University of Chicago
Department of Sociology
Ph.D. Dissertation Proposal
May 2004 (revised June)
Organizations and Free-riding
A Survey on Japanese Workplaces
by
Jun Kobayashi
Committee:
Kazuo Yamaguchi (chair)
Edward O. Laumann
Gary S. Becker
Abstract
This research investigates empirically the causes of free-riding in the workplace. A
free-rider takes advantage of coworkers’ efforts by not doing his fair share of the
work. To date, limited empirical data are available. So, I will conduct a survey of 600
full-time workers in a large Japanese firm. The unit of analysis is the individual
worker. The scope condition is large Japanese firms. This research will help identify
conditions that might reduce shirking and thus potential solutions to the free-rider
problem in general.
1
1.1
Free-riding in Workplaces
Background
In Japan, it is widely believed that 20% of workers work hard, 60% work moderately, and the
remaining 20% shirk in a firm (Shiroyama 2000). Sometimes even as much as 80% are regarded
as shirkers (Tao 1993). This is a typical “free-rider problem.” The free-rider is defined as ”a
member of a group who obtain benefits from group membership but does not bear a proportional
share of the costs of providing the benefits” (Albanese and Fleet 1985).
Then, questions arise. How many of the workers are actually free-riding? How are they
distributed? Who free-rides and why? Is it rational to free-ride? If so, why do some workers still
work hard? Is it rational also for organizations to allow free-riders? And do organizations survive
with so many free-riders?
Clearly, free-riding is problematic for organizations. People form organizations to achieve a
common goal (Bernard 1938). So, as long as those workers remain with an organization, they are
expected to contribute to that goal (March and Simon 1958). Even for individual workers,
1
free-riding spoils their intrinsic motivations to work. As a result, workers may come to regard
their work only as a means to other ends.
Free-riding in the workplace has been investigated as “shirking” in economics and “social
loafing” in social psychology (Kidwell and Bennett 1993). However, limited empirical study has
been conducted on these questions (Kollock 1998). This is because of the difficulty of measuring
free-riding in the workplace. Takahashi (1997) is the an important exception, yet he measures
free-riding only indirectly. He regards workers’ motivations as an indicator of free-riding.
1.2
Research Question
Therefore, by modifying Takahashi’s measurements, I will investigate the causal relationships of
free-riding in the workplace. The unit of analysis is the individual worker. The scope condition is
large Japanese firms (a large firm is defined as having 300 or more employees).
For this purpose, I will collect data by a survey of all 600 workers in two branches of a large
Japanese energy company. With the data, I will investigate personal aspects (motivations,
commitment, and fairness of workers) and institutional aspects (occupations and career paths).
This study is expected to specify how to manage human resources effectively. It will also
show how people solve the free-rider problem in the workplace.
If we ignore free-riding, we will fail to fully understand organizational decisions in the
workplace. Free-riding naturally affects and is affected by other organizational decisions, such as
motivation and turnover.
In Japan, there are 67 million workers (in 2002, the total population is 132 million, Ministry
of Health, Labor and Welfare 2003). Among them, 41% are female workers and 26% are
self-employed. About 38% of workers are blue-collar, while 49% are white-collar (managers,
professionals, clerks, and sales workers). Service workers are 11%. Primary industry has 5%,
secondary industry has 30%, and tertiary industry has 65% of the workers. About 41% work in
large firms (with 300 or more employees). Japanese management of large firms has been
characterized by “lifetime employment,” “seniority as a prime basis for reward,” and
“company-based unions” (Takahashi 1997).
