Clean Air Legislation
Ma. Lourdes N. Tiquia
Introduction
This case study focuses on the experience of Greenpeace and the Clean Air Coalition in
the landmark legislation known as the Clean Air Law or Republic Act No. 8749.
The
engagement of civil society organizations with Congress led to the creation of a single-issue
coalition. The outcome of the engagement was the final passage of a long pending measure,
dating back to the 8th Congress. The Clean Air Law adopted several progressive provisions, part
of which were contained in the agenda of the coalition.
R.A. No. 8749's unique legislative language centered on the principles of sustainable
development and “polluters must pay”. Section 4 of the law recognized rights of citizens on the
issue of clean air. The rights of citizens are "hereby sought to be recognized and the State shall
seek to guarantee their enjoyment":

Right to breathe air;

Right to utilize and enjoy all natural resources according to the principle of
sustainable development;

Right to participate in the formulation, planning, implementation and monitoring of
environmental policies and programs and in the decision-making process;

Right to participate in the decision-making process concerning development policies,
plans, programs, projects or activities that may have adverse impact on the
environment and public health;

Right to be informed of the nature and extent of potential hazard of any activity,
undertaking or project and to be served timely notice of any significant rise in the
level of pollution and the accidental or deliberate release into the atmosphere of
harmful or hazardous substances;
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
Right of access to public records which a citizen may need to exercise his or her
rights effectively;

Right to bring action in any court or quasi-judicial bodies to enjoin all activities in
violation of environmental laws and regulations, to compel the rehabilitation and
cleanup of affected area, and to seek the imposition of penal sanctions against
violators of environmental laws; and

Right to bring action in court for compensation of personal damages from the adverse
environmental and public health impact of a project or activity.
A vital provision of the law is on citizen suit found in Section 41. With the inclusion of
this provision, any citizen may file an appropriate civil, criminal or administrative action in the
proper courts against: a) any person who violates or fails to comply with the law and its
implementing rules and regulations; b) the DENR and other implementing agencies with respect
to orders, rules and regulations issued inconsistent with this Act; and/or c) any public officer who
willfully or grossly neglects the performance of an act specifically enjoined as a duty by the law
or its IRR; or abuses his authority in the performance of his duty.
The institution of a citizen suit is further enhanced by the mandatory exemption from the
payment of filing fees to exempting the plaintiff from the filing of an injunction bond for the
issuance of a preliminary injunction. The court is also taken to task to act on the complaint
within the 30-day determination period. All these are reform measures on substantive as well as
procedural law.
The Clean Air Coalition is composed of the following organizations: Haribon
Foundation, Mother Earth Unlimited, Inc., Philippine Greens, Ecological Society of the
Philippines, Womanhealth, Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement, Southeast Asia Regional
Institute for Community Education, U.P. Medical Students for Social Responsibility, Green
Forum, Sagip Pasig Movement, People's Task Force for Bases Clean-Up, Lakay Kalikasan,
Concerned Citizens Against Pollution, Recycling Movement of the Philippines, Damayan, IMA
Foundation, Miriam P.E.A.C.E, Visayan Forum, Linis-Ganda Balikatan Movement, CEIDEC,
Bantay Kalikasan, Environmental Legal Assistance Center and Balik Kalikasan.
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The international dimension that Greenpeace brought to the picture and the formation of
a coalition to pressure a new administration to finally enact legislation on clean air are critical
factors in the success of engagement. Knowledge of the legislative mill, its access and pressure
points, and the use of media to pressure Congress, in particular ABS-CBN’s high profile
monitoring of Congress were essential in the passage the Clean Air Law.
The engagement of the CSOs in Clean Air proved to be successful because they were
able to get major concessions in the law. In getting major advocacy issues included in the final
version, the Clean Air Coalition was engaged in every step of the process except in the drafting
of the rules and regulations of the law, which remains pending in the bowels of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources to this very day. The delay is due to jurisdictional issues
apart from the fact that there is no budget for the implementation of the law in the General
Appropriations Act Fiscal Year 2000.
