Limits 2NC
3. Participation --- broad topics destroy entire programs
Rowland ‘84
(Robert C., Baylor U., “Topic Selection in Debate”, American Forensics in Perspective. Ed. Parson, p. 53-4)
The first major problem identified by the work group as relating to topic selection is the decline in participation in the National Debate Tournament (NDT) policy
debate. As Boman notes: There is a growing dissatisfaction with academic debate that utilizes a policy proposition. Programs which are oriented toward debating the
national policy debate proposition, so-called “NDT” programs, are diminishing in scope and size.4 This decline
in policy debate is tied, many in the work group
believe, to excessively broad topics. The most obvious characteristic of some recent policy debate topics is extreme breath. A resolution calling for regulation
of land use literally and figuratively covers a lot of ground. Naitonal debate topics have not always been so broad. Before the late 1960s the topic often specified a
particular policy change.5 The
move from narrow to broad topics has had, according to some, the effect of limiting the number of students
who participate in policy debate. First, the breadth of the topics has all but destroyed novice debate. Paul Gaske argues that because
the stock issues of policy debate are clearly defined, it is superior to value debate as a means of introducing students to the debate process.6 Despite this advantage of
policy debate, Gaske belives that NDT debate is not the best vehicle for teaching beginners. The problem is that broad policy topics
especially those who lack high school debate experience. They
terrify novice debaters,
are unable to cope with the breadth of the topic and experience “negophobia,”7 the
fear of debating negative. As a consequence, the educational advantages associated with teaching novices through policy debate are lost: “Yet all of these
benefits fly out the window as rookies in their formative stage quickly experience humiliation at being caugh without evidence or substantive awareness of the issues
that confront them at a tournament.”8 The ultimate result is that fewer novices participate in NDT, thus lessening the educational value of the activity and limiting the
number of debaters or eventually participate in more advanced divisions of policy debate. In addition to noting the effect on novices, participants argued that broad
topics also discourage experienced debaters from continued participation in policy debate. Here, the claim is that it takes so much times
and effort to be competitive on a broad topic that students who are concerned with doing more than just debate are forced out of the
activity.9 Gaske notes, that “broad topics discourage participation because of insufficient time to do requisite research.”10 The final effect may be that
entire programs either cease functioning or shift to value debate as a way to avoid unreasonable research burdens. Boman supports this point: “It is this
expanding necessity of evidence, and thereby research, which has created a competitive imbalance between institutions that participate in academic debate.”11 In this
view, it is the competitive imbalance resulting from the use of broad topics that has led some small schools to cancel their programs.
Basic limits are necessary to effective resistance –-- they govern deliberative democracy and are essential to prevent
violence and tyranny
Shively ‘2K
(Ruth Lessl, Assistant Prof Political Science – Texas A&M U., Partisan Politics and Political Theory, p.
184)
The point here is that in arguing—and the point holds equally for other forms of contest—we assume that it is possible to educate or
persuade one another. We assume that it is possible to come to more mutual understandings of an issue and that the
participants in an argument are open to this possibility. Otherwise, there is no point to the exercise; we are simply talking at or past
one another. At this point, the ambiguists might respond that, even if there are such rules of argument, they do not
apply to the more subversive or radical activities they have in mind. Subversion is, after all, about questioning and undermining such
seemingly “necessary” or universal rules of behavior. But, again, the response to the ambiguist must be that the
practice of questioning and undermining rules, like all other social practices, needs a certain order. The
subversive needs rules to protect subversion. And when we look more closely at the rules protective of
subversion, we find that they are roughly the rules of argument discussed above. In fact, the rules of argument are
roughly the rules of democracy or civility: the delineation of boundaries necessary to protect speech and action
from violence, manipulation and other forms of tyranny. Earlier we asked how the ambiguists distinguish legitimate political behaviors,
like contest or resistance, from illegitimate behaviors, like cruelty and subjugation. We find a more complete answer here. The former are legitimate because they have
civil or rational persuasion as their end. That is, legitimate
forms of contest and resistance seek to inform or convince others by
appeal to reasons rather than by force or manipulation. The idea is implicit in democracy because democracy
implies a basic respect for self-determination: a respect for people’s rights to direct their own lives as much as
possible by their own choices, to work and carry on relationships as they see fit, to participate in community and politics according to decisions freely
made by them rather than decisions forced on them, and so on. Thus, to say that rational persuasion is the end of political action is
simply to acknowledge that, in democratic politics, this is the way we show respect for others’ capacities for
self-direction. In public debate, our goal is to persuade others with ideas that they recognize as true rather than by trying to
manipulate them or move them without their conscious, rational assent.