1.3
Table of Contents
Ch. 1 Introduction: Free-riding in The workplace
Ch. 2 Literature Review
Ch. 3 Method: Data, Measurement, and Variables
Ch. 4 Motivations
Ch. 5 Commitment
Ch. 6 Fairness
Ch. 7 Occupations, Career Paths, and Gender
Ch. 8 Conclusion
Appendix Sampling, Questionnaire, and Descriptive Statistics
2
Data and Schedule
I am currently planning a pilot survey to be conducted in June 2004. The main survey will be
conducted in July 2004 in a large energy company. The company has about 23,000 employees
and 17 branches. I will collect data from all 600 workers in two branches. A branch consists of 11
2
departments: general, public relations, individual sales, corporate sales, customer relations,
invoice, planning, facilities, maintenance, construction, and security.
The company has had a monopoly in its area operation, but is now threatened by other
newly entering firms since 2000. Accordingly, a few years ago they introduced an
achievement-based reward system to replace seniority as the sole basis of reward.
These surveys will be carried out in cooperation with the International Economy and Work
Institute, a Japanese independent think tank. They have allowed me to add 10 questions to their
original questionnaire.
The pilot survey will interview 10 full-time white-collar nonmanagers and managers. In the
main survey, respondents will be all the full-time workers in two branches, 600 persons in total.
The International Economy and Work Institute will implement the survey and collect the
questionnaires.
To supplement those data, I will conduct secondary analyses of previously collected data in
2001 on the firm (N=21,000).
year month
2004 June
3
3.1
Pilot survey
July
Main survey
August +
Analysis
Sample
White-collar workers, Joint with the International
Economy and Work Institute
N
10
All full-time workers in two branches, Joint with the 600
International Economy and Work Institute
Measuring Free-riding
Concept
Olson (1965) and Hardin (1968) first identified the free-rider problem. Free-riders minimize costs
by taking advantage of others’ contributions to the nonexcludable common good (Dawes 1980).
In the workplace, free-riders free-ride on coworkers’ efforts. Work organizations try to mobilize
workers’ efforts to achieve organizational goals (March and Simon 1958).
Workers face no free-rider problem if jobs are not “transferable” between them, such as on
an assembly line or in sales jobs. There, each worker’s share of work is clearly defined and can
be readily monitored. Workers thus have little chance to shirk.
On the other hand, suppose that jobs are transferable among workers, as in clerical jobs.
Then we face the free-rider problem. Here, workers’ expected shares of work are vaguely defined.
So, if a worker shirks, his coworkers have to compensate for failure to perform his work. Such a
worker thus has an incentive to take advantage of her coworkers’ efforts.
Note that whether a worker is regarded as a free-rider depends on who judges it: the worker
himself, his coworkers, or his supervisor. These evaluations may coincide, but not necessarily. I
will give priority to the coworkers’ judgments because they are in the best position to know what
their respective fair shares of the work are (Tsui 1984).
3.2
Takahashi’s Index
3
Takahashi (2001) developed an empirical index of free-riding in the workplace. He supposed that
a worker is more likely to free-ride if he is less intrinsically motivated. A set of five yes-no
questions was used in a survey (Takahashi 1997, with 8,785 respondents). He showed that the
more motivated coworkers are, the -more likely a worker is to free-ride.
Still, this index equated motivations with free-riding. This might be true, yet it is not
self-evident. So, I propose an alternative, more direct indicator of free-riding here.
3.3
Self-report of Free-riding
I will measure free-riding by subjective self-report. It is true that the ideal index of free-riding
would measure “objective behavior” regarding workers’ efforts. Unfortunately, such efforts are in
practice unobservable in team compensation. If we could observe them, there would be no
free-rider problem.
So, as the second best approach, I will measure “subjective self-report” of the relative
contribution to work. I ask it in three questions.
In some shared jobs, coworkers have to compensate if someone does not do his fair share of the
work.
F1. (Self-evaluation) When work is shared between you and your coworkers, how much of the
work do you do?
F2. (Coworkers’ evaluation) How much of the work do your coworkers regard you as doing?
F3. (Supervisor’s evaluation) How much of the work does your chief regard you as doing?
(much more than my fair share, more, somewhat more, somewhat less, less, much less).
