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Inaugural Tokyo-Washington Dialogue
The U.S.-Japan Alliance after 3/11
Wednesday, September 7, 2011
Willard InterContinental Hotel
Washington, D.C.
•-•-•
3:00 p.m.
Introduction:
DANIEL BOB, Senior Fellow, Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA
Welcome:
MASAHIRO AKIYAMA, Chairman, Ocean Policy Research Foundation
Remarks:
YOHEI SASAKAWA, Chairman, Nippon Foundation
BOB: Ladies and gentlemen, if I could get all of you to take your seats. We're on a
rather tight schedule today. Thank you all for joining us. I'm Dan Bob. I'm Senior Fellow and
Director of U.S.-Japan programs at the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, and we're delighted to be
able to co-sponsor today's conference along with the Ocean Policy Research Foundation, the
Nippon Foundation, and the Stimson Center. This is the first of what will be a series of five
annual conferences that we'll be holding annually on the U.S.-Japan Alliance and today's focus is
the Alliance in the aftermath of the 3/11 tragedy, the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear meltdown
that struck Japan with such tremendous force just 6 months ago. But we'll also touch upon the
future of the Alliance in the context of regional and global change and of ongoing change in
Japan's domestic politics.
We have a terrific group assembled to discuss the Alliance, and among the participants
this afternoon, we have senior members of the Diet from both the ruling Democratic Party of
Japan as well as the main opposition party. We also have members of the U.S. Senate, current
and former leading government officials from both countries, and some of the leading thinkers on
the Alliance from both sides of the Pacific.
Now, to kick things off this afternoon, it's my pleasure to introduce the Chairman of the
Ocean Policy Research Foundation, Masahiro Akiyama. Previously, Akiyama-san served as
Vice Minister of National Defense, and while he was at the Defense Agency, Akiyama-san
played a pivotal role in the reaffirmation of the bilateral alliance in the aftermath of the end of the
cold war and in the formulation of the National Defense Program outline, and the realignment
plans for U.S. military bases in Okinawa.
So, Akiyama-san, the podium is yours.
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[Applause.]
Welcome
AKIYAMA: Thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen, for gathering today to join
this symposium. My foundation, Ocean Policy Research Foundation, a think-tank on maritime
affairs, has co-hosted the Japan-U.S. Sea Power symposium for the past 3 years together with the
Nippon Foundation and others. We decided this year launching a new type of symposium aimed
at announcing the importance of the Japanese Alliance by hosting an interesting symposium in
Washington. The symposium is named "Tokyo-Washington Dialogue." It consists of political
leaders, academia, and government officials, and young fellows from both states. We intend to
hold the dialogue every year in Washington, D.C., capital of the U.S., hopefully at the same
hotel, this hotel, bearing in mind announcement of joint declaration and proposal based on our 5year discussion ahead. I would like you to listen Mr. Sasakawa's opening remarks on this point.
I hope all of you enjoy and feel this dialogue to be significant. Thank you.
Well, I would like to introduce the Chairman of the Nippon Foundation, Mr. Yohei
Sasakawa, for his opening remarks.
Mr. Sasakawa, please.
[Applause.]
Remarks
SASAKAWA: Good afternoon. It is a great pleasure and honor to be given this
opportunity to speak before you today at this Inaugural Dialogue to consider the U.S.-Japanese
Alliance in the wake of the tragedy of March 11th.
I wish to express my sincere appreciation to everyone whose efforts have enabled this
symposium to take place, especially the Stimson Center, the Ocean Policy Research Foundation,
the Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA, and all our friends both in Japan and here in the United
States.
As many of you know, this symposium was originally scheduled to take place in May.
Then the disastrous event that occurred in Japan on March 11th forced its postponement. Nearly
6 months have now passed since the disaster. During this time, we Japanese have learned a great
deal and we have come to look differently at various things. Among them, the most significant, I
believe, is the vital importance of good relations between Japan and the United States. The speed
and the scale of the disaster relief activities undertaken under the American military's Operation
Tomodachi made many Japanese aware of the importance of maintaining close ties with the U.S.
Also, the donations raised by the U.S. from the grassroots level to the industrial sector are
contributing greatly to recovery in the affected regions. I would like to take this opportunity to
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express my deepest appreciation to the people of the United States for your generous and warm
support.
Since March 11th, the average Japanese citizen has come, in this way, to realize once
more how vitally linked our two countries are. However, at the same time, there is concern that
positive dialogue between our two governments often breaks down. Important agreements
supposedly reached between our two countries last year -- concerning national security, economic
issues, and cultural and personal exchanges -- have apparently failed to go forward. Moreover,
issues relating to the reorganization of U.S. military bases in Okinawa and to our Economic
Partnership Agreement are being put on hold. Allowing these matters to remain in limbo is of
benefit to neither side.
Unfortunately, discussions toward resolving these various issues have made no headway,
especially because of Japan's unstable political situation. I sincerely hope that with the formation
of a new Cabinet under Prime Minister Noda, efforts will now resume quickly toward resolving
these matters.
As you all know, global society today is undergoing structural changes of historic
proportion, symbolized by the emergence of China and the other developing countries. Too little
discussion is taking place today, however, concerning what new roles the U.S.-Japanese
partnership should play globally in such times, from a medium to long-term perspective. This is
a situation that causes me even greater concern. There are times when the U.S. and Japan should
be working together to draw up a new blueprint for establishing a solid partnership that will
continue long into the future. What's needed today, I believe, is for the private and public sector
to come together to create a framework that will enable ongoing discussions from a long-term
perspective, even as immediate issues are being addressed.
In 2008 and 2009, the Nippon Foundation organized three sessions of the U.S.-Japan Sea
Power Dialogue, convened in Tokyo and Washington. Last year, we held a symposium marking
150 years of amity between Japan and the U.S., and the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security between our two countries.
As organizers of these events, we gave much thought to the U.S.-Japanese relations, and
the feeling we came away with was that seeking ways to resolve specific immediate issues is not
enough. What's also needed are opportunities for taking U.S.-Japanese relationships forward to a
new stage through wide-ranging discussions within a greater, global context. Your gathering
here today, as leaders who can impact U.S.-Japanese relations today and tomorrow, and your
engaging in free and open discussions, will unquestionably serve as a first step toward achieving
that goal.
Given the enormous scope of addressing the U.S.-Japanese partnership from a long-term
view, however, convening one symposium is surely not enough. Debating the issues on a
frequent and ongoing basis is of vital importance. By the same token, merely debating the issues
is not enough either. What's necessary is to take the ideas put forward during discussions and
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analyze them on a deeper level and to study matters on a sustained basis. Regrettably, it seems
that even when good ideas and helpful opinions emerge from meetings like this, only seldom are
they followed up by further studies and verification over time.
It is with this in mind that I have set an ultimate goal for this symposium: to make
proposals to the governments of both our countries of policies for developing a new phase in
U.S.-Japanese relations. My timeframe for achieving this goal is 5 years, with a symposium to
be held once each year. My aspiration is for there to be ongoing discussion that will lead to
proposals of comprehensive and strategic policies. One major long-range topic I have in mind is
the U.S.-Japanese partnership in matters relating to the world's oceans. This is an issue that the
Nippon Foundation has been actively involved in for many years. As you know, managing the
waters around the Pacific island nations today is a matter of increasingly great importance.
Relying on the traditional approach to national security, a basically military approach, is no
longer enough. We must also consider how to deal with threats from terrorism, acts of piracy,
and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. In doing so, we need to seek greater maritime
monitoring in a broader sense and to pursue closer multinational cooperation.
To be effective in such an expansive area, cooperation must include not only the Pacific
island nations themselves, but also countries of a similar mind to the United States and Japan.
This was the impetus, I believe, behind U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campell's visit this
June to nine Pacific island states. Problems also remain in the Indian Ocean and Asian maritime
zones, particularly concerning safe passage through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. As
these problems are expected to grow in importance over the long term, multinational cooperation
encompassing the U.S. and Japan will be vital. Cooperation in maritime matters is but one
example.
My hope is that you will consider U.S.-Japanese relations and debate new possibilities
from many different approaches. I also hope to create opportunities for following up on the
policy proposals that will be made after the last symposium 5 years from now. Specifically, I
would like to propose introducing mechanisms for engaging in active and ongoing discussions
between the annual symposiums in order to make the proposals all the more substantial. One
idea I have in mind is to launch a project to support studies to enable your active and ongoing
involvement in discussions on U.S.-Japanese relations.
The project would support the next generation of scholars, both in the U.S. and Japan, in
areas related to the future of U.S.-Japanese relations and a new maritime order. Study topics
would be areas that would contribute to those goals, in areas such as diplomacy, national
security, economics, and comprehensive maritime management, with the aim of developing
specific policies. My aspiration is for the results from this project to lead to deeper discussions at
the annual symposiums and ultimately to policy proposals more substantial in content. I have
high hopes that through initiatives of these kinds, the proposals developed based on your
collective wisdom will surely usher in a new phase in U.S.-Japanese relations.
Over the course of the next 2 days, you will begin the long journey toward developing
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new U.S.-Japanese relations. As befits the start of such a voyage, I hope that you will all debate
the issues freely and actively.
Thank you.
[Applause.]
BOB: Thank you very much Sasakawa-sensei, for those very important comments.
I'd like to turn now to Ellen Laipson, who is going to introduce this afternoon's keynote
speaker. Ellen is President and CEO of the Stimson Center, and previously she had a long and
distinguished career in the government, including service as Vice-Chair of the National
Intelligence Council and as Special Assistant to the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United
Nations.
Ellen?
[Applause.]
•-•-•
3:30 p.m.
Introduction
ELLEN LAIPSON, President and CEO, Stimson Center
Keynote:
"The U.S.-Japan Alliance and the Great Eastern Japan Earthquake"
HON. SEIJI MAEHARA, Member, House of Representatives;
Former Foreign Minister
LAIPSON: Thank you, Dan. And it's my great pleasure to join in welcoming you to this
very special inaugural event. We're deeply grateful to our partners at the Nippon Foundation, at
the Ocean Policy Research Foundation, and the Sasakawa Peace Foundation of the USA. We, as
the Washington-based organization, really feel very privileged to be working together on this
very important series. And there were so many things that Chairman Sasakawa said that resonate
with the way the Stimson Center hopes to make its own modest contribution to peace and
security in the Asian region and to U.S.-Japan relations.
As you know, Yuki Tatsumi has been the organizer of this conference on the Washington
end, and I consider her to be a one-person confidence-building measure between the U.S. and
Japan both at the people-to-people level and in trying to facilitate better communication between
our two governments, and we've been very proud of Yuki's work, looking in great depth at issues
in U.S.-Japan security relations. But just as Chairman Sasakawa said, we really want to think of
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the U.S.-Japan partnership in a much broader way. A few years ago we partnered with the
Embassy of Japan on how the United States and Japan can cooperate on global issues. We are
equally interested in peace and stability in Northeast Asia, looking at relations between and
among China, Korea, and Japan, and certainly maritime security is an increasingly important
focus of our work as well.
Of course, we meet at both a sad and an uplifting moment, and the impetus behind this
meeting here is to acknowledge that out of the terrible tragedy of March -- and we all, as
Americans, feel still great sympathy and compassion for what Japanese society is going through,
and yet there has been a silver lining, which has been the sort of revalidation of the U.S.-Japan
friendship, and I hope we'll be able to explore that in greater depth today.
So it is really my great honor, I'm very proud to have been invited to introduce our
keynote speaker, The Honorable Seiji Maehara, one of Japan's most important political figures,
quite recently, the Foreign Minister of Japan, and currently serving his sixth term as a member of
the House of Representatives. He has served in many different capacities as both the Vice
President and for a time the President of the Democratic Party of Japan. He has served on issues
that very much resonate with our security agenda, the Special Committee on Okinawa, the
Special Committee Preventing International Terrorism, and he has worked on international
humanitarian policies as well.
In Washington, he is well-known as one of the more thoughtful and independent thinkers
about Japan's security role in the world and its relations to its key allies. At Stimson, we've had
the privilege of hosting him a few times. We were a little bit nervous that we might miss him
this time, but he was able to make it, and we welcome him today in his current role and wonder if
someday we might be welcoming him with a different job title.
[Laughter.]
LAIPSON: So the floor is yours.
[Applause.]
Keynote
MAEHARA: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you very much for giving
me an opportunity to deliver a keynote speech at the "Tokyo-Washington Dialogue" today. I
understand that this dialogue gives a rare opportunity for Japanese and American experts on
maritime security from politics, government, and academia, to convene to discuss the
significance of Japan-U.S. Alliance, essential for peace and security of the Asia-Pacific.
