Lecture #18 Public Opinion and the Parties: The Breakdown of the New Deal Coalition, The Rise of the Gender Gap, and the (Uncertain) Future of the Party System I. Introduction A. The centrality of parties B. Parties as group alignments C. Stereotypes in social science D. Dominant coalitions E. The current situation: No dominant coalition, highly competitive elections II. The New Deal Coalition--have-nots versus haves (1932-1968 or 1932-1980 or 1932-1994) A. Democratic coalition based on using government to help people hurt by Great Depression B. Diverse coalition! 1. Southerners, northern factory workers, farmers, Catholics, Jews, Irish, Blacks, Slavs C. Class-based: poor and middle-class versus rich D. Dominant (except in presidential elections) between 1932 and 1994 1. Held House for 60 of 62 years 2. Held Senate for 52 of 62 years 3. Held majority of state and local offices 4. Held large lead in party identification III. Breakdown of the New Deal Coalition A. Causes (See Carmines & Stimpson, Black & Black) 1. Race 2. Cultural issues a. Crime b. Abortion c. Gay and Lesbian rights 3. Affluence? IV. The Current Line-Up: Democrats A. Shards of the New Deal Coalition (generally supportive but not reliable) 1. poor people 2. urbanites 3. union members B. Reliable support: Blacks and Jews C. New groups 1. Government workers 2. Highly educated (graduate degrees) 3. Latinos? 4. Women? a. Gender gap caused by movement of men to Republican Party b. Gender gap mostly among unmarried white women c. Gender gap unrelated to "women's issues" such as abortion d. Gender gap related to welfare/government support issues & views about use of violence in international relations e. Are women less individualistic? (Because of social position?) f. Why did Bush do so well among women? See Kaufmann! V. The Current Line-Up: Republicans A. The old coalition 1. Business 2. Managers 3. Whites! 4. Protestants B. New Additions 1. Southerners 2. Evangelical Christians/cultural conservatives 3. White Men! VI. A Complex Situation A. "Post-materialism"--emergence of cultural/environmental/quality of life issues across affluent democracies beginning in 1960s B. Conventional wisdom: Class basis of parties declining among affluent democracies--but evidence suggests not in U.S. 1. New data suggest class-based voting has been rising since 1950s! 2. Both cultural and class voting on the rise 3. Regionalism seems to be declining—southern conservatives, like northern conservatives, vote Republican (and northeast liberals vote Democrat) C. The problem of two-dimensional politics in a two-party system. D. A possible third dimension: globalization E. Polarization of parties—cultural and social welfare conservatives now more aligned with Republican Party, liberals with Democratic Party