The Cold War on the Periphery

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Hist 6393
Dr. Buzzanco
Yimei Zhang
Book Review 3
Robert J. McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and
Pakistan, New York: Columbia University Press, 1994.
In The Cold War on the Periphery, McMahon presents the history of American
relationship with India and Pakistan from 1947 to 1965. Based on various archive
resources, he examines how and why two nations that seemed destined to have marginal
value to U. S. global interests were finally involved into the Cold War. In his opinion, the
American thinking about India and Pakistan throughout this period was misled by
“exaggerated expectation, vague threat perception, and murky strategic calculations.”
After Indian and Pakistani independence in 1947, Truman administration showed
little attention to both countries. However, the outbreak of Korean War was a critical
turning point in American foreign policy toward South Asia. More and more U.S.
strategists insisted that India and Pakistan would be increasingly indispensable to the
containment of the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China in Asia.
The ruling classes of both countries were willing to establish closer relationship
with the United States after their independence. Nevertheless, in contrast with Pakistanis’
eagerness of aligning itself with the West against the expansion of Communism, India’s
leader, Jawaharlal Nehru, pursued the policy of nonalignment and neutrality, which
disappointed the White House and led to the U.S. tilting toward Pakistan. Due to the
important geographic location of Pakistan, U.S. hoped its alliance with Pakistan would
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deter Soviet infiltration in South Asia and the Middle East. Unfortunately, this alliance
was soon proved as “a monumental strategic blunder”. (338) On the one hand, Pakistan
consumed more than 70 percent of U.S. aid on the arm race with India and became more
reliable on the United States for its national survival; On the other hand, India was
infuriated at the U.S.—Pakistani alliance and moved closer to the Soviet Union.
In the late 1950s, the Eisenhower administration attempted to reduce Soviet
influence on India through economic assistance programs. Especially after the
Sino-Indian border war of 1962, Kennedy administration immediately provided military
and economic aid to India. The United States improved its relationship with India at the
expense of the deterioration of U.S.—Pakistani relationship. “Pakistan’s heightened sense
of mistrust, vulnerability, and betrayal led ultimately to the Sino-Pakistani entente.” (340)
The closer relationship with China indicated that Pakistani leader, Ayub, began to pursue
a policy independent of Washington’s anticommunist system.
Indian and Pakistani dispute over Kashmir was another major theme of this book.
Both Eisenhower administration and Kennedy administration sought to mediate Kashmir
dispute to keep the stability of this region. However, the negotiations were often
interrupted by Indian intransigence. The Indo-Pakistani war of 1965 was a watershed of
American relationship with India and Pakistan. The war induced Johnson administration
to reevaluate U.S. thinking about South Asia. Disturbed by the Vietnam War, Johnson
ultimately decided to terminate the intensive involvement and adopted a lowered profile
in South Asia.
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McMahon criticizes that American policy makers exaggerated the importance of
India and Pakistan to the United States. As a result, “the national security interests of the
United States became so expansive that they extended far beyond the industrial core
nations of Western Europe and East Asia to embrace nations on the Third World
periphery”. (5) Besides, the U.S. strategists overestimated their ability to foster the
regional stability and woo both countries to be loyal allies in the Cold War. The unsettled
Kashmir dispute and the criticisms on Vietnam War from both sides proved this failure.
At the end of his book, McMahon suggests that the United States should have pursued a
more even-handed policy toward the subcontinent, which might lead to a better result.
Overall, McMahon’s book is a well-researched book. His in-depth analysis is both
convincing and useful for scholars in the future study.
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