I pay my respect to all the participants here for playing extremely important roles in
shaping public opinion in their own countries through their activities. Prior to the panel
discussion, I would like to give a keynote speech titled, "Japan-U.S. Alliance in the Multilateral
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Cooperation." Can we consider the future of Japan-U.S. Alliance now? We must touch upon the
Japan-U.S. joint operation in the wake of the Great East Japan Earthquake on March 11th.
The earthquake was the strongest in Japan's recorded history. It had the magnitude of 9.0,
and the fault caused by the quake was about 450 kilometers long and about 200 kilometers wide.
In particular, the tsunami reached about 40 meters height at the highest point and caused
enormous damages to the coastal area. Additionally, the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Power Plant made search and rescue operation harder. This crisis, a combination of
unprecedented natural disaster and radiation, imposed unexpected strain on our Alliance, which
is meant to defend Japan from external armed attack and maintain peace and stability in the AsiaPacific.
Nevertheless, the alliance functioned sufficiently. The Self-Defense Forces of Japan
dispatched more than 100,000 personnel to the affected areas. The U.S. Forces conducted
disaster relief activities jointly with SDF under Operation Tomodachi. In a statement issued
immediately after the earthquake, President Obama committed that the U.S. spared no effort in
supporting Japan. In fact, USAID sent a rescue team to Japan. The U.S. also sent nuclear
experts and offered necessary equipment to tackle the Fukushima accident. American citizens
kindly extended us donations amounting to about $300 million as well as many encouraging
messages. As can be seen, Japan received a great deal of support from every level of the U.S.
Above all, Operation Tomodachi was largely taken up at home and abroad. About 24,500
U.S. military personnel, 189 airplanes, and 24 warships, including Aircraft Carrier Ronald
Reagan, joined the operation. Former Defense Minister Mr. Kitazawa made a statement that,
"We have never appreciated the value and the significance of our alliance with the U.S. as much
as we do today." The rescue operation ran by the SDF and the U.S. Forces in one drew attention
of the Japanese people. It has been highly evaluated. In Japan, people say that the Japanese
people and the SDF have never been closer than now since its creation. It is also without doubt
that the U.S. Forces gave a considerably good impression to the Japanese people than ever.
As such, I believe the alliance fully demonstrated its true value, which has been fostered
over 50 years, in the aftermath of the disaster. I wish to reiterate my gratitude as we owe this to
prompt and efficient response of the American side.
Meanwhile, we have recognized once again that in a time of crisis, the top priority for
both countries is to protect their people, people's lives and properties. The military is on duty to
protect its national interest. On the outbreak of the nuclear accident, the U.S. authority
recommended American citizens in Japan to leave the country. I understand this was a very
natural recommendation for any country to make. We must, therefore, consider how to respond
to more severe cases.
The concept of "complex contingencies," included in Japan's National Defense Program
Guidelines decided by the Cabinet last year, is a case where the government must defend
offshore islands, respond to ballistic missiles, and other threats all at once. However, the concept
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does not include large-scale and special disasters. Naturally, complex contingencies will be more
confused, complicated, and intense as offensive intention of enemy exists accompanied with
military combats. After all, Japan-U.S. Alliance must appropriately tackle them.
Now, as I have raised Japan's National Defense Program Guidelines, let me talk about
recent international security environment. In short, it may be said that the world is now in
transition to a new age of power balance accompanied with globalization. Rise of the BRICS is
amazing. Polarization of the international community has long been pointed out. I consider this
tendency will become more prominent in the years to come. However, current globalization is
happening more in economy. Globalization in politics has not developed much. The world is
not flatting; rather, sovereign states are becoming increasingly self-assertive. Especially, due to
relative change in influence of the West, the center of the global power balance is shifting from
west to east, or from the West to the Middle East and Asia.
We can say that the 21st century will be the age of the Asia-Pacific. Under the situation,
a competition is beginning between those who established and have maintained international
rules until today and those who wish to form new international rules. Some people point out that
the openness of current global commons such as the ocean, outer space, and cyberspace will be
damaged as a result of such competition. Further, they argue that competition over resources,
energy, territory, and so forth -- the so-called "gray zone" disputes-confrontations -- will increase
in the process, if not lead to armed conflicts. Let's suppose that the Fukushima accident was
caused not by tsunami but by a terrorist attack. Attack against nuclear power, a gray zone case, is
highly likely. Thus, it is necessary for us to consider ways to prevent nuclear proliferation and to
counter terrorism.
Shift in power balance is more obvious in the Asia-Pacific. First, North Korea is now in
the middle of a regime shift. Its nuclear and missile development programs, as well as the
abduction issue, are serious factors destabilizing the region. Moreover, we cannot ignore North
Korea's increasingly provocative behavior both in the region and in the international community.
This was seen in the sinking of the Cheonan, an ROK naval vessel, in March last year. The
shelling of Yeonpyeong Island of the ROK as well as announcement of its uranium enrichment
program last November against U.S. Security Council resolutions and the joint declaration of the
six-party talk. Meantime, many countries are modernizing its military capability and increasing
military activities against a backdrop of their economic growth. Particularly, we should be
mindful of China growing as a major power.
The recent conflicts around Philippines and Vietnam in the South China Sea might be
results of China's growing confidence towards its national power. Perhaps, the time of Deng
Xiaoping's admonition, "Hide your capacity and bide your time," is over. China is overwhelming
in its size. When dealing with China, the uniqueness of rules it insists and difference in value are
also challenging factors.
I would like to listen to how the U.S. observe China in the following discussion. It seems
that Washington's perception on Beijing is gradually changing since late last year. Some experts
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analyze that China is trying to change existing rules favorably for itself as it must maintain
current economic growth in order to secure its political stability. That is to say, for China,
current international norms and systems are rules of a game formed under the initiative of the
U.S. after World War II, and China is a "game changer" who alters the power balance of the
game in the region.
How would China and the international community come to terms with each other? In
other words, how could we lead China to soft-land on the existing international systems? These
are our major challenges. The key is to make constant efforts so that China and other countries
would follow the established international rules such as free trade and freedom of the sea. A
strategy to construct a favorable environment for us is needed.
Now, how would Japan-U.S. Alliance in the future be? From now on, I will talk on how
Japan sees the value and the present mission of the alliance. I have earlier mentioned military
polarization of the international community. Where does Japan stand in the age of military
polarization? GDP of the U.S. remains to account for about one-fourth of the world GDP.
Overwhelmingly, its military budget is about eight times of China's. Its population is projected
to continue to rise unlike other developed countries. It shares fundamental values with Japan
such as freedom, democracy, and market economy with Japan. Looking at these facts, the value
of the alliance with U.S. will increase even more, precisely because we are now entering an age
of greater uncertainty. In fact, global power balance is shifting due to stronger China, India,
Russia, and others, as the people discuss military polarization. Therefore, it will become even
more valuable to ally with the U.S., which plays the largest role in global peace and stability.
Japan-U.S. Alliance has gone through the redefinition in 1996 and enactment of Act
concerning the Measures for Peace and Safety of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan
in 1999. And with the end of the cold war, it has become vital for peace and stability of the
region. It is also true that Japan has worked to establish "an alliance in the world" through such
efforts as reconstruction assistance in Iraq and Afghanistan. For Japan, Japan-U.S. Alliance has
evolved into two directions. That is, enhancement of collaboration with the U.S. in the AsiaPacific region, including defense of Japan as well as cooperation in addressing global challenges.
To which direction should Japan and the U.S. lead the Alliance in the years to come?
Comparing the present and the final days of the cold war, I believe the role of the SDF in
global issues has largely expanded, and the security cooperation between Japan and the U.S. has
deepened accordingly. We recognize that destabilizing factors of the other regions directly affect
Japan's security in the mutually dependent international community. Then there is no other
choice for Japan, the third largest economic power, than to fulfill its responsibility in global
issues.
Meanwhile, in addressing regional challenges, such as defense of Japan and the response
to situations in the areas surrounding Japan, many improvements must be made in legal, human,
and institutional fundamentals. Recent security environment of the Asia-Pacific shows these are
pressing issues.
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Japan-U.S. Alliance is important not only to defend Japan but to secure regional peace
and stability as a linchpin. It must continue to fulfill its responsibility as public goods especially
for the Asia-Pacific. We welcome the U.S. to strengthen its engagement and to ensure its
presence in the region.
Looking at current incidents in the South China Sea, the presence of the U.S. with
overwhelming power is indispensable. Power balance is shifting dynamically in the Asia-Pacific.
Then the most important for Japan and the U.S. is to squarely work on forming of a new regional
order with emerging game changers. In doing so, we must keep in mind to hold sufficient
deterrence and the capability to cope with countries which don't hesitate to use force to solve
issues. Traditional threats still remain in the region.
It is also true that both Japan and the U.S. have many challenges at home. The debt of
Japanese government exceeds twice the size of its GDP. On top of that, the government now has
to earmark budget for the earthquake reconstruction. Japan's population will shrink, and Japan
will enter aged society with declining birthrate soon. Meanwhile, the U.S. government is forced
to reduce its national security-related budget largely as a part of its long-term plan for debt
reduction. In his speech on June 22nd, President Obama clearly referred to withdraw from
Afghanistan and mentioned that he would focus on nation building. With China, the game
changer, the U.S. is substantially promoting policy dialogue. Following Former Defense
Secretary Mr. Gates' visit to China and the Chinese President Mr. Hu Jintao's visit to the U.S. in
January, the U.S. and China held an Asia-Pacific Affairs consultation in Hawaii in June. Under
the circumstance, it can be said that Japan and the U.S. share a common sense of danger on
relative decrease of national power and financial collapse.
To begin with, peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region cannot be sustained only by
Japan and the U.S. Cooperation from many countries is needed. As allies and friendly states in
the region other than the U.S. are gaining national strength due to economic development, then
we must consider how Japan-U.S. Alliance should be in the context of the multilateral
cooperation.
It is my view that "Japan-U.S. Alliance in the Multilateral Cooperation" is a new theme
when considering the future alliance. Let me elaborate the idea using an example. In the past,
United States solved most of a huge complicated jigsaw puzzle called international community.
But now, some allies and friendly countries of the U.S. needed to help to keep in the space
bilaterally, multilaterally, or through regional architecture.
In 2001, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command Denny C. Blair and the Primary
Strategic Advisor John T. Hanley, Jr., published an academic journal titled, "From Wheels to
Web." In the article, the authors argue that to respond to the emergence of Russia, China, and
India, we must shift from the so-called hub-and-spoke led by the U.S. to a web in which the allies
and friendly states of the U.S. closely cooperate. However, this concept is not possible without
solid bilateral relations between the U.S. and those countries.
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In the vision of the "Japan-U.S. Alliance in the Multilateral Cooperation," in addition to
allies and friendly states of the U.S., regional organizations such as ASEAN, ARF, and EAS will
also join as spokes. Collaboration among these spokes will create a rim or further solidify the
spoke. More specifically, by building multilayered network consisting of various combination of
bilateral and/or multilateral cooperation, it aims to maintain and strengthen the Japan-U.S.
Alliance itself.
Looking at the decisions made at the "Two-plus-Two" meeting in Washington in June, I
assume such vision was in minds of the Ministers. At the "Two-plus-Two," common strategic
objectives were renewed for the first time in 4 years. The Ministers clarified to further deepen
and expand security and defense cooperation to accomplish the targets. What is now important is
how to proceed with them.
I would now move on to my personal view on specific measures in order to deepen our
alliance. The theme of the panel discussion following this speech is the security aspect of the
Alliance. I therefore will talk here in accordance to the spirit of the preamble of the security
treaty. My argument is that Japan-U.S. Alliance is not a mere military alliance. That is, it
intends to share our fundamental values, such as mutual economic cooperation, democracy,
individual freedom, and protection of the rule of laws. I will touch upon the ways to deepen the
alliance in security as well as in economic and cultural fields from Japanese perspective.
First, regarding security, the main pillar of the Alliance, interoperability between Japan
and U.S. must be improved. How to coordinate the concept of "dynamic defense force" included
in the Defense Guidelines and the U.S. QDR in 2010 will be important. Japan recognizes that a
more suitable defense system must be built in accordance to changes of strategic environment in
the Asia-Pacific. The system must be able to address every kind of cases from normal activity to
complex contingency. Seamless response to the gray zone areas are particularly critical to
prevent the situation to further escalate. Many lessons have been learned through the earthquake
disaster at all levels. These lessons will be used in defending the nation, in responding to the
situations in the areas surrounding Japan, and also in combined cases. In the nuclear accident,
we had to make decisions and take actions continuously based on a little information and everchanging situation day-by-day. Reinforcement of the security function of the Cabinet is also
included in the Guidelines. It is necessary to prepare and examine each chain of command, the
ways of coordination, and the information sharing so that Japan and the U.S. can jointly tackle
any cases from natural disaster to armed attacks smoothly.