To confirm the answers by using an alternative route, I will also ask the following question.
F4. (Free-riding of coworkers) How many do you think are doing their fair shares of the work in
your department?
(0-10%, 20-30%, 40-60%, 70-80%, 90-100%)
3.4
Control Variables
Control variables will include basic information about age, education, income, and marital status.
Also I will control for organizational variables, including managerial status, rank and position,
work experience, experience of turnover, quality and quantity of jobs, and matching of goals.
In addition, institutional variables will be taken into account, including the size of the
workplace, their composition (gender, education, and work experience), and the status of the
branches in the firm.
Note that I omit membership in the labor union because all workers belong to the same
union. Also, I do not ask whether they are tenured or not, because all workers in the firm are
tenured.
4
4.1
Motivations
Intrinsic Motivations
What determines free-riding? Takahashi (2001) suggests that free-riding can be estimated by
4
respondent’s lower intrinsic motivation. So, I assume that the more a worker is intrinsically
motivated, the more efforts she will provide to the organization.
Deci (1975) distinguished intrinsic motivations from extrinsic ones. A worker is
“intrinsically” motivated if he is motivated to work even without any objective rewards, such as
money. Those workers see the work itself as a reward. Deci argues that a worker is intrinsically
motivated when he feels competent and self-determining with respect to his jobs. A worker is
“extrinsically” motivated if she is motivated for objective rewards, regarding work as a means to
some other ends.
Based on this distinction, Deci (1975) showed that intrinsically motivated workers provide
more efforts than extrinsically motivated ones. Intrinsically motivated workers do their best
because they enjoy the work.
Following this argument, Takahashi (2004) predicts that intrinsically motivated workers are
less likely to free-ride than extrinsically motivated ones. I will also test this prediction. The
original questionnaire asks about intrinsic motivation to work.
M1 (Enjoying work). I enjoy my work.
M2 (Thriving on work). I thrive on my work.
(yes, somewhat yes, neutral, somewhat no, no)
Hypothesis M1.
4.2
The more a worker is intrinsically motivated, the less likely she is to free-ride.
Extrinsic Motivations
What happens when a worker is extrinsically motivated? According to Deci (1975), extrinsically
motivated workers conserve their effort by rationally calculating what is expected. They do
exactly what they are expected to do, but do not exceed it. In addition, he found that extrinsic
rewards reduce intrinsic motivations.
Following this, Takahashi (2004) hypothesizes that extrinsically motivated workers are more
likely to free-ride. They do not do their best because, unlike intrinsically motivated workers,
work is just a means to obtain extrinsic rewards.
To test this prediction, I assume that the more a worker is intrinsically motivated, the less
she is extrinsically motivated, as Deci argues. So, if the above score is low, I regard that worker
as “extrinsically motivated.” These motivations might be independent of one another as Herzberg
et al (1959) suggested. Yet in most cases they will be negatively correlated.
Hypothesis M2.
free-ride.
4.3
The more a worker is extrinsically motivated, the more likely she is to
Social Control
In addition to those motivations, workers may be motivated to work as a result of social control.
The Hawthorne experiments revealed the importance of peer group pressure (Mayo 1933 and
Homans 1950). Workers may do more than their fair share of the work if it is informally
encouraged. So, workers may avoid free-riding if free-riding is informally discouraged or
sanctioned.
I will analyze such effects of positive and negative sanctions on free-riding. I will ask about
workers’ perception of those sanctions in two questions.
5
M4 (Positive sanction). If you want to do more than your fair share, do you think your coworkers
will welcome it?
M5 (Negative sanction). If you want to do less than your fair share, do you think your coworkers
will feel badly about it?
(yes, somewhat yes, neutral, somewhat no, no)
Hypothesis M3. The more a worker perceives positive sanctions from his coworkers, the less
likely he is to free-ride.
Hypothesis M4. The more a worker perceives negative sanctions from his coworkers, the less
likely he is to free-ride.