The Clean Air Law
It is a constitutionally defined policy of the State to "protect and advance the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature”1.
R.A. No. 8749 or the Clean Air Law is one of the few landmark legislation to ever come out of
the post-Martial Law Congress.
It is a very comprehensive law that appears to be
unimplementable, according to experts in the foreign donor community. As its principal author,
Representative J.R. Nereus Acosta (Lone District, Bukidnon), stressed: “its policy
problematique2 is too daunting.” It should be noted that the higher your policy problematique,
the harder it is to implement policy.
Clean Air legislation was enacted in the 11th Congress although first proposed during the
8th Congress.
It is one of the three (3) earliest national laws3 passed by Congress a year after
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada took office. The passage of this law augurs well for the
Estrada Administration because this is its first major and comprehensive law.
With both
chambers of Congress controlled by the party in government, the passage of a major legislative
1
Section 16 Article II, Philippine Constitution.
2
Problematique is a French word that refers to five basic principles in implementation: multiple goals, multiple stakes, technical
expertise or requirements, budgetary/financial requirements and time frame.
3 The other two laws were the 1999 G.A.A. and the Mandatory Use of Seatbelts.
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agenda of the President is a clear response to the growing disillusionment against government
across sectors. For the environmental advocates, it signals a renewed commitment to engaged
Congress and the Estrada Administration on other concerns: land use, solid waste management,
clean-up of Clark and Subic, safe drinking water, among others.
Clean air legislation started as early as the 8th Congress when four measures were filed on
air pollution. House Bill No. 30895 by Representative Carmencita Puyat-Reyes was on air
pollution from motor vehicles. The bill was referred to the Committee on Transportation and
Communication and remained pending until the adjournment of Congress in 1992. House Bill
No. 22420 by Representative Eduardo Pilapil, also on the same subject, and was referred to the
same committee. House Bill No. 7815, authored by Representative Carmencita Reyes, proposes
to increase penalties for pollution, was referred to the House Standing Committee on Revision of
Laws and was never reported out. Lastly, House Bill No. 33931 or the Environment Code,
authored by Representatives Gascon, Webb, Almario, Jabar, etc. was referred to the Standing
Committee on Natural Resources and remained unacted. Thus, during the 8th Congress, not
much happened to push the measure.
By the opening of the 9th Congress, House Bill No. 144594 authored by Representative
Socorro Acosta was refiled. The House Standing Committee on Ecology approved the measure
and was reported out.
In plenary, the measure was approved overwhelmingly and was
transmitted to the Senate for concurrence. The 9th Congress ended without the Senate's approval.
The 10th Congress saw Speaker De Venecia again directly handling the levers of the
legislative mill. The Acosta measure was again refiled as House Bill No. 86225, and was coauthored by the Speaker himself. The bills reached the Bicameral Conference Committee. The
Senate on 19 January 1998 approved the Conference Committee Report but the House sat on the
report, thereby killing the measure.
Majority Floor Leader Rodolfo Albano never called the bill
for votation. Some CSOs noted that Representative Albano was frequently "absent" on the floor.
Reports going around Congress and even among CSOs was that the proposal was allegedly used
as a stick to milk interested players in the industry in exchange for funding for the 1998 electoral
campaign.
4
An Act to Revise the Philippine Environmental Code, Defining Its Scope and Integrating All Other Laws Relative Thereto.
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On 7 October 1998, the Committees on Environment and Natural Resources, Finance and
Ways and Means issued Committee Report No. 8 on Senate Bill No. 1255 6. The Committee
recommended its approval in substitution of Senate Bill Nos. 9 (Flavier), 864 (Jaworski), and
912 (Legarda-Leviste).
On 29 December 1998, the Committees on Ecology, Appropriations and Ways and
Means reported out House Bill No. 6216 recommending the approval in substitution of House
Bill Nos. 129, 730, 1016, 1121.
House Bill Nos. 129, 730, 1016 and 1121 introduced by Reps.
Acosta, Sarmiento (R), Montemayor, Bascug, Villarosa, etc. were similarly titled 7 and their
contents were very much identical to one another.
