INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ORGANIZATION THEORY AND
BEHAVIOR, 8 (4), 541-558
WINTER 2005
CRITICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE AND CONFLICT
TRANSFORMATION: OPPORTUNITIES FOR
CITIZEN GOVERNANCE
Nancy Meyer-Emerick*
ABSTRACT.
Critical theory has rarely articulated an agenda for social
change linking theory to practice. This paper provides several examples of
“critical theory in practice” and focuses specifically on Fay’s Critical Social
Science (CSS) model. The methods of conflict transformation are then applied
to CSS in order to accomplish two goals. First, political conflicts resulting from
decision making can be used to transform both individuals and systems. Second,
CSS more adequately accounts for some of the non-rational aspects of human
nature, such as our resistance to change, thus improving its catalytic validity as a
critical social theory.
Together, the processes of CSS and conflict
transformation provide a framework for enhancing the potential for citizen
governance.
INTRODUCTION
This paper begins by identifying the gaps in critical theory as
defined by the Frankfurt School and Habermas’s discourse theory.
Critical Social Science (CSS) fills in those gaps to enable researchers or
practitioners who are working with citizen groups to build decisionmaking capacity in order to enable them to self-govern. Yet even the
methods from CSS are difficult to achieve because human beings are
inherently uncomfortable with change, and CSS is particularly
disconcerting because it generally challenges an individual’s core beliefs
and worldview. This psychological disruption causes both personal and
interpersonal conflict. The paper describes how this conflict can be
overcome using conflict transformation processes.
----------------------------* Nancy Meyer-Emerick, Ph.D., is an Associate Professor at the Maxine
Goodman Levin College of Urban Affairs, Cleveland State University. Her
research interests include democratic governance, policy analysis, and risk
analysis.
CRITICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE AND CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION
Copyright © 2005 by PrAcademics Press
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MEYER-EMERICK
THE ORIGINS OF CRITICAL THEORY
Critical theory was developed in the 1920s by members of the
“Frankfurt School”, the Institute for Social Research at the University of
Frankfurt, Germany (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford,
1982; Arato & Gebhardt, 1978; Held, 1980; Jay, 1973; Kellner, 1989).
Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse were the
primary scholars associated with the theory, which built chiefly on the
work of Marx, Kant, Hegel, Weber, and Durkheim (Fay, 1987;
Kincheloe & McLaren, 2000; Morrow, 1994). This group initially used
the term “Critical Theory” to highlight their “substantive, neo-Marxist
theory of advanced capitalism” (Fay, 1987, p. 4) and to acknowledge its
roots in Kant’s critical philosophy and Marx’s critique of ideology.
Morrow (1994, p. 99) states that “at the time of his inauguration as
director of the Frankfurt Institute, Horkheimer defined the programmatic
task of Critical Theory as ‘the question of the connection between the
economic life of society, the psychic development of individuals, and the
changes in cultural domains in the narrower sense. To these belong not
only the so-called spiritual contents of science, art, and religion, but also
law, custom, fashion, public opinion, sports, leisure pastimes, life style,
etc.’ (Horkheimer, 1972, p. 43, translated by Morrow).”
The Frankfurt School theorists’ analysis was derived from
philosophy, sociology, psychology, economics, and political science,
however they rejected the positivist methods of the natural sciences,
seeking instead to formulate a historical theory of society. Having lived
through the destruction of World War I and recognizing that people were
unable to free themselves from domination by the market, they rejected
Marx’s economic determinism. Instead they came to believe that even
people’s personalities were being subsumed by the market, therefore any
plausible theory needed to identify paths to liberation.
After field research in Nazi Germany in the 1930s revealed the
growing fascism among the proletariat in whom they held such hope,
Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse, among others, fled to the United
States. Yet here too they were dismayed by “contradictions between
progressive American rhetoric of egalitarianism and the reality of racial
and class discrimination” (Kincheloe & McLaren, 2000, p. 280) as well
as social scientists’ complete reliance on empirical methodology.
Horkheimer and Adorno, and others, returned to Germany in 1953 to
CRITICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE AND CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION
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reestablish the Institute for Social Research, but Marcuse remained and
the student movement of the 1960s popularized his philosophical work.