5
5.1
Commitment
Commitment to Current Job
What affects intrinsic motivations? March and Simon (1958) argue that participants in
organizations make two decisions. First, they decide whether to enter an organization. Then, once
a participant, they choose whether to contribute to the organizational activities or not. If they are
dissatisfied, they will exit from the organization when it is possible to do so. So, I will evaluate
the role of willingness to remain or to exit.
Among large Japanese firms, life-long employment is widely adopted. So, turnover is very
unlikely to happen. Such life-long commitment is often regarded as the essence of Japanese
management (Abegglen 1958).
Life-time employment in large firms was established between 1936 and 1955 among
white-collar workers and between 1946 and 1960s among the blue-collar workers (Inada 2000).
This trend formed a dual labor market structure: large firms had relatively low turnover and high
income, while medium and small firms had high turnover and low income. Still, turnover is now
spreading even into the large firms in the 1990s.
First, I measure willingness to remain as “commitment to the workplace.” I assume that if a
worker is committed to an organization, she will be well intrinsically motivated. Thus, she will
provide enough work effort to the organization. The original questionnaire asks about
commitment in two questions.
C1 (Belonging). How much do you have a sense of belonging to your firm? Assign a number
from 1 to 9.
C2 (Weights). How much importance do the following activities have for you? Split 100 points
with respect to leisure, community, work, religion, and family.
Hypothesis C1. The more a worker is committed to the firm, the more he will be intrinsically
motivated, and therefore the less likely he is to free-ride.
5.2
Turnover
Second, I will investigate the other side of commitment: turnover. A reverse argument will apply
here. The original questionnaire asks about it in the following question.
6
C3 (Turnover). I want to work in my firm for a long time.
(yes, somewhat yes, neutral, somewhat no, no)
Takahashi (1997) reports that if a worker wants to exit, she is more likely to be extrinsically
motivated. As a result, she will be inclined to free-ride. Once a worker decides to exit, they have
no incentive to maintain a good reputation in the workplace. As Hirschman (1970) points out,
exiting is an effective option for a worker if she is dissatisfied with an organization.
Hypothesis C2. The more a worker is willing to exit, the more she is extrinsically motivated,
and therefore the more likely she is to free-ride.
6
6.1
Fairness
Seniority
In addition to commitment, intrinsic motivations will be affected also by a sense of fairness. I
will compare seniority and achievement as alternative reward systems.
In large Japanese firms and the government, rewards are typically determined by seniority,
that is, by age and work history. In this system, rank, position, and income increase constantly
and never decrease.
This system expects and promotes workers’ long-term contributions to the organization. The
system was introduced into large firms in the 1920s, and spread widely in World War II. Now it is
common in large Japanese firms (Takahashi 1997).
Recently, some firms, such as Cannon and Fujitsu, started introducing reward systems based
on achievement. The sample firm introduced such a schema a few years ago. So, I will analyze
the impact of this transition.
The original questionnaire asks workers’ preference about concepts of fairness. A survey
reports that about 57% of workers in large firms supported seniority over achievement in 2000
(Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training 2000).
FN1 (Seniority). I prefer “seniority” to “achievement” for decisions regarding income and
promotion.
(yes, somewhat yes, neutral, somewhat no, no)
Seniority and achievement represent two typical concepts of fairness. When we distribute
pooled resources, we can split them either equally or proportionally according to some criteria,
such as effort or performance.
Seniority is based on equality of distribution. It prioritizes processes of contribution rather
than outcomes. This is because seniority assumes long-term contribution by a group. On the other
hand, achievement presupposes equitable distribution based on observable outcomes. It expects
individual short-term contributions.
Fairness
Seniority
Equality
Achievement Equity
Focus
Process
Result
Range of contribution
Long-term
Short-term
7
Unit of contribution
Group
Individual
Now, how does such preference affect free-riding? Takahashi (2004) argues that seniority
promotes intrinsic motivations to work. This is because it offers “interesting” jobs to workers as
rewards, while achievement offers higher income as rewards. As a result, workers see work itself
as a goal rather than as a means.