Secondly, I would like to touch upon the issue of global commons, such as the ocean,
cyberspace, and outer space. Concerning the ocean, Japan still does have an issue of Maritime
Domain Awareness, MDA, but I understand, due to growing interests of the public in the
maritime issues, that certain progress has been made, such as the creation of the Maritime Crisis
Management mechanism between Japan and China in July. On the contrary, discussion on the
security aspect of the cyberspace and outer space has only just started. As the U.S. released its
cyber strategy a few months ago, I expect that many discussions will be held on the issue,
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including the use of civil defense, not just only between Japan and the U.S., but in many other
occasions. As to outer space, although Basic Space Law has been enacted, Japan does not have
any legislation on space activities. Law Concerning Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency is yet
to be amended. Looking at the recent development of the anti-satellite weapon, I believe it is
time for Japan to seriously discuss the use of outer space from a security aspect.
Next, let me talk on the strengthening of the international peace cooperation. When
considering "Japan-U.S. Alliance in the Multilateral Cooperation," cooperation in international
peace operations, which has become the primary role of the SDF, is an important tool to manage
the alliance. This is to balance the alliance in the worldwide scale. In other words, Japan and
other friendly states will fill in the pieces of the puzzle which the U.S. cannot do. There is room
to improve, for the SDF's actual participation to the peace operation is still not enough compared
to that of other major states.
In doing so, we need to solve bigger issues. First, it is necessary to enable SDF to defend
other countries' military units operating with JSDF from imminent and unlawful infringement.
This issue easily becomes off the point in Japan since it is regarded as a matter of the right of
self-defense and activities involving the use of force. Concerning the controversy on the use of
weapons of the SDF, the question of self-defense and the collective self-defense also remain
unsolved.
We must also review three principles on arms export, another legal aspect which the
Guidelines failed to include. Under present principle, Japan's defense industry cannot even
participate in joint development projects of leading technologies at the private level. Therefore,
there is a risk that Japanese defense industry might be left behind in the trend of international
technology innovation. By reviewing the principle, we can avoid the risks. We can also hold
down the price of equipment. Furthermore, we can deepen Japan-U.S. Alliance as well as
security cooperation with other countries through joint development and production. In this
regard, it is a welcome step that we made clear the conditions for the third-party-transfer of SM-3
IIA in Ballistic Missile Defense cooperation at the "Two-plus-Two." Obviously, as this means
transfer of equipment installed with Japanese technology to third countries, we must carefully
examine to what extent we approve the transfer.
Next is on economy, the second pillar of deepening of Japan-U.S. Alliance. I believe the
development of the alliance must be sustained by robust economy. Economy is physical strength
of the country. Economic ties between Japan and the U.S. continue to be important. U.S. is the
second largest trade partner of Japan. About 14.6 percent of local subsidiaries of Japanese
companies operating abroad exist in the United States.
Given the facts, early restoration of the Japanese economy is a significant factor to deepen
the Japan-U.S. Alliance. It is important to cooperate in the fields which will lead to new growth,
jobs, and exports of both countries. For instance, cooperation in new growth areas and in new
technologies, such as high-speed railways including MAGLEV, green energy, and environment
technology are of importance. Cooperation in these areas will be beneficial for both of us.
13
Meanwhile, it is important to strengthen collaboration with countries with matured
democracy and market economy to build a security and economic cooperation system. Path
towards Asia-Pacific FTA is in line with the concept of "Japan-U.S. Alliance in the Multilateral
Cooperation."
The third pillar of the alliance is people-to-people exchange. Recently, people say that
the number of Japanese students studying in the U.S. is decreasing. We must come up with
incentives to encourage Japanese youth to choose to study in the U.S. and other countries. Japan
still has much to learn from others. No matter how excellent equipment or a system is on its
merit, it is used by people. I consider the success of the joint response of the SDF and the U.S.
Forces to the earthquake in March was thanks to joint training over many years. More
importantly, it was thanks to the U.S. Forces' deep understanding in Japanese culture, customs,
and sensitivity. I therefore am sure that the enhancement of cultural and people-to-people
exchange in various fields such as industry, academia, and arts will fundamentally support JapanU.S. Alliance.
I have so far spoken on my personal view. The power balance in the Asia-Pacific is
changing dramatically, as seen in emergence of China, economic integration, and the
proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction. In a time like this, security arrangements
between Japan and the U.S. is the core of the alliance. Profits to be gained by economic
integration are large. Nevertheless, we should be aware of the danger of the integration when
disputes in gray zone concerning territory and history cannot be solved peacefully. If the 21st
century belongs to the Asia-Pacific, and if the region continues to be an engine of the global
economic growth, I believe Japan and the U.S., with common values, must fulfill their roles in
forming a new order for peace and stability of the region.
Finally, the most important thing in an alliance is mutual trust. Effective joint operation
in response to the earthquake was a result of mutual trust. It is likely that Japan will become
inward-looking for a while, as their major interest is recovery from the disaster.
Meanwhile, the U.S. is likely to focus more on domestic affairs. Even so, situation of the
international community will continue to change at top speed. Because Japan-U.S. Alliance
should contribute to peace and stability not only of the Asia-Pacific but of the whole world,
Japan should not spend its time only on domestic issues. I believe Japan must renew its
diplomacy. It will be crucial for Japan whether it can fully collaborate with the allies and the
friendly countries of the U.S., as it will decide the future position of Japan in the international
community.
An alliance is never a given. Constant efforts to maintain and reinforce Japan-U.S.
Alliance are needed. I believe many excellent ideas will be shared in the discussions to follow.
To conclude, I wish that today's dialogue will give us a good opportunity to deepen the friendship
between Japan and the U.S. and to strengthen the relationship of trust.
14
Thank you very much for your kind attention.
[Applause.]
BOB: Thank you so much, Maehara-sensei. We have time for just a very few questions,
but we really appreciate your thoughtful and insightful and forward-leaning comments. So very
short time period. Please identify yourself. Wait for the mics that will come. And questions
only, no comments.
Who would like to start?
TAKAHATA: Thank you, Maehara-sensei. My name is Takahata from the Japanese
Sankei Shimbun.
My question is, in order to enhance and strengthen Japan-U.S. Alliance, one of the key
homework next for Japan is the movement of Futenma Air Base. I know that you are fully
understanding the situation and the difficulty of it, but as the key adviser to newly born Noda
administration, how are you going to solve this issue? Thank you.
MAEHARA: I do have to answer in Japanese. [Answering in Japanese.]
INTERPRETER: [Translating.] I believe that the Futenma relocation plan and to move
this forward and to implement this is a very big challenge in order to strengthen the Japan-U.S.
Alliance.
MAEHARA: [Answering in Japanese.]
INTERPRETER: [Translating.] There are two points that I would like to emphasize to
the people of the United States.
MAEHARA: [Answering in Japanese.]
INTERPRETER: [Translating.] We are currently having dialogue between the people
of Okinawa, and since the Hatoyama administration, I believe that there was a shift in where to
relocate the Futenma facilities, but I believe that we have put a lot of enormous difficulties on the
people of Okinawa, and I believe it will take time to amend the situation.
MAEHARA: [Answering in Japanese.]
INTERPRETER: [Translating.] So I would like to seek your understanding that from
the United States side or from a foreign side, it may seem like there is nothing moving on this
issue.
MAEHARA: [Answering in Japanese.]
15
INTERPRETER: [Translating.] I also understand that because the relocation plan has
not moved for the past 15 years, there is frustration from the U.S. side and that we should seek
other ways besides the agreement that we have agreed upon at the "Two-plus-Two" meeting.
MAEHARA: [Answering in Japanese.]
INTERPRETER: [Translating.] I also understand that there is significant discussion in
U.S. Congress on the budget cut of its defense, and I have made these remarks in my speech.
MAEHARA: [Answering in Japanese.]
INTERPRETER: [Translating.] In these discussions, I do understand that there are
debates about formalizing and making Futenma as it is.
MAEHARA: [Answering in Japanese.]
INTERPRETER: [Translating.] Fifteen years ago, while we had a coalition group with
the Jiminto, the Shaminto, and the Sakigake group, I had a discussion with then Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense Mr. Kurt Campbell on this issue.
MAEHARA: [Answering in Japanese.]
INTERPRETER: [Translating.] At that time, one of the reasons why I raised the
Futenma Air Station should be relocated was because of the proximity to its residents and the
huge damage it would cause if an accident does occur.
MAEHARA: [Answering in Japanese.]
INTERPRETER: [Translating.] This is the reason why I would like to have the
understanding from the United States that we have to prevent having these situations as well and
to maintain other bases in Okinawa.
MAEHARA: [Answering in Japanese.]
INTERPRETER: [Translating.] We will put our maximum efforts in order to proceed
in implementing the agreement we have made at the "Two-plus-Two."
BOB: Time for one last question, I'm afraid.
KATO: My name is Yoichi Kato, with Asahi Shimbun. Thank you very much for a very
wide range, insightful speech.
And I would like to ask you about China. It is still a fresh memory that you made a
16
comment when you were in the United States a few years ago that China is a threat to Japanese
national interests. In today's speech, you described China as a game changer a couple times but
never said that they're a threat to Japanese interests. And I was wondering why you decided not
to use the term "threat." Have you changed your mind or assessment, or was it a political
consideration of some sort?
[Laughter.]
KATO: Thank you very much.
MAEHARA: [Answering in Japanese.]
INTERPRETER: [Translating.] Back 5 to 6 years ago when I was a Representative of
the DPJ, I made remarks at the CSIS, and at that time I mentioned that China was a concern and
not a threat.
MAEHARA: [Answering in Japanese.]
INTERPRETER: [Translating.] The past 20 years, China has increased its military
budget 20 times.
MAEHARA: [Answering in Japanese.]
INTERPRETER: [Translating.] For the past 10 years, we have seen an increase, 10
times increase, year-by-year on its military budget as well.
MAEHARA: [Answering in Japanese.]
INTERPRETER: [Translating.] There are also concerns expressed in a Pentagon report
that whatever is publicized on the budget of China's military, that it should be more actually
twice as much as what has been publicized.
MAEHARA: [Answering in Japanese.]
INTERPRETER: [Translating.] I believe therefore it is very important to throw out our
concern about what these objectives are of increasing its military budget.
MAEHARA: [Answering in Japanese.]
INTERPRETER: [Translating.] I also would like to emphasize that at the same time, I
used the word "game changer" for China several times, but it is very important for China to abide
by the rules that we have established, the rules and the norms, and so that we, the United States,
and Japan coordinate so that China will follow this path.
17
MAEHARA: [Answering in Japanese.]
INTERPRETER: [Translating.] And that is why in my remarks I mentioned that it is
very important to look at the Japan-U.S. relationships in a very multilateral view.
INTERPRETER: Thank you again.
[Applause.]
BOB: Again, thank you, Maehara-sensei, I really appreciate it. I want to let you know
that there will be copies of the speech on the table as we finish up for today.
•-•-•
4:15 p.m.
Panel: "The Alliance and Future Changes"
Moderator: YOSHIHIDE SOEYA, Professor, Keio University
Speakers:
HON. YASUHISA SHIOZAKI, Member, House of Representatives;
Former Chief Cabinet Secretary
MICHAEL GREEN, Japan Chair, CSIS, and Associate Professor, Georgetown University
MATAKE KAMIYA, Professor, National Defense Academy
SHEILA SMITH, Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations
BOB: But I would like to move right now into the next session, which will be moderated
by Dr. Yoshihide Soeya, who is Director of the Institute of East Asian Studies at Keio University,
where he also serves as Professor at the University's Faculty of Law. Soeya-sensei specializes in
Japanese and Asian Pacific political and security issues, and is a leading thinker on the bilateral
alliance.
So if I can ask all the panelists to come up here. Thank you.
SOEYA: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I was just kindly introduced by Bob,
and so I will not spend any seconds to do that. So I would like to straightly get into symposium - is it?
BOB: Yes, sounds good.
SOEYA: And the following Honorable Maehara-sensei's very explicit statement, I think
we have lots of things to discuss and think about. And just to use the prerogative of a chair, I
would like to mention just one thing, as a kind of background assumption, of which I think is
18
important. People may have different views, but I like to do that at the beginning.
I think it was very, very fortunate for us to have a new Cabinet as well as the presence of
Honorable Maehara here. Otherwise, we would have been bothered by a very prevalent
argument that with the current state of Japanese politics, what's the use of debating these issues?
And often the case is made that we are one of the most productive countries in terms of
producing prime ministers.
[Laughter.]
SOEYA: Six during the past five.
But the point that I would like to make against that somewhat sarcastic way of describing
recent developments in Japanese politics is there is a huge fundamental difference between the
first set of three prime ministers and the second set of three prime ministers. The first set came
from Liberal Democratic Party, which the Honorable Shiozaki represents here. And in his
presence, I sort of hesitate to say this, but I've been saying this, so I will say this anyway. But I
think the productivity of the prime minister during the last stage of LDP rule was somewhat
symbolic phenomena implying I think many things about the end of the LDP rule. So that's a
phenomena of a particular LDP rule system was being collapsed.