With the exception of Marcuse (e.g., 1969, 1972) none of the
original critical theorists was able to advance an enlightened and
emancipatory theory of political action. This insurmountable difficulty
was partially the result of the obscurity of their writing. They were afraid
to expose their analysis lest it be co-opted and its emancipatory potential
destroyed. Works such as Marcuse’s “One Dimensional Man” (1964)
and Horkheimer and Adorno’s “Dialectic of Enlightenment” (1972)
explicitly lacked the possibility of resistance (Fay, 1987, p. 6).
Nevertheless, the immense contribution of the Frankfurt School critical
theorists persists, although in different forms.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CRITICAL THEORY
Since the 1960s, Jürgen Habermas (e.g., 1973, 1975, 1984, 1987,
1990) has been considered the most prominent of the intellectual heirs of
the Frankfurt School. However, he dramatically revised critical theory
focusing on knowledge interests and communicative action. The three
primary knowledge interests were “an empirical-analytical interest in
potential control, a hermeneutic-historical interest in understanding; and
a critical-emancipatory interest in freedom and autonomy (Habermas,
1971)” [italics in original] (Morrow, 1994, p. 144). Unfortunately
however, despite the brilliance of Habermas’ extensive analysis, it lacks
an emancipatory political agenda. As Zanetti (1997) states, “Without a
political agenda—a connection to practice—critical theory can be
nothing but philosophy “after the fact,” an intellectual cul-de-sac. It can
interpret, but not change, the world” (p. 156). Yet, critical theory as
derived from the Frankfurt School is only one of the many ‘critical’
theories in the social sciences today.
Morrow (1994) describes the development of critical theory from its
origins to the present day and then discusses it from three sociological
perspectives: as an approach to the sciences, a conception of society, and
a vision for realizing certain values. He identifies aspects of critical
theory in all the social science disciplines: for example, anthropology,
history, political science, communications and cultural studies,
psychology, geography and urban studies, and economics. Parallel
developments can be seen also in more applied and professional fields
such as education, social work, organizational studies and public
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administration, legal studies, and planning and policy research. Critical
theory has also had a strong influence on feminist theory and cultural
studies.
Largely following Habermas’ method, critical theory in Germany
has been further developed by “Wolfgang Bonß, Helmut Dubiel, Klaus
Eder, Axel Honneth, Hans Joas, Claus Offe, and Albrecht Wellmer”
(Morrow, 1994, p. 16). Offe, for example, has been involved “with the
founding of the Green Party and has observed its ‘maturation’ process
with critical support” (Mayer & Ely, 1998, p. 336). Joachim Hirsch “is
one of Germany’s leading political theorists. He has published
extensively on social movements, regulation theory, and the state and
system of states in capitalism” (Anderson, 2002, p. x). Although Morrow
(1994) states that critical theory is not currently associated specifically
with any group in France, in French Quebec it is with Rioux and Nielsen,
and can be loosely associated with the work of contemporary French
“sociologists Alain Touraine…and Pierre Bourdieu… as well as the late
philosopher and historian Michel Foucault” (p. 17).
However the vast majority of critical theorists are Anglo American.
According to Morrow (1994, p. 17),
Examples of contemporary British and North American
sociologists and social, political, and cultural theorists closely
associated with critical theory are the work of Zygmunt Bauman,
Anthony Giddens, David Held, John Keane, William Outhwaite,
and John B. Thompson in Britain; Ben Agger, Robert Antonio,
Andrew Arato, Stanley Aronowitz, Seyla Benhabib, Richard
Bernstein, Norman Birnbaum, Craig Calhoun, Jean Cohen, Fred
Dallmayr, Nancy Fraser, Henry Giroux, Alvin Gouldner, Martin
Jay, Douglas Kellner, Tim Luke, Tom McCarthy, Paul Piccone,
Mark Posner, and Philip Wexler in the United States; Barry
Adam, Gregory Baum, Ioan Davies, Rick Gruneau, Barb
Marshall, William Leiss, Greg Nielsen, John O’Neill, Marcel
Rioux, and Charles Taylor in Canada; and in Australia and New
Zealand in work associated with the journal Thesis Eleven (e.g.,
Beilharz, et al…) and individuals such as Johann Arnason, Bob
Connell, Michael Pusey, Robert E. Young, and Barry Smart.
Prominent critical theorists within U.S. public administration
literature include Richard Box, Robert Denhardt, Arthur Felts, John
Forester, Jay White, and Lisa Zanetti.