By 12 May 1999, the Bicameral Conference Committee approved its report and
submitted to their respective chambers the result of the conference. The Senate approved the
Conference Committee Report on 13 May 1999 while the House of Representatives approved it
much earlier, 10 May 1999.
The factors that delayed the passage of the measure in the 8th to the 10th Congress were
both political in nature as well as the disorganized effort of the CSOs to speak in one voice.
Political in the sense that there were strong lobby efforts conducted by other stakeholders,
principally the oil companies, against the measure. This became even more intense at the
bicameral level and at the level of the President when foreign embassies were lobbying against
the adoption of a total incinerator ban. On the other hand, consensus was not readily achieved
from among CSOs because of other contending issues each CSO was advocating for. The issue
management and advocacy efforts were sporadic and far in between.
The Coalition strongly pushed for environmental rights, the incinerator ban, the polluters
must pay principle, citizen suits, and the concept of eco-profiling.
5
An Act to revise the Philippine Environmental Code, Defining its Scope and Integrating All Other Laws relative Thereto (aka
Clean Air)
6 An Act Providing for a Comprehensive Air Pollution Control Policy, and For Other Purposes, authored by Senators Flavier,
Jaworski, Legarda-Leviste, Honasan, Osmena, Enrile, and Aquino-Oreta.
7 An Act Providing for A Comprehensive Air Pollution Control Policy, and For Other Purposes.
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CSOs' Experience
In studying the process of crafting R.A. No. 8749, one should not lose sight of the fact
that the leading personality in the CSO’s advocacy used to be a legislative staff 8 of Sen. Orlando
Mercado during the 8th Congress and partly during the 9th Congress. He later became head of the
technical staff of the Senator, handling both legislation and media. After his stint in the Senate,
he became the in-country campaigner of Greenpeace International based in Amsterdam. His
background, as a former staff, ability to craft legislation and read between the lines of legislative
language and avail of media's reach and influence made the effort for Greenpeace and later the
Green Coalition a success story for policy involvement by CSOs.
Greenpeace has no formal office in the country, but it has a campaign presence in the
Philippines and Asia. Greenpeace was formed in 1971 by a group of Canadian and American
activists. They chose the name Greenpeace because they wanted to "create a green and peaceful
world." Greenpeace Australia was formed in 1979. At present there are Greenpeace offices in
30 countries worldwide. It is an international environmental action group that seeks solutions
and campaigns for a nuclear-free future, to stop pollution and protect nature. It campaigns
against environmental abuse through: "a) the use of non-violent direct action; b) the lobbying of
relevant authorities and international conventions; c) provision of alternatives and solutions in
the form of studies and reports; and d) work with companies that want to do the right thing" 9.
Aggressiveness is akin to almost all campaigns of Greenpeace. They bring the issue to one's
homecourt to stress the obvious and force decision-makers to decide, thereby locking their
support with the advocacies of Greenpeace.
The spearheading of the campaign effort by Greenpeace gave other CSOs a different
perspective of pressure politics. Because Greenpeace is known abroad, it could very well
“internationalize” a domestic issue. If this happens, heavy pressure is placed on government to
positively respond to the issue. This should not be taken to mean that the local environment
CSOs are weak. In fact, the reason why Greenpeace pushed for a coalition was because of the
8
Mr. Von Hernandez is the regional campaigner in Asia, principally on toxic. He was with Senator Mercado for five (5) years
and joined Greenpeace only in 1995.
9 Brown, Michael and John May. The Greenpeace Story. London: Darling Kindersley Ltd. 1991.
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realization that they needed foot soldiers, they needed to create a bandwagon effect to pressure
Congress, and they needed domestic support. Greenpeace felt that that pressure should come
from within and by banding together, a message can be sent to Congress that the coalition is a
force to reckon with owing to its composition and sheer number.