Eliminating rules transforms competitive debate into ‘cooperative conversation’ --- this approach privileges dominant voices,
locking in exclusion and political alienation
Tonn ‘05
(Mari Boor, Professor of Communication – University of Maryland, “Taking Conversation, Dialogue,
and Therapy Public”, Rhetoric & Public Affairs, Vol. 8, Issue 3, Fall)
Perhaps the most conspicuous effort at replacing public debate with therapeutic dialogue was President Clinton's Conversation on Race, launched in mid-1997.
Controversial from its inception for its ideological bent, the initiative met further widespread criticism for its encounter-group approaches to racial stratification and
strife, critiques echoing previously articulated concerns- my own among them6-that certain
dangers lurk in employing private or social
communication modes for public problem-solving.7 Since then, others have joined in contesting the treating of public problems with
narrative and psychological approaches, which-in the name of promoting civility, cooperation, personal empowerment, and socially constructed or
idiosyncratic truths-actually work to contain dissent, locate systemic social problems solely within individual neurosis, and
otherwise fortify hegemony.8 Particularly noteworthy is Michael Schudson's challenge to the utopian equating of "conversation" with the "soul of
democracy." Schudson points to pivotal differences in the goals and architecture of conversational and democratic deliberative processes. To him, political (or
democratic) conversation is a contradiction in terms. Political deliberation entails a clear instrumental purpose, ideally remaining ever mindful of its implications
beyond an individual case. Marked
by disagreement-even pain-democratic deliberation contains transparent prescribed procedures
governing participation and decision making so as to protect the timid or otherwise weak. In such processes, written records chronicle the
interactional journey toward resolution, and in the case of writing law especially, provide accessible justification for decisions rendered. In sharp contrast,
conversation is often "small talk" exchanged among family, friends, or candidates for intimacy, unbridled by set agendas, and prone to egocentric
rather than altruistic goals. Subject only to unstated "rules" such as turn-taking and politeness, conversation tends to advantage the
gregarious or articulate over the shy or slight of tongue.9 The events of 9/11, the onset of war with Afghanistan and Iraq, and the subsequent
failure to locate Iraqi w eapons of m ass d estruction have resuscitated some faith in debate, argument, warrant, and facts as crucial to the
public sphere. Still, the romance with public conversation persists. As examples among communication scholars, Karlyn Kohrs Campbell's 2001 Carroll C.
Arnold Distinguished Lecture treated what she termed "the rhetoric of conversation" as a means to "manage controversy" and empower non-dominant voices10;
multiple essays in a 2002 special issue of Rhetoric & Public Affairs on deliberative democracy couch a deliberative democratic ideal in dialogic terms11; and the 2005
Southern States Communication Convention featured family therapist Sallyann Roth, founding member and trainer of the Public Conversations Project, as keynote
speaker.12 Representative of the dialogic turn in deliberative democracy scholarship is Gerard A. Hauser and Chantal Benoit-Barne's critique of the traditional
procedural, reasoning model of public problem solving: "A deliberative model of democracy . . . constru[es] democracy in terms of participation in the ongoing
conversation about how we shall act and interact-our political relations" and "Civil society redirects our attention to the language of social dialogue on which our
understanding of political interests and possibility rests."13 And on the political front, British Prime Minister Tony Blair-facing declining poll numbers and mounting
criticism of his indifference to public opinion on issues ranging from the Iraq war to steep tuition hike proposals-launched The Big Conversation on November 28,
2003. Trumpeted as "as way of enriching the Labour Party's policy making process by listening to the British public about their priorities," the initiative includes an
interactive government website and community meetings ostensibly designed to solicit citizens' voices on public issues.14 In their own way, each treatment of public
conversation positions it as a democratic good, a mode that heals divisions and carves out spaces wherein ordinary voices can be heard. In certain ways, Schudson's
initial reluctance to dismiss public conversation echoes my own early reservations, given the ideals of egalitarianism, empowerment, and mutual respect conversational
various negative consequences can
result from transporting conversational and therapeutic paradigms into public problem solving. In what follows, I extend Schudson's critique
of a conversational model for democracy in two ways: First, whereas Schudson primarily offers a theoretical analysis, I interrogate public conversation as a praxis in a
