared with other
international financing facilities, is unconditional and designed for quick activation and
disbursement. It became effective in November 2000 and allows member banks to
swap their local currencies with major international currencies - such as the U.S.
dollar, Euro, and yen - for a period of up to six months, and for an amount up to twice
their committed amount under the ASA. (18) In line with its role as a rapid
disbursement facility, a member's swap request for temporary liquidity or balance of
payments assistance will be confirmed through the Agent Bank, (19) which will inform
and consult with the rest of the members to assess and process the request as
expeditiously as possible. (Manupipatpong 2002)
By 2004, thirteen major swap arrangements had been made, with a total value of
US$32.5 billion, indicating a degree of ‘monetary regionalism’ (He 2004, pp105106). Likewise, this broad level agenda and the November 2002 Declaration on the
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea has reduced hot conflicts in the South
China Sea, even if the issue of sovereignty and boundaries has not been resolved
(Kim 2004, p49).
It is possible to envision several futures for East Asian regionalism. In one of
these, ASEAN may be able to create its triple economic, security and socio-cultural
community through 2012-2020, ASEAN Concord II (see Hew & Soesastro 2003)
thereby beginning a process that deep integration that may well may it a strong core
of regional process in the 21st century. This core could then moderate cooperation
through outreach into South and Northeast Asia. However, as we have seen, serious
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progress on this triple community will be slow and has yet to face numerous
developmental and democratic challenges (see lecture 6). Other possibilities include: This opens up a variety of “futurible” scenarios for the emerging East Asian regional
order: a hegemonic model (whether Sino-centric or U.S.-centric); an intraregional
bipolar balance-of-power model (Sino-Japanese); a multipolar ‘concert of power”
condominial model; a collective security model; an Asia-Pacific or East Asian
economic community model; and a pluralistic security community model. (Kim 2004,
pp61-62
All of these models are partly in progress at present, leading to some internal
competition among different patterns of regionalism, but also to decision paths in
the future as certain options become more or less viable.
In one view, Asian regionalism, both in Southeast and Northeast Asia, has been
shaped by the recognition of the dominant power of the United States: In addition, what underlies Asian perceptions of regionalism is the awareness of a
dominant US power in Asia. The unipolar system, under which US power penetrates
East Asia and maintains the fragmentation and division of East Asia, has made
difficult and even impossible the emergence of a common Asian identity. With the
presence of the US factor, Asian regionalism can only be achieved without Asian
identity. Asian regionalism can only be a ‘supplement’ to the USA, rather than a force
against it. Asian regionalism has to be Pacific-centric regionalism with its door open
to the USA (He 2004, p107)
This is partly true, especially of under the forceful foreign policy of the Bush
administration through 2001-2003, and has only begun to slowly change through
2003-2006. As we have seen, even Southeast Asian regionalism is problematic if
based on a shared identity, and even more so for any wider grouping. On this basis,
regionalism is more likely to driven by shared benefits, patterns of cooperation,
and the limited, complementary mobilisation of cultural values and products,
rather than some imagined identity.
Here, ASEAN from 2003 has been driven towards creating a stronger economic
and security process, explicitly set out in the ASEAN Concord II process from 2003,
and the East Asian Summit process from 2005. In turn, ASEAN and PRC in
particular have found the ASEAN-Plus-Three as a strong venue for an active and
progressive international policy that has reduced some regional tensions (Straits
Times 2005). China has found this a non-threatening forum from which to extend its
foreign policy, while ASEAN has sought to moderate growing Chinese power through
mutual engagement with South Korea and Japan, and drawing India, Australia and
New Zealand into the EAS process. Through 2005-2006 this has led to the beginning
of a deeper East Asian Summit (EAS) process. Perhaps more important than the EAS
agenda itself has been use of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, already signed
by the ASEAN states, China, Japan in 2004, India and conditionally by Australia. It
has been viewed as a background norm for expectations in this summit process
(Pakistan has also signed the TAC). The TAC has a set of loose but important
principles: a. Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and
national identity of all nations;
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b. The right of every State to lead its national existence free from external
interference, subversion or coercion;
c. Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another;
d. Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means;
e. Renunciation of the threat or use of force;
f. Effective cooperation among themselves. (in Heller 2005, p127)
Thus, the EAS should promote strong political dialogue focused on Asian issues,
but is not set to be the basis of a future 'Asian Union' (see Bowring 2005). This has
lead to some shift in Australian policy, which has wanted to be part of this process,
but has been reluctant to sign the TAC without reservation. Through July 2005 the
Howard government that it would be willing to sign the TAC, but that this should not
interfere with existing Australian alliances, especially with the U.S. Through mid2005 the background politics to this was worth noting: Australia has been officially invited to join the first East Asia summit after it agreed to accede
to the South-East Asian non-aggression pact.