Still, a survey shows that supporters of seniority are polarized into those who provide “very
large” effort and those who provided “very little” effort (effort is measured by hours of overtime
work, Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training 2000). Some are highly motivated because
they can work for long-range plans. But the majority are those who try to free-ride on others,
thanks to an egalitarian rule.
Hypothesis FN1. If a worker prefers seniority, he will be either highly intrinsically motivated
or highly extrinsically motivated.
6.2
Achievement
On the other hand, Takahashi (2004) indicates that the achievement system reduces intrinsic
motivations and promotes extrinsic ones. This happens because workers tend to regard work as a
means to obtain extrinsic rewards.
Therefore, they do not do their best, but try to do no more than what is minimally expected.
He reports that once achievement was introduced, workers started avoiding to challenge new jobs.
I will test his argument.
Hypothesis FN2.
motivated.
7
7.1
The more a worker prefers achievement, the more she is extrinsically
Occupations, Career Paths, and Gender
Occupations
Which occupations are more likely to free-ride? The respondents consist of clerks, sales workers,
and maintenance workers. The maintenance workers deal with the maintenance of the company’s
technical systems.
Theoretically, people can free-ride if jobs are interdependent and transferable (Dawes 1980).
In the workplace, these conditions will apply more to white-collar workers than to blue-collar
workers.
Therefore, among the respondents, clerks will face the free-rider problem most often. The
next will be sales workers because their sales records are rarely transferred. Maintenance workers
would have least chances to free-ride since their jobs have clear and monitorable boundaries.
Hypothesis O1. Clerks are most likely to free-ride. This is because they are most likely to deal
with transferable jobs.
Hypothesis O2. Maintenance workers are least likely to free-ride. This is because they are least
likely to deal with transferable jobs.
To test these hypotheses, I have designed several original questions. They measure
transferabi+lity of jobs.
O1 (Interdependence). My jobs are affected by the efforts of my coworkers.
O2 (Division). My jobs and my coworkers’ jobs are clearly divided from one another.
8
O3 (Cooperation). My jobs require my coworkers’ cooperation.
(yes, somewhat yes, neutral, somewhat no, no)
7.2
Career Paths
Most large Japanese firms, including my sample firm, adopt dual career paths. “Career track”
workers have the chance to be promoted and be rotated among branches. On the other hand,
“non-career track” workers work in the same job with no chance of rotation.
In this system, non-career track workers are more likely to be extrinsically motivated,
because they have no chance of promotion. Promotion is an importance source of intrinsic
motivations (Herzberg et al 1959).
Hypothesis CP1. Non-career track workers are more likely to be extrinsically motivated, and
therefore are more likely to free-ride than career track workers.
7.3
Gender
This system may affect gender differences in free-riding. All non-career track workers are
females, while career track workers consist of both females and males.
Akiba (1993) reports that female workers on a non-career track are less motivated than those
on a career track. In the sample firm, most females are non-career track workers. So, female
workers may be extrinsically motivated, and therefore often free-ride. This would be, however,
because of institutional constraints rather than of personal tendencies.
Hypothesis G1. Female workers are more likely to be extrinsically motivated, and therefore are
more likely to free-ride than male workers.
Hypothesis G2. Controlling for career paths, there will be no significant difference between
females and males on free-riding.
References
Abegglen, James C. 1958. The Japanese Factory: Aspects of Its Social Organization. Free Press.
Akiba, Fukiko. 1993. Reason Why She Quit Career Track Job (Kanojo ga Sougoushoku wo
Yameta Riyuu). Wave.
Albanese, Robert and David D. van Fleet. 1985. “Rational Behavior in Groups: The Free-riding
Tendency.” Academy of Management Review 10: 244-55.