variety of venues, illustrating how public "conversation" and "dialogue" have been coopted to silence rather than empower
marginalized or dissenting voices. In practice, public conversation easily can emulate what feminist political scientist Jo Freeman termed "the
tyranny of structurelessness" in her classic 1970 critique of consciousness- raising groups in the women's liberation movement,15 as well as the key traits
Irving L. Janis ascribes to "groupthink."16 Thus, contrary to its promotion as a means to neutralize hierarchy and exclusion in the public
sphere, public conversation can and has accomplished the reverse. When such moves are rendered transparent, public conversation and
dialogue, I contend, risk increasing rather than diminishing political cynicism and alienation. [Continues…] This widespread
advocates champion. Still, in the spirit of the dialectic ostensibly underlying dialogic premises, this essay argues that
recognition that access to public deliberative processes and the ballot is a baseline of any genuine democracy points to the most curious irony of the conversation
movement: portions of its constituency. Numbering among the most fervid dialogic loyalists have been some feminists and multiculturalists who represent groups
historically denied both the right to speak in public and the ballot. Oddly, some feminists who championed the slogan "The Personal Is Political" to emphasize ways
relational power can oppress tend to ignore similar dangers lurking in the appropriation of conversation and dialogue in public deliberation. Yet the conversational
model's emphasis on empowerment through intimacy can duplicate the power networks that traditionally excluded females and nonwhites and gave rise to numerous,
sometimes necessarily uncivil, demands for democratic inclusion. Formalized
participation structures in deliberative processes obviously cannot
ensure the elimination of relational power blocs, but, as Freeman pointed out, the absence of formal rules leaves relational power
unchecked and potentially capricious. Moreover, the privileging of the self, personal experiences, and individual perspectives of reality intrinsic in the
conversational paradigm mirrors justifications once used by dominant groups who used their own lives, beliefs, and interests as templates for hegemonic social premises
to oppress women, the lower class, and people of color. Paradigms infused with the therapeutic language of emotional healing and coping likewise flirt with the type of
psychological diagnoses once ascribed to disaffected women. But as Betty Friedan's landmark 1963 The Feminist Mystique argued, the cure for female alienation was
neither tranquilizers nor attitude adjustments fostered through psychotherapy but, rather, unrestricted opportunities.102
Shively 2NC
Determining framework is a prior question ---- only once agreed-upon limits are established can the debate even begin
Ehninger ‘70
(Douglas, Professor of Speech – U Iowa, Speech Monographs, June, p. 108)
If two friends differ on whether they will gain greater satisfaction from dining at Restaurant A or Restaurant B, because the causes are simple and immediate, the
common end at which they aim-that of maximum enjoyment-will exhibit like qualities. When, on the other hand, as in a dispute concerning political persuasions or
social philosophies, the causes are broad and complex, the end aimed at may be remote or abstract. Always, however, some
agreed upon end or goal
must be present to define and delimit the evaluative ground within which the interchange is to proceed. When
such ground is lacking, argument itself, let alone any hope of resolution or agreement, becomes impossible. The absence of a commonly
accepted aim or value is what lies at the root of many of the breakdowns that occur, for example, in negotiations between the Communist and Western nations, and what
their claims pass without
touching, just as they pass when different subjects are being discussed. What one party says simply is
evaluatively irrelevant to the position of the other. An examination of the nature of ends or values need not concern
us here. Perhaps at bottom they are matters of feeling, of personal style or taste. The important point is that they lie on a deeper stratum than
argument is capable of penetrating; they are something which argument cannot shape or determine but which it must
presuppose-something which any two disputants need to assume and agree upon as a necessary condition of
argumentative interchange.
accounts for the well known futility of most disputes on matters of politics or religion. When disputants hold different values
Alternatives to expert-driven evidence qualifications are equally dangerous
Solt ‘04
(Roger, Debate Coach – U. Kentucky, “Debate’s Culture of Narcissism”, Contemporary Argumentation
and Debate, p. 58)
Kritik debaters often indict “experts” because of their narrowly focused specialization . But radical critics are the ultimate debate specialists.