The invitation meant Australia would for the first time be involved in the evolution of the east
Asian community, the Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, said last night.
He also revealed Australia had adopted a similar model to the one South Korea used for
signing the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation, by exchanging correspondence setting out
Australia's and ASEAN's understanding of the pact. . . .
Mr Downer said Australia's invitation would mean "for the first time ever Australia will be
involved in the evolution of an east Asian community".
"That's an enormous issue for Australia," he said.
Australia's reluctance to sign the treaty was because of concerns it would conflict with its
obligations under the ANZUS alliance and would inhibit its ability to criticise ASEAN
countries on human rights issues.
The move came as Burma finally bowed to pressure from its ASEAN neighbours yesterday
and gave up the 2006 chairmanship of the regional forum, saying it needed to focus on
national reconciliation.
The decision closed the chapter on one of the most intensive lobbying efforts the forum has
seen, and allows ASEAN to avoid messy confrontations with Western dialogue partners such
as the US and the European Union. (Banham & Levett 2005)
This nuanced shift also reduced the rhetoric of pre-emption in the region.
Moreover, though the US has been concerned about its exclusion from the EAS, it has
encouraged both Indian and Australian involvement (Kelly 2005). This probably
improves Australia's diplomatic leverage, but once again it will have to avoid being
seen as promoting US interests within a regional forum. Australia that made it clear
that the TAC moderated it relations with Southeast Asia, but did not override
other agreements: In July 2005, Canberra announced that it would, despite misgivings, sign the TAC
(which it did on the eve of the summit in December). At the same time, Foreign
Minister Alexander Downer emphasised four ‘understandings’(effectively
reservations) that Canberra had agreed with its ASEAN counterparts: that signing the
TAC should not affect Canberra’s existing security arrangements (notably its alliance
with America), Australia’s rights and obligations under the UN charter, or Australia’s
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relations outside Southeast Asia, and that ASEAN could intervene in disputes
involving Australia only after an invitation from Canberra. (Strategic Comments 2005)
In the long run, we may see two different 'cores' emerging in the Asia-Pacific, one
focused on the US and one on China (Kelly 2005) - if so, Australia will need to
balance its relations and move towards low levels of competition among its two major
'patrons'. In the long run, Australia and Japan may act as bridges to ensure that US
interests are not totally sidelined within the EAS.
Moreover, the ASEAN community itself seems to have realised that these general
principles of cooperation, 'amity' and non-interference may not be enough to
drive the organisation forward. On this basis, through late 2005 they took the key
elements of earlier agreements and outlined a values-based agenda for the future, the
ASEAN Charter (ASEAN 2005): * Promotion of community interest for the benefit of all ASEAN Member Countries;
* Maintaining primary driving force of ASEAN;
* Narrowing the development gaps among Member Countries;
* Adherence to a set of common socio-cultural and political community values and
shared norms as contained in the various ASEAN documents;
* Continuing to foster a community of caring societies and promote a common
regional identity;
* Effective implementation as well as compliance with ASEAN’s agreements;
* Promotion of democracy, human rights and obligations, transparency and good
governance and strengthening democratic institutions;
* Ensuring that countries in the region live at peace with one another and with the
world at large in a just, democratic and harmonious environment;
* Decision making on the basis of equality, mutual respect and consensus;
* Commitment to strengthen ASEAN’s competitiveness, to deepen and broaden
ASEAN’s internal economic integration and linkages with the world economy;
* Promotion of regional solidarity and cooperation;
* Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and
national identity of all nations;
* Renunciation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and
avoidance of arms race;
* Renunciation of the use of force and threat to use of force; non-aggression and
exclusive reliance on peaceful means for the settlement of differences or disputes;
* Enhancing beneficial relations between ASEAN and its friends and partners;
* Upholding non-discrimination of any ASEAN Member Countries in ASEAN’s
external relations and cooperative activities;
* Observance of principles of international law concerning friendly relations and
cooperation among States; and
* The right of every state to lead its national existence free from external
interference, subversion or coercion and non-interference in the internal affairs of one
another. (ASEAN 2005)
What is new, is that if the Charter is accepted and ratified, ASEAN it 'will confer a
legal personality to ASEAN and determine the functions, develop areas of
competence of key ASEAN bodies and their relationship with one another in the
overall ASEAN structure' (ASEAN 2005), thus suggesting that this norms would
guide the structure and functioning of ASEAN in future. If so, 'democracy, human
rights and obligations, transparency and good governance and strengthening
democratic institutions' would be a strong expectation, though once again limited by '
respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national
identity' (ASEAN 2005). It remains to be seen, then, whether this really is a way
11
forward for the organisation, but it does at least suggest an entrenching of current
trends towards an Southeast Asian community focused on dialogue and shared needs
amid a turbulent wider environment. It is thus viewed internally as 'a firm foundation
for ASEAN in the years ahead and to facilitate community building towards an
ASEAN Community' (ASEAN 2005)