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Morrow (1994) defends critical theory from the common claims that
it is antiscientific, elitist, and rationalistic. Critical theory is not
antiscientific simply because it questions the nature of knowledge and
the traditional scientific method. He insists that it is a valid program of
research in the social sciences and, while it is often associated with
specific ideologies, because it makes this association explicit these
linkages can be examined for legitimacy. Critical theorists are often
charged with being elitist because their language appears obscure and
unrealistic. Morrow suggests that this is due in part to the necessity of
discussing philosophical and theoretical concepts with which readers
may be unfamiliar. He states, “viewed more closely, the deeper
aspirations of contemporary critical theory are very different. On the one
hand, critical theory aspires to facilitate a democratization of knowledge
in the sense that every person is recognized de facto as a philosopher and
encouraged to develop the faculties of fundamental questioning. At the
same time, however, there is a refusal to identify the adequacy of
theories with their immediate accessibility. A side of scientific inquiry is
also inevitably elitist in the sense that novel interpretations of nature and
society are often difficult to grasp and translate into popular
formulations” (p. 27-28).
Finally, and ironically, critical theory is now sometimes attacked as
being too rationalistic, primarily by postmodern theorists. Morrow
(1994) notes that there are modernist and postmodernist types of critical
theory; “although retaining a similar political engagement in its
opposition to orthodoxies of Marxism and academic disciplines,
postmodern critical theory – as in the work of Michel Foucault – ‘indicts,
sometimes explicitly, more often implicitly, the idea that modernity
contains within itself the potential for human emancipation’ (Leonard,
1990, p. xiv)” (p. 29).
Morrow uses the work of critical realist Roy Bhaskar to bridge the
gap between positivism and postmodern relativism. Bhaskar
distinguishes between “thought and objects of thought, hence between
‘intransitive’ and ‘transitive’ objects of scientific knowledge. Intransitive
objects are thus ‘the (relatively) unchanging real objects which exist
outside and perdure independently of the scientific process,’ whereas
transitive objects involve ‘the changing (and theoretically –imbued)
cognitive objects which are produced within the science as a function
and result of its practice’ (Bhaskar, 1986, p. 51)” (Morrow, 1994, p. 78).
Ultimately, “critical social science has three distinctive features: ‘an
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emphasis on reflexivity, the acceptance of a methodological and
ontological orientation distinct from the naturalistic paradigm, and a
commitment to social criticism and advocacy’ (Sabia & Wallulis, 1983,
p. 6)” (Morrow, 1994, p. 110).
Bernstein (1978) researched foundational questions about human
nature, social and political knowledge and how it affects lives, and the
relation of theory and practice in order to integrate what was right and
reject what was false in the complex debate within the social sciences in
the 1960s and 70s. He examined social science as natural science and
from three contrasting perspectives: analytic philosophy, particularly the
“linguistic turn” and the history and philosophy of science;
phenomenology; and from the perspective of the Frankfurt School
Critical Theorists.
Bernstein (1978) found that the critical theory of society was central
to the restructuring of social and political theory and that “the search for
empirical correlations, the task of interpreting social and political reality,
and the critique of this ‘reality,’ are not three distinct types of inquiry.
They are the three moments of theorizing about social and political life”
(p. 174). He concluded that “We can recognize that there will be no
significant movement toward emancipation unless there is a
transformation of social and political institutions. But we must also
recognize that human beings are capable of bringing to consciousness the
interpretations, evaluations, and standards that they tacitly accept, and
can subject them to rational criticism” (p. 236). Leonard has identified
some practical examples of this process.
Leonard (1990) proposes that many social movements are examples
of “critical theory in practice” although not explicitly identified as such.
He discusses four popular movements. The dependency theory
developed by Henri Fernando Cardoso focused on socioeconomic
development in Latin America. Cardoso’s (1977) “radically critical”
theory sought to “provide social agents with the theoretical tools for
understanding and changing their oppressed condition” (p. 16). However,
dependency theory is not verified until social actors are able to actually
implement the changes implied by their analysis.
Freire’s (1970) “pedagogy of the oppressed” is a second example of
critical theory in practice. In this educational model (as will be discussed
further below) the “teacher” works with the students to enable them to
develop their own critical consciousness of oppression and use this
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knowledge to take action. Liberation theology as defined by Gutierrez
(1973) is “a theological reflection born of the experience of shared
efforts to abolish the current unjust situation and to build a different
society, freer and more human” (as cited in Leonard, 1990, p. xxi).