They acquire extreme expertise in the execution of certain themes and forms of argument. As a results, they generally fail to engage with the broader issues that more
mainstream debaters commonly encounter. Radical kritik is sometimes strong on persuasion and conviction, but it is all too often short on critical thinking and
especially self-criticism. Reliance
on experts obviously has its dangers, though it is difficult to avoid in a complex world in which
the experts usually know a lot more about a given subject than one does oneself. (This is, of course, the ultimate rationale for
the employment of experts, whether they are doctors, lawyers, auto mechanics, scholars, or debate coaches.) But reliance on personal experience
is also no panacea. One’s personal experience may not be representative. It is also filtered through the opaque glass of all of
our own prejudices and preconceptions, most of which we acquire from our close social associates. And personal experience is subject to
interpretation and reinterpretation. A given “experience” can have many interpretations, all partial, all selective, some paranoid. A salutary skepticism
towards the experts should be accompanied by an equally important skepticism with regards to our own infallibility.
A2: Debating Plans Bad
Debating about the state does not mean capitulating to it --- discussing government policy creates critical understanding that
facilitates resistance against its worst abuses
Donovan and Larkin ‘06
(Clair and Phil, Australian National University, Politics, Vol. 26, No. 1)
We do not suggest that political science should merely fall into line with the government instrumentalism that we have identified,
becoming a 'slave social science' (see Donovan, 2005). But, we maintain that political scientists should be able to engage with
practical politics on their own terms and should be able to provide research output that is of value to practitioners. It is because of its focus on
understanding, explanation, conceptualisation and classification that political science has the potential to contribute more to
practical politics, and more successfully. As Brian Barry notes, 'Granting (for the sake of argument) that [students of politics] have some methods that
enable us to improve on the deliverances of untutored common sense or political journalism, what good do they do? The answer to that question is: not much. But if we
change the question and ask what good they could do, I believe that it is possible to justify a more positive answer' (Bany, 2004, p. 22). A
clear understanding
of how institutions and individuals interact or how different institutions interact with each other can provide clear and useful insights
that practitioners can successfully use, making - or perhaps remaking - a political science that 'directs research efforts to good questions and
enables incremental improvements to be made' (ibid., 19). In this sense, political science already has the raw material to make this contribution, but it
chooses not to utilise it in this way: no doubt, in part, because academics are motivated to present their findings to other academics and not the practitioners within the
institutions they study.
This can’t be offense --- even if our framework is ineffective, their’s is the political equivalent of burying your head in the sand
--- ignoring pragmatic policy details leaves the Left completely unequipped to prevent domination
McClean ‘01
(David E., Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, http://www.americanphilosophy.org/archives/past_conference_programs/pc2001/discussion%20papers/david_mcclean.htm)
I would like to suggest that it is time for American social critics who are enamored with this group, those who actually want to be relevant, to
recognize that they have a disease, and a disease regarding which I myself must remember to stay faithful to my own twelve step program of recovery.
The disease is the need for elaborate theoretical "remedies" wrapped in neological and multi-syllabic jargon. These elaborate
theoretical remedies are more "interesting, " to be sure, than the pragmatically settled questions about what shape democracy should take in various contexts, or whether
private property should be protected by the state, or regarding our basic human nature (described, if not defined (heaven forbid!), in such statements as "We don't like to
starve" and "We like to speak our minds without fear of death" and "We like to keep our children safe from poverty"). As Rorty puts it, "When one of today's academic
leftists says that some topic has been 'inadequately theorized,' you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either philosophy of language, or Lacanian
futile attempts to philosophize one's way into political
relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left retreats from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach to the
psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist version of economic determinism. . . . These
problems of its country. Disengagement from practice produces theoretical hallucinations"(italics mine).(1) Or as John Dewey put it in his The Need for a Recovery of
Philosophy, "I believe that philosophy in America will be lost between chewing a historical cud long since reduced to woody fiber, or an apologetics for lost causes, . . .