4. Multiple Cores Or Tiered Multipolarity?
As we have seen, the regionalism the Indo-Pacific have been moderated by the
rise of great powers regionally, who to some degree moderate or entangle the power
of the remaining global superpower, the United States. In such a system, China is
usually viewed as the rising contender for regional hegemony, using both
traditional avenues of sovereign power (military modernisation, moderate power
projection, missile and nuclear technology, sustained and rapid growth in GDP), as
well as new forms of diplomacy and influence, now routed along multilateral
channels (engagement in regional projects, the APT, the China-ASEAN FTA, the
ARF, the EAS, APEC, the SCO, the Code of Conduct for the South China Sea, the
AP6 or Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate, and its new,
global energy and resource politics, including a new focus on Latin America, see
Malik 2006). Likewise, India has also been touted as a rising power over the next
two decades, and has perhaps been partly viewed as a counterbalance to Chinese longterm interests, though large internal challenges and needs still need to be met (see
lecture 10).
Another project that has been shared by some of these emerging powers is an
emphasis on multipolarity in the global system was one way of enhancing national
power, regional abilities, and as a way of moderating the impact of U.S. policy.
Multipolarity has at times been favoured by countries such as China, Russia, India,
and France, as well as by the EU in trade and governance areas. Rather than accept a
bipolar or unipolar world system, key states including China, France, Russia and India
have long argued that today several major centres of power need to be recognised
within the world system (Xinhua 2000; Dixit 1999). On this basis, the possibility of
sustained hegemonic dominance or preponderance of power by the remaining
superpower seems unlikely, since such power soon generates 'countervailing
forces', contesting the legitimacy of such a role. (Guehenno 1998, p16).
Furthermore, the 'balance of power' model that was the basis of traditional realist
models must be adapted in the light of the rise of geo-economic power, the influence
of international institutions, and the impact of globalisation (see Vasquez 1997;
Christensen & Synder 1997). At the very least, it may be necessary to include
'balance of threat' and 'balance of interests' factors to explain alliance behaviour,
and to include the influence of decision-makers and public perceptions in order to
arrive at theories that explain actual inter-state behaviour (Vasquez 1997; Christensen
& Snyder 1997).
Hence, we need to consider not just 'poles' of power but levels and structures: No singe hierarchy describes adequately a world politics with multiple structures. The
distribution of power in world politics has become like a layer cake. The top military
layer is largely unipolar, for there is no other military comparable to the United States.
12
The economic middle layer is tripolar and has been for two decades. The bottom
layer of transnational interdependence shows a diffusion of power. (Harkavy 1997)
On this basis, the U.S. remains as the global superpower, but cores of economic
power have developed below this in Europe, Northeast Asia and North America.