The women’s movement is a fourth example of a critical theory in
practice specifically because of its “ongoing critical self-examination and
consciousness-raising” that provides feminist theories with prescriptions
for practice (Leonard, p. xxii). Leonard agrees with Fay that the
difference between a “truly critical and a manipulative, instrumentalist
social theory ‘is not only the fact that people come to have a particular
self-understanding, and that this new self-understanding provides the
basis for altering social arrangements, but also the manner in which they
come to adopt this new ‘guiding idea.’ In fact, rational discourse must be
the cause of the oppressed’s change in basic self-conception’ (Fay, 1977,
p. 224-225)” (Leonard, 1990, p. xxii-xxiii).
Other processes, particularly Critical Social Science (CSS) as
defined by Fay (1987) address some of the gaps within the original
critical theory. Morrow (1994, p. 194) states, “Brian Fay provides a
useful summary of the basic scheme of a strong program for a critical
social science, at least from the perspective of a focus on its task as a
theory of praxis….This general model applies rather well to the early
form of Critical Theory advocated by Horkheimer and remains pertinent
to Habermas’s overall schema, but the latter’s abandonment of the
classical revolutionary model of transition puts greater emphasis on its
educative functions as a research program.”
CRITICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE
Fay critiqued the foundations of critical theory and developed a
scheme of “critical social science” that would enable emancipatory
political action. Although an extensive discussion of his work is beyond
the scope of this paper, several key concepts provide the link between
critical theory and conflict transformation. Fay distinguishes CSS as a
theory of science from the Frankfurt School critical theory, which
attempted to describe how society functioned. He uses the term “science”
to distinguish this form of critical theory from other “theories of social
life which are critical in the requisite sense in both intention and content,
but which are not products of the Frankfurt School” (Fay, p. 5).
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Fay describes the human condition as a variation of selfestrangement theory, forms of which have existed throughout human
history. This theory posits that humans are ignorant of their true nature
and situation and so live unsatisfying lives. But it also proposes that
people can be enlightened and therefore emancipated to change their
social condition. According to Fay, in modern times it is thought that
emancipation can only be achieved through scientific knowledge, which
could also be appropriated to improve society (Fay, p. 22). Fay maintains
that his CSS is scientific, critical, practical, and non-idealistic. He defines
CSS as scientific because it can provide “comprehensive explanations in
terms of a few basic principles which are subject to public evidence” (p.
26). It is critical in its “sustained negative evaluation of the social order
on the basis of explicit and rationally supported criteria” (p. 26). CSS is
practical because it arouses “some members of society identified by the
theory to transform their social existence in specified ways through
fostering in them a new self-knowledge to serve as the basis for such a
transformation” (p. 26). And CSS is non-idealistic as it is “not committed
to the claims either that ideas are the sole determinant of behavior…or
that emancipation simply involves a certain sort of enlightenment…or
that people are able and willing to change their self-understandings
simply on the basis of rational argument” (p. 26.). Fay’s (1987, pp. 3132) basic CSS scheme outlines the criteria for a truly critical social
theory in Table 1.
TABLE 1
Criteria for a Truly Critical Social Theory
I. A theory of false consciousness which
1. demonstrates the ways in which the self-understandings of a group
of people are false (in the sense of failing to account for the life
experiences of the members of the group), or incoherent (because
internally contradictory), or both. This is sometimes called an
“ideology-critique”;
2. explains how the members of this group came to have these selfmisunderstandings, and how they are maintained;
3. contrasts them with an alternative self-understanding, showing
how this alternative is superior.
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TABLE 1 (Continued)
II. A theory of crisis which
4. spells out what a social crisis is;
5. indicates how a particular society is in such a crisis. This would
require examining the felt dissatisfactions of a group of people and
showing both that they threaten social cohesion and that they
cannot be alleviated given the basic organization of the society and
the self-understandings of its members;
6. provides an historical account of the development of this crisis
partly in terms of false consciousness of the members of the group
and partly in terms of the structural bases of the society.
III. A theory of education which
7. offers an account of the conditions necessary and sufficient for the
sort of enlightenment envisioned by the theory;
8. shows that given the current social situation these conditions are
satisfied.
IV. A theory of transformative action which
9. isolates those aspects of a society, which must be altered if the
social crisis is to be resolved and the dissatisfactions of its
members lessened;
10. details a plan of action indicating the people who are to be the
“carriers” of the anticipated social transformation and at least some
general idea of how they might do this.