. or a scholastic, schematic formalism, unless it can somehow bring to consciousness America's own needs and its own implicit principle of successful action." Those
who suffer or have suffered from this disease Rorty refers to as the Cultural Left, which left is juxtaposed to the Political Left that Rorty prefers and prefers for good
reason. Another attribute of the Cultural Left is that its members fancy themselves pure culture critics who view the successes of America and the West, rather than
some of the barbarous methods for achieving those successes, as mostly evil, and who view anything like national pride as equally evil even when that pride is tempered
with the knowledge and admission of the nation's shortcomings. In other words, the Cultural Left, in this country, too often dismiss American society as beyond reform
and redemption. And Rorty correctly argues that this is a disastrous conclusion, i.e. disastrous for the Cultural Left. I think it may also be disastrous for our social hopes,
as I will explain. Leftist American culture critics
might put their considerable talents to better use if they bury some of their cynicism
about America's social and political prospects and help forge public and political possibilities in a spirit of determination to, indeed, achieve our
country - the country of Jefferson and King; the country of John Dewey and Malcom X; the country of Franklin Roosevelt and Bayard Rustin, and of the later George
Wallace and the later Barry Goldwater. To invoke the words of King, and with reference to the American society, the time is always ripe to seize the opportunity to help
create the "beloved community," one woven with the thread of agape into a conceptually single yet diverse tapestry that shoots for nothing less than a true intraAmerican cosmopolitan ethos, one wherein both same sex unions and faith-based initiatives will be able to be part of the same social reality, one wherein business
interests and the university are not seen as belonging to two separate galaxies but as part of the same answer to the threat of social and ethical nihilism. We who fancy
ourselves philosophers would do well to create from within ourselves and from within our ranks a new kind of public intellectual who has both a hungry theoretical
mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to move past high theory to other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" but more important to
the prospect of our flourishing - questions such as "How is it possible to develop a citizenry that cherishes a certain hexis, one which prizes the character of the
Samaritan on the road to Jericho almost more than any
other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds the fantasy of a missile defense system with the need to treat America as but one member in a
community of nations under a "law of peoples?" The new public philosopher might seek to understand labor law and military and trade theory and doctrine as much as
theories of surplus value; the logic of international markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the
This means going down deep into the guts of our quotidian social institutions, into
the grimy pragmatic details where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take
difficult and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and it means making honest attempts to truly understand
how those institutions actually function in the actual world before howling for their overthrow commences. This might help keep us
politics of power (all of which can still be done from our arm chairs.)
from being slapped down in debates by true policy pros who actually know what they are talking about but who
lack awareness of the dogmatic assumptions from which they proceed.
A2: Aff Choice
4. Framework debates are uniquely educational --- they underpin all other debate knowledge
Ehninger and Brockriede ‘63
(Douglas, University of Iowa and Wayne, CSU Fullerton, Decision By Debate, p. 27)
and practice are, they would make for a torturous learning process and might in the end prove unrewarding were
they not correlated with a third factor. This factor is a knowledge of debate theory, of the body of principle and procedures that constitute
the discipline of argumentation. A book such as this can be of only modest help in guiding observations and of almost none in directing and criticizing
Important as observation
practice. It can, however, be of material aid in teaching the body of theory on which intelligent observation and purposeful practice must be based.
SSD Good
Privileging personal narratives squelches debate and ruins the ‘switch-side’ model
Stannard ‘06
(Matt, Director of Forensics and Associate Editor – U. Wyoming, “Deliberation, Democracy, and
Debate”, Spring, 4-28, http://theunderview.blogspot.com/2006/04/deliberation-democracy-anddebate.html)
But the Academy is not only under attack from "outsiders," and not merely because the post-September 11 world has given the nod to sterile and commodified forms of
patriotic communication and safe, symbolic dissent. Both inside and outside college life, the value of discussion is increasingly under attack, under sabotage, sometimes
unintentionally, sometimes violently, and the attackers are often not recognizable as such. We cower away from religious fanatics because we know they refuse to
entertain the possibility of their incorrectness, but we fail to see our own failure to embrace the possibilities of our own incorrectness. We label other points of view
"ideological" from vantage points we assume to be free of ideology, or we excuse our narrow-mindedness by telling ourselves that "ideology is inevitable." Part of this
weakening of our commitment to open debate is our recent, seemingly liberating embrace of personal conviction over public
deliberation, the self-comfort of personal narrative over the clumsy, awkward, and fallible attempt to forge consensus across the lines of
identity and politics. The fetishization of personal conviction is no less threatening to the public forum than violent
authoritarianism—both seek to render disagreement impossible, close off deliberation, and take us closer towards
eventual, unnatural silence. The alternative I would offer today is rooted in the communicative ethics of deliberation, and its academic embodiment is
the practice of debate—both in competitive and non-competitive formats: debate as rule-based cooperative truth-generation. Deliberative ethics,
following the communication theories of Jurgen Habermas, and the ethical theories of Emmanuel Levinas, among others, are ethics concerning how we collectively
construct "truth" itself. What I am speaking of might be called the democratization of truth. Such talk is immensely unpopular on both sides of the ideological spectrum.