And the recent set of three prime ministers is an indication that something new is
beginning, and including the current Cabinet. The ministers are very young, and many are
inexperienced. But that is natural because DPJ has just started to rule Japan, and many members
are just new to the power structure of Japanese politics. So they're in the learning process. So
that's a new phenomenon. So that's what I wanted to mean by just mixing those six prime
ministers up is a non-starter as an argument of Japanese politics.
And I think the Honorable Maehara's speech was an exemplification, a clear indication,
that something new is really starting.
But here in Japan we are still bothered by there are many factors of complication, of
course, but one of them which seems to be important to me is the kind of phenomena of a gap, a
huge gap between those politicians who are used to the old political systems and practices, the
1955 regime type of politics, and the new group of politicians who are not operating on those
assumptions almost at all. And I think that gap is a source of confusion, a source of immobilism
in Japanese politics. And there should be many other factors, I think, and I don't know which
side Honorable Shiozaki represents.
[Laughter.]
SOEYA: But LDP, of course, has to change. I think the election result 2 years ago was a
de facto no-confidence vote by the Japanese public against LDP, I think that was obvious, rather
than positive support for DPJ necessarily. So in that sense, LDP has to learn quite important
19
things, and I'm curious to know how things are in fact going on within the party, and when LDP
will ever come back to power, I think which is not impossible, but that LDP should be a different
LDP. Otherwise, they will not be able to come back. And so those important things actually are
happening, I think changes are happening in Japan. So I like to say that as kind of a word of
prevention against what we may hear about the recent state of Japanese politics.
So without further ado, I'd like to go straight into presentations. And perhaps I think all
the people here are typical case of no need of introduction. So there are brief introductions I
think in your pamphlet, so I will not do that and would like to go straight into the presentations
by the four panelists. And I need to ask each of you to limit yourself maximum 10 minutes.
That's how I was instructed by the organizer. And so I would like to be strict on that even though
I sort of hesitate, but I think I need to do that.
So first I'd like to have Mr. Shiozaki to kick off.
SHIOZAKI: Thank you, Soeya-sensei. And before going into what I have to say today,
I think I should make it clear that politics is not so simple as new and old.
[Laughter.]
SHIOZAKI: And there are many things going on both in the Democratic Party and also
LDP, and it's not so easy. And another thing is, a very important thing is, that politics always
matters when outcome comes, and it all depends on the outcome of the politics, and we will have
to wait and see what's going to happen in several years.
But thank you very much for organizing this wonderful symposium, and I am very
grateful and pleased and honored to be here. And first I would like to express my sincere and
renewed gratitude to the United States government and the American people for their assistance
to Japan after the unprecedented earthquake and tsunami and nuclear power plant incident on
March 11th. And we must turn this tragedy into an opportunity to recover and become a stronger
Japan and a stronger Japanese people. The Noda administration has started out with fairly high
public approval ratings. This shows the high expectation among the Japanese public for new
politics, as Soeya-sensei said, and their disdain for what they perceive as the old way of running
government, which could mean LDP.
[Laughter.]
SHIOZAKI: Could mean. The real issue here is whether the Noda administration can
prove itself as a purveyor of new politics by overcoming the negative nature of internal DPJ style
politics and whether the new Noda administration can effectively solve the deep-rooted problems
which recent governments could not, which includes three prime ministers from LDP also.
Personally, I wish the new government greater success than its predecessors, but as you might
have guessed, I'm a little pessimistic about its future. Operation Tomodachi served as a tangible
reminder of the need for the benefits of a strong and vibrant alliance. The crisis has allowed us
20
to lay a new foundation for Japan and the U.S. to actively participate together around the world,
as Maehara-sensei said, not just confined to disaster relief operation but on operations of broader
scope both unilaterally and in partnership with each other. And in spite of all the tragedy and
hardship, one positive in the aftermath of the disaster is that Japanese have come to view the U.S.
military in a much more positive light. And while devastating, the disasters also present us with
a great opportunity to deepen and strengthen the U.S.-Japan Alliance.
I would now like to talk about the challenges we face and how we should tackle these
challenges. On the issue of Futenma, after all the confusion, it is the responsibility of Japan, or
Noda administration, to make a prompt decision and act on this issue. Pledging to implement the
current plan within 3 years might be acceptable to the concerned parties. Another alternative
might be to allow the central government to make the final decision to hasten the process. After
exhausting those efforts, we might have to consider yet more alternatives in Okinawa. In any
case, we must make it clear that the U.S. Marine presence in Okinawa is an indispensable part of
the Japanese defense policy.
And on China, the healthy economic growth of China will benefit Japan and the United
States. At the same time, Japan and the United States must also stand firm on our principles and
continue to push China towards democracy. That includes pushing back against China's rapidly
growing military budget, which includes the modernization and reinforcement of its nuclear
arsenal. Together with other Asian countries, Japan and the U.S. should also oppose China's
expanding maritime activities in both the East and South China Seas. We should also prepare for
Chinese military activities beyond the Second Island Chain.
For its part, when necessary, Japan should send more clear messages to China. Last
year's Senkaku incident was a case of diplomatic mismanagement. Prime Minister Noda seems
to be cognizant of the importance of territorial sovereignty. If so, the Japanese government
should consider purchasing the Senkaku Islands from the Japanese citizen who owns them, and
then build a public facility maintained by Japanese personnel who would be stationed on the
island. I strongly recommend more and better communication, consultation, and coordination
between Japan and the United States in how we deal with an emerging China in a unilateral,
bilateral, and multilateral context.
In 2006, when I was senior Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, I visited the White House.
I explained the importance of East Asia Summit, and I recall very little interest on U.S. side.
This fall, the U.S. will participate in the EAS for the first time, and we all welcome this
participation, but we needed more consultation.
China has been extending assistance to North Korea for a variety of reasons. We need the
Chinese to change their strategic decision on this issue, and there should be a need for Japan, the
U.S., and South Korea to discuss the future of the peninsula and engage China at a later stage in
the dialogue.
Last month, I had a chance to visit Mongolia and meet Mongolian president. We
21
discussed Mongolia's desire to seek to a "third neighbor" other than China and Russia.
Candidates for the role include Japan, U.S., and South Korea. Are Japan and the U.S. positioned
to fill this role and nurture Mongolia's economic development and security policy? Given
China's strong effort to capitalize on Mongolia's natural resources, are we ready to step in and be
the "third neighbor"?
As I said before, we need better coordination between Japan and the United States, not
only as it relates to Mongolia, but also as it relates to Myanmar and the other Mekong nations,
and even in regions outside of Asia where China's influence is growing.
And, finally, I suggest that the Noda government schedule the next "Two-plus-Two"
meeting as soon as possible and start the discussion on a new action plan.
The basis for the better functioning alliance is Japan's strong economic and strong politics
that would implement all the necessary policy for alliance. Without strong politics, no strong
economy will be realized, and vice versa. And in order to revive Japan, more consistent and
stable economic and security policies are needed. The only way to revive the Japanese economy
is not to procrastinate again, but to regain our competitive edge by converting our economic and
industrial structure to a new one. "Reform" which ceased in 2007 should be resumed and
accelerated. For that purpose, we must further open our markets through the EPA, FDAs, and
begin preparation to join the TPP.
A change in government and 2 years of DPJ politics has taught us of the need for strong
politics with a more realistic, stable, and consistent set of policies that can effectively protect the
people and the national interest and promote economic growth. In 2007, to improve the JapanU.S. Alliance, then Prime Minister Abe made clear the inevitable need to change the
interpretation of the Constitution on the right to collective self-defense and the "Three Principles
of Arms Exports," which Maehara-san also touched upon.
Thus, I and a group of other like-minded Diet members from all political parties recently
started a new multipartisan group, "Nihon wo nekko kara kaeru hoshu no kai," formed around the
common ground of "conservatism." We know that the political realignment of parties is not
easy, but without it, it is the people who have to suffer.
Prime Minister Noda and Mr. Maehara and new METI Minister Hachiro have recently
essentially announced their intention to abandon nuclear power and its technology over the
coming decades. But that decision has enormous implications on Japan's security policy and on
Japanese economy. The main beneficiaries of Japan's abandonment would be the nuclear states
in East Asia. We also have to remember that we must keep pace with advances in nuclear
technology to protect our people in the wake of a possible nuclear accident in neighboring
countries. I hope the new governments will take another look at this policy and take into account
how it would affect our national interests and the effect it would have on our alliance between the
two.
22
And, finally, I must add that the U.S. also needs strong politics and strong economy.
Despite all the domestic problems, including spending cuts being made on both sides of the
Pacific, we must keep our bilateral alliance as viable as possible to maintain the peace and
stability of the East Asia region.
In conclusion, Japan should use the disaster as an opportunity to move forward towards a
better economic, industrial, and energy policy which will lead to an enhanced Japan-U.S.
Alliance. This is a good time to integrate all the policies that have been so uncoordinated up to
this point. Now is the time to revitalize and restore Japan. I commit myself to continuing to
work towards improving and strengthening the Japan-U.S. Alliance.
Thank you very much.
[Applause.]
SOEYA: Thank you very much. Contrary to my statement at the outset, I did not have
the guts to stop him.
[Laughter.]
SOEYA: I think he deserves time, flying over from Japan, and of course, I cannot stop a
Chief Cabinet Secretary. So I will need some cooperation from particularly American
colleagues.
[Laughter.]
SOEYA: I know you have lots of things to say, but, please, try to be concise. So Sheila
Smith next.
SMITH: Thank you. I'm delighted to be here. I want to thank our organizers also for
convening this meeting, and particularly Yuki Tatsumi, who has worked so hard to make this
happen.
When Yuki gave us our instructions about this panel and what we were to talk about, she
said talk about the significance of the U.S.-Japan Alliance today and look forward. And I would
like to look ahead in my comments, but I think it's also very valuable at this inaugural meeting
that you're convening today to recognize the tremendous achievements of both of our
governments in crafting a very close and highly effective response to the Great Eastern Japan
Earthquake. I look around the room and I see many of our friends in government on both sides
who worked 24/7 for months in order to respond to Japan's greatest disaster since World War II.
So for many people like me, who sat here in Washington outside of government, it was also a
tremendous moment to watch our communities here in the United States galvanize in support,
citizen-based support, for Japan. So I think as a long-time observer of this bilateral relationship,
it is this moment in our time of need that spoke the loudest to me about the significance of this
23
bilateral partnership.
As all of our speakers right now have outlined to us, I think both of our countries are at a
very difficult moment. We are looking at the sources of our national strength, very specifically
our debt, our economic power, and we are looking at a new emerging set of nations that are
coming to challenge our preeminence in global economic, strategic, and cultural affairs. Here in
Washington, you will be surprised to know that we, too, have partisan politics -[Laughter.]
SMITH: -- we have our differences about the road forward, and we have intense
differences ahead of us as we enter our presidential campaign next year.
So both Japan and the United States are looking internally, but I think we have great
opportunities ahead of us if we focus and make some critical choices about where the
opportunities are to strengthen and extend our cooperation. My sense is that we should
strengthen what we already do well together, that we should focus on clarifying our goals, and
then put our efforts together to sharing our way forward.
The most important thing that I've heard of late really has to do with our strategic rethink
of the alliance in the face of the changes in front of us in Northeast Asia. Our defense
departments on both sides of the Pacific are clearly thinking about how to improve, strengthen,
and reorganize our forces. I think that's a very important task. We need to incorporate the
lessons learned from our disaster response, and I think we also need to update our efforts to
transform our forces that began in 2005-2006 to really try to cope with this changing Northeast
Asia.
This past June, despite the difficulties Japan was confronted with, our two governments
managed to announce a new set of common strategic objectives. They did this because of the
importance of this partnership and the importance, I think, of moving forward in the very
important work of the strategic refinement. Now is the time, therefore, to craft the means that we
have to achieve them, and I think this will involve a very careful thinking of the fiscal constraints
ahead of both of our countries.
You all know that the U.S. is going to have significant cuts in its defense spending this
year and for several years to come. The shape and the content of those cuts I think remain to be
negotiated, and we'll see that happen in the coming months. I don't think, however, that this is a
moment of weakening of our alliance, and I don't think we should see fiscal cutbacks necessarily
as a moment of weakening our capabilities either. I think, rather, it's imperative that we think of
this as a moment to articulate a new sharing of the roles, the missions, the capabilities of our two
militaries and to think the way forward in how our two nations look outwards from the bilateral
foundation of our security commitments to look and see what it is exactly we need to prioritize in
terms of our strategic thinking. I think the full appreciation of the strategic shifts underway in the
Asia-Pacific region has already begun, and I think it's very important that this initiative continue
24
that process outside of government because this is not something that just our governments alone
will have to sort through.