Thereafter, the rise of India, Southeast Asia, and more slowly South America have
complicated this picture. Thus thinkers such as Huntington and Nye argued that a
hybrid system of uni-multipolarity had emerged from the 1990s onward: The post-Cold War period has witnessed 'a strange hybrid' of these in what
Huntington terms a uni-multipolar international system, with one superpower and
several major powers. Within this unique system, the only superpower may veto
action on key international issues taken by a combination of major powers, but it also
needs the co-operation of others to solve disputes effectively. n their accounts, both
Nye and Huntington have reservations about whether the current international order
is a genuine unipolarity. (Kan 2004)
Multipolarity has been viewed by neo-realists as intrinsically less stable than
bipolar systems, and that in general the fewer number of great powers in an
international system the better (Friedberg 1993). However: The validity of this claim is by no means self-evident and, indeed, has been the object
of a prolonged, heated, and ultimately inconclusive scholarly debate. Disagreement
on the comparative merits is unresolvable on either deductive grounds (clever
arguments can be made on both sides of the question) or, because of the relative
rarity of bipolar systems, on the basis of historical evidence. In any case, with the
sudden collapse of the old bipolar order, a new and more pressing issue has begun
to assert itself: What may account for differences in the functioning of systems of
similar structure? And, specifically, why is it that some multipolar systems have
proven more stable (in terms both of their duration and of the level of conflict within
them) than others? (Friedberg 1993)
Thus, for example, the concert of power system helped stabilise much of Europe after
the end of the Napoleonic wars down till the 1860s. Likewise, Coral Bell has
suggested that a ‘status quo’ alliance of the US, the EU, and Japan, backed up by
Russia, PRC (if ‘brought on board’) and Pakistan might emerge (Bell 2003, pp41-42;
see further lecture 4). Beyond this a range of developing powers, including Indonesia
and South Africa, might play a bigger role in the future (Bell 2003, p42), to which we
could add the loose convergence of ASEAN and Indian interests. Through 2005-2006
its seems unlikely that this wider status quo power system can emerge in the short
term, in part due to tensions between Japan and China, and in part due to China and
Russian efforts in building an alternative power system in Eurasia based on the SCO.
While the dangers of multipolarity are recognised, including the possibility of
competition and alliance politics among these key powers (now expressed through the
concepts of 'strategic partnerships' and 'special relationships'), a constructive,
cooperative multipolarity can also be envisaged. In particular, it is necessary to move
beyond the simple concept of power-balancing among several discrete national
powers, where complexity, lack of quickness in seeking balance, the role of
revisionist powers, strategic miscalculation or misperceptions (Christensen 1997), and
irrational alliance building can undermine any sense of security offered by the system.
(Harkavy 1997; Friedberg 1993). In the current global system, power is also nested
within regional systems, within global patterns of trade and financial flows, partly
13
arbitrated through international institutions which radically alter the nature of both the
system and the poles of power at play. This means that multipolar power patterns
are also played out through influence in multilateral institutions, and in
economic, trade and energy politics.
This terminology of multipolarity was mobilised as part of reninvigorating IndiaRussia relations. In October 2000 the two countries signed 'a declaration on strategic
partnership on greater defence and military-technical cooperation and joint effort to
fight international terrorism, while giving a boost to the economic relationship
between the two countries.' (INDOLink 2000). Although the long-term benefits from
this relationship can be debated in comparison to growing US linkages to India (see
lecture 10), the term 'strategic partnership' in this context is highly significant, since
this is the same terminology used in the crucial Sino-Russian rapprochement since
1996 (Chengappa 2000). This terminology seems, at least from the Russian point-ofview, to be part of an emerging emphasis on developing greater multipolarity in the
international system (Srivastava 2000, pp334-335). Likewise, in the 2000 Summit
between EU and India efforts were outlined towards the building of a 'new strategic
partnership' in which the 'EU and India are important partners in the shaping of the
emerging multipolar world' of the 21st century.1
At present, the global system has not so much developed a 'simple multipolarity' of
roughly equal great powers, but rather a regional multipolarity of several regional
subsystems, sometimes terms 'multi-multipolarity' (Friedberg 1993). In such a
setting, countries such as India and PRC, and groupings such as ASEAN, can increase
their regional and global profile through conscious employment of a the model of
multipolarity, combined with a circles of engagement approach. However, this
'tiered multipolarity' system in the wider India-Pacific also has several dangers
(see Kan 2004; Buzan & Waever 2003; Buzan, Jones & Little 1993). Multipolar
patterns can slip from regional cooperation which still engages the remaining
superpower towards more contentious system where unresolved conflicts and
intensified competition could turn the system into a contest for regional or subregional hegemony. Here the role of smaller power and weaker alliance partners can
also be problematic, especially when combined with new challenges to the existing
international set of regimes. Likewise, it is possible that contending claims can lead to
an erosion of leadership and direction in the international system. In one view: What Washington has most essentially lost is acquiescence to its leadership. Other
powers no longer have any compunction about opposing U.S. policies and
preferences when it is not in their own independent interests to follow them. It is a
game of every power for itself, in which each regional power center cooperates with
others when it shares common interests with them and opposes them when interests
conflict. The result is the absence of a single paradigm of world order or even of a
coherent pattern of alliances. In their place are coalitions of convenience that -- taken
together -- have no consistent direction. (Weinstein 2004)
1
"EU-India Summit Joint Declaration", 28 June 2000 [Internet access at
http://europa.eu.int/external_relations/india/simmit_06_00/joint_declaration.htm].