Benefits of switching sides comparatively outweigh its drawbacks
Muir ‘93
(Star, Professor of Communication – George Mason U., “A Defense of the Ethics of Contemporary
Debate”, Philosophy & Rhetoric, Vol. 26, No. 4, p. 292)
Contemporary debate, even in the context of a vigorous defense, does have its drawbacks. It tends to overemphasize logic and tactics and
to downplay personal feelings; it is by nature competitive, and therefore susceptible to competitive impulses and techniques (such as rapid speaking
and a multiplicity of arguments); and it can desensitize debaters to real human problems and needs through continual labeling and discussion of abstract
issues on paper. These problems, however, are more than matched by the conceptual flexibility, empathy, and familiarity with
significant issues provided by switch-side debate.
Solves all their offense – can read the aff as a K of the rez on the neg.
Switch side debating is the highest ethical act because it subordinates personal convictions to the importance of the
decision-making process
Day ‘66
(Dennis, Professor of Speech – U Wisconsin-Madison, Central States Speech Journal, Feb, p. 7)
To present persuasively the arguments for a position with which one disagrees is, perhaps, the greatest need and the highest ethical act
in democratic debate. It is the greatest need because most minority views, if expressed at all, are not expressed forcefully and persuasively. Bryce, in his
perceptive analysis of America and Americans, saw two dangers to democratic government: the danger of not ascertaining accurately the will of the majority and the
danger that minorities might not effectively express themselves. In regard to the second danger, which he considered the greater of the two, he suggested: The duty,
therefore, of a patriotic statesman in a country where public opinion rules, would seem to be rather to resist and correct than to encourage the dominant sentiment. He
will not be content with trying to form and mould and lead it, but he will confront it, lecture it, remind it that it is fallible, rouse it -out of its self-complacency To
present persuasively arguments for a position with which one disagrees is the highest ethical act in debate because it sets aside
personal interests for the benefit of the common good. Essentially, for the person who accepts decision by debate, the ethics of the
decision-making process are superior to the ethics of personal conviction on particular subjects for debate. Democracy is a commitment to
means, not ends. Democratic society accepts certain ends, i.e., decisions, because they have been arrived at by democratic means. We recognize the moral priority of
decision by debate when we agree to be bound by that decision regardless of personal conviction. Such an agreement is morally acceptable because the
decisionmaking process guarantees our moral integrity by guaranteeing the opportunity to debate for a reversal of the decision. Thus,
personal conviction can have moral significance in social decision-making only so long as the integrity of debate is
maintained. And the integrity of debate is maintained only when there is a full and forceful confrontation of arguments and evidence relevant to decision. When an
argument is not presented or is not presented as persuasively as possible, then debate fails. As debate fails decisions become less "wise." As decisions become less wise
the process of decision-making is questioned. And finally, if and when debate is set aside for the alternative method of decision-making by authority, the personal
convictions of individuals within society lose their moral significance as determinants of social choice.
And, democratic deliberation solves extinction.
Boggs 97 (Carl Boggs, The great retreat: Decline of the public sphere in late twentieth-century America National University, Los Angeles Theory and Society 26:
741-780
The decline of the public sphere in late twentieth-century America poses a series of great dilemmas and
challenges. Many ideological currents scrutinized here - localism, metaphysics, spontaneism, postmodernism, Deep Ecology - intersect with and reinforce each other. While these currents have deep origins in popular movements
of the 1960s and 1970s, they remain very much alive in the 1990s. Despite their different outlooks and trajectories, they all share one thing in
common: a depoliticized expression of struggles to combat and over- come alienation. The false sense of
empowerment that comes with such mesmerizing impulses is accompanied by a loss of public engagement,
an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacity of individuals in large groups to work for social change. As this
ideological quagmire worsens, urgent problems that are destroying the fabric of American society will go
unsolved - perhaps even unrecognized - only to fester more ominously into the future. And such problems (ecological crisis, poverty,
urban decay, spread of infectious diseases, technological displacement of workers) cannot be understood outside the larger
social and global context of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. Paradoxically, the widespread retreat from politics, often
inspired by localist sentiment, comes at a time when agendas that ignore or side- step these global realities
will, more than ever, be reduced to impotence. In his commentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the
increasing sublimation and dilution of politics, as larger numbers of people turn away from public concerns
toward private ones. By diluting the life of common involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a
source of public ideals and visions.74 In the meantime, the fate of the world hangs in the balance. The unyielding
truth is that, even as the ethos of anti-politics becomes more compelling and even fashionable in the United States, it
is the vagaries of political power that will continue to decide the fate of human societies. This last point demands
further elaboration. The shrinkage of politics hardly means that corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that
social hierarchies will somehow disappear, or that gigantic state and military structures will lose their hold
over people's lives. Far from it: the space abdicated by a broad citizenry, well-informed and ready to
participate at many levels, can in fact be filled by authoritarian and reactionary elites - an already familiar
dynamic in many lesser- developed countries. The fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian world, not very far
removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a part of the American landscape, could be the
prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in the face of disunity and atomized retreat. In this
way the eclipse of politics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more virulent guise - or it might help further rationalize the existing power structure.