In 1997, the 1st meeting of the Coalition was called after a loose aggrupation worked on
the anti-toxic campaign. The anti-toxic campaign is a Greenpeace advocacy. Each member of
the loose coalition saw some degree of political opportunity10 in a coalition for the clean air
campaign. It was agreed upon then that individually and as a coalition, there is a need for them
to consistently push for environmentally sound laws since there are various proposals already
filed in Congress, some of which were already in the pipeline. This is apart from periodically
nurturing allies in the Senate individually in order to cover majority of the members.
The first formal attempt to flex the coalition's muscles happened during congressional
deliberations on the House Omnibus Environmental Code during the 10th Congress. The effort
was not successful because of the wide coverage of the measure. The House of Representatives
decided to instead separately consider each chapter of the proposed code. Members of the
coalition attended meetings, not as a coalition but as separate and distinct organization. Because
the code focused on several policy concerns, effort by the CSOs were diluted since they started
focusing on their respective agenda. The main problem then why the code never moved in the
legislative mill was a close clique to then President Ramos allegedly approved the contract for
the use of an incinerator at San Mateo, Rizal. Although as earlier stated, the Senate ratified the
Conference Committee Report, the House sat on the report even while Ramos certified it as an
administrative measure.
The loose coalition reviewed their effort and Greenpeace came into the picture and
suggested the formation of a Clean Air Coalition focused on a single issue. It became a priority
for the members of the Coalition because they saw that then candidate Estrada already had this
issue in his campaign platform. This gave the coalition more strength to push for its passage and
eventual signing. In fact, reports have it that Defense Secretary Orlando Mercado only had to
remind President Estrada of this campaign pledge and that made the Chief Executive realize that
he cannot afford not to sign the bill into law.
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Engaging Congress
Of the transport sector to be directly affected, it was only PISTON who registered
support in favor of the measure as early as 1993.
Although PISTON rejected the allegations
that they were the cause of pollution in the metropolis. By debunking this perception, PISTON
was making a political move. PISTON president Menardo Roda noted that:
“the vehicles that we used for our daily economic survival are the very same
vehicles for our shortened breath and health… the engines we have are natural
pollutants since they are second-hand engines purchased and facilitated by government
from Japan. We patronize these simply because we can’t afford new engines and our
country does not have our own engine-manufacturing industry… all Filipinos would
benefit and appreciate it if the giant oil corporations will raise the quality of diesel and
other petroleum products at no extra cost to the consuming public… the government’s
anti-pollution campaign is focused on earning via the penalties and fines it imposes
rather than the lessening number of polluting vehicles11”
The position of PISTON appears to be more of a solidarity support to other CSOs. On
the other hand, some analysts have said that PISTON may not have been fully aware of the
impact of the proposed measure.
In the deliberations done during this 11th Congress, the oil industry monitored and
actively engaged Congress. Caltex, Petron, and Shell, together with the Philippine Institute of
Petroleum, were present in most hearings or Technical Working Group meetings in both
chambers. They registered their position and appeared in full force everytime pubic hearings
were called. They came prepared, knew their positions and understood what consensus building
and compromise were. The oil companies also used various tactics from sending mails to "VIPs"
to immediately preparing position papers on an issue that came up during committee hearings to
doing one-on-one with the legislator, personal staff and committee staff, and to crafting the
legislative language for the proposed amendment.
Although there was a Clean Air Coalition, each member was allowed to craft their
involvement and advocacies independently creating a snowball effect in Congress and media.
The various CSOs which consistently engaged Congress on Clean Air legislation were the Legal
Rights Center, FEJODAP, PISTON, Federation of Free Farmers, TUCP, Concerned Citizens
10
11
“Filipinos Need the Clean Air Act” (A Statement from the Clean Air Coalition). January 27, 1997.
Senate Committee on Environment and Natural Resources transcript. 13 May 1993.
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Against Pollution, Mother Earth, Artists for the Environment, Recycling Movement of the
Philippines, World Ecologists Foundation, NACFAR, Linis Ganda, Philippine Federation for
Environmental Concerns, Foundation for Safe Waste, Inc. and Cainta Homeowners Association,
etc. Other stakeholders were the Philippine Motor Association, HCO International, Industron,
Inc., Metro Waste, Filcar Foundation, Integrated Waste Management, Luzon hospital, Wood
Ward Clyde Inc., Motorcycle Manufacturer's Association-Honda, Alliance of Bus Operators,
Eastern Petroleum, Isuzu, Phils., Zxl Group, Bosch, Diesel Pro, Norkis, SEAOIL, Suzuki,
Toyota Motors Corp., Phils. Automotive Federation, Inc., Honda Phils., and Victoria Motors.