Axelrod, Robert. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
Bernard, Chester Irving.1938. The Functions of the Executive. Harvard University Press.
Dawes, Robyn M. 1980. “Social Dilemmas.” Annual Review of Psychology 31:169-93.
Deci, Edward L. 1975. Intrinsic Motivation. Plenum Press.
Hardin, Garrett. 1968. “The Tragedy of the Commons.” Science 162:1243-8.
Herzberg, Frederick, Bernard Mausner, and Barbara Bloch Snyderman. 1959. The Motivation to
Work. Wiley.
Hirschman, Albert O. 1970. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms,
Organizations and States. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Homans, Georg C. 1950. The Human Group. Brace.
9
Inada, Masaya. 2000. “Japanese Management and Long-term Employment: After WWII.” In
Nihon no Kaiso Sisutem 1: Kindaika to Shakai Kaisou (Stratification System in Japan 1:
Modernization and Social Stratification), edited by Junsuke Hara. University of Tokyo
Press.
Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training. 2000. Management Strategy, Corporate
Governance, and Employment Strategy in the New Century (Shin Seiki no Keiei Senryaku,
Koporeito Gabanansu, Jinji Senryaku).
Kidwell, Roland E. Jr. and Nathan Bennett. 1993. “Employee Propensity to Withhold Efforts: A
Conceptual Model to Intersect Three Avenues of Research.” Academy of Management
Review 18: 429-56.
Kollock, Peter. 1998. “Social Dilemmas: The Anatomy of Cooperation. Annual Review of
Sociology 24:183-214.
March, James G. and Herbert Simon. 1958. Organizations. New York: John Wiley and Son.
Mayo, Elton. 1933. The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization. Macmillan.Ministry of
Health, Labor and Welfare, Japan. 2003. Handbook of Labor Statistics 2002.
Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.
Harvard University Press.
Shiroyama, Saburo, ed. 2001. Now, Forster Human Resources (Imakoso, Hito wo Tsukuru).
Kobunsha.
Takahashi, Nobuo. 1997. Nihon Kigyo no Ishikettei Genri (Principles of Decision-Making in
Japanese Firms, Japanese). University of Tokyo Press.
Takahashi, Nobuo. 2001. “Effective Temperature Hypothesis and Lukewarm Feeling in Japanese
Firms.” International Journal of Management Literature 1: 127-42.
Takahashi, Nobuo. 2004. Delusional Achievement Reward System (Kyomou no Seika Shugi).
Nihon Keizai Shimbun.
Tao, Masaya. 1993. Introduction to Motivations (Mochibeichon Nyuumon). Nihon Keizai
Shimbun.
Tsui, Anne Shuk Ying A.S. 1984. “A Role Set Analysis of Managerial Reputation.”
Organizational Behavior and Human Performance 34: 64-96.
10
Appendix A: Assumed Causal Relationships
Social control
Commitment
−
+
Intrinsic
Motivations
+
Prefer Seniority
+
Career track
Male
−
Free-riding
+
White-collar
+
Appendix B: Expected Questionnaire
Alternatives in parentheses.
Extra questions may be added by the International Economy and Work Institute to these core
questions.
Questions about yourself
1. Department
(General, PR, Individual sales, Corporate sales, Customer relations, Invoice, Planning, Facilities,
Maintenance, Construction, Security)
2. Rank
(Manager, Lower manager, nonmanager)
3. Occupational category
(Sales, Professional, Clerk, Engineer, Other)
4. Work experience
(Years by April 1, 2004)
5. Age
(Years by April 1, 2004)
6. Gender
(Male, Female)
7. Marital status
(Single, Married, Divorced/Separated)
8. Education
11
(Junior high school, High school, Technical college, Vocational school, Junior college, College,
Graduate school, Other)
9. Income (tax and bonus included)
(-1,999K yens, 2,000K-2,999K, 3,000K-3,999K, 4,000K-4,999K,
7,000K-7,999K, 8,000K-9,999K, 10,000K-11,999K, 12,000K-)
6,000K-6,999K,
10. Turnover experience
(Yes, No)
Questions about group/organization
1. How do you think of groups or organizations?
(1) I want to participate in groups or organizations as many as possible.