In either case, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal,
collective interests that had vanished from civil society.
Policy education is even more important for those who won’t become policy-makers
Keller ‘01
(Thomas, Professor of Social Work Education, Journal of Social Work Education, Spring/Summer)
Experiential learning, in the form of the practicum placement, is a key element in social work education. However, few social work students enroll in
political or policy oriented practicum. In a survey of 161 CSWE-accredited programs (131 BSW, 30 MSW), Wolk and colleagues (1996) found that
less than half offered practice in government relations (BSW=20%, MSW=47%) and even fewer had placements in policy advocacy/development
(BSW=15%, MSW=33%). Moreover, programs typically reported only one or two students participating in these types of placements, with the
largest representation at a single school being 9 out of 250 MSW students (Wolk et al., 1996). Because few students receive policy-related field education,
introducing students to policy relevant skills and experiences via active learning exercises in the classroom assumes greater importance. Bonwell and Eison
(1991) describe the general characteristics of active learning in the classroom: Students are involved in more than listening. Less emphasis is placed
on transmitting information and more on developing students' skills. Students are involved in higher-order thinking (analysis, synthesis, evaluation).
Students are engaged in activities. Greater emphasis is placed on students' exploration of their own attitudes and values. (p. 2) Experiential learning in
the classroom may involve case studies, role plays, debates, simulations, or other activities that allow students to make connections among theory, knowledge,
and experience (Lewis & Williams, 1994). These active learning strategies encourage students to think on their feet, to question their own values and
responses to situations, and to consider new ways of thinking in contexts which they may experience more intensely and, consequently, may remember
longer (Meyers & Jones, 1993).
Refusing switch-side debate results in covert suppression of minority views --- this is a greater ethical threat than subverting
public convictions
Day ‘66
(Dennis, Professor of Speech – U Wisconsin-Madison, Central States Speech Journal, Feb)
Thus, personal conviction can have moral significance in social decision-making only so long as the integrity of debate is maintained. And the
integrity of
debate is maintained only when there is a full and forceful confrontation of arguments and evidence relevant to decision . When an
argument is not presented or is not presented as persuasively as possible, then debate fails. As debate fails decisions become less "wise." As decisions become less wise
the process of decision-making is questioned. And finally, if and when debate
is set aside for the alternative method of decision-making by
authority, the personal convictions of individuals within society lose their moral significance as determinants of social choice. This may
seem to present a paradoxical ethical dichotomy to those who believe that sincerity of expression is the highest ethical test of
public address. No paradox obtains, however, for those who are committed to debate. Belief that the wisest decisions are achieved by a full confrontation of arguments
and information dictates a primary obligation to see that debate takes place. And if
personal conviction on a particular subject has a preponderance of
truth in its favor it will prevail over other views even when all views are fully presented. If we believe that our personal
conviction can prevail only if not confronted by other opinions, then we must either reject the belief that debate is the best method
of arriving at truth in social matters or admit that our general interests of society. When we give personal conviction an ethical priority over the decision-making
process our emphasis can too easily focus on ends rather than means. And personal conviction, as noted above, derives its moral significance only in
a specified context of means. Perhaps this is what Murphy had in mind when he wrote, "Although personal integrity and honest belief are important parts of a
man's character, it is not the sincerity of the man but the honesty of his expression which as to be measured in rhetoric."9 The ethic suggested here is similar to another
ethical position which is widely accepted.10 Most readily acknowledge
an ethical responsibility to oppose overt attempts to silence debate or
suppress the expression of minority and unpopular views, even when such attempts are made in the name of personal conviction. Most
fail, however, to recognize the more subtle and dangerous form of suppression which takes place in the name of
personal conviction: an individual's failure to give effective expression to an argument which is not otherwise being effectively expressed,
because the argument is in opposition to his personal conviction on a problem. The act of suppression is no less harmful to the
decision-making process because it is covert instead of overt. The social effects are the same: decision based on incomplete
debate. The covert suppression of argument and information is as ethically culpable as is overt suppression. And personal conviction is no
justification for either. Covert suppression is the greater threat to democratic processes because it is clandestine and is more
difficult to overcome because of the ego-involvement that usually accompanies personal conviction.
