Lochner v. New York
Argued:
February 23, 1905
Decided:
April 17, 1905
Facts of the Case
The state of New York enacted a statute forbidding bakers to work more than 60 hours a week or 10 hours a day.
Question Presented
Does the New York law violate the liberty protected by due process of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Conclusion
The Court invalidated the New York law. The majority (through Peckham) maintained that the statute interfered with
the freedom of contract, and thus the Fourteenth Amendment's right to liberty afforded to employer and employee.
The Court viewed the statute as a labor law; the state had no reasonable ground for interfering with liberty by
determining the hours of labor.
Muller v. Oregon
Argued:
Decided:
January 15, 1908
February 24, 1908
Facts of the Case
Oregon enacted a law that limited women to ten hours of work in factories and laundries.
Question Presented
Does the Oregon law violate a woman's freedom of contract implicit in the liberty protected by due process of the
Fourteenth Amendment?
Conclusion
There was no constitutional violation. The factory and laundry owners claimed that there was no reasonable
connection between the law and public health, safety, or welfare. In a famous brief in defense of the Oregon law,
attorney Louis Brandeis elaborately detailed expert reports on the harmful physical, economic and social effects of
long working hours on women. Brewer's opinion was based on the proposition that physical and social differences
between the sexes warranted a different rule respecting labor contracts. Theretofore, gender was not a basis for
such distinctions. Brewer's opinion conveyed the accepted wisdom of the day: that women were unequal and
inferior to men.
Hammer v. Dagenhart
Argued:
April 15, 1918
Decided:
June 3, 1918
Facts of the Case
The Keating-Owen Child Labor Act prohibited the interstate shipment of goods produced by child labor. Reuben
Dagenhart's father had sued on behalf of his freedom to allow his fourteen year old son to work in a textile mill.
Question Presented
Does the congressional act violate the Commerce Clause, the Tenth Amendment, or the Fifth Amendment?
Conclusion
Day spoke for the Court majority and found two grounds to invalidate the law. Production was not commerce, and
thus outside the power of Congress to regulate. And the regulation of production was reserved by the Tenth
Amendment to the states. Day wrote that "the powers not expressly delegated to the national government are
reserved" to the states and to the people. In his wording, Day revised the Constitution slightly and changed the
intent of the framers: The Tenth Amendment does not say "expressly." The framers purposely left the word
expressly out of the amendment because they believed they could not possibly specify every power that might be
needed in the future to run the government.
Schenck v. United States
Argued:
January 9, 1919
Decided:
March 3, 1919
Facts of the Case
During World War I, Schenck mailed circulars to draftees. The circulars suggested that the draft was a monstrous
wrong motivated by the capitalist system. The circulars urged "Do not submit to intimidation" but advised only
peaceful action such as petitioning to repeal the Conscription Act. Schenck was charged with conspiracy to violate
the Espionage Act by attempting to cause insubordination in the military and to obstruct recruitment.
Question Presented
Are Schenck's actions (words, expression) protected by the free speech clause of the First Amendment?
Conclusion
Holmes, speaking for a unanimous Court, concluded that Schenck is not protected in this situation. The character
of every act depends on the circumstances. "The question in every case is whether the words used are used in
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." During wartime, utterances tolerable in peacetime can be
punished.
Adkins v. Children's Hospital
Argued:
March 14, 1923
Decided:
April 9, 1923
Facts of the Case
In 1918, Congress enacted a law which guaranteed a minimum wage to women and children employed in the
District of Columbia. This case was decided together with Children's Hospital v. Lyons.
Question Presented
Did the law interfere with the ability of employers and employees to enter into contracts with each other without
assuring due process of law, a freedom guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment?
Conclusion
The Court found that upholding the statute would dangerously extend the police power of the state and, thus, found
it unconstitutional. Justice Sutherland recognized that the freedom of individuals to make contracts is not absolute
and curtailments of this right may be justified in the face of "exceptional circumstances." However, in this case, the
statute's implementation procedures were overly vague and did not act to regulate the character or method of wage
payments, or the conditions and hours of labor, areas in which regulation to protect the public welfare were
legitimate. The Congress simply had enacted a "price-fixing law."
Gitlow v. New York
Argued:
Reargued:
Decided:
April 12, 1923
November 23, 1923
June 8, 1925
Facts of the Case
Gitlow, a socialist, was arrested for distributing copies of a "left-wing manifesto" that called for the establishment of
socialism through strikes and class action of any form. Gitlow was convicted under a state criminal anarchy law,
which punished advocating the overthrow of the government by force. At his trial, Gitlow argued that since there
was no resulting action flowing from the manifesto's publication, the statute penalized utterences without propensity
to incitement of concrete action. The New York courts had decided that anyone who advocated the doctrine of
violent revolution violated the law.
Question Presented
Does the New York law punishing the advocacy of overthrowing the government an unconstitutional violation of the
free speech clause of the First Amendment?
Conclusion
Threshold issue: Does the First Amendment apply to the states? Yes, by virtue of the liberty protected by due
process that no state shall deny (14th Amendment). On the merits, a state may forbid both speech and publication
if they have a tendency to result in action dangerous to public security, even though such utterances create no
clear and present danger. The rationale of the majority has sometimes been called the "dangerous tendency" test.
The legislature may decide that an entire class of speech is so dangerous that it should be prohibited. Those
legislative decisions will be upheld if not unreasonable, and the defendant will be punished even if her speech
created no danger at all.