Although Fay’s basic CSS scheme appears valid, he emphasizes that
it is incomplete due to the assumptions it makes about human nature, that
is, its ontological rather than epistemological grounding. First, it is too
rational in its “activist conception of human beings” (p. 46) which posits
that people will always use their intelligence, curiosity, reflection, and
willfulness to actively emancipate themselves. Alternatively, Fay
proposes that people will only sometimes alter their beliefs and behavior
based on new information about the world (i.e., intelligence). People also
are not always curious or seeking out new information in order to
understand their world more fully, nor are they generally reflective or
willing to examine their deeply held beliefs in relation to the evidence.
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This is the core problem that arises when critical theorists attempt to
educate and enable people to identify their ‘false consciousness’ about
their condition to answer the question “what is the proper end of my life
and thus what sort of person ought I to be” (p. 49). Finally, even given
new information or self-consciousness, humans will not always change
or act (i.e., be willful) based on what they have learned, because change,
even for the better, is difficult for people.
Secondly, individuals are also deeply influenced by the norms of
their cultural community. Fay describes this as the activist theory of
society, which is conventional in the sense that an individual could not
have a social life without it. Third, people and societies intentionally
change themselves through time and Fay describes this as the activist
theory of history. These three theories imply that people are always
potentially active, yet as Fay notes, they do not always think or behave
that way. This reality is problematic for traditional critical theory and
CSS because their allure is based, in part, on the belief that once people
lose their false consciousness via enlightenment, they will be empowered
to act, thus becoming emancipated. If our human nature dictates that we
are only partially active, the basic scheme of CSS must be revised.
Fay has done this based on four limits. First of all, there is no final
“truth” because human beings are historical – in process. And because
we are constantly revising what we believe, we also are reconsidering
our actions. As we do this, rational disagreement on courses of action is
to be expected. The second limit is due to our physical bodies. Fay states,
“People are in part what they are because of inherited biological
tendencies and in part because of a somatic learning in which they
acquire behavioral dispositions which are rooted in their bodily
constitution” (p. 207). Thus our bodies themselves may limit
“emancipation” and as Fay emphasizes, also allow us to be physically
controlled and coerced. The third limit is our “embeddedness” within the
human community. We cannot be truly autonomous individuals because
so much of who we are is grounded in our traditions. Even more
importantly, humans are dependent on each other in countless ways,
particularly those attempting to undertake social change. Thus, Fay
states, “Humans are not only active beings; they are also embodied,
traditional, historical, and embedded….Intelligence, curiosity, reflection,
and will are only partly responsible for making humans what they are,
and so it is only in certain circumstances and in partial ways that they can
be effective” (p. 209).
CRITICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE AND CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION
551
Fay warns that there is a dangerous fourth limit to CSS due to its
narrowly defined assumptions about human nature. He dubs it the
‘tyranny scenario,’ (p. 209) reminiscent of the revolutions rooted in
critical theory that became despotic. Fay proposes that while many
movements began with good intentions (enlightening the masses,
empowerment, and emancipation), they became corrupted when the
leaders found these processes slow and difficult. Convinced of their
vision, movement leaders imposed ‘emancipation,’ making the new order
equally or more oppressive than the one they were attempting to
overthrow. To address the four limits, Fay (1987, p. 213) developed the
amendments to the basic CSS scheme as shown in Table 2.
After a somewhat lengthy explanation of Fay’s basic and amended
CSS schemes, we can now explore how conflict transformation processes
might be used to operationalize some of the theories and sub-theories.
TABLE 2
Amendment to Truly Critical Social Theory
I. A theory of the body which
1. develops an explicit account of the nature and role of inherited
dispositions and somatic knowledge
2. formulates a theory of body therapy;
3. spells out the limits which inherited dispositions and somatic
knowledge place on liberation.
II. A theory of tradition which
4. identifies which parts of a particular tradition are, at any given
time, changeable;
5. identifies which parts of a particular tradition are, at any given
time, not changeable or worthy of change.
III. A theory of force which
6. develops an account of the conditions and use of force in particular
socio-political settings;
7. explicitly recognizes the limits to the effectiveness of a critical
theory in the face of certain kinds of force.