The critical thinking benefits comparatively outweigh their reasons that switch-side debate is bad
Muir ‘93
(Star, Professor of Communication – George Mason U., “A Defense of the Ethics of Contemporary
Debate”, Philosophy & Rhetoric, Vol. 26, No. 4, p. 286-7)
A third point about isolation from the real world is that switch-side debate develops habits of the mind and instills a lifelong pattern of critical
assessment. Students who have debated both sides of a topic are better voters, Dell writes, because of "their habit of
analyzing both sides before forming a conclusion." O'Neill, Laycock and Scales, responding in part to Roosevelt's indictment, iterated the basic
position in 1931: Skill in the use of facts and inferences available may be gained on either side of a question without regard to convictions. Instruction and practice in
debate should give young men this skill. And where these matters are properly handled, stress is not laid on getting the speaker to think rightly in regard to the merits of
either side of these questions—but to think accurately on both sides. Reasons
"real world," sophistry)
for not taking a position counter to one's beliefs (isolation from the
are largely outweighed by the benefit of such mental habits throughout an individual's life .
Debating both sides is the only way to create reflective thinking, a crucial pre-condition for critical decision-making
Muir ‘93
(Star, Professor of Communication – George Mason U., “A Defense of the Ethics of Contemporary
Debate”, Philosophy & Rhetoric, Vol. 26, No. 4, p. 289-90)
At an individual level, tolerance is related to moral identity via empathic and critical assessments of differing perspectives. Paul posits a strong relationship between
tolerance, empathy, and critical thought. Discussing the function of argument in everyday life, he observes that in order to overcome natural tendencies to reason
egocentrically and sociocentrically, individuals must gain the capacity to engage in self-reflective questioning, to reason dialogically and dialectically. and to
"reconstruct alien and opposing belief systems empathically."*- Our system of beliefs is. by definition, irrational when we are incapable of abandoning a belief for
rational reasons; that is, when we egocentrically associate our beliefs with our own integrity. Paul describes an intimate relationship between private inferential habits,
moral practices, and the nature of argumentation. Critical
thought and moral identity, he urges, must be predicated on discovering the insights of
opposing views and the weaknesses of our own beliefs. Role playing, he reasons, is a central element of any effort to gain
such insight. Only an activity that requires the defense of both sides of an issue, moving beyond acknowledgement to exploration and
advocacy, can engender such powerful role playing. Redding explains that "debating both sides is a special instance of role-playing,
where debaters are forced to empathize on a constant basis with a position contrary to their own. This role playing, Baird agrees, is an
exercise in reflective thinking, an engagement in problem solving that exposes weaknesses and strengths, “Motivated by the
knowledge that they may debate against their own case, debaters constantly pose arguments and counter-arguments for discussion,
erecting defenses and then challenging these defenses with a different tact." Such conceptual flexibility, Paul argues, is essential for
effective critical thinking, and in turn for the development of a reasoned moral identity.
Debating both sides improves advocacy and critical thinking skills
Rutledge ‘02
(Skip, Point Loma Nazarene University, “Ethics in Action in NPDA Debate”,
cas.bethel.edu/dept/comm/npda/journal/vol8no1.pdf)
The reason for such dramatic findings in improved critical thinking skills from debate is that the activity stresses that each
participant should analytically weigh each statement being made both by the participant and the opponent. One strives to make wellreasoned arguments and to spot fallacies or poorly reasoned positions within an opponent's arguments. Many of these benefits are directly attributable to the counter
attitudinal advocacy training intrinsic to debate. By
defending a position counter to one's own conviction, one learns the strengths and
weaknesses of the Opposition's arguments. This is helpful for several reasons. First, by knowing both sets of arguments, that
debater is then better able to attack this position when on the other side in future debates, and better able to defend one's
original position. But the best benefit is that they actually learn to listen to what others are saying and to understand why,
rather than automatically parroting standard positions and rejecting claims counter to their own views without even considering their warrants or
support data. The truth is that there is a lot more gray than black and white in the world, and by seriously listening to other's views one can be better
equipped to reason logically to stronger conclusions. This brings the discussion full circle back to Socrates and Plato's efforts to seek truth. Aristotle
believed that truth was best served by vigorously comparing opposing positions. The stronger position was presumed to be the most truthful.