Already the speakers who have come before me have mentioned issues that I think are
also terribly important, so let me just touch upon them here. Our maritime strategy: our bilateral
thinking of how to organize our maritime strategies is vitally important. The developing effort to
devise a Code of Conduct for the Asia-Pacific, although this is an exercise that will take place
within ASEAN, it is also terribly important for us. The South China Sea, the East China Sea,
and all of the seas in the Asia-Pacific really ought to have one sense of rules, norms, and ways
forward, and so it's very important for the United States and Japan and other friends and allies in
the Asia-Pacific to focus on making sure that the norms and the rules, the freedom of navigation
of these seas, is respected. But this will require cooperation with China, and I think the East Asia
Summit that you mentioned is a very important moment for us to gain that cooperation, to begin
to ensure that this is not a conversation that we're having all by ourselves, but that we're deeply
engaging the Chinese on how we make sure that the seas of the Asia-Pacific, in fact, global seas,
are to be used by all of us.
Second, stability on the Korean peninsula will affect the future of Northeast Asian
regional security for decades to come. And I think last December when the Foreign Minister of
Japan, Mr. Maehara, the Foreign Minister of South Korea, and Secretary of State Clinton began
to articulate a road ahead for trilateral cooperation on this area. I think it was a very strong
statement of our intent to work closely together. This needs to continue. We need to be prepared
for whatever should happen on the Korean peninsula, but we also should build the basis for
cooperation should North Korea decide that it really does want to consider its security as a joint
endeavor with its neighbors.
2012 is a volatile year in Northeast Asia. Countries around the region have elections, and
we all know that elections don't always bring out the best in national sentiments. So it is very
important, I think, for Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington to navigate this next 18 to 24 months
effectively.
Finally, these are the things that we do well together, these are the things that we know
we ought to be doing, and now I think is the time to focus on them, but I think there is another
issue that emanates from our experience in the aftermath of March 11 that is also worth our
attention and continued close cooperation, and that is how we work together on nuclear issues.
The United States and Japan have a very strong record on nonproliferation. We have worked
together in the United Nations bilaterally, trilaterally on North Korea, and now on Iran, and I
think we've been very successful. Next year, the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul provides
another opportunity for us to focus on nuclear security issues and for enhancing Japan's role in
helping to build capacity regionally and globally. We need a good, serious monitoring effort on
the seas and beyond that will ensure that fissile and other kinds of materials can be detected.
Finally, our disaster relief cooperation on Fukushima Daiichi offers us this new set of
opportunities to think of U.S.-Japan cooperation on nuclear safety. We have much to learn from
25
what happened and is still happening at Fukushima Daiichi. It is not Japan's lessons to learn
only, I think, it is all of our lessons to learn. I think the decision about nuclear energy is a
different kind of decision, so I am focused here specifically on nuclear safety. I was deeply
struck by how immediately and eventually how closely our two governments worked at
Fukushima Daiichi. It made a significant difference in Japan's ability to respond. It made a
significant difference in the globe's understanding of what was going on at Fukushima Daiichi.
Our nuclear experts were on the ground quickly and continued throughout the months afterward
to lend their expertise and manpower.
Nuclear safety in today's world is a global challenge and one I believe our bilateral
experience can speak to well. The IAEA begins its effort at capacity building to deal with
nuclear accidents. I think the shared responsibility for the United States and Japan is an
important one as we look out to the Asia-Pacific. There are nuclear powers around Japan and
around us where this expertise could be greatly appreciated. At the very least, this is an area of
unprecedented U.S.-Japan cooperation, and our advocacy, as well as our sharing of thoughts,
with the broader global nuclear safety community is tremendously important.
I think we've spent a lot of time in the last couple of years looking inward at our own
domestic politics, our own domestic economic challenges, and I expect that to continue, but I do
think it we are carefully calibrating the issues where we want to focus our attention, we have a
very strong partnership and foundation of support among our peoples to continue this level of
cooperation.
Thank you very much.
[Applause.]
SOEYA: Thank you very much, Sheila. Great work.
Kamiya-san next, please.
KAMIYA: Yes, thank you, Professor Soeya. And I would like to thank organizers to
invite me to this first of a very important dialogue between the United States and Japan.
By the way, I'm a professor at the National Defense Academy of Japan. I would like to
explain what it is. Although in many countries, including the United States, most of the faculty
members in such institutions are military uniformed people, in Japan most of the faculty
members at their institutions are civilians. And I'm a civilian who has never been in uniform.
And I think today, this afternoon, we have three Japanese speakers, including Maeharasensei, but I'm the only non-politician, so my mission should be to present, I would say, a
scholar's view on the current state of the U.S.-Japan Alliance, but as civilian researcher at the
National Defense Academy, my view doesn't represent the view of National Defense Academy --
26
[Laughter.]
KAMIYA: -- nor the views of Defense Ministry of Japan. I have to say this before I
start everything.
By the way, I have almost 100 percent of freedom of speech, I think.
[Laughter.]
KAMIYA: But anyway, the last time I was here at the Willard Hotel was in January
2010 to participate in the 16th Annual Japan-U.S.A. Security Seminar, and compared with that
time, the state of our alliance has become much improved. I am glad that I can start my short
remark today by these words because in January last year I had to start my presentation titled,
"The Future Visions of the Alliance," by saying that it was the worst time to discuss the future of
our alliance.
In the first half of last year, you may remember that our alliance was really at rock
bottom, due mainly to the poor handling of the alliance by Japanese Prime Minister Yukio
Hatoyama. Since the summer of 2010, however, a series of remarkable developments have
brought back our alliance to its recovery path.
First, a series of events since last year with regard to China and North Korea have made
both Japan and the United States to rediscover the importance of the role of the alliance for the
peace and security in East Asia. Particularly important has been the issue of China's increasing
assertiveness. Once there was a gradually spreading view both in Japan and in the United States
that China had finally started to become what the Bush administration called "responsible
stakeholder." However, observing China's behavior in recent years in South China Sea, East
China Sea with regard to North Korea and so on and so forth, and particularly after the Senkaku
incident which took place in last September, both the Japanese and the Americans have realized
that they have to face the reality about China.
During and after the Senkaku incident, the Chinese government took outrageous
measures such as stopping rare material exports to Japan. Such an unrestrained way of
exercising power has been generally refrained by leading liberal democracies which have
supported the existing liberal open-based international order.
However, China is unfortunately still a country that exercises its power in such a way.
That was what both the Japanese and the Americans realized, together with many others in East
Asia and globally. Both of us have rediscovered the importance of alliance for security goals in
East Asia, and this represents the first factor that has brought back our alliance to its recovery
path.
The second factor that has reinvigorated our alliance was the tragedy of the Great East
Japan Earthquake and the Operation Tomodachi that followed. When the U.S.-Japan Alliance
27
celebrated the 50th anniversary 10 years ago on September 8, 2001, a huge commemorative
conference took place in San Francisco. There, most of the participants from the two countries
almost unanimously praised the half century of close cooperation between the former enemies in
World War II. Some American participants actually pointed out that the U.S.-Japan Alliance had
never been tested in any places and expressed concern that it was unclear what Japan would be
able to do in a crisis due to domestic constraints. And for Japan, the 9/11, that took place only 3
days after the 50th anniversary of the alliance, representing the first serious test of whether Japan
could effectively help the United States in a national crisis, and with the strong leadership of
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, Japan passed the test.
For the United States, however, the test was yet to come. Before 3/11, considerably a
number of Japanese people actually questioned the contribution of the U.S. military presence in
Japan, to Japan's security. Some said that the United States was simply using Japan as a part of
its global strategy. Some even questioned whether the United States military would actually
come to help Japan in time of emergency. However, with Japan facing its biggest national crisis
since the war, the United States, U.S. military in Japan, clearly proved to the fullest degree that
the United States is really a trustable ally of Japan.
Operation Tomodachi, as Maehara-sensei and Shiozaki-sensei have already pointed out,
also proved that the Japan-U.S. Alliance can really function in time of emergency in a wellcoordinated manner. In fact, in the past, the Japan Self-Defense Force and the U.S. military had
never jointly carried out a large-scale campaign. The success of Operation Tomodachi clearly
showed to the world there were absolutely no problems with interoperability or communication
between the two organizations and that they can take effective joint action.
The third factor that has reinvigorated our alliance was the effort made by the two
governments to get our alliance back on the track. First of all, in December last year, the
Japanese government, including Maehara-sensei, adopted the new National Defense Program
Guidelines that stressed the importance of Japan's alliance and cooperation with the United
States. The Guidelines maintained that the U.S.-Japan Alliance is indispensable to Japan's
security and stated that cooperation between the two countries should be stepped up in order to
strengthen the U.S. Forces' deterrent and response capability to regional contingencies.
Then in June this year, the first "Two-plus-Two" meeting under the DPJ government was
held, and in the joint statement titled, "Toward a Deeper and Broader Japan-U.S. Alliance:
Building on 50 Years of Partnership," Japan and the United States both reaffirmed their alliance
commitments. More importantly, the two countries revalidated and updated the alliance common
strategic objective of 2005 and 2007.
In the joint statement and the new common strategic objectives, awareness toward the
strengthening Chinese military and their maritime advances in recent years was clearly
noticeable. To respond to the rise of China, Japan and the United States must strengthen and
deepen their bilateral alliance first, and then based upon that, need to keep encouraging China
through continuous talks to take responsible actions. The two countries are in agreement on this
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point. This confirms that for Japan its foreign security policy remains centered on Japan-U.S.
Alliance, even after the change in the ruling party. And for the United States, this alliance is still
the cornerstone of its East Asia strategy even after China's GDP surpassed Japan's.
So far so good, but at least two serious problems remain. First, of course, the Futenma
issue is still there, and although the "Two-plus-Two" meeting was a large step toward resolving
the confusion surrounding the Japan-U.S. Alliance since the change in the ruling party in Japan,
it is still too early to be optimistic that the restoration will be successfully achieved. Without
doubt, the "Two-plus-Two" halted the deterioration in the U.S.-Japan Alliance that started during
the Hatoyama administration. However, whether the alliance will really become deeper and
broader depends on whether the Japanese government can adequately settle over a very large
issue, and that's the relocation of the Futenma Air Station.
And, second, there is a problem of implementation. The laws written in Japan's new
National Defense Program Guidelines and in the new Joint Strategic Objectives sounds
marvelous. It is also significant that these two documents were issued under the DPJ, not the
LDP, administration in Japan.
Now, finally, the DPJ has come to share the basically same security perspective with the
LDP. However, it is not clear whether Japan will really be able to implement what are written in
these two documents. When the Japanese government adopted the new National Defense
Program Guidelines last December, in an interview with Yomiuri Shimbun, Michael Green said
he would give A to the strategic aspect of the guidelines, but only B-minus to the financial aspect
of the same guidelines.
GREEN: I'm an easy grader, too.
[Laughter.]
KAMIYA: Yeah, but in the aftermath of 3/11, fiscal constraints on Japan's defense
expenditures will be much tighter than last December.
And at the 17th Japan-U.S. Security Seminar, which was held in San Francisco only 2
weeks after 3/11, both the U.S. and Japanese participants agreed that if Japan did not waste the
crisis and turn misfortunes into blessing, it will definitely be able to reconstruct itself again as a
strong nation full of vitality.
The U.S. participants emphasized that in order for Japan not to waste the crisis, the
country required a political leadership that would adopt and implement necessary policy
promptly. Half a year later, I have to say sadly that Japan's political leadership has failed to
function that way. Implementation represents the most serious problem for Japanese policies in
general, and we represent the chief factor to determine the future of the U.S.-Japan Alliance.
Finally, having said that, I would like to conclude my remarks by pointing out one
29
optimistic sign for the future of our alliance. Japan's new Prime Minister, Yoshihiko Noda,
unlike his DPJ predecessor, Naoto Kan, seems to have a clear policy vision with regard to Japan's
security relations with the United States.
I have just obtained a copy of Noda's new article which was written just after he was
elected new Prime Minister and is to be published in the Japanese monthly magazine "Voice"
this Saturday. In that article, Noda says that the DPJ government has failed to advance the U.S.Japan Alliance in a sufficient manner so far, and he says, quote, "Japan's relations with Asian
countries should be win-win relationship. However, the central appeal for Japan is without doubt
the Japan-U.S. relations. Reaffirming that point clearly, Japan needs to reconstruct its foreign
policies. For that purpose, what will be necessary for Japan? The Japanese need to have a firm
resolve that they have to defend their own country, and based on that premise, Japan will firmly
maintain the important relationship of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. That is how Japan's security
policy should be," unquote.