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TABLE 2 (Continued)
IV. A theory of reflexivity which
8. gives an explanation of its own historical emergence, and in this
portrays itself as a necessarily one-sided construction in a
particular historical setting;
9. explicitly eschews transcendental aspirations regarding experience
of all humans (or all members of the working class, or all women,
or all blacks, or some other subset of humanity identified as
oppressed), and gives up any pretensions to capture the “essence”
of liberation;
10. offers an account of the ways in which it is inherently and essentially
contextual, partial, local, and hypothetical.
CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION AND THE CSS SCHEMES
Conflict transformation, versus conflict resolution or management,is
unique in that it focuses on the social construction of meaning, the
importance of the history and cultural differences between peoples, and
the “dialectical nature of peacemaking that seeks to change both
destructive individual behavior and the larger social system. Using the
term transformation acknowledges the possibility that conflict can also
be destructive but affirms a goal of mutually beneficial process and
result” (Lederach, 1995, p. 17). Lederach (1995) describes conflict
transformation as non-violent social change that is focused on facilitating
a particular community’s movement through the phases of conflict while
also achieving justice. It is based on three theories. The first is a theory
of popular education, specifically the work of Freire (1970). Fay (1987,
p. 108) emphasizes that Freire’s work [used in conflict transformation] is
one of the few instances of “critical scientific thinking about reflection
and educative enlightenment” that has been “about the public world of
concerted social and political action.” The second is the use of
appropriate technology, and a third is ethnographic methodology. Among
its working assumptions are (Lederach, 1995, p. 9-10):
1….social conflict is “a natural, common experience present in all
relationships and cultures;”
2….“people are active participants in creating the situations and
interactions they experience as conflict;”
CRITICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE AND CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION
553
3. “Conflict emerges through an interactive process based on the
search for and creation of shared meaning;”
4. “The interactive process is accomplished through and rooted in
people’s perceptions, interpretations, expressions, and intentions,
each of which grows and cycles back to common sense knowledge”
5….“a person’s common sense and accumulated experience and
knowledge are the primary basis of how they create, understand,
and respond to conflict;”
6. Culture is “rooted in the shared knowledge and schemes created and
used by a set of people for perceiving, interpreting, expressing, and
responding to social realities around them;”
7. Therefore…“understanding the connection of social conflict and
culture is not merely a question of sensitivity or of awareness, but a
far more profound adventure of discovery and digging in the
archeology of accumulated shared knowledge common to a set of
people.”
Lederach (1995) emphasizes that popular education is never neutral.
“It is centered on the concept of conscientization, the process of building
awareness of self-in-context that produces individual growth and social
change” (p. 26). People and their common knowledge are valued as key
resources. In CSS, just the opposite is implied; it is the leaders who are
valued. Indeed, Fay warns that “There is in critical science the potential
for great harm because it claims to know the needs and capacities of its
audience better than the members of this audience themselves do” (p.
81). Alternatively, the conflict transformation facilitator more often
elicits solutions from the community rather than prescribing them and
engages in mutual learning with the participants.
Lederach also applied principles from appropriate technology to
emphasize that by enabling a particular community to use their own
knowledge and resources to solve conflict, they are able to do so long
after the initial conflict transformation intervention. He states, “The idea
is not simply that you teach people to fish rather than give them food;
more importantly, they fish in their own ponds!” (p. 28). Finally,
Lederach uses methods from ethnography to discover how the
community perceives itself. This is accomplished through careful
observation of the language people use and how they understand their
own behavior and world. Thus equipped with a basic framework for
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conflict transformation, it is now possible to identify its specific potential
for the CSS schemes. In the discussion that follows, please refer to the
Basic and amended CSS schemes as outlined earlier.
Conflict transformation provides a method to fulfill “the theory of
false consciousness” through Freire’s conscientization process, which
Lederach (1995) states, “is needed when the conflict is hidden and
people are unaware of imbalances and injustices” (p. 12). In line with
Fay’s sub-theories 1 and 2, conscientization through conflict
transformation’s ethnography enables a people to undertake an ideology
critique, determine how their particular culture developed a false
consciousness, and how it is maintained. These steps in turn, may lead
them to develop alternatives. Conscientization and appropriate
technology may also enable the fulfillment of the “theory of education”,
because it assists people in identifying whether, per sub-theory 7, a
specific critical theory provides an accurate “account of the conditions
necessary and sufficient for the sort of enlightenment envisioned by the
theory” (Fay, 1987, p. 32).