On the observation that despite the presence of big companies they were not able to halt
the passage of the measure, one should remember that they have been able to delay the measure
since the 8th Congress. Second, that there was already a commitment made by the House
leadership that the bill will be enacted. Third, the strategy done by the Coalition became more
apparent when big companies became known and called as polluters and the CSOs and ordinary
citizens as friends of the environment. In such a scenario, big companies are in a no-win
situation because public support is not with them and if public support is not within, this has a
way of affecting their bottoms. That this is easily understood by big businesses led to their
willingness to compromise their position via the formula of phasing the changes mandated in the
measure. Apart from the ultimate reality that in any event, effect of the measure and changes in
the market will ultimately be borne by the consumers. Another reality which big business is too
familiar with is that by the time government fully implements the law, a considerable length of
time has passed and by that time, they have managed to conform to the changes required by law.
Besides government does not have the necessary instruments to measure and monitor standards,
hence enforcement may not at all be too rid.
Interestingly, the House Committee on Ecology never invited the coalition, even for
TWG discussions, according to Mr. Hernandez. The coalition exposed in media the very
"deceptive Committee Report" of the House. They stressed though that the fuel reformulation
provision of the House version was good. On the other hand, the coalition was in agreement
with the Senate version on two (2) major points: the ban on incinerator and the framework on the
community's right to take legal action.
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Several parallel moves were made by the coalition, assigning members to work on other
stakeholders. One move was the circulation of a position paper banning incinerator which was
signed by more than 100 legislators supporting the Clean Air Bill. This became useful later
when the group convinced the Speaker to take a strong stand. Mother Earth, headed by Ms.
Odette Alcantara made another parallel effort. Through the Congressional Spouses Foundation,
Mother Earth designed a solid waste training program for the Foundation. This effort locked in
the wives of legislators at the House of Representatives on Clean Air. With Ms. Cynthia Villar's
assistance, Speaker Manuel Villar became the main difference in the 11th Congress because he
practically diffused opposition from the majority party on clean air legislation.
Greenpeace was also able to bring to the country the Artic Sunrise. The timing was
crucial since the Bicameral Conference Committee already met for the first time. They invited
Defense Secretary Mercado, Speaker Manuel Villar, and the media for a press conference
onboard the Artic Sunrise. The two main players in clean air legislation attended and the
coalition was able to lock in their support. Another positive development was the designation by
Senate Ecology Chairman Gregorio Honasan of the Coalition as advisers to the Senate panel of
conferees.
This allowed access to bicameral meetings and immediate crisis management
operations for provisions that were being watered down or nebulously formulated.
By the 2nd bicameral meeting, the House panel had less opposition since Speaker Villar
made it a party position to support the speedy enactment of the proposed bill. The passage of the
Clean Air Law was a success since the law adopted the position taken by the Coalition on fuels
(total phase-out by year 2000, aromatics and desulfurization) and an incinerator ban. A potential
loophole though is seen in the definition of the term "incinerator". But inspite of this, the
coalition was said to be victorious in pushing clean air legislation.
With the passage of the law, the Philippines became the world’s first country to have a
ban on land-based incinerators. Because of this victory, the coalition is said to be ready to
expand and take in other groups such as the Catholic Bishop’s Conference of the Philippines on
issues like the anti-landfill efforts and the proposed solid waste bill.
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Executive Rule-making
By operation of Section 51, The Department of Environment and Natural Resources, in
coordination with the Committees on Environment and Ecology of the Senate and House of
Representatives, and other concerned agencies, shall promulgate the IRR for R.A. 8749, within a
year after the enactment of the law. The coalition has not been invited by the DENR in the
formulation of the IRR nor have they seen a draft. The key respondent to this study said that
there are some "good souls" in government who can tell what should be done and what should
not be done.