Noda also says that it is not the proper time now to propose a grand vision like an East
Asian community. Noda argues that before making such a proposal, what Japan should do now
is to simulate its response to grave incidents related to each territory and so on. And he adds that
the government, led by his Democratic Party of Japan, has not given sufficient consideration to
that matter. As a security expert of Japan who really loves his country and worries about the
future of Japan, as well as the future of the U.S.-Japan Alliance, I sincerely hope that Noda will
be a prime minister who will be able to implement his words.
Thank you very much.
[Applause.]
SOEYA: Thank you, Professor Kamiya.
I think the article by Noda you mentioned is published in "Voice"?
KAMIYA: Yes. Actually, I have a friend in "Voice," and he says that the admission of
Noda, and, you know, "Voice" magazine -SOEYA: Oh, you got the earlier draft. So it's not published yet. So it's coming soon
from "Voice" magazine.
KAMIYA: Yeah.
SOEYA: Okay, so finally, Michael Green, please.
GREEN: Well, I just want to sit here and enjoy for a moment Noda-san's quote because
he's exactly right. And I also want to congratulate Maehara-sensei on once again giving a very
thoughtful, strategic, and long-range vision for Japan's foreign policy for the alliance. And also
30
to Mr. Sasakawa and Mr. Akiyama and OPRF, congratulations on this conference. You have
engaged the strategic community in Washington for 5, 6 years now, and you have helped to really
be at the beginning of the resurgence or the renaissance of real thinking about maritime strategy
in this city. We sometimes lose our focus on maritime strategy. I think we're now coming into a
new era where people are thinking seriously about what the maritime domain means to our
security and our alliances.
March 11th highlighted deep strengths of Japan and the Japanese people. I used to live in
Tohoku and was very moved and saddened by what I saw but recognized the Tohoku I knew in
terms of the strength and resilience of the people. And 3/11 also, I think, showed the world some
of the real strength of the U.S.-Japan Alliance, but I would add some of the weaknesses or some
of the challenges.
In terms of the strengths, it's quite striking that in the first week private American citizens
gave over $150 million in donations. Koreans had the largest donation drive in the history of
Korea for Japan. Poor Afghanistan contributed money. It showed the depth of goodwill and
admiration for Japan, but it also showed how important people around the world think an active
Japan is to their own interests. And, of course, Tomodachi Sakusen, Operation Tomodachi,
showed enormous strength to the Japanese people, to the American people, to the region. It
showed how joint and comfortable we are operating on a large scale. It created a new level,
unprecedented level, of support for both the Self-Defense Forces and the alliance. And,
coincidently, with the rapid recovery at Sendai Airport, it demonstrated to potential adversaries a
very impressive capability for what in the military's field is called "battlefield damage recovery."
So it had a dissuasion effect in the region as well. We should be very proud of that.
But at the same time, I think we should recognize that in many ways Operation
Tomodachi drew on 15 years of work by a lot of people in this room, and we should really ask
ourselves, in the last year or two, have we sufficiently recapitalized or reinvested in our alliance
so that we'll have something to draw on in future crises? I am worried about this. My friend,
Yoichi Kato has coined a phrase, I think you've put it in press, 3/11 moratorium, the idea growing
that because of 3/11, Japan should not be ambitious in foreign or economic or security policy.
We have a similar strain of thinking on our side. You may have heard or read American strategic
thinkers say it's time for strategic restraint, or I forgot Richard Haass' phrase, we need a strategy
of renewal, I think?
ATTENDEE: National restoration.
GREEN: National restoration.
The problem with that kind of thinking is that international relations is not like a
basketball game where you can blow the whistle and have a timeout. China is not taking a
timeout. North Korea is not taking a timeout. Iran is not taking a timeout. If anything, many of
these countries are accelerating some of their activities because they sense that we might be
turning inward. If international relations in Asia is like a sports game or a basketball game, then
31
it's like a basketball game between the Georgetown Hoyas and the PLA team.
[Laughter.]
GREEN: There's a lot of cooperation, there's some goodwill, but, you know, sometimes
the rules are broken and you have to end the game early.
[Laughter.]
GREEN: I don't speak for Georgetown University, like my friend Kamiya-sensei, I only
speak for myself.
I also would say that we should not fool ourselves and argue that our current level of
defense spending or defense cuts are acceptable or are safe. Our defense capabilities are one
instrument of our national power -- values matter, economics matter, resilience of our systems
matter -- but before the Obama administration announced the major cuts in defense recently,
before that, the Pentagon assessed what it would need to carry out its primary missions in the
world, and particularly in Asia, and before the budget cuts were announced, the Navy and Marine
Corps found they were 200 aircraft short, were going to be 200 aircraft short, that our nuclear
subs were going to be significantly short of target, surface combatants, so on and so forth, that's
before hundreds of billions of dollars were put on the table by the administration in cuts and
before the possibility of a trillion dollars in cuts over the next decade was introduced through the
budget debate.
At that same time, I wouldn't, for Japanese friends, take away from this the conclusion
that there absolutely will be cuts. There's nothing inevitable about this. You probably saw Mitt
Romney's speech yesterday; he's not going to cut defense. Rick Perry is certainly not going to cut
defense. And I think President Obama politically is not going to want to fight that fight. I think
there's going to be a debate about defense spending, and it is not automatic there will be cuts, and
I think that debate is healthy, and I think the debate is necessary in Japan as well, particularly
when you look at the growing threats and capabilities around us of potential adversaries.
The other thing that we need to consider is that while Operation Tomodachi was an
enormous success and demonstrated the vitality and trust and jointness on our alliance, nobody
was shooting back. This was not a complex military operation in the sense that the other side got
a move. It was an enormous disaster, we responded incredibly impressively, both sides, but in
normal complex military operations, the other side gets a vote and adjusts to your strategy. And
just to name a few of the things that would have been extremely problematic if this had been a
real contingency, most of the communication was done by open e-mail. Could we open e-mail if
this were a Taiwan or a North Korea or Senkaku contingency? I seriously doubt it.
The U.S. Command and Control structure was established in the breach by the
Commander of U.S. Naval Forces, he rushed into Japan, he brought his staff. We, in other
words, created a Command and Control setup on the U.S. side that was entirely focused on
32
Japan, and for that matter, on Tohoku. Would the U.S., Commander of U.S. Naval Forces
Pacific Command, have that kind of leeway if at the same time we were dealing with a
contingency in the area around Japan? Probably not.
So it's worth celebrating how successful we were and then asking, what if this had been a
complex contingency with somebody on the other side who had a vote? You had a flavor of how
much trouble we would have had when you look at the response to Fukushima, where, although
it was not a human actor, there were complications, uncertainties, and developments that really
challenged the alliance. It challenged Japan, but it also challenged our alliance coordination.
And it is therefore worth considering some of the difficulties that we need to overcome
and some of the problems we need to fix. One is jointness, we need to improve jointness. Cyber
and outer space, we need to be more effective in defending our interests in those domains. We
need to think seriously about the crisis management and governance capacity of the Kantei, of
the prime minister's office. There were problems. I'm very encouraged Noda-san recognizes
this. I'm even more encouraged that he's brought Aki Nagashima and other people in to fix the
problem.
And, frankly, I think on the U.S. side there were some difficulties we need to assess,
frankly. The communication channel between the U.S. and Japanese governments at a high
political level was not effective enough. You can blame whoever you want, but it was not
effective enough initially. It took us several days before we got to where we needed to be. So we
have a lot of reflection and thought to do. Overall, I think that this points to some of the efforts
rolled out in the last "Two-plus-Two" in terms of roles, missions, and capabilities, and planning
efforts, but to me, those efforts, which generally are done by very capable people at the colonel,
brigadier, deputy assistant secretary level, really we're talking about a much more complex and
comprehensive relook at our strategy, at our requirements, at basing, at thinking through how the
other side would challenge us that I think has to be done at a higher level strategically.
The last thing I would say is I think 3/11 actually showed the strength of the Japanese
economy. I was in Korea shortly after 3/11 and met with the head of a chaebol, a very famous
chaebol who I know, and he said that they looked at the supply chain interruption. They had to
go offline for some major manufacturing for about 2 or 3 months, and they considered whether
they ought to just substitute and create their own components indigenously in Korea and just get
Japanese companies out of the picture, and they studied it and they concluded it would take them
5 years to do it, and that Japan's supply chain would be back online in 3 or 4 months, and they
were right. And so that it showed the real strength of the Japanese economy, I think, in an ironic
way.
But Japanese business and U.S. companies who want to be active in Japan suffer from a
number of uncertainties. Energy? What's the energy strategy? Will there be reliable energy?
Trade policy, will there be trade liberalization? There are other issues, high end. There's the
famous six rokaja-ku [ph], the six sufferings, that business has to endure in Japan.
33
Some of these can be addressed pretty quickly, in particular, trade and energy strategy,
and that's indispensable, as Maehara-san said, to Japan's strategic role and to the alliance. Article
II of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty is about our economic relationship.
And the U.S. has its work to do, too. We've got to pass the Korea Free Trade Agreement.
In all of this, what I conclude with is we are not in a scenario where we should be applauding
ourselves. We should be applauding ourselves, but that's not sufficient. We should be
challenging ourselves. Instead of taking a sort of moratorium or a timeout because of the
difficulties, we ought to be thinking about how we can demonstrate our willpower to defend our
national interests. This is a concept that was in the Mid-Term Defense Plan. I thought it was
very striking that the Mid-Term Defense Plan emphasized the importance of demonstrating the
willpower to defend Japan's interests, and I think, as an alliance, we need to think about what
things we can do operationally in our economic relationship and in some of the other areas that
have been discussed to display now that we have the willpower to defense our interests at a time
when frankly other countries in Asia are questioning whether we, the U.S., and Japan, are really
serious.
Thank you.
[Applause.]
SOEYA: Thank you very much. We heard four presenters. And the organizer was
generous enough to give us 10 minutes extra time, relieve some of the burden from my
shoulders. So before opening up to the floor, I would like to ask two questions. And if we have
time, maybe I want to have all the four presenters respond, but because we don't have much time,
so I would like to ask one question to the two American presenters, and the other question to the
two Japanese presenters.
And the first to American presenters, Sheila and Mike. I think we should respond one
way or another to one of the very important points in Honorable Maehara's speech, which is
strengthening the U.S.-Japan Alliance in new multilateral context. Michael Green would have
been frightened if he heard the same thing 10 years ago. In fact, he did, but how do you think
about this under new circumstances? I'm very curious. And in that context, I think how you look
at China, that is very much critical in multilateralizing the alliance with the United States. If that
is not effective toward China, with some of the concerns about China, then we will continue to
deal with China as an outsider, which may not be useful starters in real strategic debates. And so
to make that sort of multilateral approach effective toward China, what do you think some of the
things which we have to do, and particularly on the side of Japan from U.S. perspective?
So, Sheila or Mike?
SMITH: Do you want to go first? Let Mike go first.
GREEN: Well, I remember Soeya-sensei and I were in the middle of this 10, 15 years
34
ago when there was a big debate in Japan, "Multi or bilateral? Multi or bilateral?" I think that
debate is largely behind us and there's a recognition, as Maehara-san put it very well, that these
are complementary, that our bilateral alliances and multilateral diplomacy, like the East Asia
Summit, they don't contradict each other, in fact, they reinforce each other, because if we have
relationships based on common values and interests, we can go into the multilateral forums and
try to shape the agenda step-by-step to build a set of norms, as Sheila said, norms and matters of
cooperation, in Asia that enhance stability.
We did a survey 2 years ago at CSIS of elites in nine Asian countries about this question
of alliances and multilateral institutions, and it was very obvious that the multilateral architecture
was a long-term investment and that when we ask even in 10 years, nobody in Asia, nobody in
Asia, very, very few of our respondents thought that they could really rely on the EAS or the
ARF or APEC for security. It was a long-term investment, that's absolutely right, and in the
foreseeable future and, indeed, complementing that investment, are alliances. And then the new
piece is, how do we have minilateral groupings of all kinds?
Secretary Clinton gave an excellent speech in January last year at the East-West Center -I'll give the East-West Center a plug -- about the need for trilaterals with the U.S., Japan, and
India; U.S., Japan, and Korea; U.S., Japan, and China. Some of these will build cooperative
areas of work with China, some of them will push issues that we, Japan, and Australia think are
important in terms of transparency norms. It's going to be eclectic. There are going to be a
variety of forums to do this because Asia is not unified by one set of norms, political rules, threat
assessment, so there's going to have to be an eclectic approach, I'd say. So it's not either/or
anymore.
SMITH: I agree with Mike. The basic premise now, I don't think we see bilateral U.S.Japan Alliance cooperation as being antithetical to multilateral regime building, which was
different a decade or so ago. I think at that moment in time there was this sense that, especially
in the early NDPGs that Japan was going in a multilateral direction instead of an alliancestrengthening direction, and I don't think that either/or calculus exists anymore.