Next, by its very nature, conflict transformation responds to II a
theory of crisis because as people become aware of social inequities their
demand for change will intensify. This demand for change might be
identified, per sub-theory 4, as social crisis and lead to the fulfillment of
sub-theory 5, the examination of the ‘crisis’ and how it cannot be
resolved given existing social relations. In the process of conflict
transformation, a historical account of the crisis may also be developed,
per sub-theory 6. Thus, “a transformation of the system and structure is
assumed, in which the relationships are embedded and which can be
changed by building on the energy and impact of conflict itself. In other
words, conflict is seen as a transforming agent of systemic change”
(Lederach, 1995, p. 18).
During the conflict transformation process, the “theory of
transformative action” will be developed to resolve the conflict crisis.
Per sub-theory 9, the “aspects of a society that must be altered” (Fay,
1987, p. 32) during the process are “the nature of unequal relationships
and the need for addressing and restoring equity, as seen, of course, from
the view of those experiencing the injustices” (Lederach, 1995, p. 12).
As Lederach (1995) notes, conflict moves through phases and results in
some form of confrontation. Out of this confrontation both sides may
recognize their interdependence and begin “a plan of action indicating
CRITICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE AND CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION
555
the people who are to be the ‘carriers’ of the anticipated social
transformation and at least some general idea of how they might do this”
(Fay, 1987, p. 12) or sub-theory 10.
Conflict transformation also addresses some components of Fay’s
amended scheme, particularly the “theory of tradition,” the “theory of
reflexivity,” and partially, the “theory of force” (Fay, 1987, p. 213). It
addresses sub-theory 4 if one is willing to equate Lederach’s concept of
“culture” with Fay’s theory of “tradition.” This author has made this
linkage because, as Lederach (1995, p. 10) states, “understanding
conflict and developing appropriate models of handling it will
necessarily be rooted in, and must respect and draw from, the cultural
knowledge of a people.” Therefore, by learning and honoring a cultural
heritage, the facilitator can work with the community to discover how a
conflict came to be and how it might be resolved. Using Fay’s
terminology from sub-theory 4, the community would be identifying
“which parts of a given tradition are…changeable” and from sub-theory
5 which are “not changeable or worthy of change” (Fay, 1987, p. 213).
Conflict transformation would focus on those parts of a tradition that
must be changed in order to achieve reconciliation but also justice. In
addition it does not dictate what people should do (one of Fay’s
concerns) but enables the community to decide what is possible as they
go through the process over time.
If this author understands the “theory of reflexivity” correctly,
conflict transformation can assist in explaining sub-theory 8, the
historical emergence of a CSS theory and its “necessarily one-sided
construction in a particular historical setting” using the same method a
community would use to explore the archaeology of conflict (p. 213).
Thus, in my view, they would be exploring the “archaeology of a CSS
theory.” Because conflict transformation focuses very specifically on the
culture of a particular community and is never finalized, its methods
comply with the tenets of sub-theory 9. Conflict transformation does this
because the community defines its own aspirations given its cultural
heritage and current historical circumstances. In the same fashion, it
fulfills sub-theory 10 by accounting for the “ways in which it is
inherently and essentially contextual, partial, local, and hypothetical” (p.
213). Conflict transformation only partially speaks to the “theory of
force”, particularly sub-theory 6, because traditionally it addresses more
blatant conflict, not the subtle uses and abuses of power that critical
theory identifies as force. However, a particular community in conflict
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could potentially develop “an account of the conditions and use of force
in [its] particular socio-political setting” (p. 213).
CONCLUSION
The application of conflict transformation theory and practice to
Fay’s basic and amended schemes enables us to see that critical theory
and CSS can have a political agenda, and in particular, a non-violent one
unlike so many revolutions in the modern era. The conflict
transformation process also grounds leadership for change in the
community rather than with outside authorities thus reducing the
potential for a “tyranny scenario.” Incorporating conflict transformation
into Fay’s CSS models during research enhances what Lather calls its
“catalytic validity” which “represents the degree to which the research
process reorients, focuses, and energizes participants toward knowing
reality in order to transform it…” (Lather, 1986, p. 272). Those who
choose to adopt the processes of CSS and conflict transformation in their
work with citizens will have embarked on what Zanetti (1998) calls a
“transformative practice” facilitating truly democratic self-governance.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The author wishes to thank the anonymous reviewers for their
helpful suggestions.
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