The Coalition is cautious when it comes to dealing with Environment Secretary
Antonio Cerilles. The CSOs actively lobbied before the Commission on Appointments against
the confirmation of Cerilles but it should also be emphasized that Cerilles, a dye-in-the-wool
politician, came up with a statement of support against incinerators.
Another problematic area is the funding requirements of the law. There are some
activities that need funding, such as pollution from stationary sources and airsheds.
The
provisions on incinerator or fuel additives do not require funding but strong enforcement.
Another problem area is the implementation of the standards identified and provided for under
the law. "Standards are never monitored" and this has resulted in legal pollution.
With the
standards, this has created a paradigm shift in the DENR, from actual guardian of the nation's
wealth to an arbiter between CSOs and business. As the first country to institute a land-based
incinerator ban in the world, "we are also rejecting the Western-style development model which
is manifested by waste management policies. We will push for front-end waste management,
and we are in effect putting the responsibility on the producer. If they cannot recycle their
products, then they should not produce them at all”, added Mr. Hernandez.
Some have said that engaging the Executive Department represents a different stage in
campaigns and advocacy. This should not be the case since most laws, whether language or
intent, have been watered down by the rule-making function of the Executive. CSOs should
therefore not celebrate with the passage of the law they have been advocating for. They may
have gained an upper hand in Congress through the adoption of their agenda but the Executive
can fully derail and amend said formulation. The implementing rules and regulations are based
on the law and by mere interpretation by the Executive, the law may take a different focus. The
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CSOs should therefore be vigilant and realize that the law may still be changed in the crafting of
the rules.
Learning from Experience
CSOs should go beyond traditional constituencies such as what happened to the Clean
Air Coalition where women, health CSOs, Church , farmers, fisherfolk, and the middle class
were welcomed. Coalition work means developing constituencies. "One can escalate without
pushing other people out." The critical moment for any CSO is to decide when to get together.
And if they would get together, a single issue advocacy would be a good starting point.
On the part of Greenpeace, they have accepted the fact that some CSOs mistrust
Greenpeace but "coalition work is to go beyond the box". For a coalition to stay together,
defining a comfortable line for all is a must. "We were on the verge of almost splitting when the
House of Representatives approved their Clean Air version." "We underestimated the strength of
the coalition." Members of any active coalition must know their roles and be able to execute
their task as designed. "They must engaged the populace in their cause."
The value of media in any advocacy work is also critical. One should find and build
relationships based on "complementary expertise." Media "trumpets success and drumbeats
support" on a tightly contested political endgame. One should not lose focus of the fact that
media sustains any campaign. Greenpeace has built a niche in media circles as a resource person
that they can turn to for comments, reactions on environmental issues. CSOs should also learn to
be creative in approach and activities so they can attract media’s attention.
Organizationally, members of the coalition or on their own must be able to build
competencies on the issue. "Knowing the issue creates an illusion that enhances the snowball
effect in advocacy." CSOs should maintain and nurture relationships with politicians for one
may never know when they can rely on these open channels of communication in pushing for
their agenda. Parallel efforts must also be designed to secure support.
To be successful, CSOs should be consistent with their positions. Aggressiveness, attack,
forcing the issue and confrontational skills are traits of Greenpeace. It has been successful in
various fronts, and CSOs in the country should probably learn a thing or two from it.
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Determining when to do confrontational work and when to avail of dialogue or consultation is
essential in mapping out strategies. Although Greenpeace never trained its coalition partners,
there were sessions made on skills sharing. Admittedly, Greenpeace had a built-in advantage
because its lead campaigner in the country knew the levers of power in Congress, he knew how
the system work. Members of the Coalition are also able to appreciate this unique experience
and are able to understand the labyrinth such as Congress.
Lastly, CSOs must look at setbacks as opportunities. Opportunities are presented to
CSOs when government is vulnerable (survey results are down) or in a situation where CSOs can
capitalize on government conflicts. Under such a situation, government is prone to building a
broader base of support and has a tendency to listen more.
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