But the one thing that sort of strikes me -- again, the China piece of it is very important in
this maritime discussion -- you know, China's behavior in the South China Sea and its diplomatic
assertions regarding its behavior in the South China Sea are very different than what they are in
the East China Sea, and I think the framework -- it's equally important for Japan as it is for the
Southeast Asian countries. The framework for negotiating with China, the bilateral framework,
is getting increasingly difficult to manage these issues. And so the multilateralizing of some of
these concerns, strategic security concerns, is absolutely essential, I think, for trying to find a way
to engage China on the broader norms of cooperation, the rulemaking that we all want to see be
the definitive way to solve the problem.
I don't think anybody wants a conflict with China in the South China Sea or the East
China Sea, but to avoid that, then I think we have to build the multilateral architecture and
continue to work at it, so that that is the place where people go to resolve the kinds of disputes
35
that China and Japan and Southeast -- they're all having these similar kinds of disputes, and it's
not an idiosyncratic means of resolving them each time.
You know, last year, the Senkaku incident, there are people here who obviously know so
much more about the decision-making in that incident than I do, but as an outside observer,
China really played its hand badly, and it resorted in a bilateral conversation. It really resorted
behavior that affected all of our ability to work together with China in the future, rare earth
embargos, the arrests of the Fujita businessmen. It alarmed all of us in terms of how we work
with a growing, rising China in dispute resolution.
So I think there's power in multilateralism today, and I think it's absolutely necessary that
we use it to engage, to get a better understanding of why this kind of behavior is now appearing
more frequently, and to find ways together to resolve it so that we're not engaged in bilateral
disputes that actually get us to the brink of some kind of conflict that we all want to avoid.
SOEYA: Thank you. If we have time, of course, we would like to engage in discussions
with China, of course, but this is too big. Just a big question, and I'll just leave it as such.
In talking about China, I think we often talk about engagement or -- we don't use
"containment," but try to engage China or you tend to take China as an outsider, and assuming
that, it's not possible, or at least difficult, to engage really China.
But I think there is a third perspective, which we don't often talk about but needs to be
debated, and that is, if we cannot deter China or engage China, a third option would be changes
coming from within China, and I think that possibility, of course, involves lots of difficult
questions, but I think there are perhaps basically three perspectives in discussing the China
factor. But I don't think we have time to get into that.
So the question to the Japanese presenters is Kamiya-san talked about the problem of
implementation, and the point was made that DPJ security policy and LDP-DPJ security policy
may not be that different, and I think that is a clear indication that perhaps Japan may not have
such wide range of options when it comes to its security policies. And that I think should raise a
natural question, why there is no bipartisan consensus among Japanese political parties,
particularly between DPJ and LDP, on some of the basic elements of Japanese security policies.
For instance, we often talk about the right of collective self-defense. I think that is a very
natural right for every country. That is obvious. Nothing wrong for Japan to have it. And so
there should be efforts toward realizing this rather than continuing to make it an issue of a
political fight among political -- of course, we have our domestic factors, which are the result of
also revolution.
And the other question which is often talked about is armed export, the three principles of
arms exports. That is also a very natural thing for any sovereign nation, I mean, to export arms,
and Japan, as a democratic and sovereign nation, it shouldn't cause much problem, even concerns
36
to anybody, even if we engage in that. I think we have that sort of trusting Japanese themselves
even though perceptions by some people may be different, I know, I know that.
But those are very basic parameters of Japanese security policies over which politicians
should not fight among themselves, and particularly DPJ and LDP. Why there is no bipartisan
consensus on those basic things?
[Laughter.]
ATTENDEE: Which of us should go?
ATTENDEE: Who goes first?
[Laughter.]
SHIOZAKI: Well, as I said, I just started out, multipartisan group recently, probably
among them -- well, of course, including DPJ, LDP, and Minna No To, or other major parties,
except for Communist and Socialist, and this time somehow Komeito is not in a group at this
moment, but that's because we all probably share what Soeya-sensei just mentioned, but if you
talk about only DPJ and LDP, yes, well, looking from outside, we might share almost all the
same philosophy on defense and security issues, but it's not so correct, I guess, especially in the
case of DPJ. DPJ has always far left people originally from Socialist Party, probably they cannot
tolerate some of the principles that we all share. And that's why realignment of the parties is
needed, but for the time being, it's all up to DPJ, whether or not they can really combine or get to
consensus about basic policies that we have to change or we have to implement. And we are
almost ready to, for example, the constitutional change, interpretation change about collective
defense, self-defense, right. And so I would say it's all up to them.
But it's not that kind of issue that is really essential. I think the parties should be a group
of people who share the almost fundamental ideas, meaning basically economic policy and
security policy. And because LDP was kind of a big residual, used to be a big residual, not
Socialist, not Communist, not special religion, but the rest, all rest. And DPJ was formed as a
kind of antithesis of LDP. So it's a big residual versus another big residual. And so how we can
differentiate each other oftentimes. But, as I said, there are a variety of people. So it's not really
a party, I would say, for parties, in Japan, in a very academic sense. So I think it's better to have
more streamlined parties in order to have more cohesive philosophy on basic policies in order to
have or save time and go forward, implementing the important policies that we must go through.
SOEYA: Thank you. Particularly, with respect to the first point, it's because DPJ split
into parties, and that prevents bipartisan consensus. Maehara-sensei want to say something or
not?
[Laughter.]
37
SMITH: Or not.
[Laughter.]
SOEYA: Maybe later between yourselves.
Okay, Kamiya-san.
KAMIYA: My observation is that if you talk about the degree of multilateral -- oh, no,
excuse, multiparties and consensus, I think there has been much improvements in Japanese
politics. Like, you know, 20 years ago, there was a big divergence between the then ruling party,
LDP, you know, the largest political party at that time, Socialist Party. They have no consensus
on the future of Japan's security policy in the post-cold war era. But now, at least among the
three leading parties, DPJ, LDP, and Komei Party, New Komei Party, all of them supports the
strengthening of the U.S.-Japan Alliance, they say that it should be the key to the Japanese
situation in foreign policies. All of them agree that Japan, Japanese government, should maintain
the agreement with the United States with regard to the Futenma relocation issues, and I think
basically all of them agree about the nature of Japan's China policy in that China represents both
opportunity and risk or threat or danger, whichever term you use.
But the problem is, I think, neither LDP, DPJ, nor Komei Party, has sufficient courage to
lead public opinion, to change the -- how is it? -- traditional security policies that has been held
many decades in Japan. For example, ban on the exercise of right of collective self-defense.
That policy has been there for at least more than 30-some years, and three principles on ban on
export of weapons, military weapons. I mean, that policy has been there for -- what? -- how
many, almost 40 years? Public opinion has been gradually changing with regard to those longheld policies or strategies of Japan, but I think the -- how they say? -- the group which is slowest
in changing their opinion and attitudes are politicians in Japan. I read about 15 years ago, I think,
after the Futenma relocation was kind of agreed among the two governments, U.S. and Japan, I
think the British Journal -- what is it? -- no, no, no, sorry, I mean, I think American "Time" or
something, wrote that -- how do you say? -- the most coward people in Japan with regard to the
change in policies are politicians.
[Laughter.]
KAMIYA: And unfortunately that criticism at least has some element of truth, because,
you know, both DPJ politicians and LDP politicians don't want to stimulate the public reactions
with regard to security something, they don't want to dare say that we should adopt new policies,
and now I think with Prime Minister Noda, we have to see if he is courageous enough to propose
new policies, new strategies.
SOEYA: Thank you. I may have asked the wrong question. I'm sure you have lots of
things to say, but thank you.
38
ATTENDEE: That's a difficult question.
SOEYA: And perhaps both presenters talked about kind of one side of the reality, which
is politicians are hard to change, but the other side, I think there are both sides, but the other side
is Shiozaki-san mentioned the group of "Nihon wo nekko kara kaeru kai," the group to -- what? - change Japan from the roots? That's a literal translation. And I think that is also a problem. I
mean, changing these I think have nothing to do with changing root of Japan, I think.
[Laughter.]
ATTENDEE: Totally change Japan.
SOEYA: And if issues presented that way, and some people will be frightened naturally
for obvious reasons, I mean in their perception, and that's a very important environment for
Japanese diplomacy, I think. Yeah, so kind of both sides may have some problems. There
should be a solution in the middle. I won't say anything beyond that.
But anyway, thank you very much for responding to my abrupt questions. And, sorry, we
have only 3 minutes, so maybe utmost two people questions. And I would like to get two
questions simultaneously. And please identify yourself and designate to whom the question is
addressed. And please try to be brief. And following Bob's practice, no comments, just the
question.
[No response.]
SOEYA: Okay, I'll leave that to have for the reception.
[Laughter.]
ATTENDEE: Stunned into silence.
[Laughter.]
SOEYA: Senator Inouye is coming to give a speech. And, yeah, we have some exciting
events afterwards. Okay, so that's good.
Okay. Yeah. Then we'll finish by time. I'll give 10 minutes extra time. So I would like
to thank all the presenters for their excellent presentations as well as well-intentioned responses
to my ill-intentioned questions. And I would like to thank cooperation by the audience coming
here during a very cold rainy day. Thank you very much.
[Applause.]
ATTENDEE: Thank you very much, panelists, for a very rich discussion.
39
We do have a reception that begins right now just down the hall at the Crystal Room.
Just go out the door, take a right, and at about 6:00 p.m. we will have some presentations by
Ambassador Fujisaki and Senator Inouye. So we hope you'll stay with us to enjoy some food,
drink, and continued discussion. Thank you all.
[Applause.]
•-•-•
7:00 p.m.
Dinner in the Willard Room
Welcome:
SHOTARO YACHI, Special Advisor, Nippon Foundation
Introduction:
AMB. LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD, JR., Chairman, Stimson Center
Remarks: SENATOR JAMES WEBB, Jr.
BOB: And in addition to his responsibilities at the Foundation, he's also a Professor at
both Waseda and Keio University. So Yachi-san, if you could come up and say just a few words.
[Applause.]
YACHI: Senator Webb, Excellencies, distinguished participants to the symposium,
ladies and gentlemen, I would like to welcome all of you here to this dinner. Actually, I will tell
you the host to this dinner today is our respectable Chairman Sasakawa, not me, but Sasakawasan cordially supposed to make welcome remarks, so I will take his place.
And this reminds me of one anecdote in the Roman Empire 2,000 years ago. The
Emperor of the Roman Empire asked somebody to fight a lion in the arena, and a lot of
spectators gathered. One day one person was asked to fight the lion, and the people were very
much excited.
The people are so excited, and the hungry lion entered into the arena, and that guy
whispered something into the lion's ear. The lion suddenly became very quiet and let him away,
run away from the arena, with the tail in between his legs. And the people were very surprised,
and to ask that guy. "What did you say to that lion?" And he said, "Well, you can take me for
dinner tonight, but you have to make a speech before the dinner."
[Laughter.]
40
YACHI: I have three principles in making a speech, and naturally, principle one is to tell
some joke, and I finished that part already.
[Laughter.]
YACHI: And the second principle is to give a clear message in the speech, and my
message today is the U.S.-Japan relationship is most important bilateral relationship, bar none,
which is I think how everybody knows the late Ambassador Mansfield said. But know this, the
China-U.S. relationship is most important bilateral relationship, but I will tell you, there is a
difference between the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-China. The difference is that in the case of JapanU.S. relations, we put the "bar none," so that is better than that.
[Laughter.]
YACHI: The U.S. relationship is better than the U.S.-China relationship.
Now, third principle is speech much be short. So I will finish my short remarks.
But once again, I would like to welcome all of you, and please enjoy your dinner and the
conversation. But I will tell Senator Webb, please feel free to make a long speech as you like.
[Laughter.]
YACHI: As much as possible. Thank you very much.
[Applause.]
BOB: Thank you, Yachi-san. Senator Webb has to leave here promptly at 8:30, so we
will have dinner followed by his speech. So please enjoy your dinner, but please enjoy it as
quickly as possible. Thank you.
[Laughter, applause.]
BLOOMFIELD: Sorry to have to stop you in midsentence, but our guests tonight are on
a bit of a tight schedule, and we want to make sure we have the full benefit of our special guest
remarks. We've had a great dinner here. I hope you're all enjoying this evening. I have the
honor of introducing one of America's most accomplished and dedicated public servants, Senator
Jim Webb, the senior Senator of Virginia, where I live, by the way, he's my Senator. And I've
tracked Senator Webb's progress as a prodigious person of high accomplishment and unbounded
service to his country. He's an incredibly talented person and an original thinker, a real strategic
heavyweight, and I've watched this at close range as a junior official in the Pentagon when he
was Secretary of the Navy, and heard about his service in Vietnam as a decorated combat
veteran. He could have spent his life as an author and dined out on that alone, he's authored nine
41
books, award-winning. He's a journalist, a filmmaker, someone who obviously is a
multidimensional thinker, and someone who cares a lot about Pacific affairs, as the Chair of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs East Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee. He has been
a friend of the Stimson Center, has been involved in our Mekong Project, has come to the center,
and we're deeply appreciative of him taking the time and knowing of his commitment to the
issues that Stimson is setting.