(2) I feel that groups or organizations control members.
(3) Members should be equally treated in groups or organizations.
(4) I can meet various people in groups or organizations.
(5) I enjoy participating in groups or organizations.
(No, Somewhat no, Neutral, Somewhat yes, Yes)
2. How much do you have a sense of belonging to the following units? Assign a number from 1
(least) to 9 (most).
(1) Company.
(2) Labor union.
(3) Family.
Questions about work
1. What do you think of your current work?
(1) I enjoy my work.
(2) I thrive on my work.
(3) I want to continue my current job.
(4) Even if could choose another job, I would choose the same job.
(5) I am permitted to schedule my tasks.
(6) My daily tasks are monotonous.
(7) I can decide on the procedures to do my tasks.
(8) My jobs are affected by the efforts of my coworkers.
(9) I can clearly see the achievement in my job.
(10) What I have to do at work are clearly defined.
(11) I want to work in my firm for a long time.
(12) Coworkers would be in trouble if I were not doing my job.
(13) Coworkers cooperate with me well.
(14) I enjoy challenging new jobs.
(15) Overall, I am satisfied with my current job.
(16) My daily tasks are varied.
(17) My jobs and my coworkers’ jobs are clearly divided from one another.
(18) I can see anytime how much and what I have done in my work.
12
(19) My jobs requires my coworkers’ cooperation.
(20) My job offers opportunity for personal growth.
(Yes, Somewhat yes, Neutral, Somewhat no, No)
2. How much importance do the following activities have for you?
(Divide up 100 points with respect to Leisure, Community, Work, Religion, and Family)
3. What do you think the task requirements of your current job are, with respect to you ability?
(Much less than my ability, Less, Somewhat less, Adequate, Somewhat more, More, Much more)
4. How demanding do you think your current job is?
(Much less than my ability, Less, Somewhat less, Adequate, Somewhat more, More, Much more)
5. Do you agree with the following statements?
(1) I am an able worker.
(2) I can solve most problems in my job.
(3) I can implement my ideas on my job.
(4) I try to plan ahead when working.
(5) I always achieve the goals of my job.
(6) I can exercise my ability well.
(7) The organization fully utilizes my ability.
(Yes, Somewhat yes, Neutral, Somewhat no, No)
6. How much are you satisfied with the following items?
(1) Supervisor’s leadership
(2) Relationships with supervisor
(3) Relationships with coworkers
(4) What my coworkers think of me
(5) Evaluations by supervisor
(6) Ability of coworkers
(7) Social relationships in workplace
(8) Your rank in work group
(9) Chances of promotion
(10) Income
(11) Facilities of company
(12) Holidays, working hours
(13) Fringe benefits
(14) Atmosphere of workplace
(15) Social status of your job
(16) Social status of company
(17) Stability of employment
(18) Physical location of workplace
(19) Personnel department’s evaluation of your work
(20) Work in general
(Dissatisfied, Somewhat dissatisfied, Neutral, Somewhat satisfied, Satisfied)
7. How much do you agree with the following statements regarding your supervisor?
13
(1) I can accept my supervisor’s directions naturally.
(2) I rely on my supervisor’s directions even when they seem to have problems.
(3) I completely trust my supervisor
(4) My supervisor gives me goals of life.
(5) I can devote myself to completing my jobs, thanks to my supervisor.
(No, Somewhat no, Neutral, Somewhat yes, Yes)
8. How much do you think is the average income of workers at your age who work on the same
job as yours?