14
5. Challenges To Regionalism and to an Indo-Pacific Tiered-multipolar System
These leads to a series of questions, challenges and problems that challenge both
regionalism and a stable tiered-multipolar system in the Indo-Pacific: 1) Is a new but unstable nuclear club emerging across the Ind-Asian zone,
including established nuclear powers (US, China), accepted non-NPT powers
(India and Pakistan) and emerging nuclear powers that make seek to creep across
the line towards weaponisation and missile capabilities (North Korea, Iran)?
2) Has progress in the ASEAN-Plus-Three, the East Asian Summit process and
strong growth in PRC given China a pivotal role in future East Asian
Regionalism? Can it moderate possible tensions with Japan and the U.S. over
potential ‘leadership’ in some regional agenda? Will PRC be willing to take up a
strong but accountable regional and international role? (see Kim 2004, p58).
3) Is ASEAN strong enough and coherent enough to remain the core driver of
wider ARF, ‘ASEAN-plus’ and EAS processes?
4) Are states with major unsatisfied claims on the international system, such as
Pakistan, North Korea and potentially Taiwan, adequately factored into plans for
regional stability?
5) Do new security organizations need to be created if the ARF remains relatively
weak and unable to fully engage ‘preventive diplomacy’?
6) Do middle powers such as Australia have sufficient influence on regional
organisations, bearing in mind tensions through 1997-2006? If we list different
groups, what leverage and influence does Australia have in them (APEC, ASEAN
Regional Forum, IOR-ARC, CSCAP, EAS, etc)?
7) Can environmental cooperation provide a focus for regional resource
management in the long term? Are a number of smaller and weaker states in Asia
and the Pacific unsustainable in the medium term?
8) Is there a clear split between East Asian regionalism and wider Asia-Pacific
processes? Can these processes be re-linked constructively?
9) Can democracy become more central to Indo-Pacific regional processes, or
would this act more as a blockage if tackled too directly (for such proposals, see
Terrill 2005; ASEAN 2005).
10) Can a stable system of 'power and need' balances be established in the IndoPacific during the early 21st century?
15
6. Bibliography, Resources and Further Reading
Resources
Asian studies on the Web with a wide range of links will be found at
http://coombs.anu.edu.au/WWWVL-AsianStudies.html
Quite good coverage on political events in Asia will be found in the South China Morning
Post, one of Hong Kong's leading newspapers, on the Web at http://www.scmp.com/
A wide range of political and governance issues are addressed in the East Asia and the
Pacific Region, section of the World Bank Group Webpage at
http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/eap/eap.nsf
Power and Interest News Reports (PINR) provide critical reporting and analysis of current
news, Asia-Pacific Affairs and world issues at http://www.pinr.com/
Further Reading
ASEAN "Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN Charter",
Kuala Lumpur, 12 December 2005 [Access via wwew.aseansec.org/18030.htm]
BEESON, Mark (ed.) Contemporary Southeast: Regional Dynamics, National Differences,
Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2004
BELL, Coral A World Out of Balance: American Power and International Politics in the TwentyFirst Century, Sydney, The Diplomat magazine and Longueville Books, 2003
BUZAN, Barry & WAEVER, Ole Regions and Powers : The Structure of International Security,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003
HE, Baogang “East Asian Ideas of Regionalism: A Normative Critique”, Australian
Journal of International Affairs, 58 no. 1, March 2004, pp105-126
KAN, Francis Yi-hua "East Asia in a unipolar international order and Europe's role in
the region", Asia Europe Journal, 2 no .4, Dec 2004, pp497-522 [Access via
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KELLY, Paul "Howard's Asian Balancing Act", The Australian, 29 June 2005, p13
KIM, Samual S. “Regionalization and Regionalism in East Asia”, Journal of East Asian
Studies, 4, 2004, pp39-67 [Access via Ebsco Database]
PYE, Lucian W. "Civility, Social Capital: Stability and Change in Comparative
Perspective: Three Powerful Concepts for Explaining Asia", The Journal of
Interdisciplinary History, 29 no. 4, Spring 1999 [Access via Infotrac Database]
SHINN, James (ed.) Fires Across the Water: Transnational Problems in Asia, N.Y., Council on
Foreign Relations, 1998
SUBRAMANIAM, Surain "The Asian values Debate: Implications for the Spread of
Liberal Democracy", Asian Affairs, 21 no. 1, Spring 2000, pp19-35 [Access via
Infotrac SearchBank]
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