And he is very much dedicated to U.S.-Japan relations going forward and made it his
business to go visit the affected areas after the March earthquake and tsunami, and then
introduced plans to take a second look at the U.S.-Japan practical plans going forward in-country
in ways that would be minimally disruptive to the Japanese people at this time of recovery, that
would be affordable, that would be sensible, and this is having a great influence, I'm sure, on
U.S. thinking in the Congress and in DoD.
There is a lot more that I could say, but I want to give the time and hear what he has to
say. Please give a warm welcome to our dinner speaker tonight, Senator Jim Webb.
[Applause.]
WEBB: Thank you very much, Lincoln Bloomfield, for that introduction, and I would
like to say that it's a great pleasure to be here with you tonight, and I would like to express my
appreciation to the organizations that have put on this conference, this very important conference,
dealing with the future of the relationship between our two countries.
I would like to begin by saying what a great pleasure it's been for me over my entire adult
life to have had an association with Japan, with the Japanese people, first beginning 42 years ago
as a United States Marine in Okinawa and then in Vietnam during the Vietnam War, and having
returned many, many times to Japan as a military planner, as a novelist, as a journalist on several
occasions, as a government official, as a guest of your government, and most especially over the
past 4-1/2 years as a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and as the Chairman of
the East Asia Subcommittee.
This is a relationship that is so vital to both of our countries and has gone, in most cases,
so smoothly that we tend, I think, to take advantage of or to ignore how well and how important
it really is.
In the United States we have a saying -- most of you know it -- that "the squeaky wheel
gets the oil," meaning that in such a competitive multicultural society as ours, you have to speak
up in order to be heard. And in Japan, as most of you know, they have a saying that "the lose nail
gets the hammer," meaning obviously that if you speak too loudly or draw too much attention to
yourself, you're going to pay the price. But when it comes to this relationship between our two
countries, in the United States, I think we need to get a little squeakier, and I think in Japan, I
hope we can see people ready to get smacked a little bit by the hammer.
42
This is a very important time in history for both of our countries and for the careful
relationship that we have developed over the past 60 years, and not incidentally for the future of
the entire East Asia region. In the United States, this means that those of us who understand and
support the reality need to speak ever more loudly. We need to work in order to have our voices
heard despite the many other distractions that have recently permeated our foreign policy
discussions, from Iraq, Afghanistan, recently Libya, to the challenge and the seduction of dealing
with an ever more assertive and ever more economically powerful China. In Japan, this means
that those who support and understand the importance of this relationship should be willing to
accept the possibility of being criticized by some who believe that the future is somehow
different than the past, that Japan would benefit by distancing itself from its close alliance with
the United States due to the undeniable economic growth of other countries in the East Asian
region.
So let me summarize a few of the fundamental principles that are familiar to many people
in this room that emphasize the importance of our relationship.
First, due to its strategic and commercial importance and the population levels and the
historic turbulence that can visit East Asia, it's undeniable that global security cannot exist
without stability in East Asia.
Second -- and I say this as a student of history, a frequent visitor to East and Southeast
Asia, including having just completed a visit to Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, and Vietnam -the geographical and historic realities of Northeast Asia remind us every day that there cannot be
stability anywhere in East Asia, including Southeast Asia, unless there's a strategic balance in
Northeast Asia.
Let us for a moment understand how important and unique the strategic balance actually
is. Northeast Asia is the only place in the world where the direct interests of Russia, Japan, and
China intersect, and they intersect historically and quite often with the Korean peninsula in the
center. Over and over again throughout history, we've seen the turbulence that has come to this
region when one or the other of these three great powers has become more dominant or has
attempted to unnaturally expand its influence. And against this historical backdrop, since World
War II, the strong presence of the United States in this region has become more than a military
deterrent; rather, it has emerged as the most important factor in the overall stability of the region.
The security partnership between Japan and the United States has formed the very basis of the
ability of the United States to become something of an honest broker, and thus as a guarantor, of
the kind of stability that has allowed other countries, such as South Korea, Singapore, Thailand,
Indonesia, even Vietnam, and most of the countries now in ASEAN to grow economically and to
evolve in terms of more liberal governmental policies.
This need for balance in Northeast Asia was true during the expansionist period of the
Soviet Union. By the mid-1980s, when I was serving in the Pentagon as Assistant Secretary of
Defense and then Secretary of the Navy, the Soviets had 370,000 ground troops in East Asia.
They had 85 backfire bombers, 2,400 combat aircraft. They had a Pacific fleet that boasted some
43
600 ships, including 2 aircraft carriers, 41 percent of their heavy-surface ships in their entire
Navy, 40 percent of their nuclear submarines. They had accomplished the historic Russian
dream of having a warm water port in the Pacific. When I was Secretary of the Navy, on any
given day in Cameron Bay, Vietnam, there were two dozen Soviet combatant ships plus fighter,
bomber, and long-range reconnaissance aircraft.
This truth, this need for strategic balance in Northeast Asia, has remained true as the
region adapts to the increased influence and activities of China that followed the collapse of the
Soviet Union. Looking back, from an American perspective, as we dealt with the expansionist
desires of the Soviet Union, there was an acceptable, if untested, logic that the Chinese political
system could be permanently liberalized through the mechanism of free trade. Sensible
Americans believed that contact with the outside world, creation of a vibrant middle class, and
exposure to creature comforts and possibly individual freedoms all would combine to bring
major changes in the way that China and its unelected leaders approached international relations.
This logic underwent some rather surprising mutations along the way as the power relationships
in East Asia began to alter.
When the Soviet Union fell apart, and at the same time, within a few years, the United
States Navy's force structure was cut in half, creating the impression of a partial American
withdrawal from East Asia, the Chinese began steadily to increase their military activities and
their claims of sovereignty over distant territories. China engaged in a massive modernization
program, fueled largely by purchases at that time of Soviet weaponry and bolstered by the
acquisition of American technology. It shifted its aviation doctrine from defensive to offensive
operations, including the ability for long-range strikes throughout Southeast Asia. It has
continuously rattled its sabers over the issue of Taiwan. It has laid physical claim to the disputed
Paracel and Spratly island groups, thus potentially straddling not only one of the most vital sea
lanes in the world but an area that is thought to be rich in mineral resources. Over time, and even
as recently as last year, China has made repeated naval excursions into Japanese territorial
waters, a cause for long-term concern, as everyone in this room, I think, knows and understands,
as China still claims the Senkaku Islands and has never formally accepted the legitimacy of
Okinawa's 1972 reversion to Japan.
In the United States, the national distractions of Iraq and Afghanistan following the 9/11
attacks, as well as the seduction of increased trading opportunities with China, led many citizens
and leaders to downplay the importance of maintaining a strategic balance and ultimately the
stability itself of the East Asian region. This was also true at some level in Japan, where many
well-intentioned leaders believed that history was providing Japan and other countries in East
Asia with a fresh opportunity to retreat into what was being called an Asia-centric policy that
diminished the importance of Japan's close relationship with the United States.
Only 18 months ago, when I visited Tokyo, Okinawa, and Guam, the importance of our
relationship was openly being called into question, both with respect to Japan's dealings with
China and with respect to the issue of the future American military forces in Japan. Now, clearly
on both of these issues, our two countries can benefit from adapting previous policies to the
44
realities of present-day activities, but no one in Japan, the United States, or elsewhere should
mistake these kinds of short-term adjustments for an abandonment of the long-term benefits that
derive from the close friendship and the security alliance between our two countries, which serve
as the linchpin of security in the entire East Asia region.
In the last 18 months since that visit, there have been incidents in the Senkaku Islands,
which Japan legally administers under the edicts of international law. There has been a spirited
emotional discussion regarding base realignments and the validity of the continued American
military presence in Japan. I have participated in that discussion. There have been military
provocations on the part of the Chinese off the coast of the Philippines just this past March, twice
in the exclusive economic zone of Vietnam in May and June. I was the sponsor of the Senate
resolution, which Senator Inouye, by the way, was one of the two principal co-sponsors, that
deplored China's use of military force in these incidents, and also in the Senkaku military
activity, calling for peaceful multilateral approaches to resolve these issues of sovereignty.
To my knowledge, this is the first time the United States Senate has ever gone on record
as deploring the Chinese use of military force in the South China Sea and other areas with respect
to sovereignty issues, and the Senate did so unanimously. This is an indicator now, I think, of the
renewed concern and the acknowledged importance of the United States remaining as the
strategic balancing factor for stability in this region.
Our two countries have learned some valuable lessons, both of our countries, I think, in
the last 18 months. Hopefully, this time period has encouraged leaders in Japan and in the
United States to understand how valuable our alliance has been and will remain and how
important it is for both of our countries, as well as the region itself, to continue to work together
and to rely on one another.
So what is it that we should continue to do together? Here are a few thoughts. First, we
need to maintain our vital security alliance, including the restructuring of the United States bases
on Japan in a way that continues to reassure countries in the region that the United States will
remain as the balancing force for stability in this volatile part of the world. I first began working
on this issue in the 1970s when I was military planner working on an analysis of all the facilities
in the Pacific and examining how we might restructure our military basing system on Okinawa
and Guam. I have worked on it continuously since I've been in the Senate, and I believe that with
the support now of Senator Levin, who is the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, and
Senator McCain, who is the ranking Republican, we will see an approach that can guarantee the
continued presence of the United States in a way that diminishes the impact on the Okinawan
people that does not diminish our ability to respond to military threats in this region.
Second, we could work together to strengthen the economic, cultural, and security
relationship between both of our countries and the Republic of Korea. As a student of history,
again I would say I know full well the challenges in cementing this three-way alliance, but the
realities of the present and of the future should be clear to all three countries that it's in our
collective interest to do so. And on a personal level, as a member of the United States Senate on
45
this committee, I would say it's been very gratifying for me to see the representatives from Japan
and from Korea both among your diplomatic corps and also from overseas visits so willing to
work together in order to strengthen the security relationships among our three countries.
We should work to maintain the health and visibility of our common political systems,
which, despite recent frustrations in both countries, should still serve as examples to the region
and to the rest of the world. Both of our countries are yearning for political and economic
stability. Both of our countries are sometimes frustrated by the visible nature of our political
systems which allows those who wish us ill to make light of our debates, but our openness, in my
view, will in the end prove to be our strength. We will work these issues out. In many areas,
such as the increasing interdependence of our economic systems, we will demonstrate the ability
of likeminded systems to create harmony and stability rather than discord and unrest.
We must remain committed to maintaining freedom of navigation in the vital sea lanes
through which such a large percentage of the world's commerce now flows. This comment does
not need elaboration. Any country that doubts the commitment of the United States to this basic
principle does not understand our history or the sacrifices that our military people have made for
more than 200 years. And on this point, we must agree openly and seriously to work together in
order to find peaceful multilateral solutions to these issues of national sovereignty especially in
areas like the Senkaku Islands and the South China Sea, where the basics of international law are
now being irresponsibly challenged. The very rule of law is in question here. Japan and the
United States should stand together to ensure that the rule of law is respected rather than the open
threats, backroom deals that have always marked the journey of those who wish to engage in
irresponsible behavior.
Serious issues are at stake, including the rights of nations to properly explore, develop,
and market natural resources within internationally recognized boundaries. And as with so many
other issues in this vital region, the motivations of our two countries should be nothing more than
the principles of fairness and the importance of stability based on the rule of law. We should
work, as we have so assiduously done over the course of my entire lifetime, to expand our trade
and to increase our cultural ties. Send us your business, share your ideas, your best ideas, and not
incidentally, send your students to study alongside our young and to develop relationships that
will carry over into the next generation and the next.
I have always respected the fundamentals of Japanese society, which focus on fairness,
human dignity, and personal honor. Both of our countries are at our best when we proceed from
these basic principles, and in that respect, we are natural allies. We are also long-time friends
with loyalties that have been tested sometimes in the crucible of war. Our partnerships are
synergistic, promising to strengthen both of our countries without detracting from the history or
from the fundamentals of either one.
So, in summary, growing our relationships in this way will be good for Japan, it will be
good for the United States, and it could prove essential to the long-term stability of the Asian
region. I have been committed to working this goal for more than 40 years. I will continue to do
46
so. It will be my honor to do so with you for the benefit of Japan and of the United States.
Thank you very much. It's been a pleasure to be with you.
[Applause.]
BLOOMFIELD: Thank you very much, Senator Webb.
Ladies and gentlemen, continue on with your conversation and enjoy your coffee. I know
some of our folks have to be on their way, but continue on, and we look forward to a great day
tomorrow. Thank you.
[Applause.]
•-•-•