(-1,999K yens, 2,000K-2,999K, 3,000K-3,999K, 4,000K-4,999K, 6,000K-6,999K,
7,000K-7,999K, 8,000K-9,999K, 10,000K-11,999K, 12,000K-)
9. How fair do you think the following items are?
(1) Your income
(2) Personnel department’s evaluation of your work
(Unfair, Somewhat unfair, Neutral, Somewhat fair, Fair)
10. I prefer “seniority” to “achievement” for decisions regarding income and promotion.
(yes, somewhat yes, neutral, somewhat no, no)
11. Which of the following items are important to you? Put the most important THREE items in
blank A. Then put the second most important THREE items in blank B. Similarly, the third
THREE in C, the fourth THREE in D, and the least important THREE in E.
(1) Income
(2) Good relationships with supervisor and coworkers
(3) Holidays and flexible work hours
(4) Stable employment
(5) Fringe benefits
(6) Physical location of workplace
(7) Your rank and status
(8) Social status of company
(9) Costumer satisfaction
(10) Educating junior workers
(11) Creativity of jobs
(12) Matching of jobs and my ability/experience
(13) Autonomy, responsibility, and authority
(14) Contribution to the society
(15) Clear perception of achievement
Questions about jobs that you share with coworkers
In some shared jobs, coworkers have to compensate if someone does not do his fair share of the
work.
(1) How many coworkers are you working with on such jobs?
(Number) (if 0, skip questions (2)-(7))
14
(2) On such jobs, how much of the work do you do?
(3) How much of the work do your coworkers regard you as doing?
(4) How much of the work does your supervisor regard you as doing?
(Much more than my fair share, More, Little more, Little less, Less, Much less).
(5) How many do you think are doing their fair shares of the work in your department?
(0-10%, 20-30%, 40-60%, 70-80%, 90-100%)
(6) If you want to do more than your fair share, do you think your coworkers will welcome it?
(7) If you want to do less than your fair share, do you think your coworkers will feel badly about
it?
(Yes, Somewhat yes, Neutral, Somewhat no, No)
Appendix C: Dummy Tables
(1) Linear regression on free-riding.
question
coefficient
Independent variables
Intrinsic motivations (factor)
Positive sanction (6-point)
Negative sanction (6-point)
3-1-1, -2
4-6
4-7
−
−
−
Commitment (factor)
Willingness of turnover (5-point)
2-2, 3-2
3-1-11
−
+
Prefer seniority (5-point)
Fairness on income (5-point)
Fairness on promotion (5-point)
3-10
3-9-1
3-9-2
−
−
−
Clerk (dummy)
Sales (dummy)
1-3
1-3
+
+
Organizational variables
Interdependence
Monitoring
Individual identification
Autonomy
Coworkers’ size
Workplace size
Department (dummy, 11 categories)
Branch (dummy)
3-1-8, -17, -19
from managers
3-1-9, -18
3-1-5, -7
4-1
from headquarter
1-1
+
−
−
+
+
+
?
?
1-5
−
Control variables
Age (years)
15
Male (dummy)
Education (dummy, 8)
Income (dummy, 9)
Rank (dummy, 3)
Work experience (years)
Turnover experience (dummy)
Married (dummy)
N=600.
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
1-6
1-8
1-9
1-2
1-4
1-10
1-7
(2) Linear regression on intrinsic motivations.
question
coefficient
Independent variables
Commitment (factor)
Willingness of turnover (5-point)
2-2, 3-2
3-1-11
+
−
Prefer seniority (5-point)
Fairness on income (5-point)
Fairness on promotion (5-point)
3-10
3-9-1
3-9-2
+
+
+
Organizational variables
Department (dummy, 11 categories)
Branch (dummy)
1-1
?
?
1-5
1-6
1-8
1-9
1-2
1-4
1-10
1-7
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
Control variables
Age (years)
Male (dummy)
Education (dummy, 8)
Income (dummy, 9)
Rank (dummy, 3)
Work experience (years)
Turnover experience (dummy)
Married